Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 101279 August 6, 1992
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EPORTERS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. RU!EN ". TORRES, #s S$%&$t#&' o( t)$ "$*#&t+$,t o( L#-o& . E+*/o'+$,t, #,0
1OSE N. SARMIENTO, #s A0+2,2st&#to& o( t)$ PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLO3MENT
A"MINISTRATION,respondents.
De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for petitioner.

GRI4O5A6UINO, J.:
This petition for prohibition with temporar restrainin! order was "led b the Philippine Association
of #ervice E$porters %PA#E&, for short', to prohibit and en(oin the #ecretar of the )epartment of
*abor and Emploment %)+*E' and the Administrator of the Philippine +verseas Emploment
Administration %or P+EA' from enforcin! and implementin! )+*E )epartment +rder No. ,-, #eries
of ,.., and P+EA Memorandum Circulars Nos. /0 and /1, #eries of ,..,, temporaril suspendin!
the recruitment b private emploment a!encies of 2ilipino domestic helpers for 3on! 4on! and
vestin! in the )+*E, throu!h the facilities of the P+EA, the tas5 of processin! and deploin! such
wor5ers.
PA#E& is the lar!est national or!ani6ation of private emploment and recruitment a!encies dul
licensed and authori6ed b the P+EA, to en!a!ed in the business of obtainin! overseas
emploment for 2ilipino landbased wor5ers, includin! domestic helpers.
+n 7une ,, ,..,, as a result of published stories re!ardin! the abuses su8ered b 2ilipino
housemaids emploed in 3on! 4on!, )+*E #ecretar Ruben ). Torres issued )epartment +rder
No. ,-, #eries of ,..,, temporaril suspendin! the recruitment b private emploment a!encies of
92ilipino domestic helpers !oin! to 3on! 4on!9 %p. /0, Rollo'. The )+*E itself, throu!h the P+EA
too5 over the business of deploin! such 3on! 4on!:bound wor5ers.
&n view of the need to establish mechanisms that will enhance the protection for
Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong, the recruitment of the same b
private emploment a!encies is hereb temporaril suspended e8ective , 7ul ,..,.
As such, the )+*E throu!h the facilities of the Philippine +verseas Emploment
Administration shall ta5e over the processin! and deploment of household wor5ers
bound for 3on! 4on!, sub(ect to !uidelines to be issued for said purpose.
&n support of this polic, all )+*E Re!ional )irectors and the Bureau of *ocal
Emploment;s re!ional o<ces are li5ewise directed to coordinate with the P+EA in
maintainin! a manpower pool of prospective domestic helpers to 3on! 4on! on a
re!ional basis.
2or compliance. %Emphasis ours= p. /0, Rollo.'
Pursuant to the above )+*E circular, the P+EA issued Memorandum Circular No. /0, #eries of
,..,, dated 7ul ,0, ,..,, providin! >?&)E*&NE# on the >overnment processin! and deploment
of 2ilipino domestic helpers to 3on! 4on! and the accreditation of 3on! 4on! recruitment a!encies
intendin! to hire 2ilipino domestic helpers.
#ub(ect@ >uidelines on the Temporar >overnment Processin! and )eploment of
)omestic 3elpers to 3on! 4on!.
Pursuant to )epartment +rder No. ,-, series of ,.., and in order to operationali6e
the temporar !overnment processin! and deploment of domestic helpers %)3s' to
3on! 4on! resultin! from the temporar suspension of recruitment b private
emploment a!encies for said s5ill and host mar5et, the followin! !uidelines and
mechanisms shall !overn the implementation of said polic.
&. Creation of a (oint P+EA:+AAA 3ousehold Aor5ers Placement ?nit %3AP?'
An ad hoc, one stop 3ousehold Aor5ers Placement ?nit Bor 3AP?C under the
supervision of the P+EA shall ta5e char!e of the various operations involved in the
3on! 4on!:)3 industr se!ment@
The 3AP? shall have the followin! functions in coordination with appropriate units
and other entities concerned@
,. Ne!otiations with and Accreditation of 3on! 4on! Recruitment A!encies
D. Manpower Poolin!
/. Aor5er Trainin! and Brie"n!
E. Processin! and )eploment
F. Aelfare Pro!rams
&&. )ocumentar ReGuirements and +ther Conditions for Accreditation of 3on! 4on!
Recruitment A!encies or Principals
Recruitment a!encies in 3on! 4on! intendin! to hire 2ilipino )3s for their emploers
ma ne!otiate with the 3AP? in Manila directl or throu!h the Philippine *abor
Attache;s +<ce in 3on! 4on!.
$$$ $$$ $$$
H. &nterim Arran!ement
All contracts stamped in 3on! 4on! as of 7une /0 shall continue to be processed b
P+EA until /, 7ul ,.., under the name of the Philippine a!encies concerned.
Thereafter, all contracts shall be processed with the 3AP?.
Recruitment a!encies in 3on! 4on! shall submit to the Philippine Consulate >eneral
in 3on! 5on! a list of their accepted applicants in their pool within the last wee5 of
7ul. The last da of acceptance shall be 7ul /, which shall then be the basis of
3AP? in acceptin! contracts for processin!. After the e$haustion of their respective
pools the onl source of applicants will be the P+EA manpower pool.
2or strict compliance of all concerned. %pp. /,:/F, Rollo.'
+n Au!ust ,, ,..,, the P+EA Administrator also issued Memorandum Circular No. /1, #eries of
,..,, on the processin! of emploment contracts of domestic wor5ers for 3on! 4on!.
T+@ All Philippine and 3on! 4on! A!encies en!a!ed in the recruitment of )omestic
helpers for 3on! 4on!
2urther to Memorandum Circular No. /0, series of ,.., pertainin! to the
!overnment processin! and deploment of domestic helpers %)3s' to 3on!
4on!, processing of emploment contracts which have been attested b the 3on!
4on! Commissioner of *abor up to /0 7une ,.., shall be processed b the P+EA
Emploment Contracts Processin! Branch up to ,F Au!ust ,.., onl.
E8ective ,- Au!ust ,..,, all 3on! 4on! recruitment a!entIs hirin! )3s from the
Philippines shall recruit under the new scheme which reGuires prior accreditation
which the P+EA.
Recruitment a!encies in 3on! 4on! ma appl for accreditation at the +<ce of the
*abor Attache, Philippine Consulate >eneral where a P+EA team is posted until /,
Au!ust ,..,. Thereafter, those who failed to have themselves accredited in 3on!
4on! ma proceed to the P+EA:+AAA 3ousehold Aor5ers Placement ?nit in Manila
for accreditation before their recruitment and processin! of )3s shall be allowed.
Recruitment a!encies in 3on! 4on! who have some accepted applicants in their
pool after the cut:o8 period shall submit this list of wor5ers upon accreditation. +nl
those )3s in said list will be allowed processin! outside of the 3AP? manpower
pool.
2or strict compliance of all concerned. %Emphasis supplied, p. /-, Rollo.'
+n #eptember D, ,..,, the petitioner, PA#E&, "led this petition for prohibition to annul the
aforementioned )+*E and P+EA circulars and to prohibit their implementation for the followin!
reasons@
,. that the respondents acted with !rave abuse of discretion andIor in e$cess of their
rule:ma5in! authorit in issuin! said circulars=
D. that the assailed )+*E and P+EA circulars are contrar to the Constitution, are
unreasonable, unfair and oppressive= and
/. that the reGuirements of publication and "lin! with the +<ce of the National
Administrative Re!ister were not complied with.
There is no merit in the "rst and second !rounds of the petition.
Article /- of the *abor Code !rants the *abor #ecretar the power to restrict and re!ulate
recruitment and placement activities.
Art. /-. Regulator !o"er. J The #ecretar of *abor shall have the power to
restrict and regulatethe recruitment and placement activities of all a!encies within
the covera!e of this title BRe!ulation of Recruitment and Placement ActivitiesC and is
hereb authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carr out
the ob#ecti$es and implement the pro$isions of this title. %Emphasis ours.'
+n the other hand, the scope of the re!ulator authorit of the P+EA, which was created b
E$ecutive +rder No. 1.1 on Ma ,, ,.KD to ta5e over the functions of the +verseas Emploment
)evelopment Board, the National #eamen Board, and the overseas emploment functions of the
Bureau of Emploment #ervices, is broad and far:ran!in! for@
,. Amon! the functions inherited b the P+EA from the defunct Bureau of
Emploment #ervices was the power and dut@
9D. To establish and maintain a re!istration andIor licensin! sstem to
regulate pri$ate sector participation in the recruitment and placement
of "or%ers, locall and o$erseas, . . .9 %Art. ,F, *abor Code, Emphasis
supplied'. %p. ,/, Rollo.'
D. &t assumed from the defunct +verseas Emploment )evelopment Board the
power and dut@
/. To recruit and place wor5ers for overseas emploment of 2ilipino
contract wor5ers on a !overnment to !overnment arran!ement and in
such other sectors as polic ma dictate . . . %Art. ,1, *abor Code.' %p.
,/, Rollo.'
/. 2rom the National #eamen Board, the P+EA too5 over@
D. To re!ulate and supervise the activities of a!ents or representatives
of shippin! companies in the hirin! of seamen for overseas
emploment= and secure the best possible terms of emploment for
contract seamen wor5ers and secure compliance therewith. %Art. D0,
*abor Code.'
The vesture of Guasi:le!islative and Guasi:(udicial powers in administrative bodies is not
unconstitutional, unreasonable and oppressive. &t has been necessitated b 9the !rowin!
comple$it of the modern societ9 %#olid 3omes, &nc. vs. Paawal, ,11 #CRA 1D, 1.'. More and
more administrative bodies are necessar to help in the re!ulation of societ;s rami"ed activities.
9#peciali6ed in the particular "eld assi!ned to them, the can deal with the problems thereof with
more e$pertise and dispatch than can be e$pected from the le!islature or the courts of (ustice9
%&bid.'.
&t is noteworth that the assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from en!a!in! in the
recruitment and deploment of 2ilipino landbased wor5ers for overseas emploment. A careful
readin! of the challen!ed administrative issuances discloses that the same fall within the
9administrative and policin! powers e$pressl or b necessar implication conferred9 upon the
respondents %People vs. Maceren, 1. #CRA EF0'. The power to 9restrict and re!ulate conferred b
Article /- of the *abor Code involves a !rant of police power %Cit of Na!a vs. Court of Appeals, DE
#CRA K.K'. To 9restrict9 means 9to con"ne, limit or stop9 %p. -D, Rollo' and whereas the power to
9re!ulate9 means 9the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due re!ard for
the interests, "rst and foremost, of the public, then of the utilit and of its patrons9 %Philippine
Communications #atellite Corporation vs. Alcua6, ,K0 #CRA D,K'.
The #olicitor >eneral, in his Comment, aptl observed@
. . . #aid Administrative +rder Bi.e., )+*E Administrative +rder No. ,-C merel
restricted the scope or area of petitioner;s business operations b e$cludin!
therefrom recruitment and deploment of domestic helpers for 3on! 4on! till after
the establishment of the 9mechanisms9 that will enhance the protection of 2ilipino
domestic helpers !oin! to 3on! 4on!. &n "ne, other than the recruitment and
deploment of Filipino domestic helpers for Hong%ong, petitioner ma still deplo
other class of Filipino "or%ers either for 3on!5on! and other countries and all other
classes of 2ilipino wor5ers for other countries.
#aid administrative issuances, intended to curtail, if not to end, rampant violations
of the rule a!ainst e$cessive collections of placement and documentation fees,
travel fees and other char!es committed b private emploment a!encies recruitin!
and deploin! domestic helpers to 3on!5on!. '(he are reasonable, $alid and
#usti)ed under the general "elfare clause of the *onstitution, since the recruitment
and deploment business, as it is conducted toda, is a+ected "ith public interest.
$$$ $$$ $$$
The alle!ed ta5eover Bof the business of recruitin! and placin! 2ilipino domestic
helpers in 3on!5on!C is merel a remedial measure, and e$pires after its purpose
shall have been attained. This is evident from the tenor of Administrative +rder No.
,- that recruitment of 2ilipino domestic helpers !oin! to 3on!5on! b private
emploment a!encies are hereb 9temporaril suspendede8ective 7ul ,, ,..,.9
The alle!ed ta5eover is limited in scope, bein! con"ned to recruitment of domestic
helpers !oin! to 3on!5on! onl.
$$$ $$$ $$$
. . . the (usti"cation for the ta5eover of the processin! and deploin! of domestic
helpers for 3on!5on! resultin! from the restriction of the scope of petitioner;s
business is con"ned solel to the unscrupulous practice of private emploment
a!encies victimi6in! applicants for emploment as domestic helpers for 3on!5on!
and not the whole recruitment business in the Philippines. %pp. -D:-F,Rollo.'
The Guestioned circulars are therefore a valid e$ercise of the police power as dele!ated to the
e$ecutive branch of >overnment.
Nevertheless, the are le!all invalid, defective and unenforceable for lac5 of power publication
and "lin! in the +<ce of the National Administrative Re!ister as reGuired in Article D of the Civil
Code, Article F of the *abor Code and #ections /%,' and E, Chapter D, Boo5 L&& of the
Administrative Code of ,.K1 which provide@
Art. D. *aws shall ta5e e8ect after "fteen %,F' das followin! the completion of their
publication in the +<cial >a6atte, unless it is otherwise provided. . . . %Civil Code.'
Art. F. Rules and Regulations. J The )epartment of *abor and other !overnment
a!encies char!ed with the administration and enforcement of this Code or an of its
parts shall promul!ate the necessar implementin! rules and re!ulations. #uch rules
and re!ulations shall become e8ective "fteen %,F' das after announcement of their
adoption in newspapers of !eneral circulation. %Emphasis supplied, *abor Code, as
amended.'
#ec. /. Filing. J %,' ,$er agenc shall )le "ith the -ni$ersit of the !hilippines .a"
*enter, three /01 certi)ed copies of e$er rule adopted b it. Rules in force on the
date of e8ectivit of this Code which are not "led within three %/' months shall not
thereafter be the basis of an sanction a!ainst an part or persons. %Emphasis
supplied, Chapter D, Boo5 L&& of the Administrative Code of ,.K1.'
#ec. E. ,+ecti$it. J &n addition to other rule2ma%ing re3uirements pro$ided b la"
not inconsistent "ith this 4oo%, each rule shall become e+ecti$e )fteen /561 das
from the date of )ling as abo$e pro$ided unless a di8erent date is "$ed b law, or
speci"ed in the rule in cases of imminent dan!er to public health, safet and
welfare, the e$istence of which must be e$pressed in a statement accompanin! the
rule. The a!enc shall ta5e appropriate measures to ma5e emer!enc rules 5nown
to persons who ma be a8ected b them. %Emphasis supplied, Chapter D, Boo5 L&& of
the Administrative Code of ,.K1'.
+nce, more we advert to our rulin! in (a7ada $s. (u$era, ,E- #CRA EE- that@
. . . Administrative rules and re!ulations must also be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement e$istin! law pursuant also to a valid dele!ation. %p. EE1.'
&nterpretative re!ulations and those merel internal in nature, that is, re!ulatin! onl
the personnel of the administrative a!enc and not the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication reGuired of the so:called letters of instructions
issued b administrative superiors concernin! the rules or !uidelines to be followed
b their subordinates in the performance of their duties. %p. EEK.'
Ae a!ree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its
purpose is to inform the public of the content of the laws. %p. EEK.'
2or lac5 of proper publication, the administrative circulars in Guestion ma not be enforced and
implemented.
A3ERE2+RE, the writ of prohibition is >RANTE). The implementation of )+*E )epartment +rder
No. ,-, #eries of ,..,, and P+EA Memorandum Circulars Nos. /0 and /1, #eries of ,..,, b the
public respondents is hereb #?#PEN)E) pendin! compliance with the statutor reGuirements of
publication and "lin! under the aforementioned laws of the land.
#+ +R)ERE).
8ar$asa, *.9., Gutierrez, 9r., *ruz, Feliciano, !adilla, 4idin, Medialdea, Regalado, Da$ide, 9r.,
Romero, 8ocon and 4ellosillo, 99., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
2&R#T )&L&#&+N
G.R. No. 177096 1#,u#&' 18, 2002
REPU!LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, &$*&$s$,t$0 -' NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION,petitioner,
vs.
EPRESS TELECOMMUNICATION CO., INC. #,0 !A3AN TELECOMMUNICATIONS CO.,
INC., respondents.
$:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::$
G.R. No. 177210 1#,u#&' 18, 2002
!A3AN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 9!#'#,t$/:, INC., petitioner,
vs.
EPRESS TELECOMMUNICATION CO., INC. 9E;t$/%o+:, respondent.
3NARES5SANTIAGO, J.:
+n )ecember D., ,..D, &nternational Communications Corporation %now Baan
Telecommunications, &nc. or Baantel' "led an application with the National Telecommunications
Commission %NTC' for a Certi"cate of Public Convenience or Necessit %CPCN' to install, operate
and maintain a di!ital Cellular Mobile Telephone #stemI#ervice %CMT#' with praer for a
Provisional Authorit %PA'. The application was doc5eted as NTC Case No. .D:EK-.,
#hortl thereafter, or on 7anuar DD, ,../, the NTC issued Memorandum Circular No. E:,:./
directin! all interested applicants for nationwide or re!ional CMT# to "le their respective
applications before the Commission on or before 2ebruar ,F, ,../, and deferrin! the acceptance
of an application "led after said date until further orders.D
+n Ma -, ,../, and prior to the issuance of an notice of hearin! b the NTC with respect to
Baantel;s ori!inal application, Baantel "led an ur!ent e:2parte motion to admit an amended
application./ +n Ma ,1, ,../, the notice of hearin! issued b the NTC with respect to this
amended application was published in the Manila Chronicle. Copies of the application as well as
the notice of hearin! were mailed to all a8ected parties. #ubseGuentl, hearin!s were conducted
on the amended application. But before Baantel could complete the presentation of its evidence,
the NTC issued an +rder dated )ecember ,., ,../ statin!@
&n view of the recent !rant of two %D' separate Provisional Authorities in favor of &#*AC+M
and >MCR, &nc., which resulted in the closin! out of all available freGuencies for the service
bein! applied for b herein applicant, and in order that this case ma not remain pendin!
for an inde"nite period of time, A# PRAME) 2+R, let this case be, as it is, hereb ordered
ARC3&LE) without pre(udice to its reinstatement if and when the reGuisite freGuenc
becomes available.
#+ +R)ERE).E
+n 7une ,K, ,..K, the NTC issued Memorandum Circular No. F:-:.K re:allocatin! "ve %F'
me!ahert6 %M36' of the radio freGuenc spectrum for the e$pansion of CMT# networ5s. The re:
allocated F M36 were ta5en from the followin! bands@ ,1/0:,1/D.F I ,KDF:,KD1.F M36 and
,1/D.F:,1/F I ,KD1.F:,K/0 M36.F
*i5ewise, on March D/, ,..., Memorandum Circular No. /:/:.. was issued b the NTC re:allocatin!
an additional "ve %F' M36 freGuencies for CMT# service, namel@ ,1/F:,1/1.F I ,K/0:,K/D.F M36=
,1/1.F:,1E0 I ,K/D.F:,K/F M36= ,1E0:,1ED.F I ,K/F:,K/1.F M36= and ,1ED.F:,1EF I ,K/1.F:,KE0
M36.-
+n Ma ,1, ,..., Baantel "led an E$:Parte Motion to Revive Case,1 citin! the availabilit of new
freGuenc bands for CMT# operators, as provided for under Memorandum Circular No. /:/:...
+n 2ebruar ,, D000, the NTC !ranted BaanTel;s motion to revive the latter;s application and set
the case for hearin!s on 2ebruar ., ,0, ,F, ,1 and DD, D000.K The NTC noted that the application
was ordered archived without pre(udice to its reinstatement if and when the reGuisite freGuenc
shall become available.
Respondent E$press Telecommunication Co., &nc. %E$telcom' "led in NTC Case No. .D:EK- an
+pposition %Aith Motion to )ismiss' prain! for the dismissal of Baantel;s application.. E$telcom
ar!ued that Baantel;s motion sou!ht the revival of an archived application "led almost ei!ht %K'
ears a!o. Thus, the documentar evidence and the alle!ations of respondent Baantel in this
application are all outdated and should no lon!er be used as basis of the necessit for the
proposed CMT# service. Moreover, E$telcom alle!ed that there was no public need for the service
applied for b Baantel as the present "ve CMT# operators ::: E$telcom, >lobe Telecom, &nc.,
#mart Communication, &nc., Pilipino Telephone Corporation, and &sla Communication Corporation,
&nc. ::: more than adeGuatel addressed the mar5et demand, and all are in the process of
enhancin! and e$pandin! their respective networ5s based on recent technolo!ical
developments. ,Nwphi,.nOt
E$telcom li5ewise contended that there were no available radio freGuencies that could
accommodate a new CMT# operator as the freGuenc bands allocated in NTC Memorandum
Circular No. /:/:.. were intended for and had in fact been applied for b the e$istin! CMT#
operators. The NTC, in its Memorandum Circular No. E:,:./, declared it its polic to defer the
acceptance of an application for CMT#. All the freGuenc bands allocated for CMT# use under the
NTC;s Memorandum Circular No. F:,,:KK and Memorandum Circular No. D:,D:.D had alread been
allocated to the e$istin! CMT# operators. 2inall, E$telcom pointed out that Baantel is its
substantial stoc5holder to the e$tent of about E-P of its outstandin! capital stoc5, and Baantel;s
application undermines the ver operations of E$telcom.
+n March ,/, D000, Baantel "led a Consolidated ReplIComment,,0 statin! that the opposition
was actuall a motion see5in! a reconsideration of the NTC +rder revivin! the instant application,
and thus cannot dwell on the material alle!ations or the merits of the case. 2urthermore, E$telcom
cannot claim that freGuencies were not available inasmuch as the allocation and assi!nment
thereof rest solel on the discretion of the NTC.
&n the meantime, the NTC issued on March ., D000 Memorandum Circular No. .:/:D000, re:
allocatin! the followin! radio freGuenc bands for assi!nment to e$istin! CMT# operators and to
public telecommunication entities which shall be authori6ed to install, operate and maintain CMT#
networ5s, namel@ ,1EF:,1F0M36 I ,KE0:,KEFM36= ,1F0:,11FM36 I ,KEF:,KF0M36= ,1-F:
,110M36 I ,K-0:,K-FM36= and ,110:,11FM36 I ,K-F:,K10M36.,,
O, M#' <, 2000, t)$ NTC 2ssu$0 #, O&0$& g&#,t2,g 2, (#=o& o( !#'#,t$/ # *&o=2s2o,#/
#ut)o&2t' to o*$&#t$ CMTS s$&=2%$.12 T)$ O&0$& st#t$0 2, *$&t2,$,t *#&t>
+n the issue of le!al capacit on the part of Baantel, this Commission has alread ta5en
notice of the chan!e in name of &nternational Communications Corporation to Baan
Telecommunications, &nc. Thus, in the )ecision entered in NTC Case No. ./:DKEI.E:D00
dated ,. 7ul ,..., 2t ?#s &$%og,2@$0 t)#t !#'#, T$/$%o++u,2%#t2o,s, I,%., ?#s
(o&+$&/' ,#+$0 I,t$&,#t2o,#/ Co++u,2%#t2o,s Co&*. !#'#,t$/ #,0 ICC T$/$%o+s,
I,%. #&$ o,$ #,0 t)$ s#+$ $,t2t', #,0 2t ,$%$ss#&2/' (o//o?s t)#t ?)#t /$g#/
%#*#%2t' ICC T$/$%o+s )#s o& )#s #%Au2&$0 2s #/so t)$ /$g#/ %#*#%2t' t)#t !#'#,t$/
*oss$ss$s.
+n the alle!ation that the Commission has committed an error in allowin! the revival of the
instant application, it appears that the +rder dated ,E )ecember ,../ archivin! the same
was anchored on the non:availabilit of freGuencies for CMT#. &n the same +rder, 2t ?#s
$;*&$ss/' st#t$0 t)#t t)$ #&%)2=#/ )$&$o(, s)#// -$ ?2t)out *&$Bu02%$ to 2ts
&$2,st#t$+$,t C2( #,0 ?)$, t)$ &$Au2s2t$ (&$Au$,%' -$%o+$s #=#2/#-/$.C I,)$&$,t
2, t)$ s#20 O&0$& 2s t)$ *&$&og#t2=$ o( t)$ Co++2ss2o, 2, &$=2=2,g t)$ s#+$,
su-B$%t to *&$=#2/2,g %o,02t2o,s. The +rder of , 2ebruar D00,, cited the availabilit of
freGuencies for CMT#, and based thereon, the Commission, e$ercisin! its prero!ative,
revived and reinstated the instant application. The fact that the motion for revival hereof
was made e$:parte b the applicant is of no moment, so lon! as the oppositors are !iven
the opportunit to be later heard and present the merits of their respective oppositions in
the proceedin!s.
+n the alle!ation that the instant application is alread obsolete and overta5en b
developments, t)$ 2ssu$ 2s ?)$t)$& #**/2%#,t )#s t)$ /$g#/, D,#,%2#/ #,0 t$%),2%#/
%#*#%2t' to u,0$&t#E$ t)$ *&o*os$0 *&oB$%t. T)$ 0$t$&+2,#t2o, o( su%) %#*#%2t'
/2$s so/$/' ?2t)2, t)$ 02s%&$t2o, o( t)$ Co++2ss2o,, t)&oug) 2ts #**/2%#-/$ &u/$s
#,0 &$gu/#t2o,s. At an rate, the oppositors are not precluded from showin! evidence
disputin! such capacit in the proceedin!s at hand. +n the alle!ed non:availabilit of
freGuencies for the proposed service in view of the pendin! applications for the same, the
Commission ta5es note that it has issued Memorandum Circular .:/:D000, allocatin!
additional freGuencies for CMT#. T)$ $/2g2-2/2t' o( $;2st2,g o*$&#to&s ?)o #**/2$0 (o&
#002t2o,#/ (&$Au$,%2$s s)#// -$ t&$#t$0 #,0 &$so/=$0 2, t)$2& &$s*$%t2=$
#**/2%#t2o,s, #,0 #&$ ,ot 2, 2ssu$ 2, t)$ %#s$ #t )#,0.
A%%o&02,g/', t)$ Mot2o,s (o& R$%o,s20$&#t2o, D/$0 -' SMARTCOM #,0 GLO!E
TELECOMSFISLACOM #,0 t)$ Mot2o, to "2s+2ss D/$0 -' ETELCOM #&$ )$&$-'
"ENIE" (o& /#%E o( +$&2t.1<
The !rant of the provisional authorit was anchored on the followin! "ndin!s@
C+MMENT#@
,. )ue to the operational mer!ers between #mart Communications, &nc. and Pilipino
Telephone Corporation %Piltel' and between >lobe Telecom, &nc. %>lobe' and &sla
Communications, &nc. %&slacom', free and e8ective competition in the CMT# mar5et is
threatened. The "fth operator, E$telcom, cannot provide !ood competition in as much as it
provides service usin! the analo! AMP#. The >#M sstem dominates the mar5et.
D. There are at present two applicants for the assi!nment of the freGuencies in the ,.1 >h6
and ,.K >h6 allocated to CMT#, namel >lobe and E$telcom. !#s$0 o, t)$ ,u+-$& o(
su-s%&2-$&s E;t$/%o+ )#s, t)$&$ #**$#&s to -$ ,o %o,g$st2o, 2, 2ts ,$t?o&E : a
condition that is necessar for an applicant to be assi!ned additional freGuencies. >lobe
has et to prove that there is con!estion in its networ5 considerin! its operational mer!er
with &slacom.
/. Based on the reports submitted to the Commission, EKP of the total number of cities and
municipalities are still without telephone service despite the more than / million installed
lines waitin! to be subscribed.
C+NC*?#&+N#@
,. To ensure e8ective competition in the CMT# mar5et considerin! the operational mer!er
of some of the CMT# operators, ,$? CMTS o*$&#to&s +ust -$ #//o?$0 to *&o=20$ t)$
s$&=2%$.
D. The re:allocated freGuencies for CMT# of / bloc5s of F Mh6 $ D is su<cient for the
number of applicants should the applicants be Guali"ed.
/. There is a need to provide service to some or all of the remainin! cities and
municipalities without telephone service.
E. T)$ su-+2tt$0 0o%u+$,ts #&$ suG%2$,t to 0$t$&+2,$ %o+*/2#,%$ to t)$
t$%),2%#/ &$Au2&$+$,ts. T)$ #**/2%#,t %#, -$ 02&$%t$0 to su-+2t 0$t#2/s su%) #s
%)#,,$/2,g */#,s, $;#%t /o%#t2o,s o( %$// s2t$s, $t%. #s t)$ *&oB$%t 2+*/$+$,t#t2o,
*&og&$ss$s, #%tu#/ #&$# %o=$&#g$ #s%$&t#2,$0 #,0 t&#G% 0#t# #&$ +#0$
#=#2/#-/$. A**/2%#,t #**$#&s to -$ t$%),2%#//' Au#/2D$0 to u,0$&t#E$ t)$
*&o*os$0 *&oB$%t #,0 oH$& t)$ *&o*os$0 s$&=2%$.
&N L&EA +2 T3E 2+RE>+&N> and considerin! that there is prima facie evidence to show
that Applicant is le!all, technicall and "nanciall Guali"ed and that the proposed service
is technicall feasible and economicall viable, in the interest of public service, and in order
to facilitate the development of telecommunications services in all areas of the countr, as
well as to ensure health competition amon! authori6ed CMT# providers, let
a PR+L&#&+NA* A?T3+R&TM %P.A.' be issued to Applicant BAMAN TE*EC+MM?N&CAT&+N#,
&NC. authori6in! it to construct, install, operate and maintain a Nationwide Cellular Mobile
Telephone #stems %CMT#', sub(ect to the followin! terms and conditions without pre(udice
to a "nal decision after completion of the hearin! which shall be called within thirt %/0'
das from !rant of authorit, in accordance with #ection /, Rule ,F, Part &L of the
Commission;s Rules of Practice and Procedure. $$$.,E
E$telcom "led with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition,,F doc5eted as CA:
>.R. #P No. FKK./, see5in! the annulment of the +rder revivin! the application of Baantel, the
+rder !rantin! Baantel a provisional authorit to construct, install, operate and maintain a
nationwide CMT#, and Memorandum Circular No. .:/:D000 allocatin! freGuenc bands to new
public telecommunication entities which are authori6ed to install, operate and maintain CMT#.
+n #eptember ,/, D000, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed )ecision,,- the dispositive
portion of which reads@
IHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari and prohibition praed for are GRANTE". The +rders
of public respondent dated 2ebruar ,, D000 and Ma /, D000 in NTC Case No. .D:EK- are
hereb ANNULLE" #,0 SET ASI"E and the Amended Application of respondent Baantel
is "ISMISSE" without pre(udice to the "lin! of a new CMT# application. The writ of
preliminar in(unction issued under our Resolution dated Au!ust ,F, D000, restrainin! and
en(oinin! the respondents from enforcin! the +rders dated 2ebruar ,, D000 and Ma /,
D000 in the said NTC case is hereb made permanent. The Motion for Reconsideration of
respondent Baantel dated Au!ust DK, D000 is denied for lac5 of merit.
SO OR"ERE".,1
Baantel "led a motion for reconsideration of the above decision.,K The NTC, represented b the
+<ce of the #olicitor >eneral %+#>', also "led its own motion for reconsideration.,. +n the other
hand, E$telcom "led a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, prain! that NTC Memorandum Circular
No. .:/:D000 be also declared null and void.D0
+n 2ebruar ., D00,, the Court of Appeals issued the assailed Resolution denin! all of the
motions for reconsideration of the parties for lac5 of merit.D,
3ence, the NTC "led the instant petition for review on certiorari, doc5eted as >.R. No. ,E10.-,
raisin! the followin! issues for resolution of this Court@
A. I)$t)$& o& ,ot t)$ O&0$& 0#t$0 F$-&u#&' 1, 2000 o( t)$ *$t2t2o,$& ?)2%)
&$=2=$0 t)$ #**/2%#t2o, o( &$s*o,0$,t !#'#,t$/ 2, NTC C#s$ No. 9257J6 =2o/#t$0
&$s*o,0$,t E;t$/%o+Ks &2g)t to *&o%$0u&#/ 0u$ *&o%$ss o( /#?L
B. Ahether or not the +rder dated Ma /, D000 of the petitioner !rantin! respondent
Baantel a provisional authorit to operate a CMT# is in substantial compliance with NTC
Rules of Practice and Procedure and Memorandum Circular No. .:,E:.0 dated #eptember E,
,..0.DD
#ubseGuentl, Baantel also "led its petition for review, doc5eted as >.R. No. ,E1D,0, assi!nin!
the followin! errors@
&. T3E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# #ER&+?#*M ERRE) &N &T# &NTERPRETAT&+N +2 T3E PR&NC&P*E +2
9EH3A?#T&+N +2 A)M&N&#TRAT&LE REME)&E#9 A3EN &T 2A&*E) T+ )&#M&## 3ERE&N
RE#P+N)ENT;# PET&T&+N 2+R CERT&+RAR& )E#P&TE &T# 2A&*?RE T+ 2&*E A M+T&+N 2+R
REC+N#&)ERAT&+N.
&&. T3E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# #ER&+?#*M ERRE) &N &T# 2&N)&N> T3AT T3E REL&LA* +2 NTC
CA#E N+. .D:EK- ANC3+RE) +N A EH:PARTE M+T&+N T+ REL&LE CA#E AA# TANTAM+?NT
T+ >RALE AB?#E +2 )&#CRET&+N +N T3E PART +2 T3E NTC.
&&&. T3E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# #ER&+?#*M ERRE) A3EN &T )EN&E) T3E MAN)ATE +2 T3E NTC
A# T3E A>ENCM +2 >+LERNMENT A&T3 T3E #+*E )&#CRET&+N RE>AR)&N> A**+CAT&+N
+2 2REQ?ENCM BAN) T+ TE*EC+MM?N&CAT&+N# ENT&T&E#.
&L. T3E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# #ER&+?#*M ERRE) &N &T# &NTERPRETAT&+N +2 T3E *E>A*
PR&NC&P*E T3AT 7?R&#)&CT&+N +NCE ACQ?&RE) CANN+T BE *+#T A3EN &T )EC*ARE)
T3AT T3E ARC3&LE) APP*&CAT&+N #3+?*) BE )EEME) A# A NEA APP*&CAT&+N &N L&EA +2
T3E #?B#TANT&A* C3AN>E &N T3E C&RC?M#TANCE# A**E>E) &N &T# AMEN)MENT
APP*&CAT&+N.
L. C+NTRARM T+ T3E 2&N)&N> +2 T3E C+?RT +2 APPEA*#, T3E ARC3&L&N> +2 T3E
BAMANTE* APP*&CAT&+N AA# A LA*&) ACT +N T3E PART +2 T3E NTC ELEN &N T3E AB#ENCE
+2 A #PEC&2&C R?*E +N ARC3&L&N> +2 CA#E# #&NCE R?*E# +2 PR+CE)?RE ARE, A# A
MATTER +2 C+?R#E, *&BERA**M C+N#TR?E) &N PR+CEE)&N># BE2+RE A)M&N&#TRAT&LE
B+)&E# AN) #3+?*) >&LE AAM T+ T3E >REATER 3&ERARC3M +2 P?B*&C AE*2ARE AN)
P?B*&C &NTERE#T.
L&. C+NTRARM T+ T3E 2&N)&N> +2 T3E C+?RT +2 APPEA*#, T3E ARC3&L&N> +2 BAMANTE*;#
APP*&CAT&+N AA# N+T L&+*AT&LE +2 T3E #?MMARM NAT?RE +2 T3E PR+CEE)&N># &N T3E
NTC ?N)ER #EC. /, R?*E , +2 T3E NTC REL&#E) R?*E# +2 PR+CE)?RE.
L&&. T3E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# #ER&+?#*M ERRE) &N &T# 2&N)&N> T3AT T3E ARC3&L&N> +2
BAMANTE*;# APP*&CAT&+N AA# L&+*AT&LE +2 T3E A**E>E) )EC*ARE) P+*&CM +2 T3E
>+LERNMENT +N T3E TRAN#PARENCM AN) 2A&RNE## +2 A)M&N&#TRAT&LE PR+CE## &N T3E
NTC A# *A&) )+AN &N #EC E%,' +2 R.A. N+. 1.DF.
L&&&. T3E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# #ER&+?#*M ERRE) &N &T# 2&N)&N> T3AT T3E NTC L&+*ATE)
T3E PR+L&#&+N# +2 T3E C+N#T&T?T&+N PERTA&N&N> T+ )?E PR+CE## +2 *AA.
&H. T3E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# #ER&+?#*M ERRE) &N )EC*AR&N> T3AT T3E MAM /, D000
+R)ER >RANT&N> BAMANTE* A PR+L&#&+NA* A?T3+R&TM #3+?*) BE #ET A#&)E AN)
RELER#E).
i. Contrar to the "ndin! of the Court of Appeals, there was no violation of the NTC Rule that
the le!al, technical, "nancial and economic documentations in support of the praer for
provisional authorit should "rst be submitted.
ii. Contrar to the "ndin! of the Court of Appeals, there was no violation of #ec. /, Rule ,F
of the NTC Rules of Practice and Procedure that a motion must "rst be "led before a
provisional authorit could be issued.
iii. Contrar to the "ndin! of the Court of Appeals that a plea for provisional authorit
necessitates a notice and hearin!, the ver rule cited b the petitioner %#ection F, Rule E of
the NTC Rules of Practice and Procedure' provides otherwise.
i$. Contrar to the "ndin! of the Court of Appeals, ur!ent public need is not the onl basis
for the !rant of a provisional authorit to an applicant=
$. Contrar to the "ndin! of the Court of Appeals, there was no violation of the
constitutional provision on the ri!ht of the public to information when the Common Carrier
Authori6ation )epartment %CCA)' prepared its evaluation report.D/
Considerin! the identit of the matters involved, this Court resolved to consolidate the two
petitions.DE
At the outset, it is well to discuss the nature and functions of the NTC, and anal6e its powers and
authorit as well as the laws, rules and re!ulations that !overn its e$istence and operations.
The NTC was created pursuant to E$ecutive +rder No. FE-, promul!ated on 7ul D/, ,.1.. &t
assumed the functions formerl assi!ned to the Board of Communications and the
Telecommunications Control Bureau, which were both abolished under the said E$ecutive +rder.
Previousl, the NTC;s functions were merel those of the defunct Public #ervice Commission %P#C',
created under Commonwealth Act No. ,E-, as amended, otherwise 5nown as the Public #ervice
Act, considerin! that the Board of Communications was the successor:in:interest of the P#C. ?nder
E$ecutive +rder No. ,DF:A, issued in April ,.K1, the NTC became an attached a!enc of the
)epartment of Transportation and Communications.
&n the re!ulator telecommunications industr, the NTC has the sole authorit to issue Certi"cates
of Public Convenience and Necessit %CPCN' for the installation, operation, and maintenance of
communications facilities and services, radio communications sstems, telephone and tele!raph
sstems. #uch power includes the authorit to determine the areas of operations of applicants for
telecommunications services. #peci"call, #ection ,- of the Public #ervice Act authori6es the then
P#C, upon notice and hearin!, to issue Certi"cates of Public Convenience for the operation of
public services within the Philippines 9whenever the Commission "nds that the operation of the
public service proposed and the authori6ation to do business will promote the public interests in a
proper and suitable manner.9DF The procedure !overnin! the issuance of such authori6ations is set
forth in #ection D. of the said Act, the pertinent portion of which states@
All hearin!s and investi!ations before the Commission shall be !overned b rules adopted
b the Commission, and in the conduct thereof, the Commission shall not be bound b the
technical rules of le!al evidence. $$$.
&n !rantin! Baantel the provisional authorit to operate a CMT#, the NTC applied Rule ,F, #ection
/ of its ,.1K Rules of Practice and Procedure, which provides@
#ec. /. !ro$isional Relief. ::: ?pon the "lin! of an application, complaint or petition or at an
sta!e thereafter, the Board ma !rant on motion of the pleader or on its own initiative, the
relief praed for, based on the pleadin!, to!ether with the a<davits and supportin!
documents attached thereto, without pre(udice to a "nal decision after completion of the
hearin! which shall be called within thirt %/0' das from !rant of authorit as5ed for.
%underscorin! ours'
Respondent E$telcom, however, contends that the NTC should have applied the Revised Rules
which were "led with the +<ce of the National Administrative Re!ister on 2ebruar /, ,../. These
Revised Rules deleted the phrase 9on its own initiative=9 accordin!l, a provisional authorit ma
be issued onl upon "lin! of the proper motion before the Commission.
&n answer to this ar!ument, the NTC, throu!h the #ecretar of the Commission, issued a
certi"cation to the e8ect that inasmuch as the ,../ Revised Rules have not been published in a
newspaper of !eneral circulation, the NTC has been applin! the ,.1K Rules.
The absence of publication, coupled with the certi"cation b the Commissioner of the NTC statin!
that the NTC was still !overned b the ,.1K Rules, clearl indicate that the ,../ Revised Rules
have not ta5en e8ect at the time of the !rant of the provisional authorit to Baantel. The fact that
the ,../ Revised Rules were "led with the ?P *aw Center on 2ebruar /, ,../ is of no moment.
There is nothin! in the Administrative Code of ,.K1 which implies that the "lin! of the rules with
the ?P *aw Center is the operative act that !ives the rules force and e8ect. Boo5 L&&, Chapter D,
#ection / thereof merel states@
Filing. ::: %,' Ever a!enc shall "le with the ?niversit of the Philippines *aw Center three
%/' certi"ed copes of ever rule adopted b it. Rules in force on the date of e8ectivit of this
Code which are not "led within three %/' months from the date shall not thereafter be the
basis of an sanction a!ainst an part or persons.
%D' The records o<cer of the a!enc, or his eGuivalent functionar, shall carr out the
reGuirements of this section under pain or disciplinar action.
%/' A permanent re!ister of all rules shall be 5ept b the issuin! a!enc and shall be open
to public inspection.
The National Administrative Re!ister is merel a bulletin of codi"ed rules and it is furnished onl to
the +<ce of the President, Con!ress, all appellate courts, the National *ibrar, other public o<ces
or a!encies as the Con!ress ma select, and to other persons at a price su<cient to cover
publication and mailin! or distribution costs.D- &n a similar case, we held@
This does not impl however, that the sub(ect Administrative +rder is a valid e$ercise of
such Guasi:le!islative power. The ori!inal Administrative +rder issued on Au!ust /0, ,.K.,
under which the respondents "led their applications for importations, was not published in
the +<cial >a6ette or in a newspaper of !eneral circulation. The Guestioned Administrative
+rder, le!all, until it is published, is invalid within the conte$t of Article D of Civil Code,
which reads@
9Article D. *aws shall ta5e e8ect after "fteen das followin! the completion of their
publication in the +<cial >a6ette %or in a newspaper of !eneral circulation in the
Philippines', unless it is otherwise provided. $ $ $9
The fact that the amendments to Administrative +rder No. #+CPEC K.:0K:0, were "led
with, and published b the ?P *aw Center in the National Administrative Re!ister, does not
cure the defect related to the e8ectivit of the Administrative +rder.
This Court, in (a7ada $s. (u$era /G.R. 8o. .2;0<56, December =<, 5<>;, 5?; @*RA
??;1 stated, thus@
9Ae hold therefore that all statutes, includin! those of local application and private
laws, shall be published as a condition for their e8ectivit, which shall be!in "fteen
das after publication unless a di8erent e8ectivit is "$ed b the le!islature.
Covered b this rule are presidential decrees and e$ecutive orders promul!ated b
the President in the e$ercise of le!islative power or, at present, directl conferred b
the Constitution. Administrative Rules and Re!ulations must also be published if
their purpose is to enforce or implement e$istin! law pursuant also to a valid
dele!ation.
&nterpretative re!ulations and those merel internal in nature, that is, re!ulatin! onl
the personnel of the administrative a!enc and not the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication reGuired of the so:called letters of instructions
issued b administrative superiors concernin! the rules or !uidelines to be followed
b their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
$ $ $
Ae a!ree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its
purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.9
The Administrative +rder under consideration is one of those issuances which should be
published for its e8ectivit, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an e$istin! law
pursuant to a valid dele!ation, i.e., P.). ,01,, in relation to *+& EEE and E+ ,//.D1
Thus, publication in the +<cial >a6ette or a newspaper of !eneral circulation is a condition sine
3ua non before statutes, rules or re!ulations can ta5e e8ect. This is e$plicit from E$ecutive +rder
No. D00, which repealed Article D of the Civil Code, and which states that@
*aws shall ta5e e8ect after "fteen das followin! the completion of their publication either
in the +<cial >a6ette or in a newspaper of !eneral circulation in the Philippines, unless it is
otherwise provided.DK
The Rules of Practice and Procedure of the NTC, which implements #ection D. of the Public #ervice
Act %C.A. ,E-, as amended', fall sGuarel within the scope of these laws, as e$plicitl mentioned in
the case (a7ada $. (u$era.D.
+ur pronouncement in (a7ada $s. (u$era is clear and cate!orical. Administrative rules and
re!ulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement e$istin! law
pursuant to a valid dele!ation. The onl e$ceptions are interpretative re!ulations, those
merel internal in nature, or those so:called letters of instructions issued b administrative
superiors concernin! the rules and !uidelines to be followed b their subordinates in the
performance of their duties./0
3ence, the ,../ Revised Rules should be published in the +<cial >a6ette or in a newspaper of
!eneral circulation before it can ta5e e8ect. Even the ,../ Revised Rules itself mandates that said
Rules shall ta5e e8ect onl after their publication in a newspaper of !eneral circulation./, &n the
absence of such publication, therefore, it is the ,.1K Rules that !overns.
&n an event, re!ardless of whether the ,.1K Rules or the ,../ Revised Rules should appl, the
records show that the amended application "led b Baantel in fact included a motion for the
issuance of a provisional authorit. 3ence, it cannot be said that the NTC !ranted the provisional
authorit motu proprio. The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred when it found that the NTC issued
its +rder of Ma /, D000 on its own initiative. This much is ac5nowled!ed in the )ecision of the
Court of Appeals@
As praer, &CC as5ed for the immediate !rant of provisional authorit to construct, install,
maintain and operate the sub(ect service and to char!e the proposed rates and after due
notice and hearin!, approve the instant application and !rant the correspondin! certi"cate
of public convenience and necessit./D
The Court of Appeals also erred when it declared that the NTC;s +rder archivin! Baantel;s
application was null and void. The archivin! of cases is a widel accepted measure desi!ned to
shelve cases in which no immediate action is e$pected but where no !rounds e$ist for their
outri!ht dismissal, albeit without pre(udice. &t saves the petitioner or applicant from the added
trouble and e$pense of re:"lin! a dismissed case. ?nder this scheme, an inactive case is 5ept alive
but held in abeance until the situation obtains wherein action thereon can be ta5en.
&n the case at bar, the said application was ordered archived because of lac5 of available
freGuencies at the time, and made sub(ect to reinstatement upon availabilit of the reGuisite
freGuenc. To be sure, there was nothin! irre!ular in the revival of the application after the
condition therefor was ful"lled.
Ahile, as held b the Court of Appeals, there are no clear provisions in the Rules of the NTC which
e$pressl allow the archivin! of an application, this recourse ma be (usti"ed under Rule ,,
#ection D of the ,.1K Rules, which states@
#ec. D. @cope.::: These rules !overn pleadin!s, practice and procedure before the Board of
Communications %no" 8(*' in all matters of hearin!, investi!ation and proceedin!s within
the (urisdiction of the Board. 3owever, in the broader interest of (ustice and in order to best
serve the public interest, the Board ma, in an particular matter, e$cept it from these rules
and appl such suitable procedure to improve the service in the transaction of the public
business. %underscorin! ours'
The Court of Appeals ruled that the NTC committed !rave abuse of discretion when it revived
Baantel;s application based on an e:2parte motion. &n this re!ard, the pertinent provisions of the
NTC Rules@
#ec. F. ,:2parte Motions. ::: E$cept for motions for provisional authori6ation of proposed
services and increase of rates, e:2parte motions shall be acted upon b the Board onl
upon showin! of ur!ent necessit therefor and the ri!ht of the opposin! part is not
substantiall impaired. //
Thus, in cases which do not involve either an application for rate increase or an application for a
provisional authorit, the NTC ma entertain e:2parte motions onl where there is an ur!ent
necessit to do so and no ri!hts of the opposin! parties are impaired.,Nwphi,.nOt
The Court of Appeals ruled that there was a violation of the fundamental ri!ht of E$telcom to due
process when it was not a8orded the opportunit to Guestion the motion for the revival of the
application. 3owever, it must be noted that said +rder referred to a simple revival of the archived
application of Baantel in NTC Case No. .D:ED-. At this sta!e, it cannot be said that E$telcom;s
ri!ht to procedural due process was pre(udiced. &t will still have the opportunit to be heard durin!
the full:blown adversarial hearin!s that will follow. &n fact, the records show that the NTC has
scheduled several hearin! dates for this purpose, at which all interested parties shall be allowed to
re!ister their opposition. Ae have ruled that there is no denial of due process where full:blown
adversarial proceedin!s are conducted before an administrative bod./E Aith E$telcom havin!
full participated in the proceedin!s, and indeed, !iven the opportunit to "le its opposition to the
application, there was clearl no denial of its ri!ht to due process.
&n Aaldi$ar $s. @andiganbaan %,-- #CRA /,- B,.KKC', we held that the ri!ht to be heard
does not onl refer to the ri!ht to present verbal ar!uments in court. A part ma also be
heard throu!h his pleadin!s. where opportunit to be heard is accorded either throu!h oral
ar!uments or pleadin!s, there is no denial of procedural due process. As reiterated
in 8ational @emiconductor /HK1 Distribution, .td. $s. 8.R* %>.R. No. ,D/FD0, 7une D-,
,..K', the essence of due process is simpl an opportunit to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedin!s, an opportunit to e$plain one;s side. 3ence, in 8a$arro &&& $s.
Damaso %DE- #CRA D-0 B,..FC', we held that a formal or trial:tpe hearin! is not at all
times and not in all instances essential. Plainl, petitioner was not denied due process./F
E$telcom had alread entered its appearance as a part and "led its opposition to the application.
&t was neither precluded nor barred from participatin! in the hearin!s thereon. &ndeed, nothin!,
not even the +rder revivin! the application, bars or prevents E$telcom and the other oppositors
from participatin! in the hearin!s and adducin! evidence in support of their respective
oppositions. The motion to revive could not have possibl caused pre(udice to E$telcom since the
motion onl sou!ht the revival of the application. &t was merel a preliminar step towards the
resumption of the hearin!s on the application of Baantel. The latter will still have to prove its
capabilit to underta5e the proposed CMT#. &ndeed, in its +rder dated 2ebruar ,, D000, the NTC
set several hearin! dates precisel intended for the presentation of evidence on Baantel;s
capabilit and Guali"cation. Notice of these hearin!s were sent to all parties concerned, includin!
E$telcom.
As re!ards the chan!es in the personal circumstances of Baantel, the same ma be ventilated at
the hearin!s durin! Baantel;s presentation of evidence. &n fact, E$telcom was able to raise its
ar!uments on this matter in the +pposition %Aith Motion to )ismiss' anent the re:openin! and re:
instatement of the application of Baantel. E$telcom was thus heard on this particular point.
*i5ewise, the reGuirements of notice and publication of the application is no lon!er necessar
inasmuch as the application is a mere revival of an application which has alread been published
earlier. At an rate, the records show that all of the "ve %F' CMT# operators in the countr were
dul noti"ed and were allowed to raise their respective oppositions to Baantel;s application
throu!h the NTC;s +rder dated 2ebruar ,, D000.
&t should be borne in mind that amon! the declared national policies under Republic Act No. 1.DF,
otherwise 5nown as the Public Telecommunications Polic Act of the Philippines, is the health
competition amon! telecommunications carriers, to wit@
A health competitive environment shall be fostered, one in which telecommunications
carriers are free to ma5e business decisions and to interact with one another in providin!
telecommunications services, with the end in view of encoura!in! their "nancial viabilit
while maintainin! a8ordable rates./-
The NTC is clothed with su<cient discretion to act on matters solel within its competence.
Clearl, the need for a health competitive environment in telecommunications is su<cient
impetus for the NTC to consider all those applicants who are willin! to o8er competition, develop
the mar5et and provide the environment necessar for !reater public service. This was the
intention that came to li!ht with the issuance of Memorandum Circular .:/:D000, allocatin! new
freGuenc bands for use of CMT#. This memorandum circular enumerated the conditions prevailin!
and the reasons which necessitated its issuance as follows@
: the international accountin! rates are rapidl declinin!, threatenin! the subsid to the
local e$chan!e service as mandated in E+ ,0. and RA 1.DF=
: the public telecommunications entities which were obli!ated to install, operate and
maintain local e$chan!e networ5 have performed their obli!ations in varin! de!rees=
: after more than three %/' ears from the performance of the obli!ations onl FDP of the
total number of cities and municipalities are provided with local telephone service.
: there are mer!ers and consolidations amon! the e$istin! cellular mobile telephone
service %CMT#' providers threatenin! the e<cienc of competition=
: there is a need to hasten the installation of local e$chan!e lines in unserved areas=
: there are e$istin! CMT# operators which are e$periencin! con!estion in the networ5
resultin! to low !rade of service=
: the consumersIcustomers shall be !iven the freedom to choose CMT# operators from
which the could !et the service./1
Clearl spelled out is the need to provide enhanced competition and the reGuirement for more
landlines and telecommunications facilities in unserved areas in the countr. +n both scores,
therefore, there was su<cient showin! that the NTC acted well within its (urisdiction and in
pursuance of its avowed duties when it allowed the revival of Baantel;s application.
Ae now come to the issue of e$haustion of administrative remedies. The rule is well:entrenched
that a part must e$haust all administrative remedies before resortin! to the courts. The
premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one;s cause of action. This rule
would not onl !ive the administrative a!enc an opportunit to decide the matter b itself
correctl, but would also prevent the unnecessar and premature resort to courts./K &n the case
of .opez $. *it of Manila,/. we held@
As a !eneral rule, where the law provides for the remedies a!ainst the action of an
administrative board, bod or o<cer, relief to courts can be sou!ht onl after e$haustin! all
remedies provided. The reason rests upon the presumption that the administrative bod, if
!iven the chance to correct its mista5e or error, ma amend its decision on a !iven matter
and decide it properl. Therefore, where a remed is available within the administrative
machiner, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts, not onl to
!ive the administrative a!enc the opportunit to decide the matter b itself correctl, but
also to prevent unnecessar and premature resort to courts.
Clearl, E$telcom violated the rule on e$haustion of administrative remedies when it went directl
to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari and prohibition from the +rder of the NTC dated
Ma /, D000, without "rst "lin! a motion for reconsideration. &t is well:settled that the "lin! of a
motion for reconsideration is a prereGuisite to the "lin! of a special civil action for certiorari.
The !eneral rule is that, in order to !ive the lower court the opportunit to correct itself, a
motion for reconsideration is a prereGuisite to certiorari. &t also basic that petitioner must
e$haust all other available remedies before resortin! to certiorari. This rule, however, is
sub(ect to certain e$ceptions such as an of the followin!@ %,' the issues raised are purel
le!al in nature, %D' public interest is involved, %/' e$treme ur!enc is obvious or %E' special
circumstances warrant immediate or more direct action.E0
This case does not fall under an of the reco!ni6ed e$ceptions to this rule. Althou!h the +rder of
the NTC dated Ma /, D000 !rantin! provisional authorit to Baantel was immediatel e$ecutor,
it did not preclude the "lin! of a motion for reconsideration. ?nder the NTC Rules, a part
adversel a8ected b a decision, order, rulin! or resolution ma within "fteen %,F' das "le a
motion for reconsideration. That the +rder of the NTC became immediatel e$ecutor does not
mean that the remed of "lin! a motion for reconsideration is foreclosed to the petitioner.E,
2urthermore, E$telcom does not en(o the !rant of an vested interest on the ri!ht to render a
public service. The Constitution is Guite emphatic that the operation of a public utilit shall not be
e$clusive. Thus@
No franchise, certi"cate, or an other form of authori6ation for the operation of a public
utilit shall be !ranted to citi6ens of the Philippines or to corporations or!ani6ed under the
laws of the Philippines at least si$t per centum of whose capital is owned b such citi6ens,
nor shall such franchise, certi"cate or authori6ation be e$clusive in character or for a lon!er
period than "ft ears. Neither shall an such franchise or ri!ht be !ranted e$cept under
the condition that it shall be sub(ect to amendment, alteraion, or repeal b the Con!ress
when the common !ood so reGuires. $$$ $$$ $$$.ED
&n Radio *ommunications of the !hils., &nc. $. 8ational (elecommunications *ommission,E/ we
held@
&t is well within the powers of the public respondent to authori6e the installation b the
private respondent networ5 of radio communications sstems in Catarman, #amar and #an
7ose, Mindoro. ?nder the circumstances, the mere fact that the petitioner possesses a
franchise to put up and operate a radio communications sstem in certain areas is not an
insuperable obstacle to the public respondent;s issuin! the proper certi"cate to an
applicant desirin! to e$tend the same services to those areas. The Constitution mandates
that a franchise cannot be e$clusive in nature nor can a franchise be !ranted e$cept that it
must be sub(ect to amendment, alteration, or even repeal b the le!islature when the
common !ood so reGuires. %Art. H&&, sec. ,, of the ,.K- Constitution'. There is an e$press
provision in the petitioner;s franchise which provides compliance with the above mandate
%RA D0/-, sec. ,F'.
Even in the provisional authorit !ranted to E$telcom, it is e$pressl stated that such authorit is
not e$clusive. Thus, the Court of Appeals erred when it !ave due course to E$telcom;s petition and
ruled that it constitutes an e$ception to the rule on e$haustion of administrative remedies.
Also, the Court of Appeals erred in annullin! the +rder of the NTC dated Ma /, D000, !rantin!
Baantel a provisional authorit to install, operate and maintain CMT#. The !eneral rule is that
purel administrative and discretionar functions ma not be interfered with b the courts. Thus,
in .acuesta $. Herrera,EE it was held@
$$$ %T'he powers !ranted to the #ecretar of A!riculture and Commerce %natural resources'
b law re!ardin! the disposition of public lands such as !rantin! of licenses, permits, leases
and contracts, or approvin!, re(ectin!, reinstatin!, or cancelin! applications, are all
e$ecutive and administrative in nature. &t is a well reco!ni6ed principle that purel
administrative and discretionar functions ma not be interfered with b the courts. %Coloso
vs. Board of Accountanc, >.R. No. *:F1F0, April D0, ,.F/' &n !eneral, courts have no
supervisin! power over the proceedin!s and actions of the administrative departments of
the !overnment. This is !enerall true with respect to acts involvin! the e$ercise of
(ud!ement or discretion and "ndin!s of fact. %FE Am. 7ur. FFK:FF.' $$$.
The established e$ception to the rule is where the issuin! authorit has !one beond its statutor
authorit, e$ercised unconstitutional powers or clearl acted arbitraril and without re!ard to his
dut or with !rave abuse of discretion.EF None of these obtains in the case at bar.
Moreover, in petitions for certiorari, evidentiar matters or matters of fact raised in the court
below are not proper !rounds nor ma such be ruled upon in the proceedin!s. As held in 8ational
Federation of .abor $. 8.R*@E-
At the outset, it should be noted that a petition for certiorari under Rule -F of the Rules of
Court will prosper onl if there is a showin! of !rave abuse of discretion or an act without or
in e$cess of (urisdiction on the part of the National *abor Relations Commission. &t does not
include an inGuir as to the correctness of the evaluation of evidence which was the basis
of the labor o<cial or o<cer in determinin! his conclusion. &t is not for this Court to re:
e$amine conRictin! evidence, re:evaluate the credibilit of witnesses nor substitute the
"ndin!s of fact of an administrative tribunal which has !ained e$pertise in its special "eld.
Considerin! that the "ndin!s of fact of the labor arbiter and the N*RC are supported b
evidence on record, the same must be accorded due respect and "nalit.
This Court has consistentl held that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to
the sound discretion of the !overnment a!enc entrusted with the re!ulation of activities comin!
under the special and technical trainin! and 5nowled!e of such a!enc.E1 &t has also been held
that the e$ercise of administrative discretion is a polic decision and a matter that can best be
dischar!ed b the !overnment a!enc concerned, and not b the courts.EK &n Billanue$a $. *ourt
of Appeals,E. it was held that "ndin!s of fact which are supported b evidence and the conclusion
of e$perts should not be disturbed. This was reiterated in Metro (ransit Crganization, &nc. $.
8ational .abor Relations *ommission,F0 wherein it was ruled that factual "ndin!s of Guasi:(udicial
bodies which have acGuired e$pertise because their (urisdiction is con"ned to speci"c matters are
!enerall accorded not onl respect but even "nalit and are bindin! even upon the #upreme
Court if the are supported b substantial evidence.,Nwphi,.nOt
Administrative a!encies are !iven a wide latitude in the evaluation of evidence and in the e$ercise
of its ad(udicative functions. This latitude includes the authorit to ta5e (udicial notice of facts
within its special competence.
&n the case at bar, we "nd no reason to disturb the factual "ndin!s of the NTC which formed the
basis for awardin! the provisional authorit to Baantel. As found b the NTC, Baantel has been
!ranted several provisional and permanent authorities before to operate various
telecommunications services.F, &ndeed, it was established that Baantel was the "rst compan to
compl with its obli!ation to install local e$chan!e lines pursuant to E.+. ,0. and R.A. 1.DF. &n
reco!nition of the same, the provisional authorit awarded in favor of Baantel to operate *ocal
E$chan!e #ervices in Que6on Cit, Malabon, Lalen6uela and the entire Bicol re!ion was made
permanent and a CPCN for the said service was !ranted in its favor. Prima facie evidence was
li5ewise found showin! Baantel;s le!al, "nancial and technical capacit to underta5e the
proposed cellular mobile telephone service.
*i5ewise, the Ma /, D000 +rder did not violate NTC Memorandum Circular No. .:,E:.0 dated
#eptember E, ,..0, contrar to the rulin! of the Court of Appeals. The memorandum circular sets
forth the procedure for the issuance of provisional authorit thus@
E22ECT&LE T3&# )ATE, and as part of the Commission;s drive to streamline and fast trac5
action on applicationsIpetitions for CPCN other forms of authori6ations, the Commission
shall be evaluatin! applicationsIpetitions for immediate issuance of provisional
authori6ations, pendin! hearin! and "nal authori6ation of an application on its merit.
2or this purpose, it is hereb directed that all applicantsIpetitioners see5in! for provisional
authori6ations, shall submit immediatel to the Commission, either to!ether with their
application or in a Motion all their le!al, technical, "nancial, economic documentations in
support of their praer for provisional authori6ations for evaluation. +n the basis of their
completeness and their havin! complied with reGuirements, the Commission shall be
issuin! provisional authori6ations.
Clearl, a provisional authorit ma be issued even pendin! hearin! and "nal determination of an
application on its merits.
2inall, this Court "nds that the Manifestations of E$telcom alle!in! forum shoppin! on the part of
the NTC and Baantel are not impressed with merit. The divisions of the #upreme Court are not to
be considered as separate and distinct courts. The #upreme Court remains a unit notwithstandin!
that it wor5s in divisions. Althou!h it ma have three divisions, it is but a sin!le court. Actions
considered in an of these divisions and decisions rendered therein are, in e8ect, b the same
Tribunal. The divisions of this Court are not to be considered as separate and distinct courts but as
divisions of one and the same court.FD
Moreover, the rules on forum shoppin! should not be literall interpreted. Ae have stated thus@
&t is scarcel necessar to add that Circular No. DK:., must be so interpreted and applied as
to achieve the purposes pro(ected b the #upreme Court when it promul!ated that circular.
Circular No. DK:., was desi!ned to serve as an instrument to promote and facilitate the
orderl administration of (ustice and should not be interpreted with such absolute
literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and le!itimate ob(ection or the !oal of all rules of
procedure S which is to achieve substantial (ustice as e$peditiousl as possible.F/
Even assumin! that separate actions have been "led b two di8erent parties involvin! essentiall
the same sub(ect matter, no forum shoppin! was committed as the parties did not resort to
multiple (udicial remedies. The Court, therefore, directed the consolidation of the two cases
because the involve essentiall the same issues. &t would also prevent the absurd situation
wherein two di8erent divisions of the same court would render alto!ether di8erent rulin!s in the
cases at bar.
Ae rule, li5ewise, that the NTC has le!al standin! to "le and initiate le!al action in cases where it
is clear that its inaction would result in an impairment of its abilit to e$ecute and perform its
functions. #imilarl, we have previousl held in *i$il @er$ice *ommission $. DacocoFE that the
Civil #ervice Commission, as an a!!rieved part, ma appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals
to this Court.
As correctl stated b the NTC, the rule invo5ed b E$telcom is Rule -F of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides that public respondents shall not appear in or "le an answer or
comment to the petition or an pleadin! therein.FF The instant petition, on the other hand, was
"led under Rule EF where no similar proscription e$ists.
IHEREFORE, in view of the fore!oin!, the consolidated petitions are GRANTE". The Court of
Appeals; )ecision dated #eptember ,/, D000 and Resolution dated 2ebruar ., D00,
are REVERSE" and SET ASI"E. The permanent in(unction issued b the Court of Appeals
is LIFTE". The +rders of the NTC dated 2ebruar ,, D000 and Ma /, D000 are REINSTATE". No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO OR"ERE".
Da$ide, 9r., *.9., !uno, Kapunan, and !ardo, 99., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIR" "IVISION
G.R. No. 17<91J A*&2/ J, 200J
REPU!LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, &$*&$s$,t$0 -' t)$ "EPARTMENT OF ENERG3
9"OE:, petitioner,
vs.
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, respondent.
" E C I S I O N
CHICO5NAMARIO, J.>
This is a Petition for Review on *ertiorari under Rule EF of the Rules of Court, assailin! the )ecision
dated E Au!ust D00- of the Court of Appeals in C.A. >.R. #P No. KD,K/., The appellate court
reversed the )ecisionDdated ,. Au!ust D00/ of the +<ce of the President in +P N+. Case .-:3:
-F1E and declared that Ministr of 2inance %M+2' Circular No. ,:KF dated ,F April ,.KF, as
amended, is ine8ective for failure to compl with #ection / of Chapter D, Boo5 1 of the
Administrative Code of ,.K1,/ which reGuires the publication and "lin! in the +<ce of the National
Administration Re!ister %+NAR' of administrative issuances. Thus, surchar!es provided under the
aforementioned circular cannot be imposed upon respondent Pilipinas #hell Petroleum Corporation.
Respondent is a corporation dul or!ani6ed e$istin! under the laws of the Philippines. &t is en!a!ed
in the business of re"nin! oil, mar5etin! petroleum, and other related activities.E
The )epartment of Ener! %)+E' is a !overnment a!enc under the direct control and supervision
of the +<ce of the President. The )epartment is mandated b Republic Act No. 1-/K to prepare,
inte!rate, coordinate, supervise and control all plans, pro!rams, pro(ects and activities of the
>overnment relative to ener! e$ploration, development, utili6ation, distribution and conservation.
+n ,0 +ctober ,.KE, the +il Price #tabili6ation 2und %+P#2' was created under Presidential )ecree
No. ,.F- for the purpose of minimi6in! freGuent price chan!es brou!ht about b e$chan!e rate
ad(ustments andIor increase in world mar5et prices of crude oil and imported petroleum
products.F
*etter of &nstruction No. ,E/, dated ,F +ctober ,.KE was issued directin! the utili6ation of the
+P#2 to reimburse oil companies the additional costs of importation of crude oil and petroleum
products due to Ructuation in forei!n e$chan!e rates to assure adeGuate and continuous suppl of
petroleum products at reasonable prices.-
*etter of &nstruction No. ,EE,, issued on D0 November ,.KE, mandated the Board of Ener! %now,
the Ener! Re!ulator Board' to review and reset prices of domestic oil products ever two
months to reRect the prevailin! prices of crude oil and petroleum. The prices were re!ulated b
ad(ustin! the +P#2 impost, increasin! or decreasin! this price component as necessar to
maintain the balance between revenues and claims on the +P#2.1
+n D1 2ebruar ,.K1, E$ecutive +rder No. ,/1 was enacted to amend P. ). No. ,.F-. &t e$panded
the sources and utili6ation of the +P#2 in order to maintain stabilit in the domestic prices of oil
products at reasonable levels.K
+n E )ecember ,..,, the +<ce of Ener! A8airs %+EA', now the )+E, informed the respondent
that respondentTs contributions to the +P#2 for forei!n e$chan!e ris5 char!e for the period
)ecember ,.K. to March ,.., were insu<cient. +EA Audit Tas5 2orce noted a total underpament
of P,E,E,E,K-0.1F b respondent to the +P#2. As a conseGuence of the underpament, a
surchar!e of P,,,-FE,1KD./, was imposed upon respondent. The said surchar!e was imposed
pursuant to M+2 Circular No. ,:KF, as amended b )epartment of 2inance %)+2' Circular No. D:
.E,. which provides that@
D. Remittance of pament to the +P#2 as provided for under #ection F of M+2 +rder No. ,,:
KF shall be made not later than D0th of the month followin! the month of remittance of the
forei!n e$chan!e pament for the import or the month of pament to the domestic
producers in the case of locall produced crude. Pament after the speci"ed date shall be
sub(ect to a surchar!e of "fteen percent %,FP' of the amount, if paid within thirt %/0' das
from the due date plus two percent %DP' per month if paid after thirt das.,0%Emphasis
supplied.'
+n . )ecember ,..,, the +EA wrote another letter,, to respondent advisin! the latter of its
additional underpament to the +P#2 of the forei!n e$chan!e ris5 fee in the amount
of P,0,,/.,FD-.F- for the period April ,.., to +ctober ,..,. &n addition, surchar!es in the amount
of PD,K0-,-F-.-F were imposed thereon.
&n a letter dated D0 7anuar ,..D addressed to the +EA, respondent (usti"ed that its calculations
for the transactions in Guestion were based on a valid interpretation of M+2 +rder N+. ,,:KF dated
,D April ,.KF and M+E Circular No. KF:0F:KD dated ,- Ma ,.KF.,D
+n DE March ,..D, respondent paid the +EA in full the principal amount of its underpament,
totalin!PDE,FFE,/K1./,, but not the surchar!es.,/
&n a letter,E dated ,F March ,..-, +EA noti"ed the respondent that the latter is reGuired to pa
the +P#2 a total amount of P,K,F/F,F/,.E0 for surchar!es on the late pament of forei!n
e$chan!e ris5 char!es for the period )ecember ,.K. to +ctober ,..,.
&n a letter,F dated ,, 7ul ,..-, the )+E reiterated its demand for respondent to settle the
surchar!es due. +therwise, the )+E warned that it would proceed a!ainst the respondentTs
&rrevocable #tandb *etter of Credit to recover its unpaid surchar!es.
+n ,. 7ul ,..-, respondent "led a Notice of Appeal before the +<ce of the President. The +<ce
of the President a<rmed the conclusion of the )+E, contained in its letters dated ,F March ,..-
and ,, 7ul ,..-. Ahile it admitted that the implementation of M+2 Circular No. ,:KF is contin!ent
upon its publication and "lin! with the +NAR, it noted that respondent failed to adduce evidence
of lac5 of compliance with such reGuirements. The aforementioned )ecision reads@,-
>iven the fore!oin!, the )+ETs implementation of M+2 Circular ,:KF b imposin!
surchar!es on Pilipinas #hell is onl proper. *i5e this +<ce, the )+E is bound to presume
the validit of that administrative re!ulation.
IHEREFORE, premises considered, the )ecision of the )epartment of Ener!, contained
in its letters dated ,F March ,..- and ,, 7ul ,..-, is hereb AFFIRME" in toto.
Respondent "led a Motion for Reconsideration of the )ecision dated ,. Au!ust D00/ of the +<ce
of the President, which was denied on DK November D00/.,1
Respondent "led an appeal before the Court of Appeals wherein it presented Certi"cations dated .
2ebruar D00E,K and ,, 2ebruar D00E,. issued b +NAR statin! that )+2 Circular No. D:.E and
M+2 Circular No. ,:KF respectivel, have not been "led before said o<ce.
The Court of Appeals reversed the )ecision of the +<ce of the President in +.P. CA#E No. .-:3:
-F1E and ruled that M+2 Circular ,:KF, as amended, was ine8ective for failure to compl with the
reGuirement to "le with +NAR. &t decreed that even if the said circular was issued b then Actin!
Minister of 2inance Alfredo de Roda, 7r. lon! before the Administrative Code of ,.K1, #ection / of
Chapter D, Boo5 1 thereof speci"es that rules alread in force on the date of the e8ectivit of the
Administrative Code of ,.K1 must be "led within three months from the date of e8ectivit of said
Code, otherwise such rules cannot thereafter be the basis of an sanction a!ainst an part or
persons.D0 Accordin! to the dispositive of the appellate courtTs )ecision@D,
IHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereb GRANTE". The )ecision dated Au!ust ,.,
D00/ and the Resolution dated November DK, D00/ of the +<ce of the President, are
hereb REVERSE".
ACCOR"INGL3, the imposition of surchar!es upon petitioner is hereb declared without
le!al basis.
+n DF #eptember D00-, petitioner "led the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, wherein the
followin! issues were raised@DD
&
T3E #?RC3AR>E &MP+#E) BM M&N&#TRM +2 2&NANCE %M+2' C&RC?*AR No. ,:KF 3A# BEEN
A22&RME) BM E.+. N+. ,/1 3AL&N> RECE&LE) L&TA*&TM 2R+M A *E>&#*AT&LE ENACTMENT,
M+2 C&RC?*AR N+. ,:KF CANN+T BE REN)ERE) &NLA*&) BM T3E #?B#EQ?ENT ENACTMENT
+2 A *AA REQ?&R&N> RE>&#TRAT&+N +2 T3E M+2 C&RC?*AR A&T3 T3E +22&CE +2 T3E
NAT&+NA* RE>&#TER
&&
A##?M&N> T3AT T3E RE>&#TRAT&+N +2 M+2 N+. ,:KF &# REQ?&RE), RE#P+N)ENT AA&LE)
&T# +B7ECT&+N +N T3E BA#&# +2 N+N:RE>&#TRAT&+N A3EN &T PA&) T3E AM+?NT
REQ?&RE) BM PET&T&+NER.
This petition is without merit.
As earl as ,.K-, this Court in (a7ada $. (u$eraD/ enunciated that publication is indispensable in
order that all statutes, includin! administrative rules that are intended to enforce or implement
e$istin! laws, attain bindin! force and e8ect, to wit@
Ae hold therefore that all statutes, includin! those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their e8ectivit, which shall be!in "fteen das after
publication unless a di8erent e8ectivit date is "$ed b the le!islature.
Covered b this rule are presidential decrees and e$ecutive orders promul!ated b the
President in the e$ercise of le!islative powers whenever the same are validl dele!ated b
the le!islature or, at present, directl conferred b the Constitution. A0+2,2st&#t2=$ &u/$s
#,0 &$gu/#t2o,s +ust #/so -$ *u-/2s)$0 2( t)$2& *u&*os$ 2s to $,(o&%$ o&
2+*/$+$,t $;2st2,g /#? *u&su#,t #/so to # =#/20 0$/$g#t2o,. %Emphasis provided.'
Thereafter, the Administrative Code of ,.K1 was enacted, with #ection / of Chapter D, Boo5 L&&
thereof speci"call providin! that@
Filing. J %,' Ever a!enc shall "le with the ?niversit of the Philippines *aw Center three
%/' certi"ed copies of ever rule adopted b it. Ru/$s 2, (o&%$ o, t)$ 0#t$ o( $H$%t2=2t'
o( t)2s Co0$ ?)2%) #&$ ,ot D/$0 ?2t)2, t)&$$ 9<: +o,t)s (&o+ t)$ 0#t$ s)#// ,ot
t)$&$#(t$& -$ t)$ -#s2s o( #,' s#,%t2o, #g#2,st #,' *#&t' o& *$&so,s.
%D' The records o<cer of the a!enc, or his eGuivalent functionar, shall carr out the
reGuirements of this section under pain of disciplinar action.
%/' A permanent re!ister of all rules shall be 5ept b the issuin! a!enc and shall be open
to public inspection. %Emphasis provided.'
?nder the doctrine of (anada $. (u$era,DE the M+2 Circular No. ,:KF, as amended, is one of those
issuances which should be published before it becomes e8ective since it is intended to enforce
Presidential )ecree No. ,.F-. The said circular should also compl with the reGuirement stated
under #ection / of Chapter D, Boo5 L&& of the Administrative Code of ,.K1 S "lin! with the +NAR in
the ?niversit of the Philippines *aw Center S for rules that are alread in force at the time the
Administrative Code of ,.K1 became e8ective. These reGuirements of publication and "lin! were
put in place as safe!uards a!ainst abuses on the part of lawma5ers and as !uarantees to the
constitutional ri!ht to due process and to information on matters of public concern and, therefore,
reGuire strict compliance.
&n the present case, the Certi"cations dated ,, 2ebruar D00EDF and . 2ebruar D00ED- issued b
+NAR prove that M+2 Circular No. ,:KF and its amendator rule, )+2 Circular No. D:.E, have not
been "led before said o<ce. Moreover, petitioner was unable to controvert respondentTs alle!ation
that neither of the aforementioned circulars were published in the +<cial >a6ette or in an
newspaper of !eneral circulation. Thus, failure to compl with the reGuirements of publication and
"lin! of administrative issuances renders M+2 Circular No. ,:KF, as amended, ine8ective.
&n 8ational Association of ,lectricit *onsumers for Reforms $. ,nerg Regulator 4oard,D1 this
Court emphasi6ed that both the reGuirements of publication and "lin! of administrative issuances
intended to enforce e$istin! laws are mandator for the e8ectivit of said issuances. &n support of
its rulin!, it speci"ed several instances wherein this Court declared administrative issuances,
which failed to observe the proper reGuirements, to have no force and e8ect@
Nowhere from the above narration does it show that the >RAM &mplementin! Rules was
published in the +<cial >a6ette or in a newspaper of !eneral circulation. #i!ni"cantl, the
e8ectivit clauses of both the >RAM and &CERA &mplementin! Rules uniforml provide that
the 9shall ta5e e8ect immediatel.9 These clauses made no mention of their publication in
either the +<cial >a6ette or in a newspaper of !eneral circulation. Moreover, per the
Certi"cation dated 7anuar ,,, D00- of the +<ce of the National Administrative Re!ister
%+NAR', the said implementin! rules and re!ulations were not li5ewise "led with the said
o<ce in contravention of the Administrative Code of ,.K1.
Applin! the doctrine enunciated in (a7ada $. (u$era, the Court has previousl declared as
havin! no force and e8ect the followin! administrative issuances@ %,' Rules and Re!ulations
issued b the 7oint Ministr of 3ealth:Ministr of *abor and Emploment Accreditation
Committee re!ardin! the accreditation of hospitals, medical clinics and laboratories= %D'
*etter of &nstruction No. ,E,- orderin! the suspension of paments due and paable b
distressed copper minin! companies to the national !overnment= %/' Memorandum
Circulars issued b the Philippine +verseas Emploment Administration re!ulatin! the
recruitment of domestic helpers to 3on! 4on!= %E' Administrative +rder No. #+CPEC K.:0K:
0, issued b the Philippine &nternational Tradin! Corporation re!ulatin! applications for
importation from the PeopleTs Republic of China= %F' Corporation Compensation Circular No.
,0 issued b the )epartment of Bud!et and Mana!ement discontinuin! the pament of
other allowances and frin!e bene"ts to !overnment o<cials and emploees= and %-' P+EA
Memorandum Circular No. D #eries of ,.K/ which provided for the schedule of placement
and documentation fees for private emploment a!encies or authorit holders.
&n all these cited cases, the administrative issuances Guestioned therein were uniforml
struc5 down as the were not published or "led with the National Administrative Re!ister.
+n the other hand, in Republic $. ,:press (elecommunications *o., &nc, the Court declared
that the ,../ Revised Rules of the National Telecommunications Commission had not
become e8ective despite the fact that it was "led with the National Administrative Re!ister
because the same had not been published at the time. The Court emphasi6ed therein that
9publication in the +<cial >a6ette or a newspaper of !eneral circulation is a condition sine
Gua non before statutes, rules or re!ulations can ta5e e8ect.9
PetitionerTs ar!ument that respondent waived the reGuisite re!istration of M+2 Circular No. ,:KF,
as amended, when it paid in full the principal amount of underpament totalin! PDE,FEE,/K1./,, is
specious. M+2 Circular No. ,:KF, as amended imposes surchar!es, while respondentsT
underpament is based on M+2 Circular No. ,,:KF dated ,D April ,.KF.
Petitioner also insists that the re!istration of M+2 Circular No. ,:KF, as amended, with the +NAR is
no lon!er necessar since the respondent 5new of its e$istence, despite its non:re!istration. This
ar!ument is seriousl Rawed and contrar to (urisprudence. #trict compliance with the
reGuirements of publication cannot be annulled b a mere alle!ation that parties were noti"ed of
the e$istence of the implementin! rules concerned. 3ence, also in8ational Association of
,lectricit *onsumers for Reforms $. ,nerg Regulator 4oard, this Court pronounced@
&n this case, the >RAM &mplementin! Rules must be declared ine8ective as the same was
never published or "led with the National Administrative Re!ister. To show that there was
compliance with the publication reGuirement, respondents MERA*C+ and the ERC dwell
len!thil on the fact that parties, particularl the distribution utilities and consumer !roups,
were dul noti"ed of the public consultation on the ERCTs proposed implementin! rules.
These parties participated in the said public consultation and even submitted their
comments thereon.
Ho?$=$&, t)$ (#%t t)#t t)$ *#&t2$s *#&t2%2*#t$0 2, t)$ *u-/2% %o,su/t#t2o, #,0
su-+2tt$0 t)$2& &$s*$%t2=$ %o++$,ts 2s ,ot %o+*/2#,%$ ?2t) t)$ (u,0#+$,t#/
&u/$ t)#t t)$ GRAM I+*/$+$,t2,g Ru/$s, o& #,' #0+2,2st&#t2=$ &u/$s ?)os$
*u&*os$ 2s to $,(o&%$ o& 2+*/$+$,t $;2st2,g /#?, +ust -$ *u-/2s)$0 2, t)$ OG%2#/
G#@$tt$ o& 2, # ,$?s*#*$& o( g$,$&#/ %2&%u/#t2o,. The reGuirement of publication of
implementin! rules of statutes is mandator and ma not be dispensed with alto!ether
even if, as in this case, there was public consultation and submission b the parties of their
comments.DK%Emphasis provided.'
Petitioner further avers that M+2 Circular No. ,:KF, as amended, !ains its vitalit from the
subseGuent enactment of E$ecutive +rder No. ,/1, which reiterates the power of then Minister of
2inance to promul!ate the necessar rules and re!ulations to implement the e$ecutive order. #uch
contention is irrelevant in the present case since the power of the Minister of 2inance to
promul!ate rules and re!ulations is not under dispute. The issue rather in the Petition at bar is the
ine8ectivit of his administrative issuance for non:compliance with the reGuisite publication and
"lin! with the +NAR. And while M+2 Circular No. ,:KF, as amended, ma be unimpeachable in
substance, the due process reGuirements of publication and "lin! cannot be disre!arded.
Moreover, none of the provisions of E$ecutive +rder No. ,/1 e$empts M+2 Circular No. ,:KF, as
amended from the aforementioned reGuirements.
IN VIEI OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is )EN&E) and the assailed )ecision dated E
Au!ust D00- of the Court of Appeals in C.A. >.R. #P No. KD,K/ is AFFIRME". No cost.
SO OR"ERE".
Austria2Martinez, Acting *hairperson, *arpio2MoralesD, (ingaD, Rees, 99., concur.
Foot,ot$s
U Assi!ned as #pecial Member.
, Penned b Associate 7ustice Monina Arevalo:VeWarosa with Associate 7ustices Renato C.
)acudao and Rosmari ). Carandan!, concurrin!. Rollo, pp. FF :1E.
D &d. at /0,:/0/.
/ #ection / of Chapter D, Boo5 L&& of the Administrative Code of ,.K1 states that@
2ilin!.J %,' Ever a!enc shall "le with the ?niversit of the Philippines *aw Center
three %/' certi"ed copies of ever rule adopted b it. Rules in force on the date of
e8ectivit of this Code which are not "led within three %/' months from the date
shall not thereafter be the basis of an sanction a!ainst an part or persons.
%D' The records o<cer of the a!enc, or his eGuivalent functionar, shall carr out
the reGuirements of this section under pain of disciplinar action.
%/' A permanent re!ister of all rules shall be 5ept b the issuin! a!enc and shall be
open to public inspection.
E Rollo, p. -/.
F #ection K of Presidential )ecree No. ,.F- states that@
#ECT&+N K. There is hereb created a #pecial Account in the >eneral 2und to be
desi!nated as +il Price #tabili6ation 2und for the purpose of minimi6in! freGuent
price chan!es brou!ht about b e$chan!e rate ad(ustments andIor an increase in
world mar5et prices of crude oil and imported petroleum products.
The 2und ma be sourced from an of the followin!@
%a' An increase in the ta$ collection from ad:valorem ta$ or customs dut
imposed on petroleum products sub(ect to ta$ under this )ecree arisin! from
e$chan!e rate ad(ustment, as ma be determined b the Minister of 2inance
in consultation with the Board of Ener!=
%b' An increase in the ta$ collection as a result of the liftin! of ta$
e$emptions of !overnment corporations under Presidential )ecree No. ,./,,
as ma be determined b the Minister of 2inance in consultation with the
Board of Ener!=
%c' An additional ta$ to be imposed on petroleum products to au!ment the
resources of the 2und throu!h an appropriate +rder that ma be issued b
the Board of Ener! reGuirin! pament b persons or companies en!a!ed in
the business of importin!, manufacturin! andIor mar5etin! petroleum
products.
The 2und created herein shall be used to reimburse the oil companies for cost
increases on crude oil and imported petroleum products resultin! from e$chan!e
rate ad(ustment andIor increase in world mar5et prices of crude oil.
The 2und shall be administered b the Ministr of Ener!.
- Rollo, p. /0,.
1 &d. at F-:F1.
K #ection , of E$ecutive +rder No. ,/1 provides that@
#ECT&+N ,. #ection K of Presidential )ecree No. ,.F- is hereb amended to read as
follows@
9#ECT&+N K. There is hereb created a Trust Account in the boo5s of accounts of the
Ministr of Ener! to be desi!nated as +il Price #tabili6ation 2und %+P#2' for the
purpose of minimi6in! freGuent price chan!es brou!ht about b e$chan!e rate
ad(ustments andIor chan!es in world mar5et prices on crude oil and imported
petroleum products. The +il Price #tabili6ation 2und %+P#2' ma be sourced from
an of the followin!@
a' An increase in the ta$ collection from ad valorem ta$ or customs dut
imposed on petroleum products sub(ect to ta$ under this )ecree arisin! from
e$chan!e rate ad(ustment, as ma be determined b the Minister of 2inance
in consultation with the Board of Ener!=
b' An increase in the ta$ collection as a result of the liftin! of ta$ e$emptions
of !overnment corporations, as ma be determined b the Minister of 2inance
in consultation with the Board of Ener!=
c' An Additional amount to be imposed on petroleum products to au!ment
the resources of the 2und throu!h an appropriate +rder that ma be issued
b the Board of Ener! reGuirin! pament b persons or companies en!a!ed
in the business of importin!, manufacturin! andIor mar5etin! petroleum
products=
d' An resultin! peso cost di8erentials in case the actual peso costs paid b
oil companies in the importation of crude oil and petroleum products is less
than the peso costs computed usin! the reference forei!n e$chan!e rate as
"$ed b the Board of Ener!.
The 2und herein created shall be used for the followin!@
,. To reimburse the oil companies for cost increases in crude oil and
imported petroleum products resultin! from e$chan!e rate ad(ustment
andIor increase in world mar5et prices of crude oil=
D. To reimburse the oil companies for possible cost underrecover
incurred as a result of the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum
products. The ma!nitude of the underrecover, if an, shall be
determined b the Ministr of 2inance. XCost underrecoverT shall
include the followin!@
i. Reduction in oil compan ta5e as directed b the Board of
Ener! without the correspondin! reduction in the landed cost
of oil inventories in the possession of the oil companies at the
time of the price chan!e=
ii. Reduction in internal ad valorem ta$es as a result of
fore!oin! !overnment mandated price reductions=
iii. +ther factors as ma be determined b the Ministr of
2inance to result in cost underrecover.
The +il Price #tabili6ation 2und %+P#2' shall be administered b the Ministr of
Ener!.9
. Rollo, p. 11.
,0 &d. at 1-.
,, &d. at 1K.
,D Ministr of 2inance %M+2' +rder No. ,,:KF dated ,D April ,.KF provides for pament of
forei!n e$chan!e ris5 char!e 9based on the actual peso value of the forei!n e$chan!e
pament for the shipment9 and Ministr of Ener! %M+E' Circular No. KF:0F:KD dated ,-
Ma ,.KF prescribin! supplemental rule and re!ulations to M+2 +rder No. ,,:KF which
provides, amon! others, that the ris5 char!e 9shall cover all crude oil and imported "nished
petroluem fuel credits outstandin! $$$.9 &d. at 1.:K0.

