Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Series Editors:
Arturo Escobar, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Dianne Rocheleau, Clark University
Foreword
by Sinclair Thomson
Translated
by Stacey Alba D. Skar
Part I.
Community Uprisings and Grassroots Democratization 1
Part II.
From Governmental Collapse to Pachakuti’s Suspension, 2003–2005 97
Notes 223 References 265 Index 275
Foreword
Beyond the Old Order of Things
At the same time, the conviction that only the armed overthrow of the state
could bring about revolution caused the group to define itself primarily as
against the state and thereby to enter into an ever tighter spiral of state and
antistate violence.
For Gutiérrez Aguilar, the missed opportunity of contributing further to
community self-determination and the disastrous engagement with the state
called for a new orientation toward radical politics. She found inspiration
in the recent Zapatista insurgency in Mexico. Here was a vibrant popular
struggle whose aim was not to seize state power but to construct and exercise
its own autonomous power, a movement rooted in indigenous communities
that also had repercussions throughout national society.
In spite of the utter defeat of the egtk and the apparent consolidation of
a neoliberal regime that intentionally undermined all collective ties of soli‑
darity, Gutiérrez Aguilar retained a conviction, unusual at the time, that the
possibilities for radical political struggle remained open in Bolivia. In another
prison writing from 1996, she concluded that
whether in the Paris Commune of 1871, among Aymara community
members in 1781, the soviets in 1917, the Turin proletarians in 1921, the
students in 1968, or the women coca growers in their recent march,
in any of these actions, the decisive factor was the joining together of
women and men willing to expend all of their energy to solve in com‑
mon, at the margin of, beyond, and outside state normativity, the prob‑
lems that stifle them. In these actions, and in the different individual
and collective efforts to overcome the destiny imposed upon them and
to move fluidly as a free release of constructive energy, we find the
thread of another history that has been systematically proscribed,
the ongoing history of el poder hacer [human capability], as well as
the foundation for imagining that another form of life is possible.
(Gutiérrez Aguilar 1996, 64)
After emerging from prison with provisional freedom while her court case
continued, Gutiérrez Aguilar became a founding member of the important
intellectual group Comuna in 1998. It was also comprised of Álvaro García
Linera, who upon release had reinvented himself as a researcher and teacher
in the sociology department of the Universidad Mayor de San Andrés in La
Paz and was gaining increasing public intellectual prominence; Bolivia’s lead‑
ing political philosopher Luis Tapia; and Raúl Prada, a creative social theorist
who went on to a political career under the auspices of mas, first as a dele‑
gate to the constituent assembly from 2006 to 2009. In 1999 Gutiérrez Aguilar
xii Foreword
between 1985 and 2000. Gutiérrez Aguilar first explores the Water War in
Cochabamba in 2000 that led to the ouster of Aguas de Tunari, an affiliate
of the multinational corporation Bechtel that sought to privatize water dis‑
tribution in the region. Second, she looks at the waves of protest and urban
siege organized by rural and urban communities of indigenous Aymara that
culminated in 2003 with the overthrow of then president Gonzalo Sánchez
de Lozada, an internationally touted architect of neoliberal reform and a
close ally of the United States. Third, she considers the movement of coca leaf
growers, with their base in the Chapare region of Cochabamba, who began
by resisting the U.S.-led War on Drugs in the Andes and who ultimately cata‑
pulted into presidential office their trade union leader Evo Morales in late
2005, at the end of the period analyzed by Gutiérrez Aguilar.
Gutiérrez Aguilar is able to write about these movements with particular
familiarity and insight because of her own political work on the altiplano and
in Cochabamba. She draws on conversations, correspondence, and interviews
with her former comrades in the egtk—Álvaro García Linera, who became
for a time a political advisor and intermediary between Felipe Quispe and
Evo Morales, and Quispe himself, who became secretary general of the Peas‑
ant Trade Union Confederation of Bolivia. She also draws on her working
relationship with Oscar Olivera, the trade union leader of factory workers in
Cochabamba who became the head of the Coalition for the Defense of Water
and Life. Gutiérrez Aguilar herself was part of the Coalition for the Defense
of Water and Life’s technical assistance team and attended grassroots meet‑
ings in which the movement deliberated on its strategies and goals. She also
gained access to rare and ephemeral documentation such as photocopies of
the notebooks of the secretary of the peasant trade union organization in
Omasuyos (pp. 125–126) and public pronouncements by grassroots organi‑
zations in the heat of the struggle such as the August 2004 declaration of
the Coalition for the Defense and Recuperation of Gas (pp. 336–340). Such
sources allow her to ascertain the movements’ popular and radical imagi‑
naries or to discern what she calls their “horizons of desire,” as well as their
limitations. These are the kind of sources that the mainstream press tended
to ignore at the time and that historians of the future are likely to overlook.
In a classic essay on the discourse of counterinsurgency, the historian
Ranajit Guha once distinguished between three sorts of sources for the
study of subaltern uprisings. For Guha, documents produced at the time of
an insurgency would constitute “primary” sources, while the works of aca‑
demic social scientists or historians writing later would constitute “terciary”
sources. Gutiérrez Aguilar’s book is what Guha would call a “secondary”
xiv Foreword
digenous and popular political subjects in the latest phase of struggle did not
define themselves primarily in terms of the nation, were not simply seeking
participation within a more inclusive and democratic state, and did not seek
to capture state power. Rather, they were experimenting with a new definition
of “us” that pushed beyond the nation-state, and were “proposing legitimate
autonomous ways to bring about collective coexistence and organize political
self-regulation” (p. 418).
She cites the list of demands ( pliego petitorio) produced by the InterUnion
Pact from 2001 as the clearest expression of this utopian community-popular
perspective (pp. 126 ff.). It sought to transform the state-society relationship
by inverting the command structure and subjecting higher representatives to
the will of local community authorities. It asserted collective property rights
and reclaimed community control over the resources that had been alienated
from their rightful owners. This project amounted to turning the dominant
political and economic regime “upside down and inside out” (pp. 417–418).
This desired “inversion of the political order” signified an imminent Pacha‑
kuti. Gutiérrez Aguilar appropriates this semantically rich, mythically reso‑
nant Quechua term, meaning a turning or upheaval (kuti) of time and space
(pacha), for contemporary political discourse as a vernacular Andean con‑
cept of “revolution,” though one that differs from a classical Western or left‑
ist notion. Her aim is to expose the signs and promise of that Pachakuti. She
tracks its emergence and unfolding dynamics, a process that she glosses using
the metaphor of rhythms. She perceives and records their particular patterns,
their motion and timing, their pauses, stresses, and beats, their alterations
and pulsation.
We need to take seriously Gutiérrez Aguilar’s vision of the recent insur‑
gencies. In fact, despite the significant roles of Olivera, Quispe, and Morales,
and the growth of mas into a national party, there was no fixed personal or
institutional leadership during crucial phases of indigenous and popular mo‑
bilization. Furthermore, there did emerge a deep critique of the Bolivian state
as a neocolonial apparatus and of neoliberalism as a hypertrophied regime of
capitalist domination. And yet, as Gutiérrez Aguilar is fully aware, the move‑
ments never fully realized the “community-popular” potential that she per‑
ceived in them. As she puts it, “Why, if they were indeed against the state, did
they not clearly advance beyond it?” (p. 260).
This problem is the crucial one for Gutiérrez Aguilar, and it is fascinating
to see how she grapples with it. She distinguishes between the elements of
radical imagination that constituted the internal and emergent “horizon of
desire” of the movements and the effective results of the challenge to power
xvi Foreword
that constituted their “practical scope.” Her method is designed to probe the
gap between the two, and she is too scrupulous to attribute the split merely to
external forces, as might a more facile or idealistic advocate of social move‑
ments. Through the careful analysis of her sources, she identifies one ex‑
planatory factor as being the contradictions in the content of the insurgents’
political vision. In large part this derived from contrary tendencies to re‑
pudiate the dynamics of the state and to desire fuller and fairer incorporation
within them. While she doesn’t belittle the latter, she notes that the often un‑
conscious points of political compromise, convention, and constraint point
to a major theoretical-discursive weakness that prevented insurgent forces
from exceeding certain parameters of liberalism. She is also attuned to the
forms through which insurgent forces expressed themselves, and in this sec‑
ond explanatory factor, she finds that the trade union tactic of the list of de‑
mands (pliego petitorio) made before the state ultimately allowed the state to
reframe and resolve the process of negotiation. A third explanatory factor
involves political strategy. She traces the increasing electoralist outlook of
mas as a crucial development that undermined the partial and temporary
unity of the community-popular perspective. In mid-2005, when the political
order was at the point of crumbling and insurgency was spreading through‑
out the country, mas opted to prop up the government of then president
Carlos Mesa in order to ensure that elections—sure to favor mas—would be
held in December. As Mesa stepped down, popular social forces also came out
in favor of an orderly succession in executive authority while failing to gener‑
ate a transformative new agenda for a constitutional assembly.
The effects of these factors were increasingly evident at the time Gutiérrez
Aguilar was writing her book, in the early years of the mas government’s
first term. In January 2006 Evo Morales assumed the role of head of state,
with García Linera at his side. As the ruling party began to centralize power
and political representation, and the social movements began to demobilize,
Gutiérrez Aguilar found the signs “ambivalent, disconcerting, confusing”
(p. xxxix). The rhythms of the Pachakuti gradually stalled.
Gutiérrez Aguilar describes Bolivia as the “most successful example of the
recent struggle against capital and against the state in Latin America,” though
how to advance beyond them remains an open challenge. Her book captures
the exceptional political effervescence in Bolivia in the period from 2000 to
2005: the mobilizations in urban streets and plazas and on rural highways,
the popular assemblies and deliberations to take direct action or to build
local electoral alliances, the democratic interventions in municipal, congres‑
sional, and constitutional arenas of public discourse and politics. She also
Foreword xvii
registers the depth of the challenge to the internal colonial and neoliberal
regime during that remarkable cycle of insurgency. And in her dense, urgent
record and her refusal to conform to the old order of things, we can still feel
the pulsations of that creative and unfinished moment. In its restless critique
and probing aspiration, Rhythms of the Pachakuti deserves to stand as a key
text in the international literature of radicalism and emancipatory politics in
the new century.
ify the series of events that established the pattern, method, and meaning
of Bolivia’s rebellious social participation. This included Aymara peasants,
residents from El Alto and Cochabamba, the Chapare region’s coca growers,
and Bolivia’s humble and hardworking inhabitants, both urban and rural. In
other words, I sought to listen to and understand the process that produced
the rhythms of the Pachakuti. In doing so, I discovered that each of the tem‑
pos I identified is based on the following: dignity recovered in the decisive
acts of rejecting what is unjust and unacceptable; autonomy exercised in the
planning and execution of what was decided, in confronting the established
power, and in the struggle for legitimacy for empowerment; and the ability to
cooperate with others in conditions that were essentially equal although never
free of tension. Dignity, autonomy, and the ability to cooperate are the fun‑
damental notes in a symphony in crescendo. These are the threads that I have
traced to examine each mobilized social group’s movements and trajectory.
