The Ethics of Animal

The Ethics of Animal
Experimentation:
A Critical Analysis and
Constructive Christian
Proposal
DONNA YARRI
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
Experimentation
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THE ETHICS OF ANIMAL
EXPERIMENTATION
A Critical Analysis and Constructive
Christian Proposal
Donna Yarri
The Ethics of
Animal
Experimentation
A Critical Analysis and Constructive
Christian Proposal
donna yarri
1
2005
1
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Yarri, Donna.
The ethics of animal experimentation : a critical analysis and constructive
Christian proposal / Donna Yarri.
p. cm.(American Academy of Religion academy series)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN-13 978-0-19-518179-1
ISBN 0-19-518179-4
1. Animal experimentationReligious aspectsChristianity. 2. Animal
experimentationMoral and ethical aspects. 3. Christian ethics. I. Title.
II. Series.
BT747.Y37 2005
241'694dc22 2004025114
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper
To Charles E. Curran,
my dissertation advisor and mentor,
who taught me how to speak in my own voice
This page intentionally left blank
On the Fifth Day
Creation of Beings began
Their fate determined by Man
For either good or ill
And so it continues still.
Anonymous
Preface
Both the practice of animal experimentation and ethical concerns
about it have a long history going virtually back to the ancient Greek
period. While the discussion of ethics has waxed and waned
throughout the years, animal experimentation has continued un-
abated and has in fact signicantly increased in use since the mid-
dle of the twentieth century. The voices raising concerns about ani-
mal experimentation for most of human history have come from
animal advocacy groups and interested individuals, but the publica-
tion in 1975 of Peter Singers book Animal Liberation moved the dis-
cussion into the scholarly realm. Scholars interested in the treat-
ment of animals now are able to marshal sound philosophical,
scientic, and theological arguments to present and bolster their
views. While many more animals are raised for food than are used
in experimentation, the latter has garnered most of the discussion
because it so dramatically pits the interests of humans and animals
against each other in matters of life, death, and health.
Many good works have been written on the topic of animal ex-
perimentation, and so one could rightly ask why another book is
needed. A straightforward answer to this question is that not only is
animal experimentation not likely to abate in the near future but
also the numbers of animals used are likely to increase as technol-
ogy pushes us in new directions. Issues such as using animals as
organ donors, transplanting genes from one species of animal into
another, and using animals to study additional genetic topics in light
of the advent and completion of the mapping of the human genetic
code ensure that animal experimentation will be with us for a long
time to come. Thus, concerns about the treatment of experimental
animals seem especially important, current, and, of course, contro-
x preface
versial. I attempt to do two unique things simultaneously. First, I provide an
interdisciplinary approach to the topic by utilizing the insights of cognitive
ethology, philosophy, science, and theology. I lay out the basic issues related to
the ethical treatment of animals in general, such as animal cognition, pain,
and rights, and I explore these issues from the perspective of these different
disciplines, particularly their relevance for animal experimentation. Second, I
provide a concrete and pragmatic way of assessing and comparing the benets
to humans with the burdens to animals. Those who support animal experi-
mentation often assert that the benet from animal experiments is what jus-
ties continuing this practice, whereas those seeking to eliminate or greatly
restrict experimentation tend to focus on the harm to animals. What is gen-
erally missing is a pragmatic way to distinguish among the kinds of experi-
ments that would be permissible from those that would not be. This book is a
slightly revised version of my dissertation, which provides an interdisciplinary
approach to the topic of animal experimentation, along with a comparison of
burdens and benets. This books ultimate purpose is to provide specic guide-
lines for benign animal experimentation, which, if followed, would greatly re-
strict animal experimentation while still allowing some research to continue.
Acknowledgments
This project could not have been successfully completed without the
assistance of a number of people along the way. The rst round of
thanks goes to those who helped me as I worked on my dissertation,
most notably those at Southern Methodist University (SMU). I
would like to thank William Babcock, director of the Ph.D. program
in Religious Studies at SMU, for his support throughout the pro-
gram and for all of his wise counsel. His open-door policy with stu-
dents endeared him to all of us who went through the program, and
I am especially grateful for all that he has done to make the Ph.D.
program at SMU the top-quality program that it is today. I am also
very indebted to all members of my dissertation committee for en-
abling my ideas for the dissertation to come to fruition. Alastair
Norcross, with his own research interests in animal ethics, provided
me with the opportunity to study independently with him and to
regularly engage in dialogue with him on this issue. My dissertation
largely became a reality because of his expertise in the area of ani-
mal ethics and his willingness to work with me to develop my own
thinking on the subject. William F. May was a wonderful guide not
only within but also outside the classroom. I am especially grateful
for the courses in ethics I was able to take with him, for the oppor-
tunity to work with him as his associate director at the Cary M. Ma-
guire Center for Ethics at SMU, and for his own example and en-
couragement to produce writing of high quality. I feel especially
privileged to have had Charles E. Curran as my dissertation advisor
and to have worked with him so closely throughout my Ph.D. stud-
ies. He has been a wonderful mentor, and in the dissertation pro-
cess I especially appreciated his insightful comments, his almost
immediate feedback on all work turned in to him, and his encour-
xii acknowledgments
agement. He was a concrete model of not only an excellent scholar but also a
truly ethical human being. Finally, I would like to thank all of my friends and
family members who cheered me on throughout this process, most especially
David A. Westcott, without whose constant support this project would never
have been completed.
A second round of thanks goes to those who helped at the book manuscript
stage. Kimberly Rae Connor at the American Academy of Religion (AAR), who
acted as my liaison between the AAR and Oxford University Press, helped
greatly in moving along the process and also provided a very positive outlook
from the outset. Marc Bekoff and Paul Waldau, as readers of the manuscript,
provided extremely helpful comments and suggestions for editing, along with
positive endorsements for publication, for which I am very grateful. Most es-
pecially, I would like to thank all of those at Oxford, in particular the Oxford
Board and Cynthia Read, my editor, for believing in my manuscript, and Chris-
tine Dahlin for her assistance with the production. My gratitude goes to all at
Oxford involved in the production of this manuscript at all stages, for all of
their creativity and hard work.
Contents
Introduction, 3
1. Nature of the Problem, 11
2. Animal Minds, 21
3. Animal Pain, 57
4. Animal Rights, 85
5. Christian Theology, 107
6. Burden/Benet Analysis, 135
Conclusion, 155
Notes, 159
Bibliography, 199
Index, 215
Experimentation
Introduction
The ethical treatment of animals has become the subject of concern
for many academics and many laypeople as well in recent years. The
subject of animal experimentation,
1
while by no means a new issue,
is an especially controversial one, with three generic positions: ap-
proval of all experimentation, abolition of all experimentation, and
permissibility of some experimentation (with some arguing for the
status quo and others for signicantly greater restrictions).
2
The ulti-
mate reasons for these differences arise from the difculty of recon-
ciling the values involved: the good of science, human advancement,
and concern for all sentient beings.
The purpose of this book is to critically examine the issue of an-
imal experimentation. The specic question to be addressed is,
Should animal experimentation be permitted, and, if so, under what
conditions? I will focus on writings from the last thirty years approx-
imately, since that is when the treatment of animals became of seri-
ous academic interest, although there will be references to works
prior to that time period if deemed important enough to warrant in-
clusion.
3
This book will be interdisciplinary in approach, taking into
account primarily the voices of philosophers, theologians, and scien-
tists. (The term scientist will be used to include all those who util-
ize animals in experiments, although obviously not all who experi-
ment on animals are, strictly speaking, scientists.) Many writers
have tried to provide an ethical theory that addresses all uses of ani-
mals. While I will examine some of the more important theories re-
lated to the treatment of animals (since it is foundational to develop-
ing an approach to the particular issue of animal experimentation),
the goal is not to propose a monolithic theory addressing all uses of
animals. Instead, the purpose is to develop an ethic primarily for the
4 the ethics of animal experimentation
issue of animal experimentation. Although there have been an increasing num-
ber of Christian theologians writing on the treatment of animals (mostly in
the context of environmental ethics), there have been relatively few voices in
theology writing specically on the subject of animal experimentation. There-
fore, the constructive part of this book will suggest a specically Christian
theological and ethical way of thinking about this topic, as well as provide a
concrete burden/benet analysis of experimentation.
Many academics and laypeople are challenging some of the long-held as-
sumptions about animals, and important questions are being raised, particu-
larly about their moral status and the implications of this for their treatment,
such as the following: What is the relationship between humans and animals?
Do animals have moral standing? Do animals deserve moral consideration?
Do animals have rights? Do we have direct or indirect duties to animals? Do
animals have intrinsic or only instrumental value? What are the relevant dif-
ferences between humans and animals, and do these differences justify dif-
ferent treatment? Are humans superior to animals? If so, in what ways, and
what difference should this make, if any? Does human benet always outweigh
animal suffering? How do we resolve conicts of interest between humans and
animals? While this book cannot hope to answer or even adequately address
all of these questions, many will be discussed because they do have implica-
tions for the use of animals in experimentation.
However, questions about the ethical treatment of animals are by no
means new, in spite of their recent more academic nature. Not only does an-
imal experimentation have a long history
4
but also the relationship of humans
and animals has a long history. Humans have interacted with and been in
relationships with animals since the beginning of human history.
5
Thus, it is
inevitable that questions arose about the use and treatment of animals. Hu-
mans have conceptualized their relationships to animals in many different
ways throughout history, but one common method is to divide the attitude
toward animals into three broad views: animals have no moral status (we have
no direct duties to them and can do with them as we please); animals have
minimal status (we can use animals but must avoid cruelty and practice kind-
ness); and animals have considerable status (based either on their ability to
experience pain and pleasure or on their mental capacities).
6
Although all of
these positions have been held throughout history, in a sense one can also view
them as distinct stages, with the latter view, often referred to as animal liber-
ation, having come into existence in its more radical form as a minority view
within the last thirty years.
7
The Western tradition in general and the Christian
tradition in particular have typically subordinated animals to humans, although
individuals throughout history challenged this approach.
8
It is important to
note here that with the advent of Darwins theory of evolution, humans came
to be understood as animals as well, although certainly still, in most minds, a
vastly superior animal.
Humans throughout history have utilized animals in a number of different
ways. Many of these uses had their origins in early human history, including
animals originally hunted for food and clothing, later domesticated as beasts
introduction 5
of burden, and ultimately venerated as objects of worship and kept as pets for
companionship.
9
The practice of animal experimentation is generally traced
back to ancient Greece to Alcmaeon of Croton in approximately 450 b.c.e.
10
He was a physician and the rst person to use animals to study physiology, in
particular by severing an animals optic nerve and observing the resulting
blindness.
11
The rst real experiments on live animals are believed to have
been conducted by Erasistratus of Alexandria (304258 b.c.e.). It is fairly com-
mon knowledge that Aristotle made anatomic dissections of animals.
12
In ad-
dition, Aristotles philosophical system, in which he created a hierarchy with
animals considerably lower than humans due to their alleged lack of a rational
nature, became embedded in the Western tradition and ultimately incorporated
into the Christian tradition through the writings of Thomas Aquinas in the
medieval period. Galen (129ca. 210 c.e.), the most renowned physician in the
Roman Empire, went further than any other individual in the numerous ex-
periments he undertook in an attempt to understand physiology.
13
During the
ancient Roman and Greek periods, animal experimentation was carried out
periodically by individuals, primarily to better understand physiology, but it
was far removed from the institutionalized practice that exists today. Although
ancient Greece had more diverse views toward animals (some positive and
some negative), ancient Rome attached little importance to animals.
14
The Judeo-Christian tradition, whose writings arose during this period,
was certainly inuenced by Greek and Roman thought and practice. The do-
minion model has predominated in this tradition, with a denitive hierarchy
and with distinct differences drawn between humans and animals. The Gen-
esis creation narrative, in particular the rst creation account, was and is often
cited as theological justication for the domination of humans over animals
and for the belief that animals exist only (or primarily) for human use.
15
Even
to the present, the Roman Catholic Church (and much of Christendom) follows
the teaching of Thomas Aquinas, whose principal reason for forbidding cruelty
to animals was that it would lead to cruelty to people. Human superiority was
and is often defended religiously on the grounds that humans are made in the
image of God and that humans possess rationality, language, free will, moral
responsibility, and an immortal soul.
16
During the Middle Ages, experimentation was not widely practiced. Me-
dieval Christianity was more concerned with eternal life than with animal life.
17
However, as mentioned previously, the writings of Thomas Aquinas put a
stronger foundation under the notion of human superiority to animals by the
incorporation of Aristotelian philosophy into his approach to Christianity. Al-
though the Christian church was not an advocate for animals, there were in-
dividualsgenerally saints and mysticswho spoke out on behalf of animals,
the most notable being Francis of Assisi. However, one of the peculiarities of
the medieval period was the apparently common practice of putting animals
on trial and condemning them to torture and/or death.
18
In any case, although
animal experimentation was not widely practiced, the general view that the
purpose of animals was to ultimately benet humans did not undergo signif-
icant change.
The scientic thought and practice of Rene Descartes in the seventeenth
century provided a stronger foundation for the general acceptability of the
practice of animal experimentation. His mind-body dualism and his theory
that animals were mere machines undermined the notion that animals could
feel pain, and this therefore justied the already commonly accepted view of
the absolute superiority of humans over animals. As a result of Descartes
theory that animals could not really feel pain, experimentation became more
widely accepted and practiced.
19
The scientists Francois Magendie and his stu-
dent Claude Bernard, two well-known heirs of Descartes scientic tradition,
performed many dissections on live animals. Descartes, Magendie, and Ber-
nard all had their contemporary critics, many of whom observed rsthand the
experiments that were often carried out in public places.
The Enlightenment period brought with it two different emphases regard-
ing the treatment of animals in general. Thinkers such as Jeremy Bentham
and John Locke questioned some of the assumptions traditionally held about
animals. Bentham in particular argued that animals feel pain and, subse-
quently, that this fact has moral implications for their treatment. On the other
hand, Enlightenment philosophy provided even stronger reasons for the ac-
cepted hierarchy of humans over animals. Its emphasis on the natural rights
of humans and the high place given to rationality undergirded the acceptance
of a sharp distinction drawn between humans and animals.
The nineteenth century saw the rise of humane societies, beginning in
England.
20
Although there were individual opponents of animal experimenta-
tion prior to this time, the rise of these societies signaled serious systematic
opposition to many practices involving animals, and they often took up anti-
vivisection as their particular cause.
21
In 1824, the rst Society for the Preven-
tion of Cruelty to Animals came into existence, and many similar organizations
eventually sprang up.
22
As a result of this opposition to experimentation, the
rst antivivisection legislation, the Cruelty to Animals Act of 1876, passed in
England. For the rst time, the treatment of experimental animals became the
focus of law. Although the legislation did not abolish painful research, it did
regulate it.
23
In the United States, Henry Bergh founded the American Society
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA) and got the rst serious
animal protection law passed in 1866 by the New York state legislature.
24
Al-
though this was not the rst law to give some protection to animals (some
state laws already existed), it was the rst effective one, and it was one that the
ASPCA was charged with enforcing.
25
Henry Bergh did try to get vivisection
banned through legislation in New York in the 1870s but was unsuccessful,
especially due to the work of the state medical society.
26
Alongside this growing humane movement, though, was a concurrent rise
in the practice of experimentation. The number of American laboratories grew
signicantly in the 1880s and 1890s, and America became a leading center of
scientic medicine.
27
The work of scientists such as Louis Pasteur, whose stud-
ies on animals showed that diseases were produced and could be cured by
immunization, empirically demonstrated the tremendous advances in human
introduction 7
health that could result from animal experimentation. With other scientic
advancessome of them taking place in the twentieth century, such as un-
derstanding the causes and development of vaccines for diseases such as
whooping cough, tuberculosis, measles, mumps, rubella, and polio
28
the be-
lief in the necessity of animal experimentation for human (and animal) health
was a very strong justication for its continuance.
The twentieth century saw a signicant rise in both the institutionalized
practice of animal experimentation and grassroots and academic opposition to
it. The contemporary animal rights movement in the United States has become
a considerable force, addressing issues in the treatment of animals in the pub-
lic sphere and often bringing to light abuses of animals in experiments. Two
movements address the humane treatment of animals, especially with regard
to animal experimentation: the reformist humane movement, which seeks re-
form in the treatment of animals in science; and the more radical antivivisec-
tion movement, a contemporary movement that is generally opposed to all or
most animal experimentation. A distinction is often made between animal
welfarists (those principally advocating kindness and absence of cruelty toward
animals) and animal liberationists/animal rightists. (There is a tendency in the
popular literature, and sometimes even in more academic writings, to lump
all animal activists under the phrase animal rights, although not all those so
called actually believe in animal rights.) The former group is more reformist
and the latter group is more radical and tends to be abolitionist regarding
certain practices involving animals. Both types of groups are actively ghting
to better the condition of animals, although they are often at odds with regard
to their practical objectives and even ultimate goals. However, their theoretical
differences are often stronger than their practical differences.