SECON" "IVISION

#EC?R&T&E# AN) EHC3AN>E >.R. No. ,-E0D-
C+MM&##&+N,
Petitioner, Present@
Q?&#?MB&N>, 9.,
*hairperson,
: versus : CARP&+ M+RA*E#,
T&N>A,
UC3&C+:NAVAR&+, and
LE*A#C+, 7R., 99.,

>MA NETA+R4, &NC.,
Respondent. Promul!ated@

)ecember D/, D00K
$::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::$
" E C I S I O N
T&N>A, 9.@
Petitioner #ecurities and E$chan!e Commission %#EC' assails the )ecisionB,C dated 2ebruar D0,
D00E of the Court of Appeals in CA:>.R. #P No. -K,-/, which directed that #EC Memorandum
Circular No. ,, #eries of ,.K- should be the basis for computin! the "lin! fee relative to >MA
Networ5, &nc.Ts %>MATs' application for the amendment of its articles of incorporation for purposes
of e$tendin! its corporate term.
The undisputed facts as narrated b the appellate court are as follows@
+n Au!ust ,., ,..F, the petitioner, >MA NETA+R4, &NC., %>MA, for brevit', a
domestic corporation, "led an application for collective approval of various
amendments to its Articles of &ncorporation and B:*aws with the respondent
#ecurities and E$chan!e Commission, %#EC, for brevit'. The amendments applied
for include, amon! others, the chan!e in the corporate name of petitioner from
YRepublic Broadcastin! #stem, &nc.Z to Y>MA Networ5, &nc.Z as well as the
e$tension of the corporate term for another "ft %F0' ears from and after 7une ,-,
D000.
?pon such "lin!, the petitioner had been assessed b the #ECTs Corporate
and *e!al )epartment a separate "lin! fee for the application for e$tension of
corporate term eGuivalent to ,I,0 of ,P of its authori6ed capital stoc5 plus D0P
thereof or an amount of P,,D,D,D00.00.
+n #eptember D-, ,..F, the petitioner informed the #EC of its intention to
contest the le!alit and propriet of the said assessment. 3owever, the petitioner
reGuested the #EC to approve the other amendments bein! reGuested b the
petitioner without bein! deemed to have withdrawn its application for e$tension of
corporate term.
+n +ctober D0, ,..F, the petitioner formall protested the assessment
amountin! to P,,D,D,D00.00 for its application for e$tension of corporate term.
+n 2ebruar D0, ,..-, the #EC approved the other amendments to the
petitionerTs Articles of &ncorporation, speci"call Article , thereof referrin! to the
corporate name of the petitioner as well as Article D thereof referrin! to the
principal purpose for which the petitioner was formed.
+n March ,., ,..-, the petitioner reGuested for an o<cial opinionIrulin!
from the #EC on the validit and propriet of the assessment for application for
e$tension of its corporate term.
ConseGuentl, the respondent #EC, throu!h Associate Commissioner 2e
Eloisa C. >loria, on April ,K, ,..-, issued its rulin! upholdin! the validit of the
Guestioned assessment, thedispositive portion of which states@
YI, /2g)t o( t)$ (o&$go2,g, ?$ -$/2$=$ t)#t t)$ Au$st2o,$0
#ss$ss+$,t 2s 2, #%%o&0#,%$ ?2t) /#?. A%%o&02,g/', 'ou #&$ )$&$-'
&$Au2&$0 to %o+*/' ?2t) t)$ &$Au2&$0 D/2,g ($$.N
An appeal from the aforeGuoted rulin! of the respondent #EC was
subseGuentl ta5en b the petitioner on the !round that the assessment of "lin!
fees for the petitionerTs application for e$tension of corporate term eGuivalent to
,I,0 of ,P of the authori6ed capital stoc5 plus D0P thereof is not in accordance
with law.
+n #eptember D-, D00,, followin! three %/' motions for earl resolution "led
b the petitioner, the respondent #EC ,n 4anc issued the assailed order dismissin!
the petitionerTs appeal, thedispositive portion of which provides as follows@
IHEREFORE, (o& /#%E o( +$&2t, t)$ 2,st#,t A**$#/ 2s )$&$-'
02s+2ss$0.
SO OR"ERE".BDC
&n its petition for reviewB/C with the Court of Appeals, >MA ar!ued that its application for the
e$tension of its corporate term is a5in to an amendment and not to a "lin! of new articles of
incorporation. &t further averred that #EC Memorandum Circular No. D, #eries of ,..E, which the
#EC used as basis for assessin! P,,D,D,D00.00 as "lin! fee for the e$tension of >MATs corporate
term, is not valid.
The appellate court a!reed with the #ECTs submission that an e$tension of the corporate term is a
!rant of a fresh license for a corporation to act as a (uridical bein! endowed with the powers
e$pressl bestowed b the #tate. As such, it is not an ordinar amendment but is analo!ous to the
"lin! of new articles of incorporation.
3owever, the Court of Appeals ruled that Memorandum Circular No. D, #eries of ,..E is le!all
invalid and ine8ective for not havin! been published in accordance with law. The challen!ed
memorandum circular, accordin! to the appellate court, is not merel an internal or interpretative
rule, but a8ects the public in !eneral. 3ence, its publication is reGuired for its e8ectivit.
The appellate court denied reconsideration in a ResolutionBEC dated 7une ., D00E.
&n its MemorandumBFC dated #eptember -, D00F, the #EC ar!ues that it issued the
Guestioned memorandum circular in the e$ercise of its dele!ated le!islative power to "$ fees and
char!es. The "lin! fees reGuired b it are alle!edl uniforml imposed on the transactin! public
and are essential to its supervisor and re!ulator functions. The fees are not a form of penalt or
sanction and, therefore, reGuire no publication.
2or its part, >MA points out in its Memorandum,B-C dated #eptember D/, D00F, that #EC
Memorandum Circular No. ,, #eries of ,.K- refers to the "lin! fees for amended articles of
incorporation where the amendment consists of e$tendin! the term of corporate e$istence. The
Guestioned circular, on the other hand, refers onl to "lin! fees for articles of incorporation. Thus,
>MA ar!ues that the former circular, bein! the one that speci"call treats of applications for the
e$tension of corporate term, should appl to its case.
Assumin! that Memorandum Circular No. D, #eries of ,..E is applicable, >MA avers that the latter
did not ta5e e8ect and cannot be the basis for the imposition of the fees stated therein for the
reasons that it was neither "led with the ?niversit of the Philippines *aw Center nor published
either in the +<cial >a6ette or in a newspaper of !eneral circulation as reGuired under e$istin!
laws.
&t should be mentioned at the outset that the authorit of the #EC to collect and receive fees as
authori6ed b law is not in Guestion.B1C &ts power to collect fees for e$aminin! and "lin! articles of
incorporation and b:laws and amendments thereto, certi"cates of increase or decrease of the
capital stoc5, amon! others, is reco!ni6ed. *i5ewise established is its power under #ec. 1 of P.).
No. .0D:A to recommend to the President the revision, alteration, amendment or ad(ustment of the
char!es which it is authori6ed to collect.
The sub(ect of the present inGuir is not the authorit of the #EC to collect and receive fees and
char!es, but rather the validit of its imposition on the basis of a memorandum circular which, the
Court of Appeals held, is ine8ective.
Republic Act No. /F/, %R.A. No. /F/,' provides that where the amendment consists in e$tendin!
the term of corporate e$istence, the #EC Yshall be entitled to collect and receive for the "lin! of
the amended articles of incorporation the same fees collectible under e$istin! law as the "lin! of
articles of incorporation.ZBKC As is clearl the import of this law, the #EC shall be entitled to collect
and receive the same fees it assesses and collects both for the "lin! of articles of incorporation
and the "lin! of an amended articles of incorporation for purposes of e$tendin! the term of
corporate e$istence.
The #EC, e8ectuatin! its mandate under the aforeGuoted law and other pertinent laws,B.C issued
#EC Memorandum Circular No. ,, #eries of ,.K-, imposin! the "lin! fee of ,I,0 of ,P of the
authori6ed capital stoc5 but not less than P/00.00 nor more than P,00,000.00 for stoc5
corporations, and ,I,0 of ,P of the authori6ed capital stoc5 but not less than PD00.00 nor more
than P,00,000.00 for stoc5 corporations without par value, for the "lin! of amended articles of
incorporation where the amendment consists of e$tendin! the term of corporate e$istence.
#everal ears after, the #EC issued Memorandum Circular No. D, #eries of ,..E, imposin! new fees
and char!es and deletin! the ma$imum "lin! fee set forth in #EC Circular No. ,, #eries of ,.K-,
such that the fee for the "lin! of articles of incorporation became ,I,0 of ,P of the authori6ed
capital stoc5 plus D0P thereof but not less thanPF00.00.
A readin! of the two circulars readil reveals that the indeed pertain to di8erent matters, as >MA
points out. #EC Memorandum Circular No. ,, #eries of ,.K- refers to the "lin! fee for the
amendment of articles of incorporation to e$tend corporate life, while Memorandum Circular No. D,
#eries of ,..E pertains to the "lin! fee for articles of incorporation. Thus, as >MA ar!ues, the
former circular, bein! sGuarel applicable and, more importantl, bein! more favorable to it,
should be followed.
Ahat this proposition fails to consider, however, is the clear directive of R.A. No. /F/, to impose
the same fees for the "lin! of articles of incorporation and the "lin! of amended articles of
incorporation to reRect an e$tension of corporate term. R.A. No. /F/, provides an unmista5able
standard which should !uide the #EC in "$in! and imposin! its rates and fees. &f such mandate
were the onl consideration, the Court would have been inclined to rule that the #EC was correct in
imposin! the "lin! fees as outlined in the Guestioned memorandum circular, >MATs ar!ument
notwithstandin!.
3owever, we a!ree with the Court of Appeals that the Guestioned memorandum circular is invalid
as it does not appear from the records that it has been published in the +<cial >a6ette or in a
newspaper of !eneral circulation. E$ecutive +rder No. D00, which repealed Art. D of the Civil Code,
provides that Ylaws shall ta5e e8ect after "fteen das followin! the completion of their publication
either in the +<cial >a6ette or in a newspaper of !eneral circulation in the Philippines, unless it is
otherwise provided.Z
&n (a7ada $. (u$era,B,0C the Court, e$poundin! on the publication reGuirement, held@
Ae hold therefore that all statutes, includin! those of local application and private
laws, shall be published as a condition for their e8ectivit, which shall be!in "fteen
das after publication unless a di8erent e8ectivit date is "$ed b the le!islature.
Covered b this rule are presidential decrees and e$ecutive orders promul!ated b
the President in the e$ercise of le!islative powers whenever the same are validl
dele!ated b the le!islature, or, at present, directl conferred b the Constitution.
Administrative rules and re!ulations must also be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement e$istin! law pursuant also to a valid dele!ation.
&nterpretative re!ulations and those merel internal in nature, that is, re!ulatin!
onl the personnel of the administrative a!enc and not the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication reGuired of the so:called letters of instructions
issued b administrative superiors concernin! the rules or !uidelines to be followed
b their subordinates in the performance of their duties.B,,C
The Guestioned memorandum circular, furthermore, has not been "led with the +<ce of the
National Administrative Re!ister of the ?niversit of the Philippines *aw Center as reGuired in the
Administrative Code of ,.K1.B,DC
&n !hilsa &nternational !lacement and @er$ices *orp. $. @ecretar of .abor and ,mploment,
B,/C Memorandum Circular No. D, #eries of ,.K/ of the Philippine +verseas Emploment
Administration, which provided for the schedule of placement and documentation fees for private
emploment a!encies or authorit holders, was struc5 down as it was not published or "led with
the National Administrative Re!ister.
The Guestioned memorandum circular, it should be emphasi6ed, cannot be construed as simpl
interpretative of R.A. No. /F/,. This administrative issuance is an implementation of the
mandate of R.A.
No. /F/, and indubitabl re!ulates and a8ects the public at lar!e. &t cannot, therefore, be
considered a mere internal rule or re!ulation, nor an interpretation of the law, but a rule which
must be declared ine8ective as it was neither published nor "led with the +<ce of the National
Administrative Re!ister.
A related factor which precludes consideration of the Guestioned issuance as interpretative in
nature merel is the fact the #ECTs assessment amountin! to P,,D,D,D00.00 is e$ceedin!l
unreasonable and amounts to an imposition. A "lin! fee, b le!al de"nition, is that char!ed b a
public o<cial to accept a document for processin!. The fee should be (ust, fair, and proportionate
to the service for which the fee is bein! collected, in this case, the e$amination and veri"cation of
the documents submitted b >MA to warrant an e$tension of its corporate term.
Rate:"$in! is a le!islative function which concededl has been dele!ated to the #EC b R.A. No.
/F/, and other pertinent laws. The due process clause, however, permits the courts to determine
whether the re!ulation issued b the #EC is reasonable and within the bounds of its rate:"$in!
authorit and to stri5e it down when it arbitraril infrin!es on a personTs ri!ht to propert.
A3ERE2+RE, the petition is )EN&E). The )ecision of the Court of Appeals in CA:>.R. #P No. -K,-/,
dated 2ebruar D0, D00E, and its Resolution, dated 7une ., D00E, are A22&RME). No
pronouncement as to costs.
#+ +R)ERE).
)ANTE +. T&N>A Associate 9ustice
AE C+NC?R@
*E+NAR)+ A. Q?&#?MB&N>
Associate 9ustice
Chairperson
C+NC3&TA CARP&+ M+RA*E# M&N&TA L. C3&C+:NAVAR&+
Associate 9ustice Associate 9ustice
PRE#B&TER+ 7. LE*A#C+, 7R.
Associate 9ustice
ATTESTATION
& attest that the conclusions in the above )ecision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assi!ned to the writer of the opinion of the CourtTs )ivision.

*E+NAR)+ A. Q?&#?MB&N>
Associate 9ustice
*hairperson, @econd Di$ision
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to #ection ,/, Article L&&& of the Constitution, and the )ivision ChairpersonTs
Attestation, it is hereb certi"ed that the conclusions in the above )ecision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assi!ned to the writer of the opinion of the CourtTs )ivision.
REMNAT+ #. P?N+
*hief 9ustice

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 1J0708 No=$+-$& 27, 2012
E"UAR"O M. CO1UANGCO, 1R., Petitioner,
vs.
REPU!LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
) E C & # & + N
VELASCO, 1R., J.:
The Case
+f the several coconut lev appealed cases that stemmed from certain issuances of the
#andi!anbaan in its Civil Case No. 00//, the present recourse proves to be one of the most
di<cult.
&n particular, the instant petition for review under Rule EF of the Rules of Court assails and see5s
to annul a portion of the Partial #ummar 7ud!ment dated 7ul ,,, D00/, as a<rmed in a
Resolution of )ecember DK, D00E, both rendered b the #andi!anbaan in its Civil Case %9CC9' No.
00//:A %the (ud!ment shall hereinafter be referred to as 9P#7:A9', entitled 9Republic of the
Philippines, Plainti8, v. Eduardo M. Co(uan!co, 7r., et al., )efendants, C+C+2E), et al., BA**ARE#,
et al., Class Action Movants.9 CC No. 00//:A is the result of the splittin! into ei!ht %K' amended
complaints of CC No. 00// entitled, 9Republic of the Philippines v. Eduardo Co(uan!co, 7r., et al.,9 a
suit for recover of ill:!otten wealth commenced b the Presidential Commission on >ood
>overnment %9PC>>9', for the Republic of the Philippines %9Republic9', a!ainst Eduardo M.
Co(uan!co, 7r. %9Co(uan!co9' and several individuals, amon! them, 2erdinand E. Marcos, Maria
Clara *obre!at %9*obre!at9', and )anilo #. ?rsua %9?rsua9'. Each of the ei!ht %K' subdivided
complaints, CC No. 00//:A to CC No. 00//:3, correspondin!l impleaded as defendants onl the
alle!ed participants in the transactionIs sub(ect of the suit, or who are averred as ownerIs of the
assets involved.
Apart from this recourse, Ae clarif ri!ht o8 that P#7:A was challen!ed in two other separate but
consolidated petitions for review, one commenced b C+C+2E) et al., doc5eted as >.R. Nos.
,11KF1:FK, and the other, interposed b )anilo #. ?rsua, and doc5eted as >.R. No. ,1K,./.
B )ecision dated 7anuar DE, D0,D, in the aforesaid >.R. Nos. ,11KF1:FK %C+C+2E) et al. v.
Republic' and >.R. No. ,1K,./ %?rsua v. Republic' consolidated cases, %hereinafter collectivel
referred to as 9C+C+2E) v. Republic9', the Court addressed and resolved all 5e matters elevated
to it in relation to P#7:A, e$cept for the issues raised in the instant petition which have not et been
resolved therein. &n the same decision, Ae made clear that@ %,' P#7:A is sub(ect of another petition
for review interposed b Eduardo Co(uan!co, 7r., in >.R. No. ,K010F, entitled Eduardo M.
Co(uan!co, 7r. v. Republic of the Philippines, which shall be decided separatel b the Court,D and
%D' the issues raised in the instant petition should not be a8ected b the earlier decision 9save for
determinativel le!al issues directl addressed therein.9/
2or a better perspective, the instant recourse see5s to reverse the Partial #ummar 7ud!mentE of
the anti:!raft court dated 7ul ,,, D00/, as reiterated in a ResolutionF of )ecember DK, D00E,
denin! C+C+2E)Ts motion for reconsideration, and the Ma ,,, D001 Resolution- denin!
C+C+2E)Ts motion to set case for trial and declarin! the partial summar (ud!ment "nal and
appealable, all issued in P#7:A. &n our adverted 7anuar DE, D0,D )ecision in C+C+2E) v. Republic,
we a<rmed with modi"cation P#7:A of the #andi!anbaan, and its Partial #ummar 7ud!ment in
Civil Case No. 00//:2, dated Ma 1, D00E %hereinafter referred to as 9P#7:2T'.1
More speci"call, Ae upheld the #andi!anbaanTs rulin! that the coconut lev funds are special
public funds of the >overnment. ConseGuentl, Ae a<rmed the #andi!anbaanTs declaration that
#ections , and D of Presidential )ecree %9P.).9' 1FF, #ection /, Article &&& of P.). .-, and #ection /,
Article &&& of P.). ,E-K, as well as the pertinent implementin! re!ulations of the Philippine Coconut
Authorit %9PCA9', are unconstitutional for allowin! the use andIor the distribution of properties
acGuired throu!h the coconut lev funds to private individuals for their own direct bene"t and
absolute ownership. The )ecision also a<rmed the >overnmentTs ownership of the si$ C&&2
companies, the fourteen holdin! companies, and the C&&2 bloc5 of #an Mi!uel Corporation shares
of stoc5, for havin! li5ewise been acGuired usin! the coconut lev funds. Accordin!l, the
properties sub(ect of the 7anuar DE, D0,D )ecision were declared owned b and ordered
reconveed to the >overnment, to be used onl for the bene"t of all coconut farmers and for the
development of the coconut industr.
B Resolution of #eptember E, D0,D,K the Court a<rmed the above:stated )ecision promul!ated
on 7anuar DE, D0,D.
&t bears to stress at this (uncture that the onl portion of the appealed Partial #ummar 7ud!ment
dated 7ul ,,, D00/ %9P#7:A9' which remains at issue revolves around the followin! decretal
holdin!s of that court relatin! to the 9compensation9 paid to petitioner for e$ercisin! his personal
and e$clusive option to acGuire the 2?BI?CPB shares.. &t will be recalled that the #andi!anbaan
declared the A!reement between the PCA and Co(uan!co containin! the assailed 9compensation9
null and void for not havin! the reGuired valuable consideration. ConseGuentl, the ?CPB shares of
stoc5s that are sub(ect of the A!reement were declared conclusivel owned b the >overnment. &t
also held that the A!reement did not have the e8ect of law as it was not published as part of P.).
1FF, even if #ection , thereof made reference to the same.
2acts
Ae reproduce, below, portions of the statement of facts in C+C+2E) v. Republic relevant to the
present case@,0
&n ,.1,, Republic Act No. %9R.A.9' -D-0 was enacted creatin! the Coconut &nvestment Compan
%9C&C9' to administer the Coconut &nvestment 2und %9C&29', which, under #ection K thereof, was to
be sourced from a PhP 0.FF lev on the sale of ever ,00 5!. of copra. +f the PhP 0.FF lev of
which the copra seller was S or ou!ht to be S issued C+C+2?N) receipts, PhP 0.0D was placed at
the disposition of C+C+2E), the national association of coconut producers declared b the
Philippine Coconut Administration %9P3&*C+A9 now 9PCA9' as havin! the lar!est
membership.
The declaration of martial law in #eptember ,.1D saw the issuance of several
presidential decrees %9P.).9' purportedl desi!ned to improve the coconut industr
throu!h the collection and use of the coconut lev fund. Ahile comin! !enerall from
impositions on the "rst sale of copra, the coconut lev fund came under various names
$ $ $. Char!ed with the dut of collectin! and administerin! the 2und was PCA. *i5e
C+C+2E) with which it had a le!al lin5a!e, the PCA, b statutor provisions scattered
in di8erent coco lev decrees, had its share of the coco lev.
The followin! were some of the issuances on the coco lev, its collection and utili6ation,
how the proceeds of the lev will be mana!ed and b whom and the purpose it was
supposed to serve@
,. P.). No. D1- established the Coconut Consumers #tabili6ation 2und %9CC#29'
and declared the proceeds of the CC#2 lev as trust fund, to be utili6ed to
subsidi6e the sale of coconut:based products, thus stabili6in! the price of edible
oil.
D. P.). No. FKD created the Coconut &ndustr )evelopment 2und %9C&)29' to
"nance the operation of a hbrid coconut seed farm.
/. Then came P.). No. 1FF providin! under its #ection , the followin!@
&t is hereb declared that the polic of the #tate is to provide readil
available credit facilities to the coconut farmers at preferential rates= that
this polic can be e$peditiousl and e<cientl reali6ed b the
implementation of the 9A!reement for the AcGuisition of a Commercial
Ban5 for the bene"t of Coconut 2armers9 e$ecuted b the PCA[= and
that the PCA is hereb authori6ed to distribute, for free, the shares of
stoc5 of the ban5 it acGuired to the coconut farmers[.
Towards achievin! the polic thus declared, P.). No. 1FF, under its
#ection D, authori6ed PCA to utili6e the CC#2 and the C&)2 collections to
acGuire a commercial ban5 and deposit the CC#2 lev collections in said
ban5 interest free, the deposit withdrawable onl when the ban5 has
attained a certain level of su<cienc in its eGuit capital. The same
section also decreed that all levies PCA is authori6ed to collect shall not
be considered as special andIor "duciar funds or form part of the
!eneral funds of the !overnment within the contemplation of P.). No.
1,,.
E. P.). No. .-, codi"ed the various laws relatin! to the development of
coconutIpalm oil industries.
F. The relevant provisions of P.). No. .-,, as later amended b P.). No. ,E-K
%Revised Coconut &ndustr Code', read@
ART&C*E &&&
*evies
#ection ,. Coconut Consumers #tabili6ation 2und *ev. J The PCA is
hereb empowered to impose and collect [ the Coconut Consumers
#tabili6ation 2und *ev, [.
[.
#ection F. E$emption. J The CC#2 and theC&)2 as well as all
disbursements as herein authori6ed, shall not be construed [ as
special andIor "duciar funds, or as part of the !eneral funds of the
national !overnment within the contemplation of P) 1,,= [ the
intention bein! that said 2und and the disbursements thereof as
herein authori6ed for the bene"t of the coconut farmers shall be
owned b them in their private capacities@ [. %Emphasis supplied'
-. *etter of &nstructions No. %9*+&9' .D-, s. of ,.1., made reference to the
creation, out of other coco lev funds, of the Coconut &ndustr &nvestment 2und
%9C&&29' in P.). No. ,E-K and entrusted a portion of the C&&2 lev to ?CPB for
investment, on behalf of coconut farmers, in oil mills and other private
corporations, with the followin! eGuit ownership structure@
#ection D. +r!ani6ation of the Cooperative Endeavor. S The ?CPB, in
its capacit as the investment arm of the coconut farmers thru the
C&&2 [ is hereb directed to invest, on behalf of the coconut farmers,
such portion of the C&&2 [ in private corporations [ under the
followin! !uidelines@
a' The coconut farmers shall own or control at least [ %F0P' of the
outstandin! votin! capital stoc5 of the private corporation acGuired
thru the C&&2 andIor corporation owned or controlled b the farmers
thru the C&&2 [. %Aords in brac5et added.'
Throu!h the ears, a part of the coconut lev funds went directl or indirectl to
"nance various pro(ects andIor was converted into various assets or
investments.,, Relevant to the present petition is the acGuisition of the 2irst
?nited Ban5 %92?B9', which was subseGuentl renamed as ?nited Coconut
Planters Ban5 %9?CPB9'.,D
Apropos the intended acGuisition of a commercial ban5 for the purpose stated
earlier, it would appear that 2?B was the ban5 of choice which Pedro
Co(uan!coTs !roup %collectivel, 9Pedro Co(uan!co9' had control of. The plan,
then, was for PCA to bu all of Pedro Co(uan!coTs shares in 2?B. 3owever, as
later events unfolded, a simple direct sale from the seller %Pedro' to PCA did not
ensue as it was made to appear that Co(uan!co had the e$clusive option to
acGuire the formerTs 2?B controllin! interests. Emer!in! from this elaborate,
circuitous arran!ement were two deeds. The "rst one was simpl denominated
as A!reement, dated Ma ,.1F, entered into b and between Co(uan!co for and
in his behalf and in behalf of 9certain other buers9, and Pedro Co(uan!co in
which the former was purportedl accorded the option to bu 1D.DP of 2?BTs
outstandin! capital stoc5, or ,/1,K-- shares %the 9option shares,9 for brevit', at
PhP D00 per share. +n its face, this a!reement does not mention the word
9option.9
The second but related contract, dated Ma DF, ,.1F, was denominated as
A!reement for the AcGuisition of a Commercial Ban5 for the Bene"t of the
Coconut 2armers of the Philippines. &t had PCA, for itself and for the bene"t of
the coconut farmers, purchase from Co(uan!co the shares of stoc5 sub(ect of the
2irst A!reement for PhPD00.00 per share. As additional consideration for PCATs
bu:out of what Co(uan!co would later claim to be his e$clusive and personal
option, it was stipulated that, from PCA, Co(uan!co shall receive eGuit in 2?B
amountin! to ,0P, or 1.DDP, of the 1D.DP, or full paid shares. And so as not to
dilute Co(uan!coTs eGuit position in 2?B, later ?CPB, the PCA a!reed under
para!raph - %b' of the second a!reement to cede over to the former a number
of full paid 2?B shares out of the shares it %PCA' underta5es to eventuall
subscribe. &t was further stipulated that Co(uan!co would act as ban5 president
for an e$tendible period of F ears.
Apart from the aforementioned 1D.DP, PCA purchased from other 2?B
shareholders -,F/E shares of which Co(uan!co, as ma be !athered from the
records, !ot ,0P..
Ahile the -E..KP portion of the option shares %1D.DP S 1.DDP \ -E..KP'
ostensibl pertained to the farmers, the correspondin! stoc5 certi"cates
supposedl representin! the farmersT eGuit were in the name of and delivered
to PCA. There were, however, shares formin! part of the aforesaid -E..KP
portion, which ended up in the hands of non:farmers. The remainin! D1.KP of
the 2?B capital stoc5 were not covered b an of the a!reements.
?nder para!raph ] K of the second a!reement, PCA a!reed to e$peditiousl
distribute the 2?B shares purchased to such 9coconut farmers holdin! re!istered
C+C+2?N) receipts9 on eGuitable basis.
As found b the #andi!anbaan, the PCA appropriated, out of its own fund, an
amount for the purchase of the said 1D.DP eGuit, albeit it would later
reimburse itself from the coconut lev fund.
And per Co(uan!coTs own admission, PCA paid, out of the CC#2, the entire acGuisition price for the
1D.DP option shares.,/
As of 7une /0, ,.1F, the list of 2?B stoc5holders included Co(uan!co with ,E,EE0 shares and PCA
with ,D.,.FF shares.,E &t would appear later that, pursuant to the stipulation on maintainin!
Co(uan!coTs eGuit position in the ban5, PCA would cede to him ,0P of its subscriptions to %a' the
authori6ed but unissued shares of 2?B and %b' the increase in 2?BTs capital stoc5 %the eGuivalent
of ,FK,KE0 and -E.,K00 shares, respectivel'. &n all, from the 9mother9 PCA shares, Co(uan!co
would receive a total of .F,/0E 2?B %?CPB' shares bro5en down as follows@ ,E,EE0 shares ^ ,0P
%,FK,KE0 shares' ^ ,0P %-E.,K00 shares' \ .F,/0E.,F
Ae further Guote, from C+C+2E) v. Republic, facts relevant to the instant case@,-
#hortl after the e$ecution of the PCA S Co(uan!co A!reement, President Marcos issued, on 7ul D.,
,.1F, P.). No. 1FF directin! $ $ $ as narrated, PCA to use the CC#2 and C&)2 to acGuire a
commercial ban5 to provide coco farmers with 9readil available credit facilities at preferential
rate9 $ $ $.
Then came the ,.K- E)#A event. +ne of the priorities of then President Cora6on C.
AGuinoTs revolutionar !overnment was the recover of ill:!otten wealth reportedl
amassed b the Marcos famil and close relatives, their nominees and associates.
Apropos thereto, she issued E$ecutive +rder Nos. %E+' ,, D and ,E, as amended b E.+.
,E:A, all series of ,.K-. E.+. , created the PC>> and provided it with the tools and
processes it ma avail of in the recover e8orts=,1 E.+. No. D asserted that the ill:
!otten assets and properties come in the form of shares of stoc5s, etc., while E.+. No.
,E conferred on the #andi!anbaan e$clusive and ori!inal (urisdiction over ill:!otten
wealth cases, with the proviso that 9technical rules of procedure and evidence shall not
be applied strictl9 to the civil cases "led under the E+. Pursuant to these issuances,
the PC>> issued numerous orders of seGuestration, amon! which were those handed
out $ $ $ a!ainst shares of stoc5 in ?CPB purportedl owned b or re!istered in the
names of %a' the more than a million coconut farmers, %b' the C&&2 companies and %c'
Co(uan!co, 7r., includin! the #MC shares held b the C&&2 companies. +n 7ul /,, ,.K1,
the PC>> instituted before the #andi!anbaan a recover suit doc5eted thereat as CC
No. 00//.
$ $ $ $
/. Civil Case 00// $ $ $ would be subdivided into ei!ht complaints, doc5eted as CC
00//:A to CC 00//:3.
$ $ $ $
F. B )ecision of )ecember ,E, D00,, in >.R. Nos. ,E10-D:-E %Republic v.
C+C+2E)',,K the Court declared the coco lev funds as prima facie public funds. And
purchased as the seGuestered ?CPB shares were b such funds, bene"cial ownership
thereon and the corollar votin! ri!hts prima facie pertain, accordin! to the Court, to
the !overnment.
$ $ $ $
Correlativel, the Republic, on the stren!th of the )ecember ,E, D00, rulin! in Republic
v. C+C+2E) and on the ar!ument, amon! others, that the claim of C+C+2E) and
Ballares et al., over the sub(ect ?CPB shares is based solel on the supposed
C+C+2?N) receipts issued for pament of the RA -D-0 C&2 lev, "led a Motion for
Partial #ummar 7ud!ment RE@ C+C+2E), et al. and Ballares, et al. dated April DD,
D00D, prain! that a summar (ud!ment be rendered declarin!@
a. That #ection D of BP)C 1FF, #ection F, Article &&& of P.). .-, and #ection F,
Article &&& of P.). No. ,E-K are unconstitutional=
b. That $ $ $ %C&2' paments under $ $ $ %R.A.' No. -D-0 are not valid and le!al
bases for ownership claims over ?CPB shares= and
c. That C+C+2E), et al., and Ballares, et al. have not le!all and validl
obtained title over the sub(ect ?CPB shares.
Ri!ht after it "led the Motion for Partial #ummar 7ud!ment RE@ C+C+2E), et al. and Ballares, et
al., the Republic interposed a Motion for Partial #ummar 7ud!ment Re@ Eduardo M. Co(uan!co, 7r.,
prain! that a summar (ud!ment be rendered@
a. )eclarin! that #ection , of P.). No. 1FF is unconstitutional insofar as it validates the
provisions in the 9PCA:Co(uan!co A!reement $ $ $9 dated Ma DF, ,.1F providin! pament
of ten percent %,0P' commission to defendant Co(uan!co with respect to the 2?B, now
?CPB shares sub(ect matter thereof=
b. )eclarin! that $ $ $ Co(uan!co, 7r. and his fronts, nominees and dummies, includin! $ $ $
and )anilo #. ?rsua, have not le!all and validl obtained title over the sub(ect ?CPB
shares= and
c. )eclarin! that the !overnment is the lawful and true owner of the sub(ect ?CPB shares
re!istered in the names of [ Co(uan!co, 7r. and the entities and persons above:
enumerated, for the bene"t of all coconut farmers. $ $ $
2ollowin! an e$chan!e of pleadin!s, the Republic "led its sur:re(oinder prain! that it be
conclusivel declared the true and absolute owner of the coconut lev funds and the ?CPB shares
acGuired therefrom.,.
Ae Guote from C+C+2E) v. Republic@D0
A (oint hearin! on the separate motions for summar (ud!ment to determine what material facts
e$ist with or without controvers then ensued. B +rder of March ,,, D00/, the #andi!anbaan
detailed, based on this CourtTs rulin! in related ill:!otten cases, the partiesT manifestations made
in open court and the pleadin!s and evidence on record, the facts it found to be without
substantial controvers, to!ether with the admissions andIor e$tent of the admission made b the
parties respectin! relevant facts, as follows@
As culled from the e$haustive discussions and manifestations of the parties in open
court of their respective pleadin!s and evidence on record, the facts which e$ist
without an substantial controvers are set forth hereunder, to!ether with the
admissions andIor the e$tent or scope of the admissions made b the parties relatin!
to the relevant facts@
,. The late President 2erdinand E. Marcos was President $ $ $ for two terms
under the ,./F Constitution and, durin! the second term, he declared Martial
*aw throu!h Proclamation No. ,0K, dated #eptember D,, ,.1D.
D. +n 7anuar ,1, ,.1/, he issued Proclamation No. ,,0D announcin! the
rati"cation of the ,.1/ Constitution.
/. 2rom 7anuar ,1, ,.1/ to April 1, ,.K,, he $ $ $ e$ercised the powers and
prero!ative of President under the ,./F Constitution and the powers and
prero!ative of President $ $ $ the ,.1/ Constitution.
3e $ $ $ promul!ated various P.).s, amon! which were P.). No. D/D, P.). No.
D1-, P.). No. E,E, P.). No. 1FF, P.). No. .-, and P.). No. ,E-K.
E. +n April ,1, ,.K,, amendments to the ,.1/ Constitution were e8ected and,
on 7une /0, ,.K,, he, after bein! elected President, 9reassumed the title and
e$ercised the powers of the President until DF 2ebruar ,.K-.9
F. )efendants Maria Clara *obre!at and 7ose R. Elea6ar, 7r. were PCA )irectors $
$ $ durin! the period ,.10 to ,.K- $ $ $.
-. Plainti8 admits the e$istence of the followin! a!reements which are attached
as Anne$es 9A9 and 9B9 to the +pposition dated +ctober ,0, D00D of defendant
Eduardo M. Co(uan!co, 7r. to the above:cited Motion for Partial #ummar
7ud!ment@
a' 9This A!reement made and entered into this ______ da of Ma,
,.1F at Ma5ati, Ri6al, Philippines, b and between@
PE)R+ C+7?AN>C+, 2ilipino, of le!al a!e and with residence at ,F1F
Princeton #t., Mandaluon!, Ri6al, for and in his own behalf and in
behalf of certain other stoc5holders of 2irst ?nited Ban5 listed in
Anne$ 9A9 attached hereto %hereinafter collectivel called the
#E**ER#'=
S and S
E)?AR)+ C+7?AN>C+, 7R., 2ilipino, of le!al a!e and with residence
at ,/- .th #treet corner Balete )rive, Que6on Cit, represented in
this act b his dul authori6ed attorne:in:fact, E)>AR)+ 7. AN>ARA,
for and in his own behalf and in behalf of certain other buers,
%hereinafter collectivel called the B?MER#'9=
A&TNE##ET3@ That
A3EREA#, the #E**ER# own of record and bene"ciall a total of
,/1,K-- shares of stoc5, with a par value of P,00.00 each, of the
common stoc5 of the 2irst ?nited Ban5 %the 9Ban59', a commercial
ban5in! corporation e$istin! under the laws of the Philippines=
A3EREA#, the B?MER# desire to purchase, and the #E**ER# are
willin! to sell, the aforementioned shares of stoc5 totalin! ,/1,K--
shares %hereinafter called the 9Contract #hares9' owned b the
#E**ER# due to their special relationship to E)?AR)+ C+7?AN>C+,
7R.=
N+A, T3ERE2+RE, for and in consideration of the premises and the
mutual covenants herein contained, the parties a!ree as follows@
,. #ale and Purchase of Contract #hares
#ub(ect to the terms and conditions of this A!reement, the
#E**ER# hereb sell, assi!n, transfer and conve unto the
B?MER#, and the B?MER# hereb purchase and acGuire, the
Contract #hares free and clear of all liens and encumbrances
thereon.
D. Contract Price
The purchase price per share of the Contract #hares paable
b the B?MER# is PD00.00 or an a!!re!ate price of
PD1,F1/,D00.00 %the 9Contract Price9'.
/. )eliver of, and pament for, stoc5 certi"cates
?pon the e$ecution of this A!reement, %i' the #E**ER# shall
deliver to the B?MER# the stoc5 certi"cates representin! the
Contract #hares, free and clear of all liens, encumbrances,
obli!ations, liabilities and other burdens in favor of the Ban5
or third parties, dul endorsed in blan5 or with stoc5 powers
su<cient to transfer the shares to bearer= and %ii' B?MER#
shall deliver to the #E**ER# PD1,F,,,D.F.F0 representin! the
Contract Price less the amount of stoc5 transfer ta$es paable
b the #E**ER#, which the B?MER# underta5e to remit to the
appropriate authorities. %Emphasis added.'
E. Representation and Aarranties of #ellers
The #E**ER# respectivel and independentl of each other
represent and warrant that@
%a' The #E**ER# are the lawful owners of, with !ood
mar5etable title to, the Contract #hares and that %i' the
certi"cates to be delivered pursuant thereto have been
validl issued and are full paid and non:assessable=
%ii' the Contract #hares are free and clear of all liens,
encumbrances, obli!ations, liabilities and other
burdens in favor of the Ban5 or third parties $ $ $.
This representation shall survive the e$ecution and
deliver of this A!reement and the consummation or
transfer hereb contemplated.
%b' The e$ecution, deliver and performance of this
A!reement b the #E**ER# does not conRict with or
constitute an breach of an provision in an
a!reement to which the are a part or b which the
ma be bound.
%c' The have complied with the condition set forth in
Article H of the Amended Articles of &ncorporation of
the Ban5.
F. Representation of B?MER#
$ $ $ $
-. &mplementation
The parties hereto hereb a!ree to e$ecute or cause to be
e$ecuted such documents and instruments as ma be
reGuired in order to carr out the intent and purpose of this
A!reement.
1. Notices
$ $ $ $
&N A&TNE## A3ERE+2, the parties hereto have hereunto set their
hands at the place and on the date "rst above written.
PE)R+ C+7?AN>C+
%on his own behalf and in
behalf of the other
listed in Anne$ 9A9 hereof'
%#E**ER#'
E)?AR)+ C+7?AN>C+, 7R.
%on his own behalf and in behalf
#ellers of the other Buers'
%B?MER#'
B@
E)>AR)+ 7. AN>ARA
Attorne:in:2act
$ $ $ $
b' 9A!reement for the AcGuisition of a Commercial Ban5 for the Bene"t of the
Coconut 2armers of the Philippines, made and entered into this DFth da of Ma
,.1F at Ma5ati, Ri6al, Philippines, b and between@
E)?AR)+ M. C+7?AN>C+, 7R., 2ilipino, of le!al a!e, with business
address at ,0th 2loor, #i5atuna Buildin!, Aala Avenue, Ma5ati, Ri6al,
hereinafter referred to as the #E**ER=
S and S
P3&*&PP&NE C+C+N?T A?T3+R&TM, a public corporation created b
Presidential )ecree No. D/D, as amended, for itself and for the
bene"t of the coconut farmers of the Philippines, %hereinafter called
the B?MER'9
A&TNE##ET3@ That
A3EREA#, on Ma ,1, ,.1F, the Philippine Coconut Producers
2ederation %9PCP29', throu!h its Board of )irectors, e$pressed the
desire of the coconut farmers to own a commercial ban5 which will
be an e8ective instrument to solve the perennial credit problems
and, for that purpose, passed a resolution reGuestin! the PCA to
ne!otiate with the #E**ER for the transfer to the coconut farmers of
the #E**ERTs option to bu the 2irst ?nited Ban5 %the 9Ban59' under
such terms and conditions as B?MER ma deem to be in the best
interest of the coconut farmers and instructed Mrs. Maria Clara
*obre!at to conve such reGuest to the B?MER=
A3EREA#, the PCP2 further instructed Mrs. Maria Clara *obre!at to
ma5e representations with the B?MER to utili6e its funds to "nance
the purchase of the Ban5=
A3EREA#, the #E**ER has the e$clusive and personal option to bu
,EE,E00 shares %the 9+ption #hares9' of the Ban5, constitutin! 1D.DP
of the present outstandin! shares of stoc5 of the Ban5, at the price of
PD00.00 per share, which option onl the #E**ER can validl
e$ercise=
A3EREA#, in response to the representations made b the coconut
farmers, the B?MER has reGuested the #E**ER to e$ercise his
personal option for the bene"t of the coconut farmers=
A3EREA#, the #E**ER is willin! to transfer the +ption #hares to the
B?MER at a price eGual to his option price of PD00 per share=
A3EREA#, reco!ni6in! that ownership b the coconut farmers of a
commercial ban5 is a permanent solution to their perennial credit
problems, that it will accelerate the !rowth and development of the
coconut industr and that the polic of the state which the B?MER is
reGuired to implement is to achieve vertical inte!ration thereof so
that coconut farmers will become participants in, and bene"ciaries of
the development and !rowth of the coconut industr, the B?MER
approved the reGuest of PCP2 that it acGuire a commercial ban5 to
be owned b the coconut farmers and, appropriated, for that
purpose, the sum of P,F0 Million to enable the farmers to bu the
Ban5 and capitali6e the Ban5 to such an e$tension as to be in a
position to adopt a credit polic for the coconut farmers at
preferential rates=
A3EREA#, $ $ $ the B?MER is willin! to subscribe to additional shares
%9#ubscribed #hares9' and place the Ban5 in a more favorable
"nancial position to e$tend loans and credit facilities to coconut
farmers at preferential rates=
N+A, T3ERE2+RE, for and in consideration of the fore!oin! premises
and the other terms and conditions hereinafter contained, the parties
hereb declare and a<rm that their principal contractual intent is %,'
to ensure that the coconut farmers own at least -0P of the
outstandin! capital stoc5 of the Ban5= and %D' that the #E**ER shall
receive compensation for e$ercisin! his personal and e$clusive
option to acGuire the +ption #hares, for transferrin! such shares to
the coconut farmers at the option price of PD00 per share, and for
performin! the mana!ement services reGuired of him hereunder.
,. To ensure that the transfer to the coconut farmers of the
+ption #hares is e8ected with the least possible dela and to
provide for the faithful performance of the obli!ations of the
parties hereunder, the parties hereb appoint the Philippine
National Ban5 as their escrow a!ent %the 9Escrow A!ent9'.
?pon e$ecution of this A!reement, the B?MER shall deposit
with the Escrow A!ent such amount as ma be necessar to
implement the terms of this A!reement $ $ $.
D. As promptl as practicable after e$ecution of this
A!reement, the #E**ER shall e$ercise his option to acGuire
the +ption #hare and #E**ER shall immediatel thereafter
deliver and turn over to the Escrow A!ent such stoc5
certi"cates as are herein provided to be received from the
e$istin! stoc5holders of the Ban5 b virtue of the e$ercise on
the aforementioned option $ $ $.
/. To ensure the stabilit of the Ban5 and continuit of
mana!ement and credit policies to be adopted for the bene"t
of the coconut farmers, the parties underta5e to cause the
stoc5holders and the Board of )irectors of the Ban5 to
authori6e and approve a mana!ement contract between the
Ban5 and the #E**ER under the followin! terms@
%a' The mana!ement contract shall be for a period of
"ve %F' ears, renewable for another "ve %F' ears b
mutual a!reement of the #E**ER and the Ban5=
%b' The #E**ER shall be elected President and shall
hold o<ce at the pleasure of the Board of )irectors.
Ahile servin! in such capacit, he shall be entitled to
such salaries and emoluments as the Board of
)irectors ma determine=
%c' The #E**ER shall recruit and develop a professional
mana!ement team to mana!e and operate the Ban5
under the control and supervision of the Board of
)irectors of the Ban5=
%d' The B?MER underta5es to cause three %/' persons
desi!nated b the #E**ER to be elected to the Board of
)irectors of the Ban5=
%e' The #E**ER shall receive no compensation for
mana!in! the Ban5, other than such salaries or
emoluments to which he ma be entitled b virtue of
the dischar!e of his function and duties as President,
provided $ $ $ and
%f' The mana!ement contract ma be assi!ned to a
mana!ement compan owned and controlled b the
#E**ER.
E. As compensation for e$ercisin! his personal and e$clusive
option to acGuire the +ption #hares and for transferrin! such
shares to the coconut farmers, as well as for performin! the
mana!ement services reGuired of him, #E**ER shall receive
eGuit in the Ban5 amountin!, in the a!!re!ate, to .F,/0E
full paid shares in accordance with the procedure set forth in
para!raph - below=
F. &n order to compl with the Central Ban5 pro!ram for
increased capitali6ation of ban5s and to ensure that the Ban5
will be in a more favorable "nancial position to attain its
ob(ective to e$tend to the coconut farmers loans and credit
facilities, the B?MER underta5es to subscribe to shares with an
a!!re!ate par value of PK0,K-E,000 %the 9#ubscribed
#hares9'. The obli!ation of the B?MER with respect to the
#ubscribed #hares shall be as follows@
%a' The B?MER underta5es to subscribe, for the bene"t
of the coconut farmers, to shares with an a!!re!ate
par value of P,F,KKE,000 from the present authori6ed
but unissued shares of the Ban5= and
%b' The B?MER underta5es to subscribe, for the bene"t
of the coconut farmers, to shares with an a!!re!ate
par value of P-E,.K0,000 from the increased capital
stoc5 of the Ban5, which subscriptions shall be deemed
made upon the approval b the stoc5holders of the
increase of the authori6ed capital stoc5 of the Ban5
from PF0 Million to P,E0 Million.
The parties underta5e to declare stoc5 dividends of PK Million
out of the present authori6ed but unissued capital stoc5 of
P/0 Million.
-. To carr into e8ect the a!reement of the parties that the
#E**ER shall receive as his compensation .F,/0E shares@
%a' The Escrow A!ent shall, upon receipt from the
#E**ER of the stoc5 certi"cates representin! the
+ption #hares, dul endorsed in blan5 or with stoc5
powers su<cient to transfer the same to bearer,
present such stoc5 certi"cates to the Transfer A!ent of
the Ban5 and shall cause such Transfer A!ent to issue
stoc5 certi"cates of the Ban5 in the followin! ratio@ one
share in the name of the #E**ER for ever nine shares
in the name of the B?MER.
%b' Aith respect to the #ubscribed #hares, the B?MER
underta5es, in order to prevent the dilution of #E**ERTs
eGuit position, that it shall cede over to the #E**ER
-E,.K0 full:paid shares out of the #ubscribed #hares.
#uch underta5in! shall be complied with in the
followin! manner@ upon receipt of advice that the
B?MER has subscribed to the #ubscribed #hares upon
approval b the stoc5holders of the increase of the
authori6ed capital stoc5 of the Ban5, the Escrow A!ent
shall thereupon issue a chec5 in favor of the Ban5
coverin! the total pament for the #ubscribed #hares.
The Escrow A!ent shall thereafter cause the Transfer
A!ent to issue a stoc5 certi"cates of the Ban5 in the
followin! ratio@ one share in the name of the #E**ER
for ever nine shares in the name of the B?MER.
1. The parties further underta5e that the Board of )irectors and mana!ement of
the Ban5 shall establish and implement a loan polic for the Ban5 of ma5in!
available for loans at preferential rates of interest to the coconut farmers $ $ $.
K. The B?MER shall e$peditiousl distribute from time to time the shares of the
Ban5, that shall be held b it for the bene"t of the coconut farmers of the
Philippines under the provisions of this A!reement, to such, coconut farmers
holdin! re!istered C+C+2?N) receipts on such eGuitable basis as ma be
determine b the B?MER in its sound discretion.
.. $ $ $ $
,0. To ensure that not onl e$istin! but future coconut farmers shall be
participants in and bene"ciaries of the credit policies, and shall be entitled to
the bene"t of loans and credit facilities to be e$tended b the Ban5 to coconut
farmers at preferential rates, the shares held b the coconut farmers shall not
be entitled to pre:emptive ri!hts with respect to the unissued portion of the
authori6ed capital stoc5 or an increase thereof.
,,. After the parties shall have acGuired two:thirds %DI/' of the outstandin!
shares of the Ban5, the parties shall call a special stoc5holdersT meetin! of the
Ban5@
%a' To classif the present authori6ed capital stoc5 of PF0,000,000 divided
into F00,000 shares, with a par value of P,00.00 per share into@ /-,,000
Class A shares, with an a!!re!ate par value of P/-,,00,000 and ,/.,000
Class B shares, with an a!!re!ate par value of P,/,.00,000. All of the
+ption #hares constitutin! 1D.DP of the outstandin! shares, shall be
classi"ed as Class A shares and the balance of the outstandin! shares,
constitutin! D1.KP of the outstandin! shares, as Class B shares=
%b' To amend the articles of incorporation of the Ban5 to e8ect the
followin! chan!es@
%i' chan!e of corporate name to 2irst ?nited Coconut Ban5=
%ii' replace the present provision restrictin! the transferabilit of
the shares with a limitation on ownership b an individual or
entit to not more than ,0P of the outstandin! shares of the
Ban5=
%iii' provide that the holders of Class A shares shall not be entitled
to pre:emptive ri!hts with respect to the unissued portion of the
authori6ed capital stoc5 or an increase thereof= and
%iv' provide that the holders of Class B shares shall be absolutel
entitled to pre:emptive ri!hts, with respect to the unissued portion
of Class B shares comprisin! part of the authori6ed capital stoc5
or an increase thereof, to subscribe to Class B shares in
proportion t the subscriptions of Class A shares, and to pa for
their subscriptions to Class B shares within a period of "ve %F'
ears from the call of the Board of )irectors.
%c' To increase the authori6ed capital stoc5 of the Ban5 from PF0 Million
to P,E0 Million, divided into ,,0,0,K00 Class A shares and /K.,D00 Class
B shares, each with a par value of P,00 per share=
%d' To declare a stoc5 dividend of PK Million paable to the #E**ER, the
B?MER and other stoc5holders of the Ban5 out of the present authori6ed
but unissued capital stoc5 of P/0 Million=
%e' To amend the b:laws of the Ban5 accordin!l= and
%f' To authori6e and approve the mana!ement contract provided in
para!raph D above.
The parties a!ree that the shall vote their shares and ta5e all the necessar
corporate action in order to carr into e8ect the fore!oin! provisions of this
para!raph ,,, includin! such other amendments of the articles of incorporation
and b:laws of the Ban5 as are necessar in order to implement the intention of
the parties with respect thereto.
,D. &t is the contemplation of the parties that the Ban5 shall achieve a "nancial
and eGuit position to be able to lend to the coconut farmers at preferential
rates.
&n order to achieve such ob(ective, the parties shall cause the Ban5 to adopt a
polic of reinvestment, b wa of stoc5 dividends, of such percenta!e of the
pro"ts of the Ban5 as ma be necessar.
,/. The parties a!ree to e$ecute or cause to be e$ecuted such documents and
instruments as ma be reGuired in order to carr out the intent and purpose of
this A!reement.
&N A&TNE## A3ERE+2 $ $ $
P3&*&PP&NE C+C+N?T A?T3+R&TM
%B?MER'
B@
E)?AR)+ C+7?AN>C+, 7R.
%#E**ER'
MAR&A C*ARA *. *+BRE>AT
$ $ $ $
1. )efendants *obre!at, et al. and C+C+2E), et al. and Ballares, et al. admit that the $
$ $ %PCA' was the 9other buers9 represented b defendant Eduardo M. Co(uan!co, 7r. in
the Ma ,.1F A!reement entered into between Pedro Co(uan!co %on his own behalf
and in behalf of other sellers listed in Anne$ 9A9of the a!reement' and defendant
Eduardo M. Co(uan!co, 7r. %on his own behalf and in behalf of the other buers'.
)efendant Co(uan!co insists he was the 9onl buer9 under the aforesaid A!reement.
K. )efendant Eduardo M. Co(uan!co, 7r. did not own an share in the $ $ $ %2?B' prior to
the e$ecution of the two A!reements $ $ $.
.. )efendants *obre!at, et al., and C+C+2E), et al., and Ballares, et al. admit that in
addition to the ,/1,K-- 2?B shares of Pedro Co(uan!co, et al. covered b the
A!reement, other 2?B stoc5holders sold their shares to PCA such that the total number
of 2?B shares purchased b PCA [ increased from ,/1,K-- shares to ,EE,E00 shares,
the +PT&+N #3ARE# referred to in the A!reement of Ma DF, ,.1F. )efendant
Co(uan!co did not ma5e said admission as to the said -,F/E shares in e$cess of the
,/1,K-- shares covered b the A!reement with Pedro Co(uan!co.
,0. )efendants *obre!at, et al. and C+C+2E), et al. and Ballares, et al. admit that the
A!reement, described in #ection , of Presidential )ecree %P.).' No. 1FF dated 7ul D.,
,.1F as the 9A!reement for the AcGuisition of a Commercial Ban5 for the Bene"t of
Coconut 2armers9 e$ecuted b the Philippine Coconut Authorit9 and incorporated in
#ection , of P.). No. 1FF b reference, refers to the 9A>REEMENT 2+R T3E
ACQ?&#&T&+N +2 A C+MMERC&A* BAN4 2+R T3E BENE2&T +2 T3E C+C+N?T 2ARMER#
+2 T3E P3&*&PP&NE#9 dated Ma DF, ,.1F between defendant Eduardo M. Co(uan!co, 7r.
and the PCA %Anne$ 9B9 for defendant Co(uan!coTs +PP+#&T&+N T+ P*A&NT&22T#
M+T&+N 2+R PART&A* #?MMARM 7?)>MENT RE@ E)?AR)+ M. C+7?AN>C+, 7R. dated
#eptember ,K, D00D'.
Plainti8 refused to ma5e the same admission.
,,. As to whether P.). No. 1FF and the te$t of the a!reement described therein was
published, the Court ta5es (udicial notice that P.). No. 1FF was published in $ $ $
volume 1, of the +<cial >a6ette but the te$t of the a!reement $ $ $ was not so
published with P.). No. 1FF.
,D. )efendants *obre!at, et al. and C+C+2E), et al. and Ballares, et al. admit that the
PCA used public funds $ $ $ in the total amount of P,F0 million, to purchase the 2?B
shares amountin! to 1D.DP of the authori6ed capital stoc5 of the 2?B, althou!h the
PCA was later reimbursed from the coconut lev funds and that the PCA subscription in
the increased capitali6ation of the 2?B, which was later renamed the $ $ $ %?CPB',
came from the said coconut lev funds $ $ $.
,/. Pursuant to the Ma DF, ,.1F A!reement, out of the 1D.DP shares of the authori6ed
and the increased capital stoc5 of the 2?B %later ?CPB', entirel paid for b PCA,
-E..KP of the shares were placed in the name of the 9PCA for the bene"t of the
coconut farmers9 and 1,DDP were !iven to defendant Co(uan!co. The remainin! D1.KP
shares of stoc5 in the 2?B which later became the ?CPB were not covered b the two
%D' a!reements referred to in item no. -, par. %a' and %b' above. 9There were shares
formin! part of the aforementioned -E..KP which were later sold or transferred to non:
coconut farmers.
,E. ?nder the Ma D1, ,.1F A!reement, defendant Co(uan!coTs eGuit in the 2?B %now
?CPB' was ten percent %,0P' of the shares of stoc5 acGuired b the PCA for the bene"t
of the coconut farmers.
,F. That the full paid .F./0E shares of the 2?B, later the ?CPB, acGuired b defendant
$ $ $ Co(uan!co, 7r. pursuant to the Ma DF, ,.1F A!reement were paid for b the PCA
in accordance with the terms and conditions provided in the said A!reement. ,-.
)efendants *obre!at, et al. and C+C+2E), et al. and Ballares, et al. admit that the
a<davits of the coconut farmers %speci"call, E$hibit 9,:2armer9 to 910:2armer9'
uniforml state that@
a. the are coconut farmers who sold coconut products=
b. in the sale thereof, the received C+C+2?N) receipts pursuant to R.A. No.
-D-0=
c. the re!istered the said C+C+2?N) receipts= and
d. b virtue thereof, and under R.A. No. -D-0, P.). Nos. 1FF, .-, and ,E-K, the
are alle!edl entitled to the sub(ect ?CPB shares.
but sub(ect to the followin! Guali"cations@
a. there were other coconut farmers who received ?CPB shares althou!h the
did not present said C+C+2?N) receipt because the PCA distributed the
unclaimed ?CPB shares not onl to those who alread received their ?CPB
shares in e$chan!e for their C+C+2?N) receipts but also to the coconut farmers
determined b a national census conducted pursuant to PCA administrative
issuances=
b. there were other a<davits e$ecuted b *obre!at, Elea6ar, Ballares and
Alde!uer relative to the said distribution of the unclaimed ?CPB shares= and
c. the coconut farmers claim the ?CPB shares b virtue of their compliance not
onl with the laws mentioned in item %d' above but also with the relevant
issuances of the PCA such as, PCA Administrative +rder No. ,, dated Au!ust D0,
,.1F %E$h. 9D.K:2armer9'= PCA Resolution No. 0//:1K dated 2ebruar ,-,
,.1K[.
The plainti8 did not ma5e an admission as to the fore!oin! Guali"cations.
,1. )efendants *obre!at, et al. and C+C+2E), et al. and Ballares, et al. claim that the
?CPB shares in Guestion have le!itimatel become the private properties of the
,,E0F,/-- coconut farmers solel on the basis of their havin! acGuired said shares in
compliance with R.A. No. -D-0, P.). Nos. 1FF, .-, and ,E-K and the administrative
issuances of the PCA cited above.
,K. +n the other hand, defendant [ Co(uan!co, 7r. claims ownership of the ?CPB
shares, which he holds, solel on the basis of the two A!reements[. %Emphasis and
words in brac5ets added.'
+n 7ul ,,, D00/, the #andi!anbaan issued the assailed P#7:A, rulin! in favor of the Republic,
disposin! insofar as pertinent as follows@D,
A3ERE2+RE, in view of the fore!oin!, we rule as follows@
$ $ $ $
C. Re@ M+T&+N 2+R PART&A* #?MMARM 7?)>MENT %RE@ E)?AR)+ M. C+7?AN>C+, 7R.' dated
#eptember ,K, D00D "led b plainti8.
,. #ec. , of P.). No. 1FF did not validate the A!reement between PCA and defendant
Eduardo M. Co(uan!co, 7r. dated Ma DF, ,.1F nor did it !ive the A!reement the bindin!
force of a law because of the non:publication of the said A!reement.
D. Re!ardin! the Guestioned transfer of the shares of stoc5 of 2?B %later ?CPB' b PCA to
defendant Co(uan!co or the so:called 9Co(uan!co ?CPB shares9 which cost the PCA more
than Ten Million Pesos in CC#2 in ,.1F, we declare, that the transfer of the followin!
2?BI?CPB shares to defendant Eduardo M. Co(uan!co, 7r. was not supported b valuable
consideration, and therefore null and void@
a. The ,E,E00 shares from the 9+ption #hares9=
b. Additional Ban5 #hares #ubscribed and Paid b PCA, consistin! of@
,. 2ifteen Thousand Ei!ht 3undred Ei!ht:2our %,F,KKE' shares out of the
authori6ed but unissued shares of the ban5, subscribed and paid b PCA=
D. #i$t 2our Thousand Nine 3undred Ei!ht %-E,.K0' shares of the increased
capital stoc5 subscribed and paid b PCA= and
/. #toc5 dividends declared pursuant to para!raph F and para!raph ,, %iv'
%d' of the A!reement.
/. The above:mentioned shares of stoc5 of the 2?BI?CPB transferred to defendant
Co(uan!co are hereb declared conclusivel owned b the plainti8 Republic of the
Philippines.
E. The ?CPB shares of stoc5 of the alle!ed fronts, nominees and dummies of defendant
Eduardo M. Co(uan!co, 7r. which form part of the 1D.DP shares of the 2?BI?CPB paid for b
the
PCA with public funds later char!ed to the coconut lev funds, particularl the CC#2, belon! to the
plainti8 Republic of the Philippines as their true and bene"cial owner.
*et trial of this Civil Case proceed with respect to the issues which have not been disposed of in
this Partial #ummar 7ud!ment. 2or this purpose, the plainti8Ts Motion Ad Cautelam to Present
Additional Evidence dated March DK, D00, is hereb >RANTE).DD %Emphasis and underlinin!
added.'
As earlier e$plained, the core issue in this instant petition is Part C of the dispositive portion in P#7:
A declarin! the 1.DDP 2?B %now ?CPB' shares transferred to Co(uan!co, plus the other shares paid
b the PCA as 9conclusivel9 owned b the Republic. Parts A and B of the same dispositive portion
have alread been "nall resolved and ad(udicated b this Court in C+C+2E) v. Republic on
7anuar DE, D0,D.D/
2rom P#7:A, Co(uan!co moved for partial reconsideration but the #andi!anbaan, b
ResolutionDE of )ecember DK, D00E, denied the motion.
3ence, the instant petition.
The &ssues
Co(uan!coTs petition formulates the issues in Guestion form, as follows@DF
a. &s the acGuisition of the so:called Co(uan!co, 7r. ?CPB shares b petitioner Co(uan!co $ $
$ 9not supported b valuable consideration and, therefore, null and void9`
b. )id the #andi!anbaan have (urisdiction, in Civil Case No. 00//:A, an 9ill:!otten wealth9
case brou!ht under E+ Nos. , and D, to declare the Co(uan!co ?CPB shares acGuired b
virtue of the Pedro Co(uan!co, et al. A!reement andIor the PCA A!reement null and void
because 9not supported b valuable consideration9`
c. Aas the claim that the acGuisition b petitioner Co(uan!co of shares representin! 1.DP of
the outstandin! capital stoc5 of 2?B %later ?CPB' 9not supported b valuable
consideration9, a 9claim9 pleaded in the complaint and ma therefore be the basis of a
9summar (ud!ment9 under #ection ,, Rule /F of the Rules of Court`
d. B declarin! the Co(uan!co ?CPB shares as 9not supported b valuable consideration,
and therefore, null and void9, did the #andi!anbaan e8ectivel nullif the PCA A!reement`
Ma the #andi!anbaan nullif the PCA A!reement when the parties to the A!reement,
namel@ $ $ $ concede its validit` &f the PCA A!reement be deemed 9null and void9, should
not the 2?B %later ?CPB' shares revert to petitioner Co(uan!co %under the PCA A!reement'
or to Pedro Co(uan!co, et al. $ $ $` Aould there be a basis then, even assumin! the
absence of consideration $ $ $, to declare 1.DP ?CPB shares of petitioner Co(uan!co as
9conclusivel owned b the plainti8 Republic of the Philippines9`D-
The CourtTs Rulin!
&
T3E #AN)&>ANBAMAN 3A# 7?R&#)&CT&+N +LER T3E #?B7ECT MATTER +2 T3E #?B)&L&)E)
AMEN)E) C+MP*A&NT#, &NC*?)&N> T3E #3ARE# A**E>E)*M ACQ?&RE) BM C+7?AN>C+ BM
L&RT?E +2 T3E PCA A>REEMENT#.
The issue of (urisdiction over the sub(ect matter of the subdivided amended complaints has
peremptoril been put to rest b the Court in its 7anuar DE, D0,D )ecision in C+C+2E) v.
Republic. There, the Court, citin! Re!aladoD1and settled (urisprudence, stressed the followin!
interloc5in! precepts@ #ub(ect matter (urisdiction is conferred b law, not b the consent or
acGuiescence of an or all of the parties. &n turn, the issue on whether a suit comes within the
penumbra of a statutor conferment is determined b the alle!ations in the complaint, re!ardless
of whether or not the suitor will be entitled to recover upon all or part of the claims asserted.
The RepublicTs material averments in its complaint subdivided in CC No. 00//:A included the
followin!@
CC No. 00//:A
,D. )efendant Eduardo M. Co(uan!co, 7r. served as a public o<cer durin! the Marcos
administration. )urin! the period of his incumbenc as a public o<cer, he acGuired assets, funds
and other propert !rossl and manifestl disproportionate to his salaries, lawful income and
income from le!itimatel acGuired propert.
,/. )efendant Eduardo M. Co(uan!co, 7r., ta5in! undue advanta!e of his association, inRuence,
connection, and actin! in unlawful concert with )efendants 2erdinand E. Marcos and &melda R.
Marcos, AN) T3E &N)&L&)?A* )E2EN)ANT#, embar5ed upon devices, schemes and strata!ems, to
un(ustl enrich themselves at the e$pense of Plainti8 and the 2ilipino people, such as when he S
a' manipulated, be!innin! the ear ,.1F with the active collaboration of )efendants $ $ $
Maria Clara *obre!at, )anilo ?rsua etc., the purchase b . . . %PCA' of 1D.DP of the
outstandin! capital stoc5 of the $ $ $ %2?B' which was subseGuentl converted into a
universal ban5 named $ $ $ %?CPB' throu!h the use of the Coconut Consumers #tabili6ation
2und %CC#2' bein! initiall in the amount of PKF,11/,,00.00 in a manner contrar to law
and to the speci"c purposes for which said coconut lev funds were imposed and collected
under P.). D1-, and with sinister desi!ns and under anomalous circumstances, to wit@
%i' )efendant Eduardo Co(uan!co, 7r. coveted the coconut lev funds as a cheap,
lucrative and ris5:free source of funds with which to e$ercise his private option to
bu the controllin! interest in 2?B= thus, claimin! that the 1D.DP of the outstandin!
capital stoc5 of 2?B could onl be purchased and transferred throu!h the e$ercise of
his 9personal and e$clusive action option to acGuire the ,EE,000 shares9 of the ban5,
)efendant Eduardo M. Co(uan!co, 7r. and PCA, $ $ $ e$ecuted on Ma D-, ,.1F a
purchase a!reement which provides, amon! others, for the pament to him in full
paid shares as compensation thereof .F,/KE shares worth P,,EEE,000.00 with the
further condition that he shall mana!e and control the ban5 as )irector and
President for a term of "ve %F' ears renewable for another "ve %F' ears and to
desi!nate three %/' persons of his choice who shall be elected as members of the
Board of )irectors of the Ban5=
%ii' to le!itimi6e a posteriori his hi!hl anomalous and irre!ular use and diversion of
!overnment funds to advance his own private and commercial interests, )efendant
Eduardo Co(uan!co, 7r. caused the issuance b )efendant 2erdinand E. Marcos of P)
1FF %a' declarin! that the coconut lev funds shall not be considered special and
"duciar and trust funds and do not form part of the !eneral funds of the National
>overnment, convenientl repealin! for that purpose a series of previous decrees,
P)s D1- and E,E, establishin! the character of the coconut lev funds as special,
"duciar, trust and !overnmental funds= %b' con"rmin! the a!reement between
)efendant Eduardo Co(uan!co, 7r. and PCA on the purchase of 2?B b incorporatin!
b reference said private commercial a!reement in P) 1FF=
%iii'To further consolidate his hold on ?CPB, )efendant Eduardo Co(uan!co, 7r.
imposed as consideration and conditions for the purchase that %a' he !ets one out of
ever nine shares !iven to PCA, and %b' he !ets to mana!e and control ?CPB as
president for a term of "ve %F' ears renewable for another "ve %F' ears=
%iv' To perpetuate his opportunit to deal with and ma5e use of the coconut lev
funds $ $ $ Co(uan!co, 7r. caused the issuance b )efendant 2erdinand E. Marcos of
an unconstitutional decree %P) ,E-K' reGuirin! the deposit of all coconut lev funds
with ?CPB, interest free to the pre(udice of the !overnment.
%v' &n !ross violation of their "duciar positions and in contravention of the !oal to
create a ban5 for the coconut farmers of the countr, the capital stoc5 of ?CPB as of
2ebruar DF, ,.K- was actuall held b the defendants, their lawers, factotum and
business associates, thereb "nall !ainin! control of the ?CPB b misusin! the
names and identities of the so:called 9more than one million coconut farmers.9
,E. The acts of )efendants, sin!l or collectivel, andIor in unlawful concert with one
another, constitute !ross abuse of o<cial position and authorit, Ra!rant breach of public
trust and "duciar obli!ations, bra6en abuse of ri!ht and power, and un(ust enrichment,
violation of the constitution and laws of the Republic of the Philippines, to the !rave and
irreparable dama!e of Plainti8 and the 2ilipino people.DK
&n no uncertain terms, the Court has upheld the #andi!anbaanTs assumption of (urisdiction over
the sub(ect matter of Civil Case Nos. 00//:A and 00//:2.D. The Court wrote@
7ud!in! from the alle!ations of the defendantsT ille!al acts thereat made, it is fairl obvious that
both CC Nos. 00//:A and CC 00//:2 parta5e, in the conte$t of E+ Nos. ,, D and ,E, series of ,.K-,
the nature of ill:!otten wealth suits. Both deal with the recover of seGuestered shares, propert or
business enterprises claimed, as alle!ed in the correspondin! basic complaints, to be ill:!otten
assets of President Marcos, his cronies and nominees and acGuired b ta5in! undue advanta!e of
relationships or inRuence andIor throu!h or as a result of improper use, conversion or diversion of
!overnment funds or propert. Recover of these assetsSSdetermined as shall hereinafter be
discussed as prima facie ill:!ottenSSfalls within the unGuestionable (urisdiction of the
#andi!anbaan./0
P.). No. ,-0-, as amended b R.A. 1.1F and E.+. No. ,E, #eries of ,.K-, vests the #andi!anbaan
with, amon! others, ori!inal (urisdiction over civil and criminal cases instituted pursuant to and in
connection with E.+. Nos. ,, D, ,E and ,E:A. Correlativel, the PC>> Rules and Re!ulations de"nes
the term 9&ll:>otten Aealth9 as 9an asset, propert, business enterprise or material possession of
persons within the purview of E.+. Nos. , and D, acGuired b them directl, or indirectl thru
dummies, nominees, a!ents, subordinates andIor business associates b an of the followin!
means or similar schemes9@
%,' Throu!h misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds or raids
on the public treasur=
%D' $ $ $ $
%/' B the ille!al or fraudulent conveance or disposition of assets belon!in! to the
!overnment or an of its subdivisions, a!encies or instrumentalities or !overnment:owned
or controlled corporations=
%E' B obtainin!, receivin! or acceptin! directl or indirectl an shares of stoc5, eGuit or
an other form of interest or participation in an business enterprise or underta5in!=
%F' Throu!h the establishment of a!ricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combination andIor b the issuance, promul!ation andIor implementation of decrees and
orders intended to bene"t particular persons or special interests= and
%-' B ta5in! undue advanta!e of o<cial position, authorit, relationship or inRuence for
personal !ain or bene"t. %Emphasis supplied'
#ection D%a' of E.+. No. , char!ed the PC>> with the tas5 of assistin! the President in 9The
recover of all ill:!otten wealth accumulated b former [ President Marcos, his immediate famil,
relatives, subordinates and close associates [ includin! the ta5eover or seGuestration of all
business enterprises and entities owned or controlled b them, durin! his administration, directl
or throu!h nominees, b ta5in! undue advanta!e of their public o<ce andIor usin! their powers,
authorit, inRuence, connections or relationship.9 Complementin! the aforesaid #ection D%a' is
#ection , of E.+. No. D decreein! the free6in! of all assets 9in which the Marcoses their close
relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, a!ents or nominees have an interest or
participation.9
The RepublicTs averments in the amended complaints, particularl those detailin! the alle!ed
wron!ful acts of the defendants, su<cientl reveal that the sub(ect matter thereof comprises the
recover b the >overnment of ill:!otten wealth acGuired b then President Marcos, his cronies or
their associates and dummies throu!h the unlawful, improper utili6ation or diversion of coconut
lev funds aided b P.). No. 1FF and other sister decrees. President Marcos himself issued these
decrees in a bra6en bid to le!ali6e what amounts to private ta5in! of the said public funds.
$ $ $ $
There was no actual need for Republic, as plainti8 a Guo, to adduce evidence to show that the
#andi!anbaan has (urisdiction over the sub(ect matter of the complaints as it leaned on the
averments in the initiator pleadin!s to ma5e visible the (urisdiction of the #andi!anbaan over
the ill:!otten wealth complaints. As previousl discussed, a perusal of the alle!ations easil
reveals the su<cienc of the statement of matters disclosin! the claim of the !overnment a!ainst
the coco lev funds and the assets acGuired directl or indirectl throu!h said funds as ill:!otten
wealth. Moreover, the Court "nds no rule that directs the plainti8 to "rst prove the sub(ect matter
(urisdiction of the court before which the complaint is "led. Rather, such burden falls on the
shoulders of defendant in the hearin! of a motion to dismiss anchored on said !round or a
preliminar hearin! thereon when such !round is alle!ed in the answer.
$ $ $ $
*est it be overloo5ed, this Court has alread decided that the seGuestered shares are prima facie
ill:!otten wealth renderin! the issue of the validit of their seGuestration and of the (urisdiction of
the #andi!anbaan over the case beond doubt. &n the case of C+C+2E) v. PC>>, Ae stated that@
&t is of course not for this Court to pass upon the factual issues thus raised. That function pertains
to the #andi!anbaan in the "rst instance. 2or purposes of this proceedin!, all that the Court
needs to determine is whether or not there is prima facie (usti"cation for the seGuestration
ordered b the PC>>. The Court is satis"ed that there is. The cited incidents, !iven the public
character of the coconut lev funds, place petitioners C+C+2E) and its leaders and o<cials, at
least prima facie, sGuarel within the purview of E$ecutive +rders Nos. ,, D and ,E, as construed
and applied in BA#EC+, to wit@
9,. that ill:!otten properties %were' amassed b the leaders and supporters of the previous re!ime=
9a. more particularl, that X%i' &ll:!otten wealth was accumulated b $ $ $ Marcos, his immediate
famil, relatives, subordinates and close associates, $ $ $ %and' business enterprises and entities
%came to be' owned or controlled b them, durin! $ $ $ %the Marcos' administration, directl or
throu!h nominees, b ta5in! undue advanta!e of their public o<ce and usin! their powers,
authorit, inRuence, connections or relationshipsT=
9b. otherwise stated, that Xthere are assets and properties purportedl pertainin! to the Marcoses,
their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, a!ents or nominees which had
been or were acGuired b them directl or indirectl, throu!h or as a result of the improper or
ille!al use of funds or properties owned b the >overnment $ $ $ or an of its branches,
instrumentalities, enterprises, ban5s or "nancial institutions, or b ta5in! undue advanta!e of their
o<ce, authorit, inRuence, connections or relationship, resultin! in their un(ust enrichment $ $ $=
$ $ $ $
D. The petitionersT claim that the assets acGuired with the coconut lev funds are privatel owned
b the coconut farmers is founded on certain provisions of law, to wit #ec. 1, RA -D-0 and #ec. F,
Art. &&&, P) ,E-K[ %Aords in brac5et added= italics in the ori!inal'.
$ $ $ $
E.+. ,, D, ,E and ,E:A, it bears to stress, were issued precisel to e8ect the recover of ill:!otten
assets amassed b the Marcoses, their associates, subordinates and cronies, or throu!h their
nominees. Be that as it ma, it stands to reason that persons listed as associated with the
Marcoses refer to those in possession of such ill:!otten wealth but holdin! the same in behalf of
the actual, albeit undisclosed owner, to prevent discover and conseGuentl recover. Certainl, it
is well:ni!h inconceivable that ill:!otten assets would be distributed to and left in the hands of
individuals or entities with obvious traceable connections to Mr. Marcos and his cronies. The Court
can ta5e, as it has in fact ta5en, (udicial notice of schemes and machinations that have been put in
place to 5eep ill:!otten assets under wraps. These would include the settin! up of laers after
laers of shell or dumm, but controlled, corporations/, or manipulated instruments calculated to
confuse if not alto!ether mislead would:be investi!ators from recoverin! wealth deceitfull
amassed at the e$pense of the people or simpl the fruits thereof. Transferrin! the ille!al assets to
third parties not readil perceived as Marcos cronies would be another. #o it was that in PC>> v.
Pena, the Court, describin! the rule of Marcos as a 9well entrenched plunderin! re!ime of twent
ears,9 noted the ma!nitude of the past re!imeTs or!ani6ed pilla!e and the in!enuit of the
plunderers and pilla!ers with the assistance of e$perts and the best le!al minds in the mar5et./D
Prescindin! from the fore!oin! premises, there can no lon!er be an serious challen!e as to the
#andi!anbaanTs sub(ect matter (urisdiction. And in connection therewith, the Court wrote in
C+C+2E) v. Republic, that the instant petition shall be decided separatel and should not be
a8ected b the 7anuar DE, D0,D )ecision, 9save for determinativel le!al issues directl
addressed9 therein.// Thus@
Ae clarif that P#7:A is sub(ect of another petition for review interposed b Eduardo Co(uan!co, 7r.,
in >.R. No. ,K010F entitled, Eduardo M. Co(uan!co, 7r. v. Republic of the Philippines, which shall be
decided separatel b this Court. #aid petition should accordin!l not be a8ected b this )ecision
save for determinativel le!al issues directl addressed herein./E %Emphasis +urs.'
Ae, therefore, reiterate our holdin! in C+C+2E) v. Republic respectin! the #andi!anbaanTs
(urisdiction over the sub(ect matter of Civil Case No. 00//:A, includin! those matters whose
ad(udication Ae shall resolve in the present case.
&&
PRE*&M&NAR&*M, T3E A>REEMENT BETAEEN T3E PCA AN) E)?AR)+ M. C+7?AN>C+, 7R. )ATE)
MAM DF, ,.1F CANN+T BE ACC+R)E) T3E #TAT?# +2 A *AA 2+R T3E *AC4 +2 T3E REQ?&#&TE
P?B*&CAT&+N.
&t will be recalled that Co(uan!coTs claim of ownership over the ?CPB shares is hin!ed on two
contract documents the respective contents of which formed part of and reproduced in their
entiret in the aforecited +rder/F of the #andi!anbaan dated March ,,, D00/. The "rst contract
refers to the a!reement entered into b and between Pedro Co(uan!co and his !roup, on one
hand, and Eduardo M. Co(uan!co, 7r., on the other, bearin! date 9Ma ,.1F9/- %hereinafter
referred to as 9PC:EC7 A!reement9', while the second relates to the accord between the PCA and
Eduardo M. Co(uan!co, 7r. dated Ma DF, ,.1F %hereinafter referred to as 9PCA:Co(uan!co
A!reement9'. The PC:EC7 A!reement alle!edl contains, inter alia, Co(uan!coTs personal and
e$clusive option to acGuire the 2?B %9?CPB9' shares from Pedro and his !roup. The PCA:Co(uan!co
A!reement shows PCATs acGuisition of the said option from Eduardo M. Co(uan!co, 7r.
#ection , of P.). No. 1FF incorporated, b reference, the 9A!reement for the AcGuisition of a
Commercial Ban5 for the Bene"t of the Coconut 2armers9 e$ecuted b the PCA. Particularl,
#ection , states@
#ection ,. )eclaration of National Polic. &t is hereb declared that the polic of the #tate is to
provide readil available credit facilities to the coconut farmers at preferential rates= that this
polic can be e$peditiousl and e<cientl reali6ed b the implementation of the 9A!reement for
the AcGuisition of a Commercial Ban5 for the bene"t of the Coconut 2armers9 e$ecuted b the
Philippine Coconut Authorit, the terms of which 9A!reement9 are hereb incorporated b
reference= and that the Philippine Coconut Authorit is hereb authori6ed to distribute, for free, the
shares of stoc5 of the ban5 it acGuired to the coconut farmers under such rules and re!ulations it
ma promul!ate. %Emphasis +urs.'
&t bears to stress at this point that the PCA:Co(uan!co A!reement referred to above in #ection , of
P.). 1FF was not reproduced or attached as an anne$ to the same law. And it is well:settled that
laws must be published to be valid. &n fact, publication is an indispensable condition for the
e8ectivit of a law. TaWada v. Tuvera/1 said as much@
Publication of the law is indispensable in ever case $ $ $.
$ $ $ $
Ae note at this point the conclusive presumption that ever person 5nows the law, which of course
presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have an le!al (usti"cation at
all. &t is no less important to remember that #ection - of the Bill of Ri!hts reco!ni6es 9the ri!ht of
the people to information on matters of public concern,9 and this certainl applies to, amon!
others, and indeed especiall, the le!islative enactments of the !overnment.
$ $ $ $
Ae hold therefore that all statutes, includin! those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their e8ectivit, which shall be!in "fteen das after publication unless
a di8erent e8ectivit date is "$ed b the le!islature.
Covered b this rule are presidential decrees and e$ecutive orders promul!ated b the President in
the e$ercise of le!islative powers whenever the same are validl dele!ated b the le!islature, or,
at present, directl conferred b the Constitution. Administrative rules and re!ulations must also
be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement e$istin! law pursuant also to a valid
dele!ation./K
Ae even went further in TaWada to sa that@
*aws must come out in the open in the clear li!ht of the sun instead of s5ul5in! in the shadows
with their dar5, deep secrets. Msterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be
reco!ni6ed as bindin! unless their e$istence and contents are con"rmed b a valid publication
intended to ma5e full disclosure and !ive proper notice to the people. The furtive law is li5e a
scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parr or cut unless the na5ed blade is drawn./.
The publication, as further held in TaWada, must be of the full te$t of the law since the purpose of
publication is to inform the public of the contents of the law. Mere referencin! the number of the
presidential decree, its title or whereabouts and its supposed date of e8ectivit would not satisf
the publication reGuirement.E0
&n this case, while it incorporated the PCA:Co(uan!co A!reement b reference, #ection , of P.).
1FF did not in an wa reproduce the e$act terms of the contract in the decree. Neither was acop
thereof attached to the decree when published. Ae cannot, therefore, e$tend to the said
A!reement the status of a law. ConseGuentl, Ae (oin the #andi!anbaan in its holdin! that the
PCA:Co(uan!co A!reement shall be treated as an ordinar transaction between a!reein! minds to
be !overned b contract law under the Civil Code.
&&&
T3E PCA:C+7?AN>C+ A>REEMENT &# A LA*&) C+NTRACT 2+R 3AL&N> T3E REQ?&#&TE
C+N#&)ERAT&+N.
&n P#7:A, the #andi!anbaan struc5 down the PCA:Co(uan!co A!reement as void for lac5 of
considerationIcause as reGuired under Article ,/,K, para!raph / in relation to Article ,E0.,
para!raph / of the Civil Code. The #andi!anbaan stated@
&n sum, the evidence on record relied upon b defendant Co(uan!co ne!ates the presence of@ %,'
his claimed personal and e$clusive option to bu the ,/1,K-- 2?B shares= and %D' an pecuniar
advanta!e to the !overnment of the said option, which could compensate for !enerous pament
to him b PCA of valuable shares of stoc5, as stipulated in the Ma DF, ,.1F A!reement between
him and the PCA.E,
+n the other hand, the aforementioned provisions of the Civil Code state@
Art. ,/,K. There is no contract unless the followin! reGuisites concur@
%,' Consent of the contractin! parties=
%D' +b(ect certain which is the sub(ect matter of the contract=
%/' Cause of the obli!ation which is established. %Emphasis supplied'ED
Art. ,E0.. The followin! contracts are ine$istent and void from the be!innin!@
$ $ $ $
%/' Those whose cause or ob(ect did not e$ist at the time of the transaction=E/
The #andi!anbaan found and so ta!!ed the alle!ed cause for the a!reement in Guestion, i.e.,
Co(uan!coTs 9personal and e$clusive option to acGuire the +ption #hares,9 as "ctitious. A readin!
of the purchase a!reement between Co(uan!co and PCA, so the #andi!anbaan ruled, would show
that Co(uan!co was not the onl seller= thus, the option was, as to him, neither personal nor
e$clusive as he claimed it to be. Moreover, as the #andi!anbaan deduced, that option was
ine$istent on the da of e$ecution of the PCA:Co(uan!co A!reement as the #pecial Power of
Attorne e$ecuted b Co(uan!co in favor of now #enator Ed!ardo 7. An!ara, for the latter to si!n
the PC:EC7 A!reement, was dated Ma DF, ,.1F while the PCA:Co(uan!co A!reement was also
si!ned on Ma DF, ,.1F. Thus, the #andi!anbaan believed that when the parties a<$ed their
si!natures on the second A!reement, Co(uan!coTs option to purchase the 2?B shares of stoc5 did
not et e$ist. The #andi!anbaan further ruled that there was no (usti"cation in the second
A!reement for the compensation of Co(uan!co of ,E,E00 shares, which it viewed as e$orbitant.
Additionall, the #andi!anbaan ruled that PCA could not validl enter, in behalf of 2?BI?CPB, into
a veritable ban5 mana!ement contract with Co(uan!co, PCA havin! a personalit separate and
distinct from that of 2?B. As such, the #andi!anbaan concluded that the PCA:Co(uan!co
A!reement was null and void. Correspondin!l, the #andi!anbaan also ruled that the seGuestered
2?B %?CPB' shares of stoc5 in the name of Co(uan!co are conclusivel owned b the Republic.
After a circumspect stud, the Court "nds as inconclusive the evidence relied upon b
#andi!anbaan to support its rulin! that the PCA:Co(uan!co A!reement is devoid of su<cient
consideration. Ae shall e$plain.
Rule ,/,, #ection /%r' of the Rules of Court states@
#ec. /. )isputable presumptions.JThe followin! presumptions are satisfactor if uncontradicted,
but ma be contradicted and overcome b other evidence@
$ $ $ $
%r' That there was a su<cient consideration for a contract=
The Court had the occasion to e$plain the reach of the above provision in #urtida v. Rural Ban5 of
Malinao %Alba', &nc.,EE to wit@
?nder #ection /, Rule ,/, of the Rules of Court, the followin! are disputable presumptions@ %,'
private transactions have been fair and re!ular= %D' the ordinar course of business has been
followed= and %/' there was su<cient consideration for a contract. A presumption ma operate
a!ainst an adversar who has not introduced proof to rebut it. The e8ect of a le!al presumption
upon a burden of proof is to create the necessit of presentin! evidence to meet the le!al
presumption or the prima facie case created thereb, and which if no proof to the contrar is
presented and o8ered, will prevail. The burden of proof remains where it is, but b the
presumption, the one who has that burden is relieved for the time bein! from introducin! evidence
in support of the averment, because the presumption stands in the place of evidence unless
rebutted.
The presumption that a contract has su<cient consideration cannot be overthrown b the bare
uncorroborated and self:servin! assertion of petitioners that it has no consideration. To overcome
the presumption of consideration, the alle!ed lac5 of consideration must be shown b
preponderance of evidence. Petitioners failed to dischar!e this burden $ $ $. %Emphasis +urs.'
The assumption that ample consideration is present in a contract is further elucidated in
Pentacapital &nvestment Corporation v. Mahina@EF
?nder Article ,/FE of the Civil Code, it is presumed that consideration e$ists and is lawful unless
the debtor proves the contrar. Moreover, under #ection /, Rule ,/, of the Rules of Court, the
followin! are disputable presumptions@ %,' private transactions have been fair and re!ular= %D' the
ordinar course of business has been followed= and %/' there was su<cient consideration for a
contract. A presumption ma operate a!ainst an adversar who has not introduced proof to rebut
it. The e8ect of a le!al presumption upon a burden of proof is to create the necessit of presentin!
evidence to meet the le!al presumption or the prima facie case created thereb, and which, if no
proof to the contrar is presented and o8ered, will prevail. The burden of proof remains where it is,
but b the presumption, the one who has that burden is relieved for the time bein! from
introducin! evidence in support of the averment, because the presumption stands in the place of
evidence unless rebutted.E-%Emphasis supplied.'
The rule then is that the part who stands to pro"t from a declaration of the nullit of a contract on
the !round of insu<cienc of considerationSSwhich would necessaril refer to one who asserts
such nullitSShas the burden of overthrowin! the presumption o8ered b the aforeGuoted #ection
/%r'. +bviousl then, the presumption conte$tuall operates in favor of Co(uan!co and a!ainst the
Republic, as plainti8 a Guo, which then had the burden to prove that indeed there was no su<cient
consideration for the #econd A!reement. The #andi!anbaanTs stated observation, therefore, that
based on the wordin!s of the #econd A!reement, Co(uan!co had no personal and e$clusive option
to purchase the 2?B shares from Pedro Co(uan!co had reall little to commend itself for
acceptance. This, as opposed to the fact that such sale and purchase a!reement is memoriali6ed
in a notari6ed document whereb both Eduardo Co(uan!co, 7r. and Pedro Co(uan!co attested to the
correctness of the provisions thereof, amon! which was that Eduardo had such option to purchase.
A notari6ed document, *a6aro v. A!ustinE1 teaches, 9!enerall carries the evidentiar wei!ht
conferred upon it with respect to its due e$ecution, and documents ac5nowled!ed before a notar
public have in their favor the disputable presumption of re!ularit.9
&n #amanilla v. Ca(ucom,EK the Court clari"ed that the presumption of a valid consideration cannot
be discarded on a simple claim of absence of consideration, especiall when the contract itself
states that consideration was !iven@
$ $ $ This presumption appellants cannot overcome b a simple assertion of lac5 of consideration.
Especiall ma not the presumption be so li!htl set aside when the contract itself states that
consideration was !iven, and the same has been reduced into a public instrument will all due
formalities and solemnities as in this case. %Emphasis ours.'
A perusal of the PCA:Co(uan!co A!reement disclosed an e$press statement of consideration for
the transaction@
N+A, T3ERE2+RE, for and in consideration of the fore!oin! premises and the other terms and
conditions hereinafter contained, the parties hereb declare and a<rm that their principal
contractual intent is %,' to ensure that the coconut farmers own at least -0P of the outstandin!
capital stoc5 of the Ban5, and %D' that the #E**ER shall receive compensation for e$ercisin! his
personal and e$clusive option to acGuire the +ption #hares, for transferrin! such shares to the
coconut farmers at the option price of PD00 per share, and for performin! the mana!ement
services reGuired of him hereunder.
$ $ $ $
E. As compensation for e$ercisin! his personal and e$clusive option to acGuire the +ption
#hareApplin! #amanilla to the case at bar, the e$press and positive declaration b the parties of
the presence of adeGuate consideration in the contract ma5es conclusive the presumption of
su<cient consideration in the PCA A!reement. Moreover, the option to purchase shares and
mana!ement services for ?CPB was alread availed of b petitioner Co(uan!co for the bene"t of
the PCA. The e$ercise of such ri!ht resulted in the e$ecution of the PC:EC7 A!reement, which fact is
not disputed. The document itself is incontrovertible proof and hard evidence that petitioner
Co(uan!co had the ri!ht to purchase the sub(ect 2?B %now ?CPB' shares. Res ipsa loGuitur.
The #andi!anbaan, however, pointed to the perceived 9lac5 of an pecuniar value or advanta!e
to the !overnment of the said option, which could compensate for the !enerous pament to him
b PCA of valuable shares of stoc5, as stipulated in the Ma DF, ,.1F A!reement between him and
the PCA.9E.
&nadeGuac of the consideration, however, does not render a contract void under Article ,/FF of
the Civil Code@
Art. ,/FF. E$cept in cases speci"ed b law, lesion or inadeGuac of cause shall not invalidate a
contract, unless there has been fraud, mista5e or undue inRuence. %Emphasis supplied.'
Alsua:Betts v. Court of AppealsF0 is instructive that lac5 of ample consideration does not nullif
the contract@
&nadeGuac of consideration does not vitiate a contract unless it is proven which in the case at bar
was not, that there was fraud, mista5e or undue inRuence. %Article ,/FF, New Civil Code'. Ae do
not "nd the stipulated price as so inadeGuate to shoc5 the courtTs conscience, considerin! that the
price paid was much hi!her than the assessed value of the sub(ect properties and considerin! that
the sales were e8ected b a father to her dau!hter in which case "lial love must be ta5en into
account. %Emphasis supplied.'s and for transferrin! such shares to the coconut farmers, as well as
for performin! the mana!ement services reGuired of him, #E**ER shall receive eGuit in the Ban5
amountin!, in the a!!re!ate, to .F,/0E full paid shares in accordance with the procedure set
forth in para!raph - below. %Emphasis supplied.'
Lales v. LillaF, elucidates wh a bad transaction cannot serve as basis for voidin! a contract@
$ $ $ Courts cannot follow one ever step of his life and e$tricate him from bad bar!ains, protect
him from unwise investments, relieve him from one:sided contracts, or annul the e8ects of foolish
acts. $ $ $ Men ma do foolish thin!s, ma5e ridiculous contracts, use miserable (ud!ment, and lose
mone b them S indeed, all the have in the world= but not for that alone can the law intervene
and restore. There must be, in addition, a violation of law, the commission of what the law 5nows
as an actionable wron!, before the courts are authori6ed to la hold of the situation and remed it.
%Emphasis ours.'
Ahile one ma posit that the PCA:Co(uan!co A!reement puts PCA and the coconut farmers at a
disadvanta!e, the facts do not ma5e out a clear case of violation of an law that will necessitate
the recall of said contract. &ndeed, the anti:!raft court has not put forward an speci"c stipulation
therein that is at war with an law, or the Constitution, for that matter. &t is even clear as da that
none of the parties who entered into the two a!reements with petitioner Co(uan!co contested nor
sou!ht the nulli"cation of said a!reements, more particularl the PCA who is alwas provided le!al
advice in said transactions b the >overnment corporate counsel, and a batter of lawers and
presumabl the C+A auditor assi!ned to said a!enc. A !overnment a!enc, li5e the PCA, stoops
down to level of an ordinar citi6en when it enters into a private transaction with private
individuals. &n this settin!, PCA is bound b the law on contracts and is bound to compl with the
terms of the PCA:Co(uan!co A!reement which is the law between the parties. Aith the silence of
PCA not to challen!e the validit of the PCA:Co(uan!co A!reement and the inabilit of !overnment
to demonstrate the lac5 of ample consideration in the transaction, the Court is left with no other
choice but to uphold the validit of said a!reements.
Ahile consideration is usuall in the form of mone or propert, it need not be monetar. This is
clear from Article ,/F0 which reads@
Art. ,/F0. &n onerous contracts the cause is understood to be, for each contractin! part, the
prestation or promise of a thin! or service b the other= in remunerator ones, the service or
bene"t which is remunerated= and in contracts of pure bene"cence, the mere liabilit of the
benefactor. %Emphasis supplied.'
>abriel v. Monte de Piedad Ca(a de AhorrosFD tells us of the meanin! of consideration@
$ $ $ A consideration, in the le!al sense of the word, is some ri!ht, interest, bene"t, or advanta!e
conferred upon the promisor, to which he is otherwise not lawfull entitled, or an detriment,
pre(udice, loss, or disadvanta!e su8ered or underta5en b the promisee other than to such as he
is at the time of consent bound to su8er. %Emphasis +urs.'
The Court rules that the transfer of the sub(ect ?CPB shares is clearl supported b valuable
consideration.
To (ustif the nulli"cation of the PCA:Co(uan!co A!reement, the #andi!anbaan centered on the
alle!ed ima!inar option claimed b petitioner to bu the 2?B shares from the Pedro Co(uan!co
!roup. &t relied on the phrase 9in behalf of certain other buers9 mentioned in the PC:EC7
A!reement as basis for the "ndin! that petitionerTs option is neither personal nor e$clusive. The
pertinent portion of said a!reement reads@
E)?AR)+ C+7?AN>C+, 7R., 2ilipino, of le!al a!e and with residence at ,/- .th #treet corner
Balete )rive, Que6on Cit, represented in this act b his dul authori6ed attorne:in:fact,
E)>AR)+ 7. AN>ARA, for and in his own behalf and in behalf of certain other buers, %hereinafter
collectivel called the 9B?MER#9'= $ $ $.
A plain readin! of the aforeGuoted description of petitioner as a part to the PC:EC7 A!reement
reveals that petitioner is not onl the buer. 3e is the named buer and there are other buers
who were unnamed. This is clear from the word 9B?MER#.9 &f petitioner is the onl buer, then his
description as a part to the sale would onl be 9B?MER.9 &t ma be true that petitioner intended to
include other buers. The fact remains, however, that the identities of the unnamed buers were
not revealed up to the present da. Ahile one can con(ure or speculate that PCA ma be one of the
buers, the fact that PCA entered into an a!reement to purchase the 2?B shares with petitioner
militates a!ainst such con(ecture since there would be no need at all to enter into the second
a!reement if PCA was alread a buer of the shares in the "rst contract. &t is onl the parties to the
PC:EC7 A!reement that can plausibl shed li!ht on the import of the phrase 9certain other buers9
but, unfortunatel, petitioner was no lon!er allowed to testif on the matter and was precluded
from e$plainin! the transactions because of the motion for partial summar (ud!ment and the
eventual promul!ation of the 7ul ,,, D00/ Partial #ummar 7ud!ment.
Even if concedin! for the sa5e of ar!ument that PCA is one of the buers of the 2?B shares in the
PC:EC7 A!reement, still it does not necessaril follow that petitioner had no option to bu said
shares from the !roup of Pedro Co(uan!co. &n fact, the ver e$ecution of the "rst a!reement
undeniabl shows that he had the ri!hts or option to bu said shares from the Pedro Co(uan!co
!roup. +therwise, the PC:EC7 A!reement could not have been consummated and enforced. The
conclusion is incontestable that petitioner indeed had the ri!ht or option to bu the 2?B shares as
buttressed b the e$ecution and enforcement of the ver document itself.
Ae can opt to treat the PC:EC7 A!reement as a totall separate a!reement from the PCA:
Co(uan!co A!reement but it will not detract from the fact that petitioner actuall acGuired the
ri!hts to the ownership of the 2?B shares from the Pedro Co(uan!co !roup. The conseGuence is he
can le!all sell the shares to PCA. &n this scenario, he would resell the shares to PCA for a pro"t
and PCA would still end up pain! a hi!her price for the 2?B shares. The 9pro"t9 that will accrue to
petitioner ma (ust be eGual to the value of the shares that were !iven to petitioner as
commission. #till we can onl speculate as to the true intentions of the parties. Aithout an
evidence adduced on this issue, the Court will not venture on an unproven conclusion or "ndin!
which should be avoided in (udicial ad(udication.
The anti:!raft court also inferred from the date of e$ecution of the special power of attorne in
favor of now #enator Ed!ardo 7. An!ara, which is Ma DF, ,.1F, that the PC:EC7 A!reement
appears to have been e$ecuted on the same da as the PCA:Co(uan!co A!reement %dated Ma DF,
,.1F'. The coincidence on the dates casts 9doubts as to the e$istence of defendant Co(uan!coTs
prior Xpersonal and e$clusiveT option to the 2?B shares.9
The fact that the e$ecution of the #PA and the PCA:Co(uan!co A!reement occurred seGuentiall on
the same da cannot, without more, be the basis for the conclusion as to the non:e$istence of the
option of petitioner. #uch con(ecture cannot prevail over the fact that without petitioner
Co(uan!co, none of the two a!reements in Guestion would have been e$ecuted and implemented
and the 2?B shares could not have been successfull conveed to PCA.
A!ain, onl the parties can e$plain the reasons behind the e$ecution of the two a!reements and
the #PA on the same da. The were, however, precluded from elucidatin! the reasons behind
such occurrence. &n the absence of such illuminatin! proof, the proposition that the option does
not e$ist has no le! to stand on.
More importantl, the fact that the PC:EC7 A!reement was e$ecuted not earlier than Ma DF, ,.1F
proves that petitioner Co(uan!co had an option to bu the 2?B shares prior to that date. A!ain, it
must be emphasi6ed that from its terms, the "rst A!reement did not create the option.&t, however,
proved the e$ercise of the option b petitioner.
The e$ecution of the PC:EC7 A!reement on the same da as the PCA:Co(uan!co A!reement more
than satis"es para!raph D thereof which reGuires petitioner to e$ercise his option to purchase the
2?B shares as promptl as practicable after, and not before, the e$ecution of the second
a!reement, thus@
D. As promptl as practicable after e$ecution of this A!reement, the #E**ER shall e$ercise his
option to acGuire the +ption #hares and #E**ER shall immediatel thereafter deliver and turn over
to the Escrow A!ent such stoc5 certi"cates as are herein provided to be received from the e$istin!
stoc5holders of the ban5 b virtue of the e$ercise on the aforementioned option. The Escrow A!ent
shall thereupon issue its chec5 in favor of the #E**ER coverin! the purchase price for the shares
delivered. %Emphasis supplied.'
The #andi!anbaan viewed the compensation of petitioner of ,E,E00 2?B shares as e$orbitant. &n
the absence of proof to the contrar and considerin! the absence of an complaint of ille!alit or
fraud from an of the contractin! parties, then the presumption that 9private transactions have
been fair and re!ular9F/ must appl.
*astl, respondent inter(ects the thesis that PCA could not validl enter into a ban5 mana!ement
a!reement with petitioner since PCA has a personalit separate and distinct from that of 2?B.
Evidentl, it is PCA which has the ri!ht to challen!e the stipulations on the mana!ement contract
as unenforceable. 3owever, PCA chose not to assail said stipulations and instead even complied
with and implemented its prestations contained in said stipulations b installin! petitioner as
Chairman of ?CPB. Thus, PCA has waived and forfeited its ri!ht to nullif said stipulations and is
now estopped from Guestionin! the same.
&n view of the fore!oin!, the Court is left with no option but to uphold the validit of the two
a!reements in Guestion.
&L
C+7?AN>C+ &# N+T ENT&T*E) T+ T3E ?CPB #3ARE# A3&C3 AERE B+?>3T A&T3 P?B*&C 2?N)#
AN) 3ENCE, ARE P?B*&C PR+PERTM.
The coconut lev funds were e$acted for a
special public purpose. ConseGuentl, an
use or transfer of the funds that directl
bene"ts private individuals should be
invalidated.
The issue of whether or not ta$paersT mone, or funds and propert acGuired throu!h the
imposition of ta$es ma be used to bene"t a private individual is once a!ain posed. Preliminaril,
the instant case inGuires whether the coconut lev funds, and accordin!l, the ?CPB shares
acGuired usin! the coconut lev funds are public funds. &ndeed, the ver same issue too5 center
sta!e, discussed and was directl addressed in C+C+2E) v. Republic. And there is hardl an
Guestion about the sub(ect fundsT public and special character. The followin! e$cerpts from
C+C+2E) v. Republic,FE citin! Republic v. C+C+2E) and related cases, settle once and for all this
core, determinative issue@
&ndeed, Ae have hitherto discussed, the coconut lev was imposed in the e$ercise of the #tateTs
inherent power of ta$ation. As Ae wrote in Republic v. C+C+2E)@
&ndeed, coconut lev funds parta5e of the nature of ta$es, which, in !eneral, are enforced
proportional contributions from persons and properties, e$acted b the #tate b virtue of its
soverei!nt for the support of !overnment and for all public needs.
Based on its de"nition, a ta$ has three elements, namel@ a' it is an enforced proportional
contribution from persons and properties= b' it is imposed b the #tate b virtue of its soverei!nt=
and c' it is levied for the support of the !overnment. The coconut lev funds fall sGuarel into
these elements for the followin! reasons@
%a' The were !enerated b virtue of statutor enactments imposed on the coconut farmers
reGuirin! the pament of prescribed amounts. Thus, P) No. D1-, which created the [ %CC#2',
mandated the followin!@
9a. A lev, initiall, of P,F.00 per ,00 5ilo!rams of copra resecada or its eGuivalent in other
coconut products, shall be imposed on ever "rst sale, in accordance with the mechanics
established under RA -D-0, e8ective at the start of business hours on Au!ust ,0, ,.1/.
9The proceeds from the lev shall be deposited with the Philippine National Ban5 or an other
!overnment ban5 to the account of the Coconut Consumers #tabili6ation 2und, as a separate trust
fund which shall not form part of the !eneral fund of the !overnment.9
The coco levies were further clari"ed in amendator laws, speci"call P) No. .-, and P) No. ,E-K
S in this wise@
9The Authorit %PCA' is hereb empowered to impose and collect a lev, to be 5nown as the
Coconut Consumers #tabili6ation 2und *ev, on ever one hundred 5ilos of copra resecada, or its
eGuivalent [ delivered to, andIor purchased b, copra e$porters, oil millers, desiccators and other
end:users of copra or its eGuivalent in other coconut products. The lev shall be paid b such
copra e$porters, oil millers, desiccators and other end:users of copra or its eGuivalent in other
coconut products under such rules and re!ulations as the Authorit ma prescribe. ?ntil otherwise
prescribed b the Authorit, the current lev bein! collected shall be continued.9
*i5e other ta$ measures, the were not voluntar paments or donations b the people. The were
enforced contributions e$acted on pain of penal sanctions, as provided under P) No. D1-@
9/. An person or "rm who violates an provision of this )ecree or the rules and re!ulations
promul!ated thereunder, shall, in addition to penalties alread prescribed under e$istin!
administrative and special law, pa a "ne of not less than PD, F00 or more than P,0,000, or su8er
cancellation of licenses to operate, or both, at the discretion of the Court.9
#uch penalties were later amended thus@ [.
%b' The coconut levies were imposed pursuant to the laws enacted b the proper le!islative
authorities of the #tate. &ndeed, the CC#2 was collected under P) No. D1-, [.9
%c' The were clearl imposed for a public purpose. There is absolutel no Guestion that the were
collected to advance the !overnmentTs avowed polic of protectin! the coconut industr.
This Court ta5es (udicial notice of the fact that the coconut industr is one of the !reat economic
pillars of our nation, and coconuts and their bproducts occup a leadin! position amon! the
countrTs e$port products= [.
Ta$ation is done not merel to raise revenues to support the !overnment, but also to provide
means for the rehabilitation and the stabili6ation of a threatened industr, which is so a8ected
with public interest as to be within the police power of the #tate [.
Even if the mone is allocated for a special purpose and raised b special means, it is still public in
character[. &n Cocofed v. PC>>, the Court observed that certain a!encies or enterprises 9were
or!ani6ed and "nanced with revenues derived from coconut levies imposed under a succession of
law of the late dictatorship [ with deposed 2erdinand Marcos and his cronies as the suspected
authors and chief bene"ciaries of the resultin! coconut industr monopol.9 The Court continued@
9[. &t cannot be denied that the coconut industr is one of the ma(or industries supportin! the
national econom. &t is, therefore, the #tateTs concern to ma5e it a stron! and secure source not
onl of the livelihood of a si!ni"cant se!ment of the population, but also of e$port earnin!s the
sustained !rowth of which is one of the imperatives of economic stabilit. %Emphasis +urs.'
The followin! parallel doctrinal lines from Pambansan! 4oalison n! m!a #amahan! Ma!sasa5a at
Man!!a!awa sa Niu!an %P4#MMN' v. E$ecutive #ecretarFF came ne$t@
The Court was satis"ed that the coco:lev funds were raised pursuant to law to support a proper
!overnmental purpose. The were raised with the use of the police and ta$in! powers of the #tate
for the bene"t of the coconut industr and its farmers in !eneral. The C+A reviewed the use of the
funds. The Bureau of &nternal Revenue %B&R' treated them as public funds and the ver laws
!overnin! coconut levies reco!ni6e their public character.
The Court has also recentl declared that the coco:lev funds are in the nature of ta$es and can
onl be used for public purpose. Ta$es are enforced proportional contributions from persons and
propert, levied b the #tate b virtue of its soverei!nt for the support of the !overnment and for
all its public needs. 3ere, the coco:lev funds were imposed pursuant to law, namel, R.A. -D-0
and P.). D1-. The funds were collected and mana!ed b the PCA, an independent !overnment
corporation directl under the President. And, as the respondent public o<cials pointed out, the
pertinent laws used the term lev, which means to ta$, in describin! the e$action.
+f course, unli5e ordinar revenue laws, R.A. -D-0 and P.). D1- did not raise mone to boost the
!overnmentTs !eneral funds but to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabili6ation of a
threatened industr, the coconut industr, which is so a8ected with public interest as to be within
the police power of the #tate. The funds sou!ht to support the coconut industr, one of the main
economic bac5bones of the countr, and to secure economic bene"ts for the coconut farmers and
far wor5ers. The sub(ect laws are a5in to the su!ar liens imposed b #ec. 1%b' of P.). /KK, and the
oil price stabili6ation funds under P.). ,.F-, as amended b E.+. ,/1.
2rom the fore!oin!, it is at once apparent that an propert acGuired b means of the coconut lev
funds, such as the sub(ect ?CPB shares, should be treated as public funds or public propert,
sub(ect to the burdens and restrictions attached b law to such propert. C+C+2E) v. Republic,
delved into such limitations, thusl@
Ae have ruled time and a!ain that ta$es are imposed onl for a public purpose. 9The cannot be
used for purel private purposes or for the e$clusive bene"t of private persons.9 Ahen a law
imposes ta$es or levies from the public, with the intent to !ive undue bene"t or advanta!e to
private persons, or the promotion of private enterprises, that law cannot be said to satisf the
reGuirement of public purpose. &n >aston v. Republic Planters Ban5, the petitionin! su!ar
producers, su!arcane planters and millers sou!ht the distribution of the shares of stoc5 of the
Republic Planters Ban5 %RPB', alle!in! that the are the true bene"cial owners thereof. &n that
case, the investment, i.e., the purchase of RPB, was funded b the deduction of PhP ,.00 per picul
from the su!ar proceeds of the su!ar producers pursuant to P.). No. /KK. &n rulin! a!ainst the
petitioners, the Court held that to rule in their favor would contravene the !eneral principle that
revenues received from the imposition of ta$es or levies 9cannot be used for purel private
purposes or for the e$clusive bene"t of private persons.9 The Court ampl reasoned that the su!ar
stabili6ation fund is to 9be utili6ed for the bene"t of the entire su!ar industr, and all its
components, stabili6ation of the domestic mar5et includin! forei!n mar5et, the industr bein! of
vital importance to the countrTs econom and to national interest.9
#imilarl in this case, the coconut lev funds were sourced from forced e$actions decreed under
P.). Nos. D/D, D1- and FKD, amon! others, with the end:!oal of developin! the entire coconut
industr. Clearl, to hold therefore, even b law, that the revenues received from the imposition of
the coconut levies be used purel for private purposes to be owned b private individuals in their
private capacit and for their bene"t, would contravene the rationale behind the imposition of
ta$es or levies.
Needless to stress, courts do not, as the cannot, allow b (udicial "at the conversion of special
funds into a private fund for the bene"t of private individuals. &n the same vein, Ae cannot
subscribe to the idea of what appears to be an indirect S if not e$actl direct S conversion of
special funds into private funds, i.e., b usin! special funds to purchase shares of stoc5s, which in
turn would be distributed for free to private individuals. Even if these private individuals belon! to,
or are a part of the coconut industr, the free distribution of shares of stoc5s purchased with
special public funds to them, nevertheless cannot be (usti"ed. The ratio in >aston, as articulated
below, applies mutatis mutandis to this case@
The stabili6ation fees in Guestion are levied b the #tate [ for a special purpose S that of
9"nancin! the !rowth and development of the su!ar industr and all its components, stabili6ation
of the domestic mar5et includin! the forei!n mar5et.9 The fact that the #tate has ta5en possession
of mones pursuant to law is su<cient to constitute them as state funds even thou!h the are
held for a special purpose[.
That the fees were collected from su!ar producers etc., and that the funds were channeled to the
purchase of shares of stoc5 in respondent Ban5 do not convert the funds into a trust fund for their
bene"t nor ma5e them the bene"cial owners of the shares so purchased. &t is but rational that the
fees be collected from them since it is also the who are bene"ted from the e$penditure of the
funds derived from it. [.F-
&n this case, the coconut lev funds were bein! e$acted from copra e$porters, oil millers,
desiccators and other end:users of copra or its eGuivalent in other coconut products.F1 *i5ewise
so, the funds here were channeled to the purchase of the shares of stoc5 in ?CPB. )rawin! a clear
parallelism between >aston and this case, the fact that the coconut lev funds were collected from
the persons or entities in the coconut industr, amon! others, does not and cannot entitle them to
be bene"cial owners of the sub(ect funds S or more bluntl, owners thereof in their private
capacit. Parentheticall, the said private individuals cannot own the ?CPB shares of stoc5s so
purchased usin! the said special funds of the !overnment.FK %Emphasis +urs.'
As the coconut lev funds parta5e of the nature of ta$es and can onl be used for public purpose,
and importantl, for the purpose for which it was e$acted, i.e., the development, rehabilitation and
stabili6ation of the coconut industr, the cannot be used to bene"tSSwhether directl or
indirectlSS private individuals, be it b wa of a commission, or as the sub(ect A!reement
interestin!l words it, compensation. ConseGuentl, Co(uan!co cannot stand to bene"t b
receivin!, in his private capacit, 1.DDP of the 2?B shares without violatin! the constitutional
caveat that public funds can onl be used for public purpose. Accordin!l, the 1.DDP 2?B %?CPB'
shares that were !iven to Co(uan!co shall be returned to the >overnment, to be used 9onl for the
bene"t of all coconut farmers and for the development of the coconut industr.9F.
The ensuin! are the underlin! rationale for declarin!, as unconstitutional, provisions that convert
public propert into private funds to be used ultimatel for personal bene"t@
[ not onl were the laws unconstitutional for decreein! the distribution of the shares of stoc5 for
free to the coconut farmers and therefore ne!atin! the public purposed declared b P.). No. D1-,
i.e., to stabili6e the price of edible oil and to protect the coconut industr. The li5ewise reclassi"ed
the coconut lev fund as private fund, to be owned b private individuals in their private
capacities, contrar to the ori!inal purpose for the creation of such fund. To compound the
situation, the o8endin! provisions e8ectivel removed the coconut lev fund awa from the cavil
of public funds which normall can be paid out onl pursuant to an appropriation made b law. The
conversion of public funds into private assets was ille!all allowed, in fact mandated, b these
provisions. Clearl therefore, the pertinent provisions of P.). Nos. 1FF, .-, and ,E-K are
unconstitutional for violatin! Article L&, #ection D. %/' of the Constitution. &n this conte$t, the
distribution b PCA of the ?CPB shares purchased b means of the coconut lev fund S a special
fund of the !overnment S to the coconut farmers is, therefore, void.-0
&t is precisel for the fore!oin! that impels the Court to stri5e down as unconstitutional the
provisions of the PCA:Co(uan!co A!reement that allow petitioner Co(uan!co to personall and
e$clusivel own public funds or propert, the disbursement of which Ae so !reatl protect if onl
to !ive li!ht and meanin! to the mandates of the Constitution.
As heretofore ampl discussed, ta$es are imposed onl for a public purpose.-, The must,
therefore, be used for the bene"t of the public and not for the e$clusive pro"t or !ain of private
persons.-D +therwise, !rave in(ustice is inRicted not onl upon the >overnment but most
especiall upon the citi6enrSSthe ta$paersSSto whom Ae owe a !reat deal of accountabilit.
&n this case, out of the 1D.DP 2?B %now ?CPB' shares of stoc5s PCA purchased usin! the coconut
lev funds, the Ma DF, ,.1F A!reement between the PCA and Co(uan!co provided for the transfer
to the latter, b wa of compensation, of ,0P of the shares sub(ect of the a!reement, or a total of
1.DDP full paid shares. &n sum, Co(uan!co received public assets S in the form of 2?B %?CPB'
shares with a value then of ten million ei!ht hundred ei!ht:si$ thousand pesos %PhP ,0,KK-,000'
in ,.1F, paid b coconut lev funds. &n e8ect, Co(uan!co received the aforementioned asset as a
result of the PCA:Co(uan!co A!reement, and e$clusivel bene"ted himself b ownin! propert
acGuired usin! solel public funds. Co(uan!co, no less, admitted that the PCA paid, out of the
CC#2, the entire acGuisition price for the 1D.DP option shares.-/ This is in clear violation of the
prohibition, which the Court see5s to uphold.,Nwphi,
Ae, therefore, a<rm, on this !round, the decision of the #andi!anbaan nullifin! the shares of
stoc5 transfer to Co(uan!co. Accordin!l, the ?CPB shares of stoc5 representin! the 1.DDP full
paid shares sub(ect of the instant petition, with all dividends declared, paid or issued thereon, as
well as an increments thereto arisin! from, but not limited to, the e$ercise of pre:emptive ri!hts,
shall be reconveed to the >overnment of the Republic of the Philippines, which as Ae previousl
clari"ed, shall 9be used onl for the bene"t of all coconut farmers and for the development of the
coconut industr.9-E
But apart from the stipulation in the PCA:Co(uan!co A!reement, more speci"call para!raph E in
relation to para!raph - thereof, providin! for the transfer to Co(uan!co for the ?CPB shares
adverted to immediatel above, other provisions are valid and shall be enforced, or shall be
respected, if the correspondin! prestation had alread been performed. &nvalid stipulations that
are independent of, and divisible from, the rest of the a!reement and which can easil be
separated therefrom without doin! violence to the manifest intention of the contractin! minds do
not nullif the entire contract.-F
A3ERE2+RE, Part C of the appealed Partial #ummar 7ud!ment in #andi!anbaan Civil Case No.
00//:A is A22&RME) with modi"cation. As M+)&2&E), the dispositive portion in Part C of the
#andi!anbaanTs Partial #ummar 7ud!ment in Civil Case No. 00//:A, shall read as follows@
C. Re@ M+T&+N 2+R PART&A* #?MMARM 7?)>MENT %RE@ E)?AR)+ M. C+7?AN>C+, 7R.' dated
#eptember ,K, D00D "led b Plainti8.
,. #ec. , of P.). No. 1FF did not validate the A!reement between PCA and defendant
Eduardo M. Co(uan!co, 7r. dated Ma DF, ,.1F nor did it !ive the A!reement the bindin!
force of a law because of the non:publication of the said A!reement.
D. The A!reement between PCA and defendant Eduardo M. Co(uan!co, 7r. dated Ma DF,
,.1F is a valid contract for havin! the reGuisite consideration under Article ,/,K of the Civil
Code.
/. The transfer b PCA to defendant Eduardo M. Co(uan!co, 7r. of ,E,E00 shares of stoc5 of
2?B %later ?CPB' from the 9+ption #hares9 and the additional 2?B shares subscribed and
paid b PCA, consistin! of
a. 2ifteen Thousand Ei!ht 3undred Ei!ht:2our %,F,KKE' shares out of the authori6ed
but unissued shares of the ban5, subscribed and paid b PCA=
b. #i$t 2our Thousand Nine 3undred Ei!ht %-E,.K0' shares of the increased capital
stoc5 subscribed and paid b PCA= and
c. #toc5 dividends declared pursuant to para!raph F and para!raph ,, %iv' %d' of the
PCA:Co(uan!co A!reement dated Ma DF, ,.1F. or the so:called 9Co(uan!co:?CPB
shares9 is declared unconstitutional, hence null and void.,Nwphi,
E. The above:mentioned shares of stoc5 of the 2?BI?CPB transferred to defendant
Co(uan!co are hereb declared conclusivel owned b the Republic of the Philippines to be
used onl for the bene"t of all coconut farmers and for the development of the coconut
industr, and ordered reconveed to the >overnment.
F. The ?CPB shares of stoc5 of the alle!ed fronts, nominees and dummies of defendant
Eduardo M. Co(uan!co, 7r. which form part of the 1D.DP shares of the 2?BI?CPB paid for b
the PCA with public funds later char!ed to the coconut lev funds, particularl the CC#2,
belon! to the plainti8 Republic of the Philippines as their true and bene"cial owner.
Accordin!l, the instant petition is hereb )EN&E).
Costs a!ainst petitioner Co(uan!co.
#+ +R)ERE).
PRES!ITERO 1. VELASCO, 1R.
Associate 7ustice
AE C+NC?R@
ARIA LOUR"ES P. A. SERENOM
Chief 7ustice
%No part'
ANTONIO T. CARPIOU
Associate 7ustice
%No part'
TERESITA 1. LEONAR"O5"E CASTROU
Associate 7ustice
%+n leave' %No part'
ARTURO ". !RIONUU
Associate 7ustice
"IOS"A"O M. PERALTAU
Associate 7ustice
LUCAS P. !ERSAMIN
Associate 7ustice
MARIANO C. "EL CASTILLO
Associate 7ustice
RO!ERTO A. A!A"
Associate 7ustice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, 1R.
Associate 7ustice
1OSE PORTUGAL PEREMUU
Associate 7ustice
1OSE CATRAL MEN"OMA
Associate 7ustice
%+n leave'
!IENVENI"O L. RE3ES
Associate 7ustice
%+n leave'
ESTELA M. PERLAS5!ERNA!EUU
Associate 7ustice
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate 7ustice
C E R T & 2 & C A T & + N
Pursuant to #ection ,/, Article L&&& of the Constitution, it is hereb certi"ed that the conclusions in
the above )ecision had been reached in consultation before the case was assi!ned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court.
MARIA LOUR"ES P. A. SERENO
Chief 7ustice
Foot,ot$s
U No part.
UU +n leave.
, >.R. Nos. ,11KF1:FK a ,1K,./, 7anuar DE, D0,D.
D &d.
/ &d.
E Penned b Associate 7ustice Teresita *eonardo:)e Castro %now a member of this Court',
concurred in b Associate 7ustices )iosdado M. Peralta %now also a member of this Court'
and 2rancisco 3. Lillaru6, 7r.= rollo, pp. ,1.:D-,.
F Rollo, pp. /-,:E00.
- &d. at ,0E/:F/.
1 C+C+2E) v. Republic, >.R. Nos. ,11KF1:FK a ,1K,./, 7anuar DE, D0,D.
The dispositive portion of the +ur modi"cator decision reads@
A3ERE2+RE, the petitions in >.R. Nos. ,11KF1:FK and ,1K1./ are hereb
)EN&E). The Partial #ummar 7ud!ment dated 7ul ,,, D00/ in Civil Case No.
00//:A as reiterated with modi"cation in Resolution dated 7une F, D001, as well
as the Partial #ummar 7ud!ment dated Ma 1, D00E in Civil Case No. 00//:2,
which was e8ectivel amended in Resolution dated Ma ,,, D001, are A22&RME)
with M+)&2&CAT&+N, onl with respect to those issues sub(ect of the petitions in
>.R. Nos. ,11KF1:FK and ,1K,./. 3owever, the issues raised in >.R. No. ,K010F
in relation to Partial #ummar 7ud!ment dated 7ul ,,, D00/ and Resolution
dated 7une F, D001 in Civil Case No. 00//:A, shall be decided b this Court in a
separate decision.
The Partial #ummar 7ud!ment in Civil Case No. 00//:A dated 7ul ,,, D00/, is
hereb M+)&2&E), and shall read as follows@
A3ERE2+RE, in view of the fore!oin!, Ae rule as follows@
#?MMARM +2 T3E C+?RTT# R?*&N>.
A. Re@ C*A## ACT&+N M+T&+N 2+R A #EPARATE #?MMARM 7?)>MENT dated April
,,,
D00, "led b )efendant Maria Clara *. *obre!at, C+C+2E), et al., and Ballares,
et al.
The Class Action Motion for #eparate #ummar 7ud!ment dated April ,,, D00,
"led b defendant Maria Clara *. *obre!at, C+C+2E), et al. and Ballares, et al.,
is hereb )EN&E) for lac5 of merit.
B. Re@ M+T&+N 2+R PART&A* #?MMARM 7?)>MENT %RE@ C+C+2E), ET A*. AN)
BA**ARE#, ET A*.' dated April DD, D00D "led b Plainti8.
,. a. The portion of #ection , of P.). No. 1FF, which reads@
[and that the Philippine Coconut Authorit is hereb authori6ed to distribute,
for free, the shares of stoc5 of the ban5 it acGuired to the coconut farmers under
such rules and re!ulations it ma promul!ate.
ta5en in relation to #ection D of the same P.)., is unconstitutional@ %i' for havin!
allowed the use of the CC#2 to bene"t directl private interest b the outri!ht
and unconditional !rant of absolute ownership of the 2?BI?CPB shares paid for
b PCA entirel with the CC#2 to the unde"ned 9coconut farmers9, which
ne!ated or circumvented the national polic or public purpose declared b P.).
No. 1FF to accelerate the !rowth and development of the coconut industr and
achieve its vertical inte!ration= and %ii' for havin! undul dele!ated le!islative
power to the PCA.
b. The implementin! re!ulations issued b PCA, namel, Administrative +rder
No. ,, #eries of ,.1F and Resolution No. 01E:1K are li5ewise invalid for their
failure to see to it that the distribution of shares serve e$clusivel or at least
primaril or directl the aforementioned public purpose or national polic
declared b P.). No. 1FF.
D. #ection D of P.). No. 1FF which mandated that the coconut lev funds shall
not be considered special andIor "duciar funds nor part of the !eneral funds of
the national !overnment and similar provisions of #ec. F, Art. &&&, P.). No. .-,
and #ec. F, Art. &&&, P.). No. ,E-K contravene the provisions of the Constitution,
particularl, Art. &H %)', #ec. D= and Article L&, #ec. D. %/'.
/. *obre!at, C+C+2E), et al. and Ballares, et al. have not le!all and validl
obtained title of ownership over the sub(ect ?CPB shares b virtue of P.). No.
1FF, the A!reement dated Ma DF, ,.1F between the PCA and defendant
Co(uan!co, and PCA implementin! rules, namel, Adm. +rder No. ,, s. ,.1F and
Resolution No. 01E:1K.
E. The so:called 92armersT ?CPB shares9 covered b -E..KP of the ?CPB shares
of stoc5, which formed part of the 1D.DP of the shares of stoc5 of the former
2?B and now of the ?CPB, the entire consideration of which was char!ed b PCA
to the CC#2, are hereb declared conclusivel owned b, the Plainti8 Republic of
the Philippines.
[ [ [
#+ +R)ERE).
The Partial #ummar 7ud!ment in Civil Case No. 00//:2 dated Ma 1, D00E, is
hereb M+)&2&E), and shall read as follows@
A3ERE2+RE, the M+T&+N 2+R EHEC?T&+N +2 PART&A* #?MMARM 7?)>MENT
%RE@ C&&2 B*+C4 +2 #MC #3ARE# +2 #T+C4' dated Au!ust K, D00F of the
plainti8 is hereb denied for lac5 of merit. 3owever, this Court orders the
severance of this particular claim of Plainti8. The Partial #ummar 7ud!ment
dated Ma 1, D00E is now considered a separate "nal and appealable (ud!ment
with respect to the said C&&2 Bloc5 of #MC shares of stoc5.
The Partial #ummar 7ud!ment rendered on Ma 1, D00E is modi"ed b deletin!
the last para!raph of the dispositive portion, which will now read, as follows@
A3ERE2+RE, in view of the fore!oin!, we hold that@
The Motion for Partial #ummar 7ud!ment %Re@ )efendants C&&2 Companies, ,E
3oldin! Companies and Cocofed, et al' "led b Plainti8 is hereb >RANTE).
ACC+R)&N>*M, T3E C&&2 C+MPAN&E#, NAME*M@
,. #outhern *u6on Coconut +il Mills %#+*C+M'=
D. Ca!aan de +ro +il Co., &nc. %CA>+&*'=
/. &li!an Coconut &ndustries, &nc. %&*&C+C+'=
E. #an Pablo Manufacturin! Corp. %#PMC'=
F. >rane$port Manufacturin! Corp. %>RANEH'= and
-. *e!aspi +il Co., &nc. %*E>+&*',
A# AE** A# T3E ,E 3+*)&N> C+MPAN&E#, NAME*M@
,. #oriano #hares, &nc.=
D. AC# &nvestors, &nc.=
/. Ro$as #hares, &nc.=
E. Arc &nvestors= &nc.=
F. Toda 3oldin!s, &nc.=
-. AP 3oldin!s, &nc.=
1. 2ernande6 3oldin!s, &nc.=
K. #MC +<cers Corps, &nc.=
.. Te )eum Resources, &nc.=
,0. An!lo Lentures, &nc.=
,,. Rand Allied Lentures, &nc.=
,D. Roc5 #teel Resources, &nc.=
,/. Lalhalla Properties *td., &nc.= and
,E. 2irst Meridian )evelopment, &nc.
AN) T3E C&&2 B*+C4 +2 #AN M&>?E* C+RP+RAT&+N %#MC' #3ARE# +2 #T+C4
T+TA*&N> //,,//,D-- #3ARE# A# +2 ,.K/ T+>ET3ER A&T3 A** )&L&)EN)#
)EC*ARE), PA&) AN) &##?E) T3ERE+N A# AE** A# ANM &NCREMENT#
T3ERET+ AR&#&N> 2R+M, B?T N+T *&M&TE) T+, EHERC&#E +2 PRE:EMPT&LE
R&>3T# ARE )EC*ARE) +ANE) BM T3E >+LERNMENT T+ BE ?#E) +N*M 2+R
T3E BENE2&T +2 A** C+C+N?T 2ARMER# AN) 2+R T3E )ELE*+PMENT +2 T3E
C+C+N?T &N)?#TRM, AN) +R)ERE) REC+NLEME) T+ T3E >+LERNMENT.
T3E C+?RT A22&RM# T3E RE#+*?T&+N# &##?E) BM T3E #AN)&>ANBAMAN +N
7?NE F, D001 &N C&L&* CA#E N+. 00//:A AN) +N MAM ,,, D001 &N C&L&* CA#E N+.
00//:2, T3AT T3ERE &# N+ M+RE NECE##&TM +2 2?RT3ER TR&A* A&T3 RE#PECT
T+ T3E &##?E +2 +ANER#3&P +2 %,' T3E #EQ?E#TERE) ?CPB #3ARE#, %D' T3E
C&&2 B*+C4 +2 #MC #3ARE#, AN) %/' T3E C&&2 C+MPAN&E#. A# T3EM 3ALE
2&NA**M BEEN A)7?)&CATE) &N T3E A2+REMENT&+NE) PART&A* #?MMARM
7?)>MENT# )ATE) 7?*M ,,, D00/ AN) MAM 1, D00E.
#+ +R)ERE).
[. %Emphasis and underlinin! in the ori!inal'
K Resolution, C+C+2E) v. Republic, >.R. Nos. ,11KF1:FK a ,1K,./, #eptember E, D0,D.
. Rollo, pp. DF.:D-0.
,0 C+C+2E) v. Republic, >.R. Nos. ,11KF1:FK a ,1K,./, 7anuar DE, D0,D.
,, &d.= citin! Republic v. #andi!anbaan, >.R. No. ,,K--,, 7anuar DD, D001, F,D #CRA DF.
,D &d.
,/ Republic v. C+C+2E), >.R. Nos. ,E10-D:-E, )ecember ,E, D00,, /1D #CRA E-D, E11.
,E Republic v. #andi!anbaan, >.R. No. ,,K--,, 7anuar DD, D001, F,D #CRA DF.
,F Rollo, p. D-/.
,- C+C+2E) v. Republic, >.R. Nos. ,11KF1:FK a ,1K,./, 7anuar DE, D0,D.
,1 The validit and propriet of these processes were sustained b the Court in BA#EC+ v.
PC>>, No. *:1FKKF, Ma D1, ,.K1, ,F0 #CRA ,K,.
,K Reported in /1D #CRA D00,.
,. Rollo %>.R. Nos. ,11KF1:FK', pp. K/0:K1,.
D0 >.R. Nos. ,11KF1:FK a ,1K,./, 7anuar DE, D0,D.
D, P#7:A, pp. ,F, FE:FF, K0:K/= rollo, pp. ,./, D/,:D/D, DF1:-0.
DD P#7:A, pp. ,F, FE:FF, K0:K/= rollo, pp. ,./, D/,:/D, DF1:-0.
D/ C+C+2E) v. Republic, >.R. Nos. ,11KF1:FK a ,1K,./, 7anuar DE, D0,D.
DE Rollo, pp. /-,:E00.
DF &d. at ED:E/.
D- &d.
D1 , Re!alado, REME)&A* *AA C+MPEN)&?M ,, %-th revised ed., ,..1'.
DK Rollo, pp. EKK:E./.
D. C+C+2E) v. Republic, >.R. Nos. ,11KF1:FK a ,1K,./, 7anuar DE, D0,D.
/0 &d.= citin! #an Mi!uel Corporation v. #andi!anbaan, >.R. Nos. ,0E-/1:/K, #eptember
,E, D000, /E0 #CRA DK..
/, &d.= citin! Muchen!co v. #andi!anbaan, >.R. No. ,E.K0D, 7anuar D0, D00-, E1. #CRA ,.
/D &d.
// &d.
/E &d.
/F Rollo, pp. .F-:.-,.
/- The date of the a!reement was left blan5.
/1 No. *:-/.,F, )ecember D., ,.K-, ,E- #CRA EE-, EFD:EFE.
/K &d.
/. &d.
E0 &d.
E, P#7:A, p. 1E= rollo, p. DF,.
ED An Act to +rdain and &nstitute the Civil Code of the Philippines BC&L&* C+)EC, Republic
Act No. /K-, Art. ,/,K %,.F0'.
E/ C&L&* C+)E, Art. ,E0.= see also E Arturo M. Tolentino, C+MMENTAR&E# AN)
7?R&#PR?)ENCE +N T3E C&L&* C+)E +2 T3E P3&*&PP&NE# -D. %D00D'.
EE >.R. No. ,10F-/, )ecember D0, D00-, F,, #CRA F01.
EF >.R. Nos. ,1,1/- a ,K,EKD, 7ul F, D0,0, -D/ #CRA DKE, /0/.
E- #ee also ?nion Ban5 of the Philippines v. #pouses Tiu, >.R. Nos. ,1/0.0:.,, #eptember
1, D0,,= >reat Asian #ales Center v. Court of Appeals, E/, Phil. D./ %D00D'= 2ernande6 v.
2ernande6, E,- Phil. /DD %D00,'= >evero v. &ntermediate Appellate Court, >.R. No. 110D.,
Au!ust /0, ,..0, ,K. #CRA D0,= #pouses Nu!uid v. Court of Appeals, DF/ Phil. D01 %,.K.'.
E1 >.R. No. ,FD/-E, April ,F, D0,0, -,K #CRA D.K.
EK ,01 Phil. E/D %,.-0'.
E. P#7:A, pp. 1/:1E.
F0 Nos. *:E-E/0:/,, 7ul /0, ,.1., .D #CRA //D= Morales )evelopment Compan, &nc. v.
Court of Appeals, No. *:D-F1D, March DK, ,.-., D1 #CRA EKE.
F, /F Phil. 1-., 1KK %,.,-'.
FD 1, Phil. E.1, F0, %,.E,'.
F/ R?*E# +2 C+?RT, Rule ,/,%p'.
FE C+C+2E) v. Republic, >.R. Nos. ,11KF1:FK a ,1K,./, 7anuar DE, D0,D= citin! Republic
v. C+C+2E), >.R. Nos. ,E10-D:-E, )ecember ,E, D00,, /1D #CRA E-D, EKD:EKE.
FF >.R. Nos. ,E10/-:/1 a ,E1K,,, April ,0, D0,D.
F- C+C+2E) v. Republic, >.R. Nos. ,11KF1:FK a ,1K,./, 7anuar DE, D0,D= citin! >aston v.
Republic Planters Ban5, No. *:11,.E, March ,F, ,.KK, ,FK #CRA -D-, -//:/E= see also
Republic v. C+C+2E), >.R. No. ,E10-D:-E, )ecember ,E, D00,, /1D #CRA E-D, EKF:EK-.
F1 Republic v. C+C+2E), >.R. No. ,E10-D:-E, )ecember ,E, D00,, /1D #CRA E-D, EK/=
citin! P.). No. .-,, ,.1-, Art. &&&, #ec. ,= P.). No. ,E-K, ,.1K, Art. &&&, #ec. ,.
FK C+C+2E) v. Republic, >.R. Nos. ,11KF1:FK a ,1K,./, 7anuar DE, D0,D.
F. &d.
-0 &d.
-, &d.= citin! Republic v. #andi!anbaan, >.R. No. ,,K--,, 7anuar DD, D001, F,D #CRA DF.
-D &d.
-/ Republic v. C+C+2E), >.R. Nos. ,E10-D:-E, )ec. ,E, D00,= /1D #CRA E-D, E11.
&n the present case before the Court, it is not disputed that the mone used to
purchase the seGuestered ?CPB shares came from the Coconut Consumer
#tabili6ation 2und %CC#2', otherwise 5nown, as the coconut lev funds.
This fact was plainl admitted b private respondentTs counsel, Att. Teresita 7.
3ebosa, durin! the +ral Ar!uments held on April ,1, D00, in Ba!uio Cit, as follows@
97ustice Pan!aniban@
9&n re!ard to the theor of the #olicitor >eneral that the funds used to purchase both
the ori!inal DK million and the subseGuent K0 million came from the CC#2, Coconut
Consumers #tabili6ation 2und, do ou a!ree with that`
9Att. 3erbosa@
9Mes, Mour 3onor.
[ [ [
97ustice Pan!aniban@
9#o it seems that the parties BhaveC a!reed up to that point that the funds used to
purchase 1DP of the former 2irst ?nited Ban5 came from the Coconut Consumer
#tabili6ation 2und`
9Att. 3erbosa@
9Mes, Mour 3onor.9
2NE0. Transcript of +ral Ar!uments, April ,1, D00,, pp. ,1,, ,1/. )urin! the same
+ral Ar!ument, Private Respondent Co(uan!co similarl admitted that the 9entire
amount9 paid for the shares had come from the Philippine Coconut Authorit. T#N, p.
,,F.
-E C+C+2E) v. Republic, >.R. Nos. ,11KF1:FK a ,1K,./, 7anuar DE, D0,D.
-F C&L&* C+)E, Art. ,ED0 speci"call provides, 9B&Cn case of a divisible contract, if the ille!al
terms can be separated from the le!al ones, the latter ma be enforced.9
>. R. No. ,K1FK1, 7une 0F, D0,/ : NA>4A4A&#AN> MARA*&TA N> #&T&+ MA#&>A#&>, &NC., Petitioner,
v. M&*&TARM #3R&NE #ERL&CE# S P3&*&PP&NE LETERAN# A22A&R# +22&CE, )EPARTMENT +2 NAT&+NA*
)E2EN#E, Respondent.= >. R. N+. ,K1-FE, 7une 0F, D0,/ : AE#TERN B&C?TAN *+T +ANER#
A##+C&AT&+N, &NC., REPRE#ENTE) BM &T# B+AR) +2 )&RECT+R#, Petitioner, v. M&*&TARM #3R&NE
#ERL&CE# S P3&*&PP&NE LETERAN# A22A&R# +22&CE, )EPARTMENT +2 NAT&+NA* )E2EN#E,
Respondent.

