The purpose of this memorandum is to examine the core elements of Switzerland’s supreme judicial authority, including its structure, jurisdiction, and
role in protecting individual rights.
The purpose of this memorandum is to examine the core elements of Switzerland’s supreme judicial authority, including its structure, jurisdiction, and
role in protecting individual rights.
The purpose of this memorandum is to examine the core elements of Switzerland’s supreme judicial authority, including its structure, jurisdiction, and
role in protecting individual rights.
THE SWISS FEDERAL TRIBUNAL: SWITZERLANDS SUPREME JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
Executive Summary
The purpose of this memorandum is to examine the core elements of Switzerlands supreme judicial authority, including its structure, jurisdiction, and role in protecting individual rights.
The Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland (Federal Tribunal) represents the highest judicial authority of the Swiss Confederation. The Federal Tribunal has original jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes between the federal government and the cantons, as well as between cantons. This promotes uniformity and neutrality in the interpretation of Swiss law, and preserves Switzerlands complex balance of power between the state and cantons.
The primary function of the Federal Tribunal is to serve as the final court of appeal. Though the Court does not exercise supervisory control over lower federal and cantonal courts, the Court is responsible for ensuring uniform interpretation and application of laws by the lower courts. In this capacity, the Supreme Court has no discretion to decline review of properly filed appeals in cases previously decided by the lower federal courts or cantonal courts. Recent reforms have streamlined the appellate process and added a safeguard for the protection of fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution.
The Constitution explicitly prevents the Federal Tribunal from conducting a constitutional review of federal legislation. As a result, no court in Switzerland may declare a federal law unconstitutional. This reflects Swiss commitment to direct democracy and faith in a consultative legislative process that heavily involves the public. However, the Constitution also permits exceptions as provided by law, notably in the area of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Statement of Purpose 1
Introduction 1
Structure of the Federal Judiciary 2
Original Jurisdiction of the Federal Tribunal 2
Appellate Jurisdiction of the Federal Tribunal 4 Appellate Procedures 5
Judicial Review of State Law 7
Conclusion 8
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THE SWISS FEDERAL TRIBUNAL: SWITZERLANDS SUPREME JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
Statement of Purpose
The purpose of this memorandum is to examine the core elements of Switzerlands supreme judicial authority, including its structure, jurisdiction, and role in protecting individual rights.
Introduction
The Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland (Federal Tribunal or Supreme Court) is the highest judicial authority of the Swiss Confederation. 1 The Constitution and the Swiss Federal Supreme Court Act (FSCA) govern all proceedings before the Court. The Federal Tribunal primarily interprets Swiss federal law and ensures that it is correctly and uniformly applied throughout the state. 2
The Federal Tribunal has limited original jurisdiction, hearing disputes between cantons as well as between the state and one or more cantons. 3 This promotes uniformity and neutrality in the interpretation of Swiss law. In addition, the Federal Tribunal has extensive appellate jurisdiction. Because the Constitution requires the Federal Tribunal to adjudicate all properly filed appeals, it resolves several thousand disputes annually. 4 Parties may appeal the decisions of cantonal courts as well as Switzerlands two lower federal courts, which handle federal crimes and federal administrative decisions. 5 Recent reforms have streamlined the appeals process to make appellate review more accessible to the public through simplified procedures. 6
Unlike the judiciaries of many other civil law countries, the Swiss judiciary seldom functions as a check on the elected government, 7 and generally cannot
1 SWISS CONST. art. 188(1) (2000), available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/1/101.en.pdf. 2 Swiss Portal, The Judiciary: The Federal Tribunal (last visited on Jan. 26, 2012), available at http://www.ch.ch/behoerden/00215/00329/00353/index.html?lang=en. 3 SWISS CONST. art. 189(2) (2000). 4 Fridolin M.R. Walther, Introduction to the Swiss Legal System: A Guide for Foreign Researchers, LLRX (Nov. 15, 2000), available at http://www.llrx.com/features/swiss.htm. 5 SWISS CONST. art. 189(1) (2000). 6 International Law Office, New Swiss Federal Supreme Court Act (Feb. 20, 2007), available at www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?g=7fa69b79-d9bc-db11-b095-001143e35d55. 7 Fridolin M.R. Walther, Introduction to the Swiss Legal System: A Guide for Foreign Researchers, LLRX (Nov. 15, 2000), available at http://www.llrx.com/features/swiss.htm.
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review the constitutionality of federal laws. 8 In some cases, however, the Federal Tribunal may review federal law for compliance with international obligations.