29
Both of these groups have their roots in the humane societies of the nine-
teenth century, but what was unique in the twentieth century was the growth
of animal rights groups, which tend to be more radical than their reformist
counterparts with regard to animal experimentation, as well as on many other
animal issues.
30
The number of those involved in the animal movement con-
tinues to grow, with an estimated ten to fteen million Americans supporting
animal protection groups. By 1990, several thousand animal welfare groups
and several hundred animal rights groups were in existence.
31
There are several reasons for this growth in interest in animal issues,
particularly in the latter part of the twentieth century. The rst is the emergence
of other liberation movements, particularly for women and minorities, with
some arguing that we should also include animals as an oppressed group. The
second is the publication in 1975 of Peter Singers book Animal Liberation
(released in a revised edition in 1990), often dubbed the bible of the animal
rights movement, which signaled the beginning of signicant academic in-
terest in the subject. For many activists, Singers book was an impetus to in-
volvement in the movement, and almost every animal rights activist either
owns or has read Singers book.
32
The book has also gained respectability in
academic circles, as Peter Singer is a philosopher of great renown who holds
a chair at Princeton University (although many disagree with his ideas). Many
articles and books have been written mostly challenging but sometimes sup-
porting some of Singers arguments, and other writers have subsequently ad-
dressed the treatment of animals from their own perspectives.
33
A third reason
is the growth in the eld of animal ethology, which studies animals primarily
in their natural habitats. Many of these studies have raised questions about
animal rationality and other cognitive processes.
In spite of this growth in activist and academic interest in the treatment
of animals in science, animal experimentation was more prevalent in the twen-
tieth century than ever before. A majority of people do not support the agenda
of the more radical animal rights groups, and perhaps not even that of the
more reformist humane groups. Most Americans, depending on how the sur-
vey is worded, indicate that they do believe that animal experimentation is
necessary and should continue if benets to humans are anticipated to accrue
from it. In addition, some surveys have indicated that people tend to be more
in favor of experimentation if the animal is a rat as opposed to a dog,
34
indi-
cating a kind of distinction not often made by animal rights groups, who tend
to want to extend protection at least to all mammals or vertebrates.
The eld of science in general has grown, and there has been tremendous
growth particularly in medicine due to the results believed to be achieved
through animal experimentation. Some of the benets to humans traditionally
cited include increased understanding of human physiology, better surgical
techniques, new procedures that enhance human life and well-being, and the
explosion of new drugs to treat all kinds of mental and physical illnesses.
Advances in human health and increases in life expectancy are considered to
be directly attributable to animal experiments. The proliferation in the number
of drugs available means that many more animals must be used to test these
substances, since U.S. legislation requires that substances be tested on animals
before they are tested on humans. As academic interest in the area of animal
experimentation grew, scientists also joined the discussion to respond to what
they considered to be extremists who want to undermine the very health of
human society by their desire to either signicantly restrict or abolish the prac-
tice of animal experimentation. These scientists often provide for the public
evidence of the important human health benets accruing from animal exper-
imentation. Some of the newer techniques now being tested, such as cloning
and the creation of transgenic animals, will probably require an increase in
the number of animals used or, if not an actual increase, then a justication
for their continued use. The issue of xenotransplantation in particular high-
lights the concern with the continuing need for animals. With so many hu-
mans dying due to the shortage of human organs for transplantation, animals
as potential organ donors are viewed as a very real solution to a serious human
health issue.
The question frequently comes down to weighing the anticipated benecial
consequences for humans against the potential suffering and death entailed
for animals.
35
Opponents of experimentation point out its paradoxical nature:
introduction 9
on the one hand, animal experimentation is justied on the grounds that an-
imals are so different from humans; on the other hand, animal experimenta-
tion is justied on the grounds that animals are close enough to humans to
be appropriate objects of comparison. A problem is how to reconcile these
seemingly contradictory viewpoints, if they can be reconciled at all.
On a more specic level, numerous ethical questions arise with regard to
the issue of animal experimentation: If animal experimentation is to con-
ducted, who should be responsible for making the decisions as to which ex-
periments to do and which animals to use? Should only certain species of
animals be used? What criteria should exist for whether experiments can be
done? Are there some experiments that should not be done (e.g., because of
reasons of pain or because of the uncertainty of results)? Who should conduct
experiments? Are there realistic alternatives to the use of animals? What kind
of legislation should be in place to protect laboratory animals? Which ethical
theories provide us with the best approach on the issue of animal experimen-
tation? In this book, I will attempt to answer these questions.
A number of different ethical theories, or approaches, have been utilized
to address the treatment of animals and the particular questions related to
animal experimentation. Here I will address rights theory and Christian the-
ology and provide a burden/benet analysis,
36
specically as they relate to an-
imal experimentation. The topic of rights is included since much of the con-
temporary philosophical writing on the treatment of animals addresses the
question of animal rights. Christian theology, while not a moral theory, is in-
cluded because of its potential contribution to the issue. This book will exclude
explicit discussion of three other approaches that address the treatment of
animals: the cruelty-kindness view, social contract theory, and feminist ap-
proaches. The cruelty-kindness view posits that we should practice kindness
and refrain from practicing cruelty to animals. Social contract theory under-
stands morality as a social contract among autonomous individuals (which
generally excludes animals) who make decisions for the rest of the commu-
nity.
37
Feminist approaches focus either on the relationship between the ex-
ploitation of animals and the exploitation of women or on challenging essen-
tialist approaches of other philosophical theories, with a particular concern for
the role of emotions and the concept of caring.
38
These are important, albeit
minor, perspectives in the contemporary philosophical and theological debate,
and therefore this book will focus on the arguments utilized primarily in the
philosophical literature.
The book is organized in the following way. Chapter 1 lays out the general
nature of the issue of animal experimentation, especially related to factual
considerations and denitions of important terms. Chapters 2 and 3 explore
the bases for the more important alleged similarities and differences between
humans and animals: mental capacity and the ability to feel pleasure and pain.
Chapter 4 addresses the issue of animal rights. Chapter 5 provides a construc-
tive Christian theology for animal experimentation. Chapter 6 offers a casuistry
based on a burden/benet analysis. The conclusion offers an interim ethic and
provides some closing remarks. While I do not claim in any way that this book
is the last word, its goal is simply to think carefully and ethically about a serious
moral issue from the perspectives of several disciplines, with the intention of
emphasizing the unique contribution that Christian theology can make on the
issue of animal experimentation, and to provide a burden/benet analysis in
light of the important issues considered throughout the book.
1
Nature of the Problem
My purpose in this chapter is to lay out some basic facts about ani-
mal experimentation. It will include general information such as im-
portant denitions, different types of experimentation, the typical
users of animals, the numbers and types of animals used, sources of
animals, and legislation.
1
One of the most important terms to dene is animal. This def-
inition should be fairly straightforward, but biologists differ among
themselves in terms of what to classify as an animal.
2
In common
usage, any living organism that is not a plant typically is considered
an animal.
3
Since the treatment of animals has become a serious
and widespread ethical concern, many people now tend to use the
term human animal (rather than human or human being)
when referring to a human being and to use the term nonhuman
animal (rather than animal) when referring to an animal. The ef-
fect and perhaps the purpose of this kind of distinction highlight the
evolutionary continuity among all nonplant organisms, suggesting
that the difference between human beings and animals is one of
degree rather than kindthat both groups are in fact animals.
There is general agreement that some kind of hierarchical clas-
sicatory system of animals exists, with simple organisms at the
lowest level (including bacteria and insects) and proceeding upward
to cold-blooded vertebrates (including sh, amphibians, and reptiles)
and nally up to warm-blooded vertebrates (including birds and
mammals, with primates at the very top).
4
Thus, animals are often
classied as higher or lower, depending on the kinds of distinctions
that are usually made among them. These distinctions generally
have to do with the degree of similarity of the animal to humans,
based particularly on the existence of a nervous system (indicating
the ability to feel pain) and mental complexity. However, the use of a hierarchy
to differentiate among animal species is very problematic for a number of
reasons. First, evolutionary theory, though often talked about in terms of a
linear progression, is more correctly understood as a line with different
branches. In addition, evolutionary theory tends to posit a difference of degree
rather than a difference of kind. Second, the problem of how to arrange the
taxonomy differs with regard to which characteristics are compared. Thus,
humans may be superior to nonhuman primates in some cognitive functions,
and nonhuman primates cognitively superior to rodents, but it may be possible
for a particular rodent to be more intelligent than a particular (e.g., brain-
damaged) chimpanzee. In addition, in their capacity to experience pain, there
may not be a hierarchy (and hence difference) at all. Finally, there are certain
characteristics (e.g., good eyesight, speed) in which some animals are superior
to humans. Of course, there are legitimate reasons for positing some kind of
hierarchy, and it is difcult to get away from it completely. The next chapter
has a more detailed consideration of hierarchy and its implications for animal
experimentation.
In this book, unless otherwise specied, when the term animal is used,
it refers to any living organism that is a vertebrate (warm-blooded or cold-
blooded), excluding human beings, as well as those invertebrates with well-
developed nerve clusters (e.g., octopus and squid). The reason for drawing the
line at this place is because pain perception is generally believed to exist in all
vertebrate species
5
and in these invertebrate species as well.
6
Pain is the most
important issue in animal experimentation. Although there may be other dif-
ferences among these species, most notably in cognitive capacities, the ability
to experience pain is the minimum requirement that should provide these
animals greater moral consideration in experimentation than those who cannot
feel pain.
7
Aside from the use of humans in experiments, animals are considered the
best models
8
for understanding human beings, and this is why they are so
often the subjects of experiments. The expression animal model is commonly
used to refer to the study of animals for the purpose of gaining helpful infor-
mation for humans or other animals,
9
and animals are considered especially
helpful because they are analogous to human beings in many ways.
10
To talk
about the issues related to the use of animals in experiments, though, we must
also dene precisely what is meant by experimentation. The term vivisection
was the word often used in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to refer
to animal experimentation. It specically meant dissection of live animals, but
it is now broader and includes the use of animals for the induction of disease
and for educational purposes.
11
This term has largely been replaced by the term
animal experimentation, both because the former word developed a pejora-
tive sense that many do not want to attribute to animal research and because
animal research has to do with more than literally dissecting animals.
12
Unless
otherwise indicated, the term experimentation in this book will refer specif-
ically to animal experimentation.
Most discussion about and denitions of experimentation divide it into
nature of the problem 13
three broad categories: research, testing, and education. When the term re-
search is used in the scientic literature, it generally refers to biomedical
research, although research can also more broadly encompass the categories
of testing and education. Biomedical research is generally divided into two
types: basic research and applied research. Basic research does not necessarily
have a specic goal to achieve or hypothesis to test; rather, it is an attempt to
better understand how biological systems function. Applied research has prac-
tical ramications that can be ascertained once the experiment is completed.
Its specic goal is to improve the health of humans and animals.
13
Research
also includes experimentation such as the development and deployment of
weapons, space research, agricultural research (usually undertaken to increase
production and prot), ethology (the study of animals in their natural habitats),
and behavioral and psychological research.
14
Testing refers to any experiments in which substances are administered
to animals to determine their toxicity or benet to humans. It is usually referred
to as toxicity testing. Products commonly tested are drugs, cosmetics, chemical
household products, and pesticides. The rationale for toxicity testing is that, if
the substance is safe or harmful for animals, then it will be safe or harmful
for humans. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requires that all new
drugs to be tested in humans must rst be tested on animals.
15
Two of the
more common and traditional tests that have been used in toxicity studies are
the LD50 test and the Draize test. Both tests have been subject to severe crit-
icism over the years, and, as a result, both have been signicantly modied to
involve fewer animals and to entail less suffering. There have been some at-
tempts to completely phase out use of these tests, particularly the Draize test.
The LD50 test (median lethal dose) is the administration of a test substance to
a group of animals until half of the animals die. The Draize test is an eye
irritancy test, primarily using rabbits, in which the substance to be tested is
put into one eye of an immobilized rabbit, and the results of the irritancy are
compared with the other eye. In this way, substances can be rated as mild,
moderate, or severe in their expected irritancy for human beings.
16
Of the three
types of experimentation, testing seems to have come under the most severe
criticism, and many who favor biomedical research and educational uses of
animals are opposed to product testing in animals.
17
Education refers to the use of animals in educational institutions, such as
experiments on animals for school science fairs, dissection in high school
biology classes, dissection and study of animals in college biology classes, and
demonstration on animal models in medical and veterinary schools.
18
Whereas
research and testing typically use live animals in their experiments, education
uses both living and dead animals, depending on the nature of the experi-
ments. In all categories of experiments, animals are generally put to death at
the conclusion of the experiment (the usual term for this is that the animals
have been sacriced), and sometimes they are then dissected to determine
the effects of the experiments.
The three categories of biomedical research, testing, and education are not
always that easy to distinguish. For example, testing the efcacy of a particular
drug on animals in order to determine its potential effects on humans can be
considered biomedical research and/or testing. Although there may be some
different issues related to the specic type of experimentation under discus-
sion, for the purpose of this book, all three categories of biomedical research,
testing, and education are meant when the term experimentation is used.
19
The reason for this is that many important ethical issues to be addressed on
the use of animals in experimentation are relevant for all three categories
for example, the problem of pain and the question of whether animals should
be experimented upon at all. However, the strongest resistance to abolition of
animal experiments has to do particularly with the perceived benets of bio-
medical research for human health.
Animals are utilized in many different sectors. The federal government is
a large user of animals. They are used in the following U.S. agencies in the
following ways: the Department of Agriculture (USDA, in the improvement of
animal health and food products, especially in agriculture); the Department of
Defense (in the testing and deployment of weapons, chemical and otherwise);
the Department of Energy (in health and environmental technologies and pro-
grams); the Department of Health and Human Services (for example, the Na-
tional Institutes of Health [NIH], which utilizes more animals than any other
agency; the FDA; the National Institute on Drug Abuse; and the National In-
stitute for Occupational Safety and Health); the Department of the Interior (in
improvement in sh and wildlife management); the Department of Transpor-
tation (in transportation safety); the Consumer Product Safety Commission (in
toxicity testing of potential consumer products); the Environmental Protection
Agency; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (in gaining knowl-
edge about health for astronauts); and the Department of Veterans Affairs.
20
Animals are also used in the private sector for biomedical research and in
toxicity testing (e.g., cosmetics companies). Some uses of animals are more
carefully regulated than others, which will be covered in the discussion on
legislation later in this chapter.
Animal research is a multibillion-dollar industry. Much money can be
made by researchers and their institutions, those that supply animals and
equipment for experiments, and companies that sell products tested on ani-
mals. The government is the primary source of funding for research, in par-
ticular through the NIH, as well as through other federal agencies. In addition,
funding comes from the private sector (e.g., pharmaceutical companies),
schools, and private foundations and agencies.
21
The amount spent on research
is not easily determined and in some cases is completely unknown. However,
the NIH is the biggest single provider of funds to medical research institutes.
22
Somewhere between 30 percent and 70 percent of NIH funding goes to animal
research, although the NIH will not reveal the exact amount.
23
In 1992, most
of the twelve billion dollars in the NIHs budget went to animal research,
24
and
it had 57 percent more money in 2001 than it did ve years earlier, with Con-
gress seeking to increase it even more.
25
The number of animals used in research is also very uncertain, so that
ranges of numbers differ widely.
26
One of the major problems is that the USDA
compiles statistics only on the use of nonrodent species; rats and mice (the
majority of animals used) are not counted. The Ofce of Technology Assess-
ment, which provides ofcial statistics on the numbers of animals used, main-
tains that it is not possible to know even whether the number of animals used
is increasing or decreasing. Their quote from 1986 of between seventeen and
twenty-two million animals in research (which includes most vertebrates) is
still widely used in the literature today.
27
There are two primary sources for
numbers and species of animals used: the National Research Councils Insti-
tute for Laboratory Animal Resources (ILAR) and the USDAs Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). The latters more recent study of
ofcial data suggests that between twenty-ve and thirty million are used.