For my second objective, I sought to understand the latent, and thus more
implicit, political substance and desires found nestled in the most intimate
depths of ancestral and modern ways of organizing social life. These occasion‑
ally surfaced during the wave of uprisings, and their analysis can assist us in
the task of imagining and producing a tolerable present and perhaps a better
future. It is only there that we can pose the question of how to advance toward
the objective of Pachakuti. For this purpose, I have researched the elements
that constitute what I call the horizon of desire defined by the events in the
struggle that unfolded in Bolivia between 2000 and 2005.
I developed this dual approach by designing a theoretical strategy while
the events were unfolding. This strategy includes a sensitive analysis of social
struggles and, at the same time, a mechanism to systematically compare the
practical scope of each struggle to the interior horizon defined primarily by
collective acts. What follows are some initial reflections on this.
Theory is almost always constructed from a dominant social position. It
is a privileged location for the gaze. Therefore, it was not my intention to de‑
velop a theory with this research. Instead, I sought to outline a theoretical
strategy. This strategy would clarify, on the one hand, the most significant acts
of rebellion that occurred in Bolivia between 2000 and 2005. On the other
hand, it would provide insight for a more general reflection on the multiple
horizons of desire stemming from these collective acts of conflict and rebel‑
lion, which a particular theoretical tradition has identified as social emanci-
pation.
This project thus draws from both the study of recent history and philo‑
sophical reflection. Consequently, it does not escape the conceptual and dis‑
Preface xxi
first is the theory of the historical necessity for socialism to prevail over capi‑
talism. The second involves privileging the knowledge about such a necessity
over real struggles against capitalist exploitation and domination. This in‑
cludes recognizing and understanding the laws of history that determined the
necessary decline of capitalist society (Holloway 2001a, 174). For a long time,
there was a set theoretical framework founded on these ideas, which framed
a specific understanding of the political aspects of social struggle. This view
of history includes various guiding assumptions. The following are three of
them: the idea that the development of capitalism itself prepares the material
conditions that lead to socialism; the understanding of socialism basically as
“nationalization of modes of production” and “economic planning”; and the
suggestion that the principal activity of the “revolutionary subject”—whether
the working class, the working class in alliance with poor farmers, the work‑
ing class organized in a revolutionary party, and so forth—should be to “take
political power,” which is managed by the state, in order to support the goal of
building socialism. This group of assumptions can be called “orthodox Marx‑
ism.” Although there has been varying emphasis on each of the aforemen‑
tioned three ideas, they have constituted the general theory within which the
political contents and meanings of social struggle were understood, classified,
and evaluated for several decades in the twentieth century.
Critical Marxism begins with a critique of these assumptions. It theorizes
that society is torn between those who work and those who control and reap
the benefits of other people’s labor—the capital/useful labor contradiction. It
then focuses on the various ways in which those who work resist and struggle
against the conditions imposed on them. In this sense, for critical Marxism,
history’s path can essentially be understood by documenting and meticu‑
lously studying the development of the conflict. This analysis would focus on
the side of the social conflict where those who work and produce wealth are
concentrated in multiple ways. Consequently, there is no historical necessity.
Instead, there is a continuous act of resistance and collective creation that
is produced within particular conditions of material production and capital
accumulation. There are no objective economic laws that determine the need
for socialism. Instead, the social conflict’s development has a specificity that
defines what is referred to as the present in each historic moment.
At least two questions (see Holloway 2004) arise from these theoretical as‑
sumptions: First, is it possible to reveal a general meaning, a political horizon,
from the recent struggles, movements, and uprisings against capitalism that
would suggest that they could possibly be in tune or linked? Second, to what
extent are such social struggles directed not only against but beyond capital‑
xxxii Preface
ism? In the research that informs this project, I continually dealt with these
questions, outlining possible responses. And as I asked myself these ques‑
tions, I repeatedly happened upon two central themes. The first of these was
how to be able to understand the sometimes drastic and at other times subtle
changes in the social temperament. These enable widespread and creative acts
of cooperation that undermine the dominant social order, thus overwhelming
institutional frameworks. The second was how to imagine and contribute to
analyzing the ongoing transformations, beginning precisely with that collec‑
tive subjectivity in a state of insubordination. In other words, I also found it
necessary to further clarify the notion of “human emancipation” as a concep‑
tual constellation that defines recent social struggles. I offer some preliminary
responses to these two questions below.
Regarding the first problem, in a world torn by conflict and tension, there
is no pure or disinterested knowledge, only knowledge that is site specific
and intentional. With this in mind, I argue that the analytical study of the so-
called new subjects, privileging their classification, sooner or later re-creates
a type of relationship of subordination between those who make up the “new
subject” studied and those who classify it in one way or another, or even those
who pay so that it can be studied precisely “in that way.”
In contrast, the theoretical approach—academic or militant—focuses on
the conflict itself. It considers the concrete and contradictory development
of the site-specific social conflict and, in particular, the tension involved in
how that development is experienced by those who produce it. This theoreti‑
cal approach facilitates understanding the various ways the conflict is defined
and, occasionally perhaps, a type of subjectivity that rejects various mecha‑
nisms for social subordination, both in daily life and in moments of overt
social rebellion. This approach also makes it possible to distinguish between
differing degrees of contesting the social order, and it does so without having
to appeal to a teleological position. Moreover, there is even the potential to
compare different human experiences as parallel, contrasting their possibili‑
ties and limits.
Judged from the standpoint of capital, intangible labor, exchange value,
and state power, modern social conflict advances through plundering, pillag‑
ing, exploitation, and contempt. This conflict can also be viewed, however,
from the side of active labor, the “making useful,” the privilege of use value,
and the practical capacity of diverse human communities to cooperate with
each other. From that perspective, that same conflict is viewed as leading to
autonomy, the reappropriation of common assets, the rebuilding of a sense
of justice and respect. The following open questions can then be considered
Preface xxxiii
from this second angle: What can we learn from this diverse, energetic, and
multitudinous group of collective acts? In what way do these struggles illumi‑
nate emancipated forms of coexistence? To what extent do they break from
subordination and exploitation, and how do they foretell a different future
even if they are again subjected to the capitalist order? In what way do they
contribute to the transformation of social relationships?
These concerns constitute the heart and soul of my research, clearly merg‑
ing historical, philosophical, and epistemological analysis. Moreover, these
fundamental questions, posed from the perspective of emancipation, form
the basis for my study of what occurred in Bolivia between 2000 and 2005.
They are necessary for establishing clues to identify the common character‑
istics shared by the polyphonic contingents and social groups that organized
during those years to plan, make decisions, speak, and act. My purpose is to
attempt to use words to re-create the subjective experience of the doing un‑
leashed against capital in some of the conflict’s most crucial moments. This
also involves examining the concrete ways in which the men and women who
mobilized have also tried to go beyond capital, either explicitly or implicitly.
In order to do this, it is necessary to study the actual development of the up‑
risings, investigating power’s most profound challenging tendencies. These
have essentially been constructed over the last decade from social structures
that are apparently “not political,” such as community, neighborhood, or
family. My research thus focuses on articulating the struggles and conflicts
that spread throughout Bolivia at the dawn of the twenty-first century and to
learn from what they teach us, once again, about human emancipation.
To accomplish this task, it is possible to investigate the most chaotic mo‑
ments of social rupture. Three levels of analysis, exemplified by the following
three questions, could potentially help us clarify what is occurring: Which
men and women within a society decide to fight and how do they do it? How
do they organize and what discourses do they produce? What space do they
create for meaning? Moving fluidly between these three questions, I will out‑
line ideas throughout the book about how, during the years of mobilization
in Bolivia, there were profound ruptures with two of the twentieth century’s
most emblematic political philosophies: statism and liberalism. From 2000
to 2005, the repeated waves of uprising, confrontation, and selective autono‑
mous management of life and public affairs shattered two notions. The first
was the restricted image of voting citizens. These were thought of as people
who exercised their rights in the privilege of private property and in political
participation through the existence of political parties, so vital to the demo‑
cratic process. The second was the image of the corporate militant committed
xxxiv Preface
John Holloway (2001a) has stated, this consists of thinking about how con‑
temporary insubordination moves against and beyond capital and the state.
There is a copious amount of literature on this topic and on some other re‑
lated questions, such as “revolution” and “communism.” It is not my present
intention to offer a systematic account of that discussion. Instead, my goal is
to delineate some elements to define “emancipation” as a notion that is open,
negative, and significant in order to outline a “conceptual constellation.” Ac‑
cording to Adorno, “cognition of the object in its constellation is cognition of
the process stored in the object,” or, stated another way, “to become aware of
the constellation in which the thing stands means so much as to decode the
one which the latter bears within itself, as what has come to be” (1966, 166).
One cannot think critically without some type of conceptual framework.
Therefore, I believe that in order to reflect on emancipation, it is advisable
to begin with certain historical experiences of struggle systematized in philo‑
sophical formulations. I join Holloway in thinking that it is necessary to con‑
sider “changing the world without taking power.” The first step involves aban‑
doning the idea of “social change,” which was part of what is referred to as the
“revolutionary strategy” prevalent during the twentieth century. Although we
have already reviewed this, let’s summarize it now.
Essentially, what is known as the “revolutionary strategy” proposed a par‑
ticular notion of change based on the struggle to take power. It consisted
of building organizations that were highly cohesive, hierarchical, and disci‑
plined. These could organize the various social struggles in a particular coun‑
try and lead them, of course. In general, with this objective in mind, revo‑
lutionary party activity identified, classified, and sought to subordinate the
actions, perspectives, and intentions of local struggles and of diverse groups
of men and women in their numerous personal struggles. The key aspect
of this strategy was the radical and systematic confrontation with the state.
The objective was to displace the social sectors that occupied its institutions
in order to then transform them from top to bottom. In this sense the logi‑
cal foundations for this argument consist of establishing the existence—and
conceptualization—of at least two specific, distinct, and opposing entities,
the state and the revolutionary party, and to account for their “opposition.”
Following this reasoning, the notion of revolutionary change remains con‑
strained to altering the group occupying the state apparatus and destroying
institutions and previous hierarchical relationships to build new ones.
However, if we part from the opposite premise, defining “social emanci‑
pation” as “changing the world without taking power,” we have to abandon
the universal modern goal within the general definition of emancipation and
xxxvi Preface
established policies so that men and women from the masses are able to build
self-governance based on their own traditional organizations. The entire pre‑
ceding analysis leads to one preliminary affirmation: social emancipation is
not achieved directly via the classic revolutionary strategy for taking power
or from its lighter version of controlling the government apparatus through
elections that seek a future constituent assembly. And it is not achieved di‑
rectly because, quite simply, social emancipation is different from a group of
people, linked broadly through political affiliation or ethnicity to the insur‑
gent contingents, who manage a society’s institutional framework “on behalf
of the people.”