Structure of the Federal Judiciary
Switzerland has a small federal judiciary, consisting of only three courts. The Federal Criminal Court is a court of first instance responsible for trying the few criminal offenses that exist under federal law (for instance, money laundering and political corruption). 9 The Federal Administrative Court adjudicates complaints regarding administrative decisions by the federal government. 10
Parties may appeal decisions from both courts to the Federal Tribunal, which has supreme judicial authority over lower federal and cantonal courts.
The Federal Tribunal presently consists of thirty-eight full-time judges and nineteen part-time judges. 11 The docket is divided into four divisions: (1) Public Law Division; (2) Civil Law Division; (3) Criminal Law Division; and (4) Social Law Division. 12 While the Constitution requires judges to act independently in the exercise of their powers, 13 there are few formal provisions to ensure this. Parliament elects judges to the Federal Tribunal, who serve six-year terms that correspond to parliamentary terms and are eligible for reelection. 14 Thus, the courts composition often reflects party representation in Parliament. 15
Original Jurisdiction
To promote uniformity in the interpretation and application of the law, the Constitution vests the Federal Tribunal with the authority to adjudicate disputes between the cantons and between the state and canton(s). 16
Switzerland has twenty-six sovereign cantons, 17 each with its own constitution, executive, parliament, judicial system, and cantonal law. 18 Cantons
8 SWISS CONST. art. 189(4) (2000). 9 SWISS CONST. art. 191a(1) (2000). 10 SWISS CONST. art. 191a(2) (2000). 11 Swiss Portal, The Judiciary: The Federal Tribunal, available at http://www.ch.ch/behoerden/00215/00329/00353/index.html?lang=en (last visited Jan. 26, 2012). 12 Swiss Portal, The Judiciary: The Federal Tribunal, available at http://www.ch.ch/behoerden/00215/00329/00353/index.html?lang=en (last visited Jan. 26, 2012). 13 SWISS CONST. art. 191(c) (2000). 14 SWISS CONST. arts. 168(1), 145 (2000). 15 Inter-Parliamentary Union, Judiciary The Federal Court (2012), available at http://www.125-ipu.ch/judiciary- the-federal-court.html. 16 SWISS CONST. art. 189(2) (2000). 17 SWISS CONST. art. 3 (2000).
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are sovereign except to the extent that their sovereignty is limited by the [Constitution]. 19 The Constitution stipulates that all governmental functions and powers not expressly granted to the Confederation belong to the cantons. 20 The cantons are also responsible for implementing federal law within their borders. 21
The Federal Tribunal has jurisdiction to adjudicate all disputes between cantons, regardless of the subject matter. This promotes a neutral arbiter of the dispute, and is important because cantonal judges may, due to bias or pressure, be inclined to decide the case in favor of their own canton.
The Federal Tribunal also handles disputes between the state and the cantons. The Constitution provides that [f]ederal law shall take precedence over any conflicting provision of cantonal law. 22 The Federal Tribunal is responsible for determining whether an actual conflict between state and cantonal law exists, and if it does, for upholding the ultimate supremacy of state law. 23
The Constitution stipulates that the processes to resolve inter-government disputes must be cooperative rather than adversarial. The Federal Tribunal therefore uses negotiation, mediation, and other conflict resolution strategies to the greatest possible extent. 24 Proceedings can be initiated only by the state or relevant canton, though individuals may be heard as interested parties. 25
In practice, the Federal Tribunal hears inter-governmental disputes infrequently. In one recent decision, the Federal Tribunal determined that cantons rather than the state have the primary authority to license mechanical devices. 26 In another decision, the Federal Tribunal considered whether the state has jurisdiction over cantonal police records that implicate national security. 27 The majority of
18 Fridolin M.R. Walther, Introduction to the Swiss Legal System: A Guide for Foreign Researchers, LLRX (Nov. 15, 2000), available at http://www.llrx.com/features/swiss.htm. 19 SWISS CONST. art. 3 (2000). 20 Gregory M. Bovey, The Swiss Legal System and Research, Hauser Global Law School Program at New York University School of Law (Nov. 2006), available at http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Switzerland.htm. 21 SWISS CONST. art. 46 (2000). 22 SWISS CONST. art. 49 (2000). 23 SWISS CONST. art. 189(2) (2000). 24 SWISS CONST. art. 44 (2000). 25 Recueil officiel des Arrts du Tribunal fdral suisse ATF 117 Ia. 26 Heinz Aemisegger, La rsolution des conflits entre Etat central et entits dotesdu pouvoir lgislatif par la Cour constitutionnelle (14-15 Juin 2002), 9, available in French at http://www.bger.ch/la_resolution_des_conflits.pdf. 27 Heinz Aemisegger, La rsolution des conflits entre Etat central et entits dotesdu pouvoir lgislatif par la Cour constitutionnelle (14-15 Juin 2002), 9, available in French at http://www.bger.ch/la_resolution_des_conflits.pdf.