28
Others put the gure as high as a hundred million.
29
Because the actual number of animals used cannot be determined pre-
cisely, it is difcult to know with certainty precisely what percentage of animals
is used in different kinds of experiments. One source estimates that half of the
animals are used in testing, the other half in research, and only 53,000 in
education,
30
while another estimates that 40 percent are used in basic research,
26 percent in drug development and testing, 20 percent in testing products
other than drugs, 7 percent in education, and 7 percent for other uses.
31
There
is considerable agreement that rats and mice comprise most experimental an-
imals used, with percentages commonly given as between 75 percent and 90
percent. Many reasons exist for the high number of rodents as research sub-
jects: they are easy to obtain, maintain, and handle (due to their small size);
they have a relatively short life span; they are relatively inexpensive to purchase
and to keep; they often are or can be genetically dened; and they have been
well studied widely in the past. The most commonly used rodents, in addition
to rats and mice, are guinea pigs, Syrian hamsters, and gerbils.
32
The questions
considered in choosing a species for a particular experiment include which is
expected to yield the most helpful results, which has been most helpful in the
past, which would provide the fewest biological risks for the researchers, which
would require the fewest numbers of animals, and which is the most econom-
ical.
33
In addition, some experiments require a genetically or microbiologically
standardized animal.
34
Tradition is also a consideration in species choice, as
well as public opinion.
35
There are basically two sources for animals used in experimentation:
purpose-bred animals and random-source animals. Purpose-bred animals, the
biggest source of experimental animals, are those specically reared for the
purpose of experiments. They can be bred by individual breeders or commer-
cial laboratories (who then sell the animals to research laboratories) or by the
laboratory itself. Random-source animals are those not purposely bred. The
term random-source usually refers to cats and dogs obtained in several ways:
from shelters and pounds,
36
from dealers (who bought them from auctions or
farms or stole them from the streets), or, in the case of retired greyhounds,
from the racetrack.
37
Another source for animals, which is not generally re-
ferred to as random-source, is their capture in the wild. Some frogs used for
dissection experiments, as well as some chimpanzees, are sometimes taken
from the wild, although both of these species are purpose-bred, too.
There are advantages and disadvantages in terms of the sources of animals,
but there are criticisms of all sources for animals. Criticisms on obtaining
animals from the wild focus on interference in ecosystems, the problem with
removing endangered species from their habitat, and the suffering and often
death that result from their transport.
38
The purpose-breeding of animals also
raises signicant ethical concerns. One of the concerns has to do with the
commodication of animals as products to be used by humans, especially
with the idea of raising animals simply to experiment on and then kill them.
In addition, animals are often purposely bred with genetic predispositions or
certainties to develop particular diseases, which ensures that many experimen-
tal animals will experience pain and suffering. The most controversial topic on
the source of animals in experimentation revolves around the issue of pound
animals, in particular because it involves normally favored species (cats and
dogs) and also because it undermines the idea of a shelter as a place of refuge
for animals.
39
Several kinds of legislation address the issue of the treatment of animals
in general and the care of research animals in particular. Legislation exists at
both the federal and state level. The most comprehensive legislation occurs at
the federal level in the form of two laws: the Animal Welfare Act and its amend-
ments (administered by the USDA, through APHIS) and the Public Health
Service (PHS) policy (administered by the NIH, through the Ofce for the
Protection from Research Risks [OPRR]).
40
There is some overlap in their cov-
erage, and attempts to bring these two laws more into line with one another
continue.
41
The Animal Welfare Act rst passed on August 24, 1966,
42
and amend-
ments in 1970, 1976, 1985, 1990, and 2002 have signicantly modied it.
Each amendment has strengthened the legal protection of animals, particularly
the protection afforded research animals, with the exception of the last amend-
ment. An article in Life magazine on the mistreatment of dogs by dealers who
were raising them for use in experiments helped to awaken public awareness
on this issue and provided the impetus for the initial legislation. The law, which
protected cat and dog owners from pet theft, prevented the use of stolen ani-
mals for experimentation, established humane standards by animal dealers and
research facilities for six kinds of animals (dogs, cats, primates, guinea pigs,
hamsters, and rabbits, although record keeping was required only for dogs and
cats), and required the USDA to enforce regulations.
43
However, this law did
not require annual reports to Congress,
44
and, although the secretary of agri-
culture was to establish minimum standards for animal care, the secretary
could not prescribe standards for experiments.
45
Each of the amendments will
be examined next.
The rst amendment was approved on December 24, 1970.
46
This amend-
ment arose in response to allegations of animal abuse by those not regulated
by passage of the rst law and because the public wanted to provide greater
protection to animals other than cats and dogs. Some of the changes regulated
those who exhibited animals to the public and those who sold animals to auc-
tions. Other important changes expanded denitions: the denition of ani-
mal was extended to include all warm-blooded animals that, as determined
by the secretary, were to be used for experimentation, in exhibitions, or as pets
(although farm animals used in medical research, as well as rats, mice, and
birds, were excluded);
47
the denition of research facility was expanded to
include facilities using covered animals in addition to cats and dogs (e.g., pri-
mates, guinea pigs, hamsters, and rabbits); and the denition of proper vet-
erinary care now included the use of pain relievers, if deemed necessary by
the veterinarian involved.
48
The 1976 amendment expanded the regulations covering those who dealt
with animals: carriers and intermediate handlers were now required to register
and keep records; and animal exhibitors, dealers, and auction operators had to
be licensed.
49
In addition, civil penalties were increased; animal ghting was
prohibited; the denition of dog was expanded to protect dogs used in hunt-
ing, for security, or for breeding; animals used in research, in exhibition, or as
pets were to receive humane treatment, including during transport;
50
and fed-
eral research facilities were now required to submit an annual report to Con-
gress
51
to demonstrate that they were following acceptable standards of treat-
ment for the animals in their care.
52
The 1985 amendment passed as the Improved Standards for Laboratory
Animals Act of 1985. This act dealt specically with treatment accorded to
research animals: research facilities were required to provide exercise for dogs
and a physical environment for nonhuman primates that would enhance their
psychological well-being;
53
pain and distress during procedures was to be min-
imized by the use of drugs;
54
alternatives to the use of animals were to be
considered in the event of painful or distressing experiments; each research
facility was to appoint an institutional animal committee of at least three mem-
bers, one of which had to be a veterinarian, and another member not in any
way afliated with the research facility conducting research;
55
the USDA must
perform annual inspections of each facility; a centralized information center
was to be established to prohibit duplication and minimize animal distress; all
research facilities had to provide training for personnel in animal care;
56
and
the use of animals in more than one major surgery was prohibited.
57
If a facility
did not comply with USDA requirements, its federal support could be sus-
pended or revoked.
58
The amendment of 1990 added farm animals to its list of protected ani-
mals (but not farm animals used for food, ber, or other agricultural purposes)
but still excluded birds, rats, and mice.
59
The acts specic denition of ani-
mal continued to exclude these species when bred for use in research. The
issue of the continued exclusion of these three types of animals generated
much controversy and concern, particularly among those concerned with an-
imal well-being. In 2000, a federal court order compelled the USDA to modify
its denition of animal to include birds, rats, and mice.
60
In response to that
action, in 2001, under pressure from the medical research industry, Senator
Jesse Helms successfully attached an amendment (called the Helms Amend-
ment) to the Senate Farm Bill to permanently exclude birds, rats, and mice
from the protections of the Animal Welfare Act. On May 13, 2002, President
George W. Bush signed into law the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act
of 2002, known as the Farm Bill, with the Helms Amendment intact.
61
In
summary, with the exception of the nal amendment, the progressive amend-
ments to the Animal Welfare Law appear to have tightened legislation consid-
erably, particularly in the following areas: they increased the scope of animals
protected, added to the list of those held responsible for inhumane treatment
of animals, provided government oversight of additional areas in research, and
focused more on the issue of pain. However, the 2002 amendment that per-
manently excluded the most used species was a severe blow to those concerned
with research animal interests.
In addition to the amendment to the Animal Welfare Law, another federal
law was passed in 1985. It is usually referred to as the Public Health Service
(PHS) policy, although it was technically called the Health Research Extension
Act. This law applies to all research institutions receiving funding from the
PHS and ultimately through the NIH.
62
Some of the legislation of the PHS
policy is very similar to that mandated by the Animal Welfare Act. The PHS
policy covers all vertebrate species without exception (including those excluded
by the Animal Welfare Act), although it has no jurisdiction over companies
not receiving its federal funding.
63
PHS requires adherence to a guide devel-
oped in 1963 by the NIH, through the National Research Councils Institute
of Laboratory Animal Resources (ILAR), entitled Guide for the Care and Use of
Laboratory Animals.
64
This guide virtually has the force of law. It is a living
document, subject to continuing change, and has been revised several times.
Its wording is general so that it can be adapted in different situations.
65
A
number of other guides have also been developed by the National Research
Council, dealing with particular species or particular aspects of animal re-
search.
66
Both the Animal Welfare Law and the PHS policy depend heavily on
self-regulation, particularly in their use of institutional animal care and use
committees.
67
Someone once said that the way one knows legislation is good is if nobody
is happy. In this regard, federal legislation on the treatment of animals must
be excellentit has come under severe criticism on a number of points, from
disparate voices in the discussion.
68
Many scientists consider animal experi-
mentation already overregulated, and many animal activists consider the leg-
islation still insufcient. New laws continue to be introduced on the federal
level.
69
Federal law has been supplemented, though, through state laws, which
have been enacted largely to deal with painful experiments on animals in set-
tings below the college level (e.g., in science fairs).
70
Many states have anti-
cruelty statutes. On both the state and federal levels, sunshine laws, such as
the Freedom of Information Act,
71
have been designed to bring government
activities in research out into the open and subject to public scrutiny. Not all
states have these laws, and the laws that do exist vary considerably.
72
Such is the factual situation at the present time with regard to animal
experimentation. Since the ethical arguments about animal experimentation
focus on the qualities and nature of animals, the next chapter will discuss
animal mentality.
2
Animal Minds
Many justify using animals for experiments (and for other purposes
as well) on the basis of their supposed lack of mental capacities. Al-
though experimentation is usually defended explicitly on the
grounds that studying animals can prove benecial for humans, it is
the assumption that animals are inferior to humans in some signi-
cant sense that justies their subordination to serving the human
good. Humans have usually considered themselves to be superior to
animals because of some kind of mental capacity or capacities that
we believe we possess but animals do not or that we believe they
possess to a considerably lesser degree. A pervading concern of
Western philosophy has been to search for the criterion or criteria
that would distinguish humans from animals.
1
The importance of this search for a criterion or criteria has im-
plications for the treatment of animals, because the conclusions we
reach determine which beings we consider to have moral standing
and hence to deserve moral consideration.
2
The question of moral
standing in particular may be the most fundamental problem in
moral theology.
3
To say that a creature has moral standing is to go
beyond simply saying that we should not treat him cruelly; it sug-
gests that this creature has interests that must be protected and that
he cannot simply be used only as a means to an end. The two most
common criteria offered as to why animals may or may not deserve
moral consideration are their cognitive capacities and their capacity
to feel pleasure and pain. This chapter will focus on the question of
animal mentality and its implications for experimentation.
4
Addressing the issue of animal minds is no easy task; it is a
complex matter for a number of reasons, including the difculty of
dening terms, problems in interpretation of behavior, and differ-
ences in the implications of this knowledge for the treatment of animals. Since
what we think about animal minds affects the way we treat them, there is much
at stake in this discussion. In examining the issue of the cognitive capacities
of animals, a number of questions have been raised: Do animals have mental
experiences? What kinds of mental experiences do animals have? Are their
mental experiences similar to those of humans? How can we study the mental
experiences of animals? Numerous mental criteria have been cited as evidence
of human uniqueness, and while I cannot address them all in this chapter, I
will proceed in the following way. In the rst section, I will examine the ar-
guments for and against the existence of animal minds in general. In the next
three sections, I will examine the arguments for and against the possession by
animals of some of the most signicant mental criteria usually offered as ev-
idence of distinctions between humans and animals: consciousness, rationality
(and related concepts), and language.
5
In the fth section, I will address the
question of speciesism, its relation to what have been called marginal humans,
and the issue of hierarchy. In the last section, I will offer some concluding
remarks.
The Existence of Animal Minds
Considerable disagreement exists as to whether animals have minds and, if
they do, to what extent their minds are similar to those of human beings. The
issue of animal minds is distinct from the question of whether they have
brains, upon which all would obviously agree. The question of animal minds,
or animal mentality, ultimately is asking whether the minds of humans and
animals are similar and in what ways they are similar. To say that animals have
minds means that animals have subjective experiences and can think. But this
does not yet answer the further question of how sharp the distinction is be-
tween human and animal mentality. While there are signicant differences
between humans and animals (which will be developed more fully in the sub-
sequent sections), my contention is that animals do have minds, that their
mental experiences are similar to those of humans, and that the differences
between them are primarily differences of degree rather than differences of
kind. The three arguments I will use to buttress this view are the argument
from evolution, the argument from other minds, and the argument from be-
havior.
The argument from evolution serves as the foundation for the other two
arguments. The theory of evolution is accepted by virtually everyone (with the
exception of some conservative religious groups and individuals) and therefore
is very important in considering the relationship of humans to other species.
Evolutionary theory in its most general outline posits a common origin for all
species and a gradual development of species differentiation, although this
progression is not necessarily linear. The emphasis in evolutionary theory is
on gradual rather than sudden differentiation. Evolutionary theory is often
marshaled in discussions of animal capabilities because it is fairly obvious that
animal minds 23
animals are similar to us in a number of important ways.
6
They are constructed
anatomically like humans, with both a nervous system and a similar brain
structure. At least some mental experiences (such as subjective feelings and
conscious thoughts) are believed to result partly from the functioning of the
nervous system.
7
The most obvious similarities are with nonhuman great apes
(which include bonobos, chimpanzees, gorillas, and orangutans).
8
If certain
physiological structures relate to mentality in humans, and if animals have
physiological structures similar to those of humans, then it follows that they
must have similar kinds of mental experiences. It seems difcult to argue that
animals are so similar to us physiologically and then assume a radical discon-
tinuity when it comes to mental capacities, especially when there is such a
close connection between the physiological and the mental. In addition, it does
not make sense to argue for a gradual development in terms of physical char-
acteristics and then to posit the sudden emergence of mentality in humans. A
concrete example would be the possession of consciousness and the existence
of a central nervous system, both of which are believed to be related to the
experience of pain and suffering.
However, to argue that differences between human and animal mentality
are a matter of degree rather than kind does not necessarily lead to the con-
clusion that the mental experiences of humans and animals are exactly the
same. There will certainly be signicant differences between different species
(both between humans and other animals and between other animal species)
and even among members of the same species. Just as there are some animals
that are physiologically closer to humans than others, there certainly are some
animals that are closer to humans in certain cognitive capacities than others.
In addition, arguing for the existence of animal minds with an emphasis on a
difference of degree between human and animal minds does allow that hu-
mans are more cognitively advanced than other animals.
9
The importance of
arguing for the existence of animal minds is that it allows us to interpret animal
behavior as we interpret human behaviornamely, as a result of mental ex-
periencesrather than simply from a behaviorist perspective. It also allows us
to take more seriously the implications of the existence of these minds for the
way we treat them. Thus, if animals can think and have subjective experiences,
then what we do to them matters much more than if we think that they are
completely other.
There are basically three ways that the argument from evolution has been
challenged with regard to animal minds. The rst is by way of religious ar-
gument in which the superiority of humans is understood to have been estab-
lished by God, as revealed in the biblical tradition, primarily through the cre-
ation accounts. The creation accounts are often quoted to demonstrate that the
directive given by God to humans includes the notion of dominion over the
earth.
10
The second is by arguing from a behaviorist perspectivethat all an-
imal behavior can be explained by reference to observation of behavior rather
than through understanding cognitive processes. This argument basically as-
sumes that animals do not have minds. The behaviorist tradition was popular
earlier in the twentieth century and the dominant paradigm for understanding
animal minds in the 1940s and 1950s, and B. F. Skinner is the most famous
advocate of this approach.
11
However, though behaviorism has been challenged
in recent times (since it is considered by many to be too simplistic a way to
explain all kinds of behavior, including human behavior) and somewhat re-
placed by the new eld of cognitive ethology, its inuence remains strong in
some circles. The third argument does not challenge evolutionary theory in
general or the existence of animal minds in particular but rather maintains
that the differences between humans and animals are a difference of kind
rather than of degree. There is general acceptance of differences of degrees
but that eventually a difference of degree can become so great as to become a
difference of kind. This is most often argued with regard to humans in com-
parison with all other animal species. Even if we do have physiological simi-
larities with animals, the argument goes, we cannot jump to the conclusion
that we have comparable mental similarities; our mental capacities are signif-
icantly greater than even those of our closest animal relatives, the chimpanzees.