The electoral control of the government apparatus, even the taking of state
power through revolution, has too often hindered the deepening of the trans‑
formative and liberating potential that comes from the act of rebellion. More‑
over, this is precisely what allows some party or political faction to come to
power or for an organization to take control of the state. Furthermore, in
specific cases in which some revolutionary or “popular” party has taken gov‑
ernment or state control, there has been a tendency toward a decline in col‑
lective potential to participate in public affairs, which constitutes an essential
aspect of current emancipatory struggle. However, this contradiction should
not suggest categorically that government or state control by some faction of
the mobilized population would always be counterproductive and block the
struggle for emancipation in every historical instance.
In this sense, and in strictly hypothetical terms for the sake of clarifying
the argument, it is possible to consider both questions as logically indepen‑
dent of one another. In concrete political-practical terms, however, this affir‑
mation demands clarification. What I am arguing is that collective emanci‑
patory action and its deep transformation of social, economic, and political
relationships needs to be considered from a separate and distinct channel from
the political struggle for government and state control. This is because they
move at different speeds and through different paths. These two types of so‑
cial action are separate and independent of one another. This is despite the
fact that each exists in relation to the other because together they define po‑
litical reality at a given place and time. Therefore, what occurs in one of these
political spaces and times is not unrelated to what is happening in the other
one and vice versa.
At a meeting of the Coalition for the Defense of Water and Life (Coordina‑
dora de la Defensa del Agua y de la Vida, known locally as La Coordinadora)
in Cochabamba on March 11, 2006, with Evo Morales’s Movement toward
Socialism (mas) government recently installed, this problem was presented
xxxviii Preface
in the following way: “The question of how to govern is really mas’s problem,
while the question that we are still facing is the problem of power, its disso‑
lution and disruption.”
There are numerous advantages to stating things this way. First, it puts the
problem of the subject of social emancipation in its proper place. It distin‑
guishes between the diverse, plural masses, faced with the problem of how to
dissolve the power apparatus, and the particular body that temporarily occu‑
pies the political apparatus. No progressive or revolutionary government in
history has concerned itself with the question of how to dissolve the power
structures allowing for “self-governance,” admitting plurality, and facilitating
conditions for society’s self-regulation. Basically, there are two predominant
relationships that define social divisions. One involves those who work and
those who live off of the labor of others. The other is between those who gov‑
ern and make decisions and those who obey and suffer the decisions of others.
In general the variety of governmental models suggests the different possible
combinations between the social groups broadly defined in this way and the
specific ways they intersect. In the current Bolivian government, for example,
its “popular” character comes from the fact that those who occupy the state
apparatus are not directly members of the elite who have traditionally lived
off of the labor of others.
It is important to note an obvious distinction between the plural, tumul‑
tuous, insubordinate, and collaborative subjectivity that continues in recent
experience to be linked to a reflection on social emancipation and the defi‑
nition of its challenges and difficulties. Another issue involves the numerous
possible types of governing bodies that face a whole series of pending tasks.
This is undoubtedly something altogether different, which is what Cocha‑
bamba’s Coalition for the Defense of Water and Life helps clarify above. An‑
other equally convincing example, similar to the previous one, is the Zapa‑
tista perspective. For the Zapatistas, existence is not defined by one unified
type of politics but by two classes of politics: the official one and the “other”
one. However, at the moment, we do not have a very clear idea how to define
the characteristics of that “other” type.
The second advantage of the aforementioned assertion by the Coalition for
the Defense of Water and Life is that it distinguishes between administrative
and governmental tasks that are part of leftover institutions and challenges
from those who insist on social emancipation and who cannot relinquish re‑
flections on power and politics now. What this means is that there is an under‑
lying conflict. On the one hand, there is a question of power, politics, and the
construction of self-governance on the basis of self-management of common
Preface xxxix
goods and social wealth. On the other hand, there are social struggles from
the last decade that demand a response to the ways in which collective co‑
existence can be regulated in a non-liberal way, meaning in a way not based
on delegated representation or the alienation of self-agency and with direct
shared decision-making power.
This problem is not an insignificant one. It stems from and seeks to pro‑
vide a solution to the fundamental question of managing to stabilize in time
a mode of social regulation that is outside of, against, and beyond the social
order imposed by capitalist production and the liberal state. Up to now, the
social energy that has overwhelmed institutions designated to regulate po‑
litical participation has had a resounding success in various Latin American
countries. However, it is paradoxical because “it is a success and then it’s lost,”
as noted by the Ecuadorians from the Confederation of Indigenous Nation‑
alities of Ecuador (conaie). The sweeping acts of insubordination and defi‑
ance against rules and schedules of production of capital and the state have
set the historical stage for the continued relevance of reflections on social
emancipation.
Although these tremendous acts have overwhelmed the institutional
framework and this excess of social energy has eroded neoliberal hegemony
and halted its advance, they lack an explicit horizon of desire once they can
veto the actions of others. We understand a horizon of desire as similar to a
metaphor for what is collectively desirable and feasible. This facilitates a com‑
mon meaning out of numerous collective actions. I reiterate that such an ab‑
sence is clearly expressed in the principle that conaie affirms: “we achieve
successes that mask defeats.” It is also revealed in the analogy expressed by a
resident from Cochabamba’s “May 1” neighborhood. Referring to the current
Bolivian political process, he stated that “we did not want to build ourselves
a little room in their home. We wanted to build a new home.” More clearly,
Eugenio Rojas, the current mayor of Achacachi and kamayu (guerrilla orga‑
nizer), points to the Aymara uprising between 2000 and 2005 and asserts that
“we have known how to destroy institutions, but we have not been able to
build new ones.” This last example also clearly shows the difficulty of express‑
ing the goal for “our own way of doing things” to be the one that is established
as legitimate and legal.
In order to consider these questions, it is worth reflecting on the dual na‑
ture of time under the capitalist order. It is possible to distinguish between
at least two different temporalities: a time of everyday life and a time of rup‑
ture, which is a rupture of everyday life. In traditional culture, everyday life
is marked by and interrupted by festivals. For that reason, when they truly
xl Preface
come from below, movements and struggles resemble festivals. They are col‑
lective enterprises in which what has been accumulated during normal times
is squandered in search of some purposeful shared objective. Therefore, it
happens that the time of rupture of everyday life, be it during a festival or a
rebellion, is filled with what is collective, tumultuous, innovative, excessive,
and dangerous.
However, during the time of everyday life, everyone, each individual, each
domestic unit, each community, union, neighborhood, or colony, is busy in
their own way with their local productive and administrative affairs. In gen‑
eral this is based on repetitive and known behaviors that define this time as
predictable and quiet. This time is the one that is more easily subsumed and
absorbed by state rules. If the times of political rupture of everyday life by the
state and its domain can be referred to as an “electoral festival”—as opposed
to the disruption and festive excess of social uprising—then the regular time
of the state comes from the permanence of what are usually referred to as
“regulations.” In other words, this is the mode that is accepted as organized
and desirable and imposed as legal when it comes to doing everyday things in
their minutiae. It is defined by the dominant logic, which carries it through‑
out the state system. It is worth outlining some ideas on these topics since a
decisive aspect of the “question of power” is concentrated there.
I must underscore that social emancipation is an infinite, albeit discon‑
tinuous, ever-changing, and sporadic collection of shared acts of insubordi‑
nation, autonomy, and, by extension, self-governance. It is not an endpoint
or the conclusion to a previous ongoing process. It consists basically of ini‑
tiating a different space-time in economic, social, and political terms, which
stands in contrast to and as an escape from the capitalist order and the state.
It is an autonomous space-time that can either be anchored territorially or
not. In it, at least three traits of nonstate and noncapitalist regulation of co‑
existence prevail, which have been supported historically by men and women
in the struggle: deliberative assembly for decision making; horizontality as a
fundamental organizational trait; and rotation as the mechanism for desig‑
nating who should carry out a specific organizational duty within the ever-
changing collective body.
Political activity, understood as the regulation of social coexistence, oc‑
curs in space and in time. This makes social emancipation above all a contest
for space and time. In moments of tension and confrontation, emancipatory
struggle generally takes the form of a contest either for time—in societies that
are more fully capitalist—or for space—in societies where agrarian canons of
existence prevail. This is despite the fact that, fundamentally, the first severely
Preface xli
lacks tangible space and the others are unable to establish their schedules as
the legitimate standard for coexistence. Therefore, autonomous social self-
regulation is based, above all, on the practical potential for a group of men
and women to have spaces and times at their disposal, and to have the ability
to occupy those spaces and to guide those times so that they can become the
basis to satisfy necessities and to achieve desires in an autonomous manner.
This conflict for an “other time” and for an “other space” is clearly revealed
in moments of intense social confrontation. However, such a conflict sub‑
sides—even though it persists—in “normal times of the state.” This means
in “moments of peace” when the waters of explicit social confrontation calm
down. Such inertia from the “normal time of the state” is, perhaps, one of the
greatest obstacles to emancipation, above all because its existence is appar‑
ently intangible. Or when it does become apparent, it is accepted without too
many objections when an almost natural character is attributed to it.
There is documented testimonial evidence of state inertia’s domestication
and harnessing of the mobilized population’s emancipatory force over time.
This includes the previously mentioned statement made by Eugenio Rojas,
expanded upon here: “We are prisoners of these institutions. Everything re‑
quires paperwork here. There is always oversight. . . . We have known how
to destroy institutions, but we have not known how to build our own insti‑
tutions. . . . And now our [Aymara] social organizations are going to be out‑
side [of the Constituent Assembly] barking like a dog.” The suggestion that
“we have not known how to build institutions” demonstrates that Rojas does
not suggest the particular ancestral manner of doing things as the legitimate
way to define political governance and “policy making.” Rojas, an influential
representative of the Aymara resistance in recent years, does not affirm that
the mechanisms for planning and organizing collaboration and regulation of
productive life, political and ritual, which spring up from communities, are
the institutions that should eventually be recognized as legitimately govern‑
mental. There is an underlying problem in this suggestion that I will explore
in detail in later chapters of this book.
For his part, Oscar Olivera stated in various assemblies and meetings of the
Coalition for the Defense of Water and Life in 2006 that they were debating
the possibility of “constructing autonomous municipalities.” Obviously, that
discussion was occurring long before the dominant classes, principally from
the country’s western region and the political Right, seized on the issue of
autonomy as the key to the discourse on restructuring. Oscar Olivera states
that “(despite not conforming to the Convocation Law of Bolivia’s Constitu‑
ent Assembly . . .) the challenge continues to be ‘self-governance.’ It is pos‑
xlii Preface
and other ethical criteria. Recall the statement made earlier by a resident of
Cochabamba’s “May 1” neighborhood: “We did not want to build ourselves a
little room in their home. We wanted to build a new home.”