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cases likewise relate to substantive issues of state and canton jurisdiction. 28 There is very little case law on procedural conflicts between state and cantonal authorities. 29
As the adjudicator of inter-government disputes, the Federal Tribunal provides a neutral forum and plays a vital role in preserving Swiss federalism. Despite its mandate to resolve disputes, the Federal Tribunal also places a procedural emphasis on cooperation and compromise between governments. 30
Appellate Jurisdiction
As the supreme judicial authority of Switzerland, the Federal Tribunal is the final court of appeal, and therefore responsible for ensuring that lower courts accurately and uniformly apply the law. Though the Court does not exercise supervisory control over lower federal or cantonal courts, the Court is responsible for ensuring that lower courts accurately interpret and apply the relevant laws. 31
Provided that the subject matter falls under its jurisdiction, the Federal Tribunal must review all properly filed appeals from both cantonal and federal courts. 32 Appeals in criminal cases may arise from cantonal courts 33 or the Federal Criminal Court, which was established by the Constitution as the court of first instance for federal crimes. 34 Likewise, administrative law appeals may arise from cantonal courts or the Federal Administrative Court. Appeals in civil cases arise exclusively from cantonal courts. 35
The Constitution permits parties to appeal decisions involving the following subject matters: (1) federal law; (2) international law; (3) inter-cantonal law; (4) cantonal constitutional rights; (5) the autonomy of the communes; (6) cantonal guarantees for public law corporations; and (7) federal and cantonal provisions on
28 Heinz Aemisegger, La rsolution des conflits entre Etat central et entits dotesdu pouvoir lgislatif par la Cour constitutionnelle 9 (June, 2002), available in French at http://www.bger.ch/la_resolution_des_conflits.pdf. 29 Heinz Aemisegger, La rsolution des conflits entre Etat central et entits dotesdu pouvoir lgislatif par la Cour constitutionnelle 9 (June, 2002), available in French at http://www.bger.ch/la_resolution_des_conflits.pdf. 30 Swiss Portal, The Judiciary: The Federal Tribunal (last visited on Jan. 26, 2012), available at http://www.ch.ch/behoerden/00215/00329/00353/index.html?lang=en. 31 Swiss Portal, The Judiciary: The Federal Tribunal, available at http://www.ch.ch/behoerden/00215/00329/00353/index.html?lang=en (last visited Jan. 26, 2012). 32 Fridolin M.R. Walther, Introduction to the Swiss Legal System: A Guide for Foreign Researchers, LLRX (Nov. 15, 2000), available at http://www.llrx.com/features/swiss.htm. 33 SWISS CONST. art. 123 (2000). 34 SWISS CONST. art. 191(a) (2000). 35 SWISS CONST. art. 122 (2000).
