ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF DIPLOMATIC

NEGOTIATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY

FILIPE SOBRAL (fsobral@fe.uc.pt)
BUSINESS MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT, FACULTY OF ECONOMICS
UNIVERSITY OF COIMBRA, PORTUGAL

NATLIA LEAL (nfleal@fe.uc.pt)
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT, FACULTY OF ECONOMICS
UNIVERSITY OF COIMBRA, PORTUGAL

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ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATION:
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY



ABSTRACT

This paper sought to examine the ethicality of negotiation behaviors in the context of
diplomatic negotiations. Mismatched ethical expectations are one of the biggest barriers to
effective conflict resolution. Using inappropriate tactics can hinder the negotiation process
and cause the breakdown. Despite this, there is scant understanding of how diplomats and
political scientists view the ethics and morals underlying the negotiation process. Twenty
senior diplomats from Portugal rated their perceptions of the appropriateness and perceived
efficacy of forty five ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics (EATN). Results showed that
respondents judged the ethical appropriateness of tactics of emotional deception more
favorably than tactics of cognitive deception. Results also indicated significant differences in
the perceptions of the appropriateness of most tactics and their efficacy in the international
arena. Implications for the role of ethics in diplomatic negotiation are discussed.

KEYWORDS: Negotiation; Ethical Decision-Making; Diplomacy

TYPE OF PAPER: Empirical
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INTRODUCTION
The international negotiation arena is populated by several types of actors from
international organizations, to multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations,
groups of people, and individuals. Still, the nation-state remains the most relevant actor
(Rasmussen, 1997). International negotiations are characterized by inter-state relations, and
are the process of reaching agreements such as official and unofficial diplomatic
communications, ministerial meetings, meetings in international organizations, and
summitry (Druckman, 1997: 90).
However, even if technically the actors in a negotiation are states or governments,
ultimately, they will have to be represented by individuals. Different individuals have
different perceptions about the decision-making process. This is why many international
negotiations often fail (Gulbro & Herbig, 1996). One particular area that can cause the
impasse or even the breakdown of a negotiation is mismatched expectations about what
constitutes appropriate negotiating behavior. Tactics involving deception or any other variant
of untruthfulness are commonly available to negotiators and are perceived as more or less
acceptable depending on who is asked (Anton, 1990). Some researchers point to the
expectation of deception as a commonplace of bargaining (Carson, 1993; Friedman &
Shapiro, 1995; Strudler, 1995), while others reject the use of any form of dishonesty in
negotiation (Provis, 2000; Reitz et al., 1998). Thus, it is important that international
negotiators understand what constitutes an acceptable or unacceptable tactic. Knowing what
is considered as an ethical or unethical behavior will help negotiators better understand the
other party and to manage their emotional responses during the decision-making process.
This paper explores how diplomats view the ethicality of several negotiation gambits
that can be regarded as deceptive in the context of international negotiation. This study adds
to the understanding of ethical decision-making in negotiation by focusing on the perspective
4
of political scientists and diplomats. The objectives proposed in this paper are: (1) identify
the tactics and behaviors as ethically acceptable or unacceptable in the context of diplomatic
negotiations; (2) examine the extent to which diplomats distinguish between cognitive tactics
of deception versus emotional tactics of deception; (3) assess the relationship between the
their perceptions about the appropriateness and efficacy of ethically ambiguous negotiation
tactics (EANT).