2&R#T )&L&#&+N
>. R. No. ,K1FK1, 7une 0F, D0,/
NA>4A4A&#AN> MARA*&TA N> #&T&+ MA#&>A#&>, &NC., Petitioner, v. M&*&TARM #3R&NE #ERL&CE# S
P3&*&PP&NE LETERAN# A22A&R# +22&CE, )EPARTMENT +2 NAT&+NA* )E2EN#E,Respondent.
R E # + * ? T & + N
B>. R. N+. ,K1-FEC
AE#TERN B&C?TAN *+T +ANER# A##+C&AT&+N, &NC., REPRE#ENTE) BM &T# B+AR) +2
)&RECT+R#, Petitioner, v. M&*&TARM #3R&NE #ERL&CE# S P3&*&PP&NE LETERAN# A22A&R# +22&CE,
)EPARTMENT +2 NAT&+NA* )E2EN#E, Respondent.
) E C & # & + N
#EREN+, C.7.@
Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule EF of the Rules of Court assailin! the
)ecision
,
promul!ated on D. April D00. of the Court of Appeals in CA:>.R. #P No. .1.DF.
T3E 2ACT#
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows@cralavvonlinelawlibrar
+n ,D 7ul ,.F1, b virtue of Proclamation No. ED/, President Carlos P. >arcia reserved parcels of
land in the Municipalities of Pasi!, Ta!ui!, ParaWaGue, Province of Ri6al and Pasa Cit for a
militar reservation. The militar reservation, then 5nown as 2ort Ailliam Mc4inle, was later on
renamed 2ort Andres Bonifacio %2ort Bonifacio'.
+n DK Ma ,.-1, President 2erdinand E. Marcos %President Marcos' issued Proclamation No. D0K,
amendin! Proclamation No. ED/, which e$cluded a certain area of 2ort Bonifacio and reserved it for
a national shrine. The e$cluded area is now 5nown as *ibin!an n! m!a Baani, which is under the
administration of herein respondent Militar #hrine #ervices S Philippine Leterans A8airs +<ce
%M##:PLA+'.
A!ain, on 1 7anuar ,.K-, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. DE1-, further amendin!
Proclamation No. ED/, which e$cluded baran!as *ower Bicutan, ?pper Bicutan and #i!nal Lilla!e
from the operation of Proclamation No. ED/ and declared it open for disposition under the
provisions of Republic Act Nos. %R.A.' D1E and 1/0.
At the bottom of Proclamation No. DE1-, President Marcos made a handwritten addendum, which
reads@cralavvonlinelawlibrar
YP.#. S This includes Aestern Bicutan
%#>).' 2erdinand E. MarcosZ
D
The cru$ of the controvers started when Proclamation No. DE1- was published in the +<cial
>a6ette
/
on / 2ebruar ,.K-, without the above:Guoted addendum.
Mears later, on ,- +ctober ,.K1, President Cora6on C. AGuino %President AGuino' issued
Proclamation No. ,1D which substantiall reiterated Proclamation No. DE1-, as published, but this
time e$cluded *ots , and D of Aestern Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation No. ED/ and
declared the said lots open for disposition under the provisions of R.A. D1E and 1/0.
Memorandum +rder No. ,,., implementin! Proclamation No. ,1D, was issued on the same da.
Throu!h the ears, informal settlers increased and occupied some areas of 2ort Bonifacio includin!
portions of the *ibin!an n! m!a Baani. Thus, Bri!adier >eneral 2redelito Bautista issued >eneral
+rder No. ,/D/ creatin! Tas5 2orce Banta %T2B', primaril to prevent further unauthori6ed
occupation and to cause the demolition of ille!al structures at 2ort Bonifacio.
+n D1 Au!ust ,..., members of petitioner Na!5a5aisan! Maralita n! #itio Masi!asi!, &nc. %NM#M&'
"led a Petition with the Commission on #ettlement of *and Problems %C+#*AP', where it was
doc5eted as C+#*AP Case No. ..:E/E. The Petition praed for the followin!@ %,' the reclassi"cation
of the areas the occupied, coverin! *ot / of #A+:,/:000:D.K of Aestern Bicutan, from public
land to alienable and disposable land pursuant to Proclamation No. DE1-= %D' the subdivision of the
sub(ect lot b the )irector of *ands= and %/' the *and Mana!ement BureauTs facilitation of the
distribution and sale of the sub(ect lot to its bona "de occupants.
E
+n , #eptember D000, petitioner Aestern Bicutan *ot +wners Association, &nc. %AB*+A&' "led a
Petition:in:&ntervention substantiall prain! for the same reliefs as those praed for b NM#M&
with re!ard to the area the former then occupied coverin! *ot 1 of #A+:00:00,/0D in Aestern
Bicutan.
F
Thus, on , #eptember D00-, C+#*AP issued a Resolution
-
!rantin! the Petition and declarin! the
portions of land in Guestion alienable and disposable, with Associate Commissioner *ina A!uilar:
>eneral dissentin!.
1
The C+#*AP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was an inte!ral part of
Proclamation No. DE1-, and was therefore, controllin!. The intention of the President could not be
defeated b the ne!li!ence or inadvertence of others. 2urther, considerin! that Proclamation No.
DE1- was done while the former President was e$ercisin! le!islative powers, it could not be
amended, repealed or superseded, b a mere e$ecutive enactment. Thus, Proclamation No. ,1D
could not have superseded much less displaced Proclamation No. DE1-, as the latter was issued on
+ctober ,-, ,.K1 when President AGuinoTs le!islative power had ceased.
&n her )issentin! +pinion, Associate Commissioner *ina A!uilar:>eneral stressed that pursuant to
Article D of the Civil Code, publication is indispensable in ever case. *i5ewise, she held that when
the provision of the law is clear and unambi!uous so that there is no occasion for the court to loo5
into le!islative intent, the law must be ta5en as it is, devoid of (udicial addition or
subtraction.
K
2inall, she maintained that the Commission had no authorit to suppl the
addendum ori!inall omitted in the published version of Proclamation No. DE1-, as to do so would
be tantamount to encroachin! on the "eld of the le!islature.
3erein respondent M##:PLA+ "led a Motion for Reconsideration,
.
which was denied b the
C+#*AP in a Resolution dated DE 7anuar D001.
,0
M##:PLA+ "led a Petition with the Court of Appeals see5in! to reverse the C+#*AP Resolutions
dated , #eptember D00- and DE 7anuar D001.
Thus, on D. April D00., the then Court of Appeals 2irst )ivision rendered the assailed )ecision
!rantin! M##:PLA+Ts Petition, the dispositive portion of which reads@cralavvonlinelawlibrar
&N L&EA +2 A** T3E 2+RE>+&N>, the instant petition is hereb >RANTE). The
Resolutions dated #eptember ,, D00- and 7anuar DE, D001 issued b the Commission
on the #ettlement of *and Problems in C+#*AP Case No. ..:E/E are herebRELER#E)
and #ET A#&)E. &n lieu thereof, the petitions of respondents in C+#*AP Case No. ..:E/E
are )&#M&##E), for lac5 of merit, as discussed herein. 2urther, pendin! ur!ent motions
"led b respondents are li5ewise )EN&E).
#+ +R)ERE).
,,
%Emphasis in the ori!inal'
Both NM#M&
,D
and AB*+A&
,/
appealed the said )ecision b "lin! their respective Petitions for
Review with this Court under Rule EF of the Rules of Court.
T3E &##?E#
Petitioner NM#M& raises the followin! issues@cralavvonlinelawlibrar
&
A3ET3ER +R N+T T3E 3+N+RAB*E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# #ER&+?#*M ERRE) &N R?*&N>
T3AT PR+C*AMAT&+N N+. DE1- )&) N+T &NC*?)E ANM P+RT&+N +2 AE#TERN B&C?TAN
A# T3E 3AN)AR&TTEN N+TAT&+N BM PRE#&)ENT MARC+# +N T3E #A&) PR+C*AMAT&+N
AA# N+T P?B*&#3E) &N T3E +22&C&A* >AVETTE.
&&
A3ET3ER +R N+T T3E 3+N+RAB*E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# #ER&+?#*M ERRE) &N R?*&N>
T3AT PR+C*AMAT&+N N+. ,1D *&4EA&#E EHC*?)E) T3E P+RT&+N +2 *AN) +CC?P&E)
BM MEMBER +2 3ERE&N PET&T&+NER.
&&&
A3ET3ER +R N+T T3E 3+N+RAB*E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# ERRE) &N N+T C+N#&)ER&N>
T3AT T3E 3+N. C+#*AP 3A# BR+A) P+AER# T+ REC+MMEN) T+ T3E PRE#&)ENT
&NN+LAT&LE MEA#?RE# T+ RE#+*LE EHPE)&T&+?#*M LAR&+?# *AN) CA#E#.
,E
+n the other hand, petitioner AB*+A& raises this sole issue@cralavvonlinelawlibrar
A3ET3ER +R N+T T3E 3+N+RAB*E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# ERRE) &N 3+*)&N> T3AT T3E
#?B7ECT PR+PERTM AA# N+T )EC*ARE) A*&ENAB*E AN) )&#P+#AB*E BM L&RT?E +2
PR+C*AMAT&+N N+. DE1- BECA?#E T3E 3AN)AR&TTEN A))EN)?M +2 PRE#&)ENT
2ER)&NAN) E. MARC+# &NC*?)&N> AE#TERN B&C?TAN &N PR+C*AMAT&+N N+. DE1-
AA# N+T &NC*?)E) &N T3E P?B*&CAT&+N.
,F
Both Petitions boil down to the principal issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in rulin! that
the sub(ect lots were not alienable and disposable b virtue of Proclamation No. DE1- on the
!round that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was not included in the publication of
the said law.
T3E C+?RTT# R?*&N>
Ae den the Petitions for lac5 of merit.
Considerin! that petitioners were occupin! *ots / and 1 of Aestern Bicutan %sub(ect lots', their
claims were anchored on the handwritten addendum of President Marcos to Proclamation No.
DE1-. The alle!e that the former President intended to include all Aestern Bicutan in the
reclassi"cation of portions of 2ort Bonifacio as disposable public land when he made a notation (ust
below the printed version of Proclamation No. DE1-.
3owever, it is undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not included when Proclamation No.
DE1- was published in the +<cial >a6ette.
The resolution of whether the sub(ect lots were declared as reclassi"ed and disposable lies in the
determination of whether the handwritten addendum of President Marcos has the force and e8ect
of law. &n relation thereto, Article D of the Civil Code e$pressl provides@cralavvonlinelawlibrar
ART. D. *aws shall ta5e e8ect after "fteen das followin! the completion of their
publication in the +<cial >a6ette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall ta5e
e8ect one ear after such publication.
?nder the above provision, the reGuirement of publication is indispensable to !ive e8ect to the
law, unless the law itself has otherwise provided. The phrase Yunless otherwise providedZ refers to
a di8erent e8ectivit date other than after "fteen das followin! the completion of the lawTs
publication in the +<cial >a6ette, but does not impl that the reGuirement of publication ma be
dispensed with. The issue of the reGuirement of publication was alread settled in the landmar5
case TaWada v. 3on. Tuvera,
,-
in which we had the occasion to rule thus@cralavvonlinelawlibrar
Publication is indispensable in ever case, but the le!islature ma in its discretion
provide that the usual "fteen:da period shall be shortened or e$tended. An e$ample,
as pointed out b the present Chief 7ustice in his separate concurrence in the ori!inal
decision, is the Civil Code which did not become e8ective after "fteen das from its
publication in the +<cial >a6ette but Yone ear after such publication.Z The !eneral
rule did not appl because it was Yotherwise provided.Z
&t is not correct to sa that under the disputed clause publication ma be dispensed
with alto!ether. The reason is that such omission would o8end due process insofar as it
would den the public 5nowled!e of the laws that are supposed to !overn it. #urel, if
the le!islature could validl provide that a law shall become e8ective immediatel
upon its approval notwithstandin! the lac5 of publication %or after an unreasonabl
short period after publication', it is not unli5el that persons not aware of it would be
pre(udiced as a result= and the would be so not because of a failure to compl with it
but simpl because the did not 5now of its e$istence. #i!ni"cantl, this is not true onl
of penal laws as is commonl supposed. +ne can thin5 of man non:penal measures,
li5e a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons the ma
a8ect before the can be!in to operate.
$ $ $ $
The term 9laws9 should refer to all laws and not onl to those of !eneral application, for
strictl spea5in! all laws relate to the people in !eneral albeit there are some that do
not appl to them directl. An e$ample is a law !rantin! citi6enship to a particular
individual, li5e a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturali6ation. &t
surel cannot be said that such a law does not a8ect the public althou!h it
unGuestionabl does not appl directl to all the people. The sub(ect of such law is a
matter of public interest which an member of the bod politic ma Guestion in the
political forums or, if he is a proper part, even in the courts of (ustice. &n fact, a law
without an bearin! on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privac or as class
le!islation or as an ultra vires act of the le!islature. To be valid, the law must invariabl
a8ect the public interest even if it mi!ht be directl applicable onl to one individual, or
some of the people onl, and not to the public as a whole.
Ae hold therefore that all statutes, includin! those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their e8ectivit, which shall be!in "fteen das
after publication unless a di8erent e8ectivit date is "$ed b the le!islature.
Covered b this rule are presidential decrees and e$ecutive orders promul!ated b the
President in the e$ercise of le!islative powers whenever the same are validl dele!ated
b the le!islature or, at present, directl conferred b the Constitution. Administrative
rules and re!ulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
e$istin! law pursuant also to a valid dele!ation.
$ $ $ $
Accordin!l, even the charter of a cit must be published notwithstandin! that it
applies to onl a portion of the national territor and directl a8ects onl the
inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published, includin! even,
sa, those namin! a public place after a favored individual or e$emptin! him from
certain prohibitions or reGuirements. The circulars issued b the Monetar Board must
be published if the are meant not merel to interpret but to 9"ll in the details9 of the
Central Ban5 Act which that bod is supposed to enforce.
$ $ $ $
Ae a!ree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its
purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctl pointed out b
the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of
such decree, its whereabouts %e.!., 9with #ecretar Tuvera9', the supposed date of
e8ectivit, and in a mere supplement of the +<cial >a6ette cannot satisf the
publication reGuirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner,
incidentall, in which the >eneral Appropriations Act for 2M ,.1F, a presidential decree
undeniabl of !eneral applicabilit and interest, was 9published9 b the Marcos
administration. The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information
on this vital law.
$ $ $ $
*aws must come out in the open in the clear li!ht of the sun instead of s5ul5in! in the
shadows with their dar5, deep secrets. Msterious pronouncements and rumored rules
cannot be reco!ni6ed as bindin! unless their e$istence and contents are con"rmed b
a valid publication intended to ma5e full disclosure and !ive proper notice to the
people. The furtive law is li5e a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parr or cut unless
the na5ed blade is drawn. %Emphases supplied'
Applin! the fore!oin! rulin! to the instant case, this Court cannot rel on a handwritten note that
was not part of Proclamation No. DE1- as published. Aithout publication, the note never had an
le!al force and e8ect.
2urthermore, under #ection DE, Chapter -, Boo5 & of the Administrative Code, YBtChe publication of
an law, resolution or other o<cial documents in the +<cial >a6ette shall be prima facie evidence
of its authorit.Z Thus, whether or not President Marcos intended to include Aestern Bicutan is not
onl irrelevant but speculative. #impl put, the courts ma not speculate as to the probable intent
of the le!islature apart from the words appearin! in the law.
,1
This Court cannot rule that a word
appears in the law when, evidentl, there is none. &n Pa!palain 3aulers, &nc. v. 3on. Tra(ano,
,K
we
ruled that YBuCnder Article K of the Civil Code, XB(Cudicial decisions applin! or interpretin! the laws
or the Constitution shall form a part of the le!al sstem of the Philippines.T This does not mean,
however, that courts can create law. The courts e$ist for interpretin! the law, not for enactin! it. To
allow otherwise would be violative of the principle of separation of powers, inasmuch as the sole
function of our courts is to appl or interpret the laws, particularl where !aps or lacunae e$ist or
where ambi!uities becloud issues, but it will not arro!ate unto itself the tas5 of le!islatin!.Z The
remed sou!ht in these Petitions is not (udicial interpretation, but another le!islation that would
amend the law to include petitionersT lots in the reclassi"cation.
A3ERE2+RE, in view of the fore!oin!, the instant petitions are hereb )EN&E) for lac5 of merit.
The assailed )ecision of the Court of Appeals in CA:>.R. CL No. .1.DF dated D. April D00.
isA22&RME) in toto. Accordin!l, this CourtTs status Guo order dated ,1 7une D00. is
hereb *&2TE). *i5ewise, all pendin! motions to cite respondent in contempt is )EN&E), havin!
been rendered moot. No costs.
#+ +R)ERE).
*eonardo:)e Castro, Bersamin, Lillarama, 7r., and Rees, 77., concur.
Republic of the
#upreme Court
Manila
SECON" "IVISION
!RIGI"O !. 6UIAO,
P$t2t2o,$&,
: versus :
RITA C. 6UIAO, OITCHIE C. 6UIAO, LOTIS C.
6UIAO, PETCHIE C. 6UIAO, &$*&$s$,t$0 -'
t)$2& +ot)$& RITA 6UIAO,
R$s*o,0$,ts.
G.R. No 176886
Present@
CARP&+, 9., *hairperson,
BR&+N,
PEREV,
#EREN+, and
REME#, 99.
Promul!ated@
7ul E, D0,D
$:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::$
"ECISION
RE3ES, J.>
The famil is the basic and the most important institution of societ. &t is in the famil
where children are born and molded either to become useful citi6ens of the countr or
troublema5ers in the communit. Thus, we are saddened when parents have to separate and "!ht
over properties, without re!ard to the messa!e the send to their children. Notwithstandin! this,
we must not shir5 from our obli!ation to rule on this case involvin! le!al separation escalatin! to
Guestions on dissolution and partition of properties.
T)$ C#s$
This case comes before us $ia Petition for Review on *ertiorariB,C under Rule EF of the
Rules of Court. The petitioner see5s that we vacate and set aside the +rderBDCdated 7anuar K,
D001 of the Re!ional Trial Court %RTC', Branch ,, . &n lieu of the said order, we are as5ed to issue a
Resolution de"nin! the net pro"ts sub(ect of the forfeiture as a result of the decree of le!al
separation in accordance with the provision of Article ,0D%E' of the 2amil Code, or alternativel, in
accordance with the provisions of Article ,1- of the Civil Code.
A,t$%$0$,t F#%ts
+n +ctober D-, D000, herein respondent Rita C. Quiao %Rita' "led a complaint for le!al
separation a!ainst herein petitioner Bri!ido B. Quiao %Bri!ido'.B/C #ubseGuentl, the RTC rendered
a )ecisionBEC dated +ctober ,0, D00F, the dispositive portion of which provides@
A3ERE2+RE, viewed from the fore!oin! considerations, (ud!ment is hereb
rendered declarin! the le!al separation of plainti8 Rita C. Quiao and defendant:
respondent Bri!ido B. Quiao pursuant to Article FF.
As such, the herein parties shall be entitled to live separatel from each
other, but the marria!e bond shall not be severed.
E$cept for *etecia C. Quiao who is of le!al a!e, the three minor children,
namel, 4itchie, *otis and Petchie, all surnamed Quiao shall remain under the
custod of the plainti8 who is the innocent spouse.
2urther, e$cept for the personal and real properties alread foreclosed b the
RCBC, all the remainin! properties, namel@
,. co8ee mill in Balon!a!an, *as Nieves, A!usan del Norte=
D. co8ee mill in )urian, *as Nieves, A!usan del Norte=
/. corn mill in Casi5lan, *as Nieves, A!usan del Norte=
E. co8ee mill in Esperan6a, A!usan del #ur=
F. a parcel of land with an area of ,,D00 sGuare meters located in
Tun!ao, =
-. a parcel of a!ricultural land with an area of F hectares located in Manila
de Bu!abos, =
1. a parcel of land with an area of KE sGuare meters located in Tun!ao, =
K. Bashier Bon 2actor located in Tun!ao, =
shall be divided eGuall between herein BrespondentsC and BpetitionerC sub(ect to the
respective le!itimes of the children and the pament of the unpaid con(u!al
liabilities of BPCEF,1E0.00.
BPetitionerTsC share, however, of the net pro"ts earned b the con(u!al
partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children.
3e is further ordered to reimburse BrespondentsC the sum of BPC,.,000.00 as
attorne;s fees and liti!ation e$penses of BPCF,000.00B.C
#+ +R)ERE).BFC
Neither part "led a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period provided for
under #ection ,1%a' and %b' of the Rule on *e!al #eparation.B-C
+n )ecember ,D, D00F, the respondents "led a motion for e$ecutionB1C which the trial
court !ranted in its +rder dated )ecember ,-, D00F, the dispositive portion of which reads@
YAherefore, "ndin! the motion to be well ta5en, the same is hereb
!ranted. *et a writ of e$ecution be issued for the immediate enforcement of the
7ud!ment.
#+ +R)ERE).ZBKC
#ubseGuentl, on 2ebruar ,0, D00-, the RTC issued a Arit of E$ecutionB.C which reads as
follows@
N+A T3ERE2+RE, that of the !oods and chattels of the BpetitionerC BR&>&)+
B. Q?&A+ ou cause to be made the sums stated in the afore:Guoted )EC&#&+N BsicC,
to!ether with our lawful fees in the service of this Arit, all in the Philippine
Currenc.
But if su<cient personal propert cannot be found whereof to satisf this
e$ecution and our lawful fees, then we command ou that of the lands and
buildin!s of the said BpetitionerC, ou ma5e the said sums in the manner reGuired b
law. Mou are en(oined to strictl observed #ection ., Rule /., Rule BsicC of the ,..1
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Mou are hereb ordered to ma5e a return of the said proceedin!s immediatel
after the (ud!ment has been satis"ed in part or in full in consonance with #ection
,E, Rule /. of the ,..1 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.B,0C
+n 7ul -, D00-, the writ was partiall e$ecuted with the petitioner pain! the respondents
the amount of PE-,K10.00, representin! the followin! paments@
%a' PDD,K10.00 S as petitioner;s share of the pament of the con(u!al share=
%b' P,.,000.00 S as attorne;s fees= and
%c' PF,000.00 S as liti!ation e$penses.B,,C
+n 7ul 1, D00-, or after more than nine months from the promul!ation of the )ecision, the
petitioner "led before the RTC a Motion for Clari"cation,B,DC as5in! the RTC to de"ne the term YNet
Pro"ts Earned.Z
To resolve the petitioner;s Motion for Clari"cation, the RTC issued an +rderB,/C dated
Au!ust /,, D00-, which held that the phrase YNET PR+2&T EARNE)Z denotes Ythe remainder of the
properties of the parties after deductin! the separate properties of each Bof theC spouse and the
debts.ZB,EC The +rder further held that after determinin! the remainder of the properties, it shall
be forfeited in favor of the common children because the o8endin! spouse does not have an ri!ht
to an share of the net pro"ts earned, pursuant to Articles -/, No. %D' and E/, No. %D' of the 2amil
Code.B,FC The dispositive portion of the +rder states@
A3ERE2+RE, there is no blatant disparit when the sheri8 intends to forfeit
all the remainin! properties after deductin! the paments of the debts for onl
separate properties of the defendant:respondent shall be delivered to him which he
has none.
The #heri8 is herein directed to proceed with the e$ecution of the )ecision.
&T &# #+ +R)ERE).B,-C
Not satis"ed with the trial court;s +rder, the petitioner "led a Motion for
ReconsiderationB,1C on #eptember K, D00-. ConseGuentl, the RTC issued another +rderB,KCdated
November K, D00-, holdin! that althou!h the )ecision dated +ctober ,0, D00F has become "nal
and e$ecutor, it ma still consider the Motion for Clari"cation because the petitioner simpl
wanted to clarif the meanin! of Ynet pro"t earned.ZB,.C 2urthermore, the same +rder held@
ALL TOL", the Court +rder dated Au!ust /,, D00- is hereb ordered set
aside. NET PR+2&T EARNE), which is sub(ect of forfeiture in favor of BtheC parties;
common children, is ordered to be computed in accordance BwithC par. E of Article
,0D of the 2amil Code.BD0C
+n November D,, D00-, the respondents "led a Motion for Reconsideration,BD,C prain! for
the correction and reversal of the +rder dated November K, D00-. Thereafter, on 7anuar K, D001,
BDDC the trial court had chan!ed its rulin! a!ain and !ranted the respondents; Motion for
Reconsideration whereb the +rder dated November K, D00- was set aside to reinstate the +rder
dated Au!ust /,, D00-.
Not satis"ed with the trial court;s +rder, the petitioner "led on 2ebruar D1, D001 this
instant Petition for Review under Rule EF of the Rules of Court, raisin! the followin!@
Issu$s
&
&# T3E )&##+*?T&+N AN) T3E C+N#EQ?ENT *&Q?&)AT&+N +2 T3E C+MM+N
PR+PERT&E# +2 T3E 3?#BAN) AN) A&2E BM L&RT?E +2 T3E )ECREE +2 *E>A*
#EPARAT&+N >+LERNE) BM ART&C*E ,DF %#&C' +2 T3E 2AM&*M C+)E`
&&
A3AT &# T3E MEAN&N> +2 T3E NET PR+2&T# EARNE) BM T3E C+N7?>A*
PARTNER#3&P 2+R P?RP+#E# +2 E22ECT&N> T3E 2+R2E&T?RE A?T3+R&VE) ?N)ER
ART&C*E -/ +2 T3E 2AM&*M C+)E`
&&&
A3AT *AA >+LERN# T3E PR+PERTM RE*AT&+N# BETAEEN T3E 3?#BAN) AN) A&2E
A3+ >+T MARR&E) &N ,.11` CAN T3E 2AM&*M C+)E +2 T3E BE >&LEN
RETR+ACT&LE E22ECT 2+R P?RP+#E# +2 )ETERM&N&N> T3E NET PR+2&T# #?B7ECT
+2 2+R2E&T?RE A# A RE#?*T +2 T3E )ECREE +2 *E>A* #EPARAT&+N A&T3+?T
&MPA&R&N> LE#TE) R&>3T# A*REA)M ACQ?&RE) ?N)ER T3E C&L&* C+)E`
&L
A3AT PR+PERT&E# #3A** BE &NC*?)E) &N T3E 2+R2E&T?RE +2 T3E #3ARE +2 T3E
>?&*TM #P+?#E &N T3E NET C+N7?>A* PARTNER#3&P A# A RE#?*T +2 T3E &##?ANCE
+2 T3E )ECREE +2 *E>A* #EPARAT&+N`BD/C
Ou& Ru/2,g
Ahile the petitioner has raised a number of issues on the applicabilit of certain laws, we
are well:aware that the respondents have called our attention to the fact that the )ecision dated
+ctober ,0, D00F has attained "nalit when the Motion for Clari"cation was "led.BDEC Thus, we
are constrained to resolve "rst the issue of the "nalit of the )ecision dated +ctober ,0, D00F and
subseGuentl discuss the matters that we can clarif.
T)$ "$%2s2o, 0#t$0 O%to-$& 10, 2008 )#s -$%o+$
D,#/ #,0 $;$%uto&' #t t)$ t2+$ t)$ Mot2o, (o&
C/#&2D%#t2o, ?#s D/$0 o, 1u/' 7, 2006.
#ection /, Rule E, of the Rules of Court provides@
#ection /. !eriod of ordinar appeal. : The appeal shall be ta5en within "fteen
%,F' das from notice of the (ud!ment or "nal order appealed from. Ahere a record
on appeal is reGuired, the appellant shall "le a notice of appeal and a record on
appeal within thirt %/0' das from notice of the (ud!ment or "nal order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted b a timel motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for e$tension of time to "le a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed.
&n 8epes $. *ourt of Appeals,BDFC we clari"ed that to standardi6e the appeal periods
provided in the Rules and to a8ord liti!ants fair opportunit to appeal their cases, we held that Yit
would be practical to allow a fresh period of ,F das within which to "le the notice of appeal in the
RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissin! a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.ZBD-C
&n 8epes, we e$plained that the 9fresh period rule9 shall also appl to Rule E0 !overnin!
appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the RTCs= Rule ED on petitions for review from the RTCs
to the Court of Appeals %CA'= Rule E/ on appeals from Guasi:(udicial a!encies to the CA and Rule
EF !overnin! appeals b certiorari to the #upreme Court. Ae also said, YThe new rule aims to
re!iment or ma5e the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denin! the
motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration %whether full or partial' or an "nal order or
resolution.ZBD1C &n other words, a part liti!ant ma "le his notice of appeal within a fresh ,F:da
period from his receipt of the trial court;s decision or "nal order denin! his motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration. 2ailure to avail of the fresh ,F:da period from the denial of the
motion for reconsideration ma5es the decision or "nal order in Guestion "nal and e$ecutor.
&n the case at bar, the trial court rendered its )ecision on +ctober ,0, D00F. The petitioner
neither "led a motion for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. +n )ecember ,-, D00F, or
after -1 das had lapsed, the trial court issued an order !rantin! the respondent;s motion for
e$ecution= and on 2ebruar ,0, D00-, or after ,D/ das had lapsed, the trial court issued a writ of
e$ecution. 2inall, when the writ had alread been partiall e$ecuted, the petitioner, on 7ul 1,
D00- or after D10 das had lapsed, "led his Motion for Clari"cation on the de"nition of the Ynet
pro"ts earned.Z 2rom the fore!oin!, the petitioner had clearl slept on his ri!ht to Guestion the
RTCTs )ecision dated +ctober ,0, D00F. 2or D10 das, the petitioner never raised a sin!le issue
until the decision had alread been partiall e$ecuted. Thus at the time the petitioner "led his
motion for clari"cation, the trial courtTs decision has become "nal and e$ecutor. A (ud!ment
becomes "nal and e$ecutor when the re!lementar period to appeal lapses and no appeal is
perfected within such period. ConseGuentl, no court, not even this Court, can arro!ate unto itself
appellate (urisdiction to review a case or modif a (ud!ment that became "nal.BDKC
The petitioner ar!ues that the decision he is Guestionin! is a void (ud!ment. Bein! such,
the petitioner;s thesis is that it can still be disturbed even after D10 das had lapsed from the
issuance of the decision to the "lin! of the motion for clari"cation. 3e said that Ya void (ud!ment
is no (ud!ment at all. &t never attains "nalit and cannot be a source of an ri!ht nor an
obli!ation.ZBD.C But what precisel is a void (ud!ment in our (urisdiction` Ahen does a (ud!ment
becomes void`
YA (ud!ment is null and void when the court which rendered it had no power to !rant the
relief or no (urisdiction over the sub(ect matter or over the parties or both.ZB/0C &n other words, a
court, which does not have the power to decide a case or that has no (urisdiction over the sub(ect
matter or the parties, will issue a void (ud!ment or a coram non #udice.B/,C
The Guestioned (ud!ment does not fall within the purview of a void (ud!ment. 2or sure, the
trial court has (urisdiction over a case involvin! le!al separation. Republic Act %R.A.' No. K/-.
confers upon an RTC, desi!nated as the 2amil Court of a cit, the e$clusive ori!inal (urisdiction to
hear and decide, amon! others, complaints or petitions relatin! to marital status and propert
relations of the husband and wife or those livin! to!ether.B/DC The Rule on *e!al
#eparationB//C provides that Ythe petition Bfor le!al separationC shall be "led in the 2amil Court of
the province or cit where the petitioner or the respondent has been residin! for at least si$
months prior to the date of "lin! or in the case of a non:resident respondent, where he ma be
found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner.ZB/EC &n the instant case, herein
respondent Rita is found to reside in Tun!ao, for more than si$ months prior to the date of "lin!
of the petition= thus, the RTC, clearl has (urisdiction over the respondent;s petition
below. 2urthermore, the RTC also acGuired (urisdiction over the persons of both parties,
considerin! that summons and a cop of the complaint with its anne$es were served upon the
herein petitioner on )ecember ,E, D000 and that the herein petitioner "led his Answer to the
Complaint on 7anuar ., D00,.B/FC Thus, without doubt, the RTC, which has rendered the
Guestioned (ud!ment, has (urisdiction over the complaint and the persons of the parties.
2rom the aforecited facts, the Guestioned +ctober ,0, D00F (ud!ment of the trial court is
clearl not void ab initio, since it was rendered within the ambit of the court;s (urisdiction. Bein!
such, the same cannot anmore be disturbed, even if the modi"cation is meant to correct what
ma be considered an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.B/-C &n fact, we have ruled that for YBasC
lon! as the public respondent acted with (urisdiction, an error committed b him or it in the
e$ercise thereof will amount to nothin! more than an error of (ud!ment which ma be reviewed or
corrected onl b appeal.ZB/1C >rantin! without admittin! that the RTC;s (ud!ment dated +ctober
,0, D00F was erroneous, the petitioner;s remed should be an appeal "led within the re!lementar
period. ?nfortunatel, the petitioner failed to do this. 3e has alread lost the chance to Guestion
the trial court;s decision, which has become immutable and unalterable. Ahat we can onl do is
to clarif the ver Guestion raised below and nothin! more.
2or our convenience, the followin! matters cannot anmore be disturbed since the +ctober
,0, D00F (ud!ment has alread become immutable and unalterable, to wit@
%a' The "ndin! that the petitioner is the o8endin! spouse since he cohabited with a woman
who is not his wife=B/KC
%b' The trial court;s !rant of the petition for le!al separation of respondent Rita=B/.C
%c' The dissolution and liGuidation of the con(u!al partnership=BE0C
%d' The forfeiture of the petitioner;s ri!ht to an share of the net pro"ts earned b the
con(u!al partnership=BE,C
%e' The award to the innocent spouse of the minor children;s custod=BEDC
%f' The disGuali"cation of the o8endin! spouse from inheritin! from the innocent spouse b
intestate succession=BE/C
%!' The revocation of provisions in favor of the o8endin! spouse made in the will of the
innocent spouse=BEEC
%h' The holdin! that the propert relation of the parties is con(u!al partnership of !ains and
pursuant to Article ,,- of the 2amil Code, all properties acGuired durin! the marria!e, whether
acGuired b one or both spouses, is presumed to be con(u!al unless the contrar is proved=BEFC
%i' The "ndin! that the spouses acGuired their real and personal properties while the were
livin! to!ether=BE-C
%(' The list of properties which Ri6al Commercial Ban5in! Corporation %RCBC' foreclosed=BE1C
%5' The list of the remainin! properties of the couple which must be dissolved and
liGuidated and the fact that respondent Rita was the one who too5 char!e of the administration of
these properties=BEKC
%l' The holdin! that the con(u!al partnership shall be liable to matters included under
Article ,D, of the 2amil Code and the con(u!al liabilities totalin! PF0/,K-D.,0 shall be char!ed to
the income !enerated b these properties=BE.C
%m' The fact that the trial court had no wa of 5nowin! whether the petitioner had separate
properties which can satisf his share for the support of the famil=BF0C
%n' The holdin! that the applicable law in this case is Article ,D.%1'=BF,C
%o' The rulin! that the remainin! properties not sub(ect to an encumbrance shall therefore
be divided eGuall between the petitioner and the respondent without pre(udice to the children;s
le!itime=BFDC
%p' The holdin! that the petitioner;s share of the net pro"ts earned b the con(u!al
partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children=BF/C and
%G' The order to the petitioner to reimburse the respondents the sum of P,.,000.00 as
attorne;s fees and liti!ation e$penses of PF,000.00.BFEC
After discussin! len!thil the immutabilit of the )ecision dated +ctober ,0, D00F, we will
discuss the followin! issues for the enli!htenment of the parties and the public at lar!e.
A&t2%/$ 129 o( t)$ F#+2/' Co0$ #**/2$s to t)$
*&$s$,t %#s$ s2,%$ t)$ *#&t2$sK *&o*$&t' &$/#t2o,
2s go=$&,$0 -' t)$ s'st$+ o( &$/#t2=$ %o++u,2t'
o& %o,Bug#/ *#&t,$&s)2* o( g#2,s.
The petitioner claims that the court a 3uo is wron! when it applied Article ,D. of the 2amil
Code, instead of Article ,0D. 3e confusin!l ar!ues that Article ,0D applies because there is no
other provision under the 2amil Code which de"nes net pro"ts earned sub(ect of forfeiture as a
result of le!al separation.
+8hand, the trial court;s )ecision dated +ctober ,0, D00F held that Article ,D.%1' of the
2amil Code applies in this case. Ae a!ree with the trial court;s holdin!.
First, let us determine what !overns the couple;s propert relation. 2rom the record, we
can deduce that the petitioner and the respondent tied the marital 5not on 7anuar -, ,.11. #ince
at the time of the e$chan!e of marital vows, the operative law was the Civil Code of the %R.A. No.
/K-' and since the did not a!ree on a marria!e settlement, the propert relations between the
petitioner and the respondent is the sstem of relative communit or con(u!al partnership of
!ains.BFFC Article ,,. of the Civil Code provides@
Art. ,,.. The future spouses ma in the marria!e settlements a!ree upon
absolute or relative communit of propert, or upon complete separation of
propert, or upon an other re!ime. &n the absence of marria!e settlements, or
when the same are void, the sstem of relative communit or con(u!al partnership
of !ains as established in this Code, shall !overn the propert relations between
husband and wife.
Thus, from the fore!oin! facts and law, it is clear that what !overns the propert relations
of the petitioner and of the respondent is con(u!al partnership of !ains. And under this propert
relation, Ythe husband and the wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate propert
and the income from their wor5 or industr.ZBF-C The husband and wife also own in common all
the propert of the con(u!al partnership of !ains.BF1C
@econd, since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the respondent;s marria!e
the operative law is alread the 2amil Code, the same applies in the instant case and the
applicable law in so far as the liGuidation of the con(u!al partnership assets and liabilities is
concerned is Article ,D. of the 2amil Code in relation to Article -/%D' of the 2amil Code. The
latter provision is applicable because accordin! to Article DF- of the 2amil Code YBtChis Code shall
have retroactive e8ect insofar as it does not pre(udice or impair vested or acGuired ri!hts in
accordance with the Civil Code or other law.ZBFKC
Now, the petitioner as5s@ Aas his vested ri!ht over half of the common properties of the
con(u!al partnership violated when the trial court forfeited them in favor of his children pursuant
to Articles -/%D' and ,D. of the 2amil Code`
Ae respond in the ne!ative.
&ndeed, the petitioner claims that his vested ri!hts have been impaired, ar!uin!@ YAs earlier
adverted to, the petitioner acGuired vested ri!hts over half of the con(u!al properties, the same
bein! owned in common b the spouses. &f the provisions of the 2amil Code are to be !iven
retroactive application to the point of authori6in! the forfeiture of the petitioner;s share in the net
remainder of the con(u!al partnership properties, the same impairs his ri!hts acGuired prior to the
e8ectivit of the 2amil Code.ZBF.C &n other words, the petitioner is sain! that since the propert
relations between the spouses is !overned b the re!ime of Con(u!al Partnership of >ains under
the Civil Code, the petitioner acGuired vested ri!hts over half of the properties of the Con(u!al
Partnership of >ains, pursuant to Article ,E/ of the Civil Code, which provides@ YAll propert of the
con(u!al partnership of !ains is owned in common b the husband and wife.ZB-0C Thus, since he is
one of the owners of the properties covered b the con(u!al partnership of !ains, he has a vested
ri!ht over half of the said properties, even after the promul!ation of the 2amil Code= and he
insisted that no provision under the 2amil Code ma deprive him of this vested ri!ht b virtue of
Article DF- of the 2amil Code which prohibits retroactive application of the 2amil Code when it
will pre(udice a person;s vested ri!ht.
3owever, the petitioner;s claim of vested ri!ht is not one which is written on stone. &n Go,
9r. $. *ourt of Appeals,B-,C we de"ne and e$plained Yvested ri!htZ in the followin! manner@
A vested ri!ht is one whose e$istence, e8ectivit and e$tent do not depend
upon events forei!n to the will of the holder, or to the e$ercise of which no obstacle
e$ists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a
contin!enc. The term Yvested ri!htZ e$presses the concept of present "$ed
interest which, in ri!ht reason and natural (ustice, should be protected a!ainst
arbitrar #tate action, or an innatel (ust and imperative ri!ht which enli!htened
free societ, sensitive to inherent and irrefra!able individual ri!hts, cannot den.
To be vested, a ri!ht must have become a titleJle!al or eGuitableJto the
present or future en(oment of propert.B-DC %Citations omitted'
&n our en banc Resolution dated +ctober ,K, D00F for A4AKADA Guro !art .ist CEcer
@amson @. Alcantara, et al. $. (he Hon. ,:ecuti$e @ecretar ,duardo R. ,rmita,B-/C we also
e$plained@
The concept of Yvested ri!htZ is a conseGuence of the %o,st2tut2o,#/
gu#&#,t' o( 0u$ *&o%$ss that e$presses a present "$ed interest which in ri!ht
reason and natural (ustice is protected a!ainst arbitrar state action= it includes not
onl le!al or eGuitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also e$emptions
from new obli!ations created after the ri!ht has become vested. Ri!hts are
considered vested when the ri!ht to en(oment is a present interest, absolute,
unconditional, and perfect or "$ed and irrefutable.B-EC %Emphasis and
underscorin! supplied'
2rom the fore!oin!, it is clear that while one ma not be deprived of his Yvested ri!ht,Z he
ma lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and
(urisprudence.
&n the present case, the petitioner was accorded his ri!ht to due process. First, he was
well:aware that the respondent praed in her complaint that all of the con(u!al properties be
awarded to her.B-FC &n fact, in his Answer, the petitioner praed that the trial court divide the
communit assets between the petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and evidence
warrant after the accountin! and inventor of all the communit properties of the parties.
B--C @econd, when the )ecision dated +ctober ,0, D00F was promul!ated, the petitioner never
Guestioned the trial court;s rulin! forfeitin! what the trial court termed as Ynet pro"ts,Z pursuant to
Article ,D.%1' of the 2amil Code.B-1C Thus, the petitioner cannot claim bein! deprived of his ri!ht
to due process.
2urthermore, we ta5e note that the alle!ed deprivation of the petitioner;s Yvested ri!htZ is
one founded, not onl in the provisions of the 2amil Code, but in Article ,1- of the Civil
Code. This provision is li5e Articles -/ and ,D. of the 2amil Code on the forfeiture of the !uilt
spouse;s share in the con(u!al partnership pro"ts. The said provision sas@
Art. ,1-. &n case of le!al separation, the !uilt spouse shall forfeit his or her
share of the con(u!al partnership pro"ts, which shall be awarded to the children of
both, and the children of the !uilt spouse had b a prior marria!e. 3owever, if the
con(u!al partnership propert came mostl or entirel from the wor5 or industr, or
from the wa!es and salaries, or from the fruits of the separate propert of the !uilt
spouse, this forfeiture shall not appl.
&n case there are no children, the innocent spouse shall be entitled to all the
net pro"ts.
2rom the fore!oin!, the petitioner;s claim of a vested ri!ht has no basis considerin! that
even under Article ,1- of the Civil Code, his share of the con(u!al partnership pro"ts ma be
forfeited if he is the !uilt part in a le!al separation case. Thus, after trial and after the petitioner
was !iven the chance to present his evidence, the petitioner;s vested ri!ht claim ma in fact be
set aside under the Civil Code since the trial court found him the !uilt part.
More, in Abalos $. Dr. Macatanga, 9r.,B-KC we reiterated our lon!:standin! rulin! that@
BPCrior to the liGuidation of the con(u!al partnership, the interest of each spouse in
the con(u!al assets is inchoate, a mere e$pectanc, which constitutes neither a
le!al nor an eGuitable estate, and does not ripen into title until it appears that there
are assets in the communit as a result of the liGuidation and settlement. The
interest of each spouse is limited to the net remainder or Yremanente li3uidoZ
%haber ganancial' resultin! from the liGuidation of the a8airs of the partnership after
its dissolution. Thus, the ri!ht of the husband or wife to one:half of the con(u!al
assets does not vest until the dissolution and liGuidation of the con(u!al partnership,
or after dissolution of the marria!e, when it is "nall determined that, after
settlement of con(u!al obli!ations, there are net assets left which can be divided
between the spouses or their respective heirs.B-.C %Citations omitted'
2inall, as earlier discussed, the trial court has alread decided in its )ecision dated
+ctober ,0, D00F that the applicable law in this case is Article ,D.%1' of the 2amil Code. B10C The
petitioner did not "le a motion for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. Thus, the petitioner is
now precluded from Guestionin! the trial court;s decision since it has become "nal and e$ecutor.
The doctrine of immutabilit and unalterabilit of a "nal (ud!ment prevents us from disturbin! the
)ecision dated +ctober ,0, D00F because "nal and e$ecutor decisions can no lon!er be reviewed
nor reversed b this Court.B1,C
2rom the above discussions, Article ,D. of the 2amil Code clearl applies to the present
case since the parties; propert relation is !overned b the sstem of relative communit or
con(u!al partnership of !ains and since the trial court;s )ecision has attained "nalit and
immutabilit.
T)$ ,$t *&oDts o( t)$ %o,Bug#/ *#&t,$&s)2* o(
g#2,s #&$ #// t)$ (&u2ts o( t)$ s$*#&#t$ *&o*$&t2$s
o( t)$ s*ous$s #,0 t)$ *&o0u%ts o( t)$2& /#-o&
#,0 2,0ust&'.
The petitioner inGuires from us the meanin! of Ynet pro"tsZ earned b the con(u!al
partnership for purposes of e8ectin! the forfeiture authori6ed under Article -/ of the 2amil
Code. 3e insists that since there is no other provision under the 2amil Code, which de"nes Ynet
pro"tsZ earned sub(ect of forfeiture as a result of le!al separation, then Article ,0D of the 2amil
Code applies.
Ahat does Article ,0D of the 2amil Code sa` &s the computation of Ynet pro"tsZ earned in
the con(u!al partnership of !ains the same with the computation of Ynet pro"tsZ earned in the
absolute communit`
Now, we clarif.
2irst and foremost, we must distin!uish between the applicable law as to the propert
relations between the parties and the applicable law as to the de"nition of Ynet pro"ts.Z As earlier
discussed, Article ,D. of the 2amil Code applies as to the propert relations of the parties. &n
other words, the computation and the succession of events will follow the provisions under Article
,D. of the said Code. Moreover, as to the de"nition of Ynet pro"ts,Z we cannot but refer to Article
,0D%E' of the 2amil Code, since it e$pressl provides that for purposes of computin! the net
pro"ts sub(ect to forfeiture under Article E/, No. %D' and Article -/, No. %D', Article ,0D%E' applies.
&n this provision, net pro"ts Yshall be the increase in value between the mar5et value of the
communit propert at the time of the celebration of the marria!e and the mar5et value at the
time of its dissolution.ZB1DC Thus, without an iota of doubt, Article ,0D%E' applies to both the
dissolution of the absolute communit re!ime under Article ,0D of the 2amil Code, and to the
dissolution of the con(u!al partnership re!ime under Article ,D. of the 2amil Code. Ahere lies the
di8erence` As earlier shown, the di8erence lies in the processes used under the dissolution of the
absolute communit re!ime under Article ,0D of the 2amil Code, and in the processes used under
the dissolution of the con(u!al partnership re!ime under Article ,D. of the 2amil Code.
*et us now discuss the di8erence in the processes between the absolute communit re!ime
and the con(u!al partnership re!ime.
+n Absolute Communit Re!ime@