Finally, the question of refounding a different country, which is one of the
ways to refer to the contemporary emancipatory horizon, depends upon re‑
moving oneself from the established conceptual and normative framework.
This defines, legitimizes, and disseminates a different way of reasoning and
arguing, and it legalizes direct social practices of self-governance and coexis‑
tence.
As Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui states, “the confines of the nation are a
straightjacket for indigenous and popular struggle in Bolivia”; this is not only
because it is founded on a “restricted citizenship” but also because “the mo‑
nopoly to name and set norms” is imbedded in the idea of the nation, and of
course in the nation-state (Rivera Cusicanqui qtd. in Escárzaga and Gutiérrez
Aguilar 2006). Rivera Cusicanqui is correct when she suggests that the elites
hold a monopoly on naming and setting norms in Latin America, although
they are sporadically surrounded by the insubordination of indigenous and
popular masses. It is a heavy anchor that fixes social relationships in the past
and inhibits and traps the collective production of political horizons. We in‑
habit a universe with different definitions, and struggles unfold in it.
Production of a common sense of dissidence in Bolivia has taken place for
the most part during moments of confrontation. It has occurred in the midst
of the explicit unfolding of social antagonism, such as during “war.” More‑
over, it has almost always been formulated negatively: against the forced
eradication of coca, against privatization of water, against the sale of natu‑
ral gas under conditions imposed by transnational corporations, and so on.
This is when the most profound planning agreements have been generated.
An exception is what is referred to in Bolivia as the October Agenda (2003),
which linked numerous objectives in a positive way. One was the national‑
ization of hydrocarbons (oil and gas) and other resources whose control had
been assigned to transnational corporations. Another called for the establish‑
ment of a sovereign constitutional assembly, with full powers and not based
on party affiliation. However, when the insurrectional population names its
desire, when it expresses a demand forcefully, then “policy making” comes
into play to take it and tie it to the past.
Beginning with the language in which the law is written, and continuing
with the concepts that are inscribed in it, the regulatory system lacks any
neutrality at all. Categories such as “public-social property” do not fit within
liberal legal frameworks. Moreover, it is not possible to grant “private” corpo‑
xliv Preface
rations the right to establish fines, and it does not make sense that the right to
participate is closely linked to the obligation to participate as well as to the act
of residency, all definitions of “public-social property” in traditional cultures
in Bolivia. Nevertheless, “public-social property” was how they referred to
the type of water company that the neighborhood residents in El Alto wanted
to build for themselves after the transnational Suez-Lyonnese des Eaux finally
left. The qualifier serves to clarify their desire: they did not want the company
to be public-municipal in the traditional sense, meaning managed by groups
of outside technicians and by political bureaucratic-administrative teams. Of
course, they did not want it to be private either. They wanted to implement
a type of direct collective property, distinguishing between ownership and
management, similar to how the other “public” tasks are organized in the
communities and neighborhoods in the city of El Alto.
The right and obligation to participate connected to the act of residency in
many Aymara and Qhiswa communities is the basis for individual possession
of a share of common wealth—in this case land and water. Yet this principle
simply does not work. It does not fit within the liberal regulations regard‑
ing land tenancy, nor is it accepted as legitimate for regulating ownership of
real estate. How is it possible then to transform the organization of property?
Under what conceptual framework is a horizon of desire articulated if it first
requires a tremendous leap of semantic exodus?
Something similar occurs with respect to political representation. For the
state, “democratic expansion” means organizing more and more elections,
which are always restricted by political parties. Even the mechanism for a
binding referendum acquires a liberal form because the government main‑
tains the prerogative, among other things, to formulate the question to be
answered. With this in mind, how is it possible to legalize political practices
that do not fit within the conceptual framework, much less in the previous re‑
public’s structure for policy making? How is it possible to “legalize” the type
of political institutions that originated in the community and in new urban
associations with members of the assembly chosen by consensus and with
obligatory participation and rotating leadership?
To understand the recent social events of resistance and uprising in Latin
America, it is important to trace the numerous, widespread, recurrent acts
of insubordination that men and women have carried out in recent years. It
is also important to be familiar with organizational structures and political
practices that have allowed such actions to occur. Only in this way can we find
the keys to thinking about emancipation. To this end, we must collectively
Preface xlv
work together on producing meanings, among other things, that escape the
prison of liberal terms, concepts, and norms.
There is a debate regarding whether these groups and their actions are
simply reformist or whether political parties and other organizations have
suddenly brought these groups together to introduce a radical discourse into
their actions. These questions merely obstruct the understanding of how criti‑
cal subjectivity is formed during and after rebellious acts. There needs to be
a reflection on the authentic radical nature of rebellions by diverse groups of
men and women who have strengthened their unity through other rebellions
and thus made their shared objective more widespread. I think that this per‑
spective relates to what we used to call “emancipation.” Furthermore, work‑
ing on this is also contributing to “changing the world.” My project thus seeks
to contribute in some way so that the second Pachakuti movement, now par‑
tially suspended, can move forward.
Acknowledgments
Last, I am deeply grateful for the constant support from my family, from
Eugenia Aguilar, and my brothers. They have always made it easier to get
through tough times, and they always give me strength to achieve my goals.
A special mention goes to José Luis Álvarez, compañero, stability, and anchor.
Thank you very much.
Translator’s Acknowledgments
My deepest gratitude is to Raquel Gutiérrez Aguilar for entrusting her ideas to
me and for providing me with contacts in Bolivia for research to accomplish
this project. In Bolivia, Oscar Olivera and Ismael Saavedra especially helped
me understand the meaning of rhythms of the Pachakuti. Interviews in
Bolivia by my research assistants, Ana Mendieta and Katharine Calvey, were
also invaluable resources. I am thankful for the Connecticut State University-
aaup grant that made my research in Bolivia possible.
I am also grateful for support from the National Endowment for the
Humanities (neh) to participate in the summer 2013 institute “The Centrality
of Translation to the Humanities.” The directors, Elizabeth Lowe and Chris
Higgins, gave me numerous opportunities to grow as a translation scholar.
Special thanks go to Suzanne Jill Levine and other institute scholars, espe‑
cially Sandra Kingery and Karen Rauch. While I must acknowledge that any
views, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this book do
not necessarily reflect those of the neh, I must also note that this fellowship
from the neh was vital for this project’s final revision.
Most important, I want to thank those who supported me in this project
from beginning to end, including the editors and reviewers at Duke Uni‑
versity Press and my family. Thank you all for your constant support and
patience.
Part I Community Uprisings and
Grassroots Democratization
anger from an endless chain of offences and plundering was being condensed
into civil action.
During that first April, people rejected government plans and refused to
respect state control. And they did so in a tumultuous and disorganized way,
as they have learned to live, organize, and rebel since ancient times: by them‑
selves.
Throughout this part, I will outline the way in which the moment of rup‑
ture that began in 2000 was constituted. I believe that the matrix for under‑
standing the politics, organization, and meaning of the subsequent “social
revolution” that unfolded in Bolivia during the following years can be found,
as a seed, in the most significant mobilizations and uprisings during that year.
For the purposes of this project, the year 2000 begins more precisely in Janu‑
ary 2000 and ends at some point in 2002, which is when the first great and
dynamic wave of indigenous and popular rebellion seemed to quiet down. My
intention is to investigate the fundamental characteristics of this matrix from
various angles. The matrix unveils a “type of politization” (Tapia 2002b, 17).
It also frames a method for social articulation that can illuminate possibili‑
ties for unification and social self-governance beyond state practices. In addi‑
tion, this represents the potential to defy the principles for the preservation of
capital. Throughout the next three chapters, I will present elements from the
following three contexts: the initial Water War in Cochabamba; the primarily
Aymara indigenous community uprisings from La Paz’s altiplano region; and
the mobilizations and roadblocks to defend coca production, which were led
by the Chapare region’s coca growers, commonly known as cocaleros. There
are four central questions that echo throughout all three chapters in this part:
Who is involved in the mobilization? What did they do? What did they say?
And what were they seeking?
1 The Coalition for the Defense of Water and Life
The Massive Public Defiance of State Order
In this chapter I will present a version of how the event known as the Water
War occurred in Bolivia. I will also explain Cochabamba’s regional political
organization known as the Coalition for the Defense of Water and Life (Co‑
ordinadora de la Defensa del Agua y de la Vida), also called La Coordinadora,
which is how I will refer to it here. The Water War marks the beginning of
the Bolivian people’s struggle to regain social agency against the plundering
of public resources, and it is a key event in the struggle to recover common
property, which exists beyond the state. Therefore, I will begin here.
gation, industrialists, and environmentalists. Each sector had its own history
of defending water rights and collective—community and labor—rights, and
they had all been critical of liberal state mechanisms for seizing and priva‑
tizing resources that had once been public. La Coordinadora was thus estab‑
lished as a space for coordination and struggle. Its purpose was to prevent the
seizure of water, understood as a public resource and managed independently
by farmers who used it for irrigation, and privatization of the water supply
system for the distribution of drinking water, which had always been under
municipal control. La Coordinadora also opposed the new legal frameworks
that regulated water through concessions granted by a top-down, unmanage‑
able state entity: the Water Superintendency.
Therefore, since its inception, La Coordinadora constituted a space to
bring diverse people together. Faced with certain governmental decisions,
these people were forced to join forces to defend water, a basic shared neces‑
sity. Given that each of the affected sectors suffered the aggression differ‑
ently, they each understood the threat of Law 2029 and the concession of con‑
trol and distribution of drinking water in a different way. However, founding
La Coordinadora opened up a space for planning par excellence. First, they
managed to define as a group the unique way in which each sector was af‑
fected by what the government was imposing. Second, they viewed the way
that each sector endured this state imposition as nothing more than a par‑
ticular manifestation of the pervasive aggression directed at all of them and at
society in general.2 From this “basic consensus,” La Coordinadora, as a group,
managed to develop a way to overcome the aggression it faced. This was La
Coordinadora’s most important contribution to the legacy of Bolivia’s recent
struggle.
Let’s review briefly La Coordinadora’s three sectors and each one’s contri‑
bution, as this will help us answer who constituted La Coordinadora. I think
this question presents a better method for an in-depth understanding of the
event’s social meaning, rather than the question “what is La Coordinadora”;
however, this is not meant to negate the validity of the other approach for
studying social reality in certain contexts.
We irrigators did not have a formal organization. Well, you could say
that there were informal organizations, but they were not even part of
the peasant union. They existed with their own uses and customs, with
their own distribution, etc. But they had not managed to come together.