ETHICS IN DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATION
Diplomacy is one of the peaceful instruments used by states to implement their
foreign policies and uphold their national interests at the international level (Ballesteros,
1995). It includes a wide range of activities among which is negotiation, for some, the most
important part of the diplomatic activity (Magalhes, 1996: 81). According to Holsti (1995:
140), diplomacy is used primarily to reach agreements, compromises, and settlements where
government objectives conflict. This definition is very similar to how negotiation is defined
a process of potentially opportunistic interaction by which two or more parties, with some
apparent conflict, seek to do better through jointly decided action than they could otherwise
(Lax & Sebenius, 1986: 11) , in the sense they both focus on the need to reconcile divergent
interests. In fact, for Schelling (1980: 168), diplomacy is bargaining. Therefore, while
diplomats, through negotiation, strive to achieve the goals defined by their home government,
they may stumble upon some ethical dilemmas. As with any other people involved in a
negotiation, ethical issues are always present (Raiffa, 1982), and may affect the way they
behave and react in a negotiation.
The issue of ethics in international relations, namely the relation of ethics and moral
elements with foreign policy and the national interest, has often been the center of
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discussions among academics and practitioners (Rosenthal, 1999; Valls, 2000). Debates on
human rights, global justice, just war theory, sovereignty or non-interference, all carry ethical
concerns (Hoffmann, 1999). But specific research on ethics in diplomatic negotiations is very
recent and scant.
In a broad sense, ethics is related with the compliance with a certain number of rules
and principles that define the adequate and admissible way to conduct. In the international
arena, ethics relates to the behavior of states, and ethical standards derive from several
features, such as international norms and standards, or socio-cultural, political, religious, and
historical norms within the state, as well as from individual conscience (Holsti, 1995). Since
states are often represented by their diplomats, their behavior is a crucial element of
international ethics. Even though some argue that it is not possible or even desirable to search
for the application of ethics in the international affairs (Welch, 2000; Cf. also Vall, 2000;
Donohue & Hoobler, 2002), policy-makers and policy-implementers, as diplomats, are role
players and are often, implicitly or explicitly, faced with the need to choose between their
conscience and the realization of their established goals and the alleged national interests
these goals incorporate. As Rosenthal (1999: 2-3) says policy decisions can be firmly rooted
in ethics while avoiding the perils of moralism and absolutism on the one hand and empty
relativism on the other. An example of how the behavior of diplomatic agents may affect our
daily lives is the impact of negotiations developed within the European Union, which are
generally conducted within the Permanent Representatives Council (the COREPER) by the
ambassadors and diplomatic staff of each member state.
Different actors in a negotiation tend to define ethics in different ways. Welber (n/d:
28-29), for instance, suggests that there are two main approaches to ethics one that views
negotiation much like a competitive sport or game [], accompanied by norms of behavior
separate from the norms of everyday human interaction, and another, more idealistic, under
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which one should maintain the same principles of honesty in negotiation that one would
apply in other interpersonal relations , plus a third pragmatic and mixed approach that
recognizes that deception is an inherent part of the negotiation process but that it should be
used sparingly, on a case by case basis. Lewicky et al. (2003: 273-245), on the other hand,
propose four approaches to what may or not constitute an ethical behavior. Ethical reasoning
may result from considerations about end-result ethics (principles of utilitarianism), rule
ethics (principles of rule utilitarianism), social contract ethics (principles of community-based
socially acceptable behavior) or personalistic ethics (determining what is right by turning to
ones conscience). In a negotiation encounter, the incentives to cross the line into the territory
of ethically ambiguous behavior are a function of the characteristics of the negotiation
situation and the differences in the motivation of the parties (OConnor & Carnevale, 1997).
Nevertheless, it is important to notice that some form of deception is frequent and inherent to
the negotiation process. In a study with experienced negotiators, more than one-third engaged
in both active and passive misrepresentation within one single encounter (Murnighan et al.,
1999).