Ahen a couple enters into a &$g2+$ o( #-so/ut$ %o++u,2t', the husband and the wife
becomes (oint owners of all the properties of the marria!e. Ahatever propert each spouse brin!s
into the marria!e, and those acGuired durin! the marria!e %e$cept those e$cluded under Article .D
of the 2amil Code' form the common mass of the couple;s properties. And when the couple;s
marria!e or communit is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their
respective heirs, eGuall or in the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value
each one ma have ori!inall owned.B1/C
?nder Article ,0D of the 2amil Code, upon dissolution of marria!e, an inventor is
prepared, listin! separatel all the properties of the absolute communit and the e$clusive
properties of each= then the debts and obli!ations of the absolute communit are paid out of the
absolute communit;s assets and if the communit;s properties are insu<cient, the separate
properties of each of the couple will be solidaril liable for the unpaid balance. Ahatever is left of
the separate properties will be delivered to each of them. The net remainder of the absolute
communit is its net assets, which shall be divided between the husband and the wife= and for
purposes of computin! the net pro"ts sub(ect to forfeiture, said pro"ts shall be the increase in
value between the mar5et value of the communit propert at the time of the celebration of the
marria!e and the mar5et value at the time of its dissolution.B1EC
Applin! Article ,0D of the 2amil Code, the Ynet pro"tsZ reGuires that we "rst "nd the
mar5et value of the properties at the time of the communit;s dissolution. 2rom the totalit of the
mar5et value of all the properties, we subtract the debts and obli!ations of the absolute
communit and this result to the net assets or net remainder of the properties of the absolute
communit, from which we deduct the mar5et value of the properties at the time of marria!e,
which then results to the net pro"ts.B1FC
>rantin! without admittin! that Article ,0D applies to the instant case, let us see what will
happen if we appl Article ,0D@
%a' Accordin! to the trial court;s "ndin! of facts, both husband and wife have no separate
properties, thus, the remainin! properties in the list above are all part of the absolute
communit. And its mar5et value at the time of the dissolution of the absolute communit
constitutes the Ymar5et value at dissolution.Z
%b' Thus, when the petitioner and the respondent "nall were le!all separated, all the
properties which remained will be liable for the debts and obli!ations of the communit. #uch
debts and obli!ations will be subtracted from the Ymar5et value at dissolution.Z
%c' Ahat remains after the debts and obli!ations have been paid from the total assets of
the absolute communit constitutes the net remainder or net asset. And from such net
assetIremainder of the petitioner and respondent;s remainin! properties, the mar5et value at the
time of marria!e will be subtracted and the resultin! totalit constitutes the Ynet pro"ts.Z
%d' S2,%$ -ot) )us-#,0 #,0 ?2($ )#=$ ,o s$*#&#t$ *&o*$&t2$s, and nothin! would be
returned to each of them, what will be divided eGuall between them is simpl the Ynet
pro"ts.Z 3owever, in the )ecision dated +ctober ,0, D00F, the trial court forfeited the half:share
of the petitioner in favor of his children. Thus, if we use Article ,0D in the instant case %which
should not be the case', nothin! is left to the petitioner since both parties entered into their
marria!e without brin!in! with them an propert.
+n Con(u!al Partnership Re!ime@

Before we !o into our disGuisition on the Con(u!al Partnership Re!ime, we ma5e it clear
that Article ,0D%E' of the 2amil Code applies in the instant case (o& *u&*os$s o,/' o( 0$D,2,g
P,$t *&oDt.Z As earlier e$plained, the de"nition of Ynet pro"tsZ in Article ,0D%E' of the 2amil
Code applies to both the absolute communit re!ime and con(u!al partnership re!ime as provided
for under Article -/, No. %D' of the 2amil Code, relative to the provisions on *e!al #eparation.
Now, when a couple enters into a &$g2+$ o( %o,Bug#/ *#&t,$&s)2* o( g#2,s under Article
,ED of the Civil Code, Ythe husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate
propert and income from their wor5 or industr, and divide eGuall, upon the dissolution of the
marria!e or of the partnership, the net !ains or bene"ts obtained indiscriminatel b either spouse
durin! the marria!e.ZB1-C 2rom the fore!oin! provision, each of the couple has his and her own
propert and debts. The law does not intend to e8ect a mi$ture or mer!er of those debts or
properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.B11C
Considerin! that the couple;s marria!e has been dissolved under the 2amil Code, Article
,D. of the same Code applies in the liGuidation of the couple;s properties in the event that the
con(u!al partnership of !ains is dissolved, to wit@
Art. ,D.. ?pon the dissolution of the con(u!al partnership re!ime, the
followin! procedure shall appl@
%,' An inventor shall be prepared, listin! separatel all the properties of the
con(u!al partnership and the e$clusive properties of each spouse.
%D' Amounts advanced b the con(u!al partnership in pament of personal
debts and obli!ations of either spouse shall be credited to the con(u!al partnership
as an asset thereof.
%/' Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her e$clusive funds
in the acGuisition of propert or for the value of his or her e$clusive propert, the
ownership of which has been vested b law in the con(u!al partnership.
%E' The debts and obli!ations of the con(u!al partnership shall be paid out of
the con(u!al assets. &n case of insu<cienc of said assets, the spouses shall be
solidaril liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties, in accordance
with the provisions of para!raph %D' of Article ,D,.
%F' Ahatever remains of the e$clusive properties of the spouses shall
thereafter be delivered to each of them.
%-' ?nless the owner had been indemni"ed from whatever source, the loss or
deterioration of movables used for the bene"t of the famil, belon!in! to either
spouse, even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse from the con(u!al
funds, if an.
%1' The net remainder of the con(u!al partnership properties shall constitute
the pro"ts, which shall be divided eGuall between husband and wife, unless a
di8erent proportion or division was a!reed upon in the marria!e settlements or
unless there has been a voluntar waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in
this Code.
%K' The presumptive le!itimes of the common children shall be delivered
upon the partition in accordance with Article F,.
%.' &n the partition of the properties, the con(u!al dwellin! and the lot on
which it is situated shall, unless otherwise a!reed upon b the parties, be
ad(udicated to the spouse with whom the ma(orit of the common children choose to
remain. Children below the a!e of seven ears are deemed to have chosen the
mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. &n case there is no such ma(orit,
the court shall decide, ta5in! into consideration the best interests of said children.
&n the normal course of events, the followin! are the steps in the liGuidation of the
properties of the spouses@
%a' An inventor of all the actual properties shall be made, separatel listin! the couple;s
con(u!al properties and their separate properties.B1KC &n the instant case, t)$ t&2#/ %ou&t (ou,0
t)#t t)$ %ou*/$ )#s ,o s$*#&#t$ *&o*$&t2$s ?)$, t)$' +#&&2$0. B1.C Rather, the trial court
identi"ed the followin! con(u!al properties, to wit@
,. co8ee mill in Balon!a!an, *as Nieves, A!usan del Norte=
D. co8ee mill in )urian, *as Nieves, A!usan del Norte=
/. corn mill in Casi5lan, *as Nieves, A!usan del Norte=
E. co8ee mill in Esperan6a, A!usan del #ur=
F. a parcel of land with an area of ,,D00 sGuare meters located in Tun!ao, =
-. a parcel of a!ricultural land with an area of F hectares located in Manila de
Bu!abos, =
1. a parcel of land with an area of KE sGuare meters located in Tun!ao, =
K. Bashier Bon 2actor located in Tun!ao, .BK0C
%b' +rdinaril, the bene"t received b a spouse from the con(u!al partnership durin! the
marria!e is returned in eGual amount to the assets of the con(u!al partnership=BK,C and if the
communit is enriched at the e$pense of the separate properties of either spouse, a restitution of
the value of such properties to their respective owners shall be made.BKDC
%c' #ubseGuentl, the couple;s con(u!al partnership shall pa the debts of the con(u!al
partnership= while the debts and obli!ation of each of the spouses shall be paid from their
respective separate properties. But if the con(u!al partnership is not su<cient to pa all its debts
and obli!ations, the spouses with their separate properties shall be solidaril liable.BK/C
%d' Now, what remains of the separate or e$clusive properties of the husband and of the
wife shall be returned to each of them.BKEC &n the instant case, s2,%$ 2t ?#s #/&$#0'
$st#-/2s)$0 -' t)$ t&2#/ %ou&t t)#t t)$ s*ous$s )#=$ ,o s$*#&#t$ *&o*$&t2$s, BKFC t)$&$ 2s
,ot)2,g to &$tu&, to #,' o( t)$+. The listed properties above are considered part of the
con(u!al partnership. Thus, ordinaril, what remains in the above:listed properties should be
divided eGuall between the spouses andIor their respective heirs.BK-C 3owever, since the trial
court found the petitioner the !uilt part, his share from the net pro"ts of the con(u!al
partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article -/%D' of the 2amil
Code. A!ain, lest we be confused, li5e in the absolute communit re!ime, nothin! will be returned
to the !uilt part in the con(u!al partnership re!ime, because t)$&$ 2s ,o s$*#&#t$ *&o*$&t'
?)2%) +#' -$ #%%ou,t$0 (o& 2, t)$ gu2/t' *#&t'Ks (#=o&.

&n the discussions above, we have seen that in both instances, the petitioner is not entitled
to an propert at all. Thus, we cannot but uphold the )ecision dated +ctober ,0, D00F of the trial
court. 3owever, we must clarif, as we alread did above, the +rder dated 7anuar K, D001.
IHEREFORE, the )ecision dated +ctober ,0, D00F of the Re!ional Trial Court, Branch , of
Butuan Cit is AFFIRME". Actin! on the Motion for Clari"cation dated 7ul 1, D00- in the Re!ional
Trial Court, the +rder dated 7anuar K, D001 of the Re!ional Trial Court is hereb CLARIFIE" in
accordance with the above discussions.
SO OR"ERE".
!IENVENI"O L. RE3ES
Associate 7ustice
IE CONCUR>
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
#enior Associate 7ustice
Chairperson, #econd )ivision
ARTURO ". !RION
Associate 7ustice
1OSE PEREM
Associate 7ustice
MARIA P. A. SERENO
Associate 7ustice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
& certif that the conclusions in the above )ecision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assi!ned to the writer of the opinion of the CourtTs )ivision.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
#enior Associate 7ustice
%Per #ection ,D, R.A. D.-
The 7udiciar Act of ,.EK, as amended'
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
#EC+N) )&L&#&+N
G.R. No. 179717 1u,$ 7, 2007
GLORIA SANTOS "UE4AS, petitioner,
vs.
SANTOS SU!"IVISION HOMEOINERS ASSOCIATION, respondent.
) E C & # & + N
6UISUM!ING, J.:
2or review on certiorari is the )ecision, dated )ecember D., D000, of the Court of Appeals in CA:
>.R. #P No. F,-0,, settin! aside the )ecisionD of the 3ousin! and *and ?se Re!ulator Board
%3*?RB' in 3*?RB Case No. REM:A:.K0DD1:00/D which earlier a<rmed the )ecision/ of the
3*?RB:NCR Re!ional 2ield +<ce in 3*?RB Case No. REM:010D.1:.KD,. #aid Re!ional 2ield +<ce
dismissed the petition of herein respondent #antos #ubdivision 3omeowners Association %##3A'
see5in! to reGuire herein petitioner, >loria #antos )ueWas, to provide for an open space in the
subdivision for recreational and communit activities. &n its assailed decision, the CA remanded the
case to the 3*?RB for determination of a de"nitive land area for open space.E Petitioner assails
also the Court of AppealsT ResolutionF dated 7ul /,, D00,, denin! her motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case are as follows@
Petitioner >loria #antos )ueWas is the dau!hter of the late Cecilio 7. #antos who, durin! his
lifetime, owned a parcel of land with a total area of D.D hectares located at >eneral T. )e
*eon, Lalen6uela Cit, Metro Manila. &n ,.--, Cecilio had the realt subdivided into smaller
lots, the whole formin! the Cecilio 7. #antos #ubdivision %for brevit, #antos #ubdivision'.
The then *and Re!istration Commission %*RC' approved the pro(ect and the National
3ousin! Authorit %N3A' issued the reGuired Certi"cate of Re!istration and *icense to #ell.
At the time of CecilioTs death in ,.KK, there were alread several residents and
homeowners in #antos #ubdivision.
#ometime in ,..1, the members of the ##3A submitted to the petitioner a resolution as5in! her to
provide within the subdivision an open space for recreational and other communit activities, in
accordance with the provisions of P.). No. .F1,- as amended b P.). No. ,D,-.1 Petitioner,
however, re(ected the reGuest, thus, promptin! the members of ##3A to see5 redress from the
N3A.
+n April DF, ,..1, the N3A >eneral Mana!er forwarded the ##3A resolution to Romulo Q. 2abul,
Commissioner and Chief E$ecutive +<cer of the 3*?RB in Que6on Cit.K
&n a letter dated Ma D., ,..1, the Re!ional )irector of the E$panded NCR 2ield +<ce, 3*?RB,
opined that the open space reGuirement of P.). No. .F1, as amended b P.). No. ,D,-, was not
applicable to #antos #ubdivision..
##3A then "led a petitionImotion for reconsideration,,0 doc5eted as 3*?RB Case No. REM:
010D.1:.KD,, which averred amon! others that@ %,' P.). No. .F1 should appl retroactivel to
#antos #ubdivision, notwithstandin! that the subdivision plans were approved in ,.-- and %D'
>loria #antos )ueWas should be bound b the verbal promise made b her late father durin! his
lifetime that an open space would be provided for in Phase &&& of #antos #ubdivision, the lots of
which were at that time alread for sale.
Petitioner denied an 5nowled!e of the alle!ations of ##3A. #he stressed that she was not a part
to the alle!ed transactions, and had neither participation nor involvement in the development of
#antos #ubdivision and the sale of the subdivisionTs lots. As a<rmative defenses, she raised the
followin!@ %a' &t was her late father, Cecilio 7. #antos, who owned and developed the subdivision,
and she was neither its owner nor developer= %b' that this suit was "led b an unauthori6ed entit
a!ainst a non:e$istent person, as ##3A and #antos #ubdivision are not (uridical entities,
authori6ed b law to institute or defend a!ainst actions= %c' that P.). No. .F1 cannot be !iven
retroactive e8ect to ma5e it applicable to #antos #ubdivision as the law does not e$pressl provide
for its retroactive applicabilit= and %d' that the present petition is barred b laches.
+n 7anuar ,E, ,..K, 3*?RB:NCR disposed of 3*?RB Case No. REM:010D.1:.KD, in this wise@
&n view of the fore!oin!, the complaint is hereb dismissed.
&t is #o +rdered.,,
&n dismissin! the case, the 3*?RB:NCR o<ce ruled that while ##3A failed to present evidence
showin! that it is an association dul or!ani6ed under Philippine law with capacit to sue,
nonetheless, the suit could still prosper if viewed as a suit "led b all its members who si!ned and
veri"ed the petition. 3owever, the petition failed to show an cause of action a!ainst herein
petitioner as %,' there is no evidence showin! #antos:)ueWas as the ownerIdeveloper or
successor:in:interest of Cecilio #antos, who was the ownerIdeveloper and sole proprietor of #antos
#ubdivision= %D' the *RC:approved subdivision plan was bereft of an proviso indicatin! or
identifin! an open space, as reGuired b P.). No. .F1, as amended, hence there was no le!al
basis to compel either Cecilio or his dau!hter #antos:)ueWas, as his purported successor, to
provide said space= and %/' the alle!ed verbal promise of the late Cecilio #antos was inadmissible
as evidence under the dead manTs statute.,D
##3A then appealed the NCR o<ceTs rulin! to the 3*?RB Board of Commissioners. The latter bod,
however, a<rmed the action ta5en b the 3*?RB:NCR o<ce, concludin! thus@
A3ERE2+RE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereb )&#M&##E) and the
decision of the +<ce below is hereb A22&RME) &N T+T+.
#+ +R)ERE).,/
The 3*?RB Board decreed that there was no basis to compel the petitioner to provide an open
space within #antos #ubdivision, inasmuch as the subdivision plans approved on 7ul K, ,.--, did
not provide for said space and there was no law reGuirin! the same at that time. &t further ruled
that P.). No. .F1 could not be !iven retroactive e8ect in the absence of an e$press provision in the
law. 2inall, it found the action time:barred since it was "led nine %.' ears after the death of
Cecilio. The Board noted that ##3A sou!ht to enforce an alle!ed oral promise of Cecilio, which
should have been done within the si$:ear prescriptive period provided for under Article ,,EF,E of
the Civil Code.
)issatis"ed, respondent sou!ht relief from the Court of Appeals $ia a petition for review under
Rule E/ of the ,..1 Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, doc5eted as CA:>.R. #P No. F,-0,, was
decided b the appellate court in this manner@
A3ERE2+RE, the petition is >RANTE)::and the decision, dated 7anuar D0, ,..., of the
3ousin! and *and ?se Re!ulator Board %3*?RB' in 3*?RB Case No. REM:A:.K0DD1:00/D is
hereb RELER#E) and #ET A#&)E. Accordin!l, this case is ordered REMAN)E) to the
3*?RB for the determination of the de"nitive land area that shall be used for open space in
accordance with law and the rules and standards prescribed b the 3*?RB. No
pronouncement as to costs.
#+ +R)ERE).,F
&n "ndin! for ##3A, the appellate court relied upon ,ugenio $. ,:ec. @ec. Drilon,,- which held that
while P.). No. .F1 did not e$pressl provide for its retroactive application, nonetheless, it can be
plainl inferred from its intent that it was to be !iven retroactive e8ect so as to e$tend its
covera!e even to those contracts e$ecuted prior to its e8ectivit in ,.1-. The Court of Appeals
also held that the action was neither barred b prescription nor laches as the obli!ation of a
subdivision developer to provide an open space is not predicated upon an oral contract, but
mandated b law, hence, an action ma be brou!ht within ten %,0' ears from the time the ri!ht of
action accrues under Article ,,EE,1 of the Civil Code. Moreover, the eGuitable principle of laches
will not appl when the claim was "led within the re!lementar period.
Petitioner dul moved for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied on 7ul /,, D00,.
3ence, this petition !rounded on the followin! assi!nment of errors@
&. T3E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# C+MM&TTE) #ER&+?# ERR+R +2 *AA BM TA4&N> C+>N&VANCE
+2 RE#P+N)ENT#T PET&T&+N %A3&C3 A##A&*# T3E )EC&#&+N +2 T3E B+AR) +2
C+MM&##&+NER# +2 T3E 3*?RB' A3EN 7?R&#)&CT&+N T3ERE+N &# A&T3 T3E +22&CE +2
T3E PRE#&)ENT, A# C*EAR*M MAN)ATE) BM @,*. =, R-., FB&&& CF (H, 5<<; R-.,@ CF
!RC*,D-R, CF (H, HC-@&8G A8D .A8D -@, R,G-.A(CRG 4CARD.
&&. &T AA# >RALE ERR+R 2+R T3E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# T+ 3ALE A##?ME) 7?R&#)&CT&+N
+LER T3E PET&T&+N BE*+A A3EN RE#P+N)ENT# C*EAR*M 2A&*E) T+ EH3A?#T T3E
A)M&N&#TRAT&LE REME)&E# ALA&*AB*E T+ T3EM ?N)ER T3E *AA.
&&&. T3E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# >RALE*M ERRE) &N N+T 2&N)&N> T3AT RE#P+N)ENT #ANT+#
#?B)&L&#&+N 3+ME+ANER# A##+C&AT&+N, A N+N:RE>&#TERE) +R>AN&VAT&+N, *AC4E)
T3E *E>A* PER#+NA*&TM T+ #?E.
&L. T3E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# #ER&+?#*M ERRE) &N N+T 3+*)&N> T3AT RE#P+N)ENT
#ANT+# #?B)&L&#&+N 3+ME+ANER# A##+C&AT&+N 3A# N+ CA?#E +2 ACT&+N A>A&N#T
PET&T&+NER= NE&T3ER AA# #ANT+# #?B)&L&#&+N, A N+N:ENT&TM, P+##E##E) A&T3
CAPAC&TM T+ BE #?E) N+R &# PET&T&+NER >*+R&A #ANT+#:)?EbA# A PR+PER PARTM T+
T3E CA#E, T3E *ATTER N+T BE&N> T3E +ANER +R )ELE*+PER +2 #ANT+# #?B)&L&#&+N.
L. T3E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# #ER&+?#*M ERRE) &N #?B#T&T?T&N> &T# 2&N)&N># A&T3 T3AT
+2 T3E A)7?)&CAT&+N B+AR) AN) B+AR) +2 C+MM&##&+NER# +2 T3E 3*?RB A3EN
T3E&R )EC&#&+N &# BA#E) +N #?B#TANT&A* EL&)ENCE AN) N+ >RALE AB?#E +2
)&#CRET&+N CAN BE ATTR&B?TE) T+ T3EM.
L&. T3E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# )EL&ATE) 2R+M T3E EH&#T&N> *AA AN) 7?R&#PR?)ENCE
A3EN &T R?*E) T3AT P.). .F1 3A# RETR+ACT&LE APP*&CAT&+N :: A3EN T3E *AA &T#E*2
)+E# N+T PR+L&)E 2+R &T# RETR+ACT&L&TM AN) T3E EH&#T&N> 7?R&#PR?)ENCE T3ERE+N
C*EAR*M PR+N+?NCE) T3AT &T 3A# N+ RETR+ACT&LE APP*&CAT&+N. T+ PR+L&)E
RETR+ACT&L&TM T+ P.). .F1 A+?*) CA?#E &MPA&RMENT +2 LE#TE) R&>3T#.
L&&. A3&*E A# A >ENERA* R?*E, T3E 2ACT?A* 2&N)&N># +2 T3E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# &#
B&N)&N> +N T3E #?PREME C+?RT, T3E #AME &# N+T TR?E A3EN T3E 2+RMERT#
C+NC*?#&+N &# BA#E) +N #PEC?*AT&+N, #?RM&#E# AN) C+N7ECT?RE#, T3E &N2ERENCE
MA)E &# MAN&2E#T*M M&#TA4EN +R AB#?R), T3ERE &# >RALE AB?#E +2 )&#CRET&+N,
7?)>MENT &# BA#E) +N M&#APPRE3EN#&+N +2 2ACT# C+NTRARM T+ T3+#E +2 T3E
A)M&N&#TRAT&LE A>ENCM C+NCERNE), AN) &T AENT BEM+N) T3E &##?E# +2 T3E CA#E
AN) T3E #AME &# C+NTRARM T+ T3E A)M&##&+N# +2 B+T3 PART&E#.,K
To our mind, the fore!oin! ma be reduced into the followin! issues@ %,' the applicabilit of the
doctrine of non:e$haustion of administrative remedies= %D' the le!al capacit of respondent to sue
the petitioner herein= and %/' the retroactivit of P.). No. .F1, as amended b P.). No. ,D,-.
+n the )rst issue, the petitioner contends that the "lin! of CA:>.R. #P No. F,-0, was premature as
##3A failed to e$haust all administrative remedies. Petitioner submits that since #ection ,,,. Rule
E/ of the ,..1 Rule of Civil Procedure does not mention the 3*?RB, the respondent should have
appealed the decision of the 3*?RB Board in 3*?RB Case No. REM:A:.K0DD1:00/D to the +<ce of
the President prior to see5in! (udicial relief. &n other words, it is the decision of the +<ce of the
President,D0 and not that of the 3*?RB Board, which the Court of Appeals ma review.
Ae "nd petitionerTs contentions bereft of merit. The principle of non:e$haustion of administrative
remedies is, under the factual circumstances of this case, inapplicable. Ahile this Court has held
that before a part is allowed to see5 intervention of the courts, it is a pre condition that he avail
himself of all administrative processes a8orded him,D, nonetheless, said rule is not without
e$ceptions.DD The doctrine is a relative one and is Re$ible dependin! on the peculiarit and
uniGueness of the factual and circumstantial settin!s of each case.D/
&n the instant case, the Guestions posed are purel le!al, namel@ %,' whether the respondent had
an ri!ht to demand an open space and the petitioner had an le!al obli!ation to provide said
open space within #antos #ubdivision under P.). No. .F1, as amended b P.). No. ,D,-, and %D'
whether the action had alread prescribed under Article ,,EF of the Civil Code. Moreover, the
Court of Appeals found that ##3A had sou!ht relief from the +<ce of the President, but the latter
forwarded the case to the 3*?RB. &n view of the fore!oin!, we "nd that in this particular case,
there was no need for ##3A to e$haust all administrative remedies before see5in! (udicial relief.
+n the second issue, the petitioner claims that respondent ##3A failed to present an evidence
showin! that it is a le!all or!ani6ed (uridical entit, authori6ed b law to sue or be sued in its own
name. Thus, pursuant to #ection ,, Rule /DE of the ,..1 Rules of Civil Procedure, it has no le!al
capacit to "le this suit before the 3*?RB and the Court of Appeals.
##3A counters that it has the capacit to sue as an association, since it is a member of the
2ederation of Lalen6uela 3omeowners Association, &nc., which is re!istered with the #ecurities and
E$chan!e Commission. &n the alternative, the individual members of ##3A who si!ned both the
resolution and the complaint in this case ma, as natural persons, pursue the action.
There is merit in petitionerTs contention. ?nder #ection ,, Rule / of the Revised Rules of Court,
onl natural or (uridical persons, or entities authori6ed b law ma be parties in a civil action.
Article EEDF of the Civil Code enumerates the various classes of (uridical persons. ?nder said
Article, an association is considered a (uridical person if the law !rants it a personalit separate
and distinct from that of its members.D- The records of the present case are bare of an showin!
b ##3A that it is an association dul or!ani6ed under Philippine law. &t was thus an error for the
3*?RB:NCR +<ce to !ive due course to the complaint in 3*?RB Case No. REM:010D.1:.KD,,
!iven the ##3ATs lac5 of capacit to sue in its own name. Nor was it proper for said a!enc to treat
the complaint as a suit b all the parties who si!ned and veri"ed the complaint. The members
cannot represent their association in an suit without valid and le!al authorit. Neither can their
si!natures confer on the association an le!al capacit to sue. Nor will the fact that ##3A belon!s
to the 2ederation of Lalen6uela 3omeowners Association, &nc., su<ce to endow ##3A with the
personalit and capacit to sue. Mere alle!ations of membership in a federation are insu<cient
and inconseGuential. The federation itself has a separate (uridical personalit and was not
impleaded as a part in 3*?RB Case No. REM:010D.1:.KD, nor in this case. Neither was it shown
that the federation was authori6ed to represent ##3A. 2acts showin! the capacit of a part to sue
or be sued or the authorit of a part to sue or be sued in a representative capacit or the le!al
e$istence of an or!ani6ed association of persons that is made a part, must be averred.D1 3ence,
for failin! to show that it is a (uridical entit, endowed b law with capacit to brin! suits in its own
name, ##3A is devoid of an le!al capacit, whatsoever, to institute an action.
Anent the third issue, the petitioner ascribes error to the appellate court for holdin! that P.). No.
.F1 has retroactive application. #he points out that there is no retroactivit provision in the said
decree. 3ence, it cannot be applied retroactivel pursuant to Article EDK of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The same holds true for P.). No. ,D,-, which amended #ection /, of P.). No. .F1 and
imposed the open space reGuirement in subdivisions. Petitioner stresses that P.). No. ,D,- onl
too5 e8ect on +ctober ,E, ,.11 or more than ten %,0' ears after the approval of the subdivision
plans of Cecilio #antos.
Althou!h it ma seem that this particular issue, !iven our rulin! on the "rst issue re!ardin! the
lac5 of capacit of ##3A to brin! an action in its name, is now moot and academic, we are
constrained to still address it.
This petition was brou!ht to us not b respondent ##3A but b >loria #antos )ueWas who assails
the appellate courtTs "ndin! that our rulin! in ,ugenio $. ,:ec. @ec. DrilonD. allows P.). No. .F1,
as amended, to appl retroactivel.
Ae "nd merit in petitionerTs contention.
,ugenio $. ,:ec. @ec. Drilon is inapplicable. &t is not on all fours with the instant case. The issue
in ,ugenio was the applicabilit of P.). No. .F1 to purchase a!reements on lots entered into prior
to its enactment where there was non:pament of amorti6ations, and failure to develop the
subdivision. Ae held therein that althou!h P.). No. .F1 does not provide for an retroactive
application, nonetheless, the intent of the law of protectin! the helpless citi6ens from the
manipulations and machinations of unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers (ustif its
retroactive application to contracts entered into prior to its enactment. 3ence, we ruled that the
non:pament of amorti6ations was (usti"ed under #ection D/ of the said decree in view of the
failure of the subdivision owner to develop the subdivision pro(ect.
?nli5e ,ugenio, non:development of the subdivision is not present in this case, nor an alle!ation
of non:pament of amorti6ations. 2urther, we have held in a subseGuent case/0 that P.). No. .F1,
as amended, cannot be applied retroactivel in view of the absence of an e$press provision on its
retroactive application. Thus@
[Article E of the Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive e8ect, unless the
contrar is provided. Thus, it is necessar that an e$press provision for its retroactive
application must be made in the law. There bein! no such provision in both P.). Nos. .F1
and ,/EE, these decrees cannot be applied to a situation that occurred ears before their
promul!ation[.
At an rate, our principal concern in this case is #ection /, of P.). No. .F1, an amendment
introduced b P.). No. ,D,-. Properl, the Guestion should focus on the retroactivit of P.).
No. ,D,- and not P.). No. .F1 per se.
Ae have e$amined the te$t of P.). No. ,D,- and nowhere do we "nd an clause or provision
e$pressl providin! for its retroactive application. Basic is the rule that no statute, decree,
ordinance, rule or re!ulation shall be !iven retrospective e8ect unless e$plicitl stated./, 3ence,
there is no le!al basis to hold that P.). No. ,D,- should appl retroactivel.
IHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTE". The assailed )ecision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA:>.R. #P No. F,-0, are REVERSE" and SET ASI"E. The )ecision of the 3*?RB
dated 7anuar D0, ,... sustainin! that of its Re!ional +<ce is AFFIRME" and REINSTATE". No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO OR"ERE".
!uno, Austria2Martinez, *alle#o, @r., and (inga, 99., concur.
Foot,ot$s
, Rollo, pp. DD://. Penned b Associate 7ustice Ramon Mabutas, 7r., with Associate 7ustices
Roberto A. Barrios and Eriberto ?. Rosario, 7r., concurrin!.
D &d. at E.:FD.
/ &d. at /-:E0.
E @ee PRE#&)ENT&A* )ECREE N+. ,D,-, #ection ,. 2or purposes of this )ecree, the term
9open space9 shall mean an area reserved e$clusivel for par5s, pla!rounds, recreational
uses, schools, roads, places of worship, hospitals, health centers, baran!a centers and
other similar facilities and amenities.
F Rollo, p. /F.
- The 9#ubdivision and Condominium BuersT Protective )ecree of ,.1-.9 The proviso in
Guestion reads@
#EC. /,. Donation of roads and open spaces to local go$ernment.SThe re!istered
owner or developer of the subdivision or condominium pro(ect, upon completion of
the development of said pro(ect ma, at his option, conve b wa of donation the
roads and open spaces found within the pro(ect to the cit or municipalit wherein
the pro(ect is located. ?pon acceptance of the donation b the cit or municipalit
concerned, no portion of the area donated shall thereafter be converted to an other
purpose or purposes unless after hearin!, the proposed conversion is approved b
the Authorit.
P.). No. ,D,-, #EC. D. #ection /, of Presidential )ecree No. .F1 is hereb amended
to read as follows@
#ECT&+N /,. Roads, Alles, @ide"al%s and Cpen @paces. S The owner as developer of
a subdivision shall provide adeGuate roads, alles and sidewal5s. 2or subdivision
pro(ects one %,' hectare or more, the owner or developer shall reserve thirt percent
%/0P' of the !ross area for open space. #uch open space shall have the followin!
standards allocated e$clusivel for par5s, pla!rounds and recreational use@
a. .P of !ross area for hi!h densit or social housin! %-- to ,00 famil lot per
!ross hectare'.
b. 1P of !ross area for medium:densit or economic housin! %D, to -F famil
lot per !ross hectare'.
c. /.FP of !ross area low:densit or open mar5et housin! %D0 famil lots and
below per !ross hectare'.
These areas reserved for par5s, pla!rounds and recreational use shall be non:
alienable public lands, and non:buildable. The plans of the subdivision pro(ect shall
include tree plantin! on such parts of the subdivision as ma be desi!nated b the
Authorit.
?pon their completion as certi"ed to b the Authorit, the roads, alles, sidewal5s
and pla!rounds shall be donated b the owner or developer to the cit or
municipalit and it shall be mandator for the local !overnments to accept provided,
however, that the par5s and pla!rounds ma be donated to the 3omeowners
Association of the pro(ect with the consent of the cit or municipalit concerned. No
portion of the par5s and pla!rounds donated thereafter shall be converted to an
other purpose or purposes.
1 The )ecree is entitled 9)e"nin! X+pen #paceT in Residential #ubdivisions and Amendin!
#ection /, of Presidential )ecree No. .F1 ReGuirin! #ubdivision +wners to Provide Roads,
Alles, #idewal5s and Reserve +pen #pace for Par5s or Recreational ?se.9
K Rollo, pp. K-, ...
. &d. at ,0,.
,0 &d. at /-.
,, &d. at E0.
,D Rules of Court, Rule ,/0, #ec. D/. )isGuali"cation b reason of death or insanit of
adverse part. S Parties or assi!nors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case
is prosecuted, a!ainst an e$ecutor or administrator or other representative of a deceased
person, or a!ainst a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand a!ainst the estate of
such deceased person or a!ainst such person of unsound mind, cannot testif as to an
matter of fact occurrin! before the death of such deceased person or before such person
became of unsound mind.
,/ Rollo, p. FD.
,E Art. ,,EF. The followin! actions must be commenced within si$ ears@
%,' ?pon an oral contract=
%D' ?pon a Guasi:contract.
,F Rollo, p. //.
,- >.R. No. ,0.E0E, DD 7anuar ,..-, /DD Phil. ,,D, ,,-.
,1 Art. ,,EE. The followin! actions must be brou!ht within ten ears from the time the ri!ht
of action accrues@
%,' ?pon a written contract=
%D' ?pon an obli!ation created b law=
%/' ?pon a (ud!ment.
,K Rollo, pp. K:..
,. #ECT&+N ,. #cope. S This Rule shall appl to appeals from (ud!ments or "nal orders of
the Court of Ta$ Appeals and from awards, (ud!ments, "nal orders or resolutions of or
authori6ed b an Guasi:(udicial a!enc in the e$ercise of its Guasi:(udicial functions. Amon!
these a!encies are the Civil #ervice Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals,
#ecurities and E$chan!e Commission, +<ce of the President, *and Re!istration Authorit,
#ocial #ecurit Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademar5s and
Technolo! Transfer, National Electri"cation Administration, Ener! Re!ulator Board,
National Telecommunications Commission, )epartment of A!rarian Reform under Republic
Act No. --F1, >overnment #ervice &nsurance #stem, Emploees Compensation
Commission, A!ricultural &nventions Board, &nsurance Commission, Philippine Atomic
Ener! Commission, Board of &nvestments, Construction &ndustr Arbitration Commission,
and voluntar arbitrators authori6ed b law.
D0 Rollo, p. ,0.
D, !ro$ince of Aamboanga del 8orte $. *ourt of Appeals, >.R. No. ,0.KF/, ,, +ctober
D000, /ED #CRA FE., FF1.
DD The doctrine will not appl when@ B,C there is a violation of due process %Quisumbin! v.
>umban, >.R. No. KF,F-, F 2ebruar ,..,, ,./ #CRA FD0'= BDC the issue involved is a
purel le!al Guestion %Eastern #hippin! *ines, &nc. v. P+EA, No. *:1--//, ,K +ctober ,.KK,
,-- #CRA F//'= B/C the administrative action is patentl ille!al amountin! to want or e$cess
of (urisdiction %&ndustrial Power #ales, &nc. v. )uma #insuat, No. *:D.,1,, ,F April ,.KK, ,-0
#CRA ,.'= BEC there is estoppel on the part of the administrative a!enc concerned %Lda. de
Tan v. Leterans Bac5pa Commission, No. *:,D.EE, /0 March ,.F., ,0F Phil. /11'= BFC there
will be irreparable in(ur %*ara, 7r., et al. v. Cloribel, et al., No. *:D,-F/, /, Ma ,.-F, ,D,
Phil. ,0-D'= B-C the respondent is a department secretar whose acts as an alter e!o of the
President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter %)emaisip v. The Court of
Appeals, et al., No. *:,/000, DF #eptember ,.F., ,0- Phil. D/1= Bartulata v. Peralta, 7r., No.
*:D/,FF, . #eptember ,.1E, F. #CRA 1'= B1C to reGuire e$haustion of administrative
remedies would be unreasonable %Cipriano v. Marcelino and 3on. )ela Cru6, etc., No. *:
D11./, DK 2ebruar ,.1D, ,F0 Phil. //-'= BKC it would amount to a nulli"cation of a claim
%Al6ate, etc. v. Aldana, etc., et al., No. *:,EE01, D. 2ebruar ,.-0, ,01 Phil. D.K'= B.C the
sub(ect matter is a private land in land case proceedin!s %#oto v. 7areno, No. *:/K.-D, ,F
#eptember ,.K-, DDK Phil. ,,1'= B,0C the rule does not provide a plain, speed, and
adeGuate remed, and B,,C the circumstances of the case indicate the ur!enc of (udicial
intervention %Quisumbin! v. >umban, supra'.
D/ #upra, note D, at FFK.
DE #ECT&+N ,. Aho ma be parties= plainti8 and defendant. S +nl natural or (uridical
persons, or entities authori6ed b law ma be parties in a civil action. The term 9plainti89
ma refer to the claimin! part, the counter:claimant, the cross:claimant, or the third
%fourth, etc.'Spart plainti8. The term 9defendant9 ma refer to the ori!inal defendin! part,
the defendant in a counterclaim, the cross:defendant, or the third %fourth, etc.'Spart
defendant.
DF Art. EE. The followin! are (uridical persons@
%,' The #tate and its political subdivisions=
%D' +ther corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose,
created b law= their personalit be!ins as soon as the have been constituted
accordin! to law=
%/' Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to
which the law !rants a (uridical personalit, separate and distinct from that of each
shareholder, partner or member.
D- Board of +ptometr v. 3on. Colet, >.R. No. ,DDDE,, /0 7ul ,..-, /DK Phil. ,,K1, ,D0D.
D1 R?*E# +2 C+?RT, Rule K, #ec. E. *apacit. S 2acts showin! the capacit of a part to sue
or be sued or the authorit of a part to sue or be sued in a representative capacit or the
le!al e$istence of an or!ani6ed association of persons that is made a part, must be
averred. A part desirin! to raise an issue as to the le!al e$istence of an part or the
capacit of an part to sue or be sued in a representative capacit, shall do so b speci"c
denial, which shall include such supportin! particulars as are peculiarl within the pleaderTs
5nowled!e.
DK Art. E. *aws shall have no retroactive e8ect, unless the contrar is provided.
D. >.R. No. ,0.E0E, DD 7anuar ,..-, /DD Phil. ,,D, ,,K.
/0 PeopleTs &ndustrial and Commercial Corp. v. Court of Appeals, >.R. No. ,,D1//, DE
+ctober ,..1, /E- Phil. ,K., D0,:D0D.
/, Republic of the Phils. v. #andi!anbaan, >.R. No. ,,.D.D, /, 7ul ,..K, /FF Phil. ,K,,
,.K.
QG.R. No. 170800. R
ERNESTINA !ERNA!E, petitioner, vs. CAROLINA ALE1O #s gu#&02#, #0 /2t$+ (o& t)$
+2,o& A"RIAN !ERNA!E, respondent.
" E C I S I O N
PANGANI!AN, J.>
The ri!ht to see5 reco!nition !ranted b the Civil Code to ille!itimate children who were still
minors at the time the 2amil Code too5 e8ect cannot be impaired or ta5en awa. The minors have
up to four ears from attainin! ma(orit a!e within which to "le an action for reco!nition.
St#t$+$,t o( t)$ C#s$
Before us is a PetitionB,C for Review on *ertiorari under Rule EF of the Rules of Court, prain!
for %,' the nulli"cation of the 7ul 1, ,... Court of AppealsBDC %CA' )ecisionB/C

in CA:>R CL No.
F,.,. and the +ctober ,E, ,... CA ResolutionBEC denin! petitionerTs Motion for Reconsideration,
as well as %D' the reinstatement of the two +rders issued b the Re!ional Trial Court %RTC'
of Pasa Cit %Branch ,0.' concernin! the same case. The dispositive portion of the assailed
)ecision reads as follows@
YA3ERE2+RE, premises considered, the order of the lower court dismissin! Civil Case No. .E:0F-D
is RELER#E) and #ET A#&)E. *et the records of this case be remanded to the lower court for trial
on the merits.ZBFC
T)$ F#%ts
The undisputed facts are summari6ed b the Court of Appeals in this wise@
YThe late 2iscal Ernesto A. Bernabe alle!edl fathered a son with his secretar of twent:three %D/'
ears, herein plainti8:appellant Carolina Ale(o. The son was born on and was named
Adrian Bernabe. 2iscal Bernabe died on , while his wife Rosalina died on )ecember / of the same
ear, leavin! Ernestina as the sole survivin! heir.
Y+n , , in behalf of , "led the aforesaid complaint prain! that be declared an ac5nowled!ed
ille!itimate son of 2iscal Bernabe and as such he %Adrian' be !iven his share in
2iscal BernabeTs estate, which is now bein! held b Ernestina as the sole survivin! heir.
Y+n 7ul ,-, ,..F, the Re!ional Trial Court dismissed the complaint, rulin! that under the
provisions of the 2amil Code as well as the case of -guangco $s. *ourt of Appeals, the complaint
is now barred $ $$.ZB-C
O&0$&s o( t)$ T&2#/ Cou&t
&n an +rder dated , the trial court !ranted Ernestina BernabeTs Motion for Reconsideration of
the trial courtTs )ecision and ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for reco!nition. Citin! Article
,1F of the 2amil Code, the RTC held that the death of the putative father had barred the action.
&n its +rder dated , the trial court added that since the putative father had not ac5nowled!ed
or reco!ni6ed Adrian Bernabe in writin!, the action for reco!nition should have been "led durin!
the lifetime of the alle!ed father to !ive him the opportunit to either a<rm or den the
childTs "liation.
Ru/2,g o( t)$ Cou&t o( A**$#/s
+n the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest of (ustice, should be allowed
to prove that he was the ille!itimate son of 2iscal Bernabe. Because the bo was born in ,.K,, his
ri!hts are !overned b Article DKF of the Civil Code, which allows an action for reco!nition to be
"led within four ears after the child has attained the a!e of ma(orit. The subseGuent enactment
of the 2amil Code did not ta5e awa that ri!ht.
3ence, this appeal.B1C
Issu$s
&n her Memorandum,BKC petitioner raises the followin! issues for our consideration@
I
YAhether or not respondent has a cause of action to "le a case a!ainst petitioner, the le!itimate
dau!hter of the putative father, for reco!nition and partition with accountin! after the putative
fatherTs death in the absence of an written ac5nowled!ment of paternit b the latter.
II
YAhether or not the 3onorable Court of Appeals erred in rulin! that respondents had four ears
from the attainment of minorit to "le an action for reco!nition as provided in Art. DKF of the Civil
Code, in complete disre!ard of its repeal b the Be$pressC provisions of the 2amil Code and the
applicable (urisprudence as held b the 3onorable Court of Appeals.
III
YAhether or not the petition for certiorari "led b the petitionBerC is fatall defective for failure
to implead the Court of Appeals as one of the respondents.ZB.C
T)$ Cou&tSs Ru/2,g
The Petition has no merit.
F2&st #,0 S$%o,0 Issu$s> Period to File Action for Recognition
Because the "rst and the second issues are interrelated, we shall discuss them (ointl.
Petitioner contends that respondent is barred from "lin! an action for reco!nition, because
Article DKF of the Civil Code has been supplanted b the provisions of the 2amil Code. #he ar!ues
that the latter Code should be !iven retroactive e8ect, since no vested ri!ht would be impaired.
Ae do not a!ree.
Article DKF of the Civil Code provides the period for "lin! an action for reco!nition as follows@
YART. DKF. The action for the reco!nition of natural children ma be brou!ht onl durin! the
lifetime of the presumed parents, e$cept in the followin! cases@
%,' &f the father or mother died durin! the minorit of the child, in which case the latter
ma "le the action before the e$piration of four ears from the attainment of his
ma(orit=
%D' &f after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which
nothin! had been heard and in which either or both parents reco!ni6e the child.
Y&n this case, the action must be commenced within four ears from the "ndin! of the document.Z
The two e$ceptions provided under the fore!oin! provision, have however been omitted b
Articles ,1D, ,1/ and ,1F of the 2amil Code, which we Guote@
YART. ,1D. The "liation of le!itimate children is established b an of the followin!@
%,' The record of birth appearin! in the civil re!ister or a "nal (ud!ment= or
%D' An admission of le!itimate "liation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and si!ned b the parent concerned.
Y&n the absence of the fore!oin! evidence, the le!itimate "liation shall be proved b@
%,' The open and continuous possession of the status of a le!itimate child= or
%D' An other means allowed b the Rules of Court and special laws.Z
YART. ,1/. The action to claim le!itimac ma be brou!ht b the child durin! his or her lifetime
and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die durin! minorit or in a state of insanit. &n
these cases, the heirs shall have a period of "ve ears within which to institute the action.
YThe action alread commenced b the child shall survive notwithstandin! the death of either or
both of the parties.Z
YART. ,1F. &lle!itimate children ma establish their ille!itimate "liation in the same wa and on the
same, evidence as le!itimate children.
YThe action must be brou!ht within the same period speci"ed in Article ,1/, e$cept when the
action is based on the second para!raph of Article ,1D, in which case the action ma be brou!ht
durin! the lifetime of the alle!ed parent.Z
?nder the new law, an action for the reco!nition of an ille!itimate child must be brou!ht
within the lifetime of the alle!ed parent. The 2amil Code ma5es no distinction on whether the
former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is !iven b the new Code a
chance to dispute the claim, considerin! that Yille!itimate children are usuall be!otten and raised
in secrec and without the le!itimate famil bein! aware of their e$istence. $ $ $ The putative
parent should thus be !iven the opportunit to a<rm or den the childTs "liation, and this, he or
she cannot do if he or she is alread dead.ZB,0C
Nonetheless, the 2amil Code provides the caveat that ri!hts that have alread vested prior to
its enactment should not be pre(udiced or impaired as follows@
YART. DFF. This Code shall have retroactive e8ect insofar as it does not pre(udice or impair vested
or acGuired ri!hts in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.Z
The crucial issue to be resolved therefore is whether Ts ri!ht to an action for reco!nition, which
was !ranted b Article DKF of the Civil Code, had alread vested prior to the enactment of the
2amil Code. +ur answer is a<rmative.
A vested ri!ht is de"ned as Yone which is absolute, complete and unconditional, to the
e$ercise of which no obstacle e$ists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not
dependent upon a contin!enc $ $ $.ZB,,C

Respondent however contends that the "lin! of an
action for reco!nition is procedural in nature and that Yas a !eneral rule, no vested ri!ht ma
attach to BorC arise from procedural laws.ZB,DC
4ustos $. .uceroB,/C distin!uished substantive from procedural law in these words@
Y$ $ $. #ubstantive law creates substantive ri!hts and the two terms in this respect ma be said to
be snonmous. #ubstantive ri!hts is a term which includes those ri!hts which one en(os under
the le!al sstem prior to the disturbance of normal relations. #ubstantive law is that part of the
law which creates, de"nes and re!ulates ri!hts, or which re!ulates the ri!hts and duties which
!ive rise to a cause of action= that part of the law which courts are established to administer= as
opposed to ad(ective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcin! ri!hts or obtains
redress for their invasion.ZB,EC

%Citations omitted'
Recentl, in 2abian v. )esierto,B,FC

the Court laid down the test for determinin! whether a rule
is procedural or substantive@
YB&Cn determinin! whether a rule prescribed b the #upreme Court, for the practice and procedure
of the lower courts, abrid!es, enlar!es, or modi"es an substantive ri!ht, the test is whether the
rule reall re!ulates procedure, that is, the #udicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized b substanti$e la" and for (ustl administerin! remed and redress for a disre!ard or
infraction of them. &f the rule ta5es awa a vested ri!ht, it is not procedural. &f the rule creates a
ri!ht such as the ri!ht to appeal, it ma be classi"ed as a substantive matter= but if it operates as
a means of implementing an e:isting right then the rule deals merel "ith procedure.HB,-C
Applin! the fore!oin! (urisprudence, we hold that Article DKF of the Civil Code is a
substantive law, as it !ives the ri!ht to "le his petition for reco!nition within four ears from
attainin! ma(orit a!e. Therefore, the 2amil Code cannot impair or ta5e Ts ri!ht to "le an action
for reco!nition, because that ri!ht had alread vested prior to its enactment.
-guangco $. *ourt of AppealsB,1C is not applicable to the case at bar, because the plainti8
therein sou!ht reco!nition as an ille!itimate child when he was no lon!er a minor. +n the other
hand, in Aruego 9r. $. *ourt of AppealsB,KC the Court ruled that an action for reco!nition "led while
the Civil Code was in e8ect should not be a8ected b the subseGuent enactment of the 2amil
Code, because the ri!ht had alread vested.
Not Limited to Natural Children
To be sure, Article DKF of the Civil Code refers to the action for reco!nition of YnaturalZ
children. Thus, petitioner contends that the provision cannot be availed of b respondent, because
at the time of his conception, his parents were impeded from marrin! each other. &n other words,
he is not a natural child.
A Ynatural childZ is one whose parents, at the time of conception, were not disGuali"ed b an
le!al impediment from marrin! each other. Thus, in De @antos $. Angeles,B,.C

the Court
e$plained@
YA childTs parents should not have been disGuali"ed to marr each other at the time of conception
for him to Gualif as a Xnatural child.TZBD0C
A strict and literal interpretation of Article DKF has alread been frowned upon b this Court in
the aforesaid case of Aruego, which allowed minors to "le a case for reco!nition even if their
parents were disGuali"ed from marrin! each other. There, the Complaint averred that the late
7ose Arue!o #r., a married man, had an e$tramarital liason with *u6 2abian. +ut of this relationship
were born two ille!itimate children who in ,.K/ "led an action for reco!nition. The two children
were born in ,.-D and ,.-/, while the alle!ed putative father died in ,.KD. &n short, at the time of
their conception, the two childrenTs parents were le!all disGuali"ed from marrin! each other.
The Court allowed the Complaint to prosper, even thou!h it had been "led almost a ear after the
death of the presumed father. At the time of his death, both children were still minors.
Moreover, in the earlier case Di$inagracia $. Ro$ira,BD,C the Court said that the rules on
voluntar and compulsor ac5nowled!ment of natural children, as well as the prescriptive period
for "lin! such action, ma li5ewise be applied to spurious children. Pertinent portions of the case
are Guoted hereunder@
YThe so:called spurious children, or ille!itimate children other than natural children, commonl
5nown as bastards, include those adulterous children or those born out of wedloc5 to a married
woman cohabitin! with a man other than her husband or to a married man cohabitin! with a
woman other than his wife. The are entitled to support and successional ri!hts. But
their "liation must be dul proven.
Y3ow should their "liation be proven` Article DK. of the Civil Code allows the investi!ation of the
paternit or maternit or spurious children under the circumstances speci"ed in articles DK/ and
DKE of the Civil Code. The implication is that the rules on compulsor reco!nition of natural
children are applicable to spurious children.
Y#purious children should not be in a better position than natural children. The rules on proof
of "liation of natural children or the rules on voluntar and compulsor ac5nowled!ment for
natural children ma be applied to spurious children.
YThat does not mean that spurious children should be ac5nowled!ed, as that term is used with
respect to natural children. Ahat is simpl meant is that the !rounds or instances for the
ac5nowled!ment of natural children are utili6ed to establish the "liation of spurious children.
YA spurious child ma prove his "liation b means of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record, or in an authentic writin!. These are the modes of voluntar reco!nition of
natural children.
Y&n case there is no evidence on the voluntar reco!nition of the spurious child, then
his "liation ma be established b means of the circumstances or !rounds for compulsor
reco!nition prescribed in the aforementioned articles DK/ and DKE.
YThe prescripti$e period for )ling the action for compulsor recognition in the case of natural
children, as pro$ided for in article =>6 of the *i$il *ode, applies to spurious
children.HBDDC

%Citations omitted, italics supplied'
Thus, under the Civil Code, natural children have superior successional ri!hts over spurious
ones.BD/C

3owever, Ro$ira treats them as eGuals with respect to other ri!hts, includin! the ri!ht to
reco!nition !ranted b Article DKF.
To emphasi6e, ille!itimate children who were still minors at the time the 2amil Code too5
e8ect and whose putative parent died durin! their minorit are thus !iven the ri!ht to see5
reco!nition %under Article DKF of the Civil Code' for a period of up to four ears from attainin!
ma(orit a!e. This vested ri!ht was not impaired or ta5en awa b the passa!e of the 2amil Code.
&ndeed, our overridin! consideration is to protect the vested ri!hts of minors who could not
have "led suit, on their own, durin! the lifetime of their putative parents. As respondent aptl
points out in his Memorandum,BDEC the #tate as parens patriae should protect a minorTs ri!ht. Born
in ,.K,, Adrian was onl seven ears old when the 2amil Code too5 e8ect and onl twelve when
his alle!ed father died in ,../. The minor must be !iven his da in court.
T)2&0 Issu$> Failure to Implead the CA
?nder #ection E%a' of Rule EF of the current Rules of Court, it is no lon!er reGuired
to implead Ythe lower courts or (ud!es $ $ $ either as petitioners or respondents.Z ?nder #ection /,
however, the lower tribunal should still be furnished a cop of the petition. 3ence, the failure of
petitioner to implead the Court of Appeals as a part is not a reversible error= it is in fact the
correct procedure.
IHEREFORE, the Petition is hereb D,8&,D and the assailed )ecision and
Resolution AFF&RM,D. Costs a!ainst petitioner.
SO OR"ERE".
Melo, /*hairman1, @ando$al2Gutierrez, and *arpio, 99., concur.
Bitug, 9., no part. Relationship with famil.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
2&R#T )&L&#&+N
G.R. No. 16<707 S$*t$+-$& 18, 2006
MICHAEL C. GU3, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SITO MARELLA, 1R., P&$s202,g 1u0g$, RTC, !&#,%) 1<J,
M#E#t2 C2t' #,0 +2,o&s, OAREN "ANES IEI #,0 OAMILLE "ANES IEI, &$*&$s$,t$0 -'
t)$2& +ot)$&, REME"IOS OANES, respondents.
) E C & # & + N
3NARES5SANTIAGO, J.>
This petition for review on certiorari assails the 7anuar DD, D00E )ecision, of the Court of Appeals
in CA:>.R. #P No. 1.1ED, which a<rmed the +rders dated 7ul D,, D000D and 7ul ,1, D00// of the
Re!ional Trial Court of Ma5ati Cit, Branch ,/K in #P Proc. Case No. EFE. denin! petitioner;s
motion to dismiss= and its Ma DF, D00E ResolutionE denin! petitioner;s motion for
reconsideration.
The facts are as follows@
+n 7une ,/, ,..1, private respondent:minors 4aren +anes Aei and 4amille +anes Aei,
represented b their mother Remedios +anes %Remedios', "led a petition for letters of
administrationF before the Re!ional Trial Court of Ma5ati Cit, Branch ,/K. The case was doc5eted
as #p. Proc. No. EFE. and entitled &ntestate ,state of @ima Iei %a.%.a. Ru)no Gu @usim'.
Private respondents alle!ed that the are the dul ac5nowled!ed ille!itimate children of #ima Aei,
who died intestate in Ma5ati Cit on +ctober D., ,..D, leavin! an estate valued at P,0,000,000.00
consistin! of real and personal properties. 3is 5nown heirs are his survivin! spouse #hirle >u
and children, Em, 7eanne, Cristina, >eor!e and Michael, all surnamed >u. Private respondents
praed for the appointment of a re!ular administrator for the orderl settlement of #ima Aei;s
estate. The li5ewise praed that, in the meantime, petitioner Michael C. >u, son of the decedent,
be appointed as #pecial Administrator of the estate. Attached to private respondents; petition was
a Certi"cation A!ainst 2orum #hoppin!- si!ned b their counsel, Att. #edfre A. +rdoWe6.
&n his CommentI+pposition,1 petitioner praed for the dismissal of the petition. 3e asserted that
his deceased father left no debts and that his estate can be settled without securin! letters of
administration pursuant to #ection ,, Rule 1E of the Rules of Court. 3e further ar!ued that private
respondents should have established their status as ille!itimate children durin! the lifetime of
#ima Aei pursuant to Article ,1F of the 2amil Code.
The other heirs of #ima Aei "led a 7oint Motion to )ismissK on the !round that the certi"cation
a!ainst forum shoppin! should have been si!ned b private respondents and not their counsel.
The contended that Remedios should have e$ecuted the certi"cation on behalf of her minor
dau!hters as mandated b #ection F, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court.
&n a ManifestationIMotion as #upplement to the 7oint Motion to )ismiss,. petitioner and his co:
heirs alle!ed that private respondents; claim had been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise
e$tin!uished b reason of Remedios; 7une 1, ,../ Release and Aaiver of Claim statin! that in
e$chan!e for the "nancial and educational assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her
minor children dischar!e the estate of #ima Aei from an and all liabilities.
The Re!ional Trial Court denied the 7oint Motion to )ismiss as well as the #upplemental Motion to
)ismiss. &t ruled that while the Release and Aaiver of Claim was si!ned b Remedios, it had not
been established that she was the dul constituted !uardian of her minor dau!hters. Thus, no
renunciation of ri!ht occurred. Applin! a liberal application of the rules, the trial court also
re(ected petitioner;s ob(ections on the certi"cation a!ainst forum shoppin!.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. 3e "led a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals which a<rmed the orders of the Re!ional Trial Court in its assailed )ecision dated
7anuar DD, D00E, the dispositive portion of which states@
A3ERE2+RE, premises considered, the present petition is hereb )EN&E) )?E C+?R#E and
accordin!l )&#M&##E), for lac5 of merit. ConseGuentl, the assailed +rders dated 7ul D,,
D000 and 7ul ,1, D00/ are hereb both A22&RME). Respondent 7ud!e is hereb )&RECTE)
to resolve the controvers over the ille!itimate "liation of the private respondents %sic'
minors B:C 4aren +anes Aei and 4amille +anes Aei who are claimin! successional ri!hts in
the intestate estate of the deceased #ima Aei, a.5.a. Ru"no >u #usim.
#+ +R)ERE).,0
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner;s motion for reconsideration, hence, this petition.
Petitioner ar!ues that the Court of Appeals disre!arded e$istin! rules on certi"cation a!ainst
forum shoppin!= that the Release and Aaiver of Claim e$ecuted b Remedios released and
dischar!ed the >u famil and the estate of #ima Aei from an claims or liabilities= and that
private respondents do not have the le!al personalit to institute the petition for letters of
administration as the failed to prove their "liation durin! the lifetime of #ima Aei in accordance
with Article ,1F of the 2amil Code.
Private respondents contend that their counsel;s certi"cation can be considered substantial
compliance with the rules on certi"cation of non:forum shoppin!, and that the petition raises no
new issues to warrant the reversal of the decisions of the Re!ional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals.
The issues for resolution are@ ,' whether private respondents; petition should be dismissed for
failure to compl with the rules on certi"cation of non:forum shoppin!= D' whether the Release and
Aaiver of Claim precludes private respondents from claimin! their successional ri!hts= and /'
whether private respondents are barred b prescription from provin! their "liation.
The petition lac5s merit.
Rule 1, #ection F of the Rules of Court provides that the certi"cation of non:forum shoppin! should
be e$ecuted b the plainti8 or the principal part. 2ailure to compl with the reGuirement shall be
cause for dismissal of the case. 3owever, a liberal application of the rules is proper where the
hi!her interest of (ustice would be served. &n@ *hin $. *ourt of Appeals,,, we ruled that while a
petition ma have been Rawed where the certi"cate of non:forum shoppin! was si!ned onl b
counsel and not b the part, this procedural lapse ma be overloo5ed in the interest of
substantial (ustice.,D #o it is in the present controvers where the merits,/ of the case and the
absence of an intention to violate the rules with impunit should be considered as compellin!
reasons to temper the strict application of the rules.
As re!ards Remedios; Release and Aaiver of Claim, the same does not bar private respondents
from claimin! successional ri!hts. To be valid and e8ective, a waiver must be couched in clear and
uneGuivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a part to !ive up a ri!ht or bene"t
which le!all pertains to him. A waiver ma not be attributed to a person when its terms do not
e$plicitl and clearl evince an intent to abandon a ri!ht.,E
&n this case, we "nd that there was no waiver of hereditar ri!hts. The Release and Aaiver of Claim
does not state with clarit the purpose of its e$ecution. &t merel states that Remedios received
P/00,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor dau!hters 9b wa of "nancial assistance and
in full settlement of an and all claims of whatsoever nature and 5ind $ $ $ a!ainst the estate of
the late Ru"no >u #usim.9,F Considerin! that the document did not speci"call mention private
respondents; hereditar share in the estate of #ima Aei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of
successional ri!hts.
Moreover, even assumin! that Remedios trul waived the hereditar ri!hts of private respondents,
such waiver will not bar the latter;s claim. Article ,0EE of the Civil Code, provides@
ART. ,0EE. An person havin! the free disposal of his propert ma accept or repudiate an
inheritance.
A,' 2,)$&2t#,%$ /$(t to +2,o&s o& 2,%#*#%2t#t$0 *$&so,s +#' -$ #%%$*t$0 -' t)$2&
*#&$,ts o& gu#&02#,s. P#&$,ts o& gu#&02#,s +#' &$*u02#t$ t)$ 2,)$&2t#,%$ /$(t to
t)$2& ?#&0s o,/' -' Bu02%2#/ #ut)o&2@#t2o,.
The ri!ht to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belon! to the persons desi!nated b
the testator to determine the bene"ciaries and distribute the propert, or in their default, to
those mentioned in Article ,0/0. %Emphasis supplied'
Parents and !uardians ma not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards without (udicial
approval. This is because repudiation amounts to an alienation of propert,- which must pass the
court;s scrutin in order to protect the interest of the ward. Not havin! been (udiciall authori6ed,
the Release and Aaiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar private respondents
from assertin! their ri!hts as heirs of the deceased.
2urthermore, it must be emphasi6ed that waiver is the intentional relinGuishment of a 5nown ri!ht.
Ahere one lac5s 5nowled!e of a ri!ht, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. &!norance
of a material fact ne!ates waiver, and waiver cannot be established b a consent !iven under a
mista5e or misapprehension of fact.,1
&n the present case, private respondents could not have possibl waived their successional ri!hts
because the are et to prove their status as ac5nowled!ed ille!itimate children of the deceased.
Petitioner himself has consistentl denied that private respondents are his co:heirs. &t would thus
be inconsistent to rule that the waived their hereditar ri!hts when petitioner claims that the do
not have such ri!ht. 3ence, petitioner;s invocation of waiver on the part of private respondents
must fail.
Anent the issue on private respondents; "liation, we a!ree with the Court of Appeals that a rulin!
on the same would be premature considerin! that private respondents have et to present
evidence. Before the 2amil Code too5 e8ect, the !overnin! law on actions for reco!nition of
ille!itimate children was Article DKF of the Civil Code, to wit@
ART. DKF. The action for the reco!nition of natural children ma be brou!ht onl durin! the
lifetime of the presumed parents, e$cept in the followin! cases@
91: I( t)$ (#t)$& o& +ot)$& 02$0 0u&2,g t)$ +2,o&2t' o( t)$ %)2/0, 2, ?)2%) %#s$ t)$
/#tt$& +#' D/$ t)$ #%t2o, -$(o&$ t)$ $;*2&#t2o, o( (ou& '$#&s (&o+ t)$ #tt#2,+$,t
o( )2s +#Bo&2t'L
%D' &f after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which
nothin! had been heard and in which either or both parents reco!ni6e the child.
&n this case, the action must be commenced within four ears from the "ndin! of the
document. %Emphasis supplied'
Ae ruled in 4ernabe $. Ale#o,K that ille!itimate children who were still minors at the time the
2amil Code too5 e8ect and whose putative parent died durin! their minorit are !iven the ri!ht to
see5 reco!nition for a period of up to four ears from attainin! ma(orit a!e. This vested ri!ht was
not impaired or ta5en awa b the passa!e of the 2amil Code.,.
+n the other hand, Articles ,1D, ,1/ and ,1F of the 2amil Code, which superseded Article DKF of
the Civil Code, provide@
ART. ,1D. The "liation of le!itimate children is established b an of the followin!@
%,' The record of birth appearin! in the civil re!ister or a "nal (ud!ment= or
%D' An admission of le!itimate "liation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and si!ned b the parent concerned.
&n the absence of the fore!oin! evidence, the le!itimate "liation shall be proved b@
%,' The open and continuous possession of the status of a le!itimate child= or
%D' An other means allowed b the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. ,1/. The action to claim le!itimac ma be brou!ht b the child durin! his or her
lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die durin! minorit or in a
state of insanit. &n these cases, the heirs shall have a period of "ve ears within which to
institute the action.
The action alread commenced b the child shall survive notwithstandin! the death of
either or both of the parties.
ART. ,1F. &lle!itimate children ma establish their ille!itimate "liation in the same wa and
on the same, evidence as le!itimate children.
The action must be brou!ht within the same period speci"ed in Article ,1/, e$cept when
the action is based on the second para!raph of Article ,1D, in which case the action ma be
brou!ht durin! the lifetime of the alle!ed parent.
?nder the 2amil Code, when "liation of an ille!itimate child is established b a record of birth
appearin! in the civil re!ister or a "nal (ud!ment, or an admission of "liation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument si!ned b the parent concerned, the action for reco!nition
ma be brou!ht b the child durin! his or her lifetime. 3owever, if the action is based upon open
and continuous possession of the status of an ille!itimate child, or an other means allowed b the
rules or special laws, it ma onl be brou!ht durin! the lifetime of the alle!ed parent.
&t is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of prescription depends on the tpe of evidence
to be adduced b private respondents in provin! their "liation. 3owever, it would be impossible to
determine the same in this case as there has been no reception of evidence et. This Court is not a
trier of facts. #uch matters ma be resolved onl b the Re!ional Trial Court after a full:blown trial.
Ahile the ori!inal action "led b private respondents was a petition for letters of administration,
the trial court is not precluded from receivin! evidence on private respondents; "liation. &ts
(urisdiction e$tends to matters incidental and collateral to the e$ercise of its reco!ni6ed powers in
handlin! the settlement of the estate, includin! the determination of the status of each
heir.D0 That the two causes of action, one to compel reco!nition and the other to claim
inheritance, ma be (oined in one complaint is not new in our (urisprudence.D, As held in 4riz $.
4riz@DD
The Guestion whether a person in the position of the present plainti8 can in an event
maintain a comple$ action to compel reco!nition as a natural child and at the same time to
obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one which in the opinion of this court must
be answered in the a<rmative, provided alwas that the conditions (ustifin! the (oinder of
the two distinct causes of action are present in the particular case. &n other words, there is
no absolute necessit reGuirin! that the action to compel ac5nowled!ment should have
been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action in which that
same plainti8 see5s additional relief in the character of heir. Certainl, there is nothin! so
peculiar to the action to compel ac5nowled!ment as to reGuire that a rule should be here
applied di8erent from that !enerall applicable in other cases. $ $ $
The conclusion above stated, thou!h not heretofore e$plicitl formulated b this court, is
undoubtedl to some e$tent supported b our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in
numerous cases, and the doctrine must be considered well settled, that a natural child
havin! a ri!ht to compel ac5nowled!ment, but who has not been in fact ac5nowled!ed,
ma maintain partition proceedin!s for the division of the inheritance a!ainst his coheirs
%#i!uion! vs. #i!uion!, K Phil., F= Tiamson vs. Tiamson, /D Phil., -D'= and the same person
ma intervene in proceedin!s for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural
father, or mother %Capistrano vs. 2abella, K Phil., ,/F= Conde vs. Abaa, ,/ Phil., DE.=
Ramire6 vs. >mur, ED Phil., KFF'. &n neither of these situations has it been thou!ht
necessar for the plainti8 to show a prior decree compellin! ac5nowled!ment. The obvious
reason is that in partition suits and distribution proceedin!s the other persons who mi!ht
ta5e b inheritance are before the court= and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to
such proceedin!s.
IHEREFORE, the instant petition is "ENIE". The )ecision dated 7anuar DD, D00E of the Court of
Appeals in CA:>.R. #P No. 1.1ED a<rmin! the denial of petitioner;s motion to dismiss= and its
Resolution dated Ma DF, D00E denin! petitioner;s motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRME".
*et the records be REMAN"E" to the Re!ional Trial Court of Ma5ati Cit, Branch ,/K for further
proceedin!s.
SO OR"ERE".
!anganiban, *.9., *hairperson, Austria2Martinez, *alle#o, @r., *hico28azario, 9.9., concur.
2&R#T )&L&#&+N
QG.R. No. 1289<2. A*&2/ 21, 1999R
REPU!LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CLAU"E A. MILLER #,0 1UMRUS S.
MILLER, respondents.
" E C I S I O N
PAR"O, J.>
The Republic of the Philippines, throu!h the #olicitor >eneral, appealed ori!inall to the Court
of Appeals from a decision of the Re!ional Trial Court, Branch F., An!eles Cit, !rantin! the
petition of respondent spouses to adopt the minor Michael Ma!no Madaa!.
&n its decision promul!ated on April ,1, ,..-, the Court of Appeals certi"ed the case to the
#upreme Court because the petition raised onl Guestions of law.
B resolution adopted on #eptember D/, ,..-, we accepted the appeal. Ae shall treat the
appeal as one $ia certiorari from a decision of the Re!ional Trial Court under the #upreme Court
Circular D:.0, dated March ., ,..0, on pure Guestions of law.
The facts are undisputed and ma be related as follows@
+n 7ul D., ,.KK, the spouses Claude A. Miller and 7umrus #. Miller, "led with the Re!ional Trial
Court, Branch F., An!eles Cit, a veri"ed petition to adopt the minor Michael Ma!no Madaa!.
The trial court scheduled the petition for hearin! on #eptember ., ,.KK, at .@00 in the
mornin!. At the hearin!, with the attendance of an assistant cit "scal of An!eles Cit, in
representation of the #olicitor >eneral, respondents adduced evidence showin! that@
9Claude A. Miller, /K ears old and 7umrus #. Miller, E0 ears of a!e, both American citi6ens, are
husband and wife, havin! been married on 7une D,, ,.KD.
The were childless and 9do not e$pect to have siblin! out of their union on account of a medical
problem of the wife.9
Claude A. Miller was a member of the ?nited #tates Air 2orce, as airman "rst class, assi!ned at
Clar5 Air Base since 7anuar D-, ,.KF.
9The famil maintains their residence at )on Bonifacio #ubdivision, Baliba!o, An!eles Cit, since
,.KF.9B,C
9The minor Michael Ma!no Madaa! is the le!itimate son of Marcelo #. Madaa!, 7r. and Venaida
Ma!no. Born on 7ul ,E, ,.K1, at #an 2ernando, *a ?nion, the minor has been in the custod of
respondents since the "rst wee5 of Au!ust ,.K1. Povert and deep concern for the future of their
son prompted the natural parents who have no visible means of livelihood to have their child
adopted b respondents. The e$ecuted a<davits !ivin! their irrevocable consent to the adoption
b respondents.9
The )epartment of #ocial Aelfare and )evelopment, throu!h its Re!ional +<ce at #an 2ernando,
Pampan!a, recommended approval of the petition on the basis of its evaluation that respondents
were morall, emotionall and "nanciall "t to be adoptive parents and that the adoption would be
to the minor;s best interest and welfare.9BDC
+n Ma ,D, ,.K., the trial court rendered decision !rantin! the petition for adoption, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows@
9A3ERE2+RE, "ndin! that petitioners possess all the Guali"cations and none of the
disGuali"cations for adoption, the instant petition is hereb >ranted, and this Court decrees the
minor M&C3AE* MA>N+ MA)AMA> freed from all obli!ation of obedience and support with respect
to natural parents and is hereb declared the child of the herein petitioners b adoption. The
minor;s surname shall be chan!ed from 9MA)AMA>9 to 9M&**ER9, which is the surname of the
herein petitioners.9B/C
&n due time, the #olicitor >eneral, in behalf of the Republic, interposed an appeal to the Court
of Appeals. As heretofore stated, the Court of Appeals certi"ed the case to this Court.
The issue raised is whether the court ma allow aliens to adopt a 2ilipino child despite the
prohibition under the 2amil Code,BEC e8ective on Au!ust /, ,.KKBFC when the petition for
adoption was "led on 7ul D., ,.KK, under the provision of the Child and Mouth Aelfare
CodeB-C which allowed aliens to adopt.
The issue is not new. This Court has ruled that an alien Guali"ed to adopt under the Child and
Mouth Aelfare Code, which was in force at the time of the "lin! of the petition, acGuired a vested
ri!ht which could not be a8ected b the subseGuent enactment of a new law disGualifin! him.
B1C 1
ConseGuentl, the enactment of the 2amil Code, e8ective Au!ust /, ,.KK, will not impair the
ri!ht of respondents who are aliens to adopt a 2ilipino child because the ri!ht has become vested
at the time of "lin! of the petition for adoption and shall be !overned b the law then in force. 9A
vested ri!ht is one whose e$istence, e8ectivit and e$tent does not depend upon events forei!n to
the will of the holder. The term e$presses the concept of present "$ed interest which in ri!ht
reason and natural (ustice should be protected a!ainst arbitrar #tate action, or an innatel (ust
and imperative ri!ht which enli!htened free societ, sensitive to inherent and irrefra!able
individual ri!hts, cannot den.9BKC 9Lested ri!hts include not onl le!al or eGuitable title to the
enforcement of a demand, but also an e$emption from new obli!ations created after the ri!ht has
vested.9B.C
9As lon! as the petition for adoption was su<cient in form and substance in accordance with
the law in !overnance at the time it was "led, the court acGuires (urisdiction and retains it until it
full disposes of the case. To repeat, the (urisdiction of the court is determined b the statute in
force at the time of the commencement of the action. #uch (urisdiction of a court, whether in
criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted b a subseGuent happenin!s or events,
althou!h of a character which would have prevented (urisdiction from attachin! in the "rst
instance.9B,0C
Therefore, an alien who "led a petition for adoption before the e8ectivit of the 2amil code,
althou!h denied the ri!ht to adopt under Art. ,KE of said Code, ma continue with his petition
under the law prevailin! before the 2amil Code.B,,C
9Adoption statutes, bein! humane and salutar, hold the interests and welfare of the child to
be of paramount consideration. The are desi!ned to provide homes, parental care and education
for unfortunate, need or orphaned children and !ive them the protection of societ and famil in
the person of the adopter, as well as childless couples or persons to e$perience the (o of
parenthood and !ive them le!all a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of
their natural parent instincts. Ever reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and
ful"ll these noble and compassionate ob(ectives of the law.9B,DC
IHEREFORE, we hereb A22&RM the appealed decision of the Re!ional Trial Court, Branch
F., An!eles Cit, in #P. Proc. No. /F-D.
No costs.
SO OR"ERE".
Da$ide, 9r., *.9., /*hairman1, Melo, Kapunan, and Gnares2@antiago, 99., concur.
#upreme Court

THIR" "IVISION
ISI"RO A!LAMA,
Petitioner,
:$ersus :
REPU!LIC OF THE,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 18J29J
Present@
CARP&+ M+RA*E#,*hairperson,
BR&+N,
BER#AM&N,
ABA),U and
L&**ARAMA, 7R., 99.
Promul!ated@
Au!ust ,,, D0,0
$:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::$

" E C I S I O N

!ERSAMIN, J.>
Ahether a person ma brin! an action for the declaration of the absolute nullit of the
marria!e of his deceased brother solemni6ed under the re!ime of the old *i$il *ode is the le!al
issue to be determined in this appeal brou!ht b the petitioner whose action for that purpose has
been dismissed b the lower courts on the !round that he, not bein! a part in the assailed
marria!e, had no ri!ht to brin! the action.
A,t$%$0$,ts
+n , the petitioner "led in the Re!ional Trial Court %RTC' in Catain!an, a petition for the
declaration of the absolute nullit of the marria!e contracted on between his late brother
Cresenciano Abla6a and *eonila 3onato.B,C The case was doc5eted as #pecial Case No. ,,1
entitled &n ReJ !etition for 8ulli)cation of Marriage *ontract bet"een *resenciano Ablaza and
.eonila HonatoK &sidro Ablaza, petitioner.
The petitioner alle!ed that the marria!e between Cresenciano and *eonila had been celebrated
without a marria!e license, due to such license bein! issued onl on, thereb renderin! the
marria!e void ab initio for havin! been solemni6ed without a marria!e license. 3e insisted that his
bein! the survivin! brother of Cresenciano who had died without an issue entitled him to one:half
of the real properties acGuired b Cresenciano before his death, thereb ma5in! him a real part in
interest= and that an person, himself included, could impu!n the validit of the marria!e between
Cresenciano and *eonila at an time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marria!e
bein! void ab initio.BDC

Ru/2,g o( t)$ RTC

+n , B/C the RTC dismissed the petition, statin!@
Considerin! the petition for annulment of marria!e "led, the Court hereb
resolved to )&#M&## the petition for the followin! reasons@ ,' petition is "led out of
time %action had lon! prescribed' and D' petitioner is not a part to the marria!e
%contracted between Cresenciano Abla6a and *eonila Nonato on and solemni6ed b
Rev. 2r. Eusebio B. Calolot'.

#+ +R)ERE).
The petitioner seasonabl "led a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied
the motion for reconsideration on .


Ru/2,g o( t)$ Cou&t o( A**$#/s
The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals %CA', assi!nin! the lone error that@
The trial court erred in dismissin! the petition for bein! "led out of time and that the
petitioner is not a part to the marria!e.
&n its decision dated ,BEC however, the CA a<rmed the dismissal order of the RTC, thus@
Ahile an action to declare the nullit of a marria!e considered void from the
be!innin! does not prescribe, the law nonetheless reGuires that the same action
must be "led b the proper part, which in this case should be "led b an of the
parties to the marria!e. &n the instant case, the petition was "led b &sidro Abla6a, a
brother of the deceased:spouse, who is not a part to the marria!e contracted b
Cresenciano Abla6a and *eonila 3onato. The contention of petitioner:appellant that
he is considered a real part in interest under #ection D, Rule / of the ,..1 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as he stands to be bene"ted or in(ured b the (ud!ment in the suit,
is simpl misplaced. Actions for annulment of marria!e will not prosper if persons
other than those speci"ed in the law "le the case.
Certainl, a survivin! brother of the deceased spouse is not the proper part
to "le the sub(ect petition. More so that the survivin! wife, who stands to be
pre(udiced, was not even impleaded as a part to said case.
A3ERE2+RE, "ndin! no reversible error therefrom, the +rders now on appeal
are hereb A22&RME). Costs a!ainst the petitioner:appellant.
#+ +R)ERE).BFC
3ence, this appeal.
Issu$s
The petitioner raises the followin! issues@
&.
A3ET3ER +R N+T T3E )EC&#&+N +2 T3&# 3+N+RAB*E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# &N CA:
>.R. CL. N+. -.-KE A22&RM&N> T3E +R)ER +2 )&#M&##A* +2 T3E RE>&+NA* TR&A*
C+?RT, BRANC3 E. AT CATA&N>AN, &N #PEC&A* PR+CEE)&N> N+. ,,1 &# &N
ACC+R)ANCE A&T3 APP*&CAB*E *AA# AN) 7?R&#PR?)ENCE=
&&.
A3ET3ER +R N+T T3E )EC&#&+N +2 T3E 3+N+RAB*E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# &N CA:
>.R. CL N+. -.-KE %#3+?*)' BE RELER#E) BA#E) +N EHEC?T&LE +R)ER N+. D0.
AN) EH&#T&N> 7?R&#PR?)ENCE.

The issues, rephrased, boil down to whether the petitioner is a real part in interest in the action to
see5 the declaration of nullit of the marria!e of his deceased brother.
Ru/2,g
The petition is meritorious.