So, I was with the irrigators from Tiquipaya, and we asked ourselves:
why can’t we work together? Besides, laws started appearing since about
1985, and we noticed that those laws were beginning to affect us. For that
and other reasons, we joined forces. Another strong motivation to come
together has been that the city of Cochabamba has planned to drill wells
in our communities to take water to Cochabamba, drinkable water, and
this has also caused the overexploitation of underground water sources,
leading to environmental damage. In many of our communities, the first
thing that has happened is that they have lost their natural springs. For
us, the springs are the water’s eyes emerging from the land. There were
irrigation systems flowing from those springs as well. But with what
they have done making wells, those water’s eyes have dried up and the
humidity has also dropped. . . . That was the first impact on us. (Qtd. in
Ceceña 2002, 52)
Regarding the organization of fedecor, Omar Fernández suggests the
following: “After the Agrarian Reform (1953), the peasants’ water usage re‑
spected the Andean systems of ‘mitas and suyus.’ 4 Relationships of reci‑
procity and fairness were widespread, including communitarian work in the
reservoirs or for improving irrigation systems defined according to mitas or
suyus. This process generated organizations of irrigators who work under an
organic structure; the community assembly is the final authority. They were
autonomous and followed a path toward consolidation, finally arriving at a
matrix organization: the Departmental Federation of Irrigation Farmer Orga‑
nizations (fedecor)” (Peredo, Crespo, and Fernández 2001, 18).
Primarily an agrarian water management organization, fedecor had dedi‑
cated eight years between 1992 and 2000 to reconstructing ancient commu‑
nitarian practices for water management. It also provided information about
these practices, simultaneously giving them “legal existence” and a modern
“name”: the Irrigators’ Federation, with legal status.5 In its statutes, agreed
upon in 1997, fedecor established itself as “the matrix organization for all
the systems and irrigation organizations in the Cochabamba valleys whose
principal purpose is the integral management of water resources through
uses and customs.” According to Carmen Peredo, this means “respect for
natural authorities, for the communitarian way of solving problems of access
The Coalition for the Defense of Water and Life 7
to water or to improving its infrastructure, respect for water rights and dis‑
tribution” (Peredo, Crespo, and Fernández 2001, 57). Therefore, at least since
1997, which is three years before the Water War, fedecor had become an
official voice in the departmental and national government for questions and
problems related to water, hydraulic projects, irrigation systems, and the like.
Moreover, since that time, two important fedecor leaders, Omar Fernán‑
dez and Carmen Peredo, were systematically studying the traditional system
of water usage. Omar Fernández presented “The Relationship between Land
and Water in Tiquipaya’s Peasant Economy” as his thesis for graduation at
the Universidad Mayor de San Simón (umss), the regional public institution
of higher education. In 2000 Peredo also presented a law thesis at umss titled
“Rules Proposal for the Applicability of Law 2066 Based on Uses and Cus‑
toms.” In other words, by the year 2000, fedecor had already accumulated
extensive organizational and investigative efforts.
Furthermore, the irrigators also led at least three great mobilizations in the
period immediately prior to the Water War:
1. On August 21, 1998, with a gathering of nearly twenty thousand
irrigators, and coinciding with a coca farmers’ protest that included
Evo Morales’s participation, the irrigators presented Cochabamba’s
parliament with a legal proposal for regulating water according to its
uses and customs.
2. At the end of 1998, the so-called Well War occurred when inhabitants
of the central valley refused to allow the Municipal Service for
Drinking Water Company (semapa) to drill a series of deep wells,
which opened a space for negotiation.
3. Finally, on November 4, 1999, roads were blocked for twenty-
four hours in the area around Vinto and toward Sacaba. The army
intervened militarily in the roadblock, meeting with resistance from
the irrigators. Specifically after that roadblock on November 4 and the
repression that followed, La Coordinadora was founded on the twelfth
of that same month. (Interview with Omar Fernández in Ceceña 2002,
58–60)
Furthermore, for three decades the ftfc controlled certain material re‑
sources, which were put at the disposal of the mobilized population dur‑
ing the Water War. They included a union headquarters in the city’s main
plaza, where La Coordinadora would work for years; a factory workers’ sport
complex, where various open meetings took place in an actual stadium; and
another group of properties that were put at the disposal of different sectors
of the population—whether they were unionized factory workers or not—
who were fighting in the struggle to defend water. This fact, occurring from
the year 2000 onward, marked true innovation in union behavior, as it went
against general procedures for workers who, following labor-union stan‑
dards, only utilize assets at their disposal to defend their own members. The
ftfc opened its spaces so that the “simple and hard-working” population as a
whole, with or without a formal contract, affiliated with a union or not, could
have access to them. Oscar Olivera affirms the following:
Organically, the working class has been completely debilitated in many
parts of the world—and particularly in Latin America. There are fewer
and fewer workers organized in labor unions. More than an organic
participation of factory workers going out into the street and blocking
roads to protest along with other sectors, our contribution has been as
a reference. . . . The Coalition for the Defense of Water and Life is an
organization that is a kind of citizen’s union. It brings together various
social sectors, both from the city as well as from rural areas. It differs
from traditional unions because, although it is similar to a traditional
labor union, it is more expansive to include the entire society. (Ceceña
2002, 68; emphasis added)
Thus, in effect, La Coordinadora’s office, its meeting spaces, telephone,
the factory workers’ auditorium, and its “sports complex” were put at the
disposal of Cochabamba’s mobilized population. This afforded a very solid
material backing for the type of “citizen’s union” that Olivera mentioned. All
those resources contributed in an important way to unite the growing social
energy from the rural areas horizontally with the existing unease in the city.
This unification occurred during numerous meetings and rallies convened
by La Coordinadora.
On the other hand, Oscar Olivera lives in a neighborhood on the west‑
ern end of the city of Cochabamba that is not connected to the central water
distribution network. He and his neighbors receive water in their homes
from a collective, independent system. The residents contributed to the drill‑
ing of a well that provides drinking water, and that well is managed locally.
10 Chapter 1
In other words, Olivera and his family, just as many other factory workers,
union leaders, and residents of Cochabamba’s suburban areas, were not
simply aware of the existence of various independent drinking water net‑
works throughout the city, but they were members of them and had partici‑
pated in them.
With that experience, having accrued vast prestige, and thanks to an ex‑
tensive network of relationships with the press and with intellectual and labor
union sectors, Olivera and the factory workers reacted to Cochabamba’s
water problem during the second half of 1999. This included the concession
contract from the water distribution company to the Bechtel transnational
corporation and the risk that Law 2029 meant for the irrigation farmers and
for the population in suburban areas. In that way, they became La Coordina‑
dora’s principal cornerstone.
pact between the city and rural zones during the course of the confrontation.
Above all, that commitment, previously agreed to and discussed, outlined the
choices that the spokespersons and representative leaders from La Coordina‑
dora were making as the events unfolded. It is worth emphasizing here how
important it was to establish clear autonomous objectives for the movement.
A very broad spectrum of Cochabamba’s population knew how the conces‑
sion agreement for Cochabamba’s water had been negotiated with Aguas del
Tunari, and they understood the threats that it contained and what Law 2029
meant. This enabled the articulation of a flexible action plan to approach the
conflict multilaterally. The rhythm of social mobilization and the tone of the
action were generated during meetings. Furthermore, the objective, under‑
stood by all as a kind of prior agreement, defined the “us” that produced dis‑
cussions and that led to La Coordinadora’s communiqués and resolutions
(see table 1.1 in appendix 2).7
La Coordinadora’s first protest was a roadblock from January 10 to Janu‑
ary 14, 2000. It was put in place as negotiations began. After a tense meeting
attended by hundreds of neighborhood residents and peasant irrigators, who
acted as delegates representing their “roadblock points,” the decision in favor
of the roadblock was communicated to the general population by explaining
that the “first battle of a long struggle to recover water and life had been won.”
Naming the protest in this way eventually gave the event a general meaning,
and it quickly became the accepted way to refer to the collective undertaking:
the Water War.
The second action, or rather the “second battle of the Water War,” con‑
sisted of what was called “Taking Cochabamba” (February 4–5). According
to the organizers, the goals of this protest were “to seal the union between the
city and rural zones in an embrace” and to underscore La Coordinadora’s in‑
fluence while negotiations were at a standstill. This led to a civil riot, a semi-
insurrection with participation from the entire Cochabamba population and
extensive rural contingents.
Finally, the third moment in the Water War is what is known as the April
conflict, conceived from the beginning as the “final battle.” It began with a
new roadblock, followed by occupying the water company, and it ended with
a general rebellion that General Bánzer’s government could not silence.
There were at least three levels of participation throughout the Water War.
The first consisted of a very well-organized and unwavering protest by the
peasant irrigators who maintained the roadblocks by rotation, taking turns,
similar to the way they manage the use of water. The second was the massive,
angry response by the urban population that built the city’s barricades and
14 Chapter 1
bamba’s public discussion and extensive political activity centered on the fol‑
lowing topics:
• To state clearly and publicly the collective rejection of defining water
as a market commodity, for any reason, under any pretext, or in any
form. It was up for discussion at the time if water should be understood
as a public right, if its access should be considered a human right, or
if it constituted a common good. In any case it was fundamentally
understood by everyone involved that its commercialization was not
acceptable.9
• To plan and carry out “semapa’s social reconstitution.” This referred
to a complicated attempt to produce a transformation within the
“recovered” municipal water company that included both the organi
zational and labor structures. It also sought to redefine the relationship
between “the company” and Cochabamba’s population in a way that
would lead to the construction of what was referred to back then as
“social control.” 10
• Based on the above, the practical limits for the normative framework—
liberal state—were collectively established. As part of this process, there
was an attempt to “reconstitute public property under social control.”
This paved the way for the slogan for achieving a “constituent assembly
without party intervention to build the country in which we want to
live.” 11
These three topics were approached collectively and actively, and they
merit further reflection. The backbone of the “interior horizon” of Cocha‑
bamba’s political activity for a long time, they clearly influenced the national
political landscape that followed.
On the first topic, dozens of forums, conferences, seminars, and colloquia
were organized to define and clarify water as a commodity, as a right, or as
a common good. These conversations also broadened the collective under‑
standing of the meaning and profound implications of each of these ways to
define water. Some were small and spontaneous, carried out in different pub‑
lic locations, such as the Auditorium of the Workers Federation, the offices
of Foro Cochabambino del Medio Ambiente (Cochabamba Environmental
Forum; focomade), and different university facilities.12 Others were much
larger and had greater resonance, with the presence of international experts
on the topic. Their conclusions appeared in the press, and they acquired col‑
lective importance through the general dissemination and discussion of their
fundamental messages on the local radio station.13
16 Chapter 1
These various actions for public planning on a topic of such decisive im‑
portance for collective life empowered numerous political groups throughout
Cochabamba’s valleys and connected diverse social sectors. Over the course
of eight months, almost no one was excluded from the discussion about what
to do with water, how to conserve and purify it, and how to widen its distri‑
bution. There was a widely held belief that there would be no toleration of
any future attempt by traditional party elites and transnational corporations
to plunder resources.