CLASSIFYING AND MEASURING THE APPROPRIATENESS OF EANTs
The main objective of this paper is to understand how diplomats evaluate ethically
ambiguous negotiation tactics regarding their acceptability and perceived efficacy. Measuring
the individual attitudes toward EANTs is potentially useful to identify intergroup differences
in order to predict the likelihood that they will use such tactics in a negotiation situation.
Lewicki and Robinson (1998) and Robinson et al. (2000) developed a measure of
attitudes toward such tactics the Self-Reported Inappropriate Strategies scale (SINS scale).
The SINS scale reports judgments of appropriateness of five categories of tactics: (1)
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bluffing, (2) inappropriate information gathering, (3) attacking opponents network, (4)
misrepresentation, (5) traditional competitive bargaining. Using the SINS scale several
studies have been conducted to understand which factors may shape a negotiators
predisposition to use unethical tactics. Findings suggest that demographic and personality
characteristics of the respondents affected the way they perceive the acceptability of such
tactics (Lewicki et al., 2003). Other studies have also found that ratings of acceptability of
EANTs vary across occupation groups (Anton, 1990), across cultures (Volkema, 1997, 1998,
1999) and across situations (Garcia et al., 2001; Volkema & Fleury, 2002).
Recently, Barry (1999) and Barry et al. (2003) proposed one more category to the
SINS scale emotional manipulation. In fact, its not only the manipulation of information in
a negotiation encounter that may involve deception. The manipulation of the emotional state
may also entail some degree of dishonesty. There is empirical evidence that emotional
deception is harder to detect than factual deception (Hocking et al., 1979), increasing the
temptation to effectively deploy such tactics. Moreover, some authors point that emotion
management is a more intrinsic and normative behavior in interpersonal relations than any
other form of deception (Barry et al. 2003; Burleson & Planalp, 2000). Results from Barrys
work suggest that tactics of emotional manipulation are more ethically appropriate than
tactics of cognitive manipulation of information (Barry, 1999; Barry et al., 2003).
Despite several studies conducted using the SINS scale, some authors raised some
concerns about the appropriateness of the SINS scale for identifying a typology of EANTs
(Rivers, 2004; Reitz et al., 1998). They argued that the categories are not conceptually
distinct and that the SINS scale does not offer content adequacy of the field of EANTs. For
example the SINS scale does not include tactics like omission or distraction, behaviors that
can be considered deceptive in a negotiation situation.
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These concerns led to the development of an alternative inventory of EANTs that
included types of tactics absent in the SINS scale. This new inventory consists of 45 items
that are being tested and validated and represents the initial step in the development of an
alternative scale for measuring ethically ambiguous tactics.


METHOD
The research subjects were ambassadors and senior staff of the Portuguese diplomatic
body. Twenty participants completed the questionnaire containing the proposed measures,
which were mailed through the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although the number
of responses does not allow to make statistical generalizations it was important to receive
opinions from qualified and experienced negotiators. One of the main critiques that has been
pointed to ethics research in negotiation is that it normally uses MBA students as subjects,
samples that are too homogeneous and with a limited negotiation experience.
To evaluate the perceptions of Portuguese diplomats, a three-section questionnaire
was designed. In the first part participants completed the appropriateness ratings of 45
ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics. Instead of considering any specific definition for
what ethics is or should be, instructions directed participants to consider each tactic in the
context of the negotiations that usually take place in scope of the diplomatic activity.
Participants were then asked to indicate how ethically appropriate they would think that each
tactic was in that context, using a 7-point scale (1-completely unacceptable to 7-completely
acceptable).
In the second section, participants provided a second rating for each of the same 45
tactics, but this time judging the perceived efficacy of such tactic in the context of diplomatic
activity. The ratings of efficacy were also measured on a 7-point scale (1-not at all effective
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to 7-very effective). Finally, in the last section the participants provided some demographic
and professional data.


RESULTS
Due to the reduced number of responses, a factor analysis is not a valid option to treat
the responses; therefore the analysis will focus on a more exploratory level, with emphasis on
descriptive analysis and in series of bivariate comparisons. For analysis purposes mean
ratings of each group of EANT will be used (varying from 1 to 7 and with 4 representing the
neutral value). Table I summarizes the results for each group of tactics for both
appropriateness and perceived efficacy ratings.