A $alid marria!e is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to !ive
rise to the mutual ri!hts, duties, and liabilities arisin! out of such relation. The law prescribes the
reGuisites of a valid marria!e. 3ence, the validit of a marria!e is tested accordin! to the law in
force at the time the marria!e is contracted.B-C As a !eneral rule, the nature of the marria!e
alread celebrated cannot be chan!ed b a subseGuent amendment of the !overnin! law.B1C To
illustrate, a marria!e between a stepbrother and a stepsister was void under the *i$il *ode, but is
not anmore prohibited under the Famil *ode= et, the intervenin! e8ectivit of the Famil
*ode does not a8ect the void nature of a marria!e between a stepbrother and a stepsister
solemni6ed under the re!ime of the *i$il *ode. The *i$il *ode marria!e remains void, considerin!
that the validit of a marria!e is !overned b the law in force at the time of the marria!e
ceremon.BKC
Before anthin! more, the Court has to clarif the impact to the issue posed herein of
Administrative Matter %A.M.' No. 0D:,,:,0:#C %Rule on Declaration of Absolute 8ullit of Boid
Marriages and Annulment of Boidable Marriages', which too5 e8ect on .
#ection D, para!raph %a', of A.M. No. 0D:,,:,0:#C e$plicitl provides the limitation that a petition
for declaration of absolute nullit of void marria!e ma be "ledsolel b the husband or wife.
#uch limitation demarcates a line to distin!uish between marria!es covered b the Famil
*ode and those solemni6ed under the re!ime of the*i$il *ode.B.C #peci"call, A.M. No. 0D:,,:,0:
#C e$tends onl to marria!es covered b the Famil *ode, which too5 e8ect on , but, bein! a
procedural rule that is prospective in application, is con"ned onl to proceedin!s
commenced after .B,0C
Based on *arlos $. @ando$al,B,,C the followin! actions for declaration of absolute nullit of a
marria!e are e$cepted from the limitation, to wit@
,. Those commenced before , the e8ectivit date of A.M. No. 0D:,,:,0:#C=
and
D. Those "led $is2L2$is marria!es celebrated durin! the e8ectivit of the *i$il
*ode and, those celebrated under the re!ime of the Famil *ode prior to .
Considerin! that the marria!e between Cresenciano and *eonila was contracted on , the
applicable law was the old *i$il *ode, the law in e8ect at the time of the celebration of the
marria!e. 3ence, the rule on the e$clusivit of the parties to the marria!e as havin! the ri!ht to
initiate the action for declaration of nullit of the marria!e under A.M. No. 0D:,,:,0:#C had
absolutel no application to the petitioner.
The old and new *i$il *odes contain no provision on who can "le a petition to declare the nullit of
a marria!e, and when. Accordin!l, in 8i7al $. 4aadog,B,DC the children were allowed to "le after
the death of their father a petition for the declaration of the nullit of their fatherTs marria!e to
their stepmother contracted on )ecember ,,, ,.K- due to lac5 of a marria!e license. There, the
Court distin!uished between a void marria!e and a voidable one, and
e$plained ho" and "hen each mi!ht be impu!ned, thuswise@
7urisprudence under the *i$il *ode states that no (udicial decree is necessar in
order to establish the nullit of a marria!e. YA void marria!e does not reGuire a
(udicial decree to restore the parties to their ori!inal ri!hts or to ma5e the marria!e
void but thou!h no sentence of avoidance be absolutel necessar, et as well for
the sa5e of !ood order of societ as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is
e$pedient that the nullit of the marria!e should be ascertained and declared b the
decree of a court of competent (urisdiction.Z YU,0$& o&02,#&' %2&%u+st#,%$s, t)$
$H$%t o( # =o20 +#&&2#g$, so (#& #s %o,%$&,s t)$ %o,($&&2,g o( /$g#/ &2g)ts
u*o, t)$ *#&t2$s, 2s #s t)oug) ,o +#&&2#g$ )#0 $=$& t#E$, */#%$. A,0
t)$&$(o&$, -$2,g goo0 (o& ,o /$g#/ *u&*os$, 2ts 2,=#/202t' %#, -$
+#2,t#2,$0 2, #,' *&o%$$02,g 2, ?)2%) t)$ (#%t o( +#&&2#g$ +#' -$
+#t$&2#/, $2t)$& 02&$%t o& %o//#t$&#/, 2, #,' %2=2/ %ou&t -$t?$$, #,' *#&t2$s
#t #,' t2+$, ?)$t)$& -$(o&$ o& #(t$& t)$ 0$#t) o( $2t)$& o& -ot) t)$
)us-#,0 #,0 t)$ ?2($, #,0 u*o, +$&$ *&oo( o( t)$ (#%ts &$,0$&2,g su%)
+#&&2#g$ =o20, 2t ?2// -$ 02s&$g#&0$0 o& t&$#t$0 #s ,o,5$;2st$,t -' t)$
%ou&ts.Z It 2s ,ot /2E$ # =o20#-/$ +#&&2#g$ ?)2%) %#,,ot -$ %o//#t$&#//'
#tt#%E$0 $;%$*t 2, 02&$%t *&o%$$02,g 2,st2tut$0 0u&2,g t)$ /2($t2+$ o( t)$
*#&t2$s so t)#t o, t)$ 0$#t) o( $2t)$&, t)$ +#&&2#g$ %#,,ot -$ 2+*$#%)$0,
#,0 2s +#0$ goo0 a initio. But Article E0 of the Famil *ode e$pressl provides
that there must be a (udicial declaration of the nullit of a previous marria!e, thou!h
void, before a part can enter into a second marria!e and such absolute nullit can
be based onl on a "nal (ud!ment to that e8ect. Fo& t)$ s#+$ &$#so,, t)$ /#?
+#E$s $2t)$& t)$ #%t2o, o& 0$($,s$ (o& t)$ 0$%/#&#t2o, o( #-so/ut$ ,u//2t'
o( +#&&2#g$ 2+*&$s%&2*t2-/$. Co&o//#&2/', 2( t)$ 0$#t) o( $2t)$& *#&t' ?ou/0
$;t2,gu2s) t)$ %#us$ o( #%t2o, o& t)$ g&ou,0 (o& 0$($,s$, t)$, t)$ s#+$
%#,,ot -$ %o,s20$&$0 2+*&$s%&2*t2-/$.
3owever, other than for purposes of remarria!e, no (udicial action is necessar to
declare a marria!e an absolute nullit. 2or other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, le!itimac or ille!itimac of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of propert re!ime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court ma
pass upon the validit of marria!e even in a suit not directl instituted to Guestion
the same so lon! as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without
pre(udice to an issue that ma arise in the case. Ahen such need arises, a "nal
(ud!ment of declaration of nullit is necessar even if the purpose is other than to
remarr. The clause Yon the basis of a "nal (ud!ment declarin! such previous
marria!e voidZ in Article E0 of theFamil *ode connotes that such "nal (ud!ment
need not be obtained onl for purpose of remarria!e.B,/C
&t is clari"ed, however, that the absence of a provision in the old and new *i$il *odes cannot be
construed as !ivin! a license to (ust an person to brin! an action to declare the absolute nullit of
a marria!e. Accordin! to *arlos $. @ando$al,B,EC the plainti8 must still be the part who stands to
be bene"ted b the suit, or the part entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural
law that ever action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real part in interest.
B,FC Thus, onl the part who can demonstrate a Yproper interestZ can "le the action.B,-C &nterest
within the meanin! of the rule means material interest, or an interest in issue to be a8ected b the
decree or (ud!ment of the case, as distin!uished from mere curiosit about the Guestion involved
or a mere incidental interest. +ne havin! no material interest to protect cannot invo5e the
(urisdiction of the court as plainti8 in an action. Ahen the plainti8 is not the real part in interest,
the case is dismissible on the !round of lac5 of cause of action.B,1C
3ere, the petitioner alle!ed himself to be the late CresencianoTs brother and survivin! heir.
Assumin! that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in
the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversel a8ected b an (ud!ment in the suit. &ndeed, a
brother li5e the petitioner, albeit not a compulsor heir under the laws of succession, has the ri!ht
to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the conditions stated in Article ,00, and
Article ,00/ of the *i$il *ode, as follows@
Article ,00,. #hould brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance and the brothers
and sisters or their children to the other half.
Article ,00/. &f there are no descendants, ascendants, ille!itimate children, or a
survivin! spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the followin! articles.
Pursuant to these provisions, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or ille!itimate
children of the deceased e:cludes collateral relatives li5e the petitioner from succeedin! to the
deceasedTs estate.B,KC Necessaril, therefore, the ri!ht of the petitioner to brin! the action hin!es
upon a prior determination of whether Cresenciano had an descendants, ascendants, or children
%le!itimate or ille!itimate', and of whether the petitioner was the late CresencianoTs survivin! heir.
#uch prior determination must be made b the trial court, for the inGuir thereon involves
Guestions of fact.
As can be seen, both the RTC and the CA erroneousl resolved the issue presented in this
case. Ae reverse their error, in order that the substantial ri!ht of the petitioner,if an, ma not be
pre(udiced.
Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead *eonila, who, as the late CresencianoTs
survivin! wife,B,.C stood to be bene"ted or pre(udiced b the nulli"cation of her o"n marria!e. &t
is relevant to observe, moreover, that not all marria!es celebrated under the old *i$il
*ode reGuired
a marria!e license for their validit=BD0C hence, her participation in this action is made all the more
necessar in order to shed li!ht on whether the marria!e had been celebrated without a marria!e
license and whether the marria!e mi!ht have been a marria!e e$cepted from the reGuirement of a
marria!e license. #he was trul an indispensable part who must be (oined herein@
$$$ under an and all conditions, BherC presence bein! a sine 3ua non for the
e$ercise of (udicial power. &t is precisel Ywhen an indispensable part is not before
the court BthatC the action should be dismissed.Z The absence of an indispensable
part renders all subseGuent actions of the court null and void for want of authorit
to act, not onl as to the absent parties but even as to those present.BD,C
Ae ta5e note, too, that the petitioner and *eonila were parties in C.A.:>.R. CL No. .,0DF
entitled Heirs of *resenciano Ablaza, namelJ .eonila G. Ablaza and .eila Ablaza 9asul $. @pouses
&sidro and *asilda Ablaza, an action to determine who between the parties were the le!al owners
of the propert involved therein. Apparentl, C.A.:>.R. CL No. .,0DF was decided on , and the
petitionerTs motion for reconsideration was denied on . As a defendant in that action, the petitioner
is reasonabl presumed to have 5nowled!e that the therein plainti8s, *eonila and *eila, were the
wife and dau!hter, respectivel, of the late Cresenciano. As such, *eila was another indispensable
part whose substantial ri!ht an (ud!ment in this action will de"nitel a8ect. The petitioner
should li5ewise implead *eila.
The omission to implead *eonila and *eila was not immediatel fatal to the present action,
however, considerin! that #ection ,,,BDDC Rule /, Rules of *ourt, states that neither mis(oinder nor
non:(oinder of parties is a !round for the dismissal of an action. The petitioner can still amend his
initiator pleadin! in order to implead her, for under the same rule, such amendment to implead
an indispensable part ma be made Yon motion of an part or on %the trial courtTs' own
initiative at an stage of the action and on such terms as are (ust.Z
IHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is !ranted.
Ae reverse and set aside the decision dated rendered b the Court of Appeals.
#pecial Case No. ,,1 entitled &n ReJ !etition for 8ulli)cation of Marriage *ontract bet"een
*resenciano Ablaza and .eonila HonatoK &sidro Ablaza, petitioner, is reinstated, and its records are
returned to the Re!ional Trial Court, Branch E., in Catain!an, Masbate, for further proceedin!s,
with instructions to "rst reGuire the petitioner to amend his initiator pleadin! in order to implead
*eonila 3onato and her dau!hter *eila Abla6a 7asul as parties:defendants= then to determine
whether the late Cresenciano Abla6a had an ascendants, descendants, or children %le!itimate or
ille!itimate' at the time of his death as well as whether the petitioner was the brother and
survivin! heir of the late Cresenciano Abla6a entitled to succeed to the estate of said deceased=
and thereafter to proceed accordin!l.
No costs of suit.
SO OR"ERE".
LUCAS P. !ERSAMIN
Associate 7ustice
IE CONCUR>
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate 7ustice
Chairperson
ARTURO ". !RION RO!ERTO A. A!A"
Associate 7ustice Associate 7ustice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, 1R.
Associate 7ustice
A T T E S T A T I O N
& attest that the conclusions in the above )ecision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assi!ned to the writer of the opinion of the CourtTs )ivision.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate
7ustice Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to #ection ,/, Article L&&& of the Constitution, and the )ivision ChairpersonTs
Attestation, & certif that the conclusions in the above )ecision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assi!ned to the writer of the opinion of the CourtTs )ivision.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief 7ustice

2ACT#@ Ed!ardo Rees and Anna Lillanueva were married twice, in civil rites and in church, in
,.11. Both weddin!s were declared null and void ab initio for lac5 of marria!e license and
consent of the parties. Even before the decree nullifin! the marria!e was issued, Rees
contracted marria!e with +felia T in April ,.1. and had their church weddin! in Ma5ati in April
,.KD. The decree was onl issued in Au!ust ,.K0. &n 7anuar ,..,, Rees "led with RTC a
complaint to have his marria!e with petitioner be declared null and void. RTC ruled that his
marria!e to +felia null and void ab initio. CA a<rmed trial courtXs decision. CA ruled that a (udicial
declaration of nullit of the marria!e with Lillanueva must "rst be secured before a subseGuent
marria!e could be validl contracted.
&##?E@ Ahether the decree of nullit of the ,st marria!e is reGuired before a subseGuent marria!e
can be entered into validl
3E*)@ Both marria!es !overned b the Civil Code hence, no (udicial declaration is necessar
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
#EC+N) )&L&#&+N
G.R. No. J0116 1u,$ <0, 19J9
IMEL"A MANALA3SA3 PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CORONA I!A35SOMERA, 2, )$& %#*#%2t' #s P&$s202,g 1u0g$ o( t)$ R$g2o,#/ T&2#/
Cou&t o( M#,2/#, !&#,%) VIL HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, 2, )2s %#*#%2t' #s t)$ C2t' F2s%#/ o(
M#,2/#L #,0 ERICH EOOEHAR" GEILING, respondents.

REGALA"O, J.:
An ill:starred marria!e of a 2ilipina and a forei!ner which ended in a forei!n absolute divorce, onl
to be followed b a criminal in"delit suit of the latter a!ainst the former, provides ?s the
opportunit to la down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved
(urisdictional Guestion.
+n #eptember 1, ,.1., petitioner &melda Manalasa Pilapil, a 2ilipino citi6en, and private
respondent Erich E55ehard >eilin!, a >erman national, were married before the Re!istrar of Births,
Marria!es and )eaths at 2riedensweiler in the 2ederal Republic of >erman. The marria!e started
auspiciousl enou!h, and the couple lived to!ether for some time in Malate, Manila where their
onl child, &sabella Pilapil >eilin!, was born on April D0, ,.K0. 1
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed b a
separation de facto between them.
After about three and a half ears of marria!e, such connubial disharmon eventuated in private
respondent initiatin! a divorce proceedin! a!ainst petitioner in >erman before the #choneber!
*ocal Court in 7anuar, ,.K/. 3e claimed that there was failure of their marria!e and that the had
been livin! apart since April, ,.KD. 2
Petitioner, on the other hand, "led an action for le!al separation, support and separation of
propert before the Re!ional Trial Court of Manila, Branch HHH&&, on 7anuar D/, ,.K/ where the
same is still pendin! as Civil Case No. K/:,FK--. <
+n 7anuar ,F, ,.K-, )ivision D0 of the #choneber! *ocal Court, 2ederal Republic of >erman,
promul!ated a decree of divorce on the !round of failure of marria!e of the spouses. The custod
of the child was !ranted to petitioner. The records show that under >erman law said court was
locall and internationall competent for the divorce proceedin! and that the dissolution of said
marria!e was le!all founded on and authori6ed b the applicable law of that forei!n (urisdiction. 7
+n 7une D1, ,.K-, or more than "ve months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private
respondent "led two complaints for adulter before the Cit 2iscal of Manila alle!in! that, while
still married to said respondent, petitioner 9had an a8air with a certain Ailliam Chia as earl as
,.KD and with et another man named 7esus Chua sometime in ,.K/9. Assistant 2iscal 7acinto A.
de los Rees, 7r., after the correspondin! investi!ation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on
the !round of insu<cienc of evidence. 8 3owever, upon review, the respondent cit "scal
approved a resolution, dated 7anuar K, ,.K-, directin! the "lin! of two complaints for adulter
a!ainst the petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordin!l "led and were eventuall raced to two
branches of the Re!ional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled M!eople of the !hilippines $s.
&melda !ilapil and Iilliam *hiaM, doc5eted as Criminal Case No. K1:FDE/F, was assi!ned to Branch
HHL& presided b the respondent (ud!e= while the other case, M!eople of the !hilippines $s. &melda
!ilapil and 9ames *huaM, doc5eted as Criminal Case No. K1:FDE/E went to the sala of 7ud!e
*eonardo Cru6, Branch HHL, of the same court. 7
+n March ,E, ,.K1, petitioner "led a petition with the #ecretar of 7ustice as5in! that the aforesaid
resolution of respondent "scal be set aside and the cases a!ainst her be dismissed. J A similar
petition was "led b 7ames Chua, her co:accused in Criminal Case No. K1:FDE/E. The #ecretar of
7ustice, throu!h the Chief #tate Prosecutor, !ave due course to both petitions and directed the
respondent cit "scal to inform the )epartment of 7ustice 9if the accused have alread been
arrai!ned and if not et arrai!ned, to move to defer further proceedin!s9 and to elevate the entire
records of both cases to his o<ce for review. 9
Petitioner thereafter "led a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arrai!nment and to suspend
further proceedin!s thereon. 10 As a conseGuence, 7ud!e *eonardo Cru6 suspended proceedin!s
in Criminal Case No. K1:FDE/E. +n the other hand, respondent (ud!e merel reset the date of the
arrai!nment in Criminal Case No. K1:FDE/F to April -, ,.K1. Before such scheduled date,
petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arrai!nment and for the suspension of proceedin!s in
said Criminal Case No. K1:FDE/F until after the resolution of the petition for review then pendin!
before the #ecretar of 7ustice. 11 A motion to Guash was also "led in the same case on the
!round of lac5 of (urisdiction, 12 which motion was denied b the respondent (ud!e in an order
dated #eptember K, ,.K1. The same order also directed the arrai!nment of both accused therein,
that is, petitioner and Ailliam Chia. The latter entered a plea of not !uilt while the petitioner
refused to be arrai!ned. #uch refusal of the petitioner bein! considered b respondent (ud!e as
direct contempt, she and her counsel were "ned and the former was ordered detained until she
submitted herself for arrai!nment. 1< *ater, private respondent entered a plea of not !uilt. 17
+n +ctober D1, ,.K1, petitioner "led this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a
praer for a temporar restrainin! order, see5in! the annulment of the order of the lower court
denin! her motion to Guash. The petition is anchored on the main !round that the court is
without (urisdiction 9to tr and decide the char!e of adulter, which is a private o8ense that
cannot be prosecuted de oEcio %sic', since the purported complainant, a forei!ner, does not
Gualif as an o8ended spouse havin! obtained a "nal divorce decree under his national law prior
to his "lin! the criminal complaint.9 18
+n +ctober D,, ,.K1, this Court issued a temporar restrainin! order en(oinin! the respondents
from implementin! the aforesaid order of #eptember K, ,.K1 and from further proceedin! with
Criminal Case No. K1:FDE/F. #ubseGuentl, on March D/, ,.KK #ecretar of 7ustice #edfre A.
+rdoWe6 acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholdin! petitioner;s ratiocinations,
issued a resolution directin! the respondent cit "scal to move for the dismissal of the complaints
a!ainst the petitioner. 16
Ae "nd this petition meritorious. The writs praed for shall accordin!l issue.
?nder Article /EE of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adulter, as well as four other crimes
a!ainst chastit, cannot be prosecuted e$cept upon a sworn written complaint "led b
the o+ended spouse. &t has lon! since been established, with unwaverin! consistenc, that
compliance with this rule is a (urisdictional, and not merel a formal, reGuirement. 1J Ahile in
point of strict law the (urisdiction of the court over the o8ense is vested in it b the 7udiciar *aw,
the reGuirement for a sworn written complaint is (ust as (urisdictional a mandate since it is that
complaint which starts the prosecutor proceedin! 19 and without which the court cannot e$ercise
its (urisdiction to tr the case.
Now, the law speci"call provides that in prosecutions for adulter and concubina!e the person
who can le!all "le the complaint should be the o8ended spouse, and nobod else. ?nli5e the
o8enses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the
prosecution of the crimes of adulter and concubina!e b the parents, !randparents or !uardian of
the o8ended part. The so:called e$clusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the "rst four
o8enses above mentioned do not appl to adulter and concubina!e. &t is si!ni"cant that while the
#tate, as parens patriae, was added and vested b the ,.KF Rules of Criminal Procedure with the
power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid
o8enses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents,
!randparents or !uardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adulter and
concubina!e. &n other words, onl the o8ended spouse, and no other, is authori6ed b law to
initiate the action therefor.
Corollar to such e$clusive !rant of power to the o8ended spouse to institute the action, it
necessaril follows that such initiator must have the status, capacit or le!al representation to do
so at the time of the "lin! of the criminal action. This is a familiar and e$press rule in civil actions=
in fact, lac5 of le!al capacit to sue, as a !round for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is
determined as of the "lin! of the complaint or petition.
The absence of an eGuivalent e$plicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that
the same reGuirement and rationale would not appl. ?nderstandabl, it ma not have been found
necessar since criminal actions are !enerall and fundamentall commenced b the #tate,
throu!h the People of the Philippines, the o8ended part bein! merel the complainin! witness
therein. 3owever, in the so:called 9private crimes9 or those which cannot be prosecuted de o)cio,
and the present prosecution for adulter is of such !enre, the o8ended spouse assumes a more
predominant role since the ri!ht to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter
e$clusivel within his power and option.
This polic was adopted out of consideration for the a!!rieved part who mi!ht prefer to su8er the
outra!e in silence rather than !o throu!h the scandal of a public trial. 20 3ence, as co!entl
ar!ued b petitioner, Article /EE of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital
relationship is still subsistin! at the time of the institution of the criminal action for, adulter. This
is a lo!ical conseGuence since the raison dNetre of said provision of law would be absent where the
supposed o8ended part had ceased to be the spouse of the alle!ed o8ender at the time of the
"lin! of the criminal case. 21
&n these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacit of the complainant to
commence the action be de"nitel established and, as alread demonstrated, such status or
capacit must indubitabl e$ist as of the time he initiates the action. &t would be absurd if his
capacit to brin! the action would be determined b his status before or subse3uent to the
commencement thereof, where such capacit or status e$isted prior to but ceased before, or was
acGuired subseGuent to but did not e$ist at the time of, the institution of the case. Ae would
thereb have the anomalous spectacle of a part brin!in! suit at the ver time when he is without
the le!al capacit to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be an local precedential (urisprudence on the speci"c issue as
to when precisel the status of a complainant as an o8ended spouse must e$ist where a criminal
prosecution can be commenced onl b one who in law can be cate!ori6ed as possessed of such
status. #tated di8erentl and with reference to the present case, the inGuir =would be whether it
is necessar in the commencement of a criminal action for adulter that the marital bonds
between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and e$istin! at the time of the institution
of the action b the former a!ainst the latter.
American (urisprudence, on cases involvin! statutes in that (urisdiction which are in pari
materia with ours, ields the rule that after a di$orce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no
longer has the right to institute proceedings against the o+enders where the statute provides that
the innocent spouse shall have the e$clusive ri!ht to institute a prosecution for adulter. Ahere,
however, proceedin!s have been properl commenced, a divorce subseGuentl !ranted can have
no le!al e8ect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedin!s to a conclusion. 22
&n the cited .oftus case, the #upreme Court of &owa held that J
;No prosecution for adulter can be commenced e$cept on the complaint of the
husband or wife.; #ection E./D, Code. (hough .oftus "as husband of defendant
"hen the o+ense is said to ha$e been committed, he had ceased to be such "hen
the prosecution "as begun= and appellant insists that his status was not such as to
entitle him to ma5e the complaint. Ae have repeatedl said that the o8ense is
a!ainst the uno8endin! spouse, as well as the state, in e$plainin! the reason for this
provision in the statute= and we are of the opinion that the uno+ending spouse must
be such "hen the prosecution is commenced. %Emphasis supplied.'
Ae see no reason wh the same doctrinal rule should not appl in this case and in our (urisdiction,
considerin! our statutor law and (ural polic on the matter. Ae are convinced that in cases of
such nature, the status of the complainant vis:a:vis the accused must be determined as of the
time the complaint was "led. Thus, the person who initiates the adulter case must be an o8ended
spouse, and b this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the "lin!
of the complaint.
&n the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his countr, the
2ederal Republic of >erman, is admitted. #aid divorce and its le!al e8ects ma be reco!ni6ed in
the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 2< in view of the nationalit principle in
our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Ban Dorn $s. Romillo, 9r., et al., 27 after a divorce was !ranted b a
?nited #tates court between Alice Lan )orn(a 2ilipina, and her American husband, the latter "led a
civil case in a trial court here alle!in! that her business concern was con(u!al propert and prain!
that she be ordered to render an accountin! and that the plainti8 be !ranted the ri!ht to mana!e
the business. Re(ectin! his pretensions, this Court perspicuousl demonstrated the error of such
stance, thus@
There can be no Guestion as to the validit of that Nevada divorce in an of the
#tates of the ?nited #tates. The decree is bindin! on private respondent as an
American citi6en. 2or instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in an #tate of the ?nion. ...
&t is true that owin! to the nationalit principle embodied in Article ,F of the Civil
Code, onl Philippine nationals are covered b the polic a!ainst absolute divorces
the same bein! considered contrar to our concept of public polic and moralit.
3owever, aliens ma obtain divorces abroad, which ma be reco!ni6ed in the
Philippines, provided the are valid accordin! to their national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no lon!er the husband of
petitioner. 3e would have no standin! to sue in the case below as petitioner;s
husband entitled to e$ercise control over con(u!al assets. ... 28
?nder the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, bein! no lon!er the husband of
petitioner, had no le!al standin! to commence the adulter case under the imposture that he was
the o8ended spouse at the time he "led suit.
The alle!ation of private respondent that he could not have brou!ht this case before the decree of
divorce for lac5 of 5nowled!e, even if true, is of no le!al si!ni"cance or conseGuence in this case.
Ahen said respondent initiated the divorce proceedin!, he obviousl 5new that there would no
lon!er be a famil nor marria!e vows to protect once a dissolution of the marria!e is decreed.
Neither would there be a dan!er of introducin! spurious heirs into the famil, which is said to be
one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adulter, 26 since there would
thenceforth be no spousal relationship to spea5 of. The severance of the marital bond had the
e8ect of dissociatin! the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not
a8ect or cast obloGu on the other.
The aforecited case of -nited @tates $s. Mata cannot be successfull relied upon b private
respondent. &n applin! Article E// of the old Penal Code, substantiall the same as Article /// of
the Revised Penal Code, which punished adulter 9althou!h the marria!e be afterwards declared
void9, the Court merel stated that 9the lawma5ers intended to declare adulterous the in"delit of
a married woman to her marital vows, even thou!h it should be made to appear that she is
entitled to have her marria!e contract declared null and void, until and unless she actuall secures
a formal (udicial declaration to that e8ect9. )e"nitel, it cannot be lo!icall inferred therefrom that
the complaint can still be "led after the declaration of nullit because such declaration that the
marria!e is void ab initio is eGuivalent to statin! that it never e$isted. There bein! no marria!e
from the be!innin!, an complaint for adulter "led after said declaration of nullit would no
lon!er have a le! to stand on. Moreover, what was conseGuentl contemplated and within the
purview of the decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for adulter was
"led before the termination of the marria!e b a (udicial declaration of its nullit ab initio. The
same rule and reGuisite would necessaril appl where the termination of the marria!e was
e8ected, as in this case, b a valid forei!n divorce.
Private respondent;s invocation of Donio2(e$es, et al. $s. Bamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must
su8er the same fate of inapplicabilit. A cursor readin! of said case reveals that the o8ended
spouse therein had dul and seasonabl "led a complaint for adulter, althou!h an issue was
raised as to its su<cienc but which was resolved in favor of the complainant. #aid case did not
involve a factual situation a5in to the one at bar or an issue determinative of the controvers
herein.
A3ERE2+RE, the Guestioned order denin! petitioner;s motion to Guash is @,( A@&D, and another
one enteredD&@M&@@&8G the complaint in Criminal Case No. K1:FDE/F for lac5 of (urisdiction. The
temporar restrainin! order issued in this case on +ctober D,, ,.K1 is hereb made permanent.
#+ +R)ERE).
Melencio2Herrera, !adilla and @armiento, 99., concur.


S$*#&#t$ O*2,2o,s

PARAS, J., concurrin!@
&t is m considered opinion that re!ardless of whether Ae consider the >erman absolute divorce as
valid also in the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, b the ver act of his
obtainin! an absolute divorce in >erman can no lon!er be considered as the o8ended part in
case his former wife actuall has carnal 5nowled!e with another, because in divorcin! her, he
alread implicitl authori6ed the woman to have se$ual relations with others. A contrar rulin!
would be less than fair for a man, who is free to have se$ will be allowed to deprive the woman of
the same privile!e.
&n the case of Recto $. Harden %,00 Phil. ED1 B,.F-C', the #upreme Court considered the absolute
divorce between the American husband and his American wife as valid and bindin! in the
Philippines on the theor that their status and capacit are !overned b their 8ational la",
namel, American law. There is no decision et of the #upreme Court re!ardin! the validit of such
a divorce if one of the parties, sa an American, is married to a 2ilipino wife, for then two %D'
di8erent nationalities would be involved.
&n the boo5 of #enate President 7ovito #alon!a entitled Private &nternational *aw and precisel
because of the8ational la" doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the
American husband is concerned but void insofar as the 2ilipino wife is involved. This results in what
he calls a 9sociall !rotesGue situation,9 where a 2ilipino woman is still married to a man who is no
lon!er her husband. &t is the opinion however, of the undersi!ned that ver li5el the opposite
e$presses the correct view. Ahile under the national la" of the husband the absolute divorce will
be valid, still one of the e$ceptions to the application of the proper forei!n law %one of the
e$ceptions to comit' is when the forei!n law will wor5 an in(ustice or in(ur to the people or
residents of the forum. ConseGuentl since to reco!ni6e the absolute divorce as valid on the part
of the husband would be in(urious or pre(udicial to the 2ilipino wife whose marria!e would be still
valid under her national law, it would seem that under our law e$istin! before the new 2amil Code
%which too5 e8ect on Au!ust /, ,.KK' the divorce should be considered void both with respect to
the American husband and the 2ilipino wife.
The recent case of Ban Dorn $. Romillo, 9r. %,/. #CRA B,.KFC' cannot appl despite the fact that
the husband was an American can with a 2ilipino wife because in said case the validit of the
divorce insofar as the 2ilipino wife is concerned was NELER put in issue.

S$*#&#t$ O*2,2o,s
PARAS, J., concurrin!@
&t is m considered opinion that re!ardless of whether Ae consider the >erman absolute divorce as
valid also in the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, b the ver act of his
obtainin! an absolute divorce in >erman can no lon!er be considered as the o8ended part in
case his former wife actuall has carnal 5nowled!e with another, because in divorcin! her, he
alread implicitl authori6ed the woman to have se$ual relations with others. A contrar rulin!
would be less than fair for a man, who is free to have se$ will be allowed to deprive the woman of
the same privile!e.
&n the case of Recto $. Harden %,00 Phil. ED1 B,.F-C', the #upreme Court considered the absolute
divorce between the American husband and his American wife as valid and bindin! in the
Philippines on the theor that their status and capacit are !overned b their 8ational la",
namel, American law. There is no decision et of the #upreme Court re!ardin! the validit of such
a divorce if one of the parties, sa an American, is married to a 2ilipino wife, for then two %D'
di8erent nationalities would be involved.
&n the boo5 of #enate President 7ovito #alon!a entitled Private &nternational *aw and precisel
because of the8ational la" doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the
American husband is concerned but void insofar as the 2ilipino wife is involved. This results in what
he calls a 9sociall !rotesGue situation,9 where a 2ilipino woman is still married to a man who is no
lon!er her husband. &t is the opinion however, of the undersi!ned that ver li5el the opposite
e$presses the correct view. Ahile under the national la" of the husband the absolute divorce will
be valid, still one of the e$ceptions to the application of the proper forei!n law %one of the
e$ceptions to comit' is when the forei!n law will wor5 an in(ustice or in(ur to the people or
residents of the forum. ConseGuentl since to reco!ni6e the absolute divorce as valid on the part
of the husband would be in(urious or pre(udicial to the 2ilipino wife whose marria!e would be still
valid under her national law, it would seem that under our law e$istin! before the new 2amil Code
%which too5 e8ect on Au!ust /, ,.KK' the divorce should be considered void both with respect to
the American husband and the 2ilipino wife.
The recent case of Ban Dorn $. Romillo, 9r. %,/. #CRA B,.KFC' cannot appl despite the fact that
the husband was an American can with a 2ilipino wife because in said case the validit of the
divorce insofar as the 2ilipino wife is concerned was NELER put in issue.
Foot,ot$s
, Rollo, F, D..
D &bid., -, D..
/ &bid., 1.
E &bid., 1, D.:/0= Anne$es A and A:,, Petition.
F &bid., 1, ,1K.
- &bid., K= Anne$es B, B:, and B:D, id.
1 &bid., K:., ,1K.
K &bid., ., ,1K= Anne$ C, id.
. &bid., .:,0, ,1K= Anne$ ), id.
,0 &bid., .= Anne$es E and E:,, id.
,, &bid., ,0= Anne$ 2, id.
,D &bid., ., ,1.= Anne$ >, id.
,/ &bid., ,0 Anne$ 3, id.
,E &bid, ,0F.
,F &bid., ,,.
,- &bid., /,,:/,/.
,1 Cf. #ec. F, Rule ,,0, Rules of Court.
,K People vs. Mandia, -0 Phil. /1D, /1F %,./E'= People vs. Vurbano, /1 #CRA F-F,
F-. %,.1,'= People vs. *in!aen, >.R. No. -EFF-, 7une ,0, ,.KK.
,. LaldepeWas vs. People, ,- #CRA K1, %,.--'= People vs. Babasa, .1 #CRA -1D
%,.K0'.
D0 #amilin vs. Court of 2irst &nstance of Pan!asinan, F1 Phil. D.K %,./D'= )onio:
Teves, et al. vs. Lamenta, et al., ,// #CRA -,- %,.KE'.
D, Rollo, DK..
DD D Am. 7ur. Dd., .1/ citin! #tate vs. *oftus, ,0E NA .0-, .01= Re #mith, D +5la.
,F/, /1 p. ,0..= #tate vs. Russell, .0 &owa F-., FK NA .,F.
D/ Recto vs. 3arden, ,00 Phil. ED1 %,.F-'.
DE ,/. #CRA ,/.,,E0 %,.KF'.
DF The said pronouncements foreshadowed and are adopted in the 2amil Code of
the Philippines %E$ecutive +rder No. D0., as amended b E$ecutive +rder No. DD1,
e8ective on Au!ust /, ,.KK', Article D- whereof provides that 9%w'here marria!e
between a 2ilipino citi6en and a forei!ner is validl celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validl obtained abroad b the alien spouse capacitatin! him or her to
remarr, the 2ilipino spouse shall li5ewise have capacit to re under Philippine law.
D- ?.#. vs. Mata, ,K Phil. E.0 %,.,,'.
D1 2ootnote D0, ante.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
2&R#T )&L&#&+N
G.R. No. L56J770 O%to-$& J, 19J8
ALICE RE3ES VAN "ORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, 1R., #s P&$s202,g 1u0g$ o( !&#,%) C, R$g2o,#/ T&2#/ Cou&t o(
t)$ N#t2o,#/ C#*2t#/ R$g2o, P#s#' C2t' #,0 RICHAR" UPTON respondents.

MELENCIO5HERRERA, J.:!
&n this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Rees Lan )orn see5s to set aside the
+rders, dated #eptember ,F, ,.K/ and Au!ust /, ,.KE, in Civil Case No. ,01F:P, issued b
respondent 7ud!e, which denied her Motion to )ismiss said case, and her Motion for
Reconsideration of the )ismissal +rder, respectivel.
The basic bac5!round facts are that petitioner is a citi6en of the Philippines while private
respondent is a citi6en of the ?nited #tates= that the were married in 3on!5on! in ,.1D= that,
after the marria!e, the established their residence in the Philippines= that the be!ot two children
born on April E, ,.1/ and )ecember ,K, ,.1F, respectivel= that the parties were divorced in
Nevada, ?nited #tates, in ,.KD= and that petitioner has re:married also in Nevada, this time to
Theodore Lan )orn.
)ated 7une K, ,.K/, private respondent "led suit a!ainst petitioner in Civil Case No. ,01F:P of the
Re!ional Trial Court, Branch CHL, in Pasa Cit, statin! that petitioner;s business in Ermita, Manila,
%the >alleon #hop, for short', is con(u!al propert of the parties, and as5in! that petitioner be
ordered to render an accountin! of that business, and that private respondent be declared with
ri!ht to mana!e the con(u!al propert. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the !round that the
cause of action is barred b previous (ud!ment in the divorce proceedin!s before the Nevada
Court wherein respondent had ac5nowled!ed that he and petitioner had 9no communit propert9
as of 7une ,,, ,.KD. The Court below denied the Motion to )ismiss in the mentioned case on the
!round that the propert involved is located in the Philippines so that the )ivorce )ecree has no
bearin! in the case. The denial is now the sub(ect of this certiorari proceedin!.
>enerall, the denial of a Motion to )ismiss in a civil case is interlocutor and is not sub(ect to
appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to Guestion the propriet of an
interlocutor order of the trial Court. 3owever, when a !rave abuse of discretion was patentl
committed, or the lower Court acted capriciousl and whimsicall, then it devolves upon this Court
in a certiorari proceedin! to e$ercise its supervisor authorit and to correct the error committed
which, in such a case, is eGuivalent to lac5 of (urisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it
would be useless and a waste of time to !o ahead with the proceedin!s. 2 Aeconsider the petition
"led in this case within the e$ception, and we have !iven it due course.
2or resolution is the e8ect of the forei!n divorce on the parties and their alle!ed con(u!al propert
in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from lain! claim on the alle!ed con(u!al propert
because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedin!s before the American Court that
the had no communit of propert= that the >alleon #hop was not established throu!h con(u!al
funds, and that respondent;s claim is barred b prior (ud!ment.
2or his part, respondent avers that the )ivorce )ecree issued b the Nevada Court cannot prevail
over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national polic= that the acts and
declaration of a forei!n Court cannot, especiall if the same is contrar to public polic, divest
Philippine Courts of (urisdiction to entertain matters within its (urisdiction.
2or the resolution of this case, it is not necessar to determine whether the propert relations
between petitioner and private respondent, after their marria!e, were upon absolute or relative
communit propert, upon complete separation of propert, or upon an other re!ime. The pivotal
fact in this case is the Nevada di$orce of the parties.
The Nevada )istrict Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained (urisdiction over petitioner
who appeared in person before the Court durin! the trial of the case. &t also obtained (urisdiction
over private respondent who, !ivin! his address as No. /K, Bush #treet, #an 2rancisco, California,
authori6ed his attornes in the divorce case, 4arp a >radt *td., to a!ree to the divorce on the
!round of incompatibilit in the understandin! that there were neither communit propert nor
communit obli!ations. < As e$plicitl stated in the Power of Attorne he e$ecuted in favor of the
law "rm of 4ARP a >RA) *T)., //- A. *ibert, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce
proceedin!s@
$$$ $$$ $$$
Mou are hereb authori6ed to accept service of #ummons, to "le an Answer, appear
on m behalf and do an thin!s necessar and proper to represent me, without
further contestin!, sub(ect to the followin!@
,. That m spouse see5s a divorce on the !round of incompatibilit.
D. That there is no communit of propert to be ad(udicated b the Court.
/. ;&;hat there are no communit obli!ations to be ad(udicated b the court.
$$$ $$$ $$$ 7
There can be no Guestion as to the validit of that Nevada divorce in an of the #tates of the
?nited #tates. The decree is bindin! on private respondent as an American citi6en. 2or instance,
private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in an #tate of the ?nion. Ahat he is
contendin! in this case is that the divorce is not valid and bindin! in this (urisdiction, the same
bein! contrar to local law and public polic.
&t is true that owin! to the nationalit principle embodied in Article ,F of the Civil Code, 8 onl
Philippine nationals are covered b the polic a!ainst absolute divorces the same bein! considered
contrar to our concept of public police and moralit. 3owever, aliens ma obtain divorces abroad,
which ma be reco!ni6ed in the Philippines, provided the are valid accordin! to their national
law. 6 &n this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marria!e from the
standards of American law, under which di$orce dissol$es the marriage. As stated b the Federal
@upreme *ourt of the -nited @tates in Atherton $s. Atherton, EF *. Ed. 1.E, 1..@
The purpose and e8ect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimon b a court
of competent (urisdiction are to chan!e the e$istin! status or domestic relation of
husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marria!e tie when thus
severed as to one part, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is un5nown to the law. Ahen the law provides, in the nature of a
penalt. that the !uilt part shall not marr a!ain, that part, as well as the other,
is still absolutel freed from the bond of the former marria!e.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no lon!er the husband of petitioner. 3e
would have no standin! to sue in the case below as petitioner;s husband entitled to e$ercise
control over con(u!al assets. As he is bound b the )ecision of his own countr;s Court, which
validl e$ercised (urisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped
b his own representation before said Court from assertin! his ri!ht over the alle!ed con(u!al
propert.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still sub(ect to a wife;s obli!ations under Article ,0., et. se3. of
the Civil Code cannot be (ust. Petitioner should not be obli!ed to live to!ether with, observe
respect and "delit, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be
one of her heirs with possible ri!hts to con(u!al propert. #he should not be discriminated a!ainst
in her own countr if the ends of (ustice are to be served.
A3ERE2+RE, the Petition is !ranted, and respondent 7ud!e is hereb ordered to dismiss the
Complaint "led in Civil Case No. ,01F:P of his Court.
Aithout costs.
#+ +R)ERE).
(eehan%ee /*hairman1, !lana, Relo$a, Gutierrez, 9r., De la Fuente and !ata#o, 99., concur.

Foot,ot$s
, #anche6 vs. Vosa, -K #CRA ,1, %,.1F'= Malit vs. People, ,,E #CRA /EK %,.KD'.
D ?.#.T. vs. 3on. Lillanueva, et al., ,0- Phil. E/. %,.F.'.
/ Anne$ 9M9, Petition for Certiorari.
E p. .K, Rollo.
F 9Art. ,F. *aws relatin! to famil ri!hts and duties or to the status, condition and
le!al capacit of persons are bindin! upon citi6ens of the Philippines, even thou!h
livin! abroad.
- cf. Recto vs. 3arden, ,00 Phil. ED1 B,.F-C= Paras, Civil Code, ,.1, ed., Lol. &, p. FD=
#alon!a, Private &nternational *aw, ,.1. ed., p. D/,.9
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
T3&R) )&L&#&+N
G.R. No. 166862 M#&%) <1, 2009
!EN1AMIN G. TING, Petitioner,
vs.
CARMEN M. VELEM5TING, Respondent.
) E C & # & + N
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari see5in! to set aside the November ,1, D00/
Amended )ecision, of the Court of Appeals %CA', and its )ecember ,/, D00E ResolutionD in CA:
>.R. CL No. F..0/. The appellate court, in its assailed decision and resolution, a<rmed the
7anuar ., ,..K )ecision/ of the Re!ional Trial Court %RTC', Branch D/, Cebu Cit, declarin! the
marria!e between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio pursuant to Article /- of the
2amil Code.E
The facts follow.
Petitioner Ben(amin Tin! %Ben(amin' and respondent Carmen Lele6:Tin! %Carmen' "rst met in ,.1D
while the were classmates in medical school.F The fell in love, and the were wed on 7ul D-,
,.1F in Cebu Cit when respondent was alread pre!nant with their "rst child.
At "rst, the resided at Ben(aminTs famil home in Ma!ui5a, Mandaue Cit.- Ahen their second
child was born, the couple decided to move to CarmenTs famil home in Cebu Cit. 1 &n #eptember
,.1F, Ben(amin passed the medical board e$aminationsK and thereafter proceeded to ta5e a
residenc pro!ram to become a sur!eon but shifted to anesthesiolo! after two ears. B ,.1.,
Ben(amin completed the preceptorship pro!ram for the said "eld. and, in ,.K0, he be!an wor5in!
for Lele6 3ospital, owned b CarmenTs famil, as member of its active sta8,,0 while Carmen
wor5ed as the hospitalTs Treasurer.,,
The couple be!ot si$ %-' children, namel )ennis, born on )ecember ., ,.1F= 7ames *ouis, born on
Au!ust DF, ,.11= A!nes &rene, born on April F, ,.K,= Charles *aurence, born on 7ul D,, ,.K-=
Mles Lincent, born on 7ul ,., ,.KK= and Marie Corinne, born on 7une ,-, ,..,.,D
+n +ctober D,, ,../, after bein! married for more than ,K ears to petitioner and while their
oun!est child was onl two ears old, Carmen "led a veri"ed petition before the RTC of Cebu Cit
prain! for the declaration of nullit of their marria!e based on Article /- of the 2amil Code. #he
claimed that Ben(amin su8ered from pscholo!ical incapacit even at the time of the celebration
of their marria!e, which, however, onl became manifest thereafter. ,/
&n her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marria!e, she was alread aware that Ben(amin
used to drin5 and !amble occasionall with his friends.,E But after the were married, petitioner
continued to drin5 re!ularl and would !o home at about midni!ht or sometimes in the wee hours
of the mornin! drun5 and violent. 3e would confront and insult respondent, phsicall assault her
and force her to have se$ with him. There were also instances when Ben(amin used his !un and
shot the !ate of their house.,F Because of his drin5in! habit, Ben(aminTs (ob as anesthesiolo!ist
was a8ected to the point that he often had to refuse to answer the call of his fellow doctors and to
pass the tas5 to other anesthesiolo!ists. #ome sur!eons even stopped callin! him for his services
because the perceived petitioner to be unreliable. Respondent tried to tal5 to her husband about
the latterTs drin5in! problem, but Ben(amin refused to ac5nowled!e the same.,-
Carmen also complained that petitioner deliberatel refused to !ive "nancial support to their
famil and would even !et an!r at her whenever she as5ed for mone for their children. &nstead
of providin! support, Ben(amin would spend his mone on drin5in! and !amblin! and would even
bu e$pensive eGuipment for his hobb.,1 3e rarel staed home,K and even ne!lected his
obli!ation to his children.,.
Aside from this, Ben(amin also en!a!ed in compulsive !amblin!.D0 3e would !amble two or three
times a wee5 and would borrow from his friends, brothers, or from loan shar5s whenever he had no
mone. #ometimes, Ben(amin would pawn his wifeTs own (ewelr to "nance his !amblin!.D, There
was also an instance when the spouses had to sell their famil car and even a portion of the lot
Ben(amin inherited from his father (ust to be able to pa o8 his !amblin! debts. DD Ben(amin onl
stopped !oin! to the casinos in ,.K- after he was banned therefrom for havin! caused trouble, an
act which he said he purposel committed so that he would be banned from the !amblin!
establishments.D/
&n sum, CarmenTs alle!ations of Ben(aminTs pscholo!ical incapacit consisted of the followin!
manifestations@
,. Ben(aminTs alcoholism, which adversel a8ected his famil relationship and his
profession=
D. Ben(aminTs violent nature brou!ht about b his e$cessive and re!ular drin5in!=
/. 3is compulsive !amblin! habit, as a result of which Ben(amin found it necessar to sell
the famil car twice and the propert he inherited from his father in order to pa o8 his
debts, because he no lon!er had mone to pa the same= and
E. Ben(aminTs irresponsibilit and immaturit as shown b his failure and refusal to !ive
re!ular "nancial support to his famil.DE
&n his answer, Ben(amin denied bein! pscholo!icall incapacitated. 3e maintained that he is a
respectable person, as his peers would con"rm. 3e said that he is an active member of social and
athletic clubs and would drin5 and !amble onl for social reasons and for leisure. 3e also denied
bein! a violent person, e$cept when provo5ed b circumstances.DF As for his alle!ed failure to
support his famil "nanciall, Ben(amin claimed that it was Carmen herself who would collect his
professional fees from Lele6 3ospital when he was still servin! there as practicin!
anesthesiolo!ist.D- &n his testimon, Ben(amin also insisted that he !ave his famil "nancial
support within his means whenever he could and would onl !et an!r at respondent for lavishl
spendin! his hard:earned mone on unnecessar thin!s.D1 3e also pointed out that it was he who
often comforted and too5 care of their children, while Carmen plaed mah(on! with her friends
twice a wee5.DK
)urin! the trial, CarmenTs testimon re!ardin! Ben(aminTs drin5in! and !amblin! habits and
violent behavior was corroborated b #usana Aasawas, who served as nann to the spousesT
children from ,.K1 to ,..D.D. Aasawas stated that she personall witnessed instances when
Ben(amin maltreated Carmen even in front of their children./0
Carmen also presented as witness )r. Pure6a Trinidad:+Wate, a pschiatrist./, &nstead of the usual
personal interview, however, )r. +WateTs evaluation of Ben(amin was limited to the transcript of
steno!raphic notes ta5en durin! Ben(aminTs deposition because the latter had alread !one to
wor5 as an anesthesiolo!ist in a hospital in #outh Africa. After readin! the transcript of
steno!raphic notes, )r. +Wate concluded that Ben(aminTs compulsive drin5in!, compulsive
!amblin! and phsical abuse of respondent are clear indications that petitioner su8ers from a
personalit disorder./D
To refute )r. +WateTs opinion, petitioner presented )r. Renato ). +bra, a pschiatrist and a
consultant at the )epartment of Pschiatr in )on Licente #otto Memorial Medical Center, as his
e$pert witness.// )r. +bra evaluated Ben(aminTs pscholo!ical behavior based on the transcript of
steno!raphic notes, as well as the pschiatric evaluation report prepared b )r. A.7.*. Pent6, a
pschiatrist from the ?niversit of Pretoria in #outh Africa, and his %)r. +braTs' interview with
Ben(aminTs brothers./E Contrar to )r. +WateTs "ndin!s, )r. +bra observed that there is nothin!
wron! with petitionerTs personalit, considerin! the latterTs !ood relationship with his fellow
doctors and his !ood trac5 record as anesthesiolo!ist./F
+n 7anuar ., ,..K, the lower court rendered its )ecision/- declarin! the marria!e between
petitioner and respondent null and void. The RTC !ave credence to )r. +WateTs "ndin!s and the
admissions made b Ben(amin in the course of his deposition, and found him to be pscholo!icall
incapacitated to compl with the essential obli!ations of marria!e. #peci"call, the trial court
found Ben(amin an e$cessive drin5er, a compulsive !ambler, someone who prefers his e$tra:
curricular activities to his famil, and a person with violent tendencies, which character traits "nd
root in a personalit defect e$istin! even before his marria!e to Carmen. The decretal portion of
the decision reads@
A3ERE2+RE, all the fore!oin! considered, (ud!ment is hereb rendered declarin! the marria!e
between plainti8 and defendant null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. /- of the 2amil Code. $ $ $
$ $ $ $
#+ +R)ERE)./1
A!!rieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. +n +ctober ,., D000, the CA rendered a
)ecision/K reversin! the trial courtTs rulin!. &t faulted the trial courtTs "ndin!, statin! that no proof
was adduced to support the conclusion that Ben(amin was pscholo!icall incapacitated at the
time he married Carmen since )r. +WateTs conclusion was based onl on theories and not on
established fact,/. contrar to the !uidelines set forth in #antos v. Court of AppealsE0 and in Rep.
of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals and Molina.E,
Because of this, Carmen "led a motion for reconsideration, ar!uin! that the Molina !uidelines
should not be applied to this case since the Molina decision was promul!ated onl on 2ebruar ,/,
,..1, or more than "ve ears after she had "led her petition with the RTC.ED #he claimed that the
Molina rulin! could not be made to appl retroactivel, as it would run counter to the principle of
stare decisis. &nitiall, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration for havin! been "led beond
the prescribed period. Respondent thereafter "led a manifestation e$plainin! compliance with the
prescriptive period but the same was li5ewise denied for lac5 of merit. ?ndaunted, respondent
"led a petition for certiorariE/ with this Court. &n a ResolutionEE dated March F, D00/, this Court
!ranted the petition and directed the CA to resolve CarmenTs motion for reconsideration.EF +n
review, the CA decided to reconsider its previous rulin!. Thus, on November ,1, D00/, it issued an
Amended )ecisionE-reversin! its "rst rulin! and sustainin! the trial courtTs decision.E1
A motion for reconsideration was "led, this time b Ben(amin, but the same was denied b the CA
in its )ecember ,/, D00E Resolution.EK
3ence, this petition.
2or our resolution are the followin! issues@
&. Ahether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the !uidelines
set forth under the #antos and Molina cases=
&&. Ahether the CA correctl ruled that the reGuirement of proof of pscholo!ical incapacit
for the declaration of absolute nullit of marria!e based on Article /- of the 2amil Code
has been liberali6ed= and
&&&. Ahether the CATs decision declarin! the marria!e between petitioner and respondent
null and void BisC in accordance with law and (urisprudence.
Ae "nd merit in the petition.
&. +n the issue of stare decisis.
The principle of stare decisis en(oins adherence b lower courts to doctrinal rules established b
this Court in its "nal decisions. &t is based on the principle that once a Guestion of law has been
e$amined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further ar!ument.E. Basicall, it
is a bar to an attempt to reliti!ate the same issues,F0 necessar for two simple reasons@
econom and stabilit. &n our (urisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article K of the Civil
Code.F,
This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied b the En!lish courts and
was later adopted b the ?nited #tates. Associate 7ustice %now Chief 7ustice' Renato #. PunoTs
discussion on the historical development of this le!al principle in his dissentin! opinion in *ambino
v. Commission on ElectionsFD is enli!htenin!@
The latin phrase stare decisis et non Guieta movere means 9stand b the thin! and do not disturb
the calm.9 The doctrine started with the En!lish Courts. Blac5stone observed that at the be!innin!
of the ,Kth centur, 9it is an established rule to abide b former precedents where the same points
come a!ain in liti!ation.9 As the rule evolved, earl limits to its application were reco!ni6ed@ %,' it
would not be followed if it were 9plainl unreasonable9= %D' where courts of eGual authorit
developed conRictin! decisions= and, %/' the bindin! force of the decision was the 9actual principle
or principles necessar for the decision= not the words or reasonin! used to reach the decision.9
The doctrine mi!rated to the ?nited #tates. &t was reco!ni6ed b the framers of the ?.#.
Constitution. Accordin! to 3amilton, 9strict rules and precedents9 are necessar to prevent
9arbitrar discretion in the courts.9 Madison a!reed but stressed that 9$ $ $ once the precedent
ventures into the realm of alterin! or repealin! the law, it should be re(ected.9 Prof. Consovo well
noted that 3amilton and Madison 9disa!ree about the countervailin! polic considerations that
would allow a (ud!e to abandon a precedent.9 3e added that their ideas 9reveal a deep internal
conRict between the concreteness reGuired b the rule of law and the Re$ibilit demanded in error
correction. &t is this internal conRict that the #upreme Court has attempted to deal with for over
two centuries.9
&ndeed, two centuries of American case law will con"rm Prof. Consovo;s observation althou!h
stare decisis developed its own life in the ?nited #tates. Two strains of stare decisis have been
isolated b le!al scholars. The "rst, 5nown as vertical stare decisis deals with the dut of lower
courts to appl the decisions of the hi!her courts to cases involvin! the same facts. The second,
5nown as hori6ontal stare decisis reGuires that hi!h courts must follow its own precedents. Prof.
Consovo correctl observes that vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an obli!ation, while
hori6ontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a polic, imposin! choice but not a command. &ndeed,
stare decisis is not one of the precepts set in stone in our Constitution.
&t is also instructive to distin!uish the two 5inds of hori6ontal stare decisis J constitutional stare
decisis and statutor stare decisis. Constitutional stare decisis involves (udicial interpretations of
the Constitution while statutor stare decisis involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is
important for courts en(o more Re$ibilit in refusin! to appl stare decisis in constitutional
liti!ations. 7ustice Brandeis; view on the bindin! e8ect of the doctrine in constitutional liti!ations
still holds swa toda. &n soothin! prose, Brandeis stated@ 9#tare decisis is not . . . a universal and
ine$orable command. The rule of stare decisis is not inRe$ible. Ahether it shall be followed or
departed from, is a Guestion entirel within the discretion of the court, which is a!ain called upon
to consider a Guestion once decided.9 &n the same vein, the venerable 7ustice 2ran5furter opined@
9the ultimate touchstone of constitutionalit is the Constitution itself and not what we have said
about it.9 &n contrast, the application of stare decisis on (udicial interpretation of statutes is more
inRe$ible. As 7ustice #tevens e$plains@ 9after a statute has been construed, either b this Court or
b a consistent course of decision b other federal (ud!es and a!encies, it acGuires a meanin! that
should be as clear as if the (udicial !loss had been drafted b the Con!ress itself.9 This stance
reRects both respect for Con!ress; role and the need to preserve the courts; limited resources.
&n !eneral, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons, vi6.@ %,' it le!itimi6es
(udicial institutions= %D' it promotes (udicial econom= and, %/' it allows for predictabilit.
Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound b the stare decisis rule where %,' its application
perpetuates ille!itimate and unconstitutional holdin!s= %D' it cannot accommodate chan!in! social
and political understandin!s= %/' it leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law solel in
the hands of Con!ress= and, %E' activist (ud!es can dictate the polic for future courts while (ud!es
that respect stare decisis are stuc5 a!reein! with them.
&n its D00:ear histor, the ?.#. #upreme Court has refused to follow the stare decisis rule and
reversed its decisions in ,.D cases. The most famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of
Education which (un5ed Pless v. 2er!uson;s 9separate but eGual doctrine.9 Pless upheld as
constitutional a state law reGuirement that races be se!re!ated on public transportation. &n Brown,
the ?.#. #upreme Court, unanimousl held that 9separate . . . is inherentl uneGual.9 Thus, b
freein! itself from the shac5les of stare decisis, the ?.#. #upreme Court freed the colored
Americans from the chains of ineGualit. &n the Philippine settin!, this Court has li5ewise refused to
be strait(ac5eted b the stare decisis rule in order to promote public welfare. &n *a Bu!al:B;laan
Tribal Association, &nc. v. Ramos, we reversed our ori!inal rulin! that certain provisions of the
Minin! *aw are unconstitutional. #imilarl, in #ecretar of 7ustice v. *antion, we overturned our "rst
rulin! and held, on motion for reconsideration, that a private respondent is bereft of the ri!ht to
notice and hearin! durin! the evaluation sta!e of the e$tradition process.
An e$amination of decisions on stare decisis in ma(or countries will show that courts are a!reed on
the factors that should be considered before overturnin! prior rulin!s. These are wor5abilit,
reliance, intervenin! developments in the law and chan!es in fact. &n addition, courts put in the
balance the followin! determinants@ closeness of the votin!, a!e of the prior decision and its
merits.
The leadin! case in decidin! whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule in constitutional
liti!ations is Planned Parenthood v. Case. &t established a E:pron!ed test. The court should %,'
determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simpl in defin! practical wor5abilit= %D'
consider whether the rule is sub(ect to a 5ind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the
conseGuences of overrulin! and add ineGuit to the cost of repudiation= %/' determine whether
related principles of law have so far developed as to have the old rule no more than a remnant of
an abandoned doctrine= and, %E' "nd out whether facts have so chan!ed or come to be seen
di8erentl, as to have robbed the old rule of si!ni"cant application or (usti"cation.F/
To be forthri!ht, respondentTs ar!ument that the doctrinal !uidelines prescribed in #antos and
Molina should not be applied retroactivel for bein! contrar to the principle of stare decisis is no
lon!er new. The same ar!ument was also raised but was struc5 down in Pesca v. Pesca,FE and
a!ain in Antonio v. Rees.FF &n these cases, we e$plained that the interpretation or construction of
a law b courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. &t is onl when a
prior rulin! of this Court is overruled, and a di8erent view is adopted, that the new doctrine ma
have to be applied prospectivel in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have
acted in !ood faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of 9le$ prospicit, non respicit.9
&&. +n liberali6in! the reGuired proof for the declaration of nullit of marria!e under Article /-.
Now, petitioner wants to 5now if we have abandoned the Molina doctrine.
Ae have not.
&n Edward 4enneth N!o Te v. Rowena +n! >utierre6 Mu:Te,F- we declared that, in hindsi!ht, it ma
have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a ri!id set of rules, as the one in Molina, in
resolvin! all cases of pscholo!ical incapacit. Ae said that instead of servin! as a !uideline,
Molina unintentionall became a strai!ht(ac5et, forcin! all cases involvin! pscholo!ical incapacit
to "t into and be bound b it, which is not onl contrar to the intention of the law but unrealistic
as well because, with respect to pscholo!ical incapacit, no case can be considered as on 9all
fours9 with another.F1
B the ver nature of cases involvin! the application of Article /-, it is lo!ical and understandable
to !ive wei!ht to the e$pert opinions furnished b pscholo!ists re!ardin! the pscholo!ical
temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, (uridical antecedence, !ravit and
incurabilit of the pscholo!ical incapacit. 3owever, such opinions, while hi!hl advisable, are not
conditions sine Gua non in !rantin! petitions for declaration of nullit of marria!e.FK At best,
courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determinin! the
merits of a !iven case. &n fact, if the totalit of evidence presented is enou!h to sustain a "ndin!
of pscholo!ical incapacit, then actual medical or pscholo!ical e$amination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.F. The trial court, as in an other !iven case presented before
it, must alwas base its decision not solel on the e$pert opinions furnished b the parties but also
on the totalit of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedin!s.
&t was for this reason that we found it necessar to emphasi6e in N!o Te that each case involvin!
the application of Article /- must be treated distinctl and (ud!ed not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or !enerali6ations but accordin! to its own attendant facts. Courts
should interpret the provision on a case:to:case basis, !uided b e$perience, the "ndin!s of
e$perts and researchers in pscholo!ical disciplines, and b decisions of church tribunals.
2ar from abandonin! Molina, we simpl su!!ested the rela$ation of the strin!ent reGuirements set
forth therein, co!ni6ant of the e$planation !iven b the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on
the rationale of the Rule on )eclaration of Absolute Nullit of Loid Marria!es and Annulment of
Loidable Marria!es %A.M. No. 0D:,,:,0:#C', vi6.@
To reGuire the petitioner to alle!e in the petition the particular root cause of the pscholo!ical
incapacit and to attach thereto the veri"ed written report of an accredited pscholo!ist or
pschiatrist have proved to be too e$pensive for the parties. The adversel a8ect access to
(ustice o poor liti!ants. &t is also a fact that there are provinces where these e$perts are not
available. Thus, the Committee deemed it necessar to rela$ this strin!ent reGuirement
enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the e$amination of a part or parties b a pschiatrist
or clinical pscholo!ist and the presentation of pschiatric e$perts shall now be determined b the
court durin! the pre:trial conference.-0
But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunit to present professional and e$pert
opinions of pschiatrists tracin! the root cause, !ravit and incurabilit of a partTs alle!ed
pscholo!ical incapacit, then such e$pert opinion should be presented and, accordin!l, be
wei!hed b the court in decidin! whether to !rant a petition for nullit of marria!e.
&&&. +n petitionerTs pscholo!ical incapacit.
Comin! now to the main issue, we "nd the totalit of evidence adduced b respondent insu<cient
to prove that petitioner is pscholo!icall un"t to dischar!e the duties e$pected of him as a
husband, and more particularl, that he su8ered from such pscholo!ical incapacit as of the date
of the marria!e ei!hteen %,K' ears a!o. Accordin!l, we reverse the trial courtTs and the appellate
courtTs rulin!s declarin! the marria!e between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.
The intendment of the law has been to con"ne the application of Article /- to the most serious
cases of personalit disorders clearl demonstrative of an utter insensitivit or inabilit to !ive
meanin! and si!ni"cance to the marria!e.-, The pscholo!ical illness that must have acicted a
part at the inception of the marria!e should be a malad so !rave and permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to
assume.-D,avvphi,.6w^
&n this case, respondent failed to prove that petitionerTs 9defects9 were present at the time of the
celebration of their marria!e. #he merel cited that prior to their marria!e, she alread 5new that
petitioner would occasionall drin5 and !amble with his friends= but such statement, b itself, is
insu<cient to prove an pre:e$istin! pscholo!ical defect on the part of her husband. Neither did
the evidence adduced prove such 9defects9 to be incurable.
The evaluation of the two pschiatrists should have been the decisive evidence in determinin!
whether to declare the marria!e between the parties null and void. #adl, however, we are not
convinced that the opinions provided b these e$perts stren!thened respondentTs alle!ation of
pscholo!ical incapacit. The two e$perts provided diametricall contradictin! pscholo!ical
evaluations@ )r. +Wate testi"ed that petitionerTs behavior is a positive indication of a personalit
disorder,-/ while )r. +bra maintained that there is nothin! wron! with petitionerTs personalit.
Moreover, there appears to be !reater wei!ht in )r. +braTs opinion because, aside from anal6in!
the transcript of Ben(aminTs deposition similar to what )r. +Wate did, )r. +bra also too5 into
consideration the pscholo!ical evaluation report furnished b another pschiatrist in #outh Africa
who personall e$amined Ben(amin, as well as his %)r. +braTs' personal interview with Ben(aminTs
brothers.-E *o!icall, therefore, the balance tilts in favor of )r. +braTs "ndin!s.
*est it be misunderstood, we are not condonin! petitionerTs drin5in! and !amblin! problems, or
his violent outbursts a!ainst his wife. There is no valid e$cuse to (ustif such a behavior. Petitioner
must remember that he owes love, respect, and "delit to his spouse as much as the latter owes
the same to him. ?nfortunatel, this court "nds respondentTs testimon, as well as the totalit of
evidence presented b the respondent, to be too inadeGuate to declare him pscholo!icall un"t
pursuant to Article /-.
&t should be remembered that the presumption is alwas in favor of the validit of
marria!e. @emper praesumitur pro matrimonio.-F &n this case, the presumption has not been
ampl rebutted and must, perforce, prevail.
A3ERE2+RE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is >RANTE). The
November ,1, D00/ Amended )ecision and the )ecember ,/, D00E Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA:>.R. CL No. F..0/ are accordin!l RELER#E) and #ET A#&)E.
#+ +R)ERE).
ANTONIO E"UAR"O !. NACHURA
Associate 7ustice
AE C+NC?R@
CONSUELO 3NARES5SANTIAGO
Associate 7ustice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALESU
Associate 7ustice
MINITA V. CHICO5NAMARIO
Associate 7ustice
"IOS"A"O M. PERALTA
Associate 7ustice
A T T E # T A T & + N
& attest that the conclusions in the above )ecision were reached in consultation before the case
was assi!ned to the writer of the opinion of the CourtTs )ivision.
CONSUELO 3NARES5SANTIAGO
Associate 7ustice
Chairperson, Third )ivision
C E R T & 2 & C A T & + N
Pursuant to #ection ,/, Article L&&& of the Constitution and the )ivision Chairperson;s Attestation, &
certif that the conclusions in the above )ecision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assi!ned to the writer of the opinion of the CourtTs )ivision.
RE3NATO S. PUNO
Chief 7ustice
Foot,ot$s
U Additional member in lieu of Associate 7ustice Ma. Alicia Austria:Martine6 per #pecial
+rder No. -0D dated March D0, D00..
, Penned b Associate 7ustice Bienvenido *. Rees, with Associate 7ustices Rodri!o L. Cosico
and #er!io *. PestaWo, concurrin!= rollo, pp. 1K:K..
D Rollo, pp. ,,0:,,,.
/ &d. at /F:EF.
E Art. /- of the 2amil Code provides in full@
Article /-. A marria!e contracted b an part who, at the time of the celebration,
was pscholo!icall incapacitated to compl with the essential marital obli!ations of
marria!e, shall li5ewise be void even if such incapacit becomes manifest onl after
its solemni6ation. Bas amended b E$ecutive +rder No. DD1 dated 7ul ,1, ,.K1C
F T#N, )ecember 1, ,..E, mornin!, p. E.
- &d. at ,D.
1 &d. at ,1.
K &d. at ,E= E$hibit 9/.9
. &d. at ,/, ,F.
,0 &d. at D,:D/.
,, &d. at ,0.
,D Rollo, p. EK.
,/ &d. at /F.
,E T#N, 7anuar -, ,..F, pp. /, K:..
,F Rollo, p. /-.
,- &d. at /1.
,1 &d.
,K &d. at E0.
,. &d. at EE.
D0 &d. at E0.
D, &d.
DD &d. at /-.
D/ &d. at E0.
DE &d. at EK:E..
DF &d. at ED, E..
D- &d. at E..
D1 T#N, )ecember 1, ,..E, mornin!, pp. D/:DF.
DK &d. at D-.
D. T#N, Au!ust /,, ,..F, pp. F:D-.
/0 &d. at 1:..
/, Rollo, p. /K.
/D &d. at /..
// &d. at E,.
/E &d. at FE:FF.
/F &d. at ED.
/- &d. at /F:EF.
/1 &d. at EF.
/K &d. at E1:-F.
/. &d. at -E.
E0 >.R. No. ,,D0,., 7anuar E, ,..F, DE0 #CRA D0.
E, //F Phil. --E %,..1'.
ED Rollo, pp. K0:K,.
E/ )oc5eted as >.R. No. ,F0E1..
EE CA rollo, pp. ,..:D0D.
EF Rollo, pp. 1K:1..
E- #upra note ,.
E1 Pertinent portion of the CATs Amended )ecision dated November ,1, D00/ reads@
The fore!oin! considered and ta5in! a cue on the adoption $ $ $ of the 3onorable
7ustices of the #upreme Court of the new 9Rule +n )eclaration of Absolute Nullit of
Loid Marria!es and Annulment of Loidable Marria!es9 %A.M. No. 0D:,,:,0:#C' which
too5 e8ect on March ,F, D00/, this Court hereb REC+N#&)ER# itself and >RANT#
the motion for reconsideration "led b the herein petitioner:appellee on November
D., D000. ConseGuentl, respondent:appellantTs appeal is hereb )&#M&##E) and the
)EC&#&+N of the court below declarin! the marria!e between CARMEN M. LE*EV:
T&N> and BEN7AM&N >. T&N> null and void ab initio under Article /- of the 2amil
Code of the Philippines is hereb A22&RME).
A3ERE2+RE, in view thereof, we can not do an less but sustain the decision dated
D. Au!ust D00D of the court below in Civil Case No. CEB:,EKD- declarin! the
marria!e between petitioner:appellee Carmen Lele6:Tin! and respondent:appellant
Ben(amin >. Tin! void from the be!innin! under Article /-, 2amil Code %as
amended b E.+. No. DD1 dated ,1 7ul ,.K1'.
ConseGuentl, the )ecision of this Court promul!ated on +ctober ,., D000 is hereb
#ET A#&)E and a new one rendered A22&RM&N> the appealed )ecision of the Court a
Guo.
#+ +R)ERE). %&d. at KK:K..'
Republic of the
#upreme Court

THIR" "IVISION
ISI"RO A!LAMA,
Petitioner,
:$ersus :
REPU!LIC OF THE,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 18J29J
Present@
CARP&+ M+RA*E#,*hairperson,
BR&+N,
BER#AM&N,
ABA),U and
L&**ARAMA, 7R., 99.
Promul!ated@
Au!ust ,,, D0,0
$:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::$

" E C I S I O N

!ERSAMIN, J.>
Ahether a person ma brin! an action for the declaration of the absolute nullit of the
marria!e of his deceased brother solemni6ed under the re!ime of the old *i$il *ode is the le!al
issue to be determined in this appeal brou!ht b the petitioner whose action for that purpose has
been dismissed b the lower courts on the !round that he, not bein! a part in the assailed
marria!e, had no ri!ht to brin! the action.
A,t$%$0$,ts
+n , the petitioner "led in the Re!ional Trial Court %RTC' in Catain!an, a petition for the
declaration of the absolute nullit of the marria!e contracted on between his late brother
Cresenciano Abla6a and *eonila 3onato.B,C The case was doc5eted as #pecial Case No. ,,1
entitled &n ReJ !etition for 8ulli)cation of Marriage *ontract bet"een *resenciano Ablaza and
.eonila HonatoK &sidro Ablaza, petitioner.
The petitioner alle!ed that the marria!e between Cresenciano and *eonila had been
celebrated without a marria!e license, due to such license bein! issued onl on , thereb
renderin! the marria!e void ab initio for havin! been solemni6ed without a marria!e license. 3e
insisted that his bein! the survivin! brother of Cresenciano who had died without an issue
entitled him to one:half of the real properties acGuired b Cresenciano before his death, thereb
ma5in! him a real part in interest= and that an person, himself included, could impu!n the
validit of the marria!e between Cresenciano and *eonila at an time, even after the death of
Cresenciano, due to the marria!e bein! void ab initio.BDC

Ru/2,g o( t)$ RTC

+n , B/C the RTC dismissed the petition, statin!@
Considerin! the petition for annulment of marria!e "led, the Court hereb
resolved to )&#M&## the petition for the followin! reasons@ ,' petition is "led out of
time %action had lon! prescribed' and D' petitioner is not a part to the marria!e
%contracted between Cresenciano Abla6a and *eonila Nonato on and solemni6ed b
Rev. 2r. Eusebio B. Calolot'.

#+ +R)ERE).
The petitioner seasonabl "led a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied
the motion for reconsiderationon .


Ru/2,g o( t)$ Cou&t o( A**$#/s
The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals %CA', assi!nin! the lone error that@
The trial court erred in dismissin! the petition for bein! "led out of time and that the
petitioner is not a part to the marria!e.
&n its decision dated ,BEC however, the CA a<rmed the dismissal order of the RTC, thus@
Ahile an action to declare the nullit of a marria!e considered void from the
be!innin! does not prescribe, the law nonetheless reGuires that the same action
must be "led b the proper part, which in this case should be "led b an of the
parties to the marria!e. &n the instant case, the petition was "led b &sidro Abla6a, a
brother of the deceased:spouse, who is not a part to the marria!e contracted b
Cresenciano Abla6a and *eonila 3onato. The contention of petitioner:appellant that
he is considered a real part in interest under #ection D, Rule / of the ,..1 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as he stands to be bene"ted or in(ured b the (ud!ment in the suit,
is simpl misplaced. Actions for annulment of marria!e will not prosper if persons
other than those speci"ed in the law "le the case.
Certainl, a survivin! brother of the deceased spouse is not the proper part
to "le the sub(ect petition. More so that the survivin! wife, who stands to be
pre(udiced, was not even impleaded as a part to said case.
A3ERE2+RE, "ndin! no reversible error therefrom, the +rders now on appeal
are hereb A22&RME). Costs a!ainst the petitioner:appellant.
#+ +R)ERE).BFC
3ence, this appeal.
Issu$s
The petitioner raises the followin! issues@
&.
A3ET3ER +R N+T T3E )EC&#&+N +2 T3&# 3+N+RAB*E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# &N CA:
>.R. CL. N+. -.-KE A22&RM&N> T3E +R)ER +2 )&#M&##A* +2 T3E RE>&+NA* TR&A*
C+?RT, BRANC3 E. AT CATA&N>AN, &N #PEC&A* PR+CEE)&N> N+. ,,1 &# &N
ACC+R)ANCE A&T3 APP*&CAB*E *AA# AN) 7?R&#PR?)ENCE=
&&.
A3ET3ER +R N+T T3E )EC&#&+N +2 T3E 3+N+RAB*E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# &N CA:
>.R. CL N+. -.-KE %#3+?*)' BE RELER#E) BA#E) +N EHEC?T&LE +R)ER N+. D0.
AN) EH&#T&N> 7?R&#PR?)ENCE.

The issues, rephrased, boil down to whether the petitioner is a real part in interest in the
action to see5 the declaration of nullit of the marria!e of his deceased brother.
Ru/2,g
The petition is meritorious.

A $alid marria!e is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to !ive
rise to the mutual ri!hts, duties, and liabilities arisin! out of such relation. The law prescribes the
reGuisites of a valid marria!e. 3ence, the validit of a marria!e is tested accordin! to the law in
force at the time the marria!e is contracted.B-C As a !eneral rule, the nature of the marria!e
alread celebrated cannot be chan!ed b a subseGuent amendment of the !overnin! law. B1C To
illustrate, a marria!e between a stepbrother and a stepsister was void under the *i$il *ode, but is
not anmore prohibited under theFamil *ode= et, the intervenin! e8ectivit of the Famil
*ode does not a8ect the void nature of a marria!e between a stepbrother and a stepsister
solemni6ed under the re!ime of the *i$il *ode. The *i$il *ode marria!e remains void, considerin!
that the validit of a marria!e is !overned b the law in force at the time of the marria!e
ceremon.BKC
Before anthin! more, the Court has to clarif the impact to the issue posed herein of
Administrative Matter %A.M.' No. 0D:,,:,0:#C %Rule on Declaration of Absolute 8ullit of Boid
Marriages and Annulment of Boidable Marriages', which too5 e8ect on .
#ection D, para!raph %a', of A.M. No. 0D:,,:,0:#C e$plicitl provides the limitation that a
petition for declaration of absolute nullit of void marria!e ma be "led solel b the husband or
wife. #uch limitation demarcates a line to distin!uish between marria!es covered b the Famil
*ode and those solemni6ed under the re!ime of the *i$il *ode.B.C#peci"call, A.M. No. 0D:,,:,0:
#C e$tends onl to marria!es covered b the Famil *ode, which too5 e8ect on, but, bein! a
procedural rule that is prospective in application, is con"ned onl to proceedin!s
commenced after .B,0C
Based on *arlos $. @ando$al,B,,C the followin! actions for declaration of absolute nullit of
a marria!e are e$cepted from the limitation, to wit@
,. Those commenced before , the e8ectivit date of A.M. No. 0D:,,:,0:#C= and
D. Those "led $is2L2$is marria!es celebrated durin! the e8ectivit of the *i$il
*ode and, those celebrated under the re!ime of the Famil *ode prior to .
Considerin! that the marria!e between Cresenciano and *eonila was contracted on , the
applicable law was the old *i$il *ode, the law in e8ect at the time of the celebration of the
marria!e. 3ence, the rule on the e$clusivit of the parties to the marria!e as havin! the ri!ht to
initiate the action for declaration of nullit of the marria!e under A.M. No. 0D:,,:,0:#C had
absolutel no application to the petitioner.
The old and new *i$il *odes contain no provision on who can "le a petition to declare the
nullit of a marria!e, and when. Accordin!l, in 8i7al $. 4aadog,B,DC the children were allowed to
"le after the death of their father a petition for the declaration of the nullit of their fatherTs
marria!e to their stepmother contracted on )ecember ,,, ,.K- due to lac5 of a marria!e license.
There, the Court distin!uished between a void marria!e and a voidable one, and
e$plained ho" and "hen each mi!ht be impu!ned, thuswise@
7urisprudence under the *i$il *ode states that no (udicial decree is necessar
in order to establish the nullit of a marria!e. YA void marria!e does not reGuire a
(udicial decree to restore the parties to their ori!inal ri!hts or to ma5e the marria!e
void but thou!h no sentence of avoidance be absolutel necessar, et as well for
the sa5e of !ood order of societ as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is
e$pedient that the nullit of the marria!e should be ascertained and declared b the
decree of a court of competent (urisdiction.Z YU,0$& o&02,#&' %2&%u+st#,%$s, t)$
$H$%t o( # =o20 +#&&2#g$, so (#& #s %o,%$&,s t)$ %o,($&&2,g o( /$g#/ &2g)ts
u*o, t)$ *#&t2$s, 2s #s t)oug) ,o +#&&2#g$ )#0 $=$& t#E$, */#%$. A,0
t)$&$(o&$, -$2,g goo0 (o& ,o /$g#/ *u&*os$, 2ts 2,=#/202t' %#, -$
+#2,t#2,$0 2, #,' *&o%$$02,g 2, ?)2%) t)$ (#%t o( +#&&2#g$ +#' -$
+#t$&2#/, $2t)$& 02&$%t o& %o//#t$&#/, 2, #,' %2=2/ %ou&t -$t?$$, #,' *#&t2$s
#t #,' t2+$, ?)$t)$& -$(o&$ o& #(t$& t)$ 0$#t) o( $2t)$& o& -ot) t)$
)us-#,0 #,0 t)$ ?2($, #,0 u*o, +$&$ *&oo( o( t)$ (#%ts &$,0$&2,g su%)
+#&&2#g$ =o20, 2t ?2// -$ 02s&$g#&0$0 o& t&$#t$0 #s ,o,5$;2st$,t -' t)$
%ou&ts.Z It 2s ,ot /2E$ # =o20#-/$ +#&&2#g$ ?)2%) %#,,ot -$ %o//#t$&#//'
#tt#%E$0 $;%$*t 2, 02&$%t *&o%$$02,g 2,st2tut$0 0u&2,g t)$ /2($t2+$ o( t)$
*#&t2$s so t)#t o, t)$ 0$#t) o( $2t)$&, t)$ +#&&2#g$ %#,,ot -$ 2+*$#%)$0,
#,0 2s +#0$ goo0 a initio. But Article E0 of the Famil *ode e$pressl provides
that there must be a (udicial declaration of the nullit of a previous marria!e, thou!h
void, before a part can enter into a second marria!e and such absolute nullit can
be based onl on a "nal (ud!ment to that e8ect. Fo& t)$ s#+$ &$#so,, t)$ /#?
+#E$s $2t)$& t)$ #%t2o, o& 0$($,s$ (o& t)$ 0$%/#&#t2o, o( #-so/ut$ ,u//2t'
o( +#&&2#g$ 2+*&$s%&2*t2-/$. Co&o//#&2/', 2( t)$ 0$#t) o( $2t)$& *#&t' ?ou/0
$;t2,gu2s) t)$ %#us$ o( #%t2o, o& t)$ g&ou,0 (o& 0$($,s$, t)$, t)$ s#+$
%#,,ot -$ %o,s20$&$0 2+*&$s%&2*t2-/$.
3owever, other than for purposes of remarria!e, no (udicial action is necessar
to declare a marria!e an absolute nullit. 2or other purposes, such as but not limited
to determination of heirship, le!itimac or ille!itimac of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of propert re!ime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court
ma pass upon the validit of marria!e even in a suit not directl instituted to
Guestion the same so lon! as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is
without pre(udice to an issue that ma arise in the case. Ahen such need arises, a
"nal (ud!ment of declaration of nullit is necessar even if the purpose is other than
to remarr. The clause Yon the basis of a "nal (ud!ment declarin! such previous
marria!e voidZ in Article E0 of the Famil *ode connotes that such "nal (ud!ment
need not be obtained onl for purpose of remarria!e.B,/C
&t is clari"ed, however, that the absence of a provision in the old and new *i$il
*odes cannot be construed as !ivin! a license to (ust an person to brin! an action to declare the
absolute nullit of a marria!e. Accordin! to *arlos $. @ando$al,B,EC the plainti8 must still be the
part who stands to be bene"ted b the suit, or the part entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is
basic in procedural law that ever action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real
part in interest.B,FC Thus, onl the part who can demonstrate a Yproper interestZ can "le the
action.B,-C &nterest within the meanin! of the rule means material interest, or an interest in issue
to be a8ected b the decree or (ud!ment of the case, as distin!uished from mere curiosit about
the Guestion involved or a mere incidental interest. +ne havin! no material interest to protect
cannot invo5e the (urisdiction of the court as plainti8 in an action. Ahen the plainti8 is not the real
part in interest, the case is dismissible on the !round of lac5 of cause of action.B,1C
3ere, the petitioner alle!ed himself to be the late CresencianoTs brother and survivin! heir.
Assumin! that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in
the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversel a8ected b an (ud!ment in the suit. &ndeed, a
brother li5e the petitioner, albeit not a compulsor heir under the laws of succession, has the ri!ht
to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the conditions stated in Article ,00, and
Article ,00/ of the *i$il *ode, as follows@
Article ,00,. #hould brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance and the
brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
Article ,00/. &f there are no descendants, ascendants, ille!itimate children, or
a survivin! spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the followin! articles.
Pursuant to these provisions, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or ille!itimate
children of the deceasede:cludes collateral relatives li5e the petitioner from succeedin! to the
deceasedTs estate.B,KC Necessaril, therefore, the ri!ht of the petitioner to brin! the action hin!es
upon a prior determination of whether Cresenciano had an descendants, ascendants, or children
%le!itimate or ille!itimate', and of whether the petitioner was the late CresencianoTs survivin! heir.
#uch prior determination must be made b the trial court, for the inGuir thereon involves
Guestions of fact.
As can be seen, both the RTC and the CA erroneousl resolved the issue presented in this
case. Ae reverse their error, in order that the substantial ri!ht of the petitioner, if an, ma not be
pre(udiced.
Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead *eonila, who, as the late
CresencianoTs survivin! wife,B,.C stood to be bene"ted or pre(udiced b the nulli"cation of
her o"n marria!e. &t is relevant to observe, moreover, that not all marria!es celebrated under the
old *i$il *ode reGuired
a marria!e license for their validit=BD0C hence, her participation in this action is made all the more
necessar in order to shed li!ht on whether the marria!e had been celebrated without a marria!e
license and whether the marria!e mi!ht have been a marria!e e$cepted from the reGuirement of a
marria!e license. #he was trul an indispensable part who must be (oined herein@
$$$ under an and all conditions, BherC presence bein! a sine 3ua non for the
e$ercise of (udicial power. &t is precisel Ywhen an indispensable part is not before
the court BthatC the action should be dismissed.Z The absence of an indispensable
part renders all subseGuent actions of the court null and void for want of authorit
to act, not onl as to the absent parties but even as to those present.BD,C
Ae ta5e note, too, that the petitioner and *eonila were parties in C.A.:>.R. CL No. .,0DF
entitled Heirs of *resenciano Ablaza, namelJ .eonila G. Ablaza and .eila Ablaza 9asul $. @pouses
&sidro and *asilda Ablaza, an action to determine who between the parties were the le!al owners
of the propert involved therein. Apparentl, C.A.:>.R. CL No. .,0DF was decided on , and the
petitionerTs motion for reconsideration was denied on . As a defendant in that action, the petitioner
is reasonabl presumed to have 5nowled!e that the therein plainti8s, *eonila and *eila, were the
wife and dau!hter, respectivel, of the late Cresenciano. As such, *eila was another indispensable
part whose substantial ri!ht an (ud!ment in this action will de"nitel a8ect. The petitioner
should li5ewise implead *eila.
The omission to implead *eonila and *eila was not immediatel fatal to the present action,
however, considerin! that #ection ,,,BDDC Rule /, Rules of *ourt, states that neither mis(oinder nor
non:(oinder of parties is a !round for the dismissal of an action. The petitioner can still amend his
initiator pleadin! in order to implead her, for under the same rule, such amendment to implead
an indispensable part ma be made Yon motion of an part or on %the trial courtTs' own
initiative at an stage of the action and on such terms as are (ust.Z
IHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is !ranted.
Ae reverse and set aside the decision dated rendered b the Court of Appeals.
#pecial Case No. ,,1 entitled &n ReJ !etition for 8ulli)cation of Marriage *ontract bet"een
*resenciano Ablaza and .eonila HonatoK &sidro Ablaza, petitioner, is reinstated, and its records are
returned to the Re!ional Trial Court, Branch E., in Catain!an, Masbate, for further proceedin!s,
with instructions to "rst reGuire the petitioner to amend his initiator pleadin! in order to implead
*eonila 3onato and her dau!hter *eila Abla6a 7asul as parties:defendants= then to determine
whether the late Cresenciano Abla6a had an ascendants, descendants, or children %le!itimate or
ille!itimate' at the time of his death as well as whether the petitioner was the brother and
survivin! heir of the late Cresenciano Abla6a entitled to succeed to the estate of said deceased=
and thereafter to proceed accordin!l.
No costs of suit.
SO OR"ERE".
LUCAS P. !ERSAMIN
Associate 7ustice
IE CONCUR>
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate 7ustice
Chairperson
ARTURO ". !RION RO!ERTO A. A!A"
Associate 7ustice Associate 7ustice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, 1R.
Associate 7ustice
A T T E S T A T I O N
& attest that the conclusions in the above )ecision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assi!ned to the writer of the opinion of the CourtTs )ivision.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate
7ustice Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to #ection ,/, Article L&&& of the Constitution, and the )ivision ChairpersonTs
Attestation, & certif that the conclusions in the above )ecision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assi!ned to the writer of the opinion of the CourtTs )ivision.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief 7ustice

