1. People v.

Yorac | November 23, 1971

GR No. L-29270, Fernando, J.

Facts: Lam Hock, offended party, who according to the medical certificate issued
on April 10, 1968 by Dr. Rogelio Zulueta was confined since April 8, 1968 to
present due to head injury. Rodrigo Yorac, defendant-appellee, was charged
with slight physical injuries before the City Court of Bacolod; pleaded guilty on
April 16 resulting in his being penalized to suffer 10 days of arresto menor. He
then started serving his sentence. On April 18, the provincial fiscal filed an
information in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, charging the
same defendant with frustrated murder arising from the same act against the
aforesaid victim Lam Hock upon another medical certificate dated April 17
issued by the same doctor. On June 10, a motion to quash was filed by defendant
on the ground that he has been previously convicted of slight physical injuries
and having already served the penalty imposed on him for the very same
offense, the prosecution for frustrated murder arising out of the same act
committed against the same offended party, the crime of slight physical injuries
necessarily being included in that of frustrated murder, he would be placed in
second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense. Judge Alampay, relying on the
ruling of People v. Buling, granted the motion to quash and ordered the
dismissal of the criminal case of frustrated murder against the accused. A motion
for reconsideration being unavailing, an appeal was elevated to the SC.

Issue: WoN the decision of Judge Alampay to grant the motion to quash and to
dismiss the criminal case of frustrated murder against accused is correct.

Held: The Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE. The X-ray examination discloses
the existence of a fracture on January 17, 1957, that fracture must have existed
when the first examination was made on December 10, 1956. There is therefore,
no supervening fact that could be said to have developed or arisen since the
filing of the original action, which would justify the application of the rule in the
case of Melo vs. People and People vs. Manolong for which reason we are
constrained to apply the general rule of double jeopardy. The Court attribute the
new finding of fracture, which evidently lengthened the period of healing of the
wound, to the very superficial and inconclusive examination made on December
10, 1956. Had an X-ray examination been taken at the time, the fracture would
have certainly been disclosed. The wound causing the delay in healing was
already in existence at the time of the first examination, but said delay was,
caused by the very superficial examination then made.

ORIGIN AND PURPOSE
According to Justice Laurel, the Constitution provision, "No person shall be twice
put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, finds its origin from the
days when sanguinary (brutal/gruesome) punishments were frequently resorted
to by despots. A defendant in a criminal case should therefore, be adjudged
either guilty or not guilty and thereafter left alone in peace. It is in that sense that
the right against being twice put in jeopardy is considered as possessing many
features in common with the rule of finality in civil cases. For the accused is
given assurance that the matter is closed, enabling him to plan his, future
accordingly, protecting him from continued distress, not to mention saving both
him and the state from the expenses incident to redundant litigation. There is
likewise the observation that this constitutional guarantee helps to equalize the
adversary capabilities of two grossly mismatched litigants, a poor and
impecunious defendant hardly in a position to keep on shouldering the costs of a
suit.

THE SAME OFFENSE (People v. Tarok; Section 9, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court)
The conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a
bar to another prosecution for any offense not only necessarily therein included
but which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.

REEXAMINED: THE SAME OFFENSE (Melo v. People)
The rule of identity does not apply, however, when the second offense was not in
existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such
case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be
convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. Stated differently, if after the
first prosecution "a new fact supervenes on which defendant may be held liable,
resulting in altering the character of the crime and giving rise to a new and
distinct offense, "the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted
for the new offense." In the Melo ruling, there was a reiteration of what was so
emphatically asserted by Justice Laurel in the Tarok case in these words: "As the
Government cannot begin with the highest, and then down step by step,
bringing the man into jeopardy for every dereliction included therein, neither
can it begin the lowest and ascend to the highest with precisely the same result."

INDISPENSIBLE REQUIREMENT: EXISTENCE OF A NEW FACT
The indispensable requirement of the existence of "a new fact which supervenes
for which the defendant is responsible" changing the character of the crime
imputed to him and together with the facts existing previously constituting a
new and distinct offense.