TABLE I APPROPRIATENESS AND EFFICACY OF EANTS
Category Appropriateness Efficacy
1. Traditional Competitive Tactics 5,25 5,13
2. Misrepresentation/Lying 2,87 3,55
3. Attacking Opponents Network 2,62 3,13
4. Bluffing (false promises and threats) 2,65 3,73
5. Inappropriate Information Gathering 3,71 4,71
6. Manipulation of Positive Emotions 5,39 5,46
7. Manipulation of Negative Emotions 4,36 4,83
8. Complete Repression of Emotions 6,18 6,05
9. Omission or Partial Disclosure 4,60 4,98
10. Distraction 4,70 4,65

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The results show that some forms of untruth are considered ethically appropriate
among diplomats. Tactics that conceal what is going on in the mind of the negotiator (e.g.
exaggeration or hiding the value of something) are considered acceptable and within the rules
of negotiation. Tactics that repress emotions, keeping a poker face, even if the negotiator is
stressed or annoyed, are also regarded as completely acceptable. The manipulation of positive
emotions is the other group of tactics that diplomats consider ethically appropriate.
On the other hand, while some tactics are completely rejected, like misrepresentation,
bluffing and attacking the opponents network, others are accepted by some and rejected by
others. Among these are tactics of omission (hidden facts or partial disclosure), distraction
(avoiding questions or direct the attention of the opponent to minor aspects) and manipulation
of negative emotions.
In terms of perceived efficacy, the most effective EANT is the complete repression of
emotions, and the least effective ones are attacking the opponents network,
misrepresentation and bluffing. Traditional competitive tactics, as emotional manipulation
tactics, seem to be reasonably effective among diplomats. Tactics that are related to the
collection, communication and sharing of information (5, 9 & 10) divide the opinions of the
diplomats, being considered by some as moderately effective and by others as moderately
ineffective.
To examine if there are differences in the way diplomats perceive cognitive and
emotional forms of deception, series of bivariate comparisons were conducted. The means
and comparisons tests between the manipulation of positive emotions (e.g. sympathy or
enthusiasm) and tactics of cognitive manipulation show that diplomats regard the strategic
expression of positive feelings as a more acceptable behavior than other forms of deception.
The exception are tactics of competitive bargaining (sig. 0,566).
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Different results were obtained for the comparison between tactics of negative
manipulation and tactics of cognitive manipulation. Diplomats show more positive attitudes
towards some tactics of cognitive deception (traditional competitive tactics, omission and
distraction) than to negative manipulation of emotion. However, statistically significant
differences were found between negative expression of feelings and some tactics of
manipulation of information (namely, misrepresentation, bluffing and attacking the
opponents network all sig. < 0.001).
As for the comparisons of the efficacy between such tactics in the context of
diplomatic negotiation, the results are very similar to those obtained in the appropriateness
ratings. Tactics of manipulation of positive feelings are considered a more effective attitude
than cognitive deception. However, traditional competitive tactics (sig. 0,213) and omission
(sig. 0,198) are rated by the respondents as being as much effective as manipulation of
positive emotions. Tactics of negative expression of emotions are regarded as more effective
than some tactics of information manipulation (misrepresentation, bluffing and attacking
opponents network all sig. <0,001) but no differences were found in comparison to tactics
such as traditional competitive bargaining (sig. 0,105), inappropriate information gathering
(sig. 0,691), omission (sig. 0,613) or distraction (sig. 0,523).
The third objective was to examine the relationship between the perceptions of
appropriateness and efficacy of such tactics in the context of diplomatic activity. To test these
relationships paired comparisons were conducted between the means of appropriateness and
efficacy ratings. Significant differences were only found in misrepresentation (sig. 0,008),
attacking the opponents network (sig. 0,035), bluffing (sig. 0,005), and inappropriate
information gathering (sig. 0,001). All these tactics were considered ethically unacceptable;
however diplomats recognize that these tactics can be more effective than they are
appropriate in diplomatic negotiations.
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DISCUSSION
The findings reported in this study contribute to research on negotiation ethics in four
major ways. Most importantly, this is among the first studies to measure the attitudes of
diplomats toward ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics. Second, the results show
differences in how these individuals assess the acceptability and efficacy of cognitive and
emotional manipulation tactics. Third, the findings suggest that there are differences in terms
of perceived efficacy and appropriateness of several EANTs. Finally, this study is the first
step to develop alternative measures of ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics, including