In a vast sea of circulating opinions, proposals, and discussions, La Co‑
ordinadora decided to create a technical support team. This team’s primary
goal was to articulate a reasonably clear vision of the following: the water
problem in Cochabamba, semapa as a company, and possible structural
changes within it; and strategies to promote social participation to manage
the company’s activities. The technical support team identified three under‑
lying problems, which were the focus of its activity. The first was the question
of semapa’s legal property. The second concerned the administrative reorga‑
nization of semapa’s operations, placing emphasis on disrupting the relation‑
ship between the company’s employees and the general population. The goal
here was to break the “company-client” relationship. Finally, accomplishing
these two previous goals would lead to establishing conditions for semapa’s
integral redefinition as a “public company under social control.” To achieve
this, “an ambitious organizational plan at the grassroots level in the urban
zone” was proposed. It consisted of contributing to “establishing drinking
water committees in various neighborhoods throughout the city,” 14 which
“would be independent of the Neighborhood Councils and of the party in‑
fluence that corrodes them” (Gutiérrez Aguilar 2001a, 203).
A question arose after recovering semapa’s privatized legal property:
How would it be possible to recognize the widespread feeling of public prop‑
erty shared by the region’s citizenry beyond defining the legal character of
semapa simply as a municipal company (Gutiérrez Aguilar 2001a)? To tackle
this question, they coined the term “social property,” which was used to em‑
phasize the nature of what they sought to construct. “Social property” was
different from the traditional forms of “state” property (state, municipal, de‑
centralized, and so on) and from “private” property (individual, by shares,
cooperative).15
There were legal obstacles to defining the company this way. Cocha‑
bamba’s population had “deprivatized” and “reconstituted” semapa, but it
still had to fit within the existing regulatory framework. On the one hand,
they had to preserve the municipal public property as a decentralized com‑
The Coalition for the Defense of Water and Life 17
This description of the assembly clearly does not propose redefining the re‑
lationship with the state. It is suggested as a tool to break the relationship with
the state and to build capacity for decision making on public affairs based on
other practices.17 La Coordinadora explained these ideas in various ways over
the following years; however, except in notable moments, it did not achieve
a conceptual hegemony of the type that had existed in Cochabamba between
2000 and 2001. Later, when in 2007 the constituent assembly finally began its
efforts under Morales’s government, La Coordinadora’s most distinguished
members and spokesmen were no longer part of the organization.
The Blue Room is a large space on the third floor of the ftfc in Cocha‑
bamba’s Central Plaza. It is furnished with a large table for meetings, some
thirty to forty chairs, a telephone, and a computer. This room became a space
to meet with people from other sectors, and it is primarily a space for infor‑
mal gatherings during times of great social upheaval where people can plan,
make agreements, and organize joint committees. Even now, La Coordina‑
dora’s physical space constitutes a certain type of “agora,” a public place for
meeting and decision making. Most people there belong to or represent some
neighborhood, trade, union, labor group, or even formal political organiza‑
tion. At the meetings, importance is given to anything occurring on a national
scale and, when that is the case, they assess whether or not to have a more
open invitation to the public to plan and decide on whatever the topic may be.
This is a type of elastic, independent, nimble organization that easily shifts
from a small meeting between representatives to an open convocation, rallies,
or large events. As it does not belong to “anyone” because it encompasses
“everyone,” it represents the potential to identify a new type of citizenship.
Oscar Olivera expresses this idea when he describes La Coordinadora as a
kind of “citizen’s union.”
La Coordinadora’s membership is essentially based on an individual’s
voluntary decision to join. Beyond words, it implies individual and above
all collective participation in discussion and decision making about ques‑
tions of collective agency. La Coordinadora has thus continued to be a privi‑
leged space for autonomous noninstitutional politicization for the myriad of
heterogeneous social networks that form Bolivia’s social fabric.
Although it is committed and participative, La Coordinadora’s loose and
informal associative form presents serious risks, particularly during elec‑
tions. Various representatives, senators, and employees from different parties
have previously been prominent figures in La Coordinadora. Even so, this
space and its most well-known spokesman Oscar Olivera always stayed out
of the electoral activity that they nevertheless represent. It is possible to argue
that La Coordinadora, after the Water War, has essentially been defined by
its multiple efforts. At the risk of oversimplifying, we can summarize these
efforts as follows: expanding active solidarity through participation and social
mobilization for the most important struggles from those years, especially the
roadblocks in La Paz and the protests against the forced eradication of coca
in the Chapare region; systematic activity to analyze, clarify, report, and dis‑
cuss government actions that either sought to contain the advance of other
struggles or that specifically provoked some sector; and constantly pushing
for open and public planning on topics affecting the population as a whole,
20 Chapter 1
Regarding the meeting with [Evo and Felipe], the meeting went well
after taking a long time to get started, although it was marked by a
somewhat bitter flavor given the topic at hand: the elections. Evo came
with his showcase of offers. . . . Felipe, for his part, had his doubts, but
he was backed by a whole brood of greedy campaigning Indianists (both
young and old) willing to risk it all to gain access to some post in the
name of the “Indian cause.” In the meeting I realized that I don’t have
the stomach for this. So I distanced myself, made recommendations
(that I wrote to you about a while ago), and I attempted to mediate
the entire discussion with the future of social movements. Everyone
was in agreement. Yet when the time came (to make decisions), they
quickly turned to the pragmatics of the positions, the candidacies, the
electoral process, etc. It seems to be the same as the armed struggle
mess; the electoral mess has its own logic, its own dynamic that works
independently (from more profound projects for transformation). All I
could do in the end was phone Oscar and tell him that there is very little
possibility for agreement. (Personal correspondence with Álvaro García
Linera, December 20, 2001)
In the end, given its organizational looseness, La Coordinadora never
managed to overcome the regional margins of its public activity in any deci‑
sive way. However, it did manage to get itself in synch with other social or‑
ganizations, such as fejuve-El Alto and various organizations for drinking
water management in Santa Cruz, for example. It was also able to share all of
its experience in defending water, as well as its knowledge about the intrica‑
cies of government regulations and the ways to evade or confront them. On
the other hand, the mediation strategies that La Coordinadora generated, in a
contradictory and difficult way, also managed to “irradiate” other geographic
zones and relevant topics. This led to wide-ranging agreements at various
levels. We will discuss this later when we analyze the process concerning what
is referred to as the Coalition for the Defense and Recuperation of Gas. In
any case La Coordinadora seemed to “grow” as a noninstitutionalized social
configuration more through replication than structural growth. In summary,
during the Water War, and above all through La Coordinadora’s activities, the
meaning of what may be thought of as politics became inverted. This pro‑
duced a discourse that would later be profoundly influential.
22 Chapter 1
our own ignoring what the people want. (Interview with Oscar Olivera
in Ceceña 2002, 76)
These reflections by Olivera are important because they express the will
shared by the spokesmen and most prominent figures from La Coordinadora
to maintain a space to connect diverse social forces in a way that functions
outside of the Bolivian regulatory and institutional framework. In my opinion
the explicit desire to “be illegal” implies that they do not want to be subjected
to established power structures. Meanwhile, Oscar Olivera was the executive
secretary for the ftfc, and Omar Fernández was the executive secretary for
the fedecor. This is an interesting contrast as both were formally elected
heads of organizations with “judicial legal status” (statutes, legal recognition,
internal regulation). Yet both perceived the association for the struggle that
occurred within La Coordinadora as a space that did not require institutional
status.
This desire for “noninstitutionality” proved shocking not only to the gov‑
ernment but also to people’s “common sense” as well. It is worth mentioning,
since it goes beyond mere anecdote, that the word “Coordinadora” is a sin‑
gular feminine noun in Spanish that sounds like it could refer to a woman.
For that reason, “La Coordinadora” was often confused with “the female co‑
ordinator” who was wisely leading the uprising, although no one knew who
she was. The fact that it was such a novel form of coordinating the struggle
added to that confusion. La Coordinadora functioned outside of the “nor‑
mal” known and predictable organizational framework of popular Bolivian
struggle: unions and trade associations. Many people, even those participat‑
ing in meetings and mobilizations that had been convened by La Coordina‑
dora, believed that this title in fact referred to a real woman. On February
10, 2000, an article from Cochabamba’s newspaper Los Tiempos ran with the
title: “More than Once, La Coordinadora Was Confused with a Woman.” That
article cites declarations made by Oscar Olivera. He states the following:
In a heated meeting that took place before the pressure measures began
early in the year, one of the factory worker labor leaders affirmed in
salient parts of his speech: “Compañeros, we believe the time has come
to know who the Coordinadora is.” The others attending the meeting
had to explain to him that “the people who were at the meeting were the
representatives of the water defense entity.” Another occasion was in
a meeting of the water committees held in a suburban zone of the city.
After listening to Omar Fernández’s and Oscar Olivera’s explanations, a
retired professor remarked: “Now we want you to report on the dealings
24 Chapter 1
wearing signs that said “Aguas del Tunari,” the company contracted for the
water supply that they were fighting against. The government’s accusation
that La Coordinadora was a “ghost organization” thus provoked a popular
reply qualifying Aguas del Tunari as a ghost company.
Ultimately, La Coordinadora’s lack of institutionalization was the foun‑
dation for its political autonomy. It was similarly defined by the material in‑
dependence of its members. During the Water War, groups of people mobi‑
lized and protested independently both in material terms and on the political
decision-making map. Each water committee, each neighborhood associa‑
tion, each vendor and trade association, each union, and so on participated
in the meetings and in the different roadblocks and protests representing
their own organizations according to their own associative practices and pro‑
cedures for membership.20 Both the ftfc and fedecor, organizations with
legal personnel, had certain resources at their disposal, and they put their
own funds from union dues to work for the uprising. This gave La Coordina‑
dora significant material independence. For example, it had a place for meet‑
ings, to hold rallies of varying capacity, and it had some financial resources
for the most urgent immediate expenses. This allowed it to have complete
political autonomy for years.
La Coordinadora essentially facilitated the use of all the combined re‑
sources, both from unionized sectors as well as from workers who were not
unionized, as “use value” to serve the uprising and collective decision making.
La Coordinadora’s activities generated a tremendously powerful space for
cooperation between different groups. More or less beginning in February
2000, the government began circulating the accusation that “obscure entities
financed La Coordinadora,” to which La Coordinadora’s spokesmen carried
out a campaign in response. They explained that the uprising really did not
prove “costly” because the “costs” consisted of collectively using what they
already had. After the initial impulse of the struggle, and especially beginning
in 2001 and 2002 when it became necessary to assign certain tasks related
to water management, that response changed. Then a series of new, related
problems emerged associated above all to the functioning of a “nonexistent
legal entity.” It continued this way until La Coordinadora’s end, with inter‑
national financing organizations, and primarily with ngos. These problems
are vast and complicated. They deserve their own discussion that will be ad‑
dressed in the general reflection on the obstacles to social unification through
extra-institutional means.