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political rights. 36 While political rights remain vaguely defined, this provision has allowed citizens to seek review of procedural hurdles to voting. For instance, a group of citizens challenged the canton of Juras policy of having the cantonal parliament decide the constitutionality of proposed referendums before submitting them to a vote. 37
To safeguard fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution, the Federal Supreme Court Act (FSCA) created a subsidiary constitutional appeal. 38
Though the enforcement of fundamental rights is primarily a cantonal responsibility, the subsidiary constitutional appeal permits the Federal Tribunal to review appeals against decisions of the highest cantonal judicial authorities in which the appellant has a legal interest and alleges a violation of fundamental rights. 39 Because earlier drafts of the FSCA permitted cantons to refer such cases directly to the European Court of Human Rights, without any review by the Federal Tribunal, the adoption of the subsidiary constitutional appeal helped to ensure uniformity in the interpretation and application of Swiss law. 40
Appellate Procedures
Adopted in 2007, the FSCA streamlined and modernized the appellate process. 41 Previously, Switzerland had a complex array of appeal procedures, each governed by a unique set of rules, 42 that depended on factors such as the relevant area of law, the court of first instance, the precise ground for appeal, and evidentiary rules. 43 This complexity frequently resulted in multiple proceedings to
36 SWISS CONST. art. 189(1) (2000). 37 Recueil officiel des Arrts du Tribunal fdral suisse ATF 124 I 107. 38 Schellenberg Wittmer, The New Federal Supreme Court Act (FSCA) (Dec. 2006), available at, http://www.swlegal.ch/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?disposition=attachment&nodeguid=37ec5254-7494-4145-a741- 8824e74f6933. 39 Schellenberg Wittmer, The New Federal Supreme Court Act (FSCA) (Dec. 2006), available at, http://www.swlegal.ch/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?disposition=attachment&nodeguid=37ec5254-7494-4145-a741- 8824e74f6933. 40 Schellenberg Wittmer, The New Federal Supreme Court Act (FSCA) (Dec. 2006), available at, http://www.swlegal.ch/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?disposition=attachment&nodeguid=37ec5254-7494-4145-a741- 8824e74f6933. 41 International Law Office, New Swiss Supreme Court Act (Feb. 20, 2007), available at www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?g=7fa69b79-d9bc-db11-b095-001143e35d55. 42 Schellenberg Wittmer, The New Federal Supreme Court Act (FSCA) (Dec. 2006), available at, http://www.swlegal.ch/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?disposition=attachment&nodeguid=37ec5254-7494-4145-a741- 8824e74f6933. 43 Schellenberg Wittmer, The New Federal Supreme Court Act (FSCA) (Dec. 2006), available at, http://www.swlegal.ch/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?disposition=attachment&nodeguid=37ec5254-7494-4145-a741- 8824e74f6933.
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resolve a single case, 44 and often discouraged parties from seeking appeal. The FSCA created the unified appeals procedure, which streamlined the process to created three broad categories of appeal criminal, civil, and administrative and had no relation to the source of law (cantonal, federal, or constitutional). 45 This uniformity and simplicity are designed to increase public access to appellate review. 46
Generally, parties may only appeal final decisions or interim decisions that operate independently or end a portion of the proceedings. 47 In most cases, the filing of an appeal does not suspend the challenged decision in the interim unless the presiding Federal Tribunal judge grants a request for suspension. 48 Exceptions do exist, however, particularly when the appellant has been sentenced to prison or the relevant law is changing. 49 In its review, the Federal Tribunal accepts the factual determinations of the lower courts unless the appeal alleges gross factual inaccuracies in the record, the correction of which can alter the outcome of the proceedings. 50
The Federal Tribunal primarily functions as an appellate court. The streamlining of the appellate process by the FSCA and the requirement that the Federal Tribunal adjudicate all properly filed appeals ensure that the public has easy access to appellate review by the highest court. The subsidiary constitutional appeal also provides a safeguard for fundamental rights and allows for the Federal Tribunal to ensure uniform interpretation and application of such rights.
44 International Law Office, New Swiss Supreme Court Act (Feb. 20, 2007), available at www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?g=7fa69b79-d9bc-db11-b095-001143e35d55. 45 International Law Office, New Swiss Supreme Court Act (Feb. 20, 2007), available at www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?g=7fa69b79-d9bc-db11-b095-001143e35d55; Schellenberg Wittmer, The New Federal Supreme Court Act (FSCA) (Dec. 2006), available at, http://www.swlegal.ch/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?disposition=attachment&nodeguid=37ec5254-7494-4145-a741- 8824e74f6933. 46 Schellenberg Wittmer, The New Federal Supreme Court Act (FSCA) (Dec. 2006), available at, http://www.swlegal.ch/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?disposition=attachment&nodeguid=37ec5254-7494-4145-a741- 8824e74f6933. 47 International Law Office, New Swiss Supreme Court Act (Feb. 20, 2007), available at www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?g=7fa69b79-d9bc-db11-b095-001143e35d55. 48 Schellenberg Wittmer, The New Federal Supreme Court Act (FSCA) (Dec. 2006), available at, http://www.swlegal.ch/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?disposition=attachment&nodeguid=37ec5254-7494-4145-a741- 8824e74f6933. 49 International Law Office, New Swiss Supreme Court Act (Feb. 20, 2007), available at www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?g=7fa69b79-d9bc-db11-b095-001143e35d55. 50 Schellenberg Wittmer, The New Federal Supreme Court Act (FSCA) (Dec. 2006), available at, http://www.swlegal.ch/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?disposition=attachment&nodeguid=37ec5254-7494-4145-a741- 8824e74f6933.