tactics of emotional deception and other forms of cognitive deception like omission or partial
disclosure and distraction.
In an era of globalization, where impersonality often seems to be one of its main
effects, it is important to remember that foreign policies and diplomacy are a result of
individuals behavior. As Ballestero (1995) underlines, the human factor is crucial in the
diplomatic activity, and as Zartman (1999) would add, negotiation is a vital process to assure
the settlement of conflicts that often arise between states and between their representatives.
Since these international disputes often appear due to different interpretation of what should
be done, the compliance with a certain number of norms and procedures should also be on the
mind of those who sometimes lead these negotiation processes. As this study has shown,
diplomats are sensible to ethical issues, but not always in the same manner. The rules of the
game seem to accept some passive forms of dishonesty (lies of omission) but do not
welcome some more factual manipulations, namely more active tactics such as
misrepresentation, false promises or threats (OConnor & Carnevale, 1997; Schweitzer &
Croson, 1999).
Regarding the comparison between cognitive and emotional forms of deception, the
present study suggests some mixed opinions. The role of emotion in negotiation has been
13
either ignored or treated as a uniquely destructive force that disrupts a rational process
(Putnam, 1994) and there was very little research that investigated affective processes in
negotiation (Barry & Oliver, 1996; Thompson et al., 1999). However, negotiation typically
occurs when there is conflict and conflict cannot be free of emotion and anxiety (Greenhalgh,
2002). Lately, research in this area has greatly expanded and moved beyond early cognition-
focused approaches (Barry et al., 2004; Bodtker & Jameson, 2001; Fulmer & Barry, in press;
Ogilvie & Carsky, 2002). Scholars have given more explicit attention to the emotional
components, recognizing it as a complementary element of cognition in the negotiation
process. However, the present study does not corroborate the results of previous studies.
Barry (1999) and Barry et al. (2003) found evidences that participants held more favorable
attitudes toward the use of emotional management tactics when compared to cognitive forms
of deception, and reported higher levels of self-efficacy for emotion management tactics.
Diplomats consider that the control of emotion and the expression of positive feelings are
acceptable and effective; however they do not share the same opinion in regard to the
expression of negative emotions. These are considered less acceptable and less effective than
some tactics of cognitive manipulation of information.
With respect to comparison between appropriateness and efficacy of EANTs the
results indicate that some tactics are regarded as more effective than they are ethically
appropriate. Maybe because some of these tactics may eventually be considered as a form of
propaganda deliberate attempts by governments, through their diplomats and
propagandists, to influence the attitudes and behavior of foreign populations (Holsti, 1995:
152). and their governments , especially behaviors like the manipulation and gathering of
information, misrepresentation/lying and false promises and threats. The activity of
propaganda is one that is more concerned with the effectiveness of its results, than with the
search for a certain truth or compliance with any specific standards. Perhaps this is why
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diplomats recognize some tactics as ethically unacceptable but somewhat effective in the
diplomatic context.
Finally, this study also intended to develop a new measuring instrument of ethically
ambiguous negotiation tactics. Despite de wide acceptance and validation of the SINS scale
(Lewicki & Robinson, 1998; Robinson, Lewicki & Donohue, 2000) there is room to include
other forms of deception. Some attempts have been made to propose new categories of
EANTs (Rivers, 2004; Reitz et al., 1998) but none, yet, has been completely validated as the
SINS scale. The present study represents the first step to an alternative scale to classify and
measure EANTs.
Some limitations in this research should be mentioned. First, the reduced number of
responses does not allow to conduct a more validated analysis and to generalize the findings.
However, targeting a sample of experienced and professional negotiators, among which were
several ambassadors, was preferred to using graduate students with limited negotiation
experience. Second, the measuring instrument is not yet validated, although other researches
have been conducted using other professional groups and countries.
In conclusion, the findings of the present study reveal the perceptions of diplomats
about the behaviors that are acceptable and effective in the international negotiation arena.
Results show that in the opinion of Portuguese diplomats some forms of deception are
regarded as honest and ethically acceptable, while others are completely rejected and
disapproved in diplomatic negotiations. Since greater honesty in diplomacy seems to be
considered a sign of the maturing of the diplomatic system (Berridge, 1995), it is expected
that this study represents a contribution to the positive evolution of man and its forms of
organization and governance.
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