La Coordinadora introduced a different way of “making politics.” In other
words, it opened a horizon of meaning—situated in space and marked by
26 Chapter 1
meaning has been born now from the impetus of a social rebellion. The
construction of a horizon of action that represents an alternative to the
one that exists inevitably passes from now on through those two great
discursive junctures of the masses in action: political-economic self-
management and the community or broadly defined ayllu. (Gutiérrez
Aguilar, García Linera, Prada, Quispe, and Tapia 2000, 177)
Two basic concepts in this horizon, community and self-management, be‑
came the cornerstone of meaning of an important aspect of the Bolivian up‑
rising as a whole: social reconstitution of wealth and the refounding of the na‑
tion. This is despite the fact that one outcome from all of this, especially after
Morales took office as Bolivia’s president, has been the restructuring of the
state as an entity that is separate from and privileged above the social whole.
Nevertheless, as previously mentioned, La Coordinadora initiated a
“strategy for articulation,” a way of formulating political problems through
the question, “Who decides public matters?” The importance of this for the
emancipatory struggle is not insignificant. Even today, it remains the founda‑
tion for open political debate in Bolivia. A communiqué from La Coordina‑
dora dated January 20, 2000, expresses this in the following way:
What is really being discussed?
What is really being discussed is the content of government
decisions. Are the decisions being made in the population’s interests or
are they simply adapting to what foreign financial entities prescribe? . . .
This is the underlying problem. Who decides the population’s present
and future, its resources, and its work and living conditions? Regarding
water, we want to decide for ourselves: that is what we call democracy.
There was a rejection of the prerogative of political leaders to monopolize
political decision making on questions that affect everyone. There was also a
persistent challenge and rejection of private plundering of social wealth by
transnational corporations. Under these basic notions, the recurrent collec‑
tive mobilization and uprisings continued to unfold until 2005. Let’s now
consider two other sides of these struggles.
Notes
Foreword
1. It was also often known at the time as the Red Ayllus (Ayllus Rojos), using the
Andean term ayllu for indigenous communities.
2. Gutiérrez Aguilar and Iturri Salmón (1995) was later republished as Gutiérrez
Aguilar (2006).
3. Gutiérrez Aguilar (1996) was later republished in Gutiérrez Aguilar (2006).
Gutiérrez plays here with the double meaning of the Spanish term poder, which can
be a verb, meaning “to be able,” or a noun, meaning “power.” She essentially counter‑
poses human capability and creativity (el poder-hacer) against the imposition of
power (el poder-imposición). John Holloway would subsequently draw the same dis‑
tinction between what he termed “power-to-do” (potentia) and “power-over” (po-
testas).
4. See Gutiérrez Aguilar’s (1999b, 2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2002) essays in several Co‑
muna publications.
5. The book was initially published in 2008 as Los ritmos del Pachakuti: Movili-
zación y levantamiento indígena-popular en Bolivia (2000–2005) (La Paz: Textos Re‑
beldes, 2008). In a notable sign of the international interest in Bolivia at the time and
of Gutiérrez Aguilar’s own international engagements, the book was also published
the same year by Tinta Limón in Buenos Aires, Argentina, where Gutiérrez Aguilar
was engaged with intellectual and activist groups on the autonomist Left. Colectivo
Situaciones contributed the prologue to the Argentine edition.
6. Holloway has long been based at the Autonomous University of Puebla, where
he codirects the seminar on Subjectivity and Critical Theory. Gutiérrez Aguilar took
up a teaching position at the university in 2012.
Preface
1. This metaphor, which casts moments in the struggle as lightning bolts that
allow us to see what was hidden in the darkness, comes from Raúl Zibechi (2006).
2. It is worth clarifying the unique, intimate relationship that I maintain with
what is, according to academic standards, my “object of study.” I lived in Bolivia be‑
tween 1984 and 2001, and I was fortunate to know about and participate in various
organizing and political efforts in that country.
224 Notes to Preface
culation, were compiled by Martha Harnecker. For approaching social conflict from
a primarily Anglo-Saxon perspective, it is worth mentioning the so-called theory of
social movements. One of the most influential authors in our milieu is Sidney Tarrow
(1994). This study will not discuss these various positions. Instead, it will present
another method for analyzing social struggles.
10. For a discussion of this based on the philosophy of logic, see Gutiérrez Aguilar
(2005).
11. I share many of the principles held by John Holloway throughout his writings,
particularly in Class = Struggle (Holloway, comp., 2004).
12. Colectivo Situaciones, reflecting on the events of December 19–20, 2001, in
Buenos Aires, conclusively affirms that “the insurrection on December 19th and 20th
did not have an author. There are no political or sociological theories available to
completely understand the logic that arose during those more than thirty uninter‑
rupted hours.” To begin this task for understanding, it suggests that “the new social
protagonism, as a method for intervention, shares a common basis with postmod‑
ernism: market conditions. But it rejects its conclusions: that the market’s omnipo‑
tence no longer leaves any room for liberation struggles” (Colectivo Situaciones
2002, 26, 33).
13. The manner in which Negri and Hardt proceed in their two famous texts Em-
pire (2000) and Multitude (2004) is to first document the transformations inherent
in domination by capital and the exploitation of labor and then explain the destruc‑
tion of the centrality of the Fordist type of industrial work world. Once this has been
documented, they address the plurality of resistance struggles and the multiplicity of
recent rebellions. They propose a comprehensive category for these: “the multitude.”
This category is then proposed for analyzing social existence rather than the empty
term “working class,” which was part of the official Marxist tradition for decades. In
this way, by substitution, there is a paradox and the criticism loses focus. What is re‑
tained and theoretically reinstated is capital as a fetish that represents social sover‑
eignty and political initiative. These ideas have been thoroughly discussed in Mexico
at the Social Sciences and Humanities Institute of the Meritorious Autonomous Uni‑
versity of Puebla Seminar on Subjectivity and Critical Theory during 2004 and 2005.
14. In Bolivia, utilizing a type of sociological tool from Pierre Bourdieu, Álvaro
García Linera (1999, 2001) documented the decline and disintegration of what he
calls the “old Bolivian working class.” Recently, the same author, along with Patricia
Costas Monje and Marxa Chávez León, directed and published research financed
by Oxfam and Diakonia (García Linera 2004b). It consists of a broad documenta‑
tion of diverse human groups who were protagonists in the struggles between 2000
and 2003, focusing its attention on their institutionalized structures and on their
so-called mobilization repertoires. This perspective served for the “stabilization” of
social movements that the Morales government has absorbed, tending to make them
extensions of government action.
15. This is principally the separation between what will have a “social” or “eco‑
226 Notes to Preface
nomic” nature, which is then clearly distinguished from the “political” nature of the
events. Another confusing characterization arises from this dichotomy: the “anti‑
capitalist” and/or “antistate” nature of each struggle.
16. John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas are among the classic theoreticians from this
tradition. Their interesting and complex political theories consider the issue of tear‑
ing contemporary society from capital in order to preserve it. Particularly worth con‑
sulting are Rawls (1971, 1993) and Habermas (1992). On the other hand, for Bolivia,
Álvaro García Linera (2004a) follows another tradition in his Estado multinacional.
He preserves the liberal idea of the notion of delegation of social capacity to decide
on a representative and the complex theory of representation.
17. For a more thorough discussion of this, it is worth consulting Ávalos Tenorio
(2002).
18. John Holloway (2001, 165) suggests that “the objective [of critical theory] is not
to understand reality but to understand (and through this understanding to inten‑
sify) its contradictions as part of the struggle to change the world.”
19. Various theories that seek to document the tension between conservation and
change in social phenomena consider social movements solely as anomalies, as dis‑
solvent fluctuations of social order that should be assimilated. The notion is based
on the existence of a supposed “general social equilibrium,” which operates through
argumentation. In particular, see Habermas (1992).
20. Guillermo Almeyra, for example, theorizes the limits and the political impo‑
tence of contemporary social movements (Almeyra, 2004).
21. John Holloway, based on a revision of Marx’s early writing, proposes recover‑
ing a useful distinction between “abstract labor” and “useful labor” as elements of the
“double character of labor.” The distinction allows Holloway to further investigate
the character of the so-called capital/labor contradiction. Holloway, analyzing the
“double character of labor,” connects the following sequence of concepts with each of
these traits: “abstract labor” is the authentic source of value and demands the division
of labor; on the other hand, “useful labor” (or “making useful” to place more empha‑
sis on the difference) is at the core of the production of use values and the possibility
for cooperative acts (Holloway 2007).
22. There has been a proliferation of conflicts in Latin America since the late 1990s
that are generally conceptualized and organized under the term “social movements.”
Analysis of this topic consists primarily of one of the following approaches: attempt‑
ing methods of classification from “organizational novelties” that have been gener‑
ated prior to and following conflicts; starting with a hypothesis about the genesis of
these collective actions; or privileging the study of “identities” that confront each
other. We have already mentioned that there has been an established “approach” to
“social movements” in Bolivia since 2005 (García Linera 2004b). It was also widely
accepted because its author became the country’s vice president. This created a type
of subordinate relationship between the Morales government and some representa‑
tives of these movements.
Notes to Preface 227
having lived “the euphoria of collective triumph,” which later acquires a sense of fail‑
ure, tainted by an unpleasant experience of frustration. They referred in particular to
the indigenous occupation of Quito in the year 2000 to protest the “dollarization of
the economy.” The force of this uprising caused the ouster of Ecuador’s president and
nearly obliterated the party institutions responsible for political negotiation. How‑
ever, they bitterly noted: “After overthrowing [President Jamil] Mahuad, dollariza‑
tion stayed with us.” Something very similar is expressed by participants in the most
important Argentine social movements of 2000 and 2001, and it is analogous to what
is being experienced in Bolivia today. In this sense philosophical reflection on the
profound meaning of social actions in order to understand the phrase “triumphs
that mask defeats” is a relevant topic hanging in the balance of the recent struggles
in South America.
29. “Constructing self-governance” is a way of naming the challenges that some
social forces are faced with both in the Aymara highlands and in the Cochabamba
valley. It is also, to a certain extent, what the Zapatista rebels have begun to build
in the territory they occupy in Chiapas, Mexico, through the governing Caracoles
networks of resistance and autonomy. This important aspect of the emancipatory
struggle deserves its own reflection.
30. This is currently occurring in Bolivia. There are already voices that can be
heard speaking of the success of the “Bolivian strategy” that “combines” social mobi‑
lization with electoral participation.
31. To reflect on the difference between “multitude” as a subject of the emancipa‑
tory act and “people” as an “object of the government,” a pertinent and fertile dis‑
tinction is the one Paolo Virno (2003) presents between “multitude” and “people.”
For him, “multitude,” among other meanings, is the “group of ‘social individuals’ ”
who are made individual through the culmination of a complex process of singula‑
rization. Therefore, they openly maintain their plural and heterogeneous traits. On
the other hand, the term “people” refers to the complicated modern construction of
a supposed “general will,” which homogenizes and unifies. It forms the basis for run‑
ning a unified government.