Thus, if animals do possess some mental states, they are much inferior to the
capabilities found in humans.
The question of whether evolutionary theory posits a difference of degree
or a difference of kind is a very important one with regard to the extent of
differences between humans and animals. In most of Western history, partic-
ularly before Darwin, there was general acceptance often based on religious
grounds that humans were a substantially different kind of creature than any
other animal species. However, Darwins theory and his own explicit state-
ments suggest that this line of demarcation had previously been drawn much
too sharply.
12
His theory suggests (and he himself believed) that the differences
between humans and animals were no longer differences of kind, as previously
believed, but rather differences of degree. This includes both physiological and
mental differences. Thus, Darwin also believed that animals had emotions for
the same reason.
13
These similarities have then serious implications for our
treatment of animals. Because evolutionary theory maintains a common origin
of all beings and presents a differentiation of species, and because these dif-
ferences emerged gradually, it seems more logical to argue for a difference of
degree. Of course, arguing for a difference of degree rather than kind still
allows for the fact that humans are superior to animals in a number of signif-
icant ways. More important than the theoretical discussion, though, are the
implications of whether one holds to a difference of degree or kind. Maintain-
ing a difference of degree generally (although not necessarily) allows animals
greater moral standing and hence greater moral consideration than does a
focus on a difference of kind.
The second argument regarding the existence of animal minds centers on
the knowledge of other mindsdo other minds exist?
14
The rst question that
arises is whether we can possibly know or understand the subjective experi-
ences of another human, and the subsequent question is whether we can un-
derstand the minds of other animals in the same way that we can understand
the minds of other humans. In answer to the rst question, to function in
human society, not only must we assume that other humans have minds but
animal minds 25
also we must believe that they have mindsmental experiencessimilar to
ours. Otherwise, there would not even be a basis for communication. Even if
not done consciously, humans relate to other humans on the basis of their
expectation of commonality of subjective experiences. We assume that, when
we communicate our thoughts and feelings to others, they will understand us.
We expect that in situations when we feel sad, for example, that other humans
in similar situations will also feel sad. One way we can know that others ex-
perience these mental states similarly is that when we respond sympathetically
or empathetically to them, they respond appropriately. The problem of at least
other human minds is a problem more for a minority of philosophers than for
the average person, and it is not at all a problem for those who believe that
animals have minds. Again, this does not commit us to the assertion that
human and animal minds function in exactly the same way, but it allows
that if we can (1) assume that other humans have minds and (2) then have
recourse to evolutionary theory, it is not such a far jump to say that other
animals have minds as well.
Those who argue against the existence of animal minds with reference to
the problem of other minds must assume one of two things: either that hu-
mans do not have mental experiences (or that they are at least skeptical about
this possibility, since it cannot be proven) or that we cannot understand the
mental experiences of others because we cannot literally get into their heads
and hence experience something precisely as they would.
15
The latter argument
is the one more commonly asserted. Of course, there is truth to the assertion
that we cannot necessarily understand precisely the experiences of another,
and at times we may even be mistaken, such as when we misjudge motives or
misunderstand emotions. However, this does not foreclose the possibility that
most of the time we can have a good idea that other humans do have minds,
that they do think, and that their thought processes are similar to ours. As
mentioned previously, we would not be able to function in society if we did
not believe and act on this belief. Thus, the presence of other human minds,
coupled with evolutionary theory, provides strong evidence for the existence of
animal minds. However, all that this commits us to is the belief that animals
do have mental experiences, that their mental states can be studied, and that
animal behavior can be explained other than simply by reference to instinct or
stimulus-response.
The third argument on the existence of animal minds is a commonsense
view based on observation of animal behavior, both by laypeople in everyday
situations and by many scientists, either in the laboratory or in more natural
settings. Common sense dictates that animals do have minds and that it makes
sense to ascribe mental states to animals as a way of both understanding and
explaining their behavior.
16
The average pet owner, for example, believes that
her dog has cognitive abilitiesthat not only can he make his wants known
but also he can do so in such a way that his human owner can understand
him. Much of the way that we relate to animals would be difcult to explain if
not for the presence of animal mentality.
The fact that animal minds are specically studied by many scientists both
in their natural habitat and in controlled laboratory experiments (particularly
psychology experiments) underscores the belief in the existence of animal
minds. In particular, the recent emergence of the discipline of cognitive ethol-
ogy attests that not only do many scientists believe that animals have minds
but also they believe that they can be studied.
17
Cognitive ethology is the dis-
cipline that studies cognitive processes in animals
18
within the context of ev-
olutionary theory.
19
Whereas most studies in animal cognition have tradition-
ally taken place in laboratories, cognitive ethologists typically study animals in
their natural habitats.
20
Cognitive ethologists move beyond merely studying
animal learning and discrimination to considering the possibility of animal
mental states and the study of some of their attendant features, such as decep-
tion and communication. Darwins approach was very much a cognitive ethol-
ogy approach, although it was called anecdotal cognitivism, making him per-
haps one of the rst cognitive ethologists. He attributed mental states to
animals based on particular observations rather than on controlled experi-
ments.
21
There is a bias against anecdotal evidence by many in the scientic
community, with a premium placed on being able to empirically verify ones
hypothesis.
However, there is some disagreement by scientists on the question of an-
imal minds and on how to best understand and explain animal behavior. Some
scientists who study animal behavior in the laboratory may also believe that
animals have mental states, although descriptions of animal behavior that con-
note mental states are often used in scare quotes (e.g., an animal is afraid),
as if the scientist is reluctant to attribute this emotion to animals. The strict
behaviorist, unlike the average layperson and many cognitive ethologists, how-
ever, tends to describe all animal activity by reference to external inuences
and without reference to subjective states. The principal reason that many
reject the behaviorist school is because cognitive studies on animals must often
assume, and therefore have concluded, that animal behavior can best be un-
derstood on the basis of mental states. Even though there are few strict behav-
iorists around today, a more modied view of how to explain animal behavior
is made by reference to Morgans Canon, which results in what could be
termed a neobehaviorist position. Morgans Canon asserts that we should not
interpret the behavior of any nonhuman animal as caused by a higher psychical
faculty if it can be explained by a lower one. Thus, Morgans Canon is a specic
example of the phenomenon of Occams Razor: that, all things being equal,
we should prefer simpler explanations for behavior over more complicated
ones.
22
Thus, if a particular animals behavior could be explained in terms of
instinct or stimulus-response rather than as a result of higher cognitive func-
tioning, then this is the best explanation because it assumes the least. The
differences in conclusions between strict behaviorists, neobehaviorists, and
cognitive ethologists have to do both with the kinds of questions they bring to
the study of animals and with their different interpretations of behavior. Ulti-
mately, the question comes down to, What is the best explanation for animal
behavior? If we cannot attribute mental states to animals, then we must assume
a different reason for their behavior than we would if, for example, we were
animal minds 27
interpreting the behavior of humans. Animal behavior simply does not make
sense if we cannot understand it on the basis of mental states. This is an
example of what is known in philosophy as the argument to the best expla-
nationif the best argument includes the existence of mental states, then we
must use it. On the basis of these arguments, then, we can posit at least the
existence of animal minds, meaning that animals have mental states by means
of which we can interpret and understand their behavior and by means of
which animals themselves behave in certain ways rather than in others. Of
course, animal mental states have to do with more than simply behavior, such
as the question of whether animals can experience the negative emotional
mental states that are sometimes attributed to them in laboratories, such as
suffering.
23
However, to fully answer the question of whether Morgans Canon
or the argument to the best explanation provides a better interpretation of
animal behavior, it will be necessary to study the specic criteria usually at-
tributed to humans but denied to animals: consciousness, rationality, and
language.
Consciousness
Consciousness is the foundational concept in the discussion of animal minds.
It is related not only to cognitive capacities but also to the experience of pain,
and therefore it has serious implications for the question of whether animals
can experience pain and suffering. It continues to be important today in the
discussion of animal minds because it is considered the dening feature of
the mental, notwithstanding the difculty of even dening mental state.
24
Consciousness is generally considered a more elementary mental state than
rationality or language possession and therefore raises the question at the most
basic level of what the best basis is for understanding animal behavior, as well
as the issue of the cognitive similarities between humans and animals. The
concept of consciousness is generally traced back to Descartes, although he
never explicitly dened it.
25
Both then and now, the issue of animal conscious-
ness is a mixture of philosophy and science.
26
The questions related to consciousness are as follows: Do animals possess
consciousness? How similar is it to human consciousness? Do animals have
self-consciousness? The questions get answered differently, depending on how
consciousness is dened. It is not necessarily controversial to argue for an-
imal consciousness, since by the late twentieth century most philosophers and
scientists had postulated some kind of consciousness for both humans and
animals.
27
However, this is not a universally held position, and some still want
to distinguish between consciousness and self-consciousness. My position is
that animals have at least rudimentary levels of consciousness that operate as
consciousness does in humans and that some animals possess self-
consciousness as well, although perhaps not to the same extent as normal adult
humans.
Before discussing the presence or absence of consciousness in animals, it
is important to dene what is meant by it. As with so many other terms related
to animals, though, the very denition is problematic, even with regard to
humans. The reason for the difculty is that there is no observable property to
consciousness, in the sense that we can point to a direct behavior as evidence
of consciousness.
28
However, some behavior can be viewed as indirect evidence
of the presence of consciousness, as later examples will attest. Consciousness
has been dened in a number of ways.
29
Most simply put, consciousness is an
awareness or perception that a creature hasa kind of subjective feeling about
what is going on. It appears to have an affective component. Consciousness
includes the notion of the experience of sensations. One of the best ways to
understand it is to see it as being synonymous with awareness. To say that an
animal is conscious is to say that she has awareness of her environment, her
own actions, and the actions and communications of her companions.
30
Some
characteristics commonly associated with consciousness are intentionality;
sensations such as fear and hunger; communication, both with the environ-
ment and with conspecics;
31
and versatility of behaviorbehavior that is non-
stereotyped, including deceptive behavior.
32
Strong arguments support the proposition that animals have conscious-
ness. Some of the arguments are very similar to those considered in the dis-
cussion on animal minds, so I will mention them only briey, although here
they will be examined particularly with regard to consciousness. The argu-
ments are functional-evolutionary, analogy with humans, and observation of
animal behavior.
The rst argument is a functional-evolutionary one. It not only assumes
an evolutionary continuity but also postulates that, in general, we should as-
sume that, if an animal has a particular type of mental state, then this mental
state would confer an evolutionary advantage to its possessor.
33
The gist of this
argument is that possessing consciousness is to the evolutionary advantage of
a species. In addition, if humans have evolved from nonhuman creatures by a
gradual process, then it is difcult to postulate the sudden emergence of con-
sciousness.
34
Froman evolutionary perspective in general, if at least one species
possesses consciousness, then it is valid to ask to what extent it may be present
in others.
35
The second argument is by analogy with humans. Virtually no one would
disagree that humans possess consciousness. We believe that others have men-
tal states like our own. The analogy with humans postulates, just as with the
existence of minds in general, that if we can assume that humans possess
consciousness because we know they experience sensations, and animals tend
to act in ways that we would typically regard as signs of experiencing sensa-
tions, then we have every reason to think that they possess consciousness as
well.
36
That is, if animals manifest behavior that we know is conscious for
humans, then it is likely that it is conscious for animals as well.
37
In addition,
in humans, mental states are closely related to brain structure and physiology.
Physiology and biochemistry in animals and humans are remarkably similar.
The brain and nervous system have typically been considered the organs of
human mental life,
38
and consciousness has been especially correlated with
animal minds 29
complex nervous systems.
39
Thus, if we posit consciousness in humans due to
their physiology, then we can do so for animals as well, since they are physi-
ologically similar. This is especially important with regard to the experience of
pain, which is believed to be directly linked to consciousness.
40
The last argument is based on observation of animal behavior. On the basis
of animal behavior, we attribute consciousness to animals as part of the way
we view the world and as part of the way in which we speak about animals.
There is not sufcient justication to reform or replace this way of speaking
about animals.
41
We assume that animals do have an awareness of their sur-
roundings, can make adaptations in it, and can communicate with others about
it. It seems difcult to explain normal animal behavior without regard to con-
sciousness.
42
Strong evidence exists for the belief that animals possess consciousness,
most specically related to observation of their behavior, by citing the kinds of
activities in which animals typically engage. Any activities that go beyond sim-
ple stereotyped behavior or simple instinctual or stimulus-response behavior
can be used as evidence of consciousness. The following abilities in animals
provide strong evidence for their possession of consciousness. Communication
among animals is generally considered evidence of conscious thinking, since
it entails some simple thoughts and feelings about situations. The study of
animal communication in particular seems to indicate an ability in animals to
convey to others some of their thoughts.
43
Communication is also considered
an example of consciousness because part of its purpose is to intentionally
affect the receivers behavior. To convey thoughts to others, one must not only
be aware of ones own situation but also be able to convey that situation to
conspecics. A very common example cited in the literature is the symbolic
dances of honeybees, particularly what have been called waggle and round
dances.
44
The movements in these dances are used to indicate the precise
location of food from the hive, including directions to, distance from, and
desirability of food. Thus, some believe it to be more than a stereotyped be-
havior, especially due to its variability at different times. Pain, suffering, intel-
ligence, and social life are typically considered evidence of consciousness in
humans, and to the extent that animals exhibit these characteristics, they are
also conscious.
45
Any activities that require planning a long sequence of behaviors to achieve
a future goal would also be examples of conscious behavior.
46
Animals search-
ing for food provide evidence of at least simple conscious thinking because
searching involves decisions, since animals do not always know what objects
might provide food. This is not to say that the search for food is not instinctual
on some level, but the sometimes innovative ways in which animals go about
it indicate conscious thought and thereby conscious behavior. Predation in-
volves versatility in hunting for individual animals. Construction of artifacts,
especially shelters and structures, requires animals to adjust their behavior in
light of the materials available. This can be argued even in the case of birds
nest-building activity, which some behavioral ethologists want to argue is sim-
ply the result of genetic programming rather than intention or learning.
Beavers and their dam building indicate evidence of adapting their behavior to
circumstances and modifying their behavior when something is not working.
Some animals have exhibited tool use. One example is birds that drop stones
or other hard objects on eggs too strong to break with their beaks. Not all
primates use tools, but a number of them do, and there is considerable vari-
ability among individuals. Finally, deception has also been offered as an ex-
ample of intentional conscious behavior, although some have argued that de-
ception requires self-consciousness rather than consciousness.
47
In spite of the strong evidence (both theoretical and in terms of practical
examples) for the existence of consciousness in animals, some persist in ar-
guing against animal consciousness by proceeding in one of three ways. The
rst way is to simply deny consciousness to animals.
48
The only way to argue
against any presence of animal consciousness seems to be to hold to a strict
behaviorist view, which disallows subjective mental states in explanations of
behavior. As has been argued previously, it does not make sense to interpret
animal behavior so simplistically and so radically differently from how we in-
terpret human behavior. The second way is by linking consciousness with ra-
tional thought or language. The argument proceeds as follows: only humans
have rationality and language; rationality and language are necessary for con-
sciousness; therefore, only humans have consciousness. What is missing is
why there is a necessary connection between conscious thought and either
rationality or language. However, where this argument about other cognitive
criteria being required for consciousness often leads is the more common way
of proceeding on this issuenamely, to divide consciousness into different
types. Therefore, one could still argue that animals have some basic type of
consciousness, but it is far removed from the consciousness found in humans.
Those who argue in this way tend to believe that animals have consciousness
(awareness) but not self-consciousness (self-awareness).
49
Whereas conscious-
ness is generally understood as a capacity to experience sensations, self-
consciousness is sometimes distinguished by dening it as an ability to think
about the sensations experienced. It has also been dened as a creatures ability
to form mental concepts about the self. Self-consciousness seems to entail
being able to reect on ones own thoughts, thus making it a second-level
activity rather than a rst-level activity. Sometimes self-consciousness has been
specically linked with language possession.
50
There are two ways to respond
to the question of self-consciousness. The rst is to examine the question of
whether animals possess rationality and language, which is addressed in the
following two sections. The second is to look at examples of behavior typically
associated with self-consciousness to see if animals actually manifest behaviors
that can be explained only with reference to higher cognitive capacities.