U Additional member per #pecial +rder No. KE/ dated .
B,C Rollo, pp. DE:D-.
BDC &d., p. ,E.
B/C &d., p. DD.
BEC Penned b Associate 7ustice Mariano C. )el Castillo %now a Member of this Court', with
Associate 7ustice Buenaventura 7. >uerrerro %retired' and Associate 7ustice Teodoro P. Re!ino
%retired' concurrin!= rollo, pp. ,K:D,.
BFC Rollo, pp. D0:D,.
B-C #ta. Maria 7r., !ersons and Famil Relations, D00E ed., p. ,0F= citin! @te"art $.
Bander$ort, /E A. LA. FDE, ,D #E 1/-, ,D *RA F0.
B1C &d. p. ,0-.
BKC &d, pp. ,0-:,01.
B.C &d.
B,0C ,nrico $s. Heirs of @ps. ,ulogio 4. Medinaceli and (rinidad *atli2Medinaceli, >.R. No.
,1/-,E, #eptember DK, D001, F/E #CRA E,K.
B,,C >.R. No. ,1..DD, , F1E #CRA ,,-.
B,DC >.R. No. ,//11K, , /DK #CRA ,DD.
B,/C At pp. ,/F:,/- %hi!hli!htin! provided for emphasis'.
B,EC @upra, note ,D.
B,FC Cco $. .imbaring, >.R. No. ,-,D.K, , EK, #CRA /EK.
B,-C Amor2*atalan $. *ourt of Appeals, >.R. No. ,-1,0., , F,E #CRA -01.
B,1C *arlos $. @ando$al, supra, note ,F= citin! Abella 9r. $. *i$il @er$ice *ommission, >.R. No.
,FDF1E, November ,1, D00E, EED #CRA F01.
B,KC #ee Heirs of &gnacio *onti $. *ourt of Appeals, >.R. No. ,,KE-E, , /00 #CRA /EF.
B,.C This action is entitled &n ReJ !etition for 8ulli)cation of Marriage *ontract bet"een
*resenciano Ablaza and .eonila HonatoK &sidro Ablaza, petitioner.
BD0C ?nder the old *i$il *ode, not all marria!es solemni6ed without a marria!e license were void
from the be!innin!. E$empt from the reGuirement of a marria!e license were marria!es of
e$ceptional character, as provided for from Article 1D to Article 1., old *i$il *ode, to wit@
Article 1D. &n case either of the contractin! parties is on the point of death or the female has
her habitual residence at a place more than "fteen 5ilometers distant from the municipal buildin!
and there is no communication b railroad or b provincial or local hi!hwas between the former
and the latter, the marria!e ma be solemni6ed without necessit of a marria!e license= but in
such cases the o<cial, priest, or minister solemni6in! it shall state in an a<davit made before the
local civil re!istrar or an person authori6ed b law to administer oaths that the marria!e was
performed in articulo mortis or at a place more than "fteen 5ilometers distant from the municipal
buildin! concerned, in which latter case he shall !ive the name of the barrio where the marria!e
was solemni6ed. The person who solemni6ed the marria!e shall also state, in either case, that he
too5 the necessar steps to ascertain the a!es and relationship of the contractin! parties and that
there was in his opinion no le!al impediment to the marria!e at the time that it was solemni6ed.
Article 1/. The ori!inal of the a<davit reGuired in the last precedin! article, to!ether with a
cop of the marria!e contract, shall be sent b the person solemni6in! the marria!e to the local
civil re!istrar of the municipalit where it was performed within the period of thirt das, after the
performance of the marria!e. The local civil re!istrar shall, however, before "lin! the papers,
reGuire the pament into the municipal treasur of the le!al fees reGuired in Article -F.
Article 1E. A marria!e in articulo mortis ma also be solemni6ed b the captain of a ship or
chief of an airplane durin! a voa!e, or b the commandin! o<cer of a militar unit, in the
absence of a chaplain, durin! war. The duties mentioned in the two precedin! articles shall be
complied with b the ship captain, airplane chief or commandin! o<cer.
Article 1F. Marria!es between 2ilipino citi6ens abroad ma be solemni6ed b consuls and
vice:consuls of the Republic of the . The duties of the local civil re!istrar and of a (ud!e or (ustice
of the peace or maor with re!ard to the celebration of marria!e shall be performed b such
consuls and vice:consuls.
Article 1-. No marria!e license shall be necessar when a man and a woman who have
attained the a!e of ma(orit and who, bein! unmarried, have lived to!ether as husband and wife
for at least "ve ears, desire to marr each other. The contractin! parties shall state the fore!oin!
facts in an a<davit before an person authori6ed b law to administer oaths. The o<cial, priest or
minister who solemni6ed the marria!e shall also state in an a<davit that he too5 steps to
ascertain the a!es and other Guali"cations of the contractin! parties and that he found no le!al
impediment to the marria!e.
Article 11. &n case two persons married in accordance with law desire to ratif their union in
conformit with the re!ulations, rites, or practices of an church, sect, or reli!ion it shall no lon!er
be necessar to compl with the reGuirements of Chapter , of this Title and an rati"cation made
shall merel be considered as a purel reli!ious ceremon.
Article 1K. Marria!es between Mohammedans or pa!ans who live in the non:Christian
provinces ma be performed in accordance with their customs, rites or practices. No marria!e
license or formal reGuisites shall be necessar. Nor shall the persons solemni6in! these marria!es
be obli!ed to compl with Article .D.
3owever, twent ears after approval of this Code, all marria!es performed between
Mohammedans or pa!ans shall be solemni6ed in accordance with the provisions of this Code. But
the President of the Philippines, upon recommendation of the #ecretar of the &nterior, ma at an
time before the e$piration of said period, b proclamation, ma5e an of said provisions applicable
to the Mohammedan and non:Christian inhabitants of an of the non:Christian provinces.
Article 1.. Mi$ed marria!es between a Christian male and a Mohammedan or pa!an female
shall be !overned b the !eneral provision of this Title and not b those of the last precedin!
article, but mi$ed marria!es between a Mohammedan or pa!an male and a Christian female ma
be performed under the provisions of the last precedin! article if so desired b the contractin!
parties, sub(ect, however, in the latter case to the provisions of the second para!raph of said
article.
BD,C Regner $. .ogarta, >.R. No. ,-K1E1, +ctober ,., D001, F/1 #CRA D11, DK.= citin! 4orlasa $.
!olistico, E1 Phil. /EF, /E1 %,.DF' and !eople $. Hon. Rodriguez, ,0- Phil. /DF, /D1 %,.F.'.
BDDC #ection ,,. Mis#oinder and non2#oinder of parties. J Neither mis(oinder nor non:(oinder of
parties is !round for dismissal of an action. Parties ma be dropped or added b order of the court
on motion of an part or on its own initiative at an sta!e of the action and on such terms as are
(ust. An claim a!ainst a mis(oined part ma be severed and proceeded with separatel. %,,a'
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
T3&R) )&L&#&+N
G.R. No. 1<J<22 O%to-$& 2, 2001
GRACE 1. GARCIA, #.E.#. GRACE 1. GARCIA5RECIO, petitioner,
vs.
RE"ERICO A. RECIO, respondents.
PANGANI!AN, J.>
A divorce obtained abroad b an alien ma be reco!ni6ed in our (urisdiction, provided such decree
is valid accordin! to the national law of the forei!ner. 3owever, the divorce decree and the
!overnin! personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. +ur courts
do not ta5e (udicial notice of forei!n laws and (ud!ment= hence, li5e an other facts, both the
divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alle!ed and proven accordin! to our law
on evidence.
T)$ C#s$
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule EF of the Rules of Court, see5in! to nullif the 7anuar
1, ,... )ecision, and the March DE, ,... +rderD of the Re!ional Trial Court of Cabanatuan Cit,
Branch DK, in Civil Case No. /0D-:A2. The assailed )ecision disposed as follows@
9A3ERE2+RE, this Court declares the marria!e between >race 7. >arcia and Rederic5 A.
Recio solemni6ed on 7anuar ,D, ,..E at Cabanatuan Cit as dissolved and both parties can
now remarr under e$istin! and applicable laws to an andIor both parties.9/
The assailed +rder denied reconsideration of the above:Guoted )ecision.
T)$ F#%ts
Rederic5 A. Recio, a 2ilipino, was married to Editha #amson, an Australian citi6en, in Malabon,
Ri6al, on March ,, ,.K1.E The lived to!ether as husband and wife in Australia. +n Ma ,K,
,.K.,F a decree of divorce, purportedl dissolvin! the marria!e, was issued b an Australian
famil court.
+n 7une D-, ,..D, respondent became an Australian citi6en, as shown b a 9Certi"cate of
Australian Citi6enship9 issued b the Australian !overnment.- Petitioner S a 2ilipina S and
respondent were married on 7anuar ,D, ,..E in +ur *ad of Perpetual 3elp Church in Cabanatuan
Cit.1 &n their application for a marria!e license, respondent was declared as 9sin!le9 and
92ilipino.9K
#tartin! +ctober DD, ,..F, petitioner and respondent lived separatel without prior (udicial
dissolution of their marria!e. Ahile the two were still in Australia, their con(u!al assets were
divided on Ma ,-, ,..-, in accordance with their #tatutor )eclarations secured in Australia..
+n March /, ,..K, petitioner "led a Complaint for )eclaration of Nullit of Marria!e,0 in the
court a 3uo, on the !round of bi!am S respondent alle!edl had a prior subsistin! marria!e at the
time he married her on 7anuar ,D, ,..E. #he claimed that she learned of respondent;s marria!e
to Editha #amson onl in November, ,..1.
&n his Answer, respondent averred that, as far bac5 as ,../, he had revealed to petitioner his prior
marria!e andits subseGuent dissolution.,, 3e contended that his "rst marria!e to an Australian
citi6en had been validl dissolved b a divorce decree obtained in Australian in ,.K.=,D thus, he
was le!all capacitated to marr petitioner in ,..E.,Nwphi,.nOt
+n 7ul 1, ,..K S or about "ve ears after the couple;s weddin! and while the suit for the
declaration of nullit was pendin! S respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a famil
court in #dne, Australia because the 9marria!e haBdC irretrievabl bro5en down.9,/
Respondent praed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the !round that it stated
no cause of action.,E The +<ce of the #olicitor >eneral a!reed with respondent.,F The court
mar5ed and admitted the documentar evidence of both parties.,- After the submitted their
respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.,1
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed )ecision and +rder.
Ru/2,g o( t)$ T&2#/ Cou&t
The trial court declared the marria!e dissolved on the !round that the divorce issued in Australia
was valid and reco!ni6ed in the Philippines. &t deemed the marria!e ended, but not on the basis of
an defect in an essential element of the marria!e= that is, respondentNs alleged lac% of legal
capacit to remarr. Rather, it based its )ecision on the divorce decree obtained b respondent.
The Australian divorce had ended the marria!e= thus, there was no more martial union to nullif or
annual.
3ence, this Petition.,K
Issu$s
Petitioner submits the followin! issues for our consideration@
9&
The trial court !ravel erred in "ndin! that the divorce decree obtained in Australia b the
respondent ipso facto terminated his "rst marria!e to Editha #amson thereb capacitatin!
him to contract a second marria!e with the petitioner.
9D
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturali6ed Australian, to present a certi"cate
of le!al capacit to marr constitutes absence of a substantial reGuisite voidin! the
petitioner; marria!e to the respondent.
9/
The trial court seriousl erred in the application of Art. D- of the 2amil Code in this case.
9E
The trial court patentl and !rievousl erred in disre!ardin! Arts. ,,, ,/, D,, /F, E0, FD and
F/ of the 2amil Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
9F
The trial court !ravel erred in pronouncin! that the divorce !ravel erred in pronouncin!
that the divorce decree obtained b the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the
parties to remarr, without "rst securin! a reco!nition of the (ud!ment !rantin! the divorce
decree before our courts.9,.
The Petition raises "ve issues, but for purposes of this )ecision, we shall concentrate on two
pivotal ones@ %,' whether the divorce between respondent and Editha #amson was proven, and %D'
whether respondent was proven to be le!all capacitated to marr petitioner. Because of our
rulin! on these two, there is no more necessit to ta5e up the rest.
T)$ Cou&tKs Ru/2,g
The Petition is partl meritorious.
F2&st Issu$>
Proving the "ivorce #et$een Respondent and %ditha &amson
Petitioner assails the trial court;s reco!nition of the divorce between respondent and Editha
#amson. Citin! Adong $. *heong @eng Gee,D0 petitioner ar!ues that the divorce decree, li5e an
other forei!n (ud!ment, ma be !iven reco!nition in this (urisdiction onl upon proof of the
e$istence of %,' the forei!n law allowin! absolute divorce and %D' the alle!ed divorce decree itself.
#he adds that respondent miserabl failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the "rst para!raph of Article D- of the 2amil Code, marria!es
solemni6ed abroad are !overned b the law of the place where the were celebrated %the le: loci
celebrationist'. &n e8ect, the Code reGuires the presentation of the forei!n law to show the
conformit of the marria!e in Guestion to the le!al reGuirements of the place where the marria!e
was performed.
At the outset, we la the followin! basic le!al principles as the ta5e:o8 points for our discussion.
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce= hence, our courts cannot !rant it.D, A
marria!e between two 2ilipinos cannot be dissolved even b a divorce obtained abroad, because of
Articles ,FDD and ,1D/ of the Civil Code.DE &n mi$ed marria!es involvin! a 2ilipino and a forei!ner,
Article D-DF of the 2amil Code allows the former to contract a subseGuent marria!e in case the
divorce is 9validl obtained abroad b the alien spouse capacitatin! him or her to remarr.9D- A
divorce obtained abroad b a couple, who are both aliens, ma be reco!ni6ed in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.D1
A comparison between marria!e and divorce, as far as pleadin! and proof are concerned, can be
made. Ban Dorn $. Romillo 9r. decrees that 9aliens ma obtain divorces abroad, which ma be
reco!ni6ed in the Philippines, provided the are valid accordin! to their national law.9DK Therefore,
before a forei!n divorce decree can be reco!ni6ed b our courts, the part pleadin! it must prove
the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformit to the forei!n law allowin! it.D. Presentation
solel of the divorce decree is insu<cient.
"ivorce as a 'uestion of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must "rst compl
with the re!istration reGuirements under Articles ,,, ,/ and FD of the 2amil Code. These articles
read as follows@
9ART. ,,. Ahere a marria!e license is reGuired, each of the contractin! parties shall "le
separatel a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil re!istrar which
shall specif the followin!@
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $
9%F' &f previousl married, how, when and where the previous marria!e was dissolved or
annulled=
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $
9ART. ,/. &n case either of the contractin! parties has been previousl married, the
applicant shall be reGuired to furnish, instead of the birth of baptismal certi"cate reGuired in
the last precedin! article, the death certi"cate of the deceased spouse or the (udicial
decree of annulment or declaration of nullit of his or her previous marria!e. $ $ $.
9ART. FD. The (ud!ment of annulment or of absolute nullit of the marria!e, the partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the deliver of the children;s
presumptive le!itimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil re!istr and re!istries of
propert= otherwise, the same shall not a8ect their persons.9
Respondent, on the other hand, ar!ues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document S a
written o<cial act of an Australian famil court. Therefore, it reGuires no further proof of its
authenticit and due e$ecution.
Respondent is !ettin! ahead of himself. Before a forei!n (ud!ment is !iven presumptive
evidentiar value, the document must "rst be presented and admitted in evidence./0 A divorce
obtained abroad is proven b the divorce decree itself. &ndeed the best evidence of a (ud!ment is
the (ud!ment itself./, The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an o<ciall
bod or tribunal of a forei!n countr./D
?nder #ections DE and DF of Rule ,/D, on the other hand, a writin! or document ma be proven as
a public or o<cial record of a forei!n countr b either %,' an o<cial publication or %D' a cop
thereof attested// b the o<cer havin! le!al custod of the document. &f the record is not 5ept in
the Philippines, such cop must be %a' accompanied b a certi"cate issued b the proper
diplomatic or consular o<cer in the Philippine forei!n service stationed in the forei!n countr in
which the record is 5ept and %b' authenticated b the seal of his o<ce./E
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha #amson appears to be an authentic one issued
b an Australian famil court./F 3owever, appearance is not su<cient= compliance with the
aforemetioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
2ortunatel for respondent;s cause, when the divorce decree of Ma ,K, ,.K. was submitted in
evidence, counsel for petitioner ob(ected, not to its admissibilit, but onl to the fact that it had
not been re!istered in the *ocal Civil Re!istr of Cabanatuan Cit./- The trial court ruled that it
was admissible, sub(ect to petitioner;s Guali"cation./13ence, it was admitted in evidence and
accorded wei!ht b the (ud!e. &ndeed, petitioner;s failure to ob(ect properl rendered the divorce
decree admissible as a written act of the 2amil Court of #dne, Australia./K
Compliance with the Guoted articles %,,, ,/ and FD' of the 2amil Code is not necessar=
respondent was no lon!er bound b Philippine personal laws after he acGuired Australian
citi6enship in ,..D./. Naturali6ation is the le!al act of adoptin! an alien and clothin! him with the
political and civil ri!hts belon!in! to a citi6en.E0 Naturali6ed citi6ens, freed from the protective
cloa5 of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. B becomin! an Australian,
respondent severed his alle!iance to the Philippines and the $inculum #uris that had tied him to
Philippine personal laws.
#urden of Proving Australian La$
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner,
because she is the part challen!in! the validit of a forei!n (ud!ment. 3e contends that
petitioner was satis"ed with the ori!inal of the divorce decree and was co!ni6ant of the marital
laws of Australia, because she had lived and wor5ed in that countr for Guite a lon! time. Besides,
the Australian divorce law is alle!edl 5nown b Philippine courts@ thus, (ud!es ma ta5e (udicial
notice of forei!n laws in the e$ercise of sound discretion.
Ae are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with 9the part who alle!es the e$istence of a fact
or thin! necessar in the prosecution or defense of an action.9E, &n civil cases, plainti8s have the
burden of provin! the material alle!ations of the complaint when those are denied b the answer=
and defendants have the burden of provin! the material alle!ations in their answer when the
introduce new matters.ED #ince the divorce was a defense raised b respondent, the burden of
provin! the pertinent Australian law validatin! it falls sGuarel upon him.
&t is well:settled in our (urisdiction that our courts cannot ta5e (udicial notice of forei!n laws.E/ *i5e
an other facts, the must be alle!ed and proved. Australian marital laws are not amon! those
matters that (ud!es are supposed to 5now b reason of their (udicial function.EE The power of
(udicial notice must be e$ercised with caution, and ever reasonable doubt upon the sub(ect
should be resolved in the ne!ative.
S$%o,0 Issu$>
Respondent(s Legal Capacit) to Remarr)
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insu<cient proof of the divorce, respondent was le!all
incapacitated to marr her in ,..E.
3ence, she concludes that their marria!e was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validl admitted in evidence,
adeGuatel established his le!al capacit to marr under Australian law.
Respondent;s contention is untenable. &n its strict le!al sense, di$orce means the le!al dissolution
of a lawful union for a cause arisin! after marria!e. But divorces are of di8erent tpes. The two
basic ones are %,' absolute divorce or a $inculo matrimonii and %D' limited divorce or a mensa et
thoro. The "rst 5ind terminates the marria!e, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in
full force.EF There is no showin! in the case at bar which tpe of divorce was procured b
respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutor decree S a conditional or provisional
(ud!ment of divorce. &t is in e8ect the same as a separation from bed and board, althou!h an
absolute divorce ma follow after the lapse of the prescribed period durin! which no reconciliation
is e8ected.E-
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court ma under some forei!n statutes and
practices, still restrict remarria!e. ?nder some other (urisdictions, remarria!e ma be limited b
statute= thus, the !uilt part in a divorce which was !ranted on the !round of adulter ma be
prohibited from remarrin! a!ain. The court ma allow a remarria!e onl after proof of !ood
behavior.E1
+n its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads@
9,. A part to a marria!e who marries a!ain before this decree becomes absolute %unless
the other part has died' commits the o8ence of bi!am.9EK
This Guotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained b respondent ma have been
restricted. &t did not absolutel establish his le!al capacit to remarr accordin! to his national law.
3ence, we "nd no basis for the rulin! of the trial court, which erroneousl assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent;s capacit to remarr despite the paucit of
evidence on this matter.
Ae also re(ect the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or
presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on #ection EK, Rule /.E. of the Rules of Court,
for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the le!al e8ects of the divorce decree
obtained under Australian laws.
&igni*cance of the Certi*cate of Legal Capacit)
Petitioner ar!ues that the certi"cate of le!al capacit reGuired b Article D, of the 2amil Code was
not submitted to!ether with the application for a marria!e license. Accordin! to her, its absence is
proof that respondent did not have le!al capacit to remarr.
Ae clarif. To repeat, the le!al capacit to contract marria!e is determined b the national law of
the part concerned. The certi"cate mentioned in Article D, of the 2amil Code would have been
su<cient to establish the le!al capacit of respondent, had he dul presented it in court. A dul
authenticated and admitted certi"cate is prima facie evidence of le!al capacit to marr on the
part of the alien applicant for a marria!e license.F0
As it is, however, there is absolutel no evidence that proves respondent;s le!al capacit to marr
petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that onl the followin! e$hibits were
presented before the lower court@ %,' for petitioner@ %a' E$hibit 9A9 S Complaint=F, %b' E$hibit 9B9 S
Certi"cate of Marria!e Between Rederic5 A. Recto %2ilipino:Australian' and >race 7. >arcia %2ilipino'
on 7anuar ,D, ,..E in Cabanatuan Cit, Nueva Eci(a=FD%c' E$hibit 9C9 S Certi"cate of Marria!e
Between Rederic5 A. Recio %2ilipino' and Editha ). #amson %Australian' on March ,, ,.K1 in
Malabon, Metro Manila=F/ %d' E$hibit 9)9 S +<ce of the Cit Re!istrar of Cabanatuan Cit
Certi"cation that no information of annulment between Rederic5 A. Recto and Editha ). #amson
was in its records=FE and %e' E$hibit 9E9 S Certi"cate of Australian Citi6enship of Rederic5 A.
Recto=FF %D' for respondent@ %E$hibit 9,9 S Amended Answer=F- %b' E$hibit 9#9 S 2amil *aw Act
,.1F )ecree Nisi of )issolution of Marria!e in the 2amil Court of Australia=F1 %c' E$hibit 9/9 S
Certi"cate of Australian Citi6enship of Rederic5 A. Recto=FK %d' E$hibit 9E9 S )ecree Nisi of
)issolution of Marria!e in the 2amil Court of Australia Certi"cate=F. and E$hibit 9F9 S #tatutor
)eclaration of the *e!al #eparation Between Rederic5 A. Recto and >race 7. >arcia Recio since
+ctober DD, ,..F.-0
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturali6ed
Australian citi6en, was le!all capacitated to marr petitioner on 7anuar ,D, ,..E. Ae a!ree with
petitioner;s contention that the court a 3uo erred in "ndin! that the divorce decree ipso facto
clothed respondent with the le!al capacit to remarr without reGuirin! him to adduce su<cient
evidence to show the Australian personal law !overnin! his status= or at the ver least, to prove
his le!al capacit to contract the second marria!e.
Neither can we !rant petitioner;s praer to declare her marria!e to respondent null and void on
the !round of bi!am. After all, it ma turn out that under Australian law, he was reall capacitated
to marr petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. 3ence, we believe that the most
(udicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if an, which show
petitioner;s le!al capacit to marr petitioner. 2ailin! in that, then the court a 3uo ma declare a
nullit of the parties; marria!e on the !round of bi!am, there bein! alread in evidence two
e$istin! marria!e certi"cates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro
Manila dated March ,, ,.K1 and the other, in Cabanatuan Cit dated 7anuar ,D, ,..E.
A3ERE2+RE, in the interest of orderl procedure and substantial (ustice, we R%+AN" the case to
the court a 3uo for the purpose of receivin! evidence which conclusivel show respondent;s le!al
capacit to marr petitioner= and failin! in that, of declarin! the parties; marria!e void on the
!round of bi!am, as above discussed. No costs.
#+ +R)ERE).
Melo, !uno, Bitug, and @ando$al2Gutierrez, 99., concur.
Foot,ot$s
, Penned b 7ud!e 2eliciano L. Buenaventura= rollo, pp. 1:..
D Rollo, p. ,0.
/ &bid, p. ..
E Rollo, p. /1.
F &bid., p. E1.
- &d., p. EE.
1 &d., p. /-.
K Anne$ 9&9= temporar rollo, p. ..
. The couple secured an Australian 9#tatutor )eclaration9 of their le!al separation and
division of con(u!al assets. @ee Anne$es 9/9 and 9E9 of Respondent;s Comment= rollo, p. EK.
,0 &d., pp. //:/F.
,, &d., p. /..
,D Amended Answer, p. D= rollo, p. /..
,/ &d., pp. 11:1K.
,E &d., p. E/.
,F Rollo, pp. EK:F,.
,- T#N, )ecember ,-, ,..K, pp. ,:K= records, pp. ,1D:,1..
,1 RTC +rder of )ecember ,-, ,..K= ibid., p. D0/.
,K The case was deemed submitted for decision on 7anuar ,,, D000, upon this Court;s
receipt of the Memorandum for petitioner, si!ned b Att. +livia Lelasco:7acoba. The
Memorandum for respondent, si!ned b Att. >loria L. >ome6 of >ome6 and Associates,
had been "led on )ecember ,0, ,....
,. Petitioner;s Memorandum, pp. K:.= rollo, pp. DED:DE/.
D0 E/ Phil. E/, E., March /, ,.DD.
D, Ruben 2. Balane, 92amil Courts and #i!ni"cant 7urisprudence in 2amil *aw,9 9ournal of
the &ntegrated 4ar of the !hilippines, ,st a Dnd Quarters, D00,, Lol. HHL&&, No. ,, p. DF.
DD 9ART. ,F. *aws relatin! to famil ri!hts and duties, or to the status, condition and le!al
capacit of persons are bindin! upon citi6ens of the Philippines, even thou!h livin! abroad.9
D/ 9ART. ,1. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments
shall be !overned b the laws of the countr in which the are e$ecuted.
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $
9Prohibitive laws concernin! persons, their acts or propert, and those which have
for their ob(ect public order, public polic and !ood customs shall not be rendered
ine8ective b laws or (ud!ments promul!ated, or b determinations or conventions
a!reed upon in a forei!n countr.9
DF (encha$es $. ,scano ,F #CRA /FF, /-D, November D., ,.-F= 4arretto Gonzalez $.
Gonzales, FK Phil. -1, 1,:1D, March 1, ,.//.
9Art. D-. All marria!es solemni6ed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the countr where the were solemni6ed, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this countr, e$cept those prohibited under Articles /F%,', %E', %F', and %-', /-, /1,
and /K. %1,a'.
9Ahere a marria!e between a 2ilipino citi6en and a forei!ner is validl celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validl obtained abroad b the alien spouse capacitatin! him or her to
remarr, the 2ilipino spouse shall have capacit to remarr under Philippine law.9 %As
amended b E+ DD1, prom. 7ul D1, ,.K1'.
D- *f. Ban Dorn $. Romillo 9r., ,/. #CRA ,/., ,E/:,EE, +ctober K, ,.KF= and !ilapil $. &ba2
@omera, ,1E #CRA -F/, --/, 7une /0, ,.K..,Nwphi,.nOt
D1 Ban Dorn $. Romillo 9r., supra.
DK &bid., p. ,E/.
D. 2or a detailed discussion of Ban Dorn, see #alon!a, !ri$ate &nternational .a", ,..F ed.
pp. D.F:/00.@ee also 7ose C. Litu!, *ompendium of *i$il .a" and 9urisprudence, ,../ ed.,
p. ,-=
/0 9#EC. ,.. *lasses of documents. S 2or the purpose of their presentation in evidence,
documents are either public or private.
9Public documents are@
9%a' The written o<cial acts, or records of the o<cial acts of the soverei!n authorit, o<cial
bodies and tribunals, and public o<cers, whether in the Philippines, or of a forei!n countr.
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $.9
/, Burr A. 7ones, *ommentaries on the .a" of ,$idence in *i$il *ases, Lol. &L, ,.D- ed., p.
/F,,= d/, Rule ,/0 of the Rules on Evidence provides that 9when the sub(ect of inGuir is
the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the ori!inal
document itself.9
/D 9#EC. ,.. *lasses of documents. O 2or the purpose of their presentation in evidence,
documents are either public or private.
Public documents are@
9%a' The written o<cial acts, or records of the o<cial acts of the soverei!n authorit, o<cial
bodies and tribunals, and public o<cers, whether in the Philippines, or of a forei!n countr.
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $.9
// 9#ec. DF. Ihat attestation of cop must state. S Ahenever a cop of a document or
record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance,
that the cop is a correct cop of the ori!inal, or a speci"c part thereof, as the case ma be.
The attestation must be under the o<cial seal of the attestin! o<cer, if there be an, or if
he be the cler5 of a court havin! a seal, under the seal of such court.9
/E 9#ec. DE. !roof of oEcial record. S The record of public documents referred to in
para!raph %a' of #ection ,., when admissible for an purpose, ma be evidenced b an
o<cial publication thereof or b a cop attested b the o<cer havin! the le!al custod of
the record, or b his deput, and accompanied, if the record is not 5ept in the Philippines,
with a certi"cate that such o<cer has the custod. &f the o<ce in which the record is 5ept is
in a forei!n countr, the certi"cate ma be made b a secretar of the embass or le!ation,
consul !eneral, consul, vice:consul, or consular a!ent or b an o<cer in the forei!n
service of the Philippines stationed in the forei!n countr in which the record is 5ept, and
authenticated b the seal of his o<ce.9
#ee also Asia$est .td. $. *ourt of Appeals, D.- #CRA F/., FF0:FF,, #eptember DF,
,..K= !aci)c Asia C$erseas @hipping *orp. $. 8ational .abor Relations *ommission, ,-,
#CRA ,DD, ,//:,/E, Ma -, ,.KK.
/F The transcript of steno!raphic notes states that the ori!inal copies of the divorce
decrees were presented in court %T#N, )ecember ,-, ,..K, p. F= records, p. ,1-', but onl
photocopies of the same documents were attached to the records %Records, &nde$ of
E$hibit, p. ,.'.
/- T#N, )ecember ,F, ,..K, p. 1= records, p. ,1K.
/1 T#N, )ecember ,-, ,..K, p. 1= records, p. ,1K.
/K !eople $. Gatco, .1 Phil. .E,, .EF, November DK, ,.FF= Marella $. Rees, ,D Phil. ,, /,
November ,0, ,.0K= !eople $. Diaz, D1, #CRA F0E, F,-, April ,K, ,..1= De la (orre $. *ourt
of Appeals, D.E #CRA ,.-, D0/:D0E, Au!ust ,E, ,..K, Maunlad @a$ings & .oan Asso., &nc.
$. *ourt of Appeals, >R No. ,,E.ED, November D1, D000, pp. K:..
/. Art. ,F, Civil Code.
E0 7oaGuin Bernas, (he 5<>P *onstitution of the Republic of the !hilippinesJ A
*ommentar, ,..- ed., p. F--.
E, Ricardo 7. 2rancisco, ,$idenceJ Rules of *ourt in the !hilippines, second edition, p. /KD.
ED &bid., p. /KE.
E/ Iild$alle @hipping *o., .td. $. *ourt of Appeals, >R No. ,,.-0D, +ctober F-, D000, p. 1.
EE 2rancisco, p. D., citin! De los Angeles $. *abahug, ,0- K/., )ecember D., ,.F..
EF D1E *9@, ,F:,1, d,.
E- &bid., p. -,,:-,/, d,-,.
E1 D1A *9@, -DF, d,-D.
EK Rollo, p. /-.
E. 9#EC. EK. ,+ect of foreign #udgments or )nal orders. S The e8ect of a (ud!ment or "nal
order of a tribunal of a forei!n countr, havin! (urisdiction to render the (ud!ment or "nal
order is as follows@
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $
9%b' &n case of a (ud!ment or "nal order a!ainst a person, the (ud!ment or "nal order
is presumptive evidence of a ri!ht as between the parties and their successors in
interest b a subseGuent title.
9&n either case, the (ud!ment or "nal order ma be repelled b evidence of a want of
(urisdiction, want of notice to the part, collusion, fraud, or clear mista5e of law or
fact.9
F0 &n passin!, we note that the absence of the said certi"cate is merel an irre!ularit in
complin! with the formal reGuirement for procurin! a marria!e license. ?nder Article E of
the 2amil Code, an irre!ularit will not a8ect the validit of a marria!e celebrated on the
basis of a marria!e license issued without that certi"cate. %Litu!, *ompendium, pp. ,D0:
,D-'= #empio:)i, Handboo% on the Famil *ode of the !hilippines, ,.1 reprint, p. ,1= Rufus
Rodri!ue6, (he Famil *ode of the !hilippines Annotated, ,..0 ed., p. ED= Melencio #ta.
Maria 7r., !ersons and Famil Relations .a", ,... ed., p. ,E-.'.
F, Records, pp. ,:/.
epublic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
#EC+N) )&L&#&+N
G.R. No. 172J20 1u,$ 20, 200<
IOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner,
vs.
MARIA CARMEN ". RO"RIGUEM, HON. 1U"GE 1OSEFINA GUEVARA5SALONGA, P&$s202,g
1u0g$ o( M#E#t2 RTC, !&#,%) 179, respondents.
6UISUM!ING, J.>
At the core of the present controvers are issues of %a' !rave abuse of discretion alle!edl
committed b public respondent and %b' lac5 of (urisdiction of the re!ional trial court, in matters
that sprin! from a divorce decree obtained abroad b petitioner.
&n this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner assails %a' the order, dated #eptember /0, ,...
of public respondent 7ud!e 7ose"na >uevara:#alon!a, Presidin! 7ud!e of Ma5ati Re!ional Trial
Court,D Branch ,E., in Civil Case No. .-:,/K. for declaration of nullit of marria!e, and %b' the
order/ dated March /,, D000 denin! his motion for reconsideration. The assailed orders partiall
set aside the trial courtTs order dismissin! Civil Case No. .-:,/K., for the purpose of resolvin!
issues relatin! to the propert settlement of the spouses and the custod of their children.
Petitioner Aolf!an! +. Roehr, a >erman citi6en and resident of >erman, married private
respondent Carmen Rodri!ue6, a 2ilipina, on )ecember ,,, ,.K0 in 3ambur!, >erman. Their
marria!e was subseGuentl rati"ed on 2ebruar ,E, ,.K, in Taasan, Ne!ros +riental.E +ut of
their union were born Carolnne and Ale$andra 4ristine on November ,K, ,.K, and +ctober DF,
,.K1, respectivel.
+n Au!ust DK, ,..-, private respondent "led a petitionF for declaration of nullit of marria!e
before the Re!ional Trial Court %RTC' of Ma5ati Cit. +n 2ebruar -, ,..1, petitioner "led a motion
to dismiss,- but it was denied b the trial court in its order1 dated Ma DK, ,..1.
+n 7une F, ,..1, petitioner "led a motion for reconsideration, but was also denied in an
orderK dated Au!ust ,/, ,..1. +n #eptember F, ,..1, petitioner "led a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals. +n November D1, ,..K, the appellate court denied the petition and
remanded the case to the RTC.
Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of 2irst &nstance of 3ambur!:
Blan5enese, promul!ated on )ecember ,-, ,..1.
The decree provides in part@
BTChe Court of 2irst &nstance, 3ambur!:Blan5enese, Branch F,/, has ruled throu!h 7ud!e
van Buiren of the Court of 2irst &nstance on the basis of the oral proceedin!s held on E Nov.
,..1@
The marria!e of the Parties contracted on ,, )ecember ,.K0 before the Civil Re!istrar of
3ambur!:Altona is hereb dissolved.
The parental custod for the children
Carolnne Roehr, born ,K November ,.K,
Ale$andra 4ristine Roehr, born on DF +ctober ,.K1
is !ranted to the father.
The liti!ation e$penses shall be assumed b the Parties..
&n view of said decree, petitioner "led a #econd Motion to )ismiss on Ma D0, ,... on the !round
that the trial court had no (urisdiction over the sub(ect matter of the action or suit as a decree of
divorce had alread been promul!ated dissolvin! the marria!e of petitioner and private
respondent.
+n 7ul ,E, ,..., 7ud!e >uevara:#alon!a issued an order !rantin! petitionerTs motion to dismiss.
Private respondent "led a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a praer that the case proceed
for the purpose of determinin! the issues of custod of children and the distribution of the
properties between petitioner and private respondent.
+n Au!ust ,K, ,..., an +pposition to the Motion for Partial Reconsideration was "led b the
petitioner on the !round that there is nothin! to be done anmore in the instant case as the
marital tie between petitioner Aolf!an! Roehr and respondent Ma. Carmen ). Rodri!ue6 had
alread been severed b the decree of divorce promul!ated b the Court of 2irst &nstance of
3ambur!, >erman on )ecember ,-, ,..1 and in view of the fact that said decree of divorce had
alread been reco!ni6ed b the RTC in its order of 7ul ,E, ,..., throu!h the implementation of
the mandate of Article D- of the 2amil Code,,0 endowin! the petitioner with the capacit to
remarr under the Philippine law.
+n #eptember /0, ,..., respondent (ud!e issued the assailed order partiall settin! aside her
order dated 7ul ,E, ,... for the purpose of tac5lin! the issues of propert relations of the spouses
as well as support and custod of their children. The pertinent portion of said order provides@
Actin! on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the +rder dated 7ul ,E, ,... "led b
petitioner thru counsel which was opposed b respondent and considerin! that the second
para!raph of Article D- of the 2amil Code was included as an amendment thru E$ecutive
+rder DD1, to avoid the absurd situation of a 2ilipino as bein! still married to his or her alien
spouse thou!h the latter is no lon!er married to the 2ilipino spouse because heIshe had
obtained a divorce abroad which is reco!ni6ed b hisIher national law, and considerin!
further the e+ects of the termination of the marriage under Article ?0 in relation to Article
6Q and 6= of the same *ode, "hich include the dissolution of the propert relations of the
spouses, and the support and custod of their children, the Crder dismissing this case is
partiall set aside "ith respect to these matters which ma be ventilated in this Court.
#+ +R)ERE).,, %Emphasis supplied.'
Petitioner "led a timel motion for reconsideration on +ctober ,., ,..., which was denied b
respondent (ud!e in an order dated March /,, D000.,D
Petitioner ascribes lac5 of (urisdiction of the trial court and !rave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent (ud!e. 3e cites as !rounds for his petition the followin!@
,. Partiall settin! aside the order dated 7ul ,E, ,... dismissin! the instant case is not
allowed b ,..1 Rules of Civil Procedure.,/
D. Respondent Maria Carmen Rodri!ue6 b her motion for Partial Reconsideration had
reco!ni6ed and admitted the )ivorce )ecision obtained b her e$:husband in 3ambur!,
>erman.,E
/. There is nothin! left to be tac5led b the 3onorable Court as there are no con(u!al assets
alle!ed in the Petition for Annulment of Marria!e and in the )ivorce petition, and the
custod of the children had alread been awarded to Petitioner Aolf!an! Roehr.,F
Pertinent in this case before us are the followin! issues@
,. Ahether or not respondent (ud!e !ravel abused her discretion in issuin! her order
dated #eptember /0, ,..., which partiall modi"ed her order dated 7ul ,E, ,...= and
D. Ahether or not respondent (ud!e !ravel abused her discretion when she assumed and
retained (urisdiction over the present case despite the fact that petitioner has alread
obtained a divorce decree from a >erman court.
+n the )rst issue, petitioner asserts that the assailed order of respondent (ud!e is completel
inconsistent with her previous order and is contrar to #ection /, Rule ,-, Rules of Civil Procedure,
which provides@
#ec. /. Resolution of motion : After the hearin!, the court ma dismiss the action or claim,
den the motion, or order the amendment of the pleadin!.
The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the !round relied
upon is not indubitable.
&n ever case, the resolution shall state clearl and distinctl the reasons therefor.
%Emphasis supplied.'
Petitioner avers that a courtTs action on a motion is limited to dismissin! the action or claim,
denin! the motion, or orderin! the amendment of the pleadin!.
Private respondent, on her part, ar!ues that the RTC can validl reconsider its order dated 7ul ,E,
,... because it had not et attained "nalit, !iven the timel "lin! of respondentTs motion for
reconsideration.
Pertinent to this issue is #ection / in relation to #ection 1, Rule /1 of the ,..1 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides@
#ec. /. Action upon motion for ne" trial or reconsideration.JThe trial court ma set aside
the (ud!ment or "nal order and !rant a new trial, upon such terms as ma be (ust, or ma
den the motion. &f the court "nds that e$cessive dama!es have been awarded or that the
#udgment or )nal order is contrar to the e$idence or la", it ma amend such #udgment or
)nal order accordingl.
#ec. 1. !artial ne" trial or reconsideration.J&f the !rounds for a motion under this Rule
appear to the court to a8ect the issues as to onl a part, or less than all of the matters in
controvers, or onl one, or less than all, of the parties to it, the court ma order a ne" trial
or grant reconsideration as to such issues if se$erable "ithout interfering "ith the
#udgment or )nal order upon the rest. %Emphasis supplied.'
&t is clear from the fore!oin! rules that a (ud!e can order a partial reconsideration of a case that
has not et attained "nalit. Considerin! that private respondent "led a motion for reconsideration
within the re!lementar period, the trial court;s decision of 7ul ,E, ,... can still be modi"ed.
Moreover, in @a7ado $. *ourt of Appeals,,-we held that the court could modif or alter a (ud!ment
even after the same has become e$ecutor whenever circumstances transpire renderin! its
decision un(ust and ineGuitable, as where certain facts and circumstances (ustifin! or reGuirin!
such modi"cation or alteration transpired after the (ud!ment has become "nal and
e$ecutor,1 and when it becomes imperative in the hi!her interest of (ustice or when supervenin!
events warrant it.,K &n our view, there are even more compellin! reasons to do so when, as in this
case, (ud!ment has not et attained "nalit.
Anent the second issue, petitioner claims that respondent (ud!e committed !rave abuse of
discretion when she partiall set aside her order dated 7ul ,E, ,..., despite the fact that
petitioner has alread obtained a divorce decree from the Court of 2irst &nstance of 3ambur!,
>erman.
&n Garcia $. Recio,,. Ban Dorn $. Romillo, 9r.,D0 and .lorente $. *ourt of Appeals,D, we consistentl
held that a divorce obtained abroad b an alien ma be reco!ni6ed in our (urisdiction, provided
such decree is valid accordin! to the national law of the forei!ner. Relevant to the present case
is !ilapil $. &ba2@omera,DD where this Court speci"call reco!ni6ed the validit of a divorce
obtained b a >erman citi6en in his countr, the 2ederal Republic of >erman. Ae held
in !ilapil that a forei!n divorce and its le!al e8ects ma be reco!ni6ed in the Philippines insofar as
respondent is concerned in view of the nationalit principle in our civil law on the status of
persons.
&n this case, the divorce decree issued b the >erman court dated )ecember ,-, ,..1 has not
been challen!ed b either of the parties. &n fact, save for the issue of parental custod, even the
trial court reco!ni6ed said decree to be valid and bindin!, thereb endowin! private respondent
the capacit to remarr. Thus, the present controvers mainl relates to the award of the custod
of their two children, Carolnne and Ale$andra 4ristine, to petitioner.
As a !eneral rule, divorce decrees obtained b forei!ners in other countries are reco!ni6able in our
(urisdiction, but the le!al e8ects thereof, e.g. on custod, care and support of the children, must
still be determined b our courts.D/ Before our courts can !ive the e8ect of res (udicata to a
forei!n (ud!ment, such as the award of custod to petitioner b the >erman court, it must be
shown that the parties opposed to the (ud!ment had been !iven ample opportunit to do so on
!rounds allowed under Rule /., #ection F0 of the Rules of Court %now Rule /., #ection EK, ,..1
Rules of Civil Procedure', to wit@
#EC. F0. ,+ect of foreign #udgments. : The e8ect of a (ud!ment of a tribunal of a forei!n
countr, havin! (urisdiction to pronounce the (ud!ment is as follows@
%a' &n case of a (ud!ment upon a speci"c thin!, the (ud!ment is conclusive upon the title to
the thin!=
%b' &n case of a (ud!ment a!ainst a person, the (ud!ment is presumptive evidence of a ri!ht
as between the parties and their successors in interest b a subseGuent title= but the
(ud!ment ma be repelled b evidence of a want of (urisdiction, want of notice to the part,
collusion, fraud, or clear mista5e of law or fact.
&t is essential that there should be an opportunit to challen!e the forei!n (ud!ment, in order for
the court in this (urisdiction to properl determine its e<cac. &n this (urisdiction, our Rules of Court
clearl provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distin!uished from actions in rem, a
forei!n (ud!ment merel constitutes prima facie evidence of the (ustness of the claim of a part
and, as such, is sub(ect to proof to the contrar.DE
&n the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was !iven the opportunit to
challen!e the (ud!ment of the >erman court so that there is basis for declarin! that (ud!ment
as res #udicata with re!ard to the ri!hts of petitioner to have parental custod of their two children.
The proceedin!s in the >erman court were summar. As to what was the e$tent of private
respondentTs participation in the proceedin!s in the >erman court, the records remain unclear. The
divorce decree itself states that neither has she commented on the proceedin!sDF nor has she
!iven her opinion to the #ocial #ervices +<ce.D- ?nli5e petitioner who was represented b two
lawers, private respondent had no counsel to assist her in said proceedin!s.D1 More importantl,
the divorce (ud!ment was issued to petitioner b virtue of the >erman Civil Code provision to the
e8ect that when a couple lived separatel for three ears, the marria!e is deemed irrefutabl
dissolved. The decree did not touch on the issue as to who the o8endin! spouse was. Absent an
"ndin! that private respondent is un"t to obtain custod of the children, the trial court was correct
in settin! the issue for hearin! to determine the issue of parental custod, care, support and
education mindful of the best interests of the children. This is in consonance with the provision in
the Child and Mouth Aelfare Code that the childTs welfare is alwas the paramount consideration in
all Guestions concernin! his care and custod. DK
+n the matter of propert relations, petitioner asserts that public respondent e$ceeded the bounds
of her (urisdiction when she claimed co!ni6ance of the issue concernin! propert relations
between petitioner and private respondent. Private respondent herself has admitted in Par. ,E of
her petition for declaration of nullit of marria!e dated Au!ust D-, ,..- "led with the RTC of
Ma5ati, sub(ect of this case, that@ 9BpCetitioner and respondent have not acGuired an con(u!al or
communit propert nor have the incurred an debts durin! their marria!e.9D. 3erein petitioner
did not contest this averment. Basic is the rule that a court shall !rant relief warranted b the
alle!ations and the proof./0 >iven the factual admission b the parties in their pleadin!s that
there is no propert to be accounted for, respondent (ud!e has no basis to assert (urisdiction in
this case to resolve a matter no lon!er deemed in controvers.
&n sum, we "nd that respondent (ud!e ma proceed to determine the issue re!ardin! the custod
of the two children born of the union between petitioner and private respondent. Private
respondent erred, however, in claimin! co!ni6ance to settle the matter of propert relations of the
parties, which is not at issue.
IHEREFORE, the orders of the Re!ional Trial Court of Ma5ati, Branch ,E., issued on #eptember
/0, ,... and March /,, D000 are AFFIRME" ?2t) MO"IFICATION. Ae hereb declare that the
trial court has (urisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has parental custod,
includin! the care, support and education of the children, namel Carolnne and Ale$andra
4ristine Roehr. *et the records of this case be remanded promptl to the trial court for continuation
of appropriate proceedin!s. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO OR"ERE".
4ellosillo, /*hairman1, and *alle#o, @r., 99., concur.
Austria2Martinez, 9., on o<cial leave.
Foot,ot$s
, Rollo, p. ,F.
D 7ud!e 7ose"na >uevara:#alon!a si!ned as E$ecutive 7ud!e.
/ Rollo, p. ,-.
E Records, pp. F:-.
F &d. at ,:E.
- &d. at ,.:DK.
1 &d. at ,E1.
K &d. at ,-F.
. Rollo, p. //.
,0 Art. D-. All marria!es solemni6ed outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in
force in the countr where the were solemni6ed, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this countr, e$cept those prohibited under Articles /F %,', %E', %F' and %-', /-, /1
and /K.
Ahere a marria!e between a 2ilipino citi6en and a forei!ner is validl celebrated and
a divorce is thereafter validl obtained abroad b the alien spouse capacitatin! him
or her to remarr, the 2ilipino spouse shall li5ewise have capacit to remarr under
Philippine law. %As amended b ,. C. 8o. ==P, dated 9ul 5P, 5<>P.'
,, @upra, note ,.
,D @upra, note /.
,/ Rollo, p. -.
,E &d. at K.
,F &bid.
,- >.R. No. ,0K//K, ,1 April D00,, /F- #CRA FE-, F-,.
,1 Da$id $. *ourt of Appeals, >.R. No. ,,FKD,, ,/ +ctober ,..., /,- #CRA 1,0, 1,..
,K !eople $. Gallo, >.R. No. ,DE1/-, D. #eptember ,..., /,F #CRA E-,, E-/.
,. >.R. No. ,/K/DD, D +ctober D00,, /-- #CRA E/1, EE1.
D0 No. *:-KE10, K +ctober ,.KF, ,/. #CRA ,/., ,E/.
D, >.R. No. ,DE/1,, D/ November D000, /EF #CRA F.D, -0,.
DD >.R. No. K0,,-, /0 7une ,.K., ,1E #CRA -F/, --/.
D/ .lorente $. *ourt of Appeals, supra at -0D.
DE !hilsec &n$estment *orporation $. *ourt of Appeals, >.R. No. ,0/E./, ,. 7une ,..1, D1E
#CRA ,0D, ,,0.
DF Rollo, p. F1.
D- &bid.
D1 &d. at FF:F-.
DK @agala2,slao $. *ourt of Appeals, >.R. No. ,,-11/, ,- 7anuar ,..1, D-- #CRA /,1, /D,,
citin! Art. K, P.). No. -0/, The Child and Mouth Aelfare Code:
Art. K. *hildRs Ielfare !aramount. : &n all Guestions re!ardin! the care, custod,
education and propert of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount
consideration.
D. Rollo, p. ,..
/0 9G @ummit Holdings, &nc. $. *ourt of Appeals, >.R. No. ,DED./, D0 November D000, /EF
#CRA ,E/, ,FE.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECON" "IVISION
G.R. No. 1886<8 No=$+-$& 7, 200J
MARIA RE!ECCA MAOAPUGA3 !A3OT, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORA!LE COURT OF APPEALS #,0 VICENTE MA"RIGAL !A3OT, respondents.
$:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::$
G.R. No. 16<979 No=$+-$& 7, 200J
MARIA RE!ECCA MAOAPUGA3 !A3OT, petitioner,
vs.
VICENTE MA"RIGAL !A3OT, respondent.
" E C I S I O N
VELASCO, 1R., J.>
T)$ C#s$
Before us are these two petitions interposed b petitioner Maria Rebecca Ma5apu!a Baot
impu!nin! certain issuances handed out b the Court of Appeals %CA' in CA:>.R. #P No. -K,K1.
&n the "rst, a petition for certiorari, under Rule -F and doc5eted as G.R. No.
1886<8, Rebecca assails and see5s to nullif the April /0, D00D ResolutionD of the CA, as
reiterated in another Resolution of #eptember D, D00D,/ !rantin! a writ of preliminar in(unction in
favor of private respondent Licente Madri!al Baot stavin! o8 the trial court;s !rant of
support pendente lite to Rebecca.
The second, a petition for review under Rule EF,E doc5eted G.R. No. 16<979, assails the March
DF, D00E )ecisionF of the CA, %,' dismissin! Civil Case No. 0,:0.E, a suit for declaration of
absolute nullit of marria!e with application for support commenced b Rebecca a!ainst Licente
before the Re!ional Trial Court %RTC' in Muntinlupa Cit= and %D' settin! aside certain orders and a
resolution issued b the RTC in the said case.
Per its Resolution of Au!ust ,,, D00E, the Court ordered the consolidation of both cases.
T)$ F#%ts
Licente and Rebecca were married on April D0, ,.1. in #anctuario de #an 7ose, >reenhills,
Mandaluon! Cit. +n its face, the Marria!e Certi"cate- identi"ed Rebecca, then D- ears old, to
be an American citi6en1 born in A!aWa, >uam, ?#A to Cesar Tanchion! Ma5apu!a, American, and
3elen Corn Ma5apu!a, American.
+n November D1, ,.KD in #an 2rancisco, California, Rebecca !ave birth to Marie 7osephine
Ale$andra or Ali$. 2rom then on, Licente and Rebecca;s marital relationship seemed to have
soured as the latter, sometime in ,..-, initiated divorce proceedin!s in the )ominican Republic.
Before the Court of the 2irst &nstance of the 7udicial )istrict of #anto )omin!o, Rebecca personall
appeared, while Licente was dul represented b counsel. +n 2ebruar DD, ,..-, the )ominican
court issuedC2=2/ "$%&$$ No. <62F96,K orderin! the dissolution of the couple;s marria!e and
9leavin! them to remarr after completin! the le!al reGuirements,9 but !ivin! them (oint custod
and !uardianship over Ali$. +ver a ear later, the same court would issue C2=2/ "$%&$$ No.
706F97,. settlin! the couple;s propert relations pursuant to an A!reement,0 the e$ecuted on
)ecember ,E, ,..-. #aid a!reement speci"call stated that the 9con(u!al propert which the
acGuired durin! their marria!e consistBsC onl of the real propert and all the improvements and
personal properties therein contained at F0D Acacia Avenue, Alaban!, Muntinlupa.9,,
Meanwhile, on March ,E, ,..-, or less than a month from the issuance of Civil )ecree No. /-DI.-,
Rebecca "led with the Ma5ati Cit RTC a petition,D dated 7anuar D-, ,..-, with attachments, for
declaration of nullit of marria!e, doc5eted as Civil Case No. .-:/1K. Rebecca, however, later
moved,/ and secured approval,E of the motion to withdraw the petition.
+n Ma D., ,..-, Rebecca e$ecuted an A<davit of Ac5nowled!ment,F statin! under oath that
she is an American citi6en= that, since ,../, she and Licente have been livin! separatel= and that
she is carrin! a child not of Licente.
+n March D,, D00,, Rebecca "led another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa Cit RTC, for
declaration of absolute nullit of marria!e,- on the !round of Licente;s alle!ed pscholo!ical
incapacit. )oc5eted as Civil Case No. 0,:0.E and entitled as Maria Rebecca Ma%apuga 4aot $.
Bicente Madrigal 4aot, the petition was eventuall raced to Branch DF- of the court. &n it,
Rebecca also sou!ht the dissolution of the con(u!al partnership of !ains with application for
support pendente lite for her and Ali$. Rebecca also praed that Licente be ordered to pa a
permanent monthl support for their dau!hter Ali$ in the amount of PhP DD0,000.
+n 7une K, D00,, Licente "led a Motion to )ismiss,1 on, inter alia, the !rounds of lac5 of cause of
action and that the petition is barred b the prior (ud!ment of divorce. Earlier, on 7une F, D00,,
Rebecca "led and moved for the allowance of her application for support pendente lite.
To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insistin! on her 2ilipino citi6enship, as
a<rmed b the )epartment of 7ustice %)+7', and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to spea5
of.
Meanwhile, Licente, who had in the interim contracted another marria!e, and Rebecca
commenced several criminal complaints a!ainst each other. #peci"call, Licente "led adulter and
per(ur complaints a!ainst Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other hand, char!ed Licente with bi!am
and concubina!e.
Ru/2,g o( t)$ RTC o, t)$ Mot2o, to "2s+2ss
#,0 Mot2o, (o& Su**o&t Pendente Lite
+n Au!ust K, D00,, the RTC issued an +rder,K denin! Licente;s motion to dismiss Civil Case No.
0,:0.E and !rantin! Rebecca;s application for support pendente lite, disposin! as follows@
Aherefore, premises considered, the Motion to )ismiss "led b the respondent is )EN&E).
Petitioner;s Application in #upport of the Motion for #upport Pendente *ite is hereb
>RANTE). Respondent is hereb ordered to remit the amount of TA+ 3?N)RE) AN)
TAENTM T3+?#AN) PE#+# %Php DD0,000.00' a month to Petitioner as support for the
duration of the proceedin!s relative to the instant Petition.
#+ +R)ERE).,.
The RTC declared, amon! other thin!s, that the divorce (ud!ment invo5ed b Licente as bar to the
petition for declaration of absolute nullit of marria!e is a matter of defense best ta5en up durin!
actual trial. As to the !rant of support pendente lite, the trial court held that a mere alle!ation of
adulter a!ainst Rebecca does not operate to preclude her from receivin! le!al support.
2ollowin! the denialD0 of his motion for reconsideration of the above Au!ust K, D00, RTC order,
Licente went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a praer for the issuance of a temporar
restrainin! order %TR+' andIor writ of preliminar in(unction.D, 3is petition was doc5eted as CA:
>.R. #P No. -K,K1.
G&#,t o( I&2t o( P&$/2+2,#&' I,Bu,%t2o, -' t)$ CA
+n 7anuar ., D00D, the CA issued the desired TR+.DD +n April /0, D00D, the appellate court
!ranted, via a Resolution, the issuance of a writ of preliminar in(unction, the decretal portion of
which reads@
&N L&EA +2 A** T3E 2+RE>+&N>, pendin! "nal resolution of the petition at bar, let the Arit
of Preliminar &n(unction be &##?E) in this case, en(oinin! the respondent court from
implementin! the assailed +mnibus +rder dated Au!ust K, D00, and the +rder dated
November D0, D00,, and from conductin! further proceedin!s in Civil Case No. 0,:0.E,
upon the postin! of an in(unction bond in the amount of PDF0,000.00.
#+ +R)ERE).D/
Rebecca movedDE but was denied reconsideration of the aforementioned April /0, D00D resolution.
&n the meantime, on Ma D0, D00D, the preliminar in(unctive writDF was issued. Rebecca also
moved for reconsideration of this issuance, but the CA, b Resolution dated #eptember D, D00D,
denied her motion.
The adverted CA resolutions of April /0, D00D and #eptember D, D00D are presentl bein! assailed
in Rebecca;s petition for certiorari, doc5eted under G.R. No. 1886<8.
Ru/2,g o( t)$ CA
Pendin! resolution of G.R. No. 1886<8, the CA, b a )ecision dated March DF, D00E, e8ectivel
dismissed Civil Case No. 0,:0.E, and set aside incidental orders the RTC issued in relation to the
case. The fallo of the presentl assailed CA )ecision reads@
&N L&EA +2 T3E 2+RE>+&N>, the petition is >RANTE). The +mnibus +rder dated Au!ust K,
D00, and the +rder dated November D0, D00, are RELER#E) and #ET A#&)E and a new
one entered )&#M&##&N> Civil Case No. 0,:0.E, for failure to state a cause of action. No
pronouncement as to costs.
#+ +R)ERE).D-
To the CA, the RTC ou!ht to have !ranted Licente;s motion to dismiss on the basis of the followin!
premises@
%,' As held in *hina Road and 4ridge *orporation $. *ourt of Appeals, the hpothetical:admission
rule applies in determinin! whether a complaint or petition states a cause of action.D1 Applin!
said rule in the li!ht of the essential elements of a cause of action, DK Rebecca had no cause of
action a!ainst Licente for declaration of nullit of marria!e.
%D' Rebecca no lon!er had a le!al ri!ht in this (urisdiction to have her marria!e with Licente
declared void, the union havin! previousl been dissolved on 2ebruar DD, ,..- b the forei!n
divorce decree she personall secured as an American citi6en. Pursuant to the second para!raph
of Article D- of the 2amil Code, such divorce restored Licente;s capacit to contract another
marria!e.
%/' Rebecca;s contention about the nullit of a divorce, she bein! a 2ilipino citi6en at the time the
forei!n divorce decree was rendered, was dubious. 3er alle!ation as to her alle!ed 2ilipino
citi6enship was also doubtful as it was not shown that her father, at the time of her birth, was still
a 2ilipino citi6en. The Certi"cation of Birth of Rebecca issued b the >overnment of >uam also did
not indicate the nationalit of her father.
%E' Rebecca was estopped from denin! her American citi6enship, havin! professed to have that
nationalit status and havin! made representations to that e8ect durin! momentous events of her
life, such as@ %a' durin! her marria!e= %b' when she applied for divorce= and %c' when she applied
for and eventuall secured an American passport on 7anuar ,K, ,..F, or a little over a ear before
she initiated the "rst but later withdrawn petition for nullit of her marria!e %Civil Case No. .-:/1K'
on March ,E, ,..-.
%F' Assumin! that she had dual citi6enship, bein! born of a purportedl 2ilipino father in >uam,
?#A which follows the #us soli principle, Rebecca;s representation and assertion about bein! an
American citi6en when she secured her forei!n divorce precluded her from denin! her citi6enship
and impu!nin! the validit of the divorce.
Rebecca seasonabl "led a motion for reconsideration of the above )ecision, but this recourse was
denied in the eGuall assailed 7une E, D00E Resolution.D. 3ence, Rebecca;s Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule EF, doc5eted under >.R. No. ,-/.1..
T)$ Issu$s
&n G.R. No. 1886<8, Rebecca raises four %E' assi!nments of errors as !rounds for the allowance
of her petition, all of which conver!ed on the proposition that the CA erred in en(oinin! the
implementation of the RTC;s orders which would have entitled her to support pendin! "nal
resolution of Civil Case No. 0,:0.E.
&n G.R. No. 16<979, Rebecca ur!es the reversal of the assailed CA decision submittin! as follows@
&
T3E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# >RALE*M ERRE) &N N+T MENT&+N&N> AN) N+T TA4&N> &NT+
C+N#&)ERAT&+N &N &T# APPREC&AT&+N +2 T3E 2ACT# T3E 2ACT +2 PET&T&+NER;# 2&*&P&N+
C&T&VEN#3&P A# CATE>+R&CA**M #TATE) AN) A**E>E) &N 3ER PET&T&+N BE2+RE T3E
C+?RT A Q?+.
&&
T3E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# >RALE*M ERRE) &N RE*M&N> +N*M +N ANNEHE# T+ T3E PET&T&+N
&N RE#+*L&N> T3E MATTER# BR+?>3T BE2+RE &T.
&&&
T3E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# >RALE*M ERRE) &N 2A&*&N> T+ C+N#&)ER T3AT RE#P+N)ENT &#
E#T+PPE) 2R+M C*A&M&N> T3AT 3&# MARR&A>E T+ PET&T&+NER 3A) A*REA)M BEEN
)&##+*LE) BM L&RT?E +2 3&# #?B#EQ?ENT AN) C+NC?RRENT ACT#.
&L
T3E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# >RALE*M ERRE) &N R?*&N> T3AT T3ERE AA# AB?#E +2
)&#CRET&+N +N T3E PART +2 T3E TR&A* C+?RT, M?C3 *E## A >RALE AB?#E./0
Ae shall "rst address the petition in >.R. No. ,-/.1., its outcome bein! determinative of the
success or failure of the petition in >.R. No. ,FF-/F.
Three le!al premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce obtained abroad b an
alien married to a Philippine national ma be reco!ni6ed in the Philippines, provided the decree of
divorce is valid accordin! to the national law of the forei!ner./, @econd, the rec5onin! point is not
the citi6enship of the divorcin! parties at birth or at the time of marria!e, but their citi6enship at
the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad. And third, an absolute divorce secured b a 2ilipino
married to another 2ilipino is contrar to our concept of public polic and moralit and shall not be
reco!ni6ed in this (urisdiction./D
>iven the fore!oin! perspective, the determinative issue tendered in >.R. No. ,FF-/F, i.e., the
propriet of the !rantin! of the motion to dismiss b the appellate court, resolves itself into the
Guestions of@ )rst, whether petitioner Rebecca was a 2ilipino citi6en at the time the divorce
(ud!ment was rendered in the )ominican Republic on 2ebruar DD, ,..-= and second, whether the
(ud!ment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its conseGuent le!al e8ects`
T)$ Cou&tKs Ru/2,g
The petition is bereft of merit.
R$-$%%# #, A+$&2%#, C2t2@$, 2, t)$ Pu&=2$? o( T)2s C#s$
There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained her divorce
from Licente, was an American citi6en and remains to be one, absent proof of an e8ective
repudiation of such citi6enship. The followin! are compellin! circumstances indicative of her
American citi6enship@ %,' she was born in A!aWa, >uam, ?#A= %D' the principle of #us soli is followed
in this American territor !rantin! American citi6enship to those who are born there= and %/' she
was, and ma still be, a holder of an American passport.//
And as aptl found b the CA, Rebecca had consistentl professed, asserted, and represented
herself as an American citi6en, particularl@ %,' durin! her marria!e as shown in the marria!e
certi"cate= %D' in the birth certi"cate of Ali$= and %/' when she secured the divorce from the
)ominican Republic. Mention ma be made of the A<davit of Ac5nowled!ment/E in which she
stated bein! an American citi6en.
&t is true that Rebecca had been issued b the Bureau of &mmi!ration %Bureau' of &denti"cation %&)'
Certi"cate No. RC .11K and a Philippine Passport. +n its face, &) Certi"cate No. RC .11K would
tend to show that she has indeed been reco!ni6ed as a 2ilipino citi6en. &t cannot be over:
emphasi6ed, however, that such reco!nition was !iven onl on 7une K, D000 upon the a<rmation
b the #ecretar of 7ustice of Rebecca;s reco!nition pursuant to the +rder of Reco!nition issued b
Bureau Associate Commissioner Ed!ar *. Mendo6a.
2or clarit, we reproduce in full the contents of &) Certi"cate No. RC .11K@
To Ahom &t Ma Concern@
This is to certif that UMAR&A REBECCA MA4AP?>AM BAM+TU whose photo!raph and
thumbprints are a<$ed hereto and partiall covered b the seal of this +<ce, and whose
other particulars are as follows@
Place of Birth@ >uam, ?#A )ate of Birth@ March F, ,.F/
#e$@ female Civil #tatus@ married Color of 3air@ brown
Color of Ees@ brown )istin!uishin! mar5s on face@ none
was : r e c o ! n i 6 e d : as a citi6en of the Philippines as per pursuant to Article &L, #ection
,, Para!raph / of the ,./F Constitution per order of Reco!nition 7B* .F:D,/ si!ned b
Associate Commissioner 7ose B. *ope6 dated +ctober -, ,..F, and dul a<rmed b
#ecretar of 7ustice Artemio >. TuGuero in his ,
st
&ndorsement dated 7une K, D000.
&ssued for identi"cation purposes onl. N+T LA*&) for travel purposes.
>iven under m hand and seal this ,,
th
da of +ctober, ,..F
%#>)' E)>AR *. MEN)+VA
A##+. C+MM&##&+NER
+<cial Receipt No. F./..KK
issued at Manila
dated +ct. ,0, ,..F for P D,000
2rom the te$t of &) Certi"cate No. RC .11K, the followin! material facts and dates ma be
deduced@ %,' Bureau Associate Commissioner 7ose B. *ope6 issued the +rder of Reco!nition
on O%to-$& 6, 1998= %D' the ,
st
&ndorsement of #ecretar of 7ustice Artemio >. TuGuero a<rmin!
Rebecca;s reco!nition as a 2ilipino citi6en was issued on 1u,$ J, 2000 or almost "ve ears from
the date of the order of reco!nition= and %/' &) Certi"cate No. RC .11K was purportedl issued
on O%to-$& 11, 1998after the pament of the PhP D,000 fee on +ctober ,0, ,..F per +R No.
F./..KK.
Ahat be!s the Guestion is, however, how the above certi"cate could have been issued b the
Bureau on +ctober ,,, ,..F when the #ecretar of 7ustice issued the reGuired a<rmation onl on
7une K, D000. No e$planation was !iven for this patent aberration. There seems to be no error with
the date of the issuance of the ,
st
&ndorsement b #ecretar of 7ustice TuGuero as this Court ta5es
(udicial notice that he was the #ecretar of 7ustice from 2ebruar ,-, D000 to 7anuar DD, D00,.
There is, thus, a stron! valid reason to conclude that the certi"cate in Guestion must be spurious.
?nder e$tant immi!ration rules, applications for reco!nition of 2ilipino citi6enship reGuire the
a<rmation b the )+7 of the +rder of Reco!nition issued b the Bureau. ?nder E$ecutive +rder
No. D.D, also 5nown as the 5<>P Administrati$e *ode, speci"call in its Title &&&, Chapter ,, #ec.
/%-', it is the )+7 which is tas5ed to 9provide immi!ration and naturali6ation re!ulator services
and2+*/$+$,t t)$ /#?s go=$&,2,g %2t2@$,s)2* and the admission and sta of aliens.9 Thus,
the con"rmation b the )+7 of an +rder of Reco!nition for 2ilipino citi6enship issued b the
Bureau is reGuired.
Pertinentl, Bureau *aw &nstruction No. RBR:..:00D/F on Reco!nition as a 2ilipino Citi6en clearl
provides@
The Bureau Bof &mmi!rationC throu!h its Records #ection shall automaticall furnish the
)epartment of 7ustice an o<cial cop of its +rder of Reco!nition within 1D das from its
date of approval b the wa of indorsement for con"rmation of the +rder b the #ecretar
of 7ustice pursuant to E$ecutive +rder No. D.D. No I0$,t2D%#t2o, C$&t2D%#t$ s)#// -$
2ssu$0 -$(o&$ t)$ 0#t$ o( %o,D&+#t2o, -' t)$ S$%&$t#&' o( 1ust2%$ and an
&denti"cation Certi"cate issued b the Bureau pursuant to an +rder of Reco!nition shall
prominentl indicate thereon the date of con"rmation b the #ecretar of 7ustice.
%Emphasis ours.'
Not lost on the Court is the acGuisition b Rebecca of her Philippine passport onl on 7une ,/,
D000, or "ve das after then #ecretar of 7ustice TuGuero issued the ,
st
&ndorsement con"rmin!
the order of reco!nition. &t ma be too much to attribute to coincidence this unusual seGuence of
close events which, to us, clearl su!!ests that prior to said a<rmation or con"rmation, Rebecca
was not et reco!ni6ed as a 2ilipino citi6en. The same seGuence would also impl that &)
Certi"cate No. RC .11K could not have been issued in ,..F, as Bureau *aw &nstruction No. RBR:..:
00D mandates that no identi"cation certi"cate shall be issued before the date of con"rmation b
the #ecretar of 7ustice. *o!icall, therefore, the a<rmation or con"rmation of Rebecca;s
reco!nition as a 2ilipino citi6en throu!h the ,
st
&ndorsement issued onl on 7une K, D000 b
#ecretar of 7ustice TuGuero corresponds to the eventual issuance of Rebecca;s passport a few
das later, or on 7une ,/, D000 to be e$act.
I)$, "2=o&%$ I#s G&#,t$0 R$-$%%#, S)$ I#s ,ot #
F2/2*2,o C2t2@$, #,0 I#s ,ot 3$t R$%og,2@$0 #s O,$
The Court can assume hpotheticall that Rebecca is now a 2ilipino citi6en. But from the fore!oin!
disGuisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was not et
reco!ni6ed as, a 2ilipino citi6en when she secured the 2ebruar DD, ,..- (ud!ment of divorce from
the )ominican Republic.
The Court notes and at this (uncture wishes to point out that Rebecca voluntaril withdrew her
ori!inal petition for declaration of nullit %Civil Case No. .-:/1K of the Ma5ati Cit RTC' obviousl
because she could not show proof of her alle!ed 2ilipino citi6enship then. &n fact, a perusal of that
petition shows that, while bearin! the date 7anuar D-, ,..-, it was onl "led with the RTC on
March ,E, ,..- or less than a month after Rebecca secured, on 2ebruar DD, ,..-, the forei!n
divorce decree in Guestion. ConseGuentl, there was no mention about said divorce in the petition.
#i!ni"cantl, the onl documents appended as anne$es to said ori!inal petition were@ the Licente:
Rebecca Marria!e Contract %Anne$ 9A9' and Birth Certi"cate of Ali$ %Anne$ 9B9'. &f indeed &)
Certi"cate No. RC .11K from the Bureau was trul issued on +ctober ,,, ,..F, is it not but lo!ical
to e$pect that this piece of document be appended to form part of the petition, the Guestion of her
citi6enship bein! crucial to her case`
As ma be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullit of marria!e under Civil Case No.
0,:0.E, li5e the withdrawn "rst petition, also did not have the &) Certi"cate from the Bureau as
attachment. Ahat were attached consisted of the followin! material documents@ Marria!e Contract
%Anne$ 9A9' and )ivorce )ecree. &t was onl throu!h her +pposition %To Respondent;s Motion to
)ismiss dated /, Ma D00,'/- did Rebecca attach as Anne$ 9C9 &) Certi"cate No. RC .11K.
At an rate, the CA was correct in holdin! that the RTC had su<cient basis to dismiss the petition
for declaration of absolute nullit of marria!e as said petition, ta5en to!ether with Licente;s
motion to dismiss and Rebecca;s opposition to motion, with their respective attachments, clearl
made out a case of lac5 of cause of action, which we will e$pound later.
V#/202t' o( "2=o&%$ "$%&$$
>oin! to the second core issue, we "nd Civil )ecree Nos. /-DI.- and E0-I.1 valid.
First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be reco!ni6ed, assumin!
for ar!ument that she was in fact later reco!ni6ed, as a 2ilipino citi6en, but represented herself in
public documents as an American citi6en. At the ver least, she chose, before, durin!, and shortl
after her divorce, her American citi6enship to !overn her marital relationship. @econd, she secured
personall said divorce as an American citi6en, as is evident in the te$t of the Civil )ecrees, which
pertinentl declared@
&N T3&# ACT&+N 2+R )&L+RCE in which the parties e$pressl submit to the (urisdiction of
this court, b reason of the e$istin! incompatibilit of temperaments $ $ $. The parties
MAR&A REBECCA M. BAM+T, o( U,2t$0 St#t$s ,#t2o,#/2t', ED ears of a!e, married,
domiciled and residin! at F0D Acacia Ave., Aala Alaban!, Muntin *upa, Philippines, $ $ $,
who *$&so,#//' #**$#&$0 -$(o&$ t)2s %ou&t, accompanied b )R. 7?AN E#TEBAN
+*&LER+, attorne, $ $ $ and L&CENTE MA)R&>A* BAM+T, of Philippine nationalit, of E/
ears of a!e, married and domiciled and residin! at F0D Acacia Ave., Aala Alaban!, Muntin
*upa, 2ilipino, appeared before this court represented b )R. A*E7AN)R+ T+RREN#,
attorne, $ $ $, revalidated b special power of attorne !iven the ,.
th
of 2ebruar of ,..-,
si!ned before the Notar Public Enrico *. Espanol of the Cit of Manila, dul le!ali6ed and
authori6in! him to subscribe all the acts concernin! this case./1 %Emphasis ours.'
(hird, bein! an American citi6en, Rebecca was bound b the national laws of the ?nited #tates of
America, a countr which allows divorce. Fourth, the propert relations of Licente and Rebecca
were properl ad(udicated throu!h their A!reement/K e$ecuted on )ecember ,E, ,..- after Civil
)ecree No. /-DI.- was rendered on 2ebruar DD, ,..-, and dul a<rmed b Civil )ecree No.
E0-I.1 issued on March E, ,..1. Leritabl, the forei!n divorce secured b Rebecca was valid.
To be sure, the Court has ta5en stoc5 of the holdin! in Garcia $. Recio that a forei!n divorce can be
reco!ni6ed here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national
law of the alien spouse./. Be this as it ma, the fact that Rebecca was clearl an American citi6en
when she secured the divorce and that divorce is reco!ni6ed and allowed in an of the #tates of
the ?nion,E0 the presentation of a cop of forei!n divorce decree 0u/' #ut)$,t2%#t$0 b the
forei!n court issuin! said decree is, as here, su<cient.
&t bears to stress that the e$istence of the divorce decree has not been denied, but in fact
admitted b both parties. And neither did the impeach the (urisdiction of the divorce court nor
challen!e the validit of its proceedin!s on the !round of collusion, fraud, or clear mista5e of fact
or law, albeit both appeared to have the opportunit to do so. The same holds true with respect to
the decree of partition of their con(u!al propert. As this Court e$plained in Roehr $. Rodriguez@
Before our courts can !ive the e8ect of res (udicata to a forei!n (ud!ment Bof divorceC $ $ $,
it must be shown that the parties opposed to the (ud!ment had been !iven ample
opportunit to do so on !rounds allowed under Rule /., #ection F0 of the Rules of Court
%now Rule /., #ection EK, ,..1 Rules of Civil Procedure', to wit@
#EC. F0. E8ect of forei!n (ud!ments.::The e8ect of a (ud!ment of a tribunal of a
forei!n countr, havin! (urisdiction to pronounce the (ud!ment is as follows@
%a' &n case of a (ud!ment upon a speci"c thin!, the (ud!ment is conclusive upon the
title to the thin!=
%b' &n case of a (ud!ment a!ainst a person, the (ud!ment is presumptive evidence of
a ri!ht as between the parties and their successors in interest b a subseGuent title=
but the (ud!ment ma be repelled b evidence of a want of (urisdiction, want of
notice to the part, collusion, fraud, or clear mista5e of law or fact.
&t is essential that there should be an opportunit to challen!e the forei!n (ud!ment, in
order for the court in this (urisdiction to properl determine its e<cac. &n this (urisdiction,
our Rules of Court clearl provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distin!uished
from actions in rem, a forei!n (ud!ment emerel constitutes prima facie evidence of the
(ustness of the claim of a part and, as such, is sub(ect to proof to the contrar.E,
As the records show, Rebecca, assisted b counsel, personall secured the forei!n divorce while
Licente was dul represented b his counsel, a certain )r. Ale(andro Torrens, in said proceedin!s.
As thin!s stand, the forei!n divorce decrees rendered and issued b the )ominican Republic court
are valid and, conseGuentl, bind both Rebecca and Licente.
2inall, the fact that Rebecca ma have been dul reco!ni6ed as a 2ilipino citi6en b force of the
7une K, D000 a<rmation b #ecretar of 7ustice TuGuero of the +ctober -, ,..F Bureau +rder of
Reco!nition will not, standin! alone, wor5 to nullif or invalidate the forei!n divorce secured b
Rebecca as an American citi6en on 2ebruar DD, ,..-. 2or as we stressed at the outset, in
determinin! whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the countr;s
polic a!ainst absolute divorce, the rec5onin! point is the citi6enship of the parties at the time a
valid divorce is obtained.ED
L$g#/ EH$%ts o( t)$ V#/20 "2=o&%$
>iven the validit and e<cac of divorce secured b Rebecca, the same shall be !iven a res
#udicatae8ect in this (urisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the
marital $inculumbetween Rebecca and Licente is considered severed= the are both freed from the
bond of matrimon. &n plain lan!ua!e, Licente and Rebecca are no lon!er husband and wife to
each other. As the divorce court formall pronounced@ 9BTChat the marria!e between MAR&A
REBECCA M. BAM+T and L&CENTE MA)R&>A* BAM+T is hereb 02sso/=$0 ; ; ; /$#=2,g t)$+ (&$$
to &$+#&&' #(t$& %o+*/$t2,g t)$ /$g#/ &$Au2&$+$,ts.9E/
ConseGuent to the dissolution of the marria!e, Licente could no lon!er be sub(ect to a husband;s
obli!ation under the Civil Code. 3e cannot, for instance, be obli!ed to live with, observe respect
and "delit, and render support to Rebecca.EE
The divorce decree in Guestion also brin!s into pla the second para!raph of Art. D- of the 2amil
Code, providin! as follows@
Art. D-. $ $ $ $
Ahere a marria!e between a 2ilipino citi6en and a forei!ner is validl celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validl obtained abroad b the alien spouse capacitatin! him or her to
remarr, the 2ilipino spouse shall li5ewise have capacit to remarr under Philippine law.
%As amended b ,.C. ==P'
&n Republic $. Crbecido &&&, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicabilit of the second
para!raph of Art. D-, thus@
$ $ $ BACe state the twin elements for the application of Para!raph D of Article D- as
follows@
,. There is a valid marria!e that has been celebrated between a 2ilipino citi6en and a
forei!ner= and
D. A valid divorce is obtained abroad b the alien spouse capacitatin! him or her to remarr.
The rec5onin! point is not the citi6enship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marria!e, but their citi6enship at the time a $alid di$orce is obtained abroad b the alien
spouse capacitatin! the latter to remarr.EF
Both elements obtain in the instant case. Ae need not belabor further the fact of marria!e of
Licente and Rebecca, their citi6enship when the wed, and their professed citi6enship durin! the
valid divorce proceedin!s.
Not to be overloo5ed of course is the fact that Civil )ecree No. E0-I.1 and the A!reement
e$ecuted on )ecember ,E, ,..- bind both Rebecca and Licente as re!ards their propert
relations. The A!reement provided that the e$:couple;s con(u!al propert consisted onl their
famil home, thus@
.. That the parties stipulate that the %o,Bug#/ *&o*$&t' ?)2%) t)$' #%Au2&$0 0u&2,g
t)$2& +#&&2#g$ %o,s2sts o,/' o( t)$ &$#/ *&o*$&t' and all the improvements and
personal properties therein contained at F0D Acacia Avenue, Aala Alaban!, Muntinlupa,
covered b TCT No. ,-K/0, dated 2eb. 1, ,..0 issued b the Re!ister of )eeds of Ma5ati,
Metro Manila re!istered in the name of Licente M. Baot, married to Rebecca M. Baot, $ $
$.E- %Emphasis ours.'
This propert settlement embodied in the A!reement was a<rmed b the divorce court which, per
its second divorce decree, Civil )ecree No. E0-I.1 dated March E, ,..1, ordered that, 9T3&R)@
That the a!reement entered into between the parties dated ,E
th
da of )ecember ,..- in Ma5ati
Cit, Philippines shall survive in this 7ud!ment of divorce b reference but not mer!ed and that the
parties are hereb ordered and directed to %o+*/' ?2t) $#%) #,0 $=$&' *&o=2s2o, o( s#20
#g&$$+$,t.9E1
Rebecca has not repudiated the propert settlement contained in the A!reement. #he is thus
estopped b her representation before the divorce court from assertin! that her and Licente;s
con(u!al propert was not limited to their famil home in Aala Alaban!.EK
No C#us$ o( A%t2o, 2, t)$ P$t2t2o, (o& Nu//2t' o( M#&&2#g$
?pon the fore!oin! disGuisitions, it is abundantl clear to the Court that Rebecca lac5s, under the
premises, cause of action. !hilippine 4an% of *ommunications $. (razo e$plains the concept and
elements of a cause of action, thus@
A cause of action is an act or omission of one part in violation of the le!al ri!ht of the
other. A motion to dismiss based on lac5 of cause of action hpotheticall admits the truth
of the alle!ations in the complaint. The alle!ations in a complaint are su<cient to
constitute a cause of action a!ainst the defendants if, hpotheticall admittin! the facts
alle!ed, the court can render a valid (ud!ment upon the same in accordance with the
praer therein. A cause of action e$ists if the followin! $/$+$,ts are present, namel@ %,' a
ri!ht in favor of the plainti8 b whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created= %D' an obli!ation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate
such ri!ht= and %/' an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the ri!ht of
the plainti8 or constitutin! a breach of the obli!ation of the defendant to the plainti8 for
which the latter ma maintain an action for recover of dama!es.E.
+ne thin! is clear from a perusal of Rebecca;s underlin! petition before the RTC, Licente;s motion
to dismiss and Rebecca;s opposition thereof, with the documentar evidence attached therein@ The
petitioner lac5s a cause of action for declaration of nullit of marria!e, a suit which presupposes
the e$istence of a marria!e.
To sustain a motion to dismiss for lac5 of cause of action, the movant must show that the claim for
relief does not e$ist rather than that a claim has been defectivel stated or is ambi!uous,
inde"nite, or uncertain.F0 Aith the valid forei!n divorce secured b Rebecca, there is no more
marital tie bindin! her to Licente. There is in "ne no more marria!e to be dissolved or nulli"ed.
The Court to be sure does not lose si!ht of the le!al obli!ation of Licente and Rebecca to support
the needs of their dau!hter, Ali$. The records do not clearl show how he had dischar!ed his dut,
albeit Rebecca alle!ed that the support !iven had been insu<cient. At an rate, we do note that
Ali$, havin! been born on November D1, ,.KD, reached the ma(orit a!e on November D1, D000,
or four months before her mother initiated her petition for declaration of nullit. #he would now be
D- ears old. 3ence, the issue of bac5 support, which alle!edl had been partl shouldered b
Rebecca, is best liti!ated in a separate civil action for reimbursement. &n this wa, the actual "!ure
for the support of Ali$ can be proved as well as the earnin! capacit of both Licente and Rebecca.
The trial court can thus determine what Licente owes, if an, considerin! that support includes
provisions until the child concerned shall have "nished her education.
?pon the fore!oin! considerations, the Court no lon!er need to delve into the issue tendered in
>.R. No. ,FF-/F, that is, Rebecca;s ri!ht to support pendente lite. As it were, her entitlement to
that 5ind of support hin!es on the tenabilit of her petition under Civil Case No. 0,:0.E for
declaration of nullit of marria!e. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 0,:0.E b the CA veritabl
removed an le!al anchora!e for, and e8ectivel mooted, the claim for support pendente lite.
IHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 1886<8 is hereb "ISMISSE" on the !round
of mootness, while the petition for review in G.R. No. 16<979 is hereb "ENIE" for lac5 of merit.
Accordin!l, the March DF, D00E )ecision and 7une E, D00E Resolution of the CA in CA:>.R. #P No.
-K,K1 are hereb AFFIRME". Costs a!ainst petitioner.
SO OR"ERE".
PRES!ITERO 1. VELASCO, 1R.
Associate 7ustice
AE C+NC?R@
LEONAR"O A. 6UISUM!ING
Associate 7ustice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate 7ustice
"ANTE O. TINGA
Associate 7ustice
ARTURO ". !RION
Associate 7ustice
ATTESTATION
& attest that the conclusions in the above )ecision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assi!ned to the writer of the opinion of the Court;s )ivision.
LEONAR"O A. 6UISUM!ING
Associate 7ustice
*hairperson
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
#EC+N) )&L&#&+N
G.R. No. 178226 F$-&u#&' 06, 2007
LUCIO MORIGO ' CACHO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
) E C & # & + N
6UISUM!ING, J.>
This petition for review on certiorari see5s to reverse the decision, dated +ctober D,, ,... of the
Court of Appeals in CA:>.R. CR No. D0100, which a<rmed the (ud!mentD dated Au!ust F, ,..- of
the Re!ional Trial Court %RTC' of Bohol, Branch E, in Criminal Case No. K-KK. The trial court found
herein petitioner *ucio Mori!o Cacho !uilt beond reasonable doubt of bi!am and sentenced
him to a prison term of seven %1' months ofprision correccional as minimum to si$ %-' ears and
one %,' da of prision maor as ma$imum. Also assailed in this petition is the resolution/ of the
appellate court, dated #eptember DF, D000, denin! Mori!oTs motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found b the court a 3uo, are as follows@
Appellant *ucio Mori!o and *ucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor
at Ta!bilaran Cit, Province of Bohol, for a period of four %E' ears %from ,.1E:,.1K'.
After school ear ,.11:1K, *ucio Mori!o and *ucia Barrete lost contact with each other.
&n ,.KE, *ucio Mori!o was surprised to receive a card from *ucia Barrete from #in!apore.
The former replied and after an e$chan!e of letters, the became sweethearts.
&n ,.K-, *ucia returned to the Philippines but left a!ain for Canada to wor5 there. Ahile in
Canada, the maintained constant communication.
&n ,..0, *ucia came bac5 to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to (oin her in
Canada. Both a!reed to !et married, thus the were married on Au!ust /0, ,..0 at
the &glesia de Filipina 8acional at Cata!daan, Pilar, Bohol.
+n #eptember K, ,..0, *ucia reported bac5 to her wor5 in Canada leavin! appellant *ucio
behind.
+n Au!ust ,., ,..,, *ucia "led with the +ntario Court %>eneral )ivision' a petition for
divorce a!ainst appellant which was !ranted b the court on 7anuar ,1, ,..D and to ta5e
e8ect on 2ebruar ,1, ,..D.
+n +ctober E, ,..D, appellant *ucio Mori!o married Maria 7ececha *umba!oE at the Birgen
sa 4aranga !arish, Ta!bilaran Cit, Bohol.
+n #eptember D,, ,../, accused "led a complaint for (udicial declaration of nullit of
marria!e in the Re!ional Trial Court of Bohol, doc5eted as Civil Case No. -0D0. The
complaint see5 %sic' amon! others, the declaration of nullit of accusedTs marria!e with
*ucia, on the !round that no marria!e ceremon actuall too5 place.
+n +ctober ,., ,../, appellant was char!ed with Bi!am in an &nformationF "led b the
Cit Prosecutor of Ta!bilaran BCitC, with the Re!ional Trial Court of Bohol.-
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arrai!nment on the !round that the civil case for
(udicial nulli"cation of his marria!e with *ucia posed a pre(udicial Guestion in the bi!am case. 3is
motion was !ranted, but subseGuentl denied upon motion for reconsideration b the prosecution.
Ahen arrai!ned in the bi!am case, which was doc5eted as Criminal Case No. K-KK, herein
petitioner pleaded not !uilt to the char!e. Trial thereafter ensued.
+n Au!ust F, ,..-, the RTC of Bohol handed down its (ud!ment in Criminal Case No. K-KK, as
follows@
A3ERE2+RE, fore!oin! premises considered, the Court "nds accused *ucio Mori!o Cacho
!uilt beond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bi!am and sentences him to su8er the
penalt of imprisonment ran!in! from #even %1' Months of !rision *orreccional as minimum
to #i$ %-' Mears and +ne %,' )a of!rision Maor as ma$imum.
#+ +R)ERE).1
&n convictin! herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitionerTs claim that his "rst marria!e
to *ucia was null and void ab initio. 2ollowin! Domingo $. *ourt of Appeals,K the trial court ruled
that want of a valid marria!e ceremon is not a defense in a char!e of bi!am. The parties to a
marria!e should not be allowed to assume that their marria!e is void even if such be the fact but
must "rst secure a (udicial declaration of the nullit of their marria!e before the can be allowed to
marr a!ain.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained b *ucia, the trial court cited Ramirez $. Gmur,. which held
that the court of a countr in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both
spouses ma resort merel for the purpose of obtainin! a divorce, has no (urisdiction to determine
the matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a divorce !ranted b said court is not entitled to
reco!nition anwhere. )ebun5in! *ucioTs defense of !ood faith in contractin! the second
marria!e, the trial court stressed that followin! !eople $. 4itdu,,0 everone is presumed to 5now
the law, and the fact that one does not 5now that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not
e$empt him from the conseGuences thereof.
#easonabl, petitioner "led an appeal with the Court of Appeals, doc5eted as CA:>.R. CR No.
D0100.
Meanwhile, on +ctober D/, ,..1, or while CA:>.R. CR No. D0100 was pendin! before the appellate
court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. -0D0 declarin! the marria!e between
*ucio and *ucia void ab initio since no marria!e ceremon actuall too5 place. No appeal was
ta5en from this decision, which then became "nal and e$ecutor.
+n +ctober D,, ,..., the appellate court decided CA:>.R. CR No. D0100 as follows@
A3ERE2+RE, "ndin! no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereb A22&RME) in
toto.
#+ +R)ERE).,,
&n a<rmin! the assailed (ud!ment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the subseGuent
declaration of nullit of *ucioTs marria!e to *ucia in Civil Case No. -0D0 could not acGuit *ucio. The
reason is that what is sou!ht to be punished b Article /E.,D of the Revised Penal Code is the act
of contractin! a second marria!e before the "rst marria!e had been dissolved. 3ence, the CA held,
the fact that the "rst marria!e was void from the be!innin! is not a valid defense in a bi!am
case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained b *ucia from the Canadian
court could not be accorded validit in the Philippines, pursuant to Article ,F,/ of the Civil Code
and !iven the fact that it is contrar to public polic in this (urisdiction. ?nder Article ,1,E of the
Civil Code, a declaration of public polic cannot be rendered ine8ectual b a (ud!ment
promul!ated in a forei!n (urisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate courtTs decision, contendin! that the doctrine
in Mendiola $. !eople,,F allows mista5e upon a di<cult Guestion of law %such as the e8ect of a
forei!n divorce decree' to be a basis for !ood faith.
+n #eptember DF, D000, the appellate court denied the motion for lac5 of merit. ,- 3owever, the
denial was b a split vote. The ponente of the appellate courtTs ori!inal decision in CA:>.R. CR No.
D0100, 7ustice Eu!enio #. *abitoria, (oined in the opinion prepared b 7ustice Bernardo P. Abesamis.
The dissent observed that as the "rst marria!e was validl declared void ab initio, then there was
no "rst marria!e to spea5 of. #ince the date of the nullit retroacts to the date of the "rst marria!e
and since herein petitioner was, in the ees of the law, never married, he cannot be convicted
beond reasonable doubt of bi!am.
The present petition raises the followin! issues for our resolution@
A.
A3ET3ER +R N+T T3E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# ERRE) &N 2A&*&N> T+ APP*M T3E R?*E T3AT &N
CR&ME# PENA*&VE) ?N)ER T3E REL&#E) PENA* C+)E, CR&M&NA* &NTENT &# AN
&N)&#PEN#AB*E REQ?&#&TE. C+R+**AR&*M, A3ET3ER +R N+T T3E C+?RT +2 APPEA*#
ERRE) &N 2A&*&N> T+ APPREC&ATE BT3EC PET&T&+NERT# *AC4 +2 CR&M&NA* &NTENT A3EN 3E
C+NTRACTE) T3E #EC+N) MARR&A>E.
B.
A3ET3ER +R N+T T3E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# ERRE) &N 3+*)&N> T3AT T3E R?*&N> &N
PE+P*E L#. B&T)? %FK P3&*. K,1' &# APP*&CAB*E T+ T3E CA#E AT BAR.
C.
A3ET3ER +R N+T T3E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# ERRE) &N 2A&*&N> T+ APP*M T3E R?*E T3AT
EAC3 AN) ELERM C&RC?M#TANCE 2AL+R&N> T3E &NN+CENCE +2 T3E ACC?#E) M?#T BE
TA4EN &NT+ ACC+?NT.,1
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bi!am and if so,
whether his defense of !ood faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relin! in !ood faith upon the divorce
decree of the +ntario court. 3e hi!hli!hts the fact that he contracted the second marria!e openl
and publicl, which a person intent upon bi!am would not be doin!. The petitioner further ar!ues
that his lac5 of criminal intent is material to a conviction or acGuittal in the instant case. The crime
of bi!am, (ust li5e other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and
hence, !ood faith and lac5 of criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. 3e stresses that
there is a di8erence between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act.
3ence, it does not necessaril follow that his intention to contract a second marria!e is
tantamount to an intent to commit bi!am.
2or the respondent, the +<ce of the #olicitor >eneral %+#>' submits that !ood faith in the instant
case is a convenient but Rims e$cuse. The #olicitor >eneral relies upon our rulin! in Marbella2
4obis $. 4obis,,K which held that bi!am can be successfull prosecuted provided all the elements
concur, stressin! that under Article E0,. of the 2amil Code, a (udicial declaration of nullit is a
must before a part ma re:marr. Ahether or not the petitioner was aware of said Article E0 is of
no account as everone is presumed to 5now the law. The +#> counters that petitionerTs
contention that he was in !ood faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the +ntario court
is ne!ated b his act of "lin! Civil Case No. -0D0, see5in! a (udicial declaration of nullit of his
marria!e to *ucia.
Before we delve into petitionerTs defense of !ood faith and lac5 of criminal intent, we must "rst
determine whether all the elements of bi!am are present in this case. &n Marbella24obis $.
4obis,D0 we laid down the elements of bi!am thus@
%,' the o8ender has been le!all married=
%D' the "rst marria!e has not been le!all dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse has not been (udiciall declared presumptivel dead=
%/' he contracts a subseGuent marria!e= and
%E' the subseGuent marria!e would have been valid had it not been for the e$istence of the
"rst.
Applin! the fore!oin! test to the instant case, we note that durin! the pendenc of CA:>.R. CR
No. D0100, the RTC of Bohol Branch ,, handed down the followin! decision in Civil Case No. -0D0,
to wit@
A3ERE2+RE, premises considered, (ud!ment is hereb rendered decreein! the annulment
of the marria!e entered into b petitioner *ucio Mori!o and *ucia Barrete on Au!ust D/,
,..0 in Pilar, Bohol and further directin! the *ocal Civil Re!istrar of Pilar, Bohol to e8ect the
cancellation of the marria!e contract.
#+ +R)ERE).D,
The trial court found that there was no actual marria!e ceremon performed between *ucio and
*ucia b a solemni6in! o<cer. &nstead, what transpired was a mere si!nin! of the marria!e
contract b the two, without the presence of a solemni6in! o<cer. The trial court thus held that
the marria!e is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles /DD and ED/ of the 2amil Code. As the
dissentin! opinion in CA:>.R. CR No. D0100, correctl puts it, 9This simpl means that there was no
marria!e to be!in with= and that such declaration of nullit retroacts to the date of the "rst
marria!e. &n other words, for all intents and purposes, rec5oned from the date of the declaration of
the "rst marria!e as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the "rst marria!e, the accused
was, under the ees of the law, never married.9DE The records show that no appeal was ta5en
from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. -0D0, hence, the decision had lon! become
"nal and e$ecutor.
The "rst element of bi!am as a crime reGuires that the accused must have been le!all married.
But in this case, le!all spea5in!, the petitioner was never married to *ucia Barrete. Thus, there is
no "rst marria!e to spea5 of. ?nder the principle of retroactivit of a marria!e bein! declared
void ab initio, the two were never married 9from the be!innin!.9 The contract of marria!e is null= it
bears no le!al e8ect. Ta5in! this ar!ument to its lo!ical conclusion, for le!al purposes, petitioner
was not married to *ucia at the time he contracted the marria!e with Maria 7ececha. The e$istence
and the validit of the "rst marria!e bein! an essential element of the crime of bi!am, it is but
lo!ical that a conviction for said o8ense cannot be sustained where there is no "rst marria!e to
spea5 of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acGuitted of the instant char!e.
The present case is analo!ous to, but must be distin!uished from Mercado $. (an.DF &n the latter
case, the (udicial declaration of nullit of the "rst marria!e was li5ewise obtained after the second
marria!e was alread celebrated. Ae held therein that@
A (udicial declaration of nullit of a previous marria!e is necessar before a subseGuent one
can be le!all contracted. +ne who enters into a subseGuent marria!e without "rst
obtainin! such (udicial declaration is !uilt of bi!am. This principle applies even if the
earlier union is characteri6ed b statutes as 9void.9D-
&t bears stressin! thou!h that in Mercado, the "rst marria!e was actuall solemni6ed not (ust once,
but twice@ "rst before a (ud!e where a marria!e certi"cate was dul issued and then a!ain si$
months later before a priest in reli!ious rites. +stensibl, at least, the "rst marria!e appeared to
have transpired, althou!h later declared void ab initio.
&n the instant case, however, no marria!e ceremon at all was performed b a dul authori6ed
solemni6in! o<cer. Petitioner and *ucia Barrete merel si!ned a marria!e contract on their own.
The mere private act of si!nin! a marria!e contract bears no semblance to a valid marria!e and
thus, needs no (udicial declaration of nullit. #uch act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to
constitute an ostensibl valid marria!e for which petitioner mi!ht be held liable for bi!am unless
he "rst secures a (udicial declaration of nullit before he contracts a subseGuent marria!e.
The law abhors an in(ustice and the Court is mandated to liberall construe a penal statute in favor
of an accused and wei!h ever circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure
that (ustice is done. ?nder the circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner has not
committed bi!am. 2urther, we also "nd that we need not tarr on the issue of the validit of his
defense of !ood faith or lac5 of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.
IHEREFORE, the instant petition is >RANTE). The assailed decision, dated +ctober D,, ,... of
the Court of Appeals in CA:>.R. CR No. D0100, as well as the resolution of the appellate court
dated #eptember DF, D000, denin! herein petitionerTs motion for reconsideration, is RELER#E)
and #ET A#&)E. The petitioner *ucio Mori!o Cacho is ACQ?&TTE) from the char!e of B&>AMM on
the !round that his !uilt has not been proven with moral certaint.
SO OR"ERE".
!uno, /*hairman1, Austria2Martinez, *alle#o, @r., and (inga, 99., concur.
Foot,ot$s
, Rollo, pp. /K:EE. Penned b Associate 7ustice Eu!enio #. *abitoria and concurred in b
Associate 7ustices Marina *. Bu6on and Ed!ardo P. Cru6.
D Records, pp. ,,E:,,..
/ Rollo, pp. E-:FK. Per Associate 7ustice Ed!ardo P. Cru6, with Associate 7ustices Cancio C.
>arcia and Marina *. Bu6on, concurrin! and Eu!enio #. *abitoria and Bernardo P. Abesamis,
dissentin!.
E 3er correct name is Maria 7ececha .imbago %&talics for emphasis'. #ee E$h. 9B,9 the cop
of their marria!e contract. Records, p. ,0.
FThe accusator portion of the char!e sheet found in Records, p. ,, reads@
9That, on or about the Eth da of +ctober, ,..D, in the Cit of Ta!bilaran,
Philippines, and within the (urisdiction of this 3onorable Court, the above:named
accused bein! previousl united in lawful marria!e with *ucia Barrete on Au!ust D/,
,..0 and without the said marria!e havin! been le!all dissolved, did then and
there willfull, unlawfull and feloniousl contract a second marria!e with Maria
7ececha *imba!o to the dama!e and pre(udice of *ucia Barrete in the amount to be
proved durin! trial.
9Acts committed contrar to the provisions of Article /E. of the Revised Penal Code.9
- Rollo, pp. /K:E0.
1 Records, p. ,,..
K >.R. No. ,0EK,K, ,1 #eptember ,../, DD- #CRA F1D.
. ED Phil. KFF, K-/ %,.,K'.
,0 FK Phil. K,1 %,.//'.
,, Rollo, p. E/.
,D ART. /E.. 4igam. S The penalt of prision maor shall be imposed upon an person who
shall contract a second or subseGuent marria!e before the former marria!e has been
le!all dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptivel dead b
means of a (ud!ment rendered in the proper proceedin!s.
,/ Art. ,F. *aws relatin! to famil ri!hts and duties, or to the status, condition and le!al
capacit of persons are bindin! upon citi6ens of the Philippines, even thou!h livin! abroad.
,E Art. ,1. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall
be !overned b the laws of the countr in which the are e$ecuted.
Ahen the acts referred to are e$ecuted before the diplomatic or consular o<cials of
the Republic of the Philippines in a forei!n countr, the solemnities established b
Philippine laws shall be observed in their e$ecution.
Prohibitive laws concernin! persons, their acts or propert, and those which have for
their ob(ect public order, public polic and !ood customs shall not be rendered
ine8ective b laws or (ud!ments promul!ated, or b determinations or conventions
a!reed upon in a forei!n countr.
,F >.R. Nos. K..K/:KE, - March ,..D, D01 #CRA KF.
,- Rollo, p. F,.
,1 &d. at D0:D,.
,K >.R. No. ,/KF0., /, 7ul D000, //- #CRA 1E1, 1FD:1F/.
,. Art. E0. The absolute nullit of a previous marria!e ma be invo5ed for purposes of
remarria!e on the basis solel of a "nal (ud!ment declarin! such previous marria!e void.
D0 @upra.
D, CA Rollo, p. /K.
DD Art. /. The formal reGuisites of marria!e are@
%,' Authorit of the solemni6in! o<cer=
%D' A valid marria!e license e$cept in the cases provided for in Chapter D of this
Title= and
%/' A marria!e ceremon which ta5es place with the appearance of the contractin!
parties before the solemni6in! o<cer and their personal declaration that the ta5e
each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of
le!al a!e.
D/ Art. E. The absence of an of the essential or formal reGuisites shall render the
marria!e $oid ab initio,e$cept as stated in Article /F %D'.
A defect in an of the essential reGuisites shall render the marria!e voidable as
provided in Article EF.
An irre!ularit in the formal reGuisites shall not a8ect the validit of the marria!e
but the part or parties responsible for the irre!ularit shall be civill, criminall and
administrativel liable.
DE Rollo, p. FE.
DF >.R. No. ,/1,,0, , Au!ust D000, //1 #CRA ,DD.
D- &d. at ,DE.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECON" "IVISION
G.R. No. 1886<8 No=$+-$& 7, 200J
MARIA RE!ECCA MAOAPUGA3 !A3OT, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORA!LE COURT OF APPEALS #,0 VICENTE MA"RIGAL !A3OT, respondents.
$:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::$
G.R. No. 16<979 No=$+-$& 7, 200J
MARIA RE!ECCA MAOAPUGA3 !A3OT, petitioner,
vs.
VICENTE MA"RIGAL !A3OT, respondent.
" E C I S I O N
VELASCO, 1R., J.>
T)$ C#s$
Before us are these two petitions interposed b petitioner Maria Rebecca Ma5apu!a Baot
impu!nin! certain issuances handed out b the Court of Appeals %CA' in CA:>.R. #P No. -K,K1.
&n the "rst, a petition for certiorari, under Rule -F and doc5eted as G.R. No.
1886<8, Rebecca assails and see5s to nullif the April /0, D00D ResolutionD of the CA, as
reiterated in another Resolution of #eptember D, D00D,/ !rantin! a writ of preliminar in(unction in
favor of private respondent Licente Madri!al Baot stavin! o8 the trial court;s !rant of
support pendente lite to Rebecca.
The second, a petition for review under Rule EF,E doc5eted G.R. No. 16<979, assails the March
DF, D00E )ecisionF of the CA, %,' dismissin! Civil Case No. 0,:0.E, a suit for declaration of
absolute nullit of marria!e with application for support commenced b Rebecca a!ainst Licente
before the Re!ional Trial Court %RTC' in Muntinlupa Cit= and %D' settin! aside certain orders and a
resolution issued b the RTC in the said case.
Per its Resolution of Au!ust ,,, D00E, the Court ordered the consolidation of both cases.
T)$ F#%ts
Licente and Rebecca were married on April D0, ,.1. in #anctuario de #an 7ose, >reenhills,
Mandaluon! Cit. +n its face, the Marria!e Certi"cate- identi"ed Rebecca, then D- ears old, to
be an American citi6en1 born in A!aWa, >uam, ?#A to Cesar Tanchion! Ma5apu!a, American, and
3elen Corn Ma5apu!a, American.
+n November D1, ,.KD in #an 2rancisco, California, Rebecca !ave birth to Marie 7osephine
Ale$andra or Ali$. 2rom then on, Licente and Rebecca;s marital relationship seemed to have
soured as the latter, sometime in ,..-, initiated divorce proceedin!s in the )ominican Republic.
Before the Court of the 2irst &nstance of the 7udicial )istrict of #anto )omin!o, Rebecca personall
appeared, while Licente was dul represented b counsel. +n 2ebruar DD, ,..-, the )ominican
court issuedC2=2/ "$%&$$ No. <62F96,K orderin! the dissolution of the couple;s marria!e and
9leavin! them to remarr after completin! the le!al reGuirements,9 but !ivin! them (oint custod
and !uardianship over Ali$. +ver a ear later, the same court would issue C2=2/ "$%&$$ No.
706F97,. settlin! the couple;s propert relations pursuant to an A!reement,0 the e$ecuted on
)ecember ,E, ,..-. #aid a!reement speci"call stated that the 9con(u!al propert which the
acGuired durin! their marria!e consistBsC onl of the real propert and all the improvements and
personal properties therein contained at F0D Acacia Avenue, Alaban!, Muntinlupa.9,,
Meanwhile, on March ,E, ,..-, or less than a month from the issuance of Civil )ecree No. /-DI.-,
Rebecca "led with the Ma5ati Cit RTC a petition,D dated 7anuar D-, ,..-, with attachments, for
declaration of nullit of marria!e, doc5eted as Civil Case No. .-:/1K. Rebecca, however, later
moved,/ and secured approval,E of the motion to withdraw the petition.
+n Ma D., ,..-, Rebecca e$ecuted an A<davit of Ac5nowled!ment,F statin! under oath that
she is an American citi6en= that, since ,../, she and Licente have been livin! separatel= and that
she is carrin! a child not of Licente.
+n March D,, D00,, Rebecca "led another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa Cit RTC, for
declaration of absolute nullit of marria!e,- on the !round of Licente;s alle!ed pscholo!ical
incapacit. )oc5eted as Civil Case No. 0,:0.E and entitled as Maria Rebecca Ma%apuga 4aot $.
Bicente Madrigal 4aot, the petition was eventuall raced to Branch DF- of the court. &n it,
Rebecca also sou!ht the dissolution of the con(u!al partnership of !ains with application for
support pendente lite for her and Ali$. Rebecca also praed that Licente be ordered to pa a
permanent monthl support for their dau!hter Ali$ in the amount of PhP DD0,000.
+n 7une K, D00,, Licente "led a Motion to )ismiss,1 on, inter alia, the !rounds of lac5 of cause of
action and that the petition is barred b the prior (ud!ment of divorce. Earlier, on 7une F, D00,,
Rebecca "led and moved for the allowance of her application for support pendente lite.
To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insistin! on her 2ilipino citi6enship, as
a<rmed b the )epartment of 7ustice %)+7', and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to spea5
of.
Meanwhile, Licente, who had in the interim contracted another marria!e, and Rebecca
commenced several criminal complaints a!ainst each other. #peci"call, Licente "led adulter and
per(ur complaints a!ainst Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other hand, char!ed Licente with bi!am
and concubina!e.
Ru/2,g o( t)$ RTC o, t)$ Mot2o, to "2s+2ss
#,0 Mot2o, (o& Su**o&t Pendente Lite
+n Au!ust K, D00,, the RTC issued an +rder,K denin! Licente;s motion to dismiss Civil Case No.
0,:0.E and !rantin! Rebecca;s application for support pendente lite, disposin! as follows@
Aherefore, premises considered, the Motion to )ismiss "led b the respondent is )EN&E).
Petitioner;s Application in #upport of the Motion for #upport Pendente *ite is hereb
>RANTE). Respondent is hereb ordered to remit the amount of TA+ 3?N)RE) AN)
TAENTM T3+?#AN) PE#+# %Php DD0,000.00' a month to Petitioner as support for the
duration of the proceedin!s relative to the instant Petition.
#+ +R)ERE).,.
The RTC declared, amon! other thin!s, that the divorce (ud!ment invo5ed b Licente as bar to the
petition for declaration of absolute nullit of marria!e is a matter of defense best ta5en up durin!
actual trial. As to the !rant of support pendente lite, the trial court held that a mere alle!ation of
adulter a!ainst Rebecca does not operate to preclude her from receivin! le!al support.
2ollowin! the denialD0 of his motion for reconsideration of the above Au!ust K, D00, RTC order,
Licente went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a praer for the issuance of a temporar
restrainin! order %TR+' andIor writ of preliminar in(unction.D, 3is petition was doc5eted as CA:
>.R. #P No. -K,K1.
G&#,t o( I&2t o( P&$/2+2,#&' I,Bu,%t2o, -' t)$ CA
+n 7anuar ., D00D, the CA issued the desired TR+.DD +n April /0, D00D, the appellate court
!ranted, via a Resolution, the issuance of a writ of preliminar in(unction, the decretal portion of
which reads@
&N L&EA +2 A** T3E 2+RE>+&N>, pendin! "nal resolution of the petition at bar, let the Arit
of Preliminar &n(unction be &##?E) in this case, en(oinin! the respondent court from
implementin! the assailed +mnibus +rder dated Au!ust K, D00, and the +rder dated
November D0, D00,, and from conductin! further proceedin!s in Civil Case No. 0,:0.E,
upon the postin! of an in(unction bond in the amount of PDF0,000.00.
#+ +R)ERE).D/
Rebecca movedDE but was denied reconsideration of the aforementioned April /0, D00D resolution.
&n the meantime, on Ma D0, D00D, the preliminar in(unctive writDF was issued. Rebecca also
moved for reconsideration of this issuance, but the CA, b Resolution dated #eptember D, D00D,
denied her motion.
The adverted CA resolutions of April /0, D00D and #eptember D, D00D are presentl bein! assailed
in Rebecca;s petition for certiorari, doc5eted under G.R. No. 1886<8.
Ru/2,g o( t)$ CA
Pendin! resolution of G.R. No. 1886<8, the CA, b a )ecision dated March DF, D00E, e8ectivel
dismissed Civil Case No. 0,:0.E, and set aside incidental orders the RTC issued in relation to the
case. The fallo of the presentl assailed CA )ecision reads@
&N L&EA +2 T3E 2+RE>+&N>, the petition is >RANTE). The +mnibus +rder dated Au!ust K,
D00, and the +rder dated November D0, D00, are RELER#E) and #ET A#&)E and a new
one entered )&#M&##&N> Civil Case No. 0,:0.E, for failure to state a cause of action. No
pronouncement as to costs.
#+ +R)ERE).D-
To the CA, the RTC ou!ht to have !ranted Licente;s motion to dismiss on the basis of the followin!
premises@
%,' As held in *hina Road and 4ridge *orporation $. *ourt of Appeals, the hpothetical:admission
rule applies in determinin! whether a complaint or petition states a cause of action.D1 Applin!
said rule in the li!ht of the essential elements of a cause of action, DK Rebecca had no cause of
action a!ainst Licente for declaration of nullit of marria!e.
%D' Rebecca no lon!er had a le!al ri!ht in this (urisdiction to have her marria!e with Licente
declared void, the union havin! previousl been dissolved on 2ebruar DD, ,..- b the forei!n
divorce decree she personall secured as an American citi6en. Pursuant to the second para!raph
of Article D- of the 2amil Code, such divorce restored Licente;s capacit to contract another
marria!e.
%/' Rebecca;s contention about the nullit of a divorce, she bein! a 2ilipino citi6en at the time the
forei!n divorce decree was rendered, was dubious. 3er alle!ation as to her alle!ed 2ilipino
citi6enship was also doubtful as it was not shown that her father, at the time of her birth, was still
a 2ilipino citi6en. The Certi"cation of Birth of Rebecca issued b the >overnment of >uam also did
not indicate the nationalit of her father.
%E' Rebecca was estopped from denin! her American citi6enship, havin! professed to have that
nationalit status and havin! made representations to that e8ect durin! momentous events of her
life, such as@ %a' durin! her marria!e= %b' when she applied for divorce= and %c' when she applied
for and eventuall secured an American passport on 7anuar ,K, ,..F, or a little over a ear before
she initiated the "rst but later withdrawn petition for nullit of her marria!e %Civil Case No. .-:/1K'
on March ,E, ,..-.
%F' Assumin! that she had dual citi6enship, bein! born of a purportedl 2ilipino father in >uam,
?#A which follows the #us soli principle, Rebecca;s representation and assertion about bein! an
American citi6en when she secured her forei!n divorce precluded her from denin! her citi6enship
and impu!nin! the validit of the divorce.
Rebecca seasonabl "led a motion for reconsideration of the above )ecision, but this recourse was
denied in the eGuall assailed 7une E, D00E Resolution.D. 3ence, Rebecca;s Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule EF, doc5eted under >.R. No. ,-/.1..
T)$ Issu$s
&n G.R. No. 1886<8, Rebecca raises four %E' assi!nments of errors as !rounds for the allowance
of her petition, all of which conver!ed on the proposition that the CA erred in en(oinin! the
implementation of the RTC;s orders which would have entitled her to support pendin! "nal
resolution of Civil Case No. 0,:0.E.
&n G.R. No. 16<979, Rebecca ur!es the reversal of the assailed CA decision submittin! as follows@
&
T3E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# >RALE*M ERRE) &N N+T MENT&+N&N> AN) N+T TA4&N> &NT+
C+N#&)ERAT&+N &N &T# APPREC&AT&+N +2 T3E 2ACT# T3E 2ACT +2 PET&T&+NER;# 2&*&P&N+
C&T&VEN#3&P A# CATE>+R&CA**M #TATE) AN) A**E>E) &N 3ER PET&T&+N BE2+RE T3E
C+?RT A Q?+.
&&
T3E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# >RALE*M ERRE) &N RE*M&N> +N*M +N ANNEHE# T+ T3E PET&T&+N
&N RE#+*L&N> T3E MATTER# BR+?>3T BE2+RE &T.
&&&
T3E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# >RALE*M ERRE) &N 2A&*&N> T+ C+N#&)ER T3AT RE#P+N)ENT &#
E#T+PPE) 2R+M C*A&M&N> T3AT 3&# MARR&A>E T+ PET&T&+NER 3A) A*REA)M BEEN
)&##+*LE) BM L&RT?E +2 3&# #?B#EQ?ENT AN) C+NC?RRENT ACT#.
&L
T3E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# >RALE*M ERRE) &N R?*&N> T3AT T3ERE AA# AB?#E +2
)&#CRET&+N +N T3E PART +2 T3E TR&A* C+?RT, M?C3 *E## A >RALE AB?#E./0
Ae shall "rst address the petition in >.R. No. ,-/.1., its outcome bein! determinative of the
success or failure of the petition in >.R. No. ,FF-/F.
Three le!al premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce obtained abroad b an
alien married to a Philippine national ma be reco!ni6ed in the Philippines, provided the decree of
divorce is valid accordin! to the national law of the forei!ner./, @econd, the rec5onin! point is not
the citi6enship of the divorcin! parties at birth or at the time of marria!e, but their citi6enship at
the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad. And third, an absolute divorce secured b a 2ilipino
married to another 2ilipino is contrar to our concept of public polic and moralit and shall not be
reco!ni6ed in this (urisdiction./D
>iven the fore!oin! perspective, the determinative issue tendered in >.R. No. ,FF-/F, i.e., the
propriet of the !rantin! of the motion to dismiss b the appellate court, resolves itself into the
Guestions of@ )rst, whether petitioner Rebecca was a 2ilipino citi6en at the time the divorce
(ud!ment was rendered in the )ominican Republic on 2ebruar DD, ,..-= and second, whether the
(ud!ment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its conseGuent le!al e8ects`
T)$ Cou&tKs Ru/2,g
The petition is bereft of merit.
R$-$%%# #, A+$&2%#, C2t2@$, 2, t)$ Pu&=2$? o( T)2s C#s$
There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained her divorce
from Licente, was an American citi6en and remains to be one, absent proof of an e8ective
repudiation of such citi6enship. The followin! are compellin! circumstances indicative of her
American citi6enship@ %,' she was born in A!aWa, >uam, ?#A= %D' the principle of #us soli is followed
in this American territor !rantin! American citi6enship to those who are born there= and %/' she
was, and ma still be, a holder of an American passport.//
And as aptl found b the CA, Rebecca had consistentl professed, asserted, and represented
herself as an American citi6en, particularl@ %,' durin! her marria!e as shown in the marria!e
certi"cate= %D' in the birth certi"cate of Ali$= and %/' when she secured the divorce from the
)ominican Republic. Mention ma be made of the A<davit of Ac5nowled!ment/E in which she
stated bein! an American citi6en.
&t is true that Rebecca had been issued b the Bureau of &mmi!ration %Bureau' of &denti"cation %&)'
Certi"cate No. RC .11K and a Philippine Passport. +n its face, &) Certi"cate No. RC .11K would
tend to show that she has indeed been reco!ni6ed as a 2ilipino citi6en. &t cannot be over:
emphasi6ed, however, that such reco!nition was !iven onl on 7une K, D000 upon the a<rmation
b the #ecretar of 7ustice of Rebecca;s reco!nition pursuant to the +rder of Reco!nition issued b
Bureau Associate Commissioner Ed!ar *. Mendo6a.
2or clarit, we reproduce in full the contents of &) Certi"cate No. RC .11K@
To Ahom &t Ma Concern@
This is to certif that UMAR&A REBECCA MA4AP?>AM BAM+TU whose photo!raph and
thumbprints are a<$ed hereto and partiall covered b the seal of this +<ce, and whose
other particulars are as follows@
Place of Birth@ >uam, ?#A )ate of Birth@ March F, ,.F/
#e$@ female Civil #tatus@ married Color of 3air@ brown
Color of Ees@ brown )istin!uishin! mar5s on face@ none
was : r e c o ! n i 6 e d : as a citi6en of the Philippines as per pursuant to Article &L, #ection
,, Para!raph / of the ,./F Constitution per order of Reco!nition 7B* .F:D,/ si!ned b
Associate Commissioner 7ose B. *ope6 dated +ctober -, ,..F, and dul a<rmed b
#ecretar of 7ustice Artemio >. TuGuero in his ,
st
&ndorsement dated 7une K, D000.
&ssued for identi"cation purposes onl. N+T LA*&) for travel purposes.
>iven under m hand and seal this ,,
th
da of +ctober, ,..F
%#>)' E)>AR *. MEN)+VA
A##+. C+MM&##&+NER
+<cial Receipt No. F./..KK
issued at Manila
dated +ct. ,0, ,..F for P D,000
2rom the te$t of &) Certi"cate No. RC .11K, the followin! material facts and dates ma be
deduced@ %,' Bureau Associate Commissioner 7ose B. *ope6 issued the +rder of Reco!nition
on O%to-$& 6, 1998= %D' the ,
st
&ndorsement of #ecretar of 7ustice Artemio >. TuGuero a<rmin!
Rebecca;s reco!nition as a 2ilipino citi6en was issued on 1u,$ J, 2000 or almost "ve ears from
the date of the order of reco!nition= and %/' &) Certi"cate No. RC .11K was purportedl issued
on O%to-$& 11, 1998after the pament of the PhP D,000 fee on +ctober ,0, ,..F per +R No.
F./..KK.
Ahat be!s the Guestion is, however, how the above certi"cate could have been issued b the
Bureau on +ctober ,,, ,..F when the #ecretar of 7ustice issued the reGuired a<rmation onl on
7une K, D000. No e$planation was !iven for this patent aberration. There seems to be no error with
the date of the issuance of the ,
st
&ndorsement b #ecretar of 7ustice TuGuero as this Court ta5es
(udicial notice that he was the #ecretar of 7ustice from 2ebruar ,-, D000 to 7anuar DD, D00,.
There is, thus, a stron! valid reason to conclude that the certi"cate in Guestion must be spurious.
?nder e$tant immi!ration rules, applications for reco!nition of 2ilipino citi6enship reGuire the
a<rmation b the )+7 of the +rder of Reco!nition issued b the Bureau. ?nder E$ecutive +rder
No. D.D, also 5nown as the 5<>P Administrati$e *ode, speci"call in its Title &&&, Chapter ,, #ec.
/%-', it is the )+7 which is tas5ed to 9provide immi!ration and naturali6ation re!ulator services
and2+*/$+$,t t)$ /#?s go=$&,2,g %2t2@$,s)2* and the admission and sta of aliens.9 Thus,
the con"rmation b the )+7 of an +rder of Reco!nition for 2ilipino citi6enship issued b the
Bureau is reGuired.
Pertinentl, Bureau *aw &nstruction No. RBR:..:00D/F on Reco!nition as a 2ilipino Citi6en clearl
provides@
The Bureau Bof &mmi!rationC throu!h its Records #ection shall automaticall furnish the
)epartment of 7ustice an o<cial cop of its +rder of Reco!nition within 1D das from its
date of approval b the wa of indorsement for con"rmation of the +rder b the #ecretar
of 7ustice pursuant to E$ecutive +rder No. D.D. No I0$,t2D%#t2o, C$&t2D%#t$ s)#// -$
2ssu$0 -$(o&$ t)$ 0#t$ o( %o,D&+#t2o, -' t)$ S$%&$t#&' o( 1ust2%$ and an
&denti"cation Certi"cate issued b the Bureau pursuant to an +rder of Reco!nition shall
prominentl indicate thereon the date of con"rmation b the #ecretar of 7ustice.
%Emphasis ours.'
Not lost on the Court is the acGuisition b Rebecca of her Philippine passport onl on 7une ,/,
D000, or "ve das after then #ecretar of 7ustice TuGuero issued the ,
st
&ndorsement con"rmin!
the order of reco!nition. &t ma be too much to attribute to coincidence this unusual seGuence of
close events which, to us, clearl su!!ests that prior to said a<rmation or con"rmation, Rebecca
was not et reco!ni6ed as a 2ilipino citi6en. The same seGuence would also impl that &)
Certi"cate No. RC .11K could not have been issued in ,..F, as Bureau *aw &nstruction No. RBR:..:
00D mandates that no identi"cation certi"cate shall be issued before the date of con"rmation b
the #ecretar of 7ustice. *o!icall, therefore, the a<rmation or con"rmation of Rebecca;s
reco!nition as a 2ilipino citi6en throu!h the ,
st
&ndorsement issued onl on 7une K, D000 b
#ecretar of 7ustice TuGuero corresponds to the eventual issuance of Rebecca;s passport a few
das later, or on 7une ,/, D000 to be e$act.
I)$, "2=o&%$ I#s G&#,t$0 R$-$%%#, S)$ I#s ,ot #
F2/2*2,o C2t2@$, #,0 I#s ,ot 3$t R$%og,2@$0 #s O,$
The Court can assume hpotheticall that Rebecca is now a 2ilipino citi6en. But from the fore!oin!
disGuisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was not et
reco!ni6ed as, a 2ilipino citi6en when she secured the 2ebruar DD, ,..- (ud!ment of divorce from
the )ominican Republic.
The Court notes and at this (uncture wishes to point out that Rebecca voluntaril withdrew her
ori!inal petition for declaration of nullit %Civil Case No. .-:/1K of the Ma5ati Cit RTC' obviousl
because she could not show proof of her alle!ed 2ilipino citi6enship then. &n fact, a perusal of that
petition shows that, while bearin! the date 7anuar D-, ,..-, it was onl "led with the RTC on
March ,E, ,..- or less than a month after Rebecca secured, on 2ebruar DD, ,..-, the forei!n
divorce decree in Guestion. ConseGuentl, there was no mention about said divorce in the petition.
#i!ni"cantl, the onl documents appended as anne$es to said ori!inal petition were@ the Licente:
Rebecca Marria!e Contract %Anne$ 9A9' and Birth Certi"cate of Ali$ %Anne$ 9B9'. &f indeed &)
Certi"cate No. RC .11K from the Bureau was trul issued on +ctober ,,, ,..F, is it not but lo!ical
to e$pect that this piece of document be appended to form part of the petition, the Guestion of her
citi6enship bein! crucial to her case`
As ma be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullit of marria!e under Civil Case No.
0,:0.E, li5e the withdrawn "rst petition, also did not have the &) Certi"cate from the Bureau as
attachment. Ahat were attached consisted of the followin! material documents@ Marria!e Contract
%Anne$ 9A9' and )ivorce )ecree. &t was onl throu!h her +pposition %To Respondent;s Motion to
)ismiss dated /, Ma D00,'/- did Rebecca attach as Anne$ 9C9 &) Certi"cate No. RC .11K.
At an rate, the CA was correct in holdin! that the RTC had su<cient basis to dismiss the petition
for declaration of absolute nullit of marria!e as said petition, ta5en to!ether with Licente;s
motion to dismiss and Rebecca;s opposition to motion, with their respective attachments, clearl
made out a case of lac5 of cause of action, which we will e$pound later.
V#/202t' o( "2=o&%$ "$%&$$
>oin! to the second core issue, we "nd Civil )ecree Nos. /-DI.- and E0-I.1 valid.
First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be reco!ni6ed, assumin!
for ar!ument that she was in fact later reco!ni6ed, as a 2ilipino citi6en, but represented herself in
public documents as an American citi6en. At the ver least, she chose, before, durin!, and shortl
after her divorce, her American citi6enship to !overn her marital relationship. @econd, she secured
personall said divorce as an American citi6en, as is evident in the te$t of the Civil )ecrees, which
pertinentl declared@
&N T3&# ACT&+N 2+R )&L+RCE in which the parties e$pressl submit to the (urisdiction of
this court, b reason of the e$istin! incompatibilit of temperaments $ $ $. The parties
MAR&A REBECCA M. BAM+T, o( U,2t$0 St#t$s ,#t2o,#/2t', ED ears of a!e, married,
domiciled and residin! at F0D Acacia Ave., Aala Alaban!, Muntin *upa, Philippines, $ $ $,
who *$&so,#//' #**$#&$0 -$(o&$ t)2s %ou&t, accompanied b )R. 7?AN E#TEBAN
+*&LER+, attorne, $ $ $ and L&CENTE MA)R&>A* BAM+T, of Philippine nationalit, of E/
ears of a!e, married and domiciled and residin! at F0D Acacia Ave., Aala Alaban!, Muntin
*upa, 2ilipino, appeared before this court represented b )R. A*E7AN)R+ T+RREN#,
attorne, $ $ $, revalidated b special power of attorne !iven the ,.
th
of 2ebruar of ,..-,
si!ned before the Notar Public Enrico *. Espanol of the Cit of Manila, dul le!ali6ed and
authori6in! him to subscribe all the acts concernin! this case./1 %Emphasis ours.'
(hird, bein! an American citi6en, Rebecca was bound b the national laws of the ?nited #tates of
America, a countr which allows divorce. Fourth, the propert relations of Licente and Rebecca
were properl ad(udicated throu!h their A!reement/K e$ecuted on )ecember ,E, ,..- after Civil
)ecree No. /-DI.- was rendered on 2ebruar DD, ,..-, and dul a<rmed b Civil )ecree No.
E0-I.1 issued on March E, ,..1. Leritabl, the forei!n divorce secured b Rebecca was valid.
To be sure, the Court has ta5en stoc5 of the holdin! in Garcia $. Recio that a forei!n divorce can be
reco!ni6ed here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national
law of the alien spouse./. Be this as it ma, the fact that Rebecca was clearl an American citi6en
when she secured the divorce and that divorce is reco!ni6ed and allowed in an of the #tates of
the ?nion,E0 the presentation of a cop of forei!n divorce decree 0u/' #ut)$,t2%#t$0 b the
forei!n court issuin! said decree is, as here, su<cient.
&t bears to stress that the e$istence of the divorce decree has not been denied, but in fact
admitted b both parties. And neither did the impeach the (urisdiction of the divorce court nor
challen!e the validit of its proceedin!s on the !round of collusion, fraud, or clear mista5e of fact
or law, albeit both appeared to have the opportunit to do so. The same holds true with respect to
the decree of partition of their con(u!al propert. As this Court e$plained in Roehr $. Rodriguez@
Before our courts can !ive the e8ect of res (udicata to a forei!n (ud!ment Bof divorceC $ $ $,
it must be shown that the parties opposed to the (ud!ment had been !iven ample
opportunit to do so on !rounds allowed under Rule /., #ection F0 of the Rules of Court
%now Rule /., #ection EK, ,..1 Rules of Civil Procedure', to wit@
#EC. F0. E8ect of forei!n (ud!ments.::The e8ect of a (ud!ment of a tribunal of a
forei!n countr, havin! (urisdiction to pronounce the (ud!ment is as follows@
%a' &n case of a (ud!ment upon a speci"c thin!, the (ud!ment is conclusive upon the
title to the thin!=
%b' &n case of a (ud!ment a!ainst a person, the (ud!ment is presumptive evidence of
a ri!ht as between the parties and their successors in interest b a subseGuent title=
but the (ud!ment ma be repelled b evidence of a want of (urisdiction, want of
notice to the part, collusion, fraud, or clear mista5e of law or fact.
&t is essential that there should be an opportunit to challen!e the forei!n (ud!ment, in
order for the court in this (urisdiction to properl determine its e<cac. &n this (urisdiction,
our Rules of Court clearl provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distin!uished
from actions in rem, a forei!n (ud!ment emerel constitutes prima facie evidence of the
(ustness of the claim of a part and, as such, is sub(ect to proof to the contrar.E,
As the records show, Rebecca, assisted b counsel, personall secured the forei!n divorce while
Licente was dul represented b his counsel, a certain )r. Ale(andro Torrens, in said proceedin!s.
As thin!s stand, the forei!n divorce decrees rendered and issued b the )ominican Republic court
are valid and, conseGuentl, bind both Rebecca and Licente.
2inall, the fact that Rebecca ma have been dul reco!ni6ed as a 2ilipino citi6en b force of the
7une K, D000 a<rmation b #ecretar of 7ustice TuGuero of the +ctober -, ,..F Bureau +rder of
Reco!nition will not, standin! alone, wor5 to nullif or invalidate the forei!n divorce secured b
Rebecca as an American citi6en on 2ebruar DD, ,..-. 2or as we stressed at the outset, in
determinin! whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the countr;s
polic a!ainst absolute divorce, the rec5onin! point is the citi6enship of the parties at the time a
valid divorce is obtained.ED
L$g#/ EH$%ts o( t)$ V#/20 "2=o&%$
>iven the validit and e<cac of divorce secured b Rebecca, the same shall be !iven a res
#udicatae8ect in this (urisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the
marital $inculumbetween Rebecca and Licente is considered severed= the are both freed from the
bond of matrimon. &n plain lan!ua!e, Licente and Rebecca are no lon!er husband and wife to
each other. As the divorce court formall pronounced@ 9BTChat the marria!e between MAR&A
REBECCA M. BAM+T and L&CENTE MA)R&>A* BAM+T is hereb 02sso/=$0 ; ; ; /$#=2,g t)$+ (&$$
to &$+#&&' #(t$& %o+*/$t2,g t)$ /$g#/ &$Au2&$+$,ts.9E/
ConseGuent to the dissolution of the marria!e, Licente could no lon!er be sub(ect to a husband;s
obli!ation under the Civil Code. 3e cannot, for instance, be obli!ed to live with, observe respect
and "delit, and render support to Rebecca.EE
The divorce decree in Guestion also brin!s into pla the second para!raph of Art. D- of the 2amil
Code, providin! as follows@
Art. D-. $ $ $ $
Ahere a marria!e between a 2ilipino citi6en and a forei!ner is validl celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validl obtained abroad b the alien spouse capacitatin! him or her to
remarr, the 2ilipino spouse shall li5ewise have capacit to remarr under Philippine law.
%As amended b ,.C. ==P'
&n Republic $. Crbecido &&&, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicabilit of the second
para!raph of Art. D-, thus@
$ $ $ BACe state the twin elements for the application of Para!raph D of Article D- as
follows@
,. There is a valid marria!e that has been celebrated between a 2ilipino citi6en and a
forei!ner= and
D. A valid divorce is obtained abroad b the alien spouse capacitatin! him or her to remarr.
The rec5onin! point is not the citi6enship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marria!e, but their citi6enship at the time a $alid di$orce is obtained abroad b the alien
spouse capacitatin! the latter to remarr.EF
Both elements obtain in the instant case. Ae need not belabor further the fact of marria!e of
Licente and Rebecca, their citi6enship when the wed, and their professed citi6enship durin! the
valid divorce proceedin!s.
Not to be overloo5ed of course is the fact that Civil )ecree No. E0-I.1 and the A!reement
e$ecuted on )ecember ,E, ,..- bind both Rebecca and Licente as re!ards their propert
relations. The A!reement provided that the e$:couple;s con(u!al propert consisted onl their
famil home, thus@
.. That the parties stipulate that the %o,Bug#/ *&o*$&t' ?)2%) t)$' #%Au2&$0 0u&2,g
t)$2& +#&&2#g$ %o,s2sts o,/' o( t)$ &$#/ *&o*$&t' and all the improvements and
personal properties therein contained at F0D Acacia Avenue, Aala Alaban!, Muntinlupa,
covered b TCT No. ,-K/0, dated 2eb. 1, ,..0 issued b the Re!ister of )eeds of Ma5ati,
Metro Manila re!istered in the name of Licente M. Baot, married to Rebecca M. Baot, $ $
$.E- %Emphasis ours.'
This propert settlement embodied in the A!reement was a<rmed b the divorce court which, per
its second divorce decree, Civil )ecree No. E0-I.1 dated March E, ,..1, ordered that, 9T3&R)@
That the a!reement entered into between the parties dated ,E
th
da of )ecember ,..- in Ma5ati
Cit, Philippines shall survive in this 7ud!ment of divorce b reference but not mer!ed and that the
parties are hereb ordered and directed to %o+*/' ?2t) $#%) #,0 $=$&' *&o=2s2o, o( s#20
#g&$$+$,t.9E1
Rebecca has not repudiated the propert settlement contained in the A!reement. #he is thus
estopped b her representation before the divorce court from assertin! that her and Licente;s
con(u!al propert was not limited to their famil home in Aala Alaban!.EK
No C#us$ o( A%t2o, 2, t)$ P$t2t2o, (o& Nu//2t' o( M#&&2#g$
?pon the fore!oin! disGuisitions, it is abundantl clear to the Court that Rebecca lac5s, under the
premises, cause of action. !hilippine 4an% of *ommunications $. (razo e$plains the concept and
elements of a cause of action, thus@
A cause of action is an act or omission of one part in violation of the le!al ri!ht of the
other. A motion to dismiss based on lac5 of cause of action hpotheticall admits the truth
of the alle!ations in the complaint. The alle!ations in a complaint are su<cient to
constitute a cause of action a!ainst the defendants if, hpotheticall admittin! the facts
alle!ed, the court can render a valid (ud!ment upon the same in accordance with the
praer therein. A cause of action e$ists if the followin! $/$+$,ts are present, namel@ %,' a
ri!ht in favor of the plainti8 b whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created= %D' an obli!ation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate
such ri!ht= and %/' an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the ri!ht of
the plainti8 or constitutin! a breach of the obli!ation of the defendant to the plainti8 for
which the latter ma maintain an action for recover of dama!es.E.
+ne thin! is clear from a perusal of Rebecca;s underlin! petition before the RTC, Licente;s motion
to dismiss and Rebecca;s opposition thereof, with the documentar evidence attached therein@ The
petitioner lac5s a cause of action for declaration of nullit of marria!e, a suit which presupposes
the e$istence of a marria!e.
To sustain a motion to dismiss for lac5 of cause of action, the movant must show that the claim for
relief does not e$ist rather than that a claim has been defectivel stated or is ambi!uous,
inde"nite, or uncertain.F0 Aith the valid forei!n divorce secured b Rebecca, there is no more
marital tie bindin! her to Licente. There is in "ne no more marria!e to be dissolved or nulli"ed.
The Court to be sure does not lose si!ht of the le!al obli!ation of Licente and Rebecca to support
the needs of their dau!hter, Ali$. The records do not clearl show how he had dischar!ed his dut,
albeit Rebecca alle!ed that the support !iven had been insu<cient. At an rate, we do note that
Ali$, havin! been born on November D1, ,.KD, reached the ma(orit a!e on November D1, D000,
or four months before her mother initiated her petition for declaration of nullit. #he would now be
D- ears old. 3ence, the issue of bac5 support, which alle!edl had been partl shouldered b
Rebecca, is best liti!ated in a separate civil action for reimbursement. &n this wa, the actual "!ure
for the support of Ali$ can be proved as well as the earnin! capacit of both Licente and Rebecca.
The trial court can thus determine what Licente owes, if an, considerin! that support includes
provisions until the child concerned shall have "nished her education.
?pon the fore!oin! considerations, the Court no lon!er need to delve into the issue tendered in
>.R. No. ,FF-/F, that is, Rebecca;s ri!ht to support pendente lite. As it were, her entitlement to
that 5ind of support hin!es on the tenabilit of her petition under Civil Case No. 0,:0.E for
declaration of nullit of marria!e. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 0,:0.E b the CA veritabl
removed an le!al anchora!e for, and e8ectivel mooted, the claim for support pendente lite.
IHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 1886<8 is hereb "ISMISSE" on the !round
of mootness, while the petition for review in G.R. No. 16<979 is hereb "ENIE" for lac5 of merit.
Accordin!l, the March DF, D00E )ecision and 7une E, D00E Resolution of the CA in CA:>.R. #P No.
-K,K1 are hereb AFFIRME". Costs a!ainst petitioner.
SO OR"ERE".
PRES!ITERO 1. VELASCO, 1R.
Associate 7ustice
AE C+NC?R@
LEONAR"O A. 6UISUM!ING
Associate 7ustice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate 7ustice
"ANTE O. TINGA
Associate 7ustice
ARTURO ". !RION
Associate 7ustice
ATTESTATION
& attest that the conclusions in the above )ecision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assi!ned to the writer of the opinion of the Court;s )ivision.
LEONAR"O A. 6UISUM!ING
Associate 7ustice
*hairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to #ection ,/, Article L&&& of the Constitution, and the )ivision Chairperson;s Attestation, it
is hereb certi"ed that the conclusions in the above )ecision were reached in consultation before
the case was assi!ned to the writer of the opinion of the Court;s )ivision.
RE3NATO S. PUNO
Chief 7ustice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
#EC+N) )&L&#&+N
G.R. No. 178226 F$-&u#&' 06, 2007
LUCIO MORIGO ' CACHO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
) E C & # & + N
6UISUM!ING, J.>
This petition for review on certiorari see5s to reverse the decision, dated +ctober D,, ,... of the
Court of Appeals in CA:>.R. CR No. D0100, which a<rmed the (ud!mentD dated Au!ust F, ,..- of
the Re!ional Trial Court %RTC' of Bohol, Branch E, in Criminal Case No. K-KK. The trial court found
herein petitioner *ucio Mori!o Cacho !uilt beond reasonable doubt of bi!am and sentenced
him to a prison term of seven %1' months ofprision correccional as minimum to si$ %-' ears and
one %,' da of prision maor as ma$imum. Also assailed in this petition is the resolution/ of the
appellate court, dated #eptember DF, D000, denin! Mori!oTs motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found b the court a 3uo, are as follows@
Appellant *ucio Mori!o and *ucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor
at Ta!bilaran Cit, Province of Bohol, for a period of four %E' ears %from ,.1E:,.1K'.
After school ear ,.11:1K, *ucio Mori!o and *ucia Barrete lost contact with each other.
&n ,.KE, *ucio Mori!o was surprised to receive a card from *ucia Barrete from #in!apore.
The former replied and after an e$chan!e of letters, the became sweethearts.
&n ,.K-, *ucia returned to the Philippines but left a!ain for Canada to wor5 there. Ahile in
Canada, the maintained constant communication.
&n ,..0, *ucia came bac5 to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to (oin her in
Canada. Both a!reed to !et married, thus the were married on Au!ust /0, ,..0 at
the &glesia de Filipina 8acional at Cata!daan, Pilar, Bohol.
+n #eptember K, ,..0, *ucia reported bac5 to her wor5 in Canada leavin! appellant *ucio
behind.
+n Au!ust ,., ,..,, *ucia "led with the +ntario Court %>eneral )ivision' a petition for
divorce a!ainst appellant which was !ranted b the court on 7anuar ,1, ,..D and to ta5e
e8ect on 2ebruar ,1, ,..D.
+n +ctober E, ,..D, appellant *ucio Mori!o married Maria 7ececha *umba!oE at the Birgen
sa 4aranga !arish, Ta!bilaran Cit, Bohol.
+n #eptember D,, ,../, accused "led a complaint for (udicial declaration of nullit of
marria!e in the Re!ional Trial Court of Bohol, doc5eted as Civil Case No. -0D0. The
complaint see5 %sic' amon! others, the declaration of nullit of accusedTs marria!e with
*ucia, on the !round that no marria!e ceremon actuall too5 place.
+n +ctober ,., ,../, appellant was char!ed with Bi!am in an &nformationF "led b the
Cit Prosecutor of Ta!bilaran BCitC, with the Re!ional Trial Court of Bohol.-
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arrai!nment on the !round that the civil case for
(udicial nulli"cation of his marria!e with *ucia posed a pre(udicial Guestion in the bi!am case. 3is
motion was !ranted, but subseGuentl denied upon motion for reconsideration b the prosecution.
Ahen arrai!ned in the bi!am case, which was doc5eted as Criminal Case No. K-KK, herein
petitioner pleaded not !uilt to the char!e. Trial thereafter ensued.
+n Au!ust F, ,..-, the RTC of Bohol handed down its (ud!ment in Criminal Case No. K-KK, as
follows@
A3ERE2+RE, fore!oin! premises considered, the Court "nds accused *ucio Mori!o Cacho
!uilt beond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bi!am and sentences him to su8er the
penalt of imprisonment ran!in! from #even %1' Months of !rision *orreccional as minimum
to #i$ %-' Mears and +ne %,' )a of!rision Maor as ma$imum.
#+ +R)ERE).1
&n convictin! herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitionerTs claim that his "rst marria!e
to *ucia was null and void ab initio. 2ollowin! Domingo $. *ourt of Appeals,K the trial court ruled
that want of a valid marria!e ceremon is not a defense in a char!e of bi!am. The parties to a
marria!e should not be allowed to assume that their marria!e is void even if such be the fact but
must "rst secure a (udicial declaration of the nullit of their marria!e before the can be allowed to
marr a!ain.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained b *ucia, the trial court cited Ramirez $. Gmur,. which held
that the court of a countr in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both
spouses ma resort merel for the purpose of obtainin! a divorce, has no (urisdiction to determine
the matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a divorce !ranted b said court is not entitled to
reco!nition anwhere. )ebun5in! *ucioTs defense of !ood faith in contractin! the second
marria!e, the trial court stressed that followin! !eople $. 4itdu,,0 everone is presumed to 5now
the law, and the fact that one does not 5now that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not
e$empt him from the conseGuences thereof.
#easonabl, petitioner "led an appeal with the Court of Appeals, doc5eted as CA:>.R. CR No.
D0100.
Meanwhile, on +ctober D/, ,..1, or while CA:>.R. CR No. D0100 was pendin! before the appellate
court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. -0D0 declarin! the marria!e between
*ucio and *ucia void ab initio since no marria!e ceremon actuall too5 place. No appeal was
ta5en from this decision, which then became "nal and e$ecutor.
+n +ctober D,, ,..., the appellate court decided CA:>.R. CR No. D0100 as follows@
A3ERE2+RE, "ndin! no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereb A22&RME) in
toto.
#+ +R)ERE).,,
&n a<rmin! the assailed (ud!ment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the subseGuent
declaration of nullit of *ucioTs marria!e to *ucia in Civil Case No. -0D0 could not acGuit *ucio. The
reason is that what is sou!ht to be punished b Article /E.,D of the Revised Penal Code is the act
of contractin! a second marria!e before the "rst marria!e had been dissolved. 3ence, the CA held,
the fact that the "rst marria!e was void from the be!innin! is not a valid defense in a bi!am
case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained b *ucia from the Canadian
court could not be accorded validit in the Philippines, pursuant to Article ,F,/ of the Civil Code
and !iven the fact that it is contrar to public polic in this (urisdiction. ?nder Article ,1,E of the
Civil Code, a declaration of public polic cannot be rendered ine8ectual b a (ud!ment
promul!ated in a forei!n (urisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate courtTs decision, contendin! that the doctrine
in Mendiola $. !eople,,F allows mista5e upon a di<cult Guestion of law %such as the e8ect of a
forei!n divorce decree' to be a basis for !ood faith.
+n #eptember DF, D000, the appellate court denied the motion for lac5 of merit. ,- 3owever, the
denial was b a split vote. The ponente of the appellate courtTs ori!inal decision in CA:>.R. CR No.
D0100, 7ustice Eu!enio #. *abitoria, (oined in the opinion prepared b 7ustice Bernardo P. Abesamis.
The dissent observed that as the "rst marria!e was validl declared void ab initio, then there was
no "rst marria!e to spea5 of. #ince the date of the nullit retroacts to the date of the "rst marria!e
and since herein petitioner was, in the ees of the law, never married, he cannot be convicted
beond reasonable doubt of bi!am.
The present petition raises the followin! issues for our resolution@
A.
A3ET3ER +R N+T T3E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# ERRE) &N 2A&*&N> T+ APP*M T3E R?*E T3AT &N
CR&ME# PENA*&VE) ?N)ER T3E REL&#E) PENA* C+)E, CR&M&NA* &NTENT &# AN
&N)&#PEN#AB*E REQ?&#&TE. C+R+**AR&*M, A3ET3ER +R N+T T3E C+?RT +2 APPEA*#
ERRE) &N 2A&*&N> T+ APPREC&ATE BT3EC PET&T&+NERT# *AC4 +2 CR&M&NA* &NTENT A3EN 3E
C+NTRACTE) T3E #EC+N) MARR&A>E.
B.
A3ET3ER +R N+T T3E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# ERRE) &N 3+*)&N> T3AT T3E R?*&N> &N
PE+P*E L#. B&T)? %FK P3&*. K,1' &# APP*&CAB*E T+ T3E CA#E AT BAR.
C.
A3ET3ER +R N+T T3E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# ERRE) &N 2A&*&N> T+ APP*M T3E R?*E T3AT
EAC3 AN) ELERM C&RC?M#TANCE 2AL+R&N> T3E &NN+CENCE +2 T3E ACC?#E) M?#T BE
TA4EN &NT+ ACC+?NT.,1
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bi!am and if so,
whether his defense of !ood faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relin! in !ood faith upon the divorce
decree of the +ntario court. 3e hi!hli!hts the fact that he contracted the second marria!e openl
and publicl, which a person intent upon bi!am would not be doin!. The petitioner further ar!ues
that his lac5 of criminal intent is material to a conviction or acGuittal in the instant case. The crime
of bi!am, (ust li5e other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and
hence, !ood faith and lac5 of criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. 3e stresses that
there is a di8erence between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act.
3ence, it does not necessaril follow that his intention to contract a second marria!e is
tantamount to an intent to commit bi!am.
2or the respondent, the +<ce of the #olicitor >eneral %+#>' submits that !ood faith in the instant
case is a convenient but Rims e$cuse. The #olicitor >eneral relies upon our rulin! in Marbella2
4obis $. 4obis,,K which held that bi!am can be successfull prosecuted provided all the elements
concur, stressin! that under Article E0,. of the 2amil Code, a (udicial declaration of nullit is a
must before a part ma re:marr. Ahether or not the petitioner was aware of said Article E0 is of
no account as everone is presumed to 5now the law. The +#> counters that petitionerTs
contention that he was in !ood faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the +ntario court
is ne!ated b his act of "lin! Civil Case No. -0D0, see5in! a (udicial declaration of nullit of his
marria!e to *ucia.
Before we delve into petitionerTs defense of !ood faith and lac5 of criminal intent, we must "rst
determine whether all the elements of bi!am are present in this case. &n Marbella24obis $.
4obis,D0 we laid down the elements of bi!am thus@
%,' the o8ender has been le!all married=
%D' the "rst marria!e has not been le!all dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse has not been (udiciall declared presumptivel dead=
%/' he contracts a subseGuent marria!e= and
%E' the subseGuent marria!e would have been valid had it not been for the e$istence of the
"rst.
Applin! the fore!oin! test to the instant case, we note that durin! the pendenc of CA:>.R. CR
No. D0100, the RTC of Bohol Branch ,, handed down the followin! decision in Civil Case No. -0D0,
to wit@
A3ERE2+RE, premises considered, (ud!ment is hereb rendered decreein! the annulment
of the marria!e entered into b petitioner *ucio Mori!o and *ucia Barrete on Au!ust D/,
,..0 in Pilar, Bohol and further directin! the *ocal Civil Re!istrar of Pilar, Bohol to e8ect the
cancellation of the marria!e contract.
#+ +R)ERE).D,
The trial court found that there was no actual marria!e ceremon performed between *ucio and
*ucia b a solemni6in! o<cer. &nstead, what transpired was a mere si!nin! of the marria!e
contract b the two, without the presence of a solemni6in! o<cer. The trial court thus held that
the marria!e is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles /DD and ED/ of the 2amil Code. As the
dissentin! opinion in CA:>.R. CR No. D0100, correctl puts it, 9This simpl means that there was no
marria!e to be!in with= and that such declaration of nullit retroacts to the date of the "rst
marria!e. &n other words, for all intents and purposes, rec5oned from the date of the declaration of
the "rst marria!e as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the "rst marria!e, the accused
was, under the ees of the law, never married.9DE The records show that no appeal was ta5en
from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. -0D0, hence, the decision had lon! become
"nal and e$ecutor.
The "rst element of bi!am as a crime reGuires that the accused must have been le!all married.
But in this case, le!all spea5in!, the petitioner was never married to *ucia Barrete. Thus, there is
no "rst marria!e to spea5 of. ?nder the principle of retroactivit of a marria!e bein! declared
void ab initio, the two were never married 9from the be!innin!.9 The contract of marria!e is null= it
bears no le!al e8ect. Ta5in! this ar!ument to its lo!ical conclusion, for le!al purposes, petitioner
was not married to *ucia at the time he contracted the marria!e with Maria 7ececha. The e$istence
and the validit of the "rst marria!e bein! an essential element of the crime of bi!am, it is but
lo!ical that a conviction for said o8ense cannot be sustained where there is no "rst marria!e to
spea5 of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acGuitted of the instant char!e.
The present case is analo!ous to, but must be distin!uished from Mercado $. (an.DF &n the latter
case, the (udicial declaration of nullit of the "rst marria!e was li5ewise obtained after the second
marria!e was alread celebrated. Ae held therein that@
A (udicial declaration of nullit of a previous marria!e is necessar before a subseGuent one
can be le!all contracted. +ne who enters into a subseGuent marria!e without "rst
obtainin! such (udicial declaration is !uilt of bi!am. This principle applies even if the
earlier union is characteri6ed b statutes as 9void.9D-
&t bears stressin! thou!h that in Mercado, the "rst marria!e was actuall solemni6ed not (ust once,
but twice@ "rst before a (ud!e where a marria!e certi"cate was dul issued and then a!ain si$
months later before a priest in reli!ious rites. +stensibl, at least, the "rst marria!e appeared to
have transpired, althou!h later declared void ab initio.
&n the instant case, however, no marria!e ceremon at all was performed b a dul authori6ed
solemni6in! o<cer. Petitioner and *ucia Barrete merel si!ned a marria!e contract on their own.
The mere private act of si!nin! a marria!e contract bears no semblance to a valid marria!e and
thus, needs no (udicial declaration of nullit. #uch act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to
constitute an ostensibl valid marria!e for which petitioner mi!ht be held liable for bi!am unless
he "rst secures a (udicial declaration of nullit before he contracts a subseGuent marria!e.
The law abhors an in(ustice and the Court is mandated to liberall construe a penal statute in favor
of an accused and wei!h ever circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure
that (ustice is done. ?nder the circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner has not
committed bi!am. 2urther, we also "nd that we need not tarr on the issue of the validit of his
defense of !ood faith or lac5 of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.
IHEREFORE, the instant petition is >RANTE). The assailed decision, dated +ctober D,, ,... of
the Court of Appeals in CA:>.R. CR No. D0100, as well as the resolution of the appellate court
dated #eptember DF, D000, denin! herein petitionerTs motion for reconsideration, is RELER#E)
and #ET A#&)E. The petitioner *ucio Mori!o Cacho is ACQ?&TTE) from the char!e of B&>AMM on
the !round that his !uilt has not been proven with moral certaint.
SO OR"ERE".
!uno, /*hairman1, Austria2Martinez, *alle#o, @r., and (inga, 99., concur.
Foot,ot$s
, Rollo, pp. /K:EE. Penned b Associate 7ustice Eu!enio #. *abitoria and concurred in b
Associate 7ustices Marina *. Bu6on and Ed!ardo P. Cru6.
D Records, pp. ,,E:,,..
/ Rollo, pp. E-:FK. Per Associate 7ustice Ed!ardo P. Cru6, with Associate 7ustices Cancio C.
>arcia and Marina *. Bu6on, concurrin! and Eu!enio #. *abitoria and Bernardo P. Abesamis,
dissentin!.
E 3er correct name is Maria 7ececha .imbago %&talics for emphasis'. #ee E$h. 9B,9 the cop
of their marria!e contract. Records, p. ,0.
FThe accusator portion of the char!e sheet found in Records, p. ,, reads@
9That, on or about the Eth da of +ctober, ,..D, in the Cit of Ta!bilaran,
Philippines, and within the (urisdiction of this 3onorable Court, the above:named
accused bein! previousl united in lawful marria!e with *ucia Barrete on Au!ust D/,
,..0 and without the said marria!e havin! been le!all dissolved, did then and
there willfull, unlawfull and feloniousl contract a second marria!e with Maria
7ececha *imba!o to the dama!e and pre(udice of *ucia Barrete in the amount to be
proved durin! trial.
9Acts committed contrar to the provisions of Article /E. of the Revised Penal Code.9
- Rollo, pp. /K:E0.
1 Records, p. ,,..
K >.R. No. ,0EK,K, ,1 #eptember ,../, DD- #CRA F1D.
. ED Phil. KFF, K-/ %,.,K'.
,0 FK Phil. K,1 %,.//'.
,, Rollo, p. E/.
,D ART. /E.. 4igam. S The penalt of prision maor shall be imposed upon an person who
shall contract a second or subseGuent marria!e before the former marria!e has been
le!all dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptivel dead b
means of a (ud!ment rendered in the proper proceedin!s.
,/ Art. ,F. *aws relatin! to famil ri!hts and duties, or to the status, condition and le!al
capacit of persons are bindin! upon citi6ens of the Philippines, even thou!h livin! abroad.
,E Art. ,1. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall
be !overned b the laws of the countr in which the are e$ecuted.
Ahen the acts referred to are e$ecuted before the diplomatic or consular o<cials of
the Republic of the Philippines in a forei!n countr, the solemnities established b
Philippine laws shall be observed in their e$ecution.
Prohibitive laws concernin! persons, their acts or propert, and those which have for
their ob(ect public order, public polic and !ood customs shall not be rendered
ine8ective b laws or (ud!ments promul!ated, or b determinations or conventions
a!reed upon in a forei!n countr.
,F >.R. Nos. K..K/:KE, - March ,..D, D01 #CRA KF.
,- Rollo, p. F,.
,1 &d. at D0:D,.
,K >.R. No. ,/KF0., /, 7ul D000, //- #CRA 1E1, 1FD:1F/.
,. Art. E0. The absolute nullit of a previous marria!e ma be invo5ed for purposes of
remarria!e on the basis solel of a "nal (ud!ment declarin! such previous marria!e void.
D0 @upra.
D, CA Rollo, p. /K.
DD Art. /. The formal reGuisites of marria!e are@
%,' Authorit of the solemni6in! o<cer=
%D' A valid marria!e license e$cept in the cases provided for in Chapter D of this
Title= and
%/' A marria!e ceremon which ta5es place with the appearance of the contractin!
parties before the solemni6in! o<cer and their personal declaration that the ta5e
each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of
le!al a!e.
D/ Art. E. The absence of an of the essential or formal reGuisites shall render the
marria!e $oid ab initio,e$cept as stated in Article /F %D'.
A defect in an of the essential reGuisites shall render the marria!e voidable as
provided in Article EF.
An irre!ularit in the formal reGuisites shall not a8ect the validit of the marria!e
but the part or parties responsible for the irre!ularit shall be civill, criminall and
administrativel liable.
DE Rollo, p. FE.