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Judicial Review
While the Federal Tribunal has broad power to review cantonal laws, it generally cannot review the constitutionality of federal statutes. 51 This prohibition is premised on the belief that Switzerlands lengthy and consultative legislative process will identify and address any constitutional problems. 52 It also reflects Switzerlands historical preference for a direct democracy in which courts cannot overrule the will of the people. 53 Because all federal legislation is subject to a popular referendum either automatically or upon the petition of 50,000 citizens, the public ultimately controls the fate of legislation. 54
The lack of judicial review has sometimes resulted in limits on the rights of certain groups. Although the 1874 Constitution proclaimed equality under the law for all human beings, 55 womens suffrage required majority approval by Switzerlands entirely male voting population. This did not occur until 1971. 56 In 2009, a referendum succeeded in banning the construction of minarets on mosques, despite the opposition of both the Federal Council and the Federal Assembly. 57
These instances highlight the potential vulnerability of constitutional principles in the absence of judicial review.
The Constitution permits the government to create exceptions to the prohibition on judicial review. 58 Because the Constitution requires all levels of government to respect international law, 59 the Federal Tribunal has authority to review the compatibility of Swiss laws with applicable international law, such as the European Convention on Human Rights. 60 In 2011, the Federal Tribunal invalidated a federal law that prevented foreign nationals without a valid visa from getting married, citing a recent decision by the European Court of Human Rights
51 SWISS CONST. art. 189 (2000). The Federal Assembly is Switzerlands bicameral federal legislature. The Federal Council is Switzerlands seven-member Executive branch, responsible for executing federal law and preparing draft laws and policy. Each member heads a department, equivalent to a ministry in other states. 52 Nicholas Schmitt, Switzerland, Institute of Federalism (last visited on Jan. 26, 2012), available at http://www.federalism.ch/files/categories/IntensivkursII/Switzerlandg1.pdf. 53 Nicholas Schmitt, Switzerland, Institute of Federalism (last visited on Jan. 26, 2012), available at http://www.federalism.ch/files/categories/IntensivkursII/Switzerlandg1.pdf. 54 Nicholas Schmitt, Switzerland, Institute of Federalism (last visited on Jan. 26, 2012), available at http://www.federalism.ch/files/categories/IntensivkursII/Switzerlandg1.pdf. 55 SWISS CONST, art 8(1) (1848). 56 Daniel Moeckli, Of Minarets and Foreign Criminals: Swiss Direct Democracy and Human Rights, 11:4 HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 774, 776 (2011). 57 Daniel Moeckli, Of Minarets and Foreign Criminals: Swiss Direct Democracy and Human Rights, 11:4 HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 774, 774 (2011). 58 SWISS CONST. art. 189(4) (2000). 59 SWISS CONST. art. 5(4) (2000). 60 Jan-Erik Lane, THE SWISS LABYRINTH: INSTITUTIONS, OUTCOMES, AND REDESIGN, 90 (2001).
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concerning a similar English law. 61 However, the Federal Tribunal will not enforce provisions of international law to which Switzerland made a reservation (a unilateral statement rejecting the laws applicability to the state). 62 For instance, a man who challenged the different retirement ages of men and women in his canton could not obtain review by the Federal Tribunal because Switzerland had made a reservation to the gender equality clause of the Convention. 63
The Swiss judiciary is not empowered to function as a check on the elected executive and legislature, and consequently has traditionally had no power of judicial review. While the Federal Tribunal has begun to exercise some authority in reviewing laws for compliance with Switzerlands international obligations, the commitment to direct democracy remains a strong constraint on the judiciary.
Conclusion
Although the administration of justice is primarily a responsibility of the cantons, the Federal Tribunal plays a critical role as Switzerlands supreme judicial authority. The Federal Tribunal is the entity primarily responsible for preserving the federal balance between the Confederation and the cantons, and resolving disputes between the cantons. In both instances, the Federal Tribunal places the utmost emphasis on cooperation and compromise. As the appellate court of final instance, the Federal Tribunal ensures the accurate and uniform application of laws throughout the cantons. Recent reforms have made the Federal Tribunal more accessible to the public and empowered it to uphold the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution. The constitutional prohibition of the Federal Tribunals constitutional review of federal legislation reflects the strong Swiss tradition of direct democracy. Nonetheless, an exception to the prohibition now allows constitutional review where human rights and fundamental freedoms are implicated.
61 Recueil officiel des Arrts du Tribunal fdral Suisse, ATF 2C_349/2011. 62 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 19, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf. 63 Recueil officiel des Arrts du Tribunal fdral Suisse, ATF 121 V 229.