Both deception and self-recognition are widely cited as evidence of self-
consciousness rather than mere consciousness. Numerous studies have dem-
onstrated that some species are indeed capable of deception. Although only a
couple of examples will be offered here, many others exist.
51
Deception can
include concealment, distraction, lying, and creating an image.
52
One common
example is found in certain bird species, in which the mother bird sometimes
animal minds 31
feigns a broken wing display and pretends to be hurt herself in order to distract
predators from her young. By dragging her pretended broken wing on the
ground, the bird is able to move the predator animal away from her vulnerable
young. If the preying animal attempts to catch her, she simply ies away and
returns to her young at a safer time. Many examples of deception have been
found in apes through observation of their behavior. Monkeys have been ob-
served concealing an erect penis to prohibit a more dominant male fromseeing
them courting a female. Some monkeys have purposely looked away from a
food source they alone knew about until they knew that their conspecics were
gone.
53
Self-recognition has not been as widely reported in other species as de-
ception has been (at least based on studies undertaken thus far), partly because
it is more difcult to test for. Self-recognition is believed to require awareness
of oneself at least at a minimum level. It is found in chimpanzees, although
not in all monkeys. One of the ways this is studied in monkeys is through the
use of videos or mirrors.
54
In experiments, anesthetized chimpanzees have
been painted with odorless markers in places they could not see without a
mirror (e.g., their foreheads). When they woke up and were given a mirror,
they immediately begin to touch the marks on their faces. Those animals not
given mirrors did not do so. Only humans, chimpanzees, bonobos, and orang-
utans have demonstrated this ability, although chimps reared in isolation did
not have this ability.
55
The signicance of this experiment is that chimps were
able to associate themselves with a mirror image of themselves, and not with
that of a different animal, suggesting some concept of a self.
56
In general, self-
consciousness is believed to be more likely to develop in highly social animals
raised normally than in solitary animals.
57
One way to address the issue of consciousness and self-consciousness is
to maintain that it is not necessary to posit two different kinds of consciousness
and instead that one should construct a continuum of levels of consciousness,
with simple consciousness and awareness at one end and a more complex
consciousness and awareness at the other end (perhaps something like self-
consciousness), in the most mentally complex animals, such as nonhuman
primates, but not necessarily limited to primates. One advantage of this ap-
proach is that it would eliminate dualistic thinkingthat consciousness or
even self-consciousness is an all-or-nothing categoryand the subsequent
problems associated with dualistic thinking. Instead, consciousness should be
viewed as possessed in different degrees by different animals. Even if it is
difcult to know where to draw the line in the phylogenetic scale in terms of
complexity of consciousness, this uncertainty should not prevent us from mak-
ing some judgments about the presence of consciousness in animals.
58
To speak of a continuum is, of course, to assume that animals do possess
consciousness. The evidence overwhelmingly supports this contention. Evo-
lutionary theory makes it unlikely that consciousness would suddenly emerge
in the human species, given the many other similarities between humans and
animals. Since the possession of consciousness is closely connected to the
possession of a nervous system, it seems, then, that one must postulate some
kind of consciousness for all animals with nervous systems. It is difcult to
understand how we can explain animal behavior if not by the presence of at
least some degree of consciousness. After all, all animals must make decisions,
communicate with their conspecics, engage in self-directed activities, and
modify their behavior in light of changes in their environmentall evidence
of consciousness that we would attribute to humans. In addition, if we do posit
a continuum, we undermine the argument that possession of consciousness
requires possession of rationality and language as well. Instead, possession of
rationality and language may simply indicate the presence of a higher form of
consciousness. However, even when we posit a continuum rather than a sharp
break, there are animals whose complexity of consciousness puts them quite
close to humans in this regard, especially animals typically believed to have
higher cognitive functions, such as primates, whales, and dolphins. It is also
possible, though, depending on how it is dened and which experiments are
done to explore this, that even other animals may have self-consciousness as
well. Ultimately, it gets down to a question of denition, and the way one
denes consciousness will determine not only which animals have it but also
to what degree they have it. Although some animals may possess higher levels
of consciousness than some humans, no animal may be likely to have self-
consciousness to the extent found in normal adult humans.
59
There is much at stake in the question of whether animals have conscious-
ness. Consciousness is often linked with experiences of pain and suffering. If
animals possess only the most rudimentary mental state of consciousness,
then the results can have an impact on our ethical views on and treatment of
animals, particularly in experimentation. But even if we agree that animals
possess consciousness, this does not answer the question of whether they have
more advanced mental states, which must be considered subsequently.
Rationality
Rationality Dened
The biggest difculty in addressing the question of rationality concerns the
denition. As with many other terms commonly associated with mental states,
how the word is dened will determine whether one can conclude that animals
possess it. Rationality differs from consciousness in that the latter is a broader
concept and tends to refer to mental processes as a whole, whereas rationality
is usually more narrowly dened and tends to refer to higher level cognitive
processes. There are basically two ways to dene rationality: one is by reducing
it to the particular components typically associated with it, and the other is by
dening it as a uniquely human capacity. Obviously, to dene it as a uniquely
human capacity excludes animals at the outset, which is therefore not really
helpful in understanding what rationality is. My position is that rationality can
best be understood or explained in terms of its component parts, that animals
possess it to the degree to which they possess these component parts, and that
rationality, as consciousness, is best understood as being on a continuum, with
animal minds 33
some creatures having greater degrees of rationality than others. In terms of
its component parts, rationality has often been associated with intelligence,
beliefs and desires, autonomy, and personhood. To argue that animals possess
rationality, then, it will be necessary to examine these components individually,
although it is not always easy to separate out what is meant by these terms,
which overlap and are interconnected.
At least since Aristotle, who believed that happiness consisted in the life
of reason, rationality has been considered by many to be the unique province
of humans.
60
John Stuart Mills dictum that it is better to be a human dissat-
ised rather than a pig satised captures the importance put on the higher
intellectual pleasures, of which rationality is the principal one and of which it
was believed that only humans were capable.
61
Thus, rationality became the
concept often used for the principal cognitive function that separates humans
from animals. Some have even dened rationality as the feature that sepa-
rates humans from animals; Jonathan Bennett specically dened rationality
as whatever it is that humans possess which marks them off, in respect of
intellectual capacity, sharply and importantly from all other known species.
62
Rationality thus understood encompasses the ability to reason, and many who
attribute consciousness to animals are reluctant to attribute rationality to them.
To dene rationality as that which belongs only to humans empties it of
any specic content. Another possible way of distinguishing between human
and animal rationality is by dividing rationality into different types, as is often
done in distinguishing between consciousness and self-consciousness. Thus,
the higher level denition of rationality includes the ability to engage in
higher level reasoning, such as constructing and following complex chains of
reasoning (this typically depends upon language possession); a lower sense
would include adjustment in behavior to the demands in ones environment,
and it can be found in humans and animals.
63
However, the more common
way of dening rationality is by viewing it as an all-or-nothing category, and
humans are then believed to possess rationality because they have the ability
to evaluate reasons as better or worse, they can detach themselves from their
desires, they can imagine alternative realistic futures, and they can make true
practical judgments about a variety of kinds of goods.
64
There are a number of problems with dening rationality as something
possessed by humans but not animals. First, not all humans possess rationality.
If some humans do not possess it, then we cannot make it the dening feature
of the human. Second, if rationality is understood in terms of its component
parts and animals can be demonstrated to possess these characteristics, then
not only do some humans lack rationality but also some animals possess
greater degrees of rationality than these humans. Third, it is not helpful to
dene a term as something humans have and animals lack, without specifying
more exactly what constitutes it. However, even when this is done, such as
when rationality is associated with, for example, being able to follow a complex
line of reasoning, studies on some species indicate that they may be capable
of these higher level capacities. Again, one does not have to argue that ration-
ality is an all-or-nothing category but simply that it is possessed in degrees.
Finally, there are problems with correlating rationality with language posses-
sion. The argument usually proceeds as follows: language and rationality are
interconnected; only humans possess language; therefore, only humans pos-
sess rationality. This way of arguing typically excludes animals at the outset,
because it assumes that human language and animal communication are dif-
ferent things.
65
In addition, it also excludes humans not capable of language.
Intelligence
In everyday morality and traditional moral philosophy, rationality and reason
have usually been understood to mean normal adult human intelligence, which
by denition excludes animals.
66
The question then becomes how intelli-
gence is dened. Intelligence is often understood as an ability to respond to
problematic situations, in which more than one response can be given. It usu-
ally encompasses the notion of learning and thinking. However, as with some
of the other mental concepts, intelligence has also been narrowly dened as
being evidenced by the possession of language.
67
Instead of this narrow un-
derstanding of intelligence, it is best understood as the capacity to learn and
to respond in novel ways to new situations. By this denition, if rationality is
understood as intelligence or if intelligence is at least one component of ra-
tionality, then animals have at least lower levels of rationality because they
possess some intelligence.
There is considerable evidence for the existence of animal intelligence.
Virtually no one would deny that animals display some degree of intelligence,
especially if the denition excludes the possession of language. It is interesting
to note that both David Hume and Charles Darwin attributed the capacity to
reason to animals because their ability to adapt to changing circumstances
suggests that their behavior goes beyond mere instinctual response. An ex-
ample of animal reasoning, or intelligence, at least on a lower level, is an
attempt to obtain food by a series of complex novel moves that were never
before learned or used.
68
This adaptation to often unpredictable circumstances,
common among birds and mammals, has often been considered as evidence
of intelligence.
69
In addition, in many different settings, humans teach animals
a number of things with the expectation that animals can learn; for example,
we instruct dogs on how to behave, we train horses for riding, and we teach
animals to perform tricks for entertainment. Even many elds of scientic
study (although not all), such as cognitive ethology and psychology, are com-
mitted to the notion that animals have intelligence and can learn. Many ex-
periments in learning are conducted on animals, utilizing positive and negative
reinforcement. It is assumed that animals are able to learn, and the experi-
ments are often undertaken to determine how animals do learn and what
features in their environments help them learn better, usually with the inten-
tion of better understanding how humans learn. Many learning experiments
are carried out on animals: mazes for rats and mice test how quickly they can
learn where the food is; language is studied with apes and dolphins, and con-
ceptual abstraction in pigeons and seals; octopuses are observed to see if they
animal minds 35
can learn behavior by observing another octopus open a jar (they can). Learning
is evidenced partly by the fact that animals can learn and demonstrate what is
being taught to them, as well as by their ability to distinguish between reward
and punishment and to associate the punishment signal with the unpleasant
experience that follows.
70
When it comes to intelligence, especially when it is correlated with ration-
ality, two arguments are generally brought against its possession by animals.
The rst argument is that animals are moved only by instinct.
71
The second
argument is that animal intelligence is much inferior to human intelligence
so inferior as to be a difference in kind. The rst argument can be easily
challenged on a number of grounds. If animals are moved only by instinct,
then it makes no sense to study their behavior, particularly in psychology and
learning experiments, because it will not at all help us understand humans
better, unless one believes that all human behavior is instinctual as well. Also,
if animals are moved only by instinct, then how can we explain their ability to
make innovations when faced with novel features in their environment? Fi-
nally, how can we explain the behavior, for example, of the octopus, who we
can certainly say is not programmed to know how to open jars, something he
would never ordinarily nd in his environment, unless he learned it from
another conspecic?
The second argument, that animal intelligence is greatly inferior to human
intelligence, is not necessarily a controversial one, and it is an argument that
has some validity. Obviously, humans are far superior to animals in their learn-
ing ability, adaptability to new circumstances, and ability to engage in abstract
thought. Recently, however, there has been criticism even of intelligence tests
designed for humans because they are believed to judge only one type of in-
telligence. The development of EQ tests for humans, designed to measure
emotional intelligence, demonstrates that there may be more to human intel-
ligence than simply IQ scores.
72
When it comes to animals, assessing intelli-
gence becomes even more problematic, most notably because the criteria are
created by people (e.g., experimenters and statisticians) to evidence a particular
kind of intelligencehuman intelligence.
73
It is probably inevitable that we
humans can test only for the kind of intelligence with which we are familiar.
There is the further problem of how to scale animal intelligence. The belief
that some species are smarter than others has been subject to criticism on the
grounds that each species is smart in its own way and in what is necessary for
it to survive and thrive as a particular species.
74
Thus, in some ways it is difcult
to say simply that one species is superior to another in an absolute way. Even
though animal intelligence is inferior to human intelligence, we again run into
the problem of marginal humans, some of whom have lesser degrees of
human intelligence than do some animals.
75
There are certainly some humans
who cannot be taught to navigate a maze as well as a rodent. However, although
intelligence exists on a continuum, with some animals closer to the level of
human intelligence than others, clearly the intellectual capacities of normal
humans are superior to those of animals, at least in terms of the typical human
understanding of intelligence.
What, then, can we conclude about animal intelligence? First, intelligence
is not an all-or-nothing category. If dened as the ability to learn, think, and
adapt to new situations, it at least commits us to the idea that animals have
some intelligence, even if most have considerably less intelligence than do
humans. Thus, like some of the other mental states, it is best to see it as existing
on a continuum. Second, the argument that there are different kinds of intel-
ligence is a compelling one. Thus, to compare and rate species according to
some arbitrary measuring point will certainly do injustice to animal species,
while allowing humans to have their superiority remain unchallenged. This
does not commit one to the position that humans are not mentally superior to
animals in many ways, but it allows the reverse argument to be truethat
different animal species can be superior to a comparatively small number of
humans in different ways. Finally, the use of animals in experiments under-
scores the notion that we do believe that they can learn and that their learning
can be applicable to humans. Thus, how rats learn in a maze is not generally
undertaken with the intent of understanding rats better but of better under-
standing how humans think and learn. Of course, to assert that animals do
have intelligence, which at the very least means that they operate on a more
complex basis than mere instinct, still does not necessarily commit one to the
notion that animals have rationality in the same way as do normal adult hu-
mans, but at least it commits one to the belief that animals have at least a
lower level rationality and that some animals have greater intelligence, and
hence rationality, than some humans. However, with regard to the issue of
multiple intelligences, it is not even necessary to state too strongly that humans
are absolutely intellectually superior to animals.
Beliefs and Desires
In addition to intelligence, beliefs and desires have also been associated with
rationality. Beliefs and desires tend to be distinguished, although there is a
relationship between them. They are both considered key components of con-
sciousness, as well as of rationality.
76
Taken together, beliefs and desires form
reasons for actions. They are related to rationality because we often explain an
animals behavior as the animal wanting (desiring) certain things and then
taking steps to get what she wants or desires.
77
Whether or not we believe that
animals have beliefs and desires largely depends upon how they are dened.
My contention is that animals have at least simple desires and beliefs.
Desires are generally believed to precede beliefs,
78
although sometimes
desires can arise by the interaction of beliefs with other desires. Thus, it may
be possible for a creature to have desires but not beliefs.
79
Desires are generally
understood as having an affective component that suggests caring about some-
thing. They are linked with concepts such as wants and preferences. A creature
is said to have desires if she is disposed to bring something about and to have
some pleasant or unpleasant feelings, depending on her success or failure in
attaining the objective. Desires can arise from deprivation, from avoiding pain-
ful stimuli, and by the interaction of beliefs with other desires. For example,
animal minds 37
if in the course of an experiment an animal is deprived of food and attempts
to get food, we can say she desires food; if we subject the animal to a painful
stimulus and she pulls away, we can say that she desires to avoid the stimulus.
Simple desires that can be attributed to animals in general include the desire
for food and water, the desire for mobility, and the desire to be free from pain.
In addition, there are simple desires that are species-specic; for example, cats
desire to lie in the sun, horses desire to snack on carrots, and pigs desire a
dry, clean environment (contrary to popular opinion). To argue that animals
have these simple desires is simply to say that animals want to engage in
this behavior or to be in a particular kind of environment if given a choice (or,
in the case of harmful outcomes or environments, to avoid them).
One way that the notion that animals have desires has been challenged
has been by dividing desires into two types: lower level desires and higher level
desires. Thus, the way that one denes desires determines if in fact desires
are present in animals. Like the distinctions between other such pairs of con-
cepts, lower desires are sometimes believed to exist in animals but not the
higher desires. It is not necessary to argue that animals have higher level
desires. It seems logical to assume that animals have desires, at least on a
simple level. It is difcult to explain animal behavior if we do not allow that
they have desires. For example, if our dog is whining at the door with his leash
in his mouth, we assume that the animal wants or desires to go out. If
indeed the dog has this desire, then this desire can be thwarted, and thus we
may be harming him if we deprive him of what he desires (although of course
there are times we must do this for his own good). As with consciousness,
rationality in general, and intelligence in particular, it is probably best to think
of desires as being along a continuum rather than as an either/or, with all
animals having at least simple desires, with some animals possessing higher
level desires, and with some animals having these desires to a greater degree
than do some humans.
