09-5080 Gregory Hollister v. Barry Soetoro, et al "Appellant/Petitioner Reply Memorand...

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Case: 09-5080 Document: 1218426 Filed: 12/01/2009 Page: 1

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United States Court of Appeals for DC Circuit

Notice of Docket Activity

The following transaction was entered on 09/18/2009 at 8:45:49 PM EDT and filed on 09/18/2009
Case Name: Gregory Hollister v. Barry Soetoro, et al
Case Number: 09-5080
Document(s): Document(s)

Docket Text:
APPELLANT REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW AND FACT [1205953] filed by Mr. Gregory S. Hollister in 09-5080, Mr. John David Hemenway in
09-5161 [Service Date: 09/18/2009 ] [09-5080, 09-5161]

The following document(s) are associated with this transaction:

Document Description:Main Document
Original Filename:REPLY BRIEF 1 09 18 09.pdf
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Document Description:Additional Document

Original Filename:TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Reply Brief 09-18-09.pdf
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[STAMP acecfStamp_ID=1109186823 [Date=09/18/2009] [FileNumber=1205953-1]
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Original Filename:REPLY BRIEF COVER.pdf
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Notice will be mailed to:

Mr. Bauer, Robert F.

Perkins Coie LLP
607 14th Street, NW
Suite 800
Washington, DC 20005-2003

Lawrence, R. Craig
U.S. Attorney's Office
(USA) Civil Division
555 4th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20530

Hemenway, John David

Law Office of John D. Hemenway
4816 Rodman Street, NW
Washington, DC 20016-0000

Ms. Andrias, Kate Ellen

Perkins Coie LLP
607 14th Street, NW
Suite 800
Washington, DC 20005-2003

The following information is for the use of court personnel:

DOCKET ENTRY ID: 1205953

RELIEF(S) DOCKETED:
DOCKET PART(S) ADDED: 2748277, 2748280, 2748279

https://ecf.cadc.uscourts.gov/cmecf-train/servlet/TransportRoom?servlet=ShowDoc/01216... 9/18/2009
 Case: 09-5080 Document: 1218426 Filed: 12/01/2009 Page: 2

No 09-5080
Consolidating No. 09-5161

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

GREGORY S. HOLLISTER, Case Below 08-2254 JR

Appellant,

v.

Barry Soetoro, in his capacity as a natural

person; de facto President in posse; and as
de jure President in posse , also known as
Barack Obama, et al.

Appellees.

=========
APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF
=========

John D.Hemenway D.C. Bar #379663

Counsel for Appellants
4816 Rodman Street, NW
Washington DC 20016
(202) 628-4819
 Case: 09-5080 Document: 1218426 Filed: 12/01/2009 Page: 3

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES PAGE(S)

Bankers Trust Co. v. Mfrs. Nat’l Bank of Detroit,

139 F.R.D. 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 10

Berg v. Obama, 574 F.Supp.2d 509 (E.D.Pa. 2008) 7

DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 242 (2006) 7

Dist. of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc. 750 F.2d 1077,

(D.C.Cir.1984) 13

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife 504 U.S. 555, 562,

112 S.Ct. 2130, 1191 L.Ed.2d 351. (Opp. Brief p. 21) 2, 6, 9

Murphy v. Travelers Insurance Company,

534 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir.1976) 11

STATUTES, RULES and TREATISES

* 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a) 8

Rule 11 15

* Rule 22 9

The Federal Interpleader Act of 1936, by Zecharia Chafee, Jr.

“DISPUTED SUBJECT MATTER” number 3, Yale Law
Journal, April 1936 12

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THE TACTIC OF MISREPRESENTING

THE CLASSICAL EXPOSITION OF “STANDING”
UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE

The brief of the appellees purposefully creates confusion by

continually citing cases involving Article III standing where there is no

specific grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts by Congress under Article

III as there is if one actually applies the Interpleader Act in this case.

Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution states: “The judicial Power shall

extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the

laws of the United States,….” Obviously, if the Framers had intended cases

in which Jurisdiction of the federal courts was dependent upon the

Constitution alone as opposed to the “laws of the United States” to be

lumped together, then the Framers would have worded the Constitution

accordingly. They did not do so, but these appellees misrepresent the three

elements of the classical exposition of “standing” by the Supreme Court

when one applies the Interpleader Act principles in this case. They do so in

the apparent hope that the disregard for the Constitution by those whom they

defend would be echoed by members of this court despite their oath to

uphold it against all enemies foreign and domestic.

One of the most significant attempts to confuse matters in the

appellees’ brief is their citation and use of a leading case where the question

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is whether a remedy exists for a particular plaintiff or group representing

particular plaintiffs where the law or prescription of Congress was not aimed

at the person or group of persons but rather was the “government’s allegedly

lawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else,…” Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife 504 U.S. 555, 562, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 1191 L.Ed.2d 351.

(Opp. Brief p. 21). Here the question is whether Colonel Hollister is entitled

to invoke the Interpleader Act and/or Rule not whether he can invoke some

government law or regulation aimed at someone else.

Further, having cited Lujan the appellees then proceed to ignore what

it holds with regard to the most important aspect of the present case. In the

classic prescription for standing Lujan sets out three elements, Id., 504 U.S.

at 561:

First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”-an

invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized,…and (b) “actual or imminent, not `conjectural’
or `hypothetical,’.…Second, there must be a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury
has to be “fairly…trace[able] to the challenged action of the
defendant and not…th[e] result [of] the independent action of
some third party not before the court.”….Third, it must be
“likely” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury will
be “redressed by a favorable decision.” (citations omitted)

We address these three classic elements of standing in reverse order in

order to elucidate the confusion being attempted here by the appellees. As

to the third element:

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It is clearly the case that the injury complained of by Colonel Hollister

is that if, as there is evidence suggesting, the defendant Soetoro a/k/a Obama

was not constitutionally qualified to run for President and is not

constitutionally qualified to be President (And the allegations of fact in that

regard in the complaint were not treated as true by the lower court, contrary

to the law) then there are conflicting claims upon his obligation to serve if

called because if Soetoro a/k/a Obama can only give orders that Colonel

Hollister is required under the principles that we established at Nuremberg

after World War II then he must instead obey orders from the other

Interpleader defendant, Joseph Biden, who, under the Constitution, must

immediately step in if it turns out that Soetoro a/k/a Obama cannot give

legitimate orders to call up members of the Individual Ready Reserve. The

conflicting claims that are the injury complained of will thus be “redressed.”

There is nothing speculative about that being the case, the “redress[ing]” of

the injury complained of.

Since the injury complained of under the Interpleader Act is the

conflicting claims upon the obligation of Colonel Hollister to serve if called

up as a member of the Individual Ready Reserve as between a man who was

elected as and is serving as President despite information indicating that he

was not constitutionally eligible to run for President and is not

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constitutionally qualified to serve, on the one hand, and Joe Biden on the

other hand, there is a direct causal connection “between the injury and the

conduct complained of.” The “conduct complained of” is the defendant

Soetoro a/k/a Obama’s running for President being (and knowing that he

was) constitutionally unqualified and then taking the oath and serving in that

office. That conduct has led directly to the injury which Colonel Hollister

has alleged. Thus the second classic element of standing is met.

Proceeding back to element number 1 in our taking up the 3 elements

in reverse order, we note that it in turn has two subcomponents after a

prefatory condition leading to those two subcomponents. The prefatory

condition of element 1 is that there must be “an invasion of a legally

protected interest.” In passing the Interpleader Act and approving the

Interpleader Rule Congress “created a legally protected interest.” That is

what congressional enactments do, by definition, they create a legally

protected interest. Further, that legally protected interest is created

specifically for situations where there are conflicting claims upon either one

of several kinds of property or upon an “obligation,” or upon both. That, as

stated, is what we have here. Either Soetoro a/k/a Obama has a claim upon

the obligation of Colonel Hollister as Commander-in-Chief, or Biden does.

Both cannot at the same time be Commander-in-Chief. Having addressed

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the prefatory condition of element 1 we now address the two subcomponents

that follow that prefatory condition, (a) and (b).

