PP VS CABARENO

349 SCRA 297

FACTS:

During a barangay fiesta in Jayobo, Lambunao, Iloilo, a certain Wilbert Cabareno
apparently tried to shoot Aurelio Catedrilla, a barangay captain, while the latter was
helping to pacify a commotion near a discohan. However, he hit Nerio Casaquite
instead, a barangay tanod who was with Catedrilla.
According to Cabareno, he was only being framed for the death of Casaquite,
which was allegedly in fact committed by Catedrillas grand nephew. He stated that
during an argument wherein Catedrillas grand nephew was involved, Catedrilla and his
grand nephew started grappling for a shotgun, which accidentally went off and hit
Casaquite while he was leading the person whom Catedrillas grand nephew was
having an argument with.

Cabareno was convicted of murder by the lower court, appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of treachery. He was sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE:

WON Cabareno is guilty of the crime of murder in the case at bar.


RULING:

No. Appellant should be convicted of homicide, not murder.
In the present case, Cabareno is indeed responsible for the death of Casaquite
even if his intended target when he fired the gun was supposedly Catedrillo.
Paragraph 1, Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, provides:
Art. 4. Criminal Liability. --- Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.
In the present case, appellant is responsible for the death of Nerio Casaquite, even if
the formers intended target when he fired the gun was supposedly Catedrillo. Criminal
liability is incurred by any person committing a felony, although the actual victim be
different from the one intended.
However, the trial court ruled that the killing was qualified by treachery. However,
it failed to explain the basis of such ruling. The proven facts do not adequately establish
the presence of this qualifying circumstance. As the Court held:
The qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot logically be appreciated
because the accused did not make any preparation to kill the deceased in such a
manner as to insure the commission of the crime or to make it impossible or hard
for the person attacked to defend himself or retaliate.
This circumstance can only be applied, according to the tenor of Article 13, Sub-section
16 of the Revised Penal Code, when the culprit employs means, methods or forms of
execution which tend directly and specially to insure the commission of the crime and at
the same time to eliminate or diminish the risk to his own person from a defense which
the other party might offer. Although it was proved that Casaquite was shot in the back,
the prosecution failed to prove that Cabareno deliberately adopted the attack,
considering that it was executed during a commotion and as a result of it.






















PP VS PILOLA
[G.R. No. 121828. June 27, 2003]
FACTS

Joselito Capa and Julian Azul were drinking in a store in Mandaluyong. While in
the midst of their drinking spree, Edmar Aguilos and Odilon Lagliba arrived and they
were invited to join the drinking. During the course of the drinking, Edmar had an
argument with Julian that led to a commotion in the store. Edmar and Julian then got
into an altercation. Joselito Capa intervened to stop the fight. But Odilon then after
grabbed Joselito on the neck and stabbed the latter with a knife. Ronnie and Pilola who
were across the street, saw, their gangmate, Odilon, stabbing the victim and joined the
fray. They immediately pulled out their knives and subsequently stabbed the victim. As
the victim fell to the canal, Odilon and Pilola left the crime scene while Ronnie chased
Julian, After not being able to run after Julian, Ronnie, not contented with the crime they
executed, picked a hollow block and with it bashed the victims head, thereafter, he also
got a piece of a broken bottle and struck the victim once more.

ISSUE
WON Pilola should be considered as a co-principal in the case at bar and not
merely as an accomplice in the committed crime herein.

HELD:

Yes. The direct participation of the accused in stabbing the victim, resulting to the
victims accelerated death, constitutes the act of conspiracy. The overt act executed by
the accused qualifies him to be a co-principal in the crime committed. Article 17 of the
revised Penal Code states:

Principals. The following are considered principals:
1. Those who take direct part in the execution of the act
2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it.
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without
which it would not have been accomplished

All the overt acts of Odilon, Ronnie and the appellant before, during, and after the
stabbing incident indubitably show that they conspired to kill the victim. In this case,
Odilon all by himself initially decided to stab the victim. However, while Odilon was
stabbing the victim, the accused and Ronnie agreed to join in; they rushed to the scene
and also stabbed the victim with their respective knives. The three men simultaneously
stabbed the hapless victim.

As the Court held, conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons
aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each
doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other,
were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association
and a concurrence of sentiment. One who joins a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as
his own the criminal designs of his co-conspirators. If conspiracy is established, all the
conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the manner and extent of their
participation since in contemplation of law, the act of one would be the act of all.

The victim died because of multiple stab wounds inflicted by two or more
persons. There is no evidence that before the arrival of Ronnie and the appellant at
the situs criminis, the victim was already dead. It cannot thus be argued that by the
time the appellant and Ronnie joined Odilon in stabbing the victim, the crime was
already consummated.
Even assuming that the appellant did not conspire with Ronnie and Odilon to kill the
victim, the appellant is nevertheless criminally liable as a principal by direct
participation.






















PP VS TOMOTORGO
136 SCRA 238

FACTS:

Plaintiff was the husband of the victim, Magdalena de los Santos. Magdalena had been
persistently asking her husband to sell their conjugal home in Camarines, Sur in order for them
to transfer to the house of her husbands in-laws. Plaintiff didnt want to abandon their house
because the improvements that he made to the land since this is where he farms and was very
far from his in-laws place.