To grant that animals have desires still falls short of granting them beliefs,
which are considered a higher level cognitive ability. Beliefs are often under-
stood as having propositional content, as interacting with desires to produce
action, and as being representations of the way things are perceived to be.
80
Beliefs have been analyzed in two different ways. The rst way is understand-
ing beliefs as mental representations, which can be triggered by internal and
external events. It is likely that animals at least have simple beliefs in light of
this denition.
81
Empirical evidence from animal learning demonstrates ani-
mal belief, because learning often requires acquiring new beliefs.
82
An example
is a rat winding its way through a maze to nd a piece of cheese. If turning to
the left at a certain point leads the rat into a blind alley, and the next time the
rat turns the other way and continues to do so on subsequent trials, what
explanation can we offer for its behavior except to say that the rat believes that
the cheese is to the right? However, there is considerable reluctance to attribute
even simple beliefs like these to animals lower on the phylogenetic scale.
83
Like
arguments for other cognitive criteria, the argument from analogy with hu-
mans also compels us to at least consider the possibility that beliefs exist in
animals. Beliefs in humans are thought to arise from perception, inference,
and other beliefs, and it is likely that beliefs similarly arise in animals.
However, the way beliefs are generally denied to animals is by understand-
ing beliefs as objects, such as sentences or propositions. This means that be-
liefs are sentence-likethat to believe something is to be able to put it in the
form of a proposition. Thus, there must be propositional content to the belief.
This understanding of beliefs generally entails the possession of language, and
therefore on this understanding animals probably do not have them, unless
we believe that animals have language.
84
Therefore, if we cannot attribute con-
tent to belief, then it cannot be a belief,
85
and no matter how much we study
animals, we will not be able to attribute content to their belief. In addition, not
having language precludes animals from having beliefs. The behaviorist argues
that animal behavior can be understood as unthinking, knee-jerk reactions
without reference to beliefs.
86
In addition, the possession of beliefs has also
been tied in with having a soul, and since it is not generally accepted that
animals have the latter, they cannot have the former.
87
To adhere to the more
restrictive view that entails language possession is to dene it specically to
exclude animalsand also some humans (e.g., infants). This is an overly nar-
row view; common sense dictates that animals have beliefs at least on the lower
denition. If one denies this, then one is committed to a strictly behaviorist
view, which, for reasons cited earlier, is not very convincing.
To go back to the example of the dog at the door: to say that a dog has a
belief in terms of a mental representation, which is being argued, is to say that
the animal has some understanding of in and out and at a particular time has
a preference to be out rather than in (for whatever reason). On the other hand,
to say that a dog has this belief in terms of a proposition is to say that when the
dog whines at the door, he is literally thinking in sentences and could put the
desire in the form of a proposition. It is not necessary to argue this way with
regard to animal belief, and all that this argument succeeds in doing is sug-
gesting that perhaps the ability to put beliefs in the form of propositions is the
way that humans express their beliefs. However, even if that is the case, this
does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that humans have higher level
beliefs than do animals, although we can probably safely assume that they do,
and it is also problematic with regard to those humans who do not have lan-
guage. In response to the argument from language, even human language is
at best an approximation of human thought; there cannot be an absolute cor-
respondence between thought and language. Another way of arguing against
animals possession of beliefs is by making a distinction between rst-order
and second-order beliefs. However, it leaves us with the same problem as the
argument from distinguishing between beliefs that do and do not have prop-
ositional content. Thus, we can conclude that animals have at least rudimentary
desires and beliefs, which, even if they are at a signicantly lower level than
most humans, commits us to caring about their mental states and compels us
to take them into account in experimentation when we subject them to pro-
cedures that may adversely affect their mental states.
animal minds 39
Autonomy and Personhood
The terms autonomy and personhood, particularly the latter, often come
up with regard to animals.
88
These terms are especially problematic because
they are even more difcult to dene than some of the terms already consid-
ered, although it is still important to address them. My argument is that, de-
pending on how the terms are dened, animals can be said to possess at least
a weaker sense of autonomy; that although personhood is not an especially
helpful category, some animals can be considered persons, depending on how
it is dened; that both concepts should best be understood as occurring on a
continuum; and that neither is as important as the previously considered cri-
teria of consciousness, beliefs, desires, and intelligence.
One way in which autonomy can be considered important for the issue of
animal experimentation is that we can raise the question of whether we are
violating an animals autonomy when we use him in an experiment. As with
so many other terms, though, how the term is dened determines whether
animals even possess autonomy. One of the problems with dening auton-
omy and with establishing it empirically is that, like the concept of conscious-
ness, autonomy cannot be directly observed or measured in the same way as
can intelligence, for example.
89
Autonomy carries with it the notions of self-governance and self-direction.
We believe an autonomous being is capable of freely making her own decisions
and should be allowed to do so without undue interference from others. We
are said to respect the autonomy of others if we refuse to be paternalistic and
trust that they can make good decisions without our assistance.
90
To deny a
being autonomy, or to violate his autonomy, is to in some sense make decisions
for him, ostensibly believing that we know what is best for him. In human
experimentation, for example, we respect the autonomy of the experimental
subject by requiring informed consent as an essential part of the process for
engaging in an experiment. Heavy criticism has been leveled in the past toward
researchers who experimented on humans without their knowledge, partly be-
cause it was considered a violation of their rights but also because it was con-
sidered an infringement on their autonomy. However, animals cannot consent
in the same way, and therefore we can ask that, if animals do have some kind
of autonomy, are we justied in using them against their will in experiments?
If they do not possess autonomy, then it may be easier to justify their use in
experimentation. However, this assumes that the human experimenter knows
what is best for the animal subject, which is not always so obvious, especially
when the principal justication for animal experimentation is that it is for the
benet of humans and not for the benet of the particular experimental animal.
Of course, to be able to violate an animals autonomy by utilizing her in ex-
perimentation assumes that she has an autonomy that can be interfered with.
In what sense, then, can we say that an animal has autonomy? If autonomy,
as dened here, includes the notion of self-governance and self-direction, and
if, as has been argued previously, that animal behavior goes beyond the level
of instinctual response, then animals certainly have a weak sense of autonomy.
A weak sense of autonomy would simply suggest the ability to act on the basis
of ones own desires, preferences, or beliefs. Thus, dogs could be said to be
autonomous, but you could not say the same for rocks, for example. Of course,
this does not mean that animals have autonomy in the same sense as do
humans; obviously, humans have a stronger sense of autonomy, which places
severe restrictions on what we can do to them. If we believe that we violate the
autonomy of humans when we do things to them to which they would not
consent, then the same argument can be made with regard to animals, at least
in a restricted sense. We believe that autonomous beings have the right to be
free from undue interference from others. Of course, it is problematic to dene
exactly what one means by undue, since there are even times when we believe
it justied to infringe on the autonomy of human beings, such as requiring
citizens to obey the law and conning them when they are found guilty of
committing a crime. However, we are still committed to the notion that in-
fringement of autonomy, most often understood as infringement of rights,
should be the exception rather than the rule. When it comes to animals,
though, it can certainly be argued that we are infringing on their autonomy
when we utilize them for experiments, especially without serious consideration
for their well-being or for their choice. It is not farfetched to assume that
animals who were given a choice would prefer life outside a cage to life inside
or that social animals would prefer a life with conspecics to one without them.
This is not to say, though, that animals cannot be utilized in experiments
because they have autonomy, even if just in a weak sense. Whether and to what
extent an animals autonomy can be infringed on needs to be addressed in
relation to animal rights and a burden/benet analysis, but, at least prelimi-
narily, we can conclude that animals do possess at least a weaker sense of
autonomy and that this should at the very least put some restrictions on what
we can do to them in experimentation.
Those arguing against animals possession of autonomy require a high
level of rationality, which often includes reasoning ability, intelligence, and
beliefs. As with the other mental concepts, autonomy has also been linked with
language possession and is sometimes considered necessary for the posses-
sion of rights.
91
A strong sense of autonomy includes the notion of self-
determination, including the ability to choose between clearly understood
alternatives and to understand ones choices in light of these alternatives.
92
In
this latter sense, then, only humans can be considered autonomous. Of course,
one can simply agree that humans have autonomy in a way that animals do
not, so that, as is often the case with the concept of rationality, it is dened to
exclude animals by denition. However, one of the problems with this ap-
proach is the same one that is a problem with regard to other high-level de-
nitions of cognitionthat some humans lack them and a number of animals
possess them. Thus, while there may be levels of autonomy that normal adult
humans possess and all animals lack, it is best to view autonomy as being on
a continuum. There are certainly some animals with higher cognitive func-
tioning whose autonomy is close to that of humansand sometimes even
surpassing that of some humans. However, because autonomy is not a directly
animal minds 41
observable quality, because it is difcult to come up with a precise denition
of what it is, because its stronger denition excludes some humans, and be-
cause it ultimately does not change the fact that animals do demonstrate at
least lower level intelligence, desires, and beliefs, then the presence or absence
of autonomy in animals does not need to be a signicant factor in our consid-
eration of whether and in what ways we experiment upon them. But even if it
can be demonstrated that all animals lack autonomy in the sense that humans
have it, one can still maintain that a weak sense of autonomy is all that is
necessary for animals to be given greater consideration in their treatment as
experimental subjectsalthough not in most cases the same kind of consid-
eration we give to humans.
The issue of autonomy is closely linked with that of personhood. Some-
times when distinctions among creatures are attempted, instead of pointing to
specic criteria, the general notion of personhood is introduced, although this
notion often includes the possession of particular criteria in its denition. The
question of personhood often comes up in biomedical ethical discussions, par-
ticularly with regard to abortion and euthanasia, and the question is sometimes
raised as to whether a fetus or a comatose individual is a person. In regard to
animal experimentation, the question becomes how we can justify doing ex-
periments on animals that may be persons and yet exempt humans who may
not be persons. The ultimate question then becomes, Is a human being the
same as a person? The answer may seem to be obviously yes, but that is not
necessarily the case; it all depends on how one denes person. Like all of the
other terms considered, one of the problems is that there is no agreed-on
denition for this term.
93
Virtually everyone would agree on what a human being is. If a person
or potential person has been born to human beings and looks like a human
being, then he is considered a human being, regardless of whether he has
deformities (physical or mental) that might distinguish him from more nor-
mal humans. Thus, human being and member of the species Homo sap-
iens are really synonymous.
94
On this denition, animals are obviously ex-
cluded; animals are not human beings.
The key way in which persons are distinguished from human beings is by
dening person in terms of the possession of specic criteria, rather than by
simply equating a person with a human being. The term person has often
been dened in terms of higher level rational capacities. Thus, Kant dened a
person as a rational being, endowed with dignity and worthy of respect, who
was to be treated only as an end in herself and not as a means to the ends of
others.
95
The term person usually includes the notions of self-consciousness
and awareness.
96
The attribution of personhood usually carries with it the de-
notation of a certain status. Thus, to be a person is to be a being whose interests
are respected because she is believed capable of suffering harms and who is
deemed worthy of moral consideration. The notion of personhood is often
integrally related to the notion of rights, in the sense that some argue that only
persons have rights.
97
But then two questions arise: rst, are there some human beings who are
not persons; second, can animals be persons? It is beyond the scope of this
work to address these questions in detail, so just a few brief comments are in
order. In both cases, it all depends on how one denes person. With regard
to the rst question, the issue of personhood is often raised in biomedical
discussions with reference to marginal humans in an attempt to distinguish
treatment among individuals or among certain groups of individuals. At times
it may be important to distinguish treatment in certain cases between marginal
humans and normal adult humans, so that the treatment afforded to fully
autonomous persons probably should, at least in some conict cases, be dif-
ferent from and perhaps superior to that afforded to individuals in permanent
vegetative or comatose states, for example. However, since personhood is re-
lated to moral status, and since the lack of denotation of personhood tends to
reduce the moral status of the individuals so designated, it makes me uncom-
fortable to designate any humans as nonpersons. It seems that utilizing such
language could result in devaluing the lives of these marginal humans, and it
is my contention that marginal humans are vulnerable populations who should
be given extra protection. Thus, while designating such humans as nonpersons
may be a convenient shorthand language at times, it is best avoided. Instead,
it would be better to simply view these individuals as humans with lesser
capacities than normal humans.
With regard to the second question, some animals can be persons insofar
as they t the denition proffered. There is also the additional point that we
do not know enough about the nature of many animals mental lives to simply
dismiss the notion that they can be persons. However, if personhood is de-
ned as by Kant and typically understood in light of Kants perception that
animals exist as means to human ends, then no animals could be persons. If
personhood is dened in terms of some higher cognitive capacities, though,
and if cognitive capacities are viewed on a continuum, then perhaps animals
such as whales, dolphins, and primates (typically considered the most intelli-
gent animals) could be considered persons. One of the advantages of desig-
nating certain animals as persons is that it does make sense that animals who
have higher rational capacities should be afforded greater protection than those
that do not, all other factors being equal. Of course, it is not always easy to
know where to draw the line in terms of personhood for animalsperhaps
there are other animals that should be included as well. There are certainly
legal advantages to attributing the status of personhood to animals; at the very
least, it would provide them with rights. However, aside from the obvious
advantages to considering some animals persons, the corollary must follow
that there are some humans who may not be persons. It seems best to desig-
nate all humans as persons and perhaps a few animals as persons, but it still
seems preferable to simply acknowledge that there is a continuum in terms of
specic cognitive states, which some animals have to a greater degree than do
a few humans.
There are a number of problems with the term personhood that make
it not especially helpful, whether with regard to humans or to animals. While
it can be a useful term in discussing medical ethical issues at times, the reason
animal minds 43
for introducing it in relation to humans generally has to do with trying to nd
a way to treat differently those humans not considered persons, such as mar-
ginal humans. The reason for introducing it with regard to animals is that,
depending on ones argument, either animals are not persons because they
lack the requisite criteria or animals are persons because they have the requisite
criteria to a higher degree than do some humans. Both reasons can be prob-
lematic. With regard to humans, dening persons as those who possess
higher cognitive criteria can result in marginalizing those humans not believed
to be persons. With regard to animals, even if some animals do possess the
criteria needed for personhood, it does not help those animal species not des-
ignated as persons. However, in both cases, since personhood is a general
term by denition including possession of some of the criteria looked at earlier,
one is still forced back to consider questions of what it means to have con-
sciousness, rationality, intelligence, and the like. In other words, to assert that
a creature is a person depends on having a clear denition of what character-
istics one must possess to qualify as a person. Therefore, it is not very helpful
to make personhood the distinguishing characteristic for different treatment,
and in fact, when it is introduced into the discussion, it seems only to muddy
the ethical waters. In addition, it might sound odd to talk about a particular
animal as being a person and subsequently some humans as not being per-
sons, although that may simply be due to linguistic custom.
98
While the term
personhood may be a convenient shorthand way of dening a being with the
characteristics described here, it seems better to continue the discussion in
light of the specic criteria.
99
Language
Language and rationality have been integrally linked in such a way that some
believe language to be the evidence of rationality; some even say that it is a
precondition of rationality. Thus, even if animals can be shown to possess
rationality, intelligence, beliefs, desires, autonomy, and personhood, the nal
line of distinction between humans and animals is often drawn on the basis
of language possession. Language possession thus is sometimes considered
the most important distinguishing criterion between humans and animals.
100
Some of the lower level cognitive functions, such as consciousness, are
not believed to be integrally connected to language, but many of the higher
level cognitive functions (e.g., rationality, beliefs) are.
101
The necessary rela-
tionship between language and higher cognitive concepts is generally posited
by those who want to deny to animals possession of any of these concepts.
However, rather than trying to untangle the interrelatedness of language and
these other concepts, the focus here will be on language itself, independent of
any other criterion.
The rst problem when it comes to language is in knowing how to dene
it, and obviously how one denes it will determine whether one believes that
animals possess it. There are two principal ways of understanding language:
language as communication and language as cognition. My contention is that
animals possess language in at least a communicative sense; that this com-
munication is analogous to human language, in that it serves the same func-
tion, namely, the ability to negotiate in ones world, by making oneself under-
stood and by strengthening social bonds;
102
and, in addition, that some animals
communicate in a cognitive way. In general, though, the linguistic abilities of
animals are inferior to those of normal humans.