FIRST "IVISION

REPU!LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
G.R. No. 187<J0




: versus :

Present@

)avide, 7r., *.9.,
%Chairman',
Quisumbin!,
Mnares:#antia!o,
Carpio, and
A6cuna, 99.
CIPRIANO OR!ECI"O III,
Respondent.

Promul!ated@
+ctober F, D00F
; 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 ;

"ECISION
',I&,+#IN-, J.:
>iven a valid marria!e between two 2ilipino citi6ens, where one part is later naturali6ed as a
forei!n citi6en and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitatin! him or her to remarr, can the
2ilipino spouse li5ewise remarr under Philippine law`
Before us is a case of "rst impression that behooves the Court to ma5e a de"nite rulin! on this
apparentl novel Guestion, presented as a pure Guestion of law.
&n this petition for review, the #olicitor >eneral assails the "$%2s2o,B,C dated Ma ,F, D00D, of the
Re!ional Trial Court of Molave, Vamboan!a del #ur, Branch D/ and its R$so/ut2o,BDC dated 7ul E,
D00D denin! the motion for reconsideration. The court a 3uo had declared that herein
respondent Cipriano +rbecido &&& is capacitated to remarr. The fallo of the impu!ned )ecision
reads@
A3ERE2+RE, b virtue of the provision of the second para!raph of Art. D- of
the 2amil Code and b reason of the divorce decree obtained a!ainst him b his
American wife, the petitioner is !iven the capacit to remarr under the Philippine
*aw.
&T &# #+ +R)ERE).B/C
The factual antecedents, as narrated b the trial court, are as follows.
+n Ma DE, ,.K,, Cipriano +rbecido &&& married *ad Mros M. Lillanueva at the ?nited
Church of Christ in the Philippines in *am:an, +6amis Cit. Their marria!e was blessed with a son
and a dau!hter, 4risto8er #imbortri6 L. +rbecido and *ad 4imberl L. +rbecido.
&n ,.K-, CiprianoTs wife left for the ?nited #tates brin!in! alon! their son 4risto8er. A few ears
later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturali6ed as an American citi6en.
#ometime in D000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and
then married a certain &nnocent #tanle. #he, #tanle and her child b him currentl live at FF--
A. Aalnut >rove Avenue, #an >abriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter "led with the trial court a petition for authorit to remarr invo5in!
Para!raph D of Article D- of the 2amil Code. No opposition was "led. 2indin! merit in the petition,
the court !ranted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, throu!h the +<ce of the #olicitor
>eneral %+#>', sou!ht reconsideration but it was denied.
&n this petition, the +#> raises a pure Guestion of law@
A3ET3ER +R N+T RE#P+N)ENT CAN REMARRM ?N)ER ART&C*E D- +2 T3E 2AM&*M
C+)EBEC
The +#> contends that Para!raph D of Article D- of the 2amil Code is not applicable to the
instant case because it onl applies to a valid mi$ed marria!e= that is, a marria!e celebrated
between a 2ilipino citi6en and an alien. The proper remed, accordin! to the +#>, is to "le a
petition for annulment or for le!al separation.BFC 2urthermore, the +#> ar!ues there is no law that
!overns respondentTs situation. The +#> posits that this is a matter of le!islation and not of
(udicial determination.B-C
2or his part, respondent admits that Article D- is not directl applicable to his case but
insists that when his naturali6ed alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to
remarr, he is li5ewise capacitated b operation of law pursuant to #ection ,D, Article && of the
Constitution.B1C
At the outset, we note that the petition for authorit to remarr "led before the trial court
actuall constituted a petition for declarator relief. &n this connection, #ection ,, Rule -/ of the
Rules of Court provides@
R?*E -/
)EC*ARAT+RM RE*&E2 AN) #&M&*AR REME)&E#

#ection ,. Iho ma )le petitionSAn person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or whose ri!hts are a8ected b a statute,
e$ecutive order or re!ulation, ordinance, or other !overnmental re!ulation ma,
before breach or violation thereof, brin! an action in the appropriate Re!ional Trial
Court to determine an Guestion of construction or validit arisin!, and for a
declaration of his ri!hts or duties, thereunder.
. . .
The reGuisites of a petition for declarator relief are@ %,' there must be a (usticiable
controvers= %D' the controvers must be between persons whose interests are adverse= %/' that
the part see5in! the relief has a le!al interest in the controvers= and %E' that the issue is ripe for
(udicial determination.BKC
This case concerns the applicabilit of Para!raph D of Article D- to a marria!e between two 2ilipino
citi6ens where one later acGuired alien citi6enship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while
in the ?.#.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representin! the #tate
asserts its dut to protect the institution of marria!e while respondent, a private citi6en, insists on
a declaration of his capacit to remarr. Respondent, prain! for relief, has le!al interest in the
controvers. The issue raised is also ripe for (udicial determination inasmuch as when respondent
remarries, liti!ation ensues and puts into Guestion the validit of his second marria!e.
Comin! now to the substantive issue, does Para!raph D of Article D- of the 2amil Code
appl to the case of respondent` Necessaril, we must dwell on how this provision had come
about in the "rst place, and what was the intent of the le!islators in its enactment`
!&2$( H2sto&2%#/ !#%Eg&ou,0
+n 7ul -, ,.K1, then President Cora6on AGuino si!ned into law E$ecutive +rder No. D0., otherwise
5nown as the Y2amil Code,Z which too5 e8ect on Au!ust /, ,.KK. Article D- thereof states@
All marria!es solemni6ed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the countr where the were solemni6ed, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this countr, e$cept those prohibited under Articles /F, /1, and /K.
+n 7ul ,1, ,.K1, shortl after the si!nin! of the ori!inal 2amil Code, E$ecutive +rder No. DD1 was
li5ewise si!ned into law, amendin! Articles D-, /-, and /. of the 2amil Code. A second para!raph
was added to Article D-. As so amended, it now provides@
ART. D-. All marria!es solemni6ed outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the countr where the were solemni6ed, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this countr, e$cept those prohibited under Articles /F%,', %E',
%F' and %-', /-, /1 and /K.
Ihere a marriage bet"een a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is $alidl celebrated
and a di$orce is thereafter $alidl obtained abroad b the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarr, the Filipino spouse shall ha$e capacit to remarr under
!hilippine la". %Emphasis supplied'
+n its face, the fore!oin! provision does not appear to !overn the situation presented b the case
at hand. &t seems to appl onl to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marria!e, the
parties are a 2ilipino citi6en and a forei!ner. The instant case is one where at the time the
marria!e was solemni6ed, the parties were two 2ilipino citi6ens, but later on, the wife was
naturali6ed as an American citi6en and subseGuentl obtained a divorce !rantin! her capacit to
remarr, and indeed she remarried an American citi6en while residin! in the ?.#.A.
Noteworth, in the Report of the Public 3earin!sB.C on the 2amil Code, the Catholic BishopsT
Conference of the Philippines %CBCP' re!istered the followin! ob(ections to Para!raph D of Article
D-@
,. (he rule is discriminator. &t discriminates against those "hose
spouses are Filipinos "ho di$orce them abroad. (hese spouses "ho are
di$orced "ill not be able to re2marr, "hile the spouses of foreigners "ho
$alidl di$orce them abroad can.
D. This is the be!innin! of the reco!nition of the validit of divorce
even for 2ilipino citi6ens. 2or those whose forei!n spouses validl divorce
them abroad will also be considered to be validl divorced here and can re:
marr. Ae propose that this be deleted and made into law onl after more
widespread consultation. %Emphasis supplied.'
L$g2s/#t2=$ I,t$,t
Records of the proceedin!s of the 2amil Code deliberations showed that the intent of Para!raph D
of Article D-, accordin! to 7ud!e Alicia #empio:)i, a member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the 2ilipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtainin! a divorce, is no lon!er married to the 2ilipino spouse.
&nterestin!l, Para!raph D of Article D- traces its ori!in to the ,.KF case of Ban Dorn $. Romillo, 9r.
B,0C The Ban Dorn case involved a marria!e between a 2ilipino citi6en and a forei!ner. The Court
held therein that a divorce decree validl obtained b the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines,
and conseGuentl, the 2ilipino spouse is capacitated to remarr under Philippine law.
)oes the same principle appl to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marria!e, the
parties were 2ilipino citi6ens, but later on, one of them obtains a forei!n citi6enship b
naturali6ation`
The (urisprudential answer lies latent in the ,..K case of Tuita $. *ourt of Appeals.B,,C &n Tuita,
the parties were, as in this case, 2ilipino citi6ens when the !ot married. The wife became a
naturali6ed American citi6en in ,.FE and obtained a divorce in the same ear. The Court therein
hinted, b wa of obiter dictum, that a 2ilipino divorced b his naturali6ed forei!n spouse is no
lon!er married under Philippine law and can thus remarr.
Thus, ta5in! into consideration the le!islative intent and applin! the rule of reason, we hold that
Para!raph D of Article D- should be interpreted to include cases involvin! parties who, at the time
of the celebration of the marria!e were 2ilipino citi6ens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturali6ed as a forei!n citi6en and obtains a divorce decree. The 2ilipino spouse should li5ewise
be allowed to remarr as if the other part were a forei!ner at the time of the solemni6ation of the
marria!e. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdit and in(ustice. Ahere the interpretation
of a statute accordin! to its e$act and literal import would lead to mischievous results or
contravene the clear purpose of the le!islature, it should be construed accordin! to its spirit and
reason, disre!ardin! as far as necessar the letter of the law. A statute ma therefore be
e$tended to cases not within the literal meanin! of its terms, so lon! as the come within its spirit
or intent.B,DC
&f we are to !ive meanin! to the le!islative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the 2ilipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtainin! a divorce is no lon!er married to
the 2ilipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as comin! within the contemplation of
Para!raph D of Article D-.
&n view of the fore!oin!, we state the twin elements for the application of Para!raph D of Article D-
as follows@
,. There is a valid marria!e that has been celebrated between a
2ilipino citi6en and a forei!ner= and
D. A valid divorce is obtained abroad b the alien spouse
capacitatin! him or her to remarr.
The rec5onin! point is not the citi6enship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marria!e, but their citi6enship at the time a $alid di$orce is obtained abroad b the alien spouse
capacitatin! the latter to remarr.
&n this case, when CiprianoTs wife was naturali6ed as an American citi6en, there was still a valid
marria!e that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the
naturali6ed alien wife subseGuentl obtained a valid divorce capacitatin! her to remarr. Clearl,
the twin reGuisites for the application of Para!raph D of Article D- are both present in this case.
Thus Cipriano, the YdivorcedZ 2ilipino spouse, should be allowed to remarr.
Ae are also unable to sustain the +#>Ts theor that the proper remed of the 2ilipino spouse is to
"le either a petition for annulment or a petition for le!al separation. Annulment would be a lon!
and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considerin! that the marria!e of
the parties appears to have all the bad!es of validit. +n the other hand, le!al separation would
not be a su<cient remed for it would not sever the marria!e tie= hence, the le!all separated
2ilipino spouse would still remain married to the naturali6ed alien spouse.
3owever, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence dul submitted b
respondent concernin! the divorce decree and the naturali6ation of respondentTs wife. &t is settled
rule that one who alle!es a fact has the burden of provin! it and mere alle!ation is not evidence.
B,/C
Accordin!l, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his alle!ation that
his wife was naturali6ed as an American citi6en. *i5ewise, before a forei!n divorce decree can be
reco!ni6ed b our own courts, the part pleadin! it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformit to the forei!n law allowin! it.B,EC #uch forei!n law must also be
proved as our courts cannot ta5e (udicial notice of forei!n laws. *i5e an other fact, such laws
must be alle!ed and proved.B,FC 2urthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree
allows his former wife to remarr as speci"call reGuired in Article D-. +therwise, there would be
no evidence su<cient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marria!e.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holdin! that Para!raph D of Article D- of the 2amil
Code %E.+. No. D0., as amended b E.+. No. DD1', should be interpreted to allow a 2ilipino citi6en,
who has been divorced b a spouse who had acGuired forei!n citi6enship and remarried, also to
remarr. 3owever, considerin! that in the present petition there is no su<cient evidence
submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondentTs bare alle!ations that
his wife, who was naturali6ed as an American citi6en, had obtained a divorce decree and had
remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarr. #uch declaration could
onl be made properl upon respondentTs submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCOR"INGL3, the petition b the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTE". The
assailed )ecision dated Ma ,F, D00D, and Resolution dated 7ul E, D00D, of the Re!ional Trial
Court of Molave, Vamboan!a del #ur, Branch D/, are hereb SET ASI"E.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO OR"ERE".

LEONAR"O A. 6UISUM!ING
Associate 7ustice

AE C+NC?R@



HILARIO G. "AVI"E, 1R.
Chief 7ustice
Chairman



CONSUELO 3NARES5SANTIAGO ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate 7ustice Associate 7ustice




A"OLFO S. AMCUNA
Associate 7ustice



CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to #ection ,/, Article L&&& of the Constitution, it is hereb certi"ed that the
conclusions in the above )ecision were reached in consultation before the case was assi!ned to
the writer of the opinion of the CourtTs )ivision.



HILARIO G. "AVI"E, 1R.
Chief 7ustice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
T3&R) )&L&#&+N
G.R. No. 1J6871 August 11, 2010
GER!ERT R. CORPUM, Petitioner,
vs.
"AIS3L3N TIROL STO. TOMAS #,0 T)$ SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
) E C & # & + N
!RION, J.:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision, of the Re!ional Trial Court %RTC' of *aoa!
Cit, Branch ,,, elevated via a petition for review on certiorariD under Rule EF of the Rules of
Court %present petition'.
Petitioner >erbert R. Corpu6 was a former 2ilipino citi6en who acGuired Canadian citi6enship
throu!h naturali6ation on November D., D000./ +n 7anuar ,K, D00F, >erbert married respondent
)aisln T. #to. Tomas, a 2ilipina, in Pasi! Cit.E )ue to wor5 and other professional commitments,
>erbert left for Canada soon after the weddin!. 3e returned to the Philippines sometime in April
D00F to surprise )aisln, but was shoc5ed to discover that his wife was havin! an a8air with
another man. 3urt and disappointed, >erbert returned to Canada and "led a petition for divorce.
The #uperior Court of 7ustice, Aindsor, +ntario, Canada !ranted >erbertTs petition for divorce on
)ecember K, D00F. The divorce decree too5 e8ect a month later, on 7anuar K, D00-.F
Two ears after the divorce, >erbert has moved on and has found another 2ilipina to love. )esirous
of marrin! his new 2ilipina "ancfe in the Philippines, >erbert went to the Pasi! Cit Civil Re!istr
+<ce and re!istered the Canadian divorce decree on his and )aislnTs marria!e certi"cate.
)espite the re!istration of the divorce decree, an o<cial of the National #tatistics +<ce %N#+'
informed >erbert that the marria!e between him and )aisln still subsists under Philippine law=
to be enforceable, the forei!n divorce decree must "rst be (udiciall reco!ni6ed b a competent
Philippine court, pursuant to N#+ Circular No. E, series of ,.KD.-
Accordin!l, >erbert "led a petition for (udicial reco!nition of forei!n divorce andIor declaration of
marria!e as dissolved %petition' with the RTC. Althou!h summoned, )aisln did not "le an
responsive pleadin! but submitted instead a notari6ed letterImanifestation to the trial court. #he
o8ered no opposition to >erbertTs petition and, in fact, alle!ed her desire to "le a similar case
herself but was prevented b "nancial and personal circumstances. #he, thus, reGuested that she
be considered as a part:in:interest with a similar praer to >erbertTs.
&n its +ctober /0, D00K decision,1 the RTC denied >erbertTs petition. The RTC concluded that
>erbert was not the proper part to institute the action for (udicial reco!nition of the forei!n
divorce decree as he is a naturali6ed Canadian citi6en. &t ruled that onl the 2ilipino spouse can
avail of the remed, under the second para!raph of Article D- of the 2amil Code,K in order for him
or her to be able to remarr under Philippine law.. Article D- of the 2amil Code reads@
Art. D-. All marria!es solemni6ed outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the countr where the were solemni6ed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
countr, e$cept those prohibited under Articles /F%,', %E', %F' and %-', /-, /1 and /K.
Ahere a marria!e between a 2ilipino citi6en and a forei!ner is validl celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validl obtained abroad b the alien spouse capacitatin! him or her to remarr, the
2ilipino spouse shall li5ewise have capacit to remarr under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the le!islative intent behind the enactment of
the second para!raph of Article D- of the 2amil Code, as determined b the Court in Republic v.
+rbecido &&&=,0 the provision was enacted to 9avoid the absurd situation where the 2ilipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtainin! a divorce, is no lon!er married to the
2ilipino spouse.9,,
T3E PET&T&+N
2rom the RTCTs rulin!,,D >erbert "led the present petition.,/
>erbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentiall for declarator relief, similar to that
"led in +rbecido= he, thus, similarl as5s for a determination of his ri!hts under the second
para!raph of Article D- of the 2amil Code. Ta5in! into account the rationale behind the second
para!raph of Article D- of the 2amil Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the
bene"t of the alien spouse. 3e claims that the RTC rulin! undul stretched the doctrine in +rbecido
b limitin! the standin! to "le the petition onl to the 2ilipino spouse S an interpretation he claims
to be contrar to the essence of the second para!raph of Article D- of the 2amil Code. 3e
considers himself as a proper part, vested with su<cient le!al interest, to institute the case, as
there is a possibilit that he mi!ht be prosecuted for bi!am if he marries his 2ilipina "ancfe in the
Philippines since two marria!e certi"cates, involvin! him, would be on "le with the Civil Re!istr
+<ce. The +<ce of the #olicitor >eneral and )aisln, in their respective Comments, ,E both
support >erbertTs position.
Essentiall, the petition raises the issue of whether the second para!raph of Article D- of the
2amil Code e$tends to aliens the ri!ht to petition a court of this (urisdiction for the reco!nition of
a forei!n divorce decree.
T3E C+?RTT# R?*&N>
The alien spouse can claim no ri!ht under the second para!raph of Article D- of the 2amil Code
as the substantive ri!ht it establishes is in favor of the 2ilipino spouse
The resolution of the issue reGuires a review of the le!islative histor and intent behind the second
para!raph of Article D- of the 2amil Code.
The 2amil Code reco!ni6es onl two tpes of defective marria!es S void,F and
voidable,- marria!es. &n both cases, the basis for the (udicial declaration of absolute nullit or
annulment of the marria!e e$ists before or at the time of the marria!e. )ivorce, on the other
hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arisin! after the marria!e.,1 +ur
famil laws do not reco!ni6e absolute divorce between 2ilipino citi6ens.,K
Reco!ni6in! the realit that divorce is a possibilit in marria!es between a 2ilipino and an alien,
President Cora6on C. AGuino, in the e$ercise of her le!islative powers under the 2reedom
Constitution,,. enacted E$ecutive +rder No. %E+' DD1, amendin! Article D- of the 2amil Code to
its present wordin!, as follows@
Art. D-. All marria!es solemni6ed outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the countr where the were solemni6ed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
countr, e$cept those prohibited under Articles /F%,', %E', %F' and %-', /-, /1 and /K.
Ahere a marria!e between a 2ilipino citi6en and a forei!ner is validl celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validl obtained abroad b the alien spouse capacitatin! him or her to remarr, the
2ilipino spouse shall li5ewise have capacit to remarr under Philippine law.
Throu!h the second para!raph of Article D- of the 2amil Code, E+ DD1 e8ectivel incorporated
into the law this CourtTs holdin! in Lan )orn v. Romillo, 7r.D0 and Pilapil v. &ba:#omera.D, &n both
cases, the Court refused to ac5nowled!e the alien spouseTs assertion of marital ri!hts after a
forei!n courtTs divorce decree between the alien and the 2ilipino. The Court, thus, reco!ni6ed that
the forei!n divorce had alread severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court
reasoned in Lan )orn v. Romillo that@
To maintain $ $ $ that, under our laws, Bthe 2ilipino spouseC has to be considered still married to
Bthe alien spouseC and still sub(ect to a wife;s obli!ations $ $ $ cannot be (ust. BThe 2ilipino spouseC
should not be obli!ed to live to!ether with, observe respect and "delit, and render support to
Bthe alien spouseC. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible ri!hts to
con(u!al propert. #he should not be discriminated a!ainst in her own countr if the ends of (ustice
are to be served.DD
As the RTC correctl stated, the provision was included in the law 9to avoid the absurd situation
where the 2ilipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtainin! a divorce, is no
lon!er married to the 2ilipino spouse.9D/ The le!islative intent is for the bene"t of the 2ilipino
spouse, b clarifin! his or her marital status, settlin! the doubts created b the divorce decree.
Essentiall, the second para!raph of Article D- of the 2amil Code provided the 2ilipino spouse a
substantive ri!ht to have his or her marria!e to the alien spouse considered as dissolved,
capacitatin! him or her to remarr.DE Aithout the second para!raph of Article D- of the 2amil
Code, the (udicial reco!nition of the forei!n decree of divorce, whether in a proceedin! instituted
precisel for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceedin!, would be of no si!ni"cance
to the 2ilipino spouse since our laws do not reco!ni6e divorce as a mode of severin! the marital
bond=DF Article ,1 of the Civil Code provides that the polic a!ainst absolute divorces cannot be
subverted b (ud!ments promul!ated in a forei!n countr. The inclusion of the second para!raph
in Article D- of the 2amil Code provides the direct e$ception to this rule and serves as basis for
reco!ni6in! the dissolution of the marria!e between the 2ilipino spouse and his or her alien
spouse.
Additionall, an action based on the second para!raph of Article D- of the 2amil Code is not
limited to the reco!nition of the forei!n divorce decree. &f the court "nds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarr, the courts can declare that the 2ilipino spouse is li5ewise
capacitated to contract another marria!e. No court in this (urisdiction, however, can ma5e a
similar declaration for the alien spouse %other than that alread established b the decree', whose
status and le!al capacit are !enerall !overned b his national law.D-
>iven the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second para!raph of
Article D- of the 2amil Code, the RTC was correct in limitin! the applicabilit of the provision for
the bene"t of the 2ilipino spouse. &n other words, onl the 2ilipino spouse can invo5e the second
para!raph of Article D- of the 2amil Code= the alien spouse can claim no ri!ht under this
provision.
The forei!n divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a ri!ht that clothes the part with le!al
interest to petition for its reco!nition in this (urisdiction
Ae Gualif our above conclusion S i.e., that the second para!raph of Article D- of the 2amil Code
bestows no ri!hts in favor of aliens S with the complementar statement that this conclusion is not
su<cient basis to dismiss >erbertTs petition before the RTC. &n other words, the unavailabilit of
the second para!raph of Article D- of the 2amil Code to aliens does not necessaril strip >erbert
of le!al interest to petition the RTC for the reco!nition of his forei!n divorce decree. The forei!n
divorce decree itself, after its authenticit and conformit with the alienTs national law have been
dul proven accordin! to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of ri!ht in favor
of >erbert, pursuant to #ection EK, Rule /. of the Rules of Court which provides for the e8ect of
forei!n (ud!ments. This #ection states@
#EC. EK. E8ect of forei!n (ud!ments or "nal orders.JThe e8ect of a (ud!ment or "nal order of a
tribunal of a forei!n countr, havin! (urisdiction to render the (ud!ment or "nal order is as follows@
%a' &n case of a (ud!ment or "nal order upon a speci"c thin!, the (ud!ment or "nal order is
conclusive upon the title of the thin!= and
%b' &n case of a (ud!ment or "nal order a!ainst a person, the (ud!ment or "nal order is
presumptive evidence of a ri!ht as between the parties and their successors in interest b a
subseGuent title.
&n either case, the (ud!ment or "nal order ma be repelled b evidence of a want of (urisdiction,
want of notice to the part, collusion, fraud, or clear mista5e of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or bein! the sub(ect of the forei!n (ud!ment is su<cient to clothe
a part with the reGuisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the reco!nition of the
forei!n (ud!ment. &n a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained b an
alien abroad ma be reco!ni6ed in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid accordin! to his or
her national law.D1
The startin! point in an reco!nition of a forei!n divorce (ud!ment is the ac5nowled!ment that our
courts do not ta5e (udicial notice of forei!n (ud!ments and laws. 7ustice 3errera e$plained that, as
a rule, 9no soverei!n is bound to !ive e8ect within its dominion to a (ud!ment rendered b a
tribunal of another countr.9DK This means that the forei!n (ud!ment and its authenticit must be
proven as facts under our rules on evidence, to!ether with the alienTs applicable national law to
show the e8ect of the (ud!ment on the alien himself or herself.D. The reco!nition ma be made in
an action instituted speci"call for the purpose or in another action where a part invo5es the
forei!n decree as an inte!ral aspect of his claim or defense.
&n >erbertTs case, since both the forei!n divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
reco!ni6in! his or her capacit to obtain a divorce, purport to be o<cial acts of a soverei!n
authorit, #ection DE, Rule ,/D of the Rules of Court comes into pla. This #ection reGuires proof,
either b %,' o<cial publications or %D' copies attested b the o<cer havin! le!al custod of the
documents. &f the copies of o<cial records are not 5ept in the Philippines, these must be %a'
accompanied b a certi"cate issued b the proper diplomatic or consular o<cer in the Philippine
forei!n service stationed in the forei!n countr in which the record is 5ept and %b' authenticated
b the seal of his o<ce.
The records show that >erbert attached to his petition a cop of the divorce decree, as well as the
reGuired certi"cates provin! its authenticit,/0 but failed to include a cop of the Canadian law on
divorce./, ?nder this situation, we can, at this point, simpl dismiss the petition for insu<cienc of
supportin! evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to
determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
Ae deem it more appropriate to ta5e this latter course of action, !iven the Article D- interests that
will be served and the 2ilipina wifeTs %)aislnTs' obvious conformit with the petition. A remand,
at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the forei!n (ud!ment and overcome
a petitionerTs presumptive evidence of a ri!ht b provin! want of (urisdiction, want of notice to a
part, collusion, fraud, or clear mista5e of law or fact. Needless to state, ever precaution must be
ta5en to ensure conformit with our laws before a reco!nition is made, as the forei!n (ud!ment,
once reco!ni6ed, shall have the e8ect of res (udicata/D between the parties, as provided in
#ection EK, Rule /. of the Rules of Court.//
&n fact, more than the principle of comit that is served b the practice of reciprocal reco!nition of
forei!n (ud!ments between nations, the res (udicata e8ect of the forei!n (ud!ments of divorce
serves as the deeper basis for e$tendin! (udicial reco!nition and for considerin! the alien spouse
bound b its terms. This same e8ect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the 2ilipino spouse
were it not for the substantive rule that the second para!raph of Article D- of the 2amil Code
provides.
Considerations beond the reco!nition of the forei!n divorce decree
As a matter of 9house5eepin!9 concern, we note that the Pasi! Cit Civil Re!istr +<ce has
alread recorded the divorce decree on >erbert and )aislnTs marria!e certi"cate based on the
mere presentation of the decree./EAe consider the recordin! to be le!all improper= hence, the
need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.
Article E01 of the Civil Code states that 9BaCcts, events and (udicial decrees concernin! the civil
status of persons shall be recorded in the civil re!ister.9 The law reGuires the entr in the civil
re!istr of (udicial decrees that produce le!al conseGuences touchin! upon a personTs le!al
capacit and status, i.e., those a8ectin! 9all his personal Gualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinaril terminable at his own will, such as his bein! le!itimate or
ille!itimate, or his bein! married or not.9/F
A (ud!ment of divorce is a (udicial decree, althou!h a forei!n one, a8ectin! a personTs le!al
capacit and status that must be recorded. &n fact, Act No. /1F/ or the *aw on Re!istr of Civil
#tatus speci"call reGuires the re!istration of divorce decrees in the civil re!istr@
#ec. ,. Civil Re!ister. S A civil re!ister is established for recordin! the civil status of persons, in
which shall be entered@
%a' births=
%b' deaths=
%c' marria!es=
%d' annulments of marria!es=
%e' divorces=
%f' le!itimations=
%!' adoptions=
%h' ac5nowled!ment of natural children=
%i' naturali6ation= and
%(' chan!es of name.
$ $ $ $
#ec. E. Civil Re!ister Boo5s. J The local re!istrars shall 5eep and preserve in their o<ces the
followin! boo5s, in which the shall, respectivel ma5e the proper entries concernin! the civil
status of persons@
%,' Birth and death re!ister=
%D' Marria!e re!ister, in which shall be entered not onl the marria!es solemni6ed but also
divorces and dissolved marria!es.
%/' *e!itimation, ac5nowled!ment, adoption, chan!e of name and naturali6ation re!ister.
But while the law reGuires the entr of the divorce decree in the civil re!istr, the law and the
submission of the decree b themselves do not ipso facto authori6e the decreeTs re!istration. The
law should be read in relation with the reGuirement of a (udicial reco!nition of the forei!n
(ud!ment before it can be !iven res (udicata e8ect. &n the conte$t of the present case, no (udicial
order as et e$ists reco!ni6in! the forei!n divorce decree. Thus, the Pasi! Cit Civil Re!istr +<ce
acted totall out of turn and without authorit of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce
decree on >erbert and )aislnTs marria!e certi"cate, on the stren!th alone of the forei!n decree
presented b >erbert.
Evidentl, the Pasi! Cit Civil Re!istr +<ce was aware of the reGuirement of a court reco!nition,
as it cited N#+ Circular No. E, series of ,.KD,/- and )epartment of 7ustice +pinion No. ,K,, series
of ,.KD/1 S both of which reGuired a "nal order from a competent Philippine court before a forei!n
(ud!ment, dissolvin! a marria!e, can be re!istered in the civil re!istr, but it, nonetheless, allowed
the re!istration of the decree. 2or bein! contrar to law, the re!istration of the forei!n divorce
decree without the reGuisite (udicial reco!nition is patentl void and cannot produce an le!al
e8ect.,avvphi,
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the reco!nition that the RTC ma e$tend to the
Canadian divorce decree does not, b itself, authori6e the cancellation of the entr in the civil
re!istr. A petition for reco!nition of a forei!n (ud!ment is not the proper proceedin!,
contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil re!istr.
Article E,D of the Civil Code declares that 9no entr in a civil re!ister shall be chan!ed or
corrected, without (udicial order.9 The Rules of Court supplements Article E,D of the Civil Code b
speci"call providin! for a special remedial proceedin! b which entries in the civil re!istr ma be
(udiciall cancelled or corrected. Rule ,0K of the Rules of Court sets in detail the (urisdictional and
procedural reGuirements that must be complied with before a (ud!ment, authori6in! the
cancellation or correction, ma be annotated in the civil re!istr. &t also reGuires, amon! others,
that the veri"ed petition must be "led with the RTC of the province where the correspondin! civil
re!istr is located=/K that the civil re!istrar and all persons who have or claim an interest must
be made parties to the proceedin!s=/. and that the time and place for hearin! must be published
in a newspaper of !eneral circulation.E0 As these basic (urisdictional reGuirements have not been
met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition >erbert "led with the RTC as one "led
under Rule ,0K of the Rules of Court.
Ae hasten to point out, however, that this rulin! should not be construed as reGuirin! two
separate proceedin!s for the re!istration of a forei!n divorce decree in the civil re!istr S one for
reco!nition of the forei!n decree and another speci"call for cancellation of the entr under Rule
,0K of the Rules of Court. The reco!nition of the forei!n divorce decree ma be made in a Rule ,0K
proceedin! itself, as the ob(ect of special proceedin!s %such as that in Rule ,0K of the Rules of
Court' is precisel to establish the status or ri!ht of a part or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule ,0K
of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceedin!E, b which the
applicabilit of the forei!n (ud!ment can be measured and tested in terms of (urisdictional
in"rmities, want of notice to the part, collusion, fraud, or clear mista5e of law or fact.
IHEREFORE, we >RANT the petition for review on certiorari, and RELER#E the +ctober /0, D00K
decision of the Re!ional Trial Court of *aoa! Cit, Branch ,,, as well as its 2ebruar ,1, D00. order.
Ae order the REMAN) of the case to the trial court for further proceedin!s in accordance with our
rulin! above. *et a cop of this )ecision be furnished the Civil Re!istrar >eneral. No costs.
#+ +R)ERE).
ARTURO ". !RION
Associate 7ustice
AE C+NC?R@
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate 7ustice
LUCAS P. !ERSAMIN
Associate 7ustice
RO!ERTO A. A!A"
Associate 7ustice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, 1R.
Associate 7ustice
A T T E # T A T & + N
& attest that the conclusions in the above )ecision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assi!ned to the writer of the opinion of the CourtTs )ivision.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate 7ustice
Chairperson
C E R T & 2 & C A T & + N
Pursuant to #ection ,/, Article L&&& of the Constitution, and the )ivision ChairpersonTs Attestation, it
is hereb certi"ed that the conclusions in the above )ecision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assi!ned to the writer of the opinion of the CourtTs )ivision.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief 7ustice
Foot,ot$s
U )esi!nated additional Member of the Third )ivision, in view of the retirement of Chief
7ustice Renato #. Puno, per #pecial +rder No. KE/ dated Ma ,1, D0,0.
, )ated +ctober /0, D00K, penned b 7ud!e Perla B. Querubin= rollo, pp. DE:/,.
D &d. at /:D0.
/ &d. at D1.
E Marria!e Certi"cate, id. at /1.
F Certi"cate of )ivorce, id. at /K.
- &d. at E1:F0= the pertinent portion of N#+ Circular No. E, series of ,.KD, states@
&t would therefore be premature to re!ister the decree of annulment in the Re!ister
of Annulment of Marria!es in Manila, unless and until "nal order of e$ecution of such
forei!n (ud!ment is issued b competent Philippine court.
1 #upra note ,.
K E$ecutive +rder No. D0., enacted on 7ul -, ,.K1.
. Rollo, p. /,.
,0 >.R. No. ,FE/K0, +ctober F, D00F, E1D #CRA ,,E.
,, &d. at ,D,.
,D >erbertTs motion for reconsideration of the RTCTs +ctober /0, D00K decision was denied
in an order dated 2ebruar ,1, D00.= rollo, p. /D.
,/ #upra note D.
,E Rollo, pp. 1.:K1 and ,DF:,ED, respectivel.
,F The void marria!es are those enumerated under Articles /F, /-, /1, /K, E0, E,, EE, and
F/ in relation to Article FD of the 2amil Code.
,- The voidable marria!es are those enumerated under Article EF of the 2amil Code.
,1 >arcia v. Recio, >.R. No. ,/K/DD, +ctober D, D00,, /-- #CRA E/1, EFD.
,K &bid. #ee A. Tolentino, Commentaries and 7urisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines, Lolume +ne, with the 2amil Code of the Philippines %D00E ed.', p. D-D.
,. Proclamation No. /, issued on March DF, ,..-.
D0 >.R. No. *:-KE10, +ctober K, ,.KF, ,/. #CRA ,/..
D, >.R. No. K0,,-, 7une /0, ,.K., ,1E #CRA -F/.
DD Lan )orn v. Romillo, supra note D0 at ,EE.
D/ Republic v. +rbecido, supra note ,0 at ,D,.
DE The capacit of the 2ilipino spouse to remarr, however, depends on whether the forei!n
divorce decree capacitated the alien spouse to do so.
DF #ee Article ,1 in relation to Article ,F of the Civil Code@
Art. ,F. *aws relatin! to famil ri!hts and duties, or to the status, condition and le!al
capacit of persons are bindin! upon citi6ens of the Philippines, even thou!h livin!
abroad.
$ $ $ $
Art. ,1. $ $ $ Prohibitive laws concernin! persons, their acts or propert, and those
which have for their ob(ect public order, public polic and !ood customs shall not be
rendered ine8ective b laws or (ud!ments promul!ated, or b determinations or
conventions a!reed upon in a forei!n countr.
D- Parentheticall, we add that an alienTs le!al capacit to contract is evidenced b a
certi"cate issued b his or her respective diplomatic and consular o<cials, which he or she
must present to secure a marria!e license %Article D,, 2amil Code'. The 2ilipino spouse
who see5s to remarr, however, must still resort to a (udicial action for a declaration of
authorit to remarr.
D1 >arcia v. Recio, supra note ,1 at EE1= citin! Lan )orn v. Romillo, supra note D0.
DK Remedial *aw, Lolume &&, Rules D/:F- %D001 ed.', p. FD..
D. Republic v. +rbecido &&&, supra note ,0 at ,D/ and >arcia v. Recio, supra note ,1 at EEK=
see also Baot v. Court of Appeals, >.R. No. ,FF-/F, November 1, D00K, F10 #CRA E1D.
/0 Rollo, pp. /K:E,.
/, The forei!n divorce decree onl stated that the marria!e between >erbert and )aisln
was dissolved b the Canadian court. The full te$t of the courtTs (ud!ment was not included.
/D *iterall means 9a thin! ad(ud!ed,9 Blac5Ts *aw )ictionar %Fth ed.', p. ,,1K= it
establishes a rule that a "nal (ud!ment or decree on the merits b a court of competent
(urisdiction is conclusive of the ri!hts of the parties or their privies in all later suits, on
points and matters determined in the former. @upra note DK at E-D.
// #ee Philsec &nvestment Corporation v. Court of Appeals, >.R. No. ,0/E./, 7une ,., ,..1,
D1E #CRA ,0D, ,,0, where the Court said@
Ahile this Court has !iven the e8ect of res (udicata to forei!n (ud!ments in several
cases, it was after the parties opposed to the (ud!ment had been !iven ample
opportunit to repel them on !rounds allowed under the law. &t is not necessar for
this purpose to initiate a separate action or proceedin! for enforcement of the
forei!n (ud!ment. Ahat is essential is that there is opportunit to challen!e the
forei!n (ud!ment, in order for the court to properl determine its e<cac. This is
because in this (urisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as distin!uished
from actions in rem, a forei!n (ud!ment merel constitutes prima facie evidence of
the (ustness of the claim of a part and, as such, is sub(ect to proof to the contrar.
/E +n the face of the marria!e certi"cate, the word 9)&L+RCE)9 was written in bi!, bold
letters= rollo, p. /1.
/F #ilverio v. Republic, >.R. No. ,1E-K., +ctober DD, D001, F/1 #CRA /1/, /.0, citin!
Bedua v. Republic, ,D0 Phil. ,,E %,.-E'.
Republic of the Philippines
Su*&$+$ Cou&t
Manila
SECON" "IVISION
MEROPE ENRI6UEM V"A. "E CATALAN,
Petitioner,
: versus :
LOUELLA A. CATALAN5LEE,
Respondent.