One day, upon returning home from his farm, he found his wife and three-month old baby
already gone. He went out to look for them and caught up with them 200 meters from their
conjugal home. He saw his wife thereupon with their baby and a bundle of
clothes. Plaintiff begged for his wife to return home but she refused. They got into a scurry
when the plaintiff tried to take their child from his wife. Magdalena, then, threw their child
onto the grassy portion of the trail, which, in return, aroused the ire of the plaintiff.
Thereafter, plaintiff picked up a wood and began hitting his wife. Magdalena fell to the ground
and complained of severe chest pains. Realizing what he had done, plaintiff brought his wife
home but the latter died despite plaintiffs effort to alleviate her pain.

Charged with paricide, Tomotorgo was given the penalty of reclusion perpetua. However, he
contends that the court handed him the wrong punishment. Appellant claims that Article 49 of
the Revised Penal Code prescribes the proper applicable penalty when the crime committed is
different from what was intended

ISSUE:
WON accused herein is guilty of the crime of parricide and was given the right penalty under
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.

HELD:

Yes. Accused herein is guilty of the crime of parricide and not merely of physical injuries even
though the latter was what he only intended to commit. He was also sentenced with the right
penalty under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which applies to the case at bar.

Article 4 of the RPC states that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing
a felony (delicto) although the wrongful act be different from that which he intended and that
accused is liable for all the consequences of his felonious act.

Article 49 of the RPC does not apply to cases where more serious consequences not intended
by the offender result from his felonious act because under Article 4. Par. 1 of the same code,
he is liable for all the direct and natural consequences of his unlawful act. His lack of intention
to commit a grave wrong is at best mitigating.

The judgment by the lower court herein is thereby affirmed but the Court recommends that
executive clemency be extended to the accused







































PP VS MONLEON
74 SCRA 263
FACTS:
Cosme Monleon in his inebriated state upon reaching home asked his wife whether his
carabao was already fed by their son Marciano. The wife answered in the affirmative.
But, to check the veracity of said statement, he went to see for himself the carabao. He
discovered that the carabao had not been adequately fed and got furious. He was about
to hit Marciano, when Concordia, his wife, intervened. Monleon then choked her,
bashed her head against the post and kicked her abdomen. Concordia died the
following day.

ISSUE:
WON Monleon is criminally liable of the crime of parricide although he had no intention
to kill his wife.
HELD:
Yes. Accused herein is criminally liable of the crime of parricide although he had no
intention herein to kill his own wife. Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended to do. The maltreatment inflicted by the
accused on his wife was the proximate cause of her death. The accused is guilty of
parricide sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.









PP VS PAGE
77 SCRA 348

FACTS:

William Page and his friend since boyhood, Crisanto Camposano held up a jeep. Page sat in
front of the jeepney holding a balisong, while Camposano seated himself at the back, with a
revolving. Veronica Balacapo, one of the passengers of the jeepney at the back, jumped out of
the vehicle during the course of the holdup. She was subsequently brought to a hospital by a
good samaritan but she was declared to be dead upon arrival.

The trial court herein convicted Camposano and Page of the crime of robbery with homicide.
Camposano died while he was being apprehended for a different crime. Page insists that he
cannot be made liable for Balacapos death because he had nothing to do with it. He reiterated
that he was at the front of the jeepney while Camposano was the one threatening Balacapo at
the back of the jeepney.

ISSUE:

WON Page is guilty of the crime herein of robbery with homicide acting as a co-conspirator with
Camposano.

RULING:

Yes. William Page is guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide acting as a co-conspirator with
Camposano.

The Court held as a rule that if a man creates in another person's mind an immediate sense of
danger, which causes such person to try to escape, and, in so doing, the latter injures himself, the
man who creates such a state of mind is responsible for the resulting injuries (People vs. Toling, L-
27097, January 17, 1975, 62 SCRA 17,33).

If the victim herein jumped out of the jeepney, it must have been because she was in mortal
dread that Camposano would shoot her. Of course, it was Camposano who directly brought
about Balacapos death. Whether Balacapo jumped from the jeepney or whether
Camposano kicked and pushed her and her sister out of the jeepney, Camposanos culpability
for that flagitious deed cannot be disputed.

However, there was not a scintilla of doubt that a conspiracy to commit robbery existed between
Page and Camposano. Their behavior inside the jeepney disclosed a synchronization of their
actions, evincing a prior concert and plan to commit robbery with violence against and
intimidation of persons. Page should answer for all the consequences of the conspiracy,
including the homicide which was intertwined with the robbery committed by his conspirator.
The homicide was committed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. Generally, when
robbery with homicide has been proven, all those who had taken part in the robbery are guilty of
the special complex crime unless it appears that they endeavored to prevent the homicide. The
same rule is followed in Spanish jurisprudence. Of course, Page did not kill the victim. But under
the rules of conspiracy, he is deemed to be a co-principal in the robbery with homicide.