To maintain that animals communicate, it is necessary to dene com-
munication. Communication occurs when there is a transfer of information
between two individuals (or between groups of individuals) through the use of
signals; the receiver gains and understands the information that the sender
deliberately means to communicate.
103
It is not controversial to maintain that
animals communicate; how the communication is understood is where the
controversy comes in. It is possible to understand animal communication as
a stimulus response to an immediate circumstance, thereby not involving a
higher level, second-order activity. However, since it has already been demon-
strated that animals act from more than mere instinct, it is not necessary to
belabor this point. In addition, numerous studies have demonstrated that an-
imals use verbal (and nonverbal) communication to inuence the behavior of
conspecics and to communicate about important matters, such as the location
of food and the presence of predators. Even if communication is understood
as operating just at this simple level, it can be argued that animal communi-
cation is analogous to human language.
104
This does not mean that human
language does not have some features lacking in animal communication, such
as the ability to engage in abstract reasoning. However, the point is that the
principal use of communication, or language, is to make oneself known to and
understand conspecics and to be able to function in ones world as a result.
Animals are certainly able to do this through their communication systems.
However, to say that animal communication is analogous to human lan-
guage is still a far cry from saying that it is actually a language and thereby
comparable in sophistication to human communication. Just because an ani-
mal may appear to be using a language, though, does not mean that he is
actually using a language.
105
Thus, those who want to deny language ability to
animals typically do it by understanding it as a cognitive function, so that
language becomes a uniquely human capacity. Language is thus thought to be
cognitive rather than communicative.
106
To the extent that animals lack cog-
nition, then, they also lack language. If we dene language as cognitive (as
do most scientists), then we need to ask the further question: what are the
characteristics or features of a form of communication that make it specically
cognitive?
The common characteristics typically associated with cognitive language
possession are a vocabulary (including a stock of words and a stock of expres-
sions, some of which consist of a string of words), a syntax (a set of rules for
combining expressions and words to make sentences), specic types of ex-
pressions (including names, denite descriptions, predicates, quantiers, de-
monstratives, and pronouns), the ability to perform speech acts, and the ability
animal minds 45
to perform certain linguistic tasks through the use of speech acts (for example,
to know that one expresses a doubt by asking a question).
107
In this understand-
ing, to speak a language implies the ability to put together expressions or words
in a grammatically correct and meaningful way, the ability to understand the
proper way of communicating what one needs to (and to receive communi-
cation from others as well), and the ability to engage in speech acts. Some
other characteristics evidencing linguistic communication are tensed expres-
sions (indicating the past, present, and future), words indicating spatially re-
mote states of affairs (e.g., the cat is down the street), and expressions as-
serting principles.
108
Whereas communication does involve the successful
transmission of information from one animal to another, what makes com-
munication cognitive is generally the use of syntax, particularly that found in
human grammar. Even if one acknowledges that perhaps some animals do
possess some kind of language, this does not necessarily mean that one must
maintain that animal language is of the same kind as human language. In
other words, not only is it possible to argue that human language is consid-
erably more complex, versatile, and subtle than animal language
109
but also it
is likely to be the case.
There are basically two ways of determining whether animals have lan-
guage, both of which involve studying animals. The rst is to study animals
in traditional ways to attempt to understand if and how they categorize, for-
mulate concepts, and link ideas. This is a roundabout way to study language
by examining the attendant cognitive capacities believed to be integrally linked
to cognitive language possession. Language as communication has been stud-
ied in numerous animal species; some of the more common studies focus on
honeybees, parrots, dolphins,
110
and apes. A second and especially important
way to study animal language is by attempting to teach animals our system of
language study.
111
The signicance of this kind of study is obvious: if animals
can communicate in human language with humans, then we must concede
that they do possess human language capabilitythat is, a cognitive type of
language. The focus here will be on the latter type of study, because it directly
studies language ability.
Some of the most signicant work has been done with bonobos, chim-
panzees, gorillas, and orangutans. Ape language experiments began in earnest
in the 1970s.
112
There have been several different approaches utilized and cri-
tiques of these approaches as well. The rst is the attempt to train apes to
vocalize spoken English. Not much effort has been expended here, because
apes are able to vocalize only a very few words with very great effort, probably
because they lack the vocal apparatus necessary for human speech. One indi-
cation for this is that one chimpanzee used her ngers to hold her lips in the
proper position as she tried to mouth particular words.
113
It may be possible
that chimps are capable of advanced communication, but because their anat-
omy and physiology may severely limit their ability to communicate in a human
manner, the use of gestures is a more comfortable way to communicate than
vocally.
114
The second method is teaching apes Amelsan, or American sign
language for the deaf, by means of which some apes have apparently learned
hundreds of words. The third method is by using plastic symbols to represent
words, and the fourth method is called the Lana project, which has apes
press keys to produce strings of symbols.
115
The Lana project was developed at
the Yerkes Primate Center, where a computerized keyboard was invented that
displayed a number of arbitrary signs known as lexigrams.
116
It was named
after Lana, the rst chimpanzee to use it.
117
In all of these studies, human
trainers usually present animals with questions in the form in which the lan-
guage is being studied (for example, sign language is used by the human
trainer to get a response in sign language from the apes). It is probably by
means of sign language that the greatest strides have been made, such that
some apes have achieved the language ability of a small child, considered to
be a signicant feat by virtually everyone. Before these studies were under-
taken, nearly no one believed that animals could learn human language at all.
118
The most common and impressive example often offered in the literature
is Koko and Michael, the worlds only signing gorillas, who eventually became
companions (Michael died in 2001). At the age of twenty-seven, Michael was
believed to know ve hundred signs. Although no one had taught Koko En-
glish, by 1993 she understood several thousand English words. In addition to
learning words, she was able to invent new words (for example, using two
signs to create a symbol for a word she did not previously know). Her IQ
consistently measured between 70 and 95 on human intelligence tests, thus
placing her in the below average but not retarded range.
119
There are similar
accounts of language acquisition by Washoe as well.
120
In spite of the advances made in ape studies, they have been subject to a
number of criticisms, primarily by those who want to deny cognitive language
possession to animals. One is that simply because an ape can identify an object
by reference to a particular word does not mean that she is able to understand
syntax; thus, labeling items is not the same as grammatical construction and
understanding concepts. In addition, some have dismissed the language-like
behavior of apes because it is much simpler than human language and because
it lacks the spontaneity and creativity of human language.
121
Others maintain
that apes are not able to lie; if they are not able to lie, then they are not able to
assert anything; if they cannot assert anything, then they do not have language.
However, as was demonstrated earlier, apes are certainly capable of deception,
which is certainly a form of a lie, even if not a verbal one. Thus, apes are able
to lie nonverbally. In addition, the level of language of those apes who have
learned it is criticized because it has never gotten beyond the level of a young
child.
122
Of course, this is quite a signicant feat in and of itself (especially
because for many years it was not believed possible) and raises the question
again of marginal humans who do not have language.
Another strong criticism is that the human trainers are inadvertently
cueing the subjects, either through natural movements or facial expressions,
thereby undermining the animals ability to engage in linguistic behavior. This
has been called the Clever Hans phenomenon.
123
The trainers are not generally
accused of intentionally trying to manipulate the situation; rather, they may be
just so eager for the expected results that they may see them where they do
animal minds 47
not exist. This is a valid criticism that may be impossible to completely elimi-
nate, but it is also possible to apply this criticism to adult humans attempting
to teach language to young children. But even if inadvertent cueing does some-
times take place in using sign language with apes, some dolphin trainers have
avoided this criticism by using only their hands and by masking their faces so
as not to cue inadvertently through eye contact as they train dolphins to re-
spond to complex commands. In addition to understanding simple commands
in this way, dolphins have demonstrated their ability to understand syntax by
differentiating between two commands that use the exact same words in a
different order.
124
If indeed some animals are able to understand and manip-
ulate human grammatical syntax properly, this undermines the argument that
animal language is not cognitive or is not similar to human languageat least
the language of some primates and dolphins can be said to be cognitive, even
if they lack the human vocal apparatus.
Of course, perhaps a more obvious reason for the apparent lack of success
in ape studies is that the animals may not be interested in communicating
with humans about the things we want them to communicate.
125
Apes may
not share the same worldview as do humans and hence cannot communicate
in a meaningful way with humans.
126
In addition, some of the descriptions of
ape studies suggest that the animals found the repetition of naming tests to
be boring and frustrating.
127
Of course, we could probably learn a lot more
about ape language if, instead of devising laboratory situations for the study
of language in which apes are taught to communicate with humans in human
language, humans instead went into the forest and listened to the animals.
128
In spite of the criticisms and problems in ape language studies, though, no
one is suggesting that something signicant has not been achieved, since some
apes are able to at least learn rudimentary communication with humans on
the basis of human language. Therefore, ape language studies will probably
continue, with some deliberate intent to work on the methodological problems
mentioned here.
In some ways, the benets of cognitive language have been greatly exag-
gerated. Language is not necessary for communication, since communication,
even among humans, can happen nonverbally or through nonlinguistic vocal-
izations. In fact, humans can communicate with other humans without the
benet of a shared language.
129
If animals such as dolphins and apes can dem-
onstrate that they understand syntax and can even create new words, then they
are engaging in something much more considerable than simply lower level
communicationnamely, a cognitive type of language. In addition, Wittgen-
steins oft-quoted aphorism that if the lion could talk, we could not understand
him is implausible, since most cat owners understand the lions domestic
cousin without any problem.
130
In this regard, most of the domestic animals
in relationship with humans seem able to make themselves understood to their
human companions, as we are often able to make ourselves understood to
them. Making oneself understood is not synonymous with talking, but the
signicant fact is that communication is taking place.
131
The question of lan-
guage also raises the problematic question noted earlier: What about those
humans who do not possess language? Finally, the arguments against posses-
sion of language in animals seem to be integrally linked with the notion of
human language. Why is human language the only criterion we will accept
that animals have language? In this sense, then, language again is dened as
something that humans have and animals lack, which simply becomes a cir-
cular argument. However, all of the foregoing does not forestall the importance
of human language. It is the principal means by which humans communicate
with each other, and the cognitive component of language enables humans to
communicate on a number of levels, including discussion of abstract concepts,
something animals are generally not considered capable of. Thus, while the
benets of human language may sometimes be exaggerated and force an un-
necessary boundary between humans and animals, the signicance of human
language cannot be easily dismissed.
The issue of language possession also raises the question of consent,
which was mentioned earlier in the discussion on human experimentation.
One obvious advantage of language is that it provides one with the means to
indicate verbally that one does not want to participate in the action at hand. If
one does not have language, then one may lose that advantage. However, an
example of nonverbal nonconsent can be observed in the following case: let us
say that an experimenter is using cats in sleep-deprivation experiments, which
involve implanting electrodes in their brains, placing them in restraining ap-
paratuses, and hooking them up to devices that deliver painful shocks when-
ever they fall asleep. If when the experimenter goes to get a cat for the exper-
iment and all of the cats retreat to a corner of their cages and cower, hissing
and striking out at the experimenter when he attempts to take one out of his
cage, and, furthermore, on the trip to the laboratory, the animal continually
tries to escape, what can we say? Can we say that the cat is not consenting to
the experiment and would vote with its feet to run away if given the chance?
132
Thus, the animal can in a sense withhold consent or, to put it another way,
express its wishes and desires, without the use of language.
133
What are the implications of language possession by animals and partic-
ularly for animal experimentation? One way to answer this question is to say
that it does not matter whether animals have language. The fact that animals
have communication and can therefore express their likes, desires, and other
matters is sufcient for us to have some knowledge of their preferences. It is
problematic that language gets dened so narrowly as to exclude animals at
the outset. One wonders if that is not the very intention of these cognitive
denitions, so that whenever an animal is discovered to fulll the criterion for
language we have laid down, such as a stock of vocabulary words, we add that
it must also be able to understand syntax and create new words. It is easy
enough to keep upping the denition of what a language is so that most or all
animals are excluded, but this still does not tell us very much about animals
except that they are not exactly like humans in this regard. Granted that human
language is related to higher level cognitive abilities, this still does not mean
that animals do not have some understanding of what is being done to them,
animal minds 49
that they can at times communicate their consent or nonconsent, and that what
is done to them can affect them for better or for worse.
Speciesism, Marginal Humans, and the Question of Hierarchy
In the consideration of different cognitive criteria, the issue arose concerning
those humans who also do not possess the characteristics that are attributed
to normal or average adult human beings. That is, most adult human be-
ings can reason, have intelligence, are autonomous, and possess language, in
ways that most animals do not. However, there are many humans who lack
one or more of these criteria or who possess them to such a limited degree
that some animals are superior to them in this regard. These people are usually
referred to in the literature as marginal humans. To call them marginal hu-
mans is not to say that they are not human beings but simply to indicate that
they lack some of the cognitive criteria possessed by normal adult humans.
Those typically belonging to this category include infants, children, the severely
retarded, the senile, and the comatose.
The question then becomes, How can we draw the line so sharply between
humans and animals on the basis of characteristics that are lacking in some
human beings? Some of these groups are easier to explain away than others.
For example, we can say that infants and very young children are at least
potentially rational and linguistic, and we can say that cognitively damaged,
comatose, or senile adults were at least at one time rational and linguistic, so
that these groups are still very much human in every sense of the term, even
though they are disabled at present.
134
In addition, there is a possibility that
any of us could become similarly cognitively disabled. However, the situation
of the severely retarded is more problematic and hence is often used as the
paradigm case in these discussions, even though they represent a very small
percentage of marginal humans. These are individuals who never have been
and never will be as rational and linguistic as normal members of the human
species, or even as much as some animal species. If this is the case, then the
argument is often made that we cannot be justied in drawing a hard line in
the sand between humans and animals. Of course, one could argue that it is
not valid to compare marginal humans with normal animals and that the com-
parison instead should be between marginal animals and marginal humans
or between normal animals and normal humans. Even if this were true, we
cannot escape the conclusion that our typical attempts at drawing a line on the
basis of certain cognitive criteria is undermined by the argument from mar-
ginal cases. While the argument from marginal human cases should not be
made too strongly, the very existence of marginal humans at least undermines
the case for a sharp line of distinction and a subsequent absolute attribution
of superiority to humans on the basis of cognition.
We seem to have an intuitive sense that these marginal humans should
not be treated in the same way as animals. In fact, at least in the Christian
tradition, they are considered as valuable as other human beings and perhaps
should even be given special protection because of their vulnerabilities. (Of
course, as the discussion on personhood indicated, not all believe this.) Even
though some animals are more intelligent and rational than some of these
marginal humans, we generally do not think that it is right to experiment on
these marginal humans without their consent or at least not without the con-
sent of a proxy who has the patients best interests at heart. That is, we believe
these marginal humans have a dignity above what we usually attribute to an-
imals. Thus, for many people, it is membership in the species Homo sapiens
that becomes important, rather than possession of particular criteria. However,
this notion of granting favor simply on the basis of species membership
which has been termed speciesismhas recently been challenged.
135
For those concerned with bringing animals into the moral community,
speciesism is considered analogous to other isms such as racism and sex-
ism.
136
Racism and sexism are discrimination simply on the basis of race and
sex, both without any regard to the individual characteristics of these persons
and without taking into account any morally relevant differences among them.
Speciesism maintains that membership in a particular species is what entitles
one to moral consideration.
137
Speciesism has been identied as the prejudice
of always granting automatic favor to ones own species over other species,
regardless of relevant differences. Those arguing for some kind of speciesism
maintain that not only is it legitimate to give preference to ones own species
over other species but also that it is morally required.
138
In this sense, species-
ism is analogous to family loyalty.
139
To better understand speciesism, it may be helpful at this juncture to offer
a couple of brief examples of what is meant by morally relevant and irrelevant
characteristics, rst with regard to humans. If we argue that a woman has a
right to an abortion, then it is not sexist to say that men cannot have one;
having a uterus is the morally relevant characteristic in this case, and it is not
discriminatory to deny men who cannot bear children the right to an abortion.
However, if we argue that women cannot vote because they are women, this
is discrimination based on a morally irrelevant characteristicgender rather
than the ability to make a political decision.
140
What would be an example of
morally relevant and irrelevant characteristics with regard to animals? If we
deny animals access to a college education and were asked why we would not
admit them, we would probably rst say that it is because they are animals.