G. R. No. 1J<622
P&$s$,t>
CARP&+, 9., Chairperson,
BR&+N,
PEREV,
#EREN+, and
REME#, 99.
P&o+u/g#t$0>
2ebruar K, D0,D
; 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 ;
RESOLUTION
SERENO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review assailin! the Court of Appeals %CA' )ecisionB,C and
ResolutionBDC re!ardin! the issuance of letters of administration of the intestate estate of +rlando
B. Catalan.
The facts are as follows@
+rlando B. Catalan was a naturali6ed American citi6en. After alle!edl obtainin! a divorce in the
?nited #tates from his "rst wife, 2elicitas Amor, he contracted a second marria!e with petitioner
herein.
+n ,K November D00E, +rlando died intestate in the Philippines.
Thereafter, on DK 2ebruar D00F, petitioner "led with the Re!ional Trial Court %RTC' of )a!upan
Cit a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as administratri$ of
the intestate estate of +rlando. The case was doc5eted as #pecial Proceedin!s %#pec. Proc.' No.
DDK.
+n / March D00F, while #pec. Proc. No. DDK was pendin!, respondent *ouella A. Catalan:*ee, one
of the children of +rlando from his "rst marria!e, "led a similar petition with the RTC doc5eted as
#pec. Proc. No. D/D.
The two cases were subseGuentl consolidated.
Petitioner praed for the dismissal of #pec. Proc. No. D/D on the !round of litis pendentia,
considerin! that #pec. Proc. No. DDK coverin! the same estate was alread pendin!.
+n the other hand, respondent alle!ed that petitioner was not considered an interested person
Guali"ed to "le a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of +rlando. &n
support of her contention, respondent alle!ed that a criminal case for bi!am was "led a!ainst
petitioner before Branch FE of the RTC of Alaminos, Pan!asinan, and doc5eted as Crim. Case No.
D-..:A.
Apparentl, 2elicitas Amor "led a Complaint for bi!am, alle!in! that petitioner contracted a
second marria!e to +rlando despite havin! been married to one Eusebio Bristol on ,D )ecember
,.F..
+n - Au!ust ,..K, the RTC had acGuitted petitioner of bi!am.B/C The trial court ruled that since
the deceased was a divorced American citi6en, and since that divorce was not reco!ni6ed under
Philippine (urisdiction, the marria!e between him and petitioner was not valid.
2urthermore, it too5 note of the action for declaration of nullit then pendin! action with the trial
court in )a!upan Cit "led b 2elicitas Amor a!ainst the deceased and petitioner. &t considered the
pendin! action to be a pre(udicial Guestion in determinin! the !uilt of petitioner for the crime of
bi!am.
2inall, the trial court found that, in the "rst place, petitioner had never been married to Eusebio
Bristol.
+n D- 7une D00-, Branch 10 of the RTC of Bur!os, Pan!asinan dismissed the Petition for the
issuance of letters of administration "led b petitioner and !ranted that of private respondent.
Contrar to its "ndin!s in Crim. Case No. D-..:A, the RTC held that the marria!e between
petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsistin! when she married +rlando. Aithout
e$poundin!, it reasoned further that her acGuittal in the previous bi!am case was fatal to her
cause. Thus, the trial court held that petitioner was not an interested part who ma "le a petition
for the issuance of letters of administration.BEC
After the subseGuent denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to
the Court of Appeals %CA' via her Petition for Certiorari, alle!in! !rave abuse of discretion on the
part of the RTC in dismissin! her Petition for the issuance of letters of administration.
Petitioner reiterated before the CA that the Petition "led b respondent should have been
dismissed on the !round of litis pendentia. #he also insisted that, while a petition for letters of
administration ma have been "led b an Yuninterested person,Z the defect was cured b the
appearance of a real part:in:interest. Thus, she insisted that, to determine who has a better ri!ht
to administer the decedentTs properties, the RTC should have "rst reGuired the parties to present
their evidence before it ruled on the matter.
+n ,K +ctober D001, the CA promul!ated the assailed )ecision. 2irst, it held that petitioner
undertoo5 the wron! remed. #he should have instead "led a petition for review rather than a
petition for certiorari. Nevertheless, since the Petition for Certiorari was "led within the "fteen:da
re!lementar period for "lin! a petition for review under #ec. E of Rule E/, the CA allowed the
Petition and continued to decide on the merits of the case. Thus, it ruled in this wise@
As to the issue of litis pendentia, we "nd it not applicable in the case. 2or litis
pendentia to be a !round for the dismissal of an action, there must be@ %a' identit
of the parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both actions= %b'
identit of ri!hts asserted and relief praed for, the relief bein! founded on the
same acts, and %c' the identit in the two cases should be such that the (ud!ment
which ma be rendered in one would, re!ardless of which part is successful,
amount to res #udicata in the other. A petition for letters of administration is a
special proceedin!. A special proceedin! is an application or proceedin! to establish
the status or ri!ht of a part, or a particular fact. And, in contrast to an ordinar civil
action, a special proceedin! involves no defendant or respondent. The onl part in
this 5ind of proceedin! is the petitioner of the applicant. Considerin! its nature, a
subseGuent petition for letters of administration can hardl be barred b a similar
pendin! petition involvin! the estate of the same decedent unless both petitions are
"led b the same person. &n the case at bar, the petitioner was not a part to the
petition "led b the private respondent, in the same manner that the latter was not
made a part to the petition "led b the former. The "rst element of litis
pendentia is wantin!. The contention of the petitioner must perforce fail.
Moreover, to ield to the contention of the petitioner would render nu!ator the
provision of the Rules reGuirin! a petitioner for letters of administration to be an
Yinterested part,Z inasmuch as an person, for that matter, re!ardless of whether
he has valid interest in the estate sou!ht to be administered, could be appointed as
administrator for as lon! as he "les his petition ahead of an other person, in
dero!ation of the ri!hts of those speci"call mentioned in the order of preference in
the appointment of administrator under Rule 1K, #ection - of the Revised Rules of
Court, which provides@
$$$ $$$ $$$
The petitioner, armed with a marria!e certi"cate, "led her petition for letters of
administration. As a spouse, the petitioner would have been preferred to administer
the estate of +rlando B. Catalan. 3owever, a marria!e certi"cate, li5e an other
public document, is onl prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. T)$ (#%t
t)#t t)$ *$t2t2o,$& )#0 -$$, %)#&g$0 ?2t) -2g#+' #,0 ?#s #%Au2tt$0 )#s
,ot -$$, 02s*ut$0 -' t)$ *$t2t2o,$&. Bi!am is an ille!al marria!e committed
b contractin! a second or subseGuent marria!e before the "rst marria!e has been
dissolved or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptivel dead b a
(ud!ment rendered in a proper proceedin!s. T)$ 0$0u%t2o, o( t)$ t&2#/ %ou&t
t)#t t)$ #%Au2tt#/ o( t)$ *$t2t2o,$& 2, t)$ s#20 %#s$ ,$g#t$s t)$ =#/202t' o(
)$& su-s$Au$,t +#&&2#g$ ?2t) O&/#,0o !. C#t#/#, )#s ,ot -$$, 02s*&o=$0
-' )$&. T)$&$ ?#s ,ot $=$, #, #tt$+*t (&o+ t)$ *$t2t2o,$& to 0$,' t)$
D,02,gs o( t)$ t&2#/ %ou&t. There is therefore no basis for us to ma5e a contrar
"ndin!. Thus, not bein! an interested part and a stran!er to the estate of +rlando
B. Catalan, the dismissal of her petition for letters of administration b the trial court
is in place.
$$$ $$$ $$$
IHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is "ISMISSE" for lac5 of merit. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO OR"ERE".BFC %Emphasis supplied'
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this )ecision.B-C #he alle!ed that the reasonin! of
the CA was illo!ical in statin!, on the one hand, that she was acGuitted of bi!am, while, on the
other hand, still holdin! that her marria!e with +rlando was invalid. #he insists that with her
acGuittal of the crime of bi!am, the marria!e en(os the presumption of validit.
+n D0 7une D00K, the CA denied her motion.
3ence, this Petition.
At the outset, it seems that the RTC in the special proceedin!s failed to appreciate the "ndin! of
the RTC in Crim. Case No. D-..:A that petitioner was never married to Eusebio Bristol. Thus, the
trial court concluded that, because petitioner was acGuitted of bi!am, it follows that the "rst
marria!e with Bristol still e$isted and was valid. B failin! to ta5e note of the "ndin!s of fact on
the none$istence of the marria!e between petitioner and Bristol, both the RTC and CA held that
petitioner was not an interested part in the estate of +rlando.
#econd, it is imperative to note that at the time the bi!am case in Crim. Case No. D-..:A was
dismissed, we had alread ruled that under the principles of comit, our (urisdiction reco!ni6es a
valid divorce obtained b a spouse of forei!n nationalit. This doctrine was established as earl as
,.KF in Ban Dorn $. Romillo, 9r.B1C wherein we said@
&t is true that owin! to the nationalit principle embodied in Article ,F of the Civil
Code, onl Philippine nationals are covered b the polic a!ainst absolute divorcesB,C
the same bein! considered contrar to our concept of public polic and
moralit.Ho?$=$&, #/2$,s +#' o-t#2, 02=o&%$s #-&o#0, ?)2%) +#' -$
&$%og,2@$0 2, t)$ P)2/2**2,$s, *&o=20$0 t)$' #&$ =#/20 #%%o&02,g to t)$2&
,#t2o,#/ /#?. I, t)2s %#s$, t)$ 02=o&%$ 2, N$=#0# &$/$#s$0 *&2=#t$
&$s*o,0$,t (&o+ t)$ +#&&2#g$ (&o+ t)$ st#,0#&0s o( A+$&2%#, /#?, u,0$&
?)2%) 02=o&%$ 02sso/=$s t)$ +#&&2#g$. $$$
Ae reiterated this principle in .lorente $. *ourt of Appeals,BKC to wit@
&n Ban Dorn $. Romillo, 9r. we held that owin! to the nationalit principle embodied
in Article ,F of the Civil Code, onl Philippine nationals are covered b the polic
a!ainst absolute divorces, the same bein! considered contrar to our concept of
public polic and moralit. &n the same case, t)$ Cou&t &u/$0 t)#t #/2$,s +#'
o-t#2, 02=o&%$s #-&o#0, *&o=20$0 t)$' #&$ =#/20 #%%o&02,g to t)$2& ,#t2o,#/
/#?.
C2t2,g t)2s /#,0+#&E %#s$, t)$ Cou&t )$/0 2, 'uita v. Court of Appeals, t)#t
o,%$ *&o=$, t)#t &$s*o,0$,t ?#s ,o /o,g$& # F2/2*2,o %2t2@$, ?)$, )$
o-t#2,$0 t)$ 02=o&%$ (&o+ *$t2t2o,$&, t)$ &u/2,g 2, .an "orn ?ou/0 -$%o+$
#**/2%#-/$ #,0 *$t2t2o,$& %ou/0 P=$&' ?$// /os$ )$& &2g)t to 2,)$&2tN (&o+
)2+.
&n !ilapil $. &ba2@omera, we reco!ni6ed the divorce obtained b the respondent in
his countr, the 2ederal Republic of >erman. T)$&$, ?$ st#t$0 t)#t 02=o&%$ #,0
2ts /$g#/ $H$%ts +#' -$ &$%og,2@$0 2, t)$ P)2/2**2,$s 2,so(#& #s &$s*o,0$,t
2s %o,%$&,$0 2, =2$? o( t)$ ,#t2o,#/2t' *&2,%2*/$ 2, ou& %2=2/ /#? o, t)$
st#tus o( *$&so,s.
2or failin! to appl these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be
reversed. I$ )o/0 t)#t t)$ 02=o&%$ o-t#2,$0 -' Lo&$,@o H. L/o&$,t$ (&o+ )2s
D&st ?2($ P#u/# ?#s =#/20 #,0 &$%og,2@$0 2, t)2s Bu&2s02%t2o, #s # +#tt$& o(
%o+2t'. $$$
Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still "rst be proven as we have enunciated in Garcia $. Recio,
B.C to wit@
Respondent is !ettin! ahead of himself. Before a forei!n (ud!ment is !iven
presumptive evidentiar value, the document must "rst be presented and admitted
in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven b the divorce decree
itself. I,0$$0 t)$ -$st $=20$,%$ o( # Bu0g+$,t 2s t)$ Bu0g+$,t 2ts$/(. The
decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an o<cial bod or tribunal
of a forei!n countr.
?nder #ections DE and DF of Rule ,/D, on the other hand, a writin! or document
ma be proven as a public or o<cial record of a forei!n countr b either %,' an
o<cial publication or %D' a cop thereof attested b the o<cer havin! le!al custod
of the document. &f the record is not 5ept in the Philippines, such cop must be %a'
accompanied b a certi"cate issued b the proper diplomatic or consular o<cer in
the Philippine forei!n service stationed in the forei!n countr in which the record is
5ept and %b' authenticated b the seal of his o<ce.
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha #amson appears to be an
authentic one issued b an Australian famil court. 3owever, appearance is not
su<cient= %o+*/2#,%$ ?2t) t)$ #(o&$+$,t2o,$0 &u/$s o, $=20$,%$ +ust -$
0$+o,st&#t$0.
2ortunatel for respondent;s cause, when the divorce decree of Ma ,K, ,.K. was
submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner ob(ected, not to its admissibilit, but
onl to the fact that it had not been re!istered in the *ocal Civil Re!istr of
Cabanatuan Cit. The trial court ruled that it was admissible, sub(ect to petitioner;s
Guali"cation. 3ence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded wei!ht b the (ud!e.
&ndeed, petitioner;s failure to ob(ect properl rendered the divorce decree admissible
as a written act of the 2amil Court of #dne, Australia.
Compliance with the Guoted articles %,,, ,/ and FD' of the 2amil Code is not
necessar= respondent was no lon!er bound b Philippine personal laws after he
acGuired Australian citi6enship in ,..D. Naturali6ation is the le!al act of adoptin! an
alien and clothin! him with the political and civil ri!hts belon!in! to a citi6en.
Naturali6ed citi6ens, freed from the protective cloa5 of their former states, don the
attires of their adoptive countries. B becomin! an Australian, respondent severed
his alle!iance to the Philippines and the $inculum #uris that had tied him to
Philippine personal laws.
4urden of !ro$ing Australian .a"
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon
petitioner, because she is the part challen!in! the validit of a forei!n (ud!ment.
3e contends that petitioner was satis"ed with the ori!inal of the divorce decree and
was co!ni6ant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and wor5ed in
that countr for Guite a lon! time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is alle!edl
5nown b Philippine courts= thus, (ud!es ma ta5e (udicial notice of forei!n laws in
the e$ercise of sound discretion.
Ae are not persuaded. T)$ -u&0$, o( *&oo( /2$s ?2t) t)$ P*#&t' ?)o #//$g$s
t)$ $;2st$,%$ o( # (#%t o& t)2,g ,$%$ss#&' 2, t)$ *&os$%ut2o, o& 0$($,s$ o(
#, #%t2o,.N I, %2=2/ %#s$s, */#2,t2Hs )#=$ t)$ -u&0$, o( *&o=2,g t)$ +#t$&2#/
#//$g#t2o,s o( t)$ %o+*/#2,t ?)$, t)os$ #&$ 0$,2$0 -' t)$ #,s?$&L #,0
0$($,0#,ts )#=$ t)$ -u&0$, o( *&o=2,g t)$ +#t$&2#/ #//$g#t2o,s 2, t)$2&
#,s?$& ?)$, t)$' 2,t&o0u%$ ,$? +#tt$&s. S2,%$ t)$ 02=o&%$ ?#s # 0$($,s$
&#2s$0 -' &$s*o,0$,t, t)$ -u&0$, o( *&o=2,g t)$ *$&t2,$,t Aust&#/2#, /#?
=#/20#t2,g 2t (#//s sAu#&$/' u*o, )2+.
It 2s ?$//5s$tt/$0 2, ou& Bu&2s02%t2o, t)#t ou& %ou&ts %#,,ot t#E$ Bu02%2#/
,ot2%$ o( (o&$2g, /#?s. L2E$ #,' ot)$& (#%ts, t)$' +ust -$ #//$g$0 #,0
*&o=$0. Aust&#/2#, +#&2t#/ /#?s #&$ ,ot #+o,g t)os$ +#tt$&s t)#t Bu0g$s
#&$ su**os$0 to E,o? -' &$#so, o( t)$2& Bu02%2#/ (u,%t2o,. T)$ *o?$& o(
Bu02%2#/ ,ot2%$ +ust -$ $;$&%2s$0 ?2t) %#ut2o,, #,0 $=$&' &$#so,#-/$ 0ou-t
u*o, t)$ su-B$%t s)ou/0 -$ &$so/=$0 2, t)$ ,$g#t2=$. %Emphasis supplied'
&t appears that the trial court no lon!er reGuired petitioner to prove the validit of +rlandoTs
divorce under the laws of the ?nited #tates and the marria!e between petitioner and the
deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedin!s to the trial court for further reception
of evidence to establish the fact of divorce.
#hould petitioner prove the validit of the divorce and the subseGuent marria!e, she has the
preferential ri!ht to be issued the letters of administration over the estate. +therwise, letters of
administration ma be issued to respondent, who is undisputedl the dau!hter or ne$t of 5in of the
deceased, in accordance with #ec. - of Rule 1K of the Revised Rules of Court.
This is consistent with our rulin! in @an .uis $. @an .uis,B,0C in which we said@
Applin! the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree alle!edl
obtained b Merr *ee which absolutel allowed 2elicisimo to remarr, would have
vested 2elicidad with the le!al personalit to "le the present petition as 2elicisimo;s
survivin! spouse. Ho?$=$&, t)$ &$%o&0s s)o? t)#t t)$&$ 2s 2,suG%2$,t
$=20$,%$ to *&o=$ t)$ =#/202t' o( t)$ 02=o&%$ o-t#2,$0 -' M$&&' L$$ #s ?$//
#s t)$ +#&&2#g$ o( &$s*o,0$,t #,0 F$/2%2s2+o u,0$& t)$ /#?s o( t)$
U.S.A. &n Garcia $. Recio, the Court laid down the speci"c !uidelines for pleadin!
and provin! forei!n law and divorce (ud!ments. &t held that presentation solel of
the divorce decree is insu<cient and that proof of its authenticit and due e$ecution
must be presented. ?nder #ections DE and DF of Rule ,/D, a writin! or document
ma be proven as a public or o<cial record of a forei!n countr b either %,' an
o<cial publication or %D' a cop thereof attested b the o<cer havin! le!al custod
of the document. &f the record is not 5ept in the Philippines, such cop must be %a'
accompanied b a certi"cate issued b the proper diplomatic or consular o<cer in
the Philippine forei!n service stationed in the forei!n countr in which the record is
5ept and %b' authenticated b the seal of his o<ce.
Aith re!ard to respondent;s marria!e to 2elicisimo alle!edl solemni6ed in
California, ?.#.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marria!e Certi"cate and the
annotated te$t of the 2amil *aw Act of California which purportedl show that their
marria!e was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in >arcia, however,
the Court cannot ta5e (udicial notice of forei!n laws as the must be alle!ed and
proved.
T)$&$(o&$, t)2s %#s$ s)ou/0 -$ &$+#,0$0 to t)$ t&2#/ %ou&t (o& (u&t)$&
&$%$*t2o, o( $=20$,%$ o, t)$ 02=o&%$ 0$%&$$ o-t#2,$0 -' M$&&' L$$ #,0 t)$
+#&&2#g$ o( &$s*o,0$,t #,0 F$/2%2s2+o. %Emphasis supplied'
Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to "rst determine the validit of the divorce to ascertain the
ri!htful part to be issued the letters of administration over the estate of +rlando B. Catalan.
IHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereb PARTIALL3 GRANTE". The )ecision
dated ,K +ctober D001 and the Resolution dated D0 7une D00K of the Court of Appeals are
hereb REVERSE" and SET ASI"E. *et this case be REMAN"E" to Branch 10 of the Re!ional
Trial Court of Bur!os, Pan!asinan for further proceedin!s in accordance with this )ecision.
SO OR"ERE".
MARIA LOUR"ES P. A. SERENO
Associate 7ustice
AE C+NC?R@
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate 7ustice
Chairperson
ARTURO ". !RION 1OSE PORTUGAL PEREM
Associate 7ustice Associate 7ustice
!IENVENI"O L. RE3ES
Associate 7ustice
A T T E S T A T I O N
& attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation
before the case was assi!ned to the writer of the opinion of the CourtTs )ivision.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate 7ustice
Chairperson, #econd )ivision
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to #ection ,/, Article L&&& of the Constitution and the )ivision ChairpersonTs
Attestation, & certif that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assi!ned to the writer of the opinion of the CourtTs )ivision.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief 7ustice
epublic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
T3&R) )&L&#&+N
G.R. No. 161921 1u/' 17, 201<
1O3CE V. AR"IENTE, PET&T&+NER,
vs.
SPOUSES 1AVIER AN" MA. THERESA PASTORFI"E, CAGA3AN "E ORO IATER "ISTRICT
AN" GASPAR GONMALEM,T 1R., RE#P+N)ENT#.
) E C & # & + N
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule EF of the Rules of Court see5in! to
reverse and set aside the )ecision, and ResolutionD of the Court of Appeals %CA', dated Au!ust
DK, D00/ and )ecember ,1, D00/, respectivel, in CA:>.R. CL No. 1/000. The CA )ecision a<rmed
with modi"cation the Au!ust ,F, D00, )ecision/ of the Re!ional Trial Court %RTC' of Ca!aan de
+ro Cit, Branch DE, while the CA Resolution denied petitioner;s Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts, as summari6ed b the CA, are as follows@
B3erein petitionerC 7oce L. Ardiente and her husband )r. Roberto #. Ardiente are owners of a
housin! unit at Emil 3omes, Balulan!, Ca!aan de +ro Cit with a lot area of one hundred "ft:
three %,F/' sGuare meters and covered b Transfer Certi"cate of Title No. -..0F.
+n 7une D, ,..E, 7oce Ardiente entered into a Memorandum of A!reement %E$h. 9B9, pp. E10:E1/,
Records' sellin!, transferrin! and convein! in favor of BrespondentC Ma. Theresa Pastor"de all
their ri!hts and interests in the housin! unit at Emil 3omes in consideration of P10,000.00. The
Memorandum of A!reement carries a stipulation@
9E. That the water and power bill of the sub(ect propert shall be for the account of the #econd
Part %Ma. Theresa Pastor"de' e8ective 7une ,, ,..E.9 %Records, p. E1'
vis:a:vis Ma. Theresa Pastor"de;s assumption of the pament of the mort!a!e loan secured b
7oce Ardiente from the National 3ome Mort!a!e %Records, E$h. 9A9, pp. E-K:E-.'
2or four %E' ears, Ma. Theresa;s use of the water connection in the name of 7oce Ardiente was
never Guestioned nor perturbed %T.#.N., +ctober /,, D000, pp. 1:K' until on March ,D, ,...,
without notice, the water connection of Ma. Theresa was cut o8. Proceedin! to the o<ce of the
Ca!aan de +ro Aater )istrict %C+A)' to complain, a certain Mrs. Mad(os told Ma. Theresa that
she was delinGuent for three %/' months correspondin! to the months of )ecember ,..K, 7anuar
,..., and 2ebruar ,.... Ma. Theresa ar!ued that the due date of her pament was March ,K,
,... et %T.#.N., +ctober /,, D000, pp. ,,:,D'. Mrs. Mad(os later told her that it was at the
instance of 7oce Ardiente that the water line was cut o8 %T.#.N., 2ebruar F, D00,, p. /,'.
+n March ,F, ,..., Ma. Theresa paid the delinGuent bills %T.#.N., +ctober /,, D000, p. ,D'. +n the
same date, throu!h her lawer, Ma. Theresa wrote a letter to the C+A) to e$plain who authori6ed
the cuttin! of the water line %Records, p. ,-0'.
+n March ,K, ,..., C+A), throu!h the !eneral mana!er, BrespondentC >aspar >on6ale6, 7r.,
answered the letter dated March ,F, ,... and reiterated that it was at the instance of 7oce
Ardiente that the water line was cut o8 %Records, p. ,-,'.
A!!rieved, on April ,E, ,..., Ma. Theresa Pastor"de Band her husbandC "led BaC complaint for
dama!es Ba!ainst petitioner, C+A) and its mana!er >aspar >on6ale6C %Records, pp. D:-'.
&n the meantime, Ma. Theresa Pastor"de;s water line was onl restored and reconnected when the
BtrialC court issued a writ of preliminar mandator in(unction on )ecember ,E, ,... %Records, p.
D/1'.E
After trial, the RTC rendered (ud!ment holdin! as follows@
$ $ $ $
&n the e$ercise of their ri!hts and performance of their duties, defendants did not act with (ustice,
!ave plainti8s their due and observe honest and !ood faith. Before disconnectin! the water
suppl, defendants C+A) and En!r. >aspar >on6ales did not even send a disconnection notice to
plainti8s as testi"ed to b En!r. Bienvenido Batar, in:char!e of the Commercial )epartment of
defendant C+A). There was one thou!h, but onl three %/' das after the actual disconnection on
March ,D, ,.... The due date for pament was et on March ,F. Clearl, the did not act with
(ustice. Neither did the observe honest.
The should not have been swaed b the proddin! of 7oce L. Ardiente. The should have
investi!ated "rst as to the present ownership of the house. 2or doin! the act because Ardiente told
them, the were ne!li!ent. )efendant 7oce Ardiente should have reGuested before the cuttin! o8
of the water suppl, plainti8s to pa. Ahile she attempted to tell plainti8s but she did not have the
patience of seein! them. #he 5new that it was plainti8s who had been usin! the water four %E'
ears a!o and not hers. #he should have been ver careful. $ $ $F
The dispositive portion of the trial court;s )ecision reads, thus@
A3ERE2+RE, premises considered, (ud!ment is hereb rendered orderin! defendants BArdiente,
C+A) and >on6ale6C to pa (ointl and severall plainti8s, the followin! sums@
%a' PD00,000.00 for moral dama!es=
%b' D00,000.00 for e$emplar dama!es= and
%c' F0,000.00 for attorne;s fee.
The cross:claim of Ca!aan de +ro Aater )istrict and En!r. >aspar >on6ales is hereb dismissed.
The Court is not swaed that the cuttin! o8 of the water suppl of plainti8s was because the
were inRuenced b defendant 7oce Ardiente. The were ne!li!ent too for which the should be
liable.
#+ +R)ERE).-
Petitioner, C+A) and >on6ale6 "led an appeal with the CA.
+n Au!ust DK, D00/, the CA promul!ated its assailed )ecision disposin! as follows@
&N L&EA +2 A** T3E 2+RE>+&N>, the appealed decision is A22&RME), with the modi"cation that
the awarded dama!es is reduced to P,00,000.00 each for moral and e$emplar dama!es, while
attorne;s fees is lowered toPDF,000.00. Costs a!ainst appellants.
#+ +R)ERE).1
The CA ruled, with respect to petitioner, that she has a 9le!al dut to honor the possession and use
of water line b Ma. Theresa Pastor"de pursuant to their Memorandum of A!reement9 and 9that
when BpetitionerC applied for its disconnection, she acted in bad faith causin! pre(udice and Bin(ur
toC Ma. Theresa Pastor"de.9K
As to C+A) and >on6ale6, the CA held that the 9failed to !ive a notice of disconnection and
derelicted in reconnectin! the water line despite pament of the unpaid bills b the Brespondent
spouses Pastor"deC.9.
Petitioner, C+A) and >on6ale6 "led their respective Motions for Reconsideration, but these were
denied b the CA in its Resolution dated )ecember ,1, D00/.
C+A) and >on6ale6 "led a petition for review on certiorari with this Court, which was doc5eted as
>.R. No. ,-,K0D. 3owever, based on technical !rounds and on the "ndin! that the CA did not
commit an reversible error in its assailed )ecision, the petition was denied via a
Resolution,0 issued b this Court on March DE, D00E. C+A) and >on6ale6 "led a motion for
reconsideration, but the same was denied with "nalit throu!h this Court;s Resolution,, dated
7une DK, D00E.
Petitioner, on the other hand, timel "led the instant petition with the followin! Assi!nment of
Errors@
1., 3+N+RAB*E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# %A*T3+?>3 &T 3A# RE)?CE) T3E *&AB&*&TM &NT+
3A*2' 3A# #T&** C+MM&TTE) >RALE AN) #ER&+?# ERR+R A3EN &T ?P3E*) T3E 7+&NT
AN) #+*&)ARM *&AB&*&TM +2 PET&T&+NER 7+MCE L. AR)&ENTE A&T3 CA>AMAN )E +R+ AATER
)&#TR&CT %C+A)' AN) EN>R. >A#PAR ). >+NVA*E# 2+R T3E *ATTER;# 2A&*?RE T+ #ERLE
N+T&CE ?P+N RE#P+N)ENT# #P+?#E# PA#T+R2&)E PR&+R T+ T3E ACT?A*
)&#C+NNECT&+N )E#P&TE EL&)ENCE A))?CE) )?R&N> TR&A* T3AT ELEN A&T3+?T
PET&T&+NER;# REQ?E#T, C+A) AA# A*REA)M #ET T+ E22ECT )&#C+NNECT&+N +2
RE#P+N)ENT#; AATER #?PP*M )?E T+ N+N:PAMMENT +2 ACC+?NT 2+R T3REE %/'
M+NT3#.
1.D T3E 3+N+RAB*E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# C+MM&TTE) >RALE AN) #ER&+?# ERR+R A3EN
&T R?*E) T+TA**M A>A&N#T PET&T&+NER AN) 2A&*E) T+ 2&N) T3AT RE#P+N)ENT# ARE
>?&*TM +2 C+NTR&B?T+RM NE>*&>ENCE A3EN T3EM 2A&*E) T+ PAM T3E&R AATER B&**#
2+R T3REE M+NT3# AN) T+ M+LE 2+R T3E TRAN#2ER +2 T3E C+A) ACC+?NT &N T3E&R
NAME, A3&C3 AA# A L&+*AT&+N +2 T3E&R MEM+RAN)?M +2 A>REEMENT A&T3
PET&T&+NER 7+MCE L. AR)&ENTE. RE#P+N)ENT# *&4EA&#E )E*&BERATE*M 2A&*E) T+
EHERC&#E )&*&>ENCE +2 A >++) 2AT3ER +2 T3E 2AM&*M T+ M&N&M&VE T3E )AMA>E ?N)ER
ART. DD0/ +2 T3E NEA C&L&* C+)E.
1./ T3E 3+N+RAB*E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# #ER&+?#*M ERRE) A3EN &T )&#RE>AR)E) T3E
2ACT T3AT RE#P+N)ENT #P+?#E# PA#T+R2&)E ARE *&4EA&#E B+?N) T+ +B#ERLE
ART&C*E ,. +2 T3E NEA C&L&* C+)E, i.e., &N T3E EHERC&#E +2 T3E&R R&>3T# AN) &N T3E
PER2+RMANCE +2 T3E&R )?T&E# T+ ACT A&T3 7?#T&CE, >&LE ELERM+NE 3&# )?E AN)
+B#ERLE 3+NE#TM AN) >++) 2A&T3.
1.E T3E 3+N+RAB*E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# >RALE*M ERRE) A3EN &T >RANTE) AN AAAR)
+2 M+RA* AN) EHEMP*ARM )AMA>E# AN) ATT+RNEM;# 2EE# A# A>A&N#T PET&T&+NER
AR)&ENTE.,D
At the outset, the Court noticed that C+A) and >on6ale6, who were petitioner;s co:defendants
before the RTC and her co:appellants in the CA, were impleaded as respondents in the instant
petition. This cannot be done. Bein! her co:parties before the RTC and the CA, petitioner cannot, in
the instant petition for review on certiorari, ma5e C+A) and >on6ale6, adversar parties. &t is a
!rave mista5e on the part of petitioner;s counsel to treat C+A) and >on6ale6 as respondents.
There is no basis to do so, considerin! that, in the "rst place, there is no showin! that petitioner
"led a cross:claim a!ainst C+A) and >on6ale6. ?nder #ection D, Rule . of the Rules of Court, a
cross:claim which is not set up shall be barred. Thus, for failin! to set up a cross:claim a!ainst
C+A) and >on6ale6 before the RTC, petitioner is alread barred from doin! so in the present
petition.
More importantl, as shown above, C+A) and >on6ale6;s petition for review on certiorari "led
with this Court was alread denied with "nalit on 7une DK, D00E, ma5in! the presentl assailed CA
)ecision "nal and e$ecutor insofar as C+A) and >on6ale6 are concerned. Thus, C+A) and
>on6ale6 are alread precluded from participatin! in the present petition. The cannot resurrect
their lost cause b "lin! pleadin!s this time as respondents but, nonetheless, reiteratin! the same
praer in their previous pleadin!s "led with the RTC and the CA.
As to the merits of the instant petition, the Court li5ewise noticed that the main issues raised b
petitioner are factual and it is settled that the resolution of factual issues is the function of lower
courts, whose "ndin!s on these matters are received with respect and considered bindin! b the
#upreme Court sub(ect onl to certain e$ceptions, none of which is present in this instant
petition.,/ This is especiall true when the "ndin!s of the RTC have been a<rmed b the CA as in
this case.,E
&n an case, a perusal of the records at hand would readil show that the instant petition lac5s
merit.
Petitioner insists that she should not be held liable for the disconnection of respondent spouses;
water suppl, because she had no participation in the actual disconnection. 3owever, she
admitted in the present petition that it was she who reGuested C+A) to disconnect the #pouses
Pastor"de;s water suppl. This was con"rmed b C+A) and >on6ale6 in their cross:claim a!ainst
petitioner. Ahile it was C+A) which actuall discontinued respondent spouses; water suppl, it
cannot be denied that it was throu!h the instance of petitioner that the #pouses Pastor"de;s water
suppl was disconnected in the "rst place.
&t is true that it is within petitioner;s ri!ht to as5 and even reGuire the #pouses Pastor"de to cause
the transfer of the former;s account with C+A) to the latter;s name pursuant to their
Memorandum of A!reement. 3owever, the remed to enforce such ri!ht is not to cause the
disconnection of the respondent spouses; water suppl. The e$ercise of a ri!ht must be in
accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be e$cessive or undul
harsh= there must be no intention to harm another.,F +therwise, liabilit for dama!es to the
in(ured part will attach.,- &n the present case, intention to harm was evident on the part of
petitioner when she reGuested for the disconnection of respondent spousesT water suppl without
warnin! or informin! the latter of such reGuest. Petitioner claims that her reGuest for disconnection
was based on the advise of C+A) personnel and that her intention was (ust to compel the
#pouses Pastor"de to compl with their a!reement that petitioner;s account with C+A) be
transferred in respondent spouses; name. &f such was petitioner;s onl intention, then she should
have advised respondent spouses before or immediatel after submittin! her reGuest for
disconnection, tellin! them that her reGuest was simpl to force them to compl with their
obli!ation under their Memorandum of A!reement. But she did not. Ahat made matters worse is
the fact that C+A) undertoo5 the disconnection also without prior notice and even failed to
reconnect the #pouses Pastor"deTs water suppl despite pament of their arrears. There was
clearl an abuse of ri!ht on the part of petitioner, C+A) and >on6ale6. The are !uilt of bad
faith.
The principle of abuse of ri!hts as enshrined in Article ,. of the Civil Code provides that ever
person must, in the e$ercise of his ri!hts and in the performance of his duties, act with (ustice,
!ive everone his due, and observe honest and !ood faith.
&n this re!ard, the Court;s rulin! in Muchen!co v. The Manila Chronicle Publishin! Corporation,1 is
instructive, to wit@
$ $ $ $
This provision of law sets standards which must be observed in the e$ercise of oneTs ri!hts as well
as in the performance of its duties, to wit@ to act with (ustice= !ive everone his due= and observe
honest and !ood faith.
&n >lobe Mac5a Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals, it was elucidated that while
Article ,. 9las down a rule of conduct for the !overnment of human relations and for the
maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remed for its violation. >enerall, an action for
dama!es under either Article D0 or Article D, would be proper.9 The Court said@
+ne of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codi"cation of 9some basic
principles that are to be observed for the ri!htful relationship between human bein!s and for the
stabilit of the social order.9 BREP+RT +N T3E C+)E C+MM&##&+N +N T3E PR+P+#E) C&L&* C+)E
+2 T3E P3&*&PP&NE#, p. /.C. The framers of the Code, see5in! to remed the defect of the old Code
which merel stated the e8ects of the law, but failed to draw out its spirit, incorporated certain
fundamental precepts which were 9desi!ned to indicate certain norms that sprin! from the
fountain of !ood conscience9 and which were also meant to serve as 9!uides for human conduct
BthatC should run as !olden threads throu!h societ, to the end that law ma approach its supreme
ideal, which is the swa and dominance of (ustice.9 %&d.' 2oremost amon! these principles is that
pronounced in Article ,. $ $ $.
$ $ $ $
This article, 5nown to contain what is commonl referred to as the principle of abuse of ri!hts, sets
certain standards which must be observed not onl in the e$ercise of one;s ri!hts, but also in the
performance of one;s duties. These standards are the followin!@ to act with (ustice= to !ive
everone his due= and to observe honest and !ood faith. The law, therefore, reco!ni6es a
primordial limitation on all ri!hts= that in their e$ercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in
Article ,. must be observed. A ri!ht, thou!h b itself le!al because reco!ni6ed or !ranted b law
as such, ma nevertheless become the source of some ille!alit. Ahen a ri!ht is e$ercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article ,. and results in dama!e to
another, a le!al wron! is thereb committed for which the wron!doer must be held responsible.
But while Article ,. las down a rule of conduct for the !overnment of human relations and for the
maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remed for its violation. >enerall, an action for
dama!es under either Article D0 or Article D, would be proper.
Corollarill, Article D0 provides that 9ever person who, contrar to law, willfull or ne!li!entl
causes dama!e to another shall indemnif the latter for the same.9 &t spea5s of the !eneral
sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not especiall provide for its own sanction. Ahen
a ri!ht is e$ercised in a manner which does not conform to the standards set forth in the said
provision and results in dama!e to another, a le!al wron! is thereb committed for which the
wron!doer must be responsible. Thus, if the provision does not provide a remed for its violation,
an action for dama!es under either Article D0 or Article D, of the Civil Code would be proper.
The Guestion of whether or not the principle of abuse of ri!hts has been violated resultin! in
dama!es under Article D0 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of
each case. $ $ $,K
To recapitulate, petitioner;s acts which violated the abovementioned provisions of law is her
un(usti"able act of havin! the respondent spouses; water suppl disconnected, coupled with her
failure to warn or at least notif respondent spouses of such intention. +n the part of C+A) and
>on6ale6, it is their failure to !ive prior notice of the impendin! disconnection and their
subseGuent ne!lect to reconnect respondent spouses; water suppl despite the latter;s settlement
of their delinGuent account.
+n the basis of the fore!oin!, the Court "nds no co!ent reason to depart from the rulin! of both
the RTC and the CA that petitioner, C+A) and >on6ale6 are solidaril liable.
The #pouses Pastor"de are entitled to moral dama!es based on the provisions of Article
DD,.,,. in connection with Articles D0D0 and D,D, of the Civil Code.
As for e$emplar dama!es, Article DDD. provides that e$emplar dama!es ma be imposed b
wa of e$ample or correction for the public !ood. Nonetheless, e$emplar dama!es are imposed
not to enrich one part or impoverish another, but to serve as a deterrent a!ainst or as a ne!ative
incentive to curb sociall deleterious actions.DD &n the instant case, the Court a!rees with the CA
in sustainin! the award of e$emplar dama!es, althou!h it reduced the amount !ranted,
considerin! that respondent spouses were deprived of their water suppl for more than nine %.'
months, and such deprivation would have continued were it not for the relief !ranted b the RTC.
Aith respect to the award of attorne;s fees, Article DD0K of the Civil Code provides, amon! others,
that such fees ma be recovered when e$emplar dama!es are awarded, when the defendant;s
act or omission has compelled the plainti8 to liti!ate with third persons or to incur e$penses to
protect his interest, and where the defendant acted in !ross and evident bad faith in refusin! to
satisf the plainti8sT plainl valid, (ust and demandable claim.
A3ERE2+RE, instant petition for review on certiorari is )EN&E). The )ecision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals, dated Au!ust DK, D00/ and )ecember ,1, D00/, respectivel, in CA:>.R. CL No.
1/000 are A22&RME).
#+ +R)ERE).
V$/#s%o, 1&., 9C)#2&*$&so,:, A-#0, M$,0o@#, #,0 L$o,$,, 11., %o,%u&.
7ul DE, D0,/
N + T & C E +2 7 ? ) > M E N T
#irsIMesdames@
Please ta5e notice that on ___7ul ,1, D0,/___ a )ecision, cop attached herewith, was
rendered b the #upreme Court in the above:entitled case, the ori!inal of which was
received b this +<ce on 7ul ,., D0,/ at D@DF p.m.
Ler trul ours,
%#>)'
LUCITA A!1ELINA SORIANO
)ivision Cler5 of Court
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
T3&R) )&L&#&+N
G.R. No. 197J72 O%to-$& 9, 201<
1AIME P. A"RIANO #,0 LEGASPI TOIERS <00, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
AL!ERTO LASALA #,0 LOUR"ES LASALA, Respondents.
) E C & # & + N
MEN"OMA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule EF of the Rules of Court see5in! the reversal of
the #eptember ,/, D0,0 )ecision, and the 7ul ,K, D0,, ResolutionD of the Court of Appeals %CA'
in CA:>.R. CL No.101-K, which denied the appeal of *e!aspi Towers /00, &nc. %*T/00' and a<rmed
with modi"cation the March ., D00, )ecision/ of the Re!ional Trial Court of Manila, Branch E-
%RTC', holdin! the petitioners liable for the ille!al termination of the #ecurit #ervice Contract
entered into with Alberto and *ourdes *asala actin! in the name of Thunder #ecurit and
&nvesti!ation A!enc %respondents'.
The facts
+n #eptember DF, ,..D, in order to protect and secure its premises a!ainst theft, pilfera!e, arson,
robber, vandalism, and other ille!al acts directed at unit owners, o<cers and personnel,
petitioner entered into a securit service contract with respondents for a period of one ear endin!
on #eptember DF, ,../.
+n +ctober ,K, ,..D, respondents received a letter si!ned b petitioner 7aime P. Adriano
%Adriano', the buildin! administrator, remindin! them of their non:compliance with the securit
services a!reement, amon! which were the failure to assi!n securit !uards with the reGuired
hei!ht andeducational attainment, and the failure to provide the a!reed service vehicle. &n
compliance, respondents relieved and replaced the unGuali"ed personnel with AdrianoTs
recommendees. A 2ord 2iera was also produced althou!h par5ed in a nearb area as no space in
the buildin! was available.
)espite their positive responses, respondents received another letter, dated +ctober D,, ,..D,
reiteratin! the same instances of non:compliance. )ismaed, the tal5ed to Adriano who replied
with an invitation to hold a meetin!. Respondents a!reed.
&n the scheduled meetin!, Adriano mentioned that the di8erences could onl be settled b
cooperatin! with each other. 3e then reGuested from respondents the pament of P,K,000.00, of
which PF,000 would be !iven to petitioner Emmanuel #antos, the *T/00 President= P/,000.00 to
Captain Pere6= and the rest to Adriano himself. These paments were reGuested in return for actin!
as the brid!e in resolvin! the issues. The respondents came across, but the petitioners demanded
another eGuivalent amount in another meetin! in November.
Thereafter, a series of correspondence between the parties too5 place, with the petitioners
constantl reiteratin! respondentsT alle!ed violations of the service contract. &n the last letter,
the added another !rievance S non: pament of the minimum wa!e. &n an attempt to "nall
settle the issues, respondents sou!ht audience before the *T/00 Board but to no avail. The Board,
without !ivin! respondents an opportunit to e$plain, terminated the contract as voted upon in a
meetin! held on 7anuar DK, ,../.
+n 2ebruar K, ,../, respondents "led a complaint for dama!es alle!in! that *T/00 and Adriano
ille!all terminated their services.
+n March ., D00,, the RTC ruled in favor of respondents. &t held that the #eptember DF, ,..D
a!reement could onl be terminated for a valid cause= that respondents neither committed an
violation nor failed to !ive securit services to *T/00= that respondents were not !iven their ri!ht
to be heard under the fundamental principle of due process of law= and that respondents were
entitled to all the bene"ts and considerations due them. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads@
A3ERE2+RE, (ud!ment is hereb rendered@
&. holdin! that plainti8s have not violated the A>REEMENT dated #eptember DF, ,..D that would
constitute a valid cause for termination of said A>REEMENT before its e$piration date on
#eptember DF, ,../.
&&. orderin! the defendants to pa (ointl and severall the plainti8s the followin!
dama!es@
a' the shorta!e of the salar !iven to plainti8s for the period from 2eb. ,-:D-,
,../ [[[[[[[ P,.,FE..K.=
b' the bene"tIcompensation of plainti8s from 2eb. D-, ,../to #ept. DF, ,../
%1,ID months' to which the are entitled. .[[[[[[[..[[[[[[[...
[[ P,,-0E,/-D.F0=
c' moral dama!es [[[[[[.[..[[[.[[ PF00,000.00= and
d' e$emplar dama!es [[[[[[[[[[[[ PDF0,000.00= and
e' attorneTs fees [[[[[[[[[[[[.[.. PF0,000.00 with interest at the
le!al rate on letters %a' and %b' from the "lin! of the complaint on 2ebruar K
,../.
&&&. Costs shall be paid b the defendants (ointl and severall= and
&L. The counterclaims of defendants are dismissed for lac5 of merit.
&T &# #+ +R)ERE).E
+n appeal, the CA cate!ori6ed as baseless and Rims all the alle!ations thrown a!ainst
respondents thereb a<rmin! the RTC rulin! but with modi"cation as to the award of
dama!es, to wit@
A3ERE2+RE, considerin! the fore!oin! premises, the )ecision of the Re!ional Trial
Court of Manila %Branch E-' dated March ., D00, is A22&RME) with modi"cations, to
wit@
9A3ERE2+RE, (ud!ment is hereb ordered@
L. holdin! that plainti8s have not violated the A>REEMENT dated #eptember DF, ,..D,
that would constitute a valid cause for termination of said A>REEMENT before its
e$piration date on #eptember DF, ,../.
L&. orderin! the defendant:appellant *T/00 with defendants 7aime P. Adriano and
Emmanuel T. #antos to pa (ointl and severall the plainti8s the followin! dama!es@
a' the shorta!e of the salar !iven to plainti8s for the period from 2eb. ,- S D-,
,../[[[[[[[[[[..[.P,.,FE..K.
b' temperate dama!es[[[[[[[[[[[[[PD00,000.00
c' moral dama!es[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[..P,00,000.00
d' e$emplar dama!es[[[[[[[[[..[[..[PF0,000.00
e' attorneTs fees[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[PF0,000.00
with interest at the le!al rate on letter%a' from the "lin! of the complaint on 2ebruar K,
,../=
L&&. Costs shall be paid b the defendant:appellant (ointl and severall with defendants
7aime P. Adriano and Emmanuel T. #antos.
L&&&. The counterclaims of defendants are dismissed for lac5 of merit.9
#+ +R)ERE).F
The petitioners "led their motion for reconsideration but it was denied b the CA on 7ul ,K, D0,,.
3ence, this petition.
The petitioners present for evaluation the followin! errors@
&.
The 3onorable Court of Appeals seriousl erred in holdin! that no breach, substantial or
otherwise, was committed b the respondents that would warrant the pre:termination
of the #ecurit #ervice Contract %A!reement' with the petitioner *T /00.
&&.
The 3onorable Court of Appeals !ravel erred in awardin! temperate dama!es as there
is clearl no pecuniar loss, from the facts of the case, su8ered b the respondents as
a direct conseGuence of the termination of the #ecurit #ervice Contract %A!reement'.
&&&.
The 3onorable Court of Appeals !ravel erred in awardin! moral and e$emplar
dama!es as well as attorneTs fees considerin! that the circumstances as laid down b
law that would warrant such award are not present in the instant case.
&n advocac of their position, petitioner *T/00 ar!ues %,' that the failure to provide the service
vehicle was not a baseless alle!ation culled out of thin air as respondentsT lac5 of par5in! space
ar!ument was unbelievable and should not have been !iven credence= %D' that the failure to pa
the minimum wa!e, as alle!edl proven durin! trial, was a substantial violation of the a!reement=
%/' that the award of temperate dama!es was not in order as the CA even found that the award of
actual dama!es had no basis= %E' that no su<cient proof of bad faith was provided as to warrant
the award of moral and e$emplar dama!es= and %F' that ample opportunit to rectif was !iven
to respondents, but the i!nored the same.
Respondents counter that the alle!ed violation in the hirin! of unGuali"ed personnel could not be
their fault because it was made at the behest and recommendation of Adriano under the
instructions of the *T/00 Board. As to the lac5 of an a!reed service vehicle, respondents e$plain
that the 2ord 2ieraTs par5in! at a distance of about "ve %F' meters from Marina #ubdivision was
su<cient compliance alread considerin! that no par5in! space was provided b *T/00. Re!ardin!
the char!e of non:pament of minimum wa!e, respondents aver that it was unsubstantiated as no
document of complaint was presented. Aith re!ard to the award of dama!es, respondents echo
the rulin! of the CA.-
The &ssues
Thus, the followin! issues remain to be resolved b this Court@
Ahether the CA erred in holdin! the petitioners liable for ille!al pre:termination of contract.
and
Ahether the CA erred in awardin! temperate dama!es, moral dama!es, e$emplar dama!es, and
attorneTs fees to respondents.
The CourtTs Rulin!
This Court "nds no merit in the petition.
No Liolation of the
Contract b Respondents
&n this case, the petition is primaril anchored on whether respondents breached the sub(ect
securit services a!reement. &n the case of En!r. Apolinario )ueWas v. Alice >uce:Africa,1 it was
held that the determination of the e$istence of a breach of contract is a factual matter not usuall
reviewable in a petition "led under Rule EF. The philosoph behind this rule is that the Court is not
a trier of facts. There are, however, well:established e$ceptions, as reiterated b this Court in
)evelopment Ban5 of the Philippines v. Traders Roal Ban5,K to wit@
The (urisdiction of the Court in cases brou!ht before it from the appellate court is limited to
reviewin! errors of law, and "ndin!s of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive upon the Court
since it is not the CourtTs function to anal6e and wei!h the evidence all over a!ain. Nevertheless,
in several cases, the Court enumerated the e$ceptions to the rule that factual "ndin!s of the Court
of Appeals are bindin! on the Court@ %,' when the "ndin!s are !rounded entirel on speculations,
surmises or con(ectures=%D' when the inference made is manifestl mista5en, absurd or impossible=
%/' when there is !rave abuse of discretion= %E' when the (ud!ment is based on a misapprehension
of facts= %F' when the "ndin!s of fact are conRictin!= %-' when in ma5in! its "ndin!s the Court of
Appeals went beond the issues of the case, or its "ndin!s are contrar to the admissions of both
the appellant and the appellee= %1' when the "ndin!s are contrar to that of the trial court= %K'
when the "ndin!s are conclusions without citation of speci"c evidence on which the are based=
%.' when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitionerTs main and repl briefs are
not disputed b the respondent= %,0' when the "ndin!s of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted b the evidence on record= or %,,' when the Court of
Appeals manifestl overloo5ed certain relevant facts not disputed b the parties, which, if properl
considered, would (ustif a di8erent conclusion.
The petitioners failed to cite in their petition the presence of an of the above circumstances to
warrant the factual re:evaluation of this case. The Court, therefore, will not review, much less
reverse, the factual "ndin!s of the CA especiall where such "ndin!s coincide with those of the
RTC.
Aside from this point, the Court a<rms the conclusion of the CA as to the "rst assi!nment of error
for reasons hereinafter recited.
2irst, respondents cannot be faulted for the absorption of personnel who failed to meet the
minimum Guali"cations of at least Dnd ear of colle!e and FT-9 in hei!ht. As observed b the RTC,
two letters containin! a list of recommended individuals were sent on various dates to
respondents.. +n the representation that it was made with the approval of the Board, which was
even con"rmed durin! the trial as true b petitioner and *T/00President #antos, respondents
readil hired AdrianoTs recommendees even if the lac5ed the Guali"cations stated in the
a!reement.,0 +bviousl, this hirin! was stron!l inRuenced b the petitioners and as such
respondents cannot be blamed for !ivin! in to their behests. To this Court, it is ridiculous and
unfair to allow the petitioners to use this !round in terminatin! respondentsT services when, in
truth, the were active participants in the selection and hirin! process.
#econd, the CA was correct in rulin! that the petitionersT complaints as to the non:provision of
service vehicle and non:pament were !roundless and Rims. Evidence on record does not support
the position that the minimum wa!e of the securit !uards were not bein! paid. No proof, such as
documented complaints "led b the a8ected emploees showin! non:compliance, was adduced
durin! the trial. There is no evidence either that the non:par5in! of the vehicle within the *T/00
premises hampered the e8ective deliver of securit services. &n fact, no untoward incident in the
entire duration of the a!reement was reported or proven on account of its distance. 2or lac5 of
material evidence, the Court cannot bestow credence on the petitionersT position.
Third, the petitioners were the ones who committed the breach b their abrupt and !roundless
termination of the a!reement. Althou!h pre:termination was allowed under the contract, the
petitioners could not (ust invo5e and e$ercise the same without a valid and le!al !round. Turnin! a
blind ee to the compliance alread e8ected and subseGuentl terminatin! respondentsT services
smac5 of hi!h handedness especiall when no sin!le incident of robber, theft, dru! addiction or
prostitution was reported for the entire duration of the contract,,.
The petitioners are, thus, reminded that 9ever person must, in the e$ercise of his ri!ht and in the
performance of his dut, act with (ustice, !ive everone his due, and observe honest and !ood
faith.9,D Respondents clearl complied with their part of the obli!ation under the securit services
a!reement but it appeared that whatever the did, the petitioners were bent on endin! it. This
e$ercise b petitioners of their ri!ht to pre:terminate the contracted services without a (ust cause
was nothin! but a Ra!rant violation of the contract.
3ence, no reversible error was committed b the CA in declarin! the respondents free from an
violation of the sub(ect contract.
Moral and E$emplar )ama!es
)oubtless, a breach was committed b the petitioners. The Guestion now is whether the
commission was attended b bad faith or malice.
?nder Article DDD0 of the Civil Code, moral dama!es ma be awarded in cases of breach of
contract provided that there was fraud or bad faith, to wit@
Art. DDD0. Aillful in(ur to propert ma be a le!al !round for awardin! moral dama!es if the court
should "nd that, under the circumstances, such dama!es are (ustl due. The same rule applies to
breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulentl or in bad faith.
To recover moral dama!es in an action for breach of contract, the breach must be palpabl
wanton, rec5less and malicious, in bad faith, oppressive, or abusive.,/ 3ence, the person claimin!
bad faith must prove its e$istence b clear and convincin! evidence for the law alwas presumes
!ood faith.,E
Bad faith does not simpl connote bad (ud!ment or ne!li!ence. &t imports a dishonest purpose or
some moral obliGuit and conscious doin! of a wron!, a breach of 5nown dut throu!h some
motive or interest or ill will that parta5es of the nature of fraud.,F &t is, therefore, a Guestion of
intention,,- which can be inferred from oneTs conduct andIor contemporaneous statements.
Bein! a Guestion of intention, it is necessar for this Court to e$amine the records to determine if
the courts below indeed found bad faith in the termination of the a!reement.
The CA decision to !rant moral dama!es was !rounded on the fact that the termination was
e8ected without valid reason.,Nwphi, The Court "nds more to what the CA had observed. The
inappropriate dealin!s of Adriano to acGuire "nancial !ain at the e$pense of respondents, with the
approval or acGuiescence of the Board= the hirin! of unGuali"ed personnel bein! used as a !round
for termination despite the fact that such hirin! was upon their recommendation= and the repeated
alle!ations of non:compliance even if respondents had corrected alread what were complained
of, constituted un(ust and dishonest acts schemed b the petitioners to provide an appearance of
validit to the termination. These mischievous insinuations cannot escape the CourtTs attention as
the manifested petitionersT malicious and un(ust intent to do awa with respondentsT services. &t
must be noted that respondents, in the course of their en!a!ement, were even commended for
e<cienc and service.
Noteworth also is the fact that respondents were not even !iven time to respond to the
alle!ations as their repeated demand for an audience before the Board went unheeded. &n fact,
their last reGuest was met with an une$pected notice of termination.
Aith these in mind, the Court is convinced that the petitioners acted in bad faith and are, thus,
liable for moral dama!es.
To warrant the award of e$emplar dama!es, 9the wron!ful act must be accompanied b bad faith,
and an award of dama!es would be allowed onl if the !uilt part acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
rec5less or malevolent manner.9,1 As bad faith attended the termination of the service contract
a!reement, there is no reason to reverse the award for e$emplar dama!es.
Temperate )ama!es and Attorne;s 2ees
?nder Article DDDE of the Civil Code, when pecuniar loss has been su8ered but the amount
cannot, from the nature of the case, be proven with certaint, temperate dama!es ma be
recovered. Temperate dama!es mabe allowed in cases where from the nature of the case,
de"nite proof of pecuniar loss cannot be adduced, althou!h the court is convinced that the
a!!rieved part su8ered some pecuniar loss.,K
&ndisputabl, respondents in this case su8ered pecuniar loss because of the untimel termination
of their services for no cause at all. As there is no proof capable of ascertainin! the actual loss, the
CA ri!htfull awarded temperate dama!es, in lieu of actual dama!es. The Court "nds the amount
of PD00,000.00 b wa of temperate dama!es as (ust and reasonable.
As to attorne;s fees, su<ce it to sa that because respondents were constrained to liti!ate to
protect their interests, the award was proper.
A3ERE2+RE, the Court )EN&E# the petition.
#+ +R)ERE).
1OSE CATRAL MEN"OMA
Associate 7ustice
AE C+NC?R@
PRES!ITERO 1. VELASCO, 1R.
Associate 7ustice
Chairperson
"IOS"A"O M. PERALTA
Associate 7ustice
RO!ERTO A. A!A"
Associate 7ustice
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate 7ustice
A T T E # T A T & + N
& attest that the conclusions in the above )ecision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assi!ned to the writer of the opinion of the Court;s )ivision.
PRES!ITERO 1. VELASCO, 1R.
Associate 7ustice
Chairperson, Third )ivision
C E R T & 2 & C A T & + N
Pursuant to #ection ,/, Article L&&& of the Constitution and the )ivision Chairperson;s Attestation, &
certif that the conclusions in the above )ecision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assi!ned to the writer of the opinion of the Court;s )ivision.
MARIA LOUR"ES P. A. SERENO
Chief 7ustice
Foot,ot$s
, Rollo, pp. /E:FD. Penned b Associate 7ustice Bienvenido *. Rees %now member or this
Court'. Aith Associate 7ustice Estela M. Perlas:Bernabe %now member of this Court' and
Associate 7ustice Elihu A. Mbane6, concurrin!.
D &d. at FF:F.
/ &d. at ,,F:,E,. Penned b 7ud!e Artemio #. Tipon.
E &d. at ,E0:,E,.
F &d. at FD:F/.
- &d. at KE.
1 >.R. No. ,-F-1., +ctober F, D00., -0/ #CRA ,,.
K >.R. No. ,1,.KD, Au!ust ,K, D0,0, -DK #CRA E0E.
. Rollo, p. ,DK.
,0 &d.
,, &d. at ,/K.
,D Article ,., New Civil Code.
,/ Erlando 2rancisco v. Ricardo 2errer, 7r., E0F Phil. 1EF %D00,', citin! Ma!at v. Court of
Appeals , /.DPhil. -/ %D000'= 2ar East Ban5 a Trust Compan v. Court of Appeals , /,, Phil.
1K/ %,..F'.
,E &d., citin! Ace 3aulers Corporation v. Court of Appeals , /./Phil. DD0, D/0 %D000'.
,F &d., citin! Tan v. Northwest Airlines, &nc., /K/ Phil. ,0DK %D000', citin! further 2ord
Philippines, &nc. v. Court of Appeals , //F Phil. , %,..1'= and *lorente, 7r. v. #andi!anbaan ,.
/F0 Phil. KD0, KE/ %,..K'.
,- Millena v. Court of Appeals , /K,Phil. ,/D, ,E/ %D000'.
,1 Erlando 2rancisco v. Ricardo 2errer, 7r., supra note ,/, citin! Cervantes v. Court of
Appeals, /-/ Phil. /.. %,...'.
,K Premiere )evelopment Ban5 v. Court of Appeals, E1, Phil. 10E, 1,. %D00E'.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
T3&R) )&L&#&+N
G.R. No. 178J22 O%to-$& 2<, 201<
CALIFORNIA CLOTHING INC. #,0 MICHELLE S. 3!A4EM, Petitioners,
vs.
SHIRLE3 G. 6UI4ONES, Respondent.
) E C & # & + N
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule EF of the = Rules of Court are the Court
of Appeals )ecision, dated Au!ust /, D00- and ResolutionD dated November ,E, D00- in CA:>.R.
CL No. K0/0.. The assailed decision reversed and set aside the 7une D0, D00/ )ecision/ of the
Re!ional Trial Court of Cebu Cit %RTC', Branch FK, in Civil Case No. CEB:D-.KE= while the assailed
resolution denied the motion for reconsideration "led b petitioner Michelle MbaWe6 %MbaWe6'.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows@
+n 7ul DF, D00,, respondent #hirle >. QuiWones, a Reservation Tic5etin! A!ent of Cebu Paci"c Air
in *apu *apu Cit, went inside the >uess ?#A BoutiGue at the second Roor of RobinsonTs
)epartment #tore %RobinsonTs' in Cebu Cit. #he "tted four items@ two (eans, a blouse and a
shorts, then decided to purchase the blac5 (eans worth PD,0.K.00.E Respondent alle!edl paid to
the cashier evidenced b a receiptF issued b the store.-
Ahile she was wal5in! throu!h the s5wal5 connectin! RobinsonTs and Mercur )ru! #tore
%Mercur' where she was headin! ne$t, a >uess emploee approached and informed her that she
failed to pa the item she !ot. #he, however, insisted that she paid and showed the emploee the
receipt issued in her favor.1 #he then su!!ested that the tal5 about it at the Cebu Paci"c +<ce
located at the basement of the mall. #he "rst went to Mercur then met the >uess emploees as
a!reed upon.K
Ahen she arrived at the Cebu Paci"c +<ce, the >uess emploees alle!edl sub(ected her to
humiliation in front of the clients of Cebu Paci"c and repeatedl demanded pament for the blac5
(eans.. The supposedl even searched her wallet to chec5 how much mone she had, followed b
another ar!ument. Respondent, thereafter, went home.,0
+n the same da, the >uess emploees alle!edl !ave a letter to the )irector of Cebu Paci"c Air
narratin! the incident, but the latter refused to receive it as it did not concern the o<ce and the
same too5 place while respondent was o8 dut.,, Another letter was alle!edl prepared and was
supposed to be sent to the Cebu Paci"c +<ce in RobinsonTs, but the latter a!ain refused to receive
it.,D Respondent also claimed that the 3uman Resource )epartment %3R)' of RobinsonTs was
furnished said letter and the latter in fact conducted an investi!ation for purposes of cancelin!
respondentTs RobinsonTs credit card. Respondent further claimed that she was not !iven a cop of
said dama!in! letter.,/ Aith the above e$perience, respondent claimed to have su8ered phsical
an$iet, sleepless ni!hts, mental an!uish, fri!ht, serious apprehension, besmirched reputation,
moral shoc5 and social humiliation.,E #he thus "led the Complaint for )ama!es,F before the RTC
a!ainst petitioners California Clothin!, &nc. %California Clothin!', E$celsis Lilla!on6alo
%Lilla!on6alo', &melda 3awaon %3awaon' and MbaWe6. #he demanded the pament of moral,
nominal, and e$emplar dama!es, plus attorneTs fees and liti!ation e$penses.,-
&n their Answer,,1 petitioners and the other defendants admitted the issuance of the receipt of
pament. The claimed, however, that instead of the cashier %3awaon' issuin! the o<cial receipt,
it was the invoicer %Lilla!on6alo' who did it manuall. The e$plained that there was
miscommunication between the emploees at that time because prior to the issuance of the
receipt, Lilla!on6alo as5ed 3awaon 9 +5 na `,9 and the latter replied 9 +5 na ,9 which the former
believed to mean that the item has alread been paid.,K Reali6in! the mista5e, Lilla!on6alo
rushed outside to loo5 for respondent and when he saw the latter, he invited her to !o bac5 to the
shop to ma5e clari"cations as to whether or not pament was indeed made. &nstead, however, of
!oin! bac5 to the shop, respondent su!!ested that the meet at the Cebu Paci"c +<ce.
Lilla!on6alo, 3awaon and MbaWe6 thus went to the a!reed venue where the tal5ed to
respondent.,. The pointed out that it appeared in their conversation that respondent could not
recall whom she !ave the pament.D0 The emphasi6ed that the were !entle and polite in tal5in!
to respondent and it was the latter who was arro!ant in answerin! their Guestions.D,As
counterclaim, petitioners and the other defendants sou!ht the pament of moral and e$emplar
dama!es, plus attorneTs fees and liti!ation e$penses.DD
+n 7une D0, D00/, the RTC rendered a )ecision dismissin! both the complaint and counterclaim of
the parties. 2rom the evidence presented, the trial court concluded that the petitioners and the
other defendants believed in !ood faith that respondent failed to ma5e pament. Considerin! that
no motive to fabricate a lie could be attributed to the >uess emploees, the court held that when
the demanded pament from respondent, the merel e$ercised a ri!ht under the honest belief
that no pament was made. The RTC li5ewise did not "nd it dama!in! for respondent when the
confrontation too5 place in front of Cebu Paci"c clients, because it was respondent herself who put
herself in that situation b choosin! the venue for discussion. As to the letter sent to Cebu Paci"c
Air, the trial court also did not ta5e it a!ainst the >uess emploees, because the merel as5ed for
assistance and not to embarrass or humiliate respondent. &n other words, the RTC found no
evidence to prove bad faith on the part of the >uess emploees to warrant the award of
dama!es.D/
+n appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision, the dispositive portion of which reads@
A3ERE2+RE, the instant appeal is >RANTE). The decision of the Re!ional Trial Court of Cebu Cit,
Branch FK, in Civil Case No. CEB:D-.KE %for@ )ama!es' is hereb RELER#E) and #ET A#&)E.
)efendants Michelle MbaWe6 and California Clothin!, &nc. are hereb ordered to pa plainti8:
appellant #hirle >. QuiWones (ointl and solidaril moral dama!es in the amount of 2ift Thousand
Pesos %PF0,000.00' and attorneTs fees in the amount of Twent Thousand Pesos %PD0,000.00'.
#+ +R)ERE).DE
Ahile a!reein! with the trial court that the >uess emploees were in !ood faith when the
confronted respondent inside the Cebu Paci"c +<ce about the alle!ed non:pament, the CA,
however, found preponderance of evidence showin! that the acted in bad faith in sendin! the
demand letter to respondentTs emploer. &t found respondentTs possession of both the o<cial
receipt and the sub(ect blac5 (eans as evidence of pament.DFContrar to the "ndin!s of the RTC,
the CA opined that the letter addressed to Cebu Paci"cTs director was sent to respondentTs
emploer not merel to as5 for assistance for the collection of the disputed pament but to sub(ect
her to ridicule, humiliation and similar in(ur such that she would be pressured to
pa.D- Considerin! that >uess alread started its investi!ation on the incident, there was a taint of
bad faith and malice when it dra!!ed respondentTs emploer who was not priv to the transaction.
This is especiall true in this case since the purported letter contained not onl a narrative of the
incident but accusations as to the alle!ed acts of respondent in trin! to evade pament.D1 The
appellate court thus held that petitioners are !uilt of abuse of ri!ht entitlin! respondent to collect
moral dama!es and attorneTs fees. Petitioner California Clothin! &nc. was made liable for its
failure to e$ercise e$traordinar dili!ence in the hirin! and selection of its emploees= while
MbaWe6Ts liabilit stemmed from her act of si!nin! the demand letter sent to respondentTs
emploer. &n view of 3awaon and Lilla!on6aloTs !ood faith, however, the were e$onerated from
liabilit.DK
MbaWe6 moved for the reconsiderationD. of the aforesaid decision, but the same was denied in the
assailed November ,E, D00- CA Resolution.
Petitioners now come before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule EF of the
Rules of Court based on the followin! !rounds@
&.
T3E 3+N+RAB*E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# ERRE) &N 2&N)&N> T3AT T3E *ETTER #ENT T+
T3E CEB? PAC&2&C +22&CE AA# MA)E T+ #?B7ECT 3ERE&N RE#P+N)ENT T+ R&)&C?*E,
3?M&*&AT&+N AN) #&M&*AR &N7?RM.
&&.
T3E 3+N+RAB*E C+?RT +2 APPEA*# ERRE) &N AAAR)&N> M+RA* )AMA>E# AN)
ATT+RNEMT# 2EE#./0
The petition is without merit.
RespondentTs complaint a!ainst petitioners stemmed from the principle of abuse of ri!hts provided
for in the Civil Code on the chapter of human relations. Respondent cried foul when petitioners
alle!edl embarrassed her when the insisted that she did not pa for the blac5 (eans she
purchased from their shop despite the evidence of pament which is the o<cial receipt issued b
the shop. The issuance of the receipt notwithstandin!, petitioners had the ri!ht to verif from
respondent whether she indeed made pament if the had reason to believe that she did not.
3owever, the e$ercise of such ri!ht is not without limitations. An abuse in the e$ercise of such
ri!ht and in the performance of dut causin! dama!e or in(ur to another is actionable under the
Civil Code. The CourtTs pronouncement in Carpio v. Lalmonte/, is noteworth@
&n the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a wron!ful act or omission, whether
done willfull or ne!li!entl, is not left without an remed or recourse to obtain relief for the
dama!e or in(ur he sustained. &ncorporated into our civil law are not onl principles of eGuit but
also universal moral precepts which are desi!ned to indicate certain norms that sprin! from the
fountain of !ood conscience and which are meant to serve as !uides for human conduct. 2irst of
these fundamental precepts is the principle commonl 5nown as 9abuse of ri!hts9 under Article ,.
of the Civil Code. &t provides that 9 Ever person must, in the e$ercise of his ri!hts and in the
performance of his duties, act with (ustice, !ive everone his due and observe honest and !ood
faith.9$ $ $/DThe elements of abuse of ri!hts are as follows@ %,' there is a le!al ri!ht or dut= %D'
which is e$ercised in bad faith= %/' for the sole intent of pre(udicin! or in(urin! another.//
&n this case, petitioners claimed that there was a miscommunication between the cashier and the
invoicer leadin! to the erroneous issuance of the receipt to respondent. Ahen the reali6ed the
mista5e, the made a cash count and discovered that the amount which is eGuivalent to the price
of the blac5 (eans was missin!. The, thus, concluded that it was respondent who failed to ma5e
such pament. &t was, therefore, within their ri!ht to verif from respondent whether she indeed
paid or not and collect from her if she did not. 3owever, the Guestion now is whether such ri!ht
was e$ercised in !ood faith or the went overboard !ivin! respondent a cause of action a!ainst
them.
?nder the abuse of ri!hts principle found in Article ,. of the Civil Code, a person must, in the
e$ercise of le!al ri!ht or dut, act in !ood faith. 3e would be liable if he instead acted in bad faith,
with intent to pre(udice another./E >ood faith refers to the state of mind which is manifested b
the acts of the individual concerned. &t consists of the intention to abstain from ta5in! an
unconscionable and unscrupulous advanta!e of another./FMalice or bad faith, on the other hand,
implies a conscious and intentional desi!n to do a wron!ful act for a dishonest purpose or moral
obliGuit./-
&nitiall, there was nothin! wron! with petitioners as5in! respondent whether she paid or not. The
>uess emploees were able to tal5 to respondent at the Cebu Paci"c +<ce. The confrontation
started well, but it eventuall turned sour when voices were raised b both parties. As aptl held
b both the RTC and the CA, such was the natural conseGuence of two parties with conRictin!
views insistin! on their respective beliefs. Considerin!, however, that respondent was in
possession of the item purchased from the shop, to!ether with the o<cial receipt of pament
issued b petitioners, the latter cannot insist that no such pament was made on the basis of a
mere speculation. Their claim should have been proven b substantial evidence in the proper
forum.
&t is evident from the circumstances of the case that petitioners went overboard and tried to force
respondent to pa the amount the were demandin!. &n the !uise of as5in! for assistance,
petitioners even sent a demand letter to respondentTs emploer not onl informin! it of the
incident but obviousl imputin! bad acts on the part of respondent.,Nwphi, Petitioners claimed
that after receivin! the receipt of pament and the item purchased, respondent 9was noted to
hurriedl left %sic' the store.9 The also accused respondent that she was not completel bein!
honest when she was as5ed about the circumstances of pament, thus@
$ $ $ After receivin! the +R and the item, Ms. >utierre6 was noted to hurriedl left %sic' the store. $
$ $
Ahen & as5ed her about to whom she !ave the mone, she !ave out a blan5 e$pression and told
me, 9& canTt remember.9 Then & as5ed her how much mone she !ave, she answered, 9PD,,00= D
pcs ,,000 and , pc ,00 bill.9 Then & told her that that would %sic' impossible since we have no such
denomination in our cash fund at that moment. 2inall, & as5ed her if how much chan!e and if she
received chan!e from the cashier, she then answered, 9& donTt remember.9 After as5in! these
simple Guestions, & am ver certain that she is not completel bein! honest about this. &n fact, we
invited her to come to our boutiGue to clear these matters but she vehementl refused sain! that
sheTs in a hurr and ver bus./1
Clearl, these statements are outri!htl accusator. Petitioners accused respondent that not onl
did she fail to pa for the (eans she purchased but that she deliberatel too5 the same without
pain! for it and later hurriedl left the shop to evade pament. These accusations were made
despite the issuance of the receipt of pament and the release of the item purchased. There was,
li5ewise, no showin! that respondent had the intention to evade pament. Contrar to petitionersT
claim, respondent was not in a rush in leavin! the shop or the mall. This is evidenced b the fact
that the >uess emploees did not have a hard time loo5in! for her when the reali6ed the
supposed non:pament.
&t can be inferred from the fore!oin! that in sendin! the demand letter to respondentTs emploer,
petitioners intended not onl to as5 for assistance in collectin! the disputed amount but to tarnish
respondentTs reputation in the ees of her emploer. To mali!n respondent without substantial
evidence and despite the latterTs possession of enou!h evidence in her favor, is clearl
impermissible. A person should not use his ri!ht un(ustl or contrar to honest and !ood faith,
otherwise, he opens himself to liabilit./K
The e$ercise of a ri!ht must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and
must not be e$cessive or undul harsh./. &n this case, petitioners obviousl abused their ri!hts.
Complementin! the principle of abuse of ri!hts are the provisions of Articles D0 and D of the Civil
Code which read@E0
Article D0. Ever person who, contrar to law, willfull or ne!li!entl causes dama!e to another,
shall indemnif the latter for the same.
Article D,. An person who willfull causes loss or in(ur to another in a manner that is contrar to
morals or !ood customs, or public polic shall compensate the latter for the dama!e.
&n view of the fore!oin!, respondent is entitled to an award of moral dama!es and attorne s fees.
Moral dama!es ma be awarded whenever the defendant s wron!ful act or omission is the
pro$imate cause of the plainti8s phsical su8erin!, mental an!uish, fri!ht, serious an$iet,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelin!s, moral shoc5, social humiliation and similar in(ur in the
cases speci"ed or analo!ous to those provided in Article DD,. of the Civil Code. E, Moral dama!es
are not a bonan6a. The are !iven to ease the defendant s !rief and su8erin!. The should, thus,
reasonabl appro$imate the e$tent of hurt caused and the !ravit of the wron! done.ED The are
awarded not to enrich the complainant but to enable the latter to obtain means, diversions, or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral su8erin! he has under!one.E/ Ae "nd that the
amount ofPF0,000.00 as moral dama!es awarded b the CA is reasonable under the
circumstances. Considerin! that respondent was compelled to liti!ate to protect her interest,
attorne s fees in the amount of ofPD0,000.00 is li5ewise (ust and proper.
A3ERE2+RE, premises considered, the petition is )EN&E) for lac5 of merit. The Court of Appeals
)ecision dated Au!ust /, D00- and Resolution dated November ,E, D00- in CA:>.R. CL No. K0/0.,
are A22&RME).
#+ +R)ERE).
"IOS"A"O M. PERALTA
Associate 7ustice
AE C+NC?R@
PRES!ITERO 1. VELASCO, 1R.
Associate 7ustice
Chairperson
RO!ERTO A. A!A"
Associate 7ustice
1OSE CATRAL MEN"OMA
Associate 7ustice
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate 7ustice
A T T E # T A T & + N
& attest that the conclusions in the above )ecision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assi!ned to the writer of the opinion of the Court s )ivision.
PRES!ITERO 1. VELASCO, 1R.
Associate 7ustice
Chairperson, Third )ivision
C E R T & 2 & C A T & + N
Pursuant to #ection ,/, Article L&&& of the Constitution and the , )ivision Chairperson s Attestation, &
certif that the conclusions n the above )ecision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assi!ned to the writer of the opinion of the Court s )ivision.
MARIA LOUR"ES P. A. SERENO
Chief 7ustice