32. With this, it is possible to understand the role of “progressive governments”
and their current importance in Latin America. To a certain extent, these progressive
governments also function—although not exclusively—as a type of counterinsur‑
gent maneuver in that they reinforce the institutions that collapsed during the period
of uprisings and insurrections, rebuilding the space and time of the state. Through
their actions and beyond their speeches, they revise and strengthen certain relation‑
ships of command that have nothing to do with leadership that is horizontal, autono‑
mous, or by assembly. Above all, this is how they reinstate in a confusing manner
the excision between those who govern and those who are governed, reinforcing the
political decision-making monopoly that had previously been held in check.
33. During recent years, progressive governments in Latin America have at‑
tempted to rebuild the institutional framework weakened by previous movements.
Notes to Preface 229
Essentially, in order to “heal the social wounds,” they have appropriated the deepest
social ruptures in each particular society. In Argentina they appeal to the wound left
by the dictatorship from 1976 t0 1983, and in Bolivia they emphasize the indigenous
issue.
34. In the Mexican case exactly the opposite is occurring. Therein lies its openly
conservative nature: the business elites directly occupy government institutions and
unlawfully retain the prerogative of political decision making.
35. The notion of a horizon of desire also comes from Bloch’s theory that suggests
the following: “Impulse manifests itself at first as an ‘aspiration,’ as a kind of hunger.
If the aspiration is felt, it becomes a ‘desire,’ the only sincere state experienced by
mankind. The desire is less vague and general than impulse, but at least it is clearly
directed outwardly. . . . (For the desire to be satisfied) it has to direct itself clearly
at something. Thus determined, it stops moving in every direction and it becomes a
‘seeking’ that has and does not have what it pursues, in a movement toward an ob‑
jective” (Bloch 1959, 74). I understand the absence of a horizon of desire precisely
as taking the insubordination movement in every direction, which strengthens it in
some ways but weakens it in others.
36. In Bolivia the struggle against the state in recent years has been based on a
successful ability to control space. The current issue is the struggle for the reappro‑
priation of time and for the right to establish patterns to measure it. In Mexico the
Zapatista struggle and the indigenous movement have been successful by carrying
out their actions in a time that can be thought of as “autonomous.” Currently, the
central question in Mexico is the struggle to reappropriate space or territory.
37. This would be a good method perhaps to describe, on a very general level, the
way of life of the most dense and solid Andean indigenous community framework,
which continues to enjoy a high level of autonomy and a certain capacity for relative
expansion. Francisco López Bárcenas makes the following statement on the struggle
of indigenous peoples in Mexico: “Resistance is a collective force of peoples to not
stop being what they have been. Struggle is the confrontation to not remain in the
location in which they have been placed” (personal conversation with López Bárce‑
nas, March 2006).
38. Oscar Olivera stated this during an assembly of the Coalition for the Defense
of Water and Life that took place in Cochabamba on March 11, 2006.
39. This is from a meeting with the Committee for Drinking Water in the May 1
neighborhood on March 10, 2006. These points constitute a summary of remarks by
more than forty leaders of the Association of Independent and Community Water
Systems in Cochabamba’s Southern Zone (asica-Sur) in a general meeting on the
night of March 10, 2006.
40. The Law of Popular Participation is a legal entity. Among other things, it pro‑
moted the decentralization of a portion of public resources, and it transferred vari‑
ous previously centralized duties to municipal councils. The distributed resources are
small and the duties to carry out are highly regulated. This law enacted in 1995 during
230 Notes to Part I
Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada’s first term as president was applauded by the apologists
for liberal-procedural democracy who classified it as a “democratizing action by the
state.” The population in towns and municipalities, especially rural and/or small
ones, soon came to perceive it as a vehicle for state interference at the municipal level,
classifying it as a barrier to decision making in accordance with traditional customs
and legal practices.
41. For information on organizational structures in El Alto, see Mamani Ramírez
(2005b) and Zibechi (2006).
42. For Virno (2003, 72), the “exodus . . . modifies the conditions in which the
protest takes place rather than presupposing them as an unmovable horizon.” In re‑
ferring to a “semantic exodus,” I am borrowing this idea to refer to the universe of
meaning.
2. See especially, Coordinadora de Defensa del Agua y de la Vida 2001a, the docu‑
ment titled “Departmental Coalition for the Defense of Water and Life” from January
28, 2000. Its argument is structured in the following way: “Question 1: What is the
problem with water in Cochabamba? This means to clearly establish the problem to
overcome. Question 2: For whom does La Coordinadora speak? The response to this
is that the peasants who rely on irrigation, the urban committees for drinking water
who are not part of the central distribution network, and users of drinking water who
are connected to the network all speak through La Coordinadora. Question 3: Why
are Law 2029 and the concession contract with Aguas del Tunari not good for us, the
people of Cochabamba?” The way in which La Coordinadora expressed its objectives
and its measures will be analyzed later in more detail.
3. “The valleys of Cochabamba cover diverse areas at different altitudes. We will
consider the participation of four in the water conflict: the Valle Alto Basin, Sacaba,
the Central Valley, and the Lower Valley” (Peredo, Crespo, and Fernández 2004, 11).
4. “Suyu” is a Quechua word that means space or place. It also refers to a par‑
ticular extension of land, a certain right to water, or to an amount of work. “Mita” is
an Andean practice that refers to rotational access to water or rotating work shifts.
It was utilized during colonial times as an institution to regulate the forced work of
indigenous peoples in silver mines.
5. The backbone of fedecor is the Tiquipaya-Colcapirhua Association of Irriga‑
tion Systems (asiritic). It was founded in 1992 and combines more than two thou‑
sand users and families. Its first president was Omar Fernández (Peredo, Crespo, and
Fernández 2004, 57).
6. Two cases exemplify this extreme: Representative Maldonado and Doctor
Soria. Both attempted, through all means and channels at their disposal, to take the
movement in less radical directions, vying for personal gain. They were not expelled
from the movement; they abandoned it.
7. The book Nosotros somos la Coordinadora [We are the Coordinadora] was
published in 2008 to celebrate the anniversary of the Water War. It includes various
communiqués and documents from the year 2000. Their analysis reveals the internal
logic of La Coodinadora’s discourse: to establish the “we” in the leadership and to
describe the goals of the struggle in the clearest way possible.
8. La Coordinadora’s most prominent leaders from January to April were Oscar
Olivera, Omar Fernández, Gabriel Herbas, and Gonzalo Maldonado.
9. One of the most important examples of this was the following: “The El Paso
community transferred water from one of its wells to the urban population (in the
northern zone) for free. This was over a period of a few weeks and equaled half of the
water processed by semapa” (Coordinadora de Defensa del Agua y de la Vida 2001a,
public declaration by Oscar Olivera on May 8, 2000).
10. There were various efforts to carry out the “takeover of the drinking water
supply company in Cochabamba” and to “establish methods for social control.” For
232 Notes to Chapter 1
the objectives of this study, it will be essential to consider the work of the technical
support team for La Coordinadora during the period from October 2000 to Febru‑
ary–March 2001. I participated directly then as a member.
11. This statement—or variations of it—was reflected in innumerous flyers,
speeches, pamphlets, and posters.
12. This was the meeting place for professionals and environmental groups that
participated in La Coordinadora.
13. The most important of these seminars took place at the end of November
2000 in the city of Cochabamba. Maude Barlow, a well-known Canadian activist and
defender of water rights, attended along with other influential people, mainly from
English-speaking countries.
14. Some years later, this early organizational effort formed the Southern Zone
Association of Independent Drinking Water Systems (ASICA-Sur).
15. These distinctions were the product of equally broad planning. In December
2000 and January 2001, the technical support team organized at least two open meet‑
ings with Cochabamba’s population to determine semapa’s legal character. This was
in the midst of governmental declarations in the media arguing that the leadership
and semapa’s director were “illegal.” They also criticized the way that La Coordina‑
dora was influencing the duties and projects that the company was initiating at that
time. There were several proposals on “how to reorganize semapa.” Some suggested
“the formation of a type of society based on shares distributed among all users and
neighborhood residents” or organizing a large cooperative. There was also a pro‑
posal to maintain semapa’s public-municipal character. The latter was the option
that eventually prevailed, most of all due to the numerous bureaucratic-legal difficul‑
ties that any change to the legal status would require, which included the requirement
to obtain a “transmission of public patrimony law.”
16. For a concise discussion of the popular roots of the desire for a Constituent
Assembly, see Mokrani and Chávez (2006). See also Olivera and Lewis (2004), par‑
ticularly the chapter “For a Constituent Assembly: Creating Public Spaces.”
17. For information, see the semimonthly newspaper Así es, numbers 1 and 2, La
Paz, Bolivia. See also Coordinadora de Defensa del Agua y de la Vida (2001b, Actas
del Foro Sobre Asamblea Constituyente [the publication from the event that was held
in November 2000 in Cochabamba]).
18. While there is no record of daily activities, meetings, and contacts, some of
La Coordinadora’s members keep a dossier of letters and documents that show what
was occurring in Cochabamba during that time. There are dozens of letters from
trade organizations, neighborhoods, associations of vendors from the main mar‑
kets, and from political organizations of all sizes. They document the specific water
problem experienced by each one of those organizations, and La Coordinadora is
“asked”—more or less—to “consider the specific problem.” Many of these letters
were answered during those months, either verbally or in writing, more or less with
the same argument: “La Coordinadora is not an entity to ‘manage complaints’ or
Notes to Chapter 2 233
‘process business matters’; your specific problem is similar to all these others, and we
have to respond equally to all with our decisions and possible solutions.” Although,
of course, when someone from La Coordinadora could “lend a hand” in some spe‑
cific case, there was an attempt to collaborate (Coordinadora de Defensa del Agua y
de la Vida 2001b).
19. The year 2002 was a general election year in Bolivia. Elections were announced
in March 2002 and took place on June 30 of that year. Among the eleven parties
that participated on the ballot, both Morales’s mas party, which received second
place overall in the voting, and Quispe’s mip were included. The mip was created
in November 2001 and obtained 6 percent of all the votes. For information, consult
www.cne.org.bo. From that moment, mas became the principal opposition party
with an important number of representatives and senators.
20. The communiqué from La Coordinadora dated January 28, 2000, states: “Our
voice is not aligned with parties or political offices. Nor can it be bought by private
enterprise or hidden interests. We speak what we feel and what the population com‑
municates to us. That is why we are different from other institutions and individuals
who reappear today and seem ambivalent; those who say that they have or who have
been deceived, or who have carried out public functions in an indolent manner.”
21. Communiqué from La Coordinadora dated February 6, 2000.
22. Claudia Espinoza, in a note from the national weekly publication Pulso
(May 5–11, 2000), states the following: “What occurred in Cochabamba was not a
mere warning to the political system for it to just tighten some loose screws. . . .
No one there was asking for or demanding ‘fair rights’ from the state, as old-style
unionism usually did to generate agreements by negotiating the terms of subordi‑
nation. This time, popular organizing efforts imposed their own style of making
politics. People ignored the political agency and the legal authority offered by the
ballot box.”