Subcomponent (a) of the first element of the classical exposition of

“standing” is that the invasion of the legally protected interest complained of

must be “concrete and particularized.” Given that the legally protected

interest is that the interest that any conflicting claims upon property and/or

an obligation be resolved and that quite frequently, as is contemplated in the

Interpleader Act, the claims are foreseeable but have not actually yet

occurred, nothing could be more “concrete” than to have to participate, in

any one or more of number of necessary and coordinated roles, either

directly or in support in such things as bombing missions, air-to-air combat

or troop and material transport in support of fighting or strategic positioning.

Likewise, nothing could be more “particularized” than such an obligation.

Finally we turn to subcomponent (b) of classical element 1 of the 3

elements of standing. Subcomponent (b) is that the “legally protected

interest” is “actual or imminent and not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”

Given that the jurisdiction created by the Interpleader Act and/or Rule

includes the situation routinely where the holder of the property and/or

obligation submits the conflict to the court before the claims have actually

been made in the situation where the conflict can be seen to exist when the

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claims are made, the argument advanced by the appellees in this regard

seems deliberately designed to confuse. The obligation of a member of the

Individual Ready Reserve such as Colonel Hollister is created by law and,

given a legitimate Commander-in-Chief, is not the least bit “conjectural” or

“hypothetical.” If a legitimate order is given by a legitimate Commander-in-

Chief the individual must report. There is no uncertainty about it. Moreover

note, in the classical exposition set out in Lujan that the disjunctive “or” is

used. That is, the invasion of the legally protected interest must be “actual

or imminent” not “actual and imminent.” The appellees, echoing the judge

below, argue that the invasion of the legally protected interest must be

imminent as if that were the only option. They thus misrepresent and seek to

confuse, in an obvious belief that they have the political clout to force such

confusion and misrepresentation upon the Court in lieu of a reasoned

analysis and an application of the law and the Constitution.

Thus the appellees (p. 21) assert:

The district court assumed, without analysis, that it had

jurisdiction over Hollister’s claims. (App. 219). In making is
ruling the district court did not address President Obama’s and
Vice President Biden’s argument that Hollister lacked
constitutional standing to pursue his claims. (App. 47-48)
Standing “is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-
controversy requirement of Article III.” (citing Lujan)

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The appellees then go on to say: “…and this Court may address it sua sponte.

See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 242 (2006).” The

DaimlerChrysler case, we would note, involves what has come to be known

as “the general prohibition on taxpayer standing.” Id., 547 U.S. at 345-347.

That is true of almost every other case cited by appellees in their opposition

brief, including those filed by or on behalf of Philip J. Berg other than the

present case. See, for example the reference to the filing pro se by Mr. Berg

of a case in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. (Opp. pp. 3,5) Berg v.

Obama, 574 F.Supp.2d 509 (E.D.Pa. 2008). In fact there are a very large

number of references to other cases in this opposition brief almost all of

which relied upon general taxpayer standing or ordinary citizen standing, not

upon any specific prescription of Congress like the Interpleader Act. In fact

the appellees do not cite a single other case that asserted jurisdiction based

on the Interpleader Act. That is apparently because there is not another filed

case that invokes its jurisdiction. Thus to maintain that all these other cases

are “related” is to misrepresent, systematically, the facts of the cases and the

law, apparently on the belief that this Court can be politically intimidated

into ignoring the well established law of issue and claim preclusion and the

vast body of such law about res judicata. To invoke, in effect, res judicata,

by simply naming cases without putting forth anything that would establish

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any principle of res judicata is misrepresentative. It is an attempt to

improperly influence the Court. We urge its rejection as of a piece with the

reliance of the judge below upon “blogging and twittering” on the Internet

rather than upon proper analysis and application of the law.

Because almost every case cited by the appellees is cited in the same

mispresentative way as the examples just given, and because there are so

many such misrepresentations, we think it emphasizes the mistake this Court

has made in, preliminarily at least, deciding not to have oral argument on

this case. Oral argument is the only way to make clear all the

misrepresentation that is involved, there is so much of it. We are, therefore,

following on the heels of the filing of this reply brief, filing a motion to have

oral argument, which we hereby incorporate by reference.

Having looked extensively at the standing issue which the appellees

brought up, we look to the “clear language” of the Interpleader Act, and why

it applies here. In this area also we see a lot of misrepresentation. Most

importantly, as emphasized in our opening brief we see a continuing pattern

of misrepresentation in the appellees’ ignoring the import of the clear

language of the statute 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a) that there is jurisdiction where

the Interpleader plaintiff owns or has “any obligation, written or unwritten,

to the amount of $500 or more,…” It is acknowledged that the statute

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articulates the long established practice of Interpleader that existed in the

law since from long before the statute was enacted. There was no diversity

analysis below and if the statute does not apply then Rule 22 does, and it

also embodies the long standing practice of Interpleader before it was ever

adopted. There is clearly diversity as between Colonel Hollister and the

Interpleader defendants. Both the Act and the Rule were invoked and

alleged and the court below was bound to consider both in any case by

statute as pointed out in our opening brief.

The appellees attempt to get around the clear language of the statute

as incorporated also in the Rule by, again, a pattern of misrepresentation.

For example, on p. 9 they create in their heading for their subsection B. 1. a

concept not actually known in Interpleader law and not found in the Act, the

Rule, or the predecessor common law and equity practice, something that

they call an “intangible duty” The statute does not use the word “duty” and

we must assume that Congress chose the word it wanted used and obeyed.

We assure those who may not be familiar with the facts of being ordered to

serve in the military, as may be the case here, that there is nothing

“intangible” about the obligation to serve if ordered to do so. It is very

tangible and very real. After thus misrepresenting and misleading in the

title of the subsection the appellees then proceed in the text of the subsection

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to quote the actual language of the statute to include the part about an

“obligation” but then ignore that part of the Act and focus only upon the

preceding part naming notes, bonds and other instruments. Then the

appellees seek to get around this glaring omission of language that they

themselves quote and then seek to ignore by again misrepresenting some

case law.

The case law that the appellees misrepresent at that point in their

argument starts with the opinion in Bankers Trust Co. v. Mfrs. Nat’l Bank of

Detroit, 139 F.R.D. 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). That opinion, like the judge

below in this case, focuses upon what is “usually” the case. But what is

usually the case does not determine the law when the clear language of the

statute or, for that matter, clear established law, of what may be sometimes

the case although it is not, statistically, the most common situation. The

Bankers Trust case involved a case that was one case out of an enormous

interrelated set of cases concerning the ownership of pledged assets

consisting of a fleet of railroad cars operating nationwide the supposed stake

of the interpleading party was the “duty” to manage the fleet of railcars.

That is quite complex and the court in that case held that the entire complex

of litigations could not be resolved in a single Interpleader action. The duty

to report for active duty if ordered to do so by a purported Commander-in-

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Chief whose eligibility under the Constitution to give such an order is, by

the admitted facts of his life, “in doubt” is not a single part of an enormous

interlocking series of complex litigations. Nor is it an “inchoate” obligation.

It is clear cut and simple. Either one is obliged to obey the order when it

comes or one is not.

Another misrepresentation at this point concerns the case of Murphy v.

Travelers Insurance Company, 534 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir.1976). What was

“inchoate” in that case and thus not subject to Interpleader were certain

contingent counsel fees. The main dispute was over an irrevocable

assignment of rights in a California property settlement agreement in a

divorce. Thus that part of the case to which Interpleader was held not to be

applicable did not resemble the obligation of Colonel Hollister in the present

situation. There is nothing contingent about the obligation of Colonel

Hollister and other members of the Individual Ready Reserve. If they are

called up they are called up. This is a clear language question and thus there

is no need for legislative history to be resorted to. An “obligation” clearly

means an obligation within the commonly understood meaning of the word.

The Individual Ready Reserve is created by law and the members of the

military who have retired and are subject to that obligation are required to do

so by their contracts of service. The court below, as part of its general

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failure to delve into the facts as required, did not examine these matters,

though duty bound to do so if it had any question.

And, we point out, the legislative history pointed to by the appellees

by its own language refers to the “broad” meaning of the word in the very

passages cited by the appellees. That history speaks of examples and makes

no claim to give an exhaustive list. Moreover, to the extent that the

subsequent writings of Zechariah Chafee, Jr. are to be considered, they

emphasize the extremely broad nature of the amendments under discussion.

At “DISPUTED SUBJECT MATTER” number 3, for example, Chafee

states, after speaking of all kinds of instruments, that “obligations” includes

“other obligations.” It then gives three examples of such obligations but

makes no attempt to claim that the three examples are anything but

representative and thus makes clear that all “obligations” are included.

On p. 9 of their brief, the appellees argue that the complaint of

Colonel Hollister does not allege “facts” to support his claiming Interpleader.

This is simply incorrect. It is misrepresentative. Colonel Hollister has

named two defendants, one of whom he has reason to believe in the facts he

has alleged, may not be able to give a legitimate order under the principles

that we established at Nuremberg and the other of whom would have to give

the order to call him up if in fact Soetoro a/k/a Obama is not eligible to

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legitimately give him an order. Those are the clearly alleged facts of the two

conflicting claimants to his obligation. He alleged that he is duty bound to

obey one or the other and he asks the court to resolve which it is. The

necessary facts are not complicated and they are alleged.

It is also because of the clear allegations of Colonel Hollister in the

complaint that it is misrepresentative of us, the appellants, to argue now that

we are referring to an obligation, to be distinguished from “property” as if

that were a new “legal theory” per the opinion of Judge Edwards of this

Court in Dist. of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc. 750 F.2d 1077

(D.C.Cir.1984). That is not, by any stretch a valid comparison. That case

arose out of the crash of an Air Florida flight, on a cold icy day when the

Potomac was covered with ice, into the 14th Street Bridge, a terrible tragedy

which all who were here well remember. The District sued Air Florida on

the theory that it held title to the stretch of the Potomac at issue in the crash,

as ceded from Maryland when the District was founded and that, therefore, it

could hold the airline responsible for negligence. It lost in the trial court

because it was shown that the stretch of the Potomac and its real and

personal property at issue belonged to the federal government, not the

District. On appeal, for the first time, the District raised a new and very

novel legal theory that because it had an obligation to remove impediments

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on the river it was a trustee for that section of the river and could, therefore,

sue the airline. This was a truly new and novel theory. But Interpleader has

been the theory of this case from the beginning and throughout. There is no

new “legal theory.” “Legal theory” and emphasis in argument are not the

same thing. Indeed, as we say, we are filing on the heels of this brief a

motion for oral argument because of the extensive number of

misrepresentations in the appellees’ brief. We could only hope that Judge

Edwards would be on the panel that might consider our motion. If there is

one judge on this court, in our experience, who will apply the law without

fear or favor and takes his oath to uphold the Constitution seriously it is

Judge Edwards.

With these things said I turn briefly to my own personal appeal, the

issuance of the reprimand against me after the withdrawal of the threat of

harsher Rule 11 sanctions. It is the case that nothing is pointed out in the

opposing brief or in the analysis of the judge below that shows any inquiry

into any prefiling inquiry that I made or didn’t make. Yet the same is

necessary in order to levy any sanction under Rule 11. Our arguments show

that, particularly because we have shown that by the holding of the Supreme

Court and the facts that the defendant Soetoro has stated throughout his

political career, that his father was not a citizen, his status as a “natural born

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citizen” is “in doubt.” At the very least, when the Supreme Court has held

that an issue is “in doubt,” seeking to have that doubt clarified is a good faith

extension of existing law. There were no hearings and the judge never had

any opportunity to observe my demeanor and conduct. He refused to have a

hearing on the sanctions although I showed in my Show of Cause,

particularly my supplemental, that I was entitled to a hearing and more than

likely to discovery. (App. 223 ff. and 252 ff.) Again here we see sleight of

hand and misrepresentation. On p. 26 appellees cite notes to the 1993

amendments to Rule 11 and state that the court may act on its own initiative.

True, but beside the point as to these requirements.

The appellees cite authority that this Court may take notice of matters

in related proceedings, pointing to proceedings that are not truly related. But

we take a leaf from their notebook and point out that evidence has surfaced

from related proceedings recently. In another case what may be the actual

birth certificate has been filed. In an eligibility proceeding proof of

deception as to the “natural born” status has been located. We will file these

documents separately.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/

JOHN D. HEMENWAY
John D. Hemenway D.C. Bar #379663

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Counsel for Appellants

4816 Rodman Street, NW
Washington DC 20016
(202) 628-4819

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have caused the foregoing Appellants Reply Brief to
be served electronically upon counsel of record this 18th day of September, 2009, upon:

Robert Bauer, Esq.

Kate Ellen Andrias, Esq.
Perkins Coie LLP
607 14th Street, NW
Suite 800
Washington, DC 20005-2003

and

R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney

U.S. Attorney's Office
(USA) Appellate Division, Civil Unit
555 4th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20530

____/s/_______________________
John D. Hemenway

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Full Docket
If you view the you will be charged for 2 Pages $0.16

General Docket
United States Court of Appeals for DC Circuit
Court of Appeals Docket #: 09-5080 Docketed:
Nature of Suit: 2890 Other Statutory Actions 03/18/2009
Gregory Hollister v. Barry Soetoro, et al
Appeal From: United States District Court for the District of
Columbia
Case Type Information:
1) Civil US
2) United States
3) -

Originating Court Information:

District: 0090-1 : 1:08-cv-02254-JR Lead: 1:08-cv-02254-JR
Trial Judge: James Robertson, U.S. Sr District Judge
Date Filed: 12/31/2008
Date Order/Judgment: Date NOA Filed:
03/05/2009 03/16/2009

08/05/2009 MOTION filed [1200620] by Mr. Gregory S. Hollister to extend time

to file brief (Response to Motion served by mail due on 08/17/2009),
to exceed word limit in brief (Response to Motion served by mail due
on 08/17/2009), to join in brief (Response to Motion served by mail
due on 08/17/2009) [Service Date: 08/02/2009 by US mail] [09-5080]
08/05/2009 NOTICE FILED [1200623] by Mr. Gregory S. Hollister styled as Rule
28 motion. [Service Date: 08/04/2009 ] [09-5080]
08/05/2009 APPENDIX [1200879] filed [Volumes:1] [09-5080, 09-5161]
08/05/2009 APPELLANT BRIEF [1200885] LODGED by Mr. Gregory S.
Hollister in 09-5080, Mr. John David Hemenway in 09-5161 [Mail
Service Date: 08/05/2009]. Length of Brief: Pages: 29; Word Count:
Not Listed. [09-5080, 09-5161]--[Edited 08/13/2009 by KRM]
08/06/2009 SEPARATE STATUTORY ADDENDUM LODGED [1200889] by
Mr. Gregory S. Hollister in 09-5080, Mr. John David Hemenway in
09-5161 to LODGED Appellant/Petitioner brief [1200885-2] [Service
Date:08/06/2009] [09-5080, 09-5161]
08/14/2009 LETTER FILED [1201457] regarding motions by Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
and Barry Soetoro . [Service Date: 08/14/2009 ] [09-5080]
 Case: 09-5080 Document: 1218426 Filed: 12/01/2009 Page: 21

08/17/2009 MODIFIED EVENT FROM FILED TO LODGED--CORRECTED

APPELLANT BRIEF [1201571] lodged by Mr. Gregory S. Hollister in
09-5080, Mr. John David Hemenway in 09-5161 [Mail Service Date:
08/17/2009]. Length of Brief: Pages: 29; Word Count: Not Listed. [09-
5080, 09-5161]--[Edited 09/08/2009 by MAL]
09/04/2009 APPELLEE BRIEF [1204814] filed by Joseph R. Biden, Jr. and Barry
Soetoro in 09-5080, 09-5161 [Service Date: 09/04/2009 ] Length of
Brief: 6,532 Words. [09-5080, 09-5161]
09/18/2009 JOINT APPENDIX [1205952] filed [Volumes:3] [Service Date:
08/05/2009 ] [09-5080, 09-5161]
09/18/2009 APPELLANT REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW AND FACT
[1205953] filed by Mr. Gregory S. Hollister in 09-5080, Mr. John
David Hemenway in 09-5161 [Service Date: 09/18/2009 ] [09-5080,
09-5161]
Case: 09-5080 Document: 1218426 Filed: 12/01/2009 Page: 22

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