However, if we were pushed, we would probably then say that we are denying
it to them due to their lack of cognition, because having a certain level of
intelligence is morally relevant to college attendance. Therefore, to say that we
can perform experiments on animals simply because they are animals may be
speciesist, because the morally relevant characteristic is the ability to feel pain,
and animals can probably feel pain.
141
For this reason, speciesism is generally
introduced with the topic of pain, but I introduce it here because, although
pain is the principal morally relevant characteristic in animal experimentation,
cognition is important as well. It is important in the context of animal exper-
imentation because cognitive development has been traditionally believed to
animal minds 51
be related to the quality of ones life, and therefore generally those beings
(usually associated with species membership, such as being human) with a
higher quality of life should be granted greater consideration than those with
a lesser quality. Thus, those animals with cognitive abilities closer to humans
may suffer more than animals less closely related to humans, and, for this
reason, discriminating simply on the basis of species does not address the
question of different mental complexity among animal species.
So, does species membership matter at all? One way to answer this is by
distinguishing among different types of speciesism.
142
A radical speciesism
would maintain that species membership is all that matters and that we should
automatically give preference to humans. This does not mean that we can do
anything we want to animals; it is most often argued for when animal and
human interests are in conict. Radical speciesism is defended on a number
of different grounds. Most commonly, it is argued that humans are qualitatively
cognitively superior to animals and therefore should always be given prefer-
ential treatment. However, the existence of marginal humans at least under-
mines these criteria as a basis, and therefore we must look elsewhere. The
second response is that there is something simply to being human that offers
us protected status, so that even when it comes to marginal humans, other
features put them in the same protected class as normal adult humans, such
as the concern of others for them, the fact that they are born to human parents,
the fact that they look like other humans, or the belief that humans are made
in the image of God.
143
Some of these criteria have validity. However, a mod-
erate or qualied speciesism would come to this same conclusion as well and,
in my view, is ethically superior to radical speciesism. A qualied speciesism
maintains that species membership is a morally relevant criterion but not the
only morally relevant criterion; instead, species membership is correlated with
other signicant differences (e.g. cognitive ability, sentience). Beings with
greater mental capacities do deserve greater moral consideration than beings
with lesser mental capacities, partly because it affects their capacity to suffer;
this is why, if given a choice, we can justify swatting a y rather than killing a
monkey. Some animals have greater mental capacities than marginal humans
and therefore deserve some moral protection. What is morally signicant in
qualied speciesism is the richness and complexity of the individual life, as
well as the ability to feel pain, although higher cognitive ability may affect the
experience of suffering perhaps more than the experience of pain.
A hypothetical example may be helpful to clarify the differences between
adherents of these two types of speciesism. Animal experimentation is an ex-
cellent example because most people believe that it is permissible to experi-
ment on animals but not on marginal humansat least not without the con-
sent of a proxy. What is the reason? Although the reasons often proffered for
extending better treatment to humans are cognitive criteria, when it can be
demonstrated that the animal in question possesses these criteria to a greater
degree than these humans, then the argument reverts back to the fact that they
are human and therefore we cannot experiment on them against their will, do
horrendous things to them, experiment on them for the benet of others, and
so onall of which we regularly do to animals. In other words, species mem-
bership becomes the most importantand sometimes the onlycriterion.
Thus it is possible from the perspective of a qualied speciesismthat in general
we should give greater priority to our own species but that we need to rethink
the case for those beings with abilities similar to or higher than those of these
marginal humans. In addition, we need to ask the question about what the
morally relevant characteristic is with regard to experimentation. Since it is my
position that pain is the most important consideration, then we cannot simply
subject animals to pain and exempt all humans, if both can feel pain.
Therefore, it is possible to argue that marginal humans should be exempt from
experimentation but that animals possessing some of these same criteria by
which we exempt these humans (e.g., the ability to feel pain and suffer, simple
beliefs and desires) should be exempt as well, at least from certain experi-
ments.
144
One could say that the preference for our own species may simply
be sentiment.
145
This may be going too far, but it is possible to hold to a qual-
ied speciesism in which one maintains that species membership is a morally
relevant criterion but not the only one.
What the arguments from speciesism and marginal cases do is undermine
the typical way we make moral distinctions, putting all the emphasis only on
species membership. Although speciesism may not be exactly analogous to
racism and sexism, it does seem arbitrary to differentiate moral treatment on
the basis of species boundary alone.
146
Therefore, qualied speciesism has
much to commend it. It allows for some of our intuitive notions (e.g., that we
generally do give ethical preference to humans over animals, that some animals
are higher than others) and also permits us to therefore treat them differently.
Since there are serious problems with allowing marginal humans to receive
less moral consideration than animals, those animals with higher capacities
should be given greater moral consideration and perhaps at least receive treat-
ment similar to what we would accord to marginal humans. Thus, in the spe-
cic case of animal experimentation, we probably should not perform experi-
ments on animals whose cognitive capacities are equal to or greater than that
of marginal humans if we are not willing to so use marginal humans.
147
This
would certainly make more sense than the other possible alternativewhich
would relegate marginal humans to the level of animals or at least to that of
nonpersons.
What, then, are we to conclude about human superiority and animal in-
feriority? First, superiority should not be viewed as an all-or-nothing category.
It is obvious that other animals are superior to us in a number of ways: ele-
phants are larger, eagles have better eyesight, cougars run faster, and beavers
are better engineers, for example.
148
Thus, all species are superior to others in
particular ways, whether by virtue of one specic criterion or a combination of
criteria. However, not all of these criteria by which some animals are superior
to us are morally relevant. But even when it comes to the usual human criteria
we use to compare ourselves with animals, it may ultimately be more helpful
to see differences between humans and animals in light of specic character-
istics that should be viewed as a continuum rather than as an overarching,
animal minds 53
unilateral criterion or in terms of criteria possessed by humans to the exclusion
of animals. It is possible that there is not one criterion that sets humans apart
but a combination of criteria, so that what makes us human is our whole
human nature, not just one aspect of it. However, every species has a unique
combination of characteristics that separates it out from all other species.
149
We do need to be careful, though, about too static a view of human and animal
natures, which have their roots in a pre-Darwinian worldview.
150
Second, if we dene too narrowly the criterion or criteria that make hu-
mans unique, then we are in danger of having this uniqueness undermined
if and when such features are found in other species.
151
Thus, if humans are
unique due to their possession of language as cognition, then what do we do
if we discover that other species utilize this kind of language (whether other
animal species or alien species)? In fact, some have argued that there has not
been one criterion identied by behaviorists, linguists, and ethologists that is
not possessed to some degree at least by the higher mammals.
152
One of the
ways in which this argument has been averted is by so dening the criterion
that it virtually excludes animals at the outset. Again, describing differences
between species on the basis of a combination of criteria may be more helpful
than focusing on one criterion or on particular criteria.
Third, because we humans are the ones who set the criteria, we must
remember that we are likely to be self-interested in the way we do it.
153
There-
fore, if in fact another species were setting up the criteria, they would be quite
different. This is not to suggest that the criteria could be set up by other species,
whatever that means; it is simply to point out that if humans are setting the
criteria, then humans will tend to include those characteristics only humans
possess or which humans possess to a signicantly greater degree than do
animals.
154
Fourth, even though it can be shown that we are different from animals
in some of our mental capacities, this does not negate the strong similarities
that we do have with themphysiologically, biochemically, and emotionally.
The issue then becomes which characteristics should be given prominence in
our comparison with animalsthose that make us similar or those that make
us dissimilar. After all, all species are unique in some signicant ways; thus,
why should the line be drawn so sharply between humans and other animals?
In other words, humans and nonhuman primates are closer to each other than
either of them is to a dog, especially if the comparison is made with regard to
intellectual abilities and social needs. In some respects, all social mammals are
more like each other than any of them is like a snake or bee, for example.
155
Fifth, the issue of superiority also raises the problem that while we may
indeed grant that there is a hierarchy with humans at the top, it is more difcult
to scale the rest of the animal kingdom. For example, are rats superior to cats,
and are horses superior to dogs? It is very difcult to even ask such a question
when comparing animal species with each other, although apparently not when
comparing humans with other animals. This raises the difculty of arguing,
for example, that, when faced with a choice, we should always utilize the rat
rather than the dog. Ultimately, the problem of deciding that one animal spe-
cies is inferior or superior to another species is present with regard to such
assertions about human superiority as well.
However, notwithstanding all of these factors, we feel the need to acknowl-
edge the existence of some kind of hierarchy with humans on top. Even if
animals are superior to us in certain ways, they are generally not superior to
us in the ways that are morally relevant to us. With regard to the cognitive
criteria discussed, normal adult humans generally have these criteria to a con-
siderably greater degree than do normal animals. Even though we may be
unwittingly and possibly necessarily self-interested in the establishment of the
morally relevant criteria, we must remember that we are the only animals in
a position to set up such criteria on the basis of which comparisons can be
made. In particular, what does set humans apart is ultimately not the posses-
sion of one or two of these criteria but a combination of criteria that provides
us with the ability to make tools; engage in abstract reasoning; possess higher
degrees of consciousness, rationality, and autonomy; have complex desires and
beliefs; establish culture; and adapt and mold virtually any environment in
which we nd ourselves.
156
This still does not mean that human superiority is
of a different kind, but it is of a different degree. In this regard, certainly some
animals, such as nonhuman primates, whales, and dolphins, are much closer
to humans than are other animals and, because of their higher cognitive abil-
ities, should be given greater consideration, all other factors being equal, on
the issue of their use in animal experimentation. However, because there is
still so much that we do not know about other animals, we need to proceed
cautiously in simple assertions of superiority.
But even if humans are superior to animals in these ways, we are still not
justied in doing to them whatever we will. In the case of animal experimen-
tation, do we have the right to subject animals to all kinds of experiments
simply because we are superior? Is it not possible that our superiority should
provide us with the prudence and compassion not to abuse our authority and
superiority? After all, we do not think that greater intelligence by some humans
gives them license to exploit humans of lesser intelligence.
157
Even if humans
are superior in signicant ways, the real question is whether these differences
are morally relevant, particularly with regard to animal experimentation. Thus,
the question is not so much whether there is or should be a hierarchy; a better
question is what purpose does a hierarchy serve? Rather than seeing all life as
created with a strict hierarchy, it seems preferable to see the world as interre-
lated, and all creatures as interdependent, since each part has an indispensable
role to play. However, there are inevitable conicts among animal species, and
sometimes we need to make hard judgments, which humans are in a unique
position to do.
We need to remember that humans are animals, too, even if we are the
most rational, linguistic, and intelligent animals, according to the criteria we
have set. Of course, even these characteristics can be challenged on the grounds
that we are also unique in the unparalleled devastation we cause not only to
other animal species but also to our own and to the environment as a whole.
Perhaps instead of focusing on what distinguishes us, we should focus on what
animal minds 55
we have in common, most notably, our ability to feel pain. If we paid sufcient
attention to this criterion alone, we would go a long way in eliminating many
of our current practices toward animals. The next chapter will address the issue
of pain.
Conclusion
The issue of animal mentality is a very complex one, and since entire books
are devoted to each of the cognitive criteria, it is very difcult to do justice to
them in this short space. What has been argued simply is that animals do have
minds, meaning that they do think and have mental experiences, including at
least simple desires and beliefs, intelligence, a weak sense of autonomy, and,
at the minimum, a communication system that functions analogously to hu-
man language, and with some animals possessing language in a cognitive way.
Thus, animals possess all of the states humans have, only to a lesser degree,
in light of which it is maintained that the differences between humans and
animals are ones of degree rather than kind. In addition, as the examination
of marginal humans has demonstrated, some animals are cognitively superior
to some humans. This at least undermines the Enlightenment legacy that has
put a premium on reasoning ability and intelligence, and it also undermines
a strong notion of hierarchy and human superiority. The fact that animals have
these cognitive criteria means, at the very least, that what we do to them in
experimentation matters to them and can signicantly affect them for better
or worse.
However, all of the foregoing does not mean that humans are not superior
to animals in signicant ways, and it especially does not mean that there is
not something special to being human. Yes, there is a danger of humans priv-
ileging themselves, but on the basis of the continuum approach developed in
this chapter, adult human beings are superior to adult animals in all of the
aspects considered here. However, as this chapter has pointed out, animals
possess to a certain degree the characteristics discussed in this chapter, in-
cluding consciousness, beliefs and desires, intelligence, rationality, autonomy,
and language.
The question of animal minds is often discussed in the literature. Propo-
nents of a very unrestricted animal experimentation often appeal to the fact
that animals do not have many of the important characteristics that human
beings have. This chapter has refuted such positions. However, the primary
reason for a more restrictive approach to animal experimentation is based on
the question of animal pain and suffering, which will be discussed in the next
chapter. It is in this regard that Jeremy Benthams oft-quoted observation be-
comes pertinent: The question is not, Can they reason? or Can they talk? but,
Can they suffer?
3
Animal Pain
The issue of pain and suffering is a very signicant one in philoso-
phy, science, and theology. There seems to be a general consensus
that pain is a bad thing, something to be avoided, if at all possible.
In the history of philosophy, many philosophers have started from
the presumption that happiness, or pleasure, was the ultimate good
in life and that its opposite was to be avoided or at least minimized
as much as possible. In theology, the troubling existence of pain and
suffering in the world has come to be known as the problem of evil,
or theodicy. Put simply, the problem is that if there exists a loving
and powerful God (which Christianity has traditionally believed),
then why does this God allow pain and suffering? There seem to be
only two possible answers: either God is not all loving or God is not
all powerful. Since no one in the Christian tradition wants to mini-
mize the reality of Gods love, the answers usually come in terms of
restrictions on Gods power, generally believed to be self-imposed.
That is, God usually chooses not to directly intervene in worldly af-
fairs, even in the face of great tragedies. Evil has traditionally been
divided into two categories: natural evil and moral evil. Natural evil
refers to the sources of pain and suffering caused by phenomena
such as hurricanes and tornadoes. The usual way to account for
these sources of evil is to say that they are the result of natural
forces beyond our control, which God permits. Moral evil refers to
the sources of pain and suffering caused directly or indirectly by the
actions of human beings. The usual way to account for this source
of evil is with what has been called the free-will defense: that God
has given humans free will as part of their nature and that God is
loath to interfere even when humans make bad choices. That is,
most in the Christian tradition have opted for an understanding of
God and human beings that would permit free will with bad choices rather
than no free will with no bad choices. The issue of animal experimentation
would clearly fall under the rubric of moral evil, since it is the actions of
humans that account for the pain and suffering of animals.
From a scientic perspective, though, one must also deal with the issue
of pain, although the questions are certainly different. Science certainly be-
lieves in the reality of pain for at least most humans, but the reality of pain
and suffering for animals raises more perplexing questions. What exactly is
pain? What about other related concepts, such as stress and suffering? How
can we know that animals experience pain? Should animals ever be subjected
to pain? Are there some animals whose pain or suffering is such that they
should never be used in experiments? Are there some experiments that should
not be performed? Are there some procedures within experiments that should
not be done? What protocols should be in place to determine whether certain
experiments should be permitted? What training should be required of those
engaging in animal experimentation to ensure humane treatment? How can
we minimize animal pain? What about the killing of animals?
1
The answers
to any of these questions, as well as others, by those with an interest in animal
experimentation are by no means uniform. What I hope to accomplish in this
chapter is to demonstrate that animals do experience pain and suffering. Al-
most all agree that animals experience some pain, and thus there exists a broad
general agreement today, at the very minimum, on steps to reduce animal pain
with regard to animal experimentation.
The chapter will proceed as follows. In the rst section, I will dene pain
and related concepts (e.g., anxiety, distress, stress, suffering) and the relation-
ship of these concepts to one another. In the second section, I will address the
question of whether animals feel pain, considering both the arguments for and
against the experience of pain in animals. In the third section, I will examine
the kinds of experiments that cause animals pain and in the fourth section will
determine how animals suffer in experiments and how we can assess whether
they are suffering. In the fth section, I will examine and critique some of the
measures taken by the scientic community in addressing animal pain, in-
cluding alternatives to animal experimentation, legislation, use of pain scales,
use of drugs, use of preference tests, and euthanasia. I will provide some
concluding remarks in the last section.
Denitions
To offer guidelines on pain management and address in the nal chapter how
to balance animal pain and human benet, it is necessary to dene pain and
related concepts. In spite of its importance to science, there is no universally
agreed-on denition of pain, although the development of a universal de-
nition and the necessity for further study on this issue have been urged.
2
Pain
can be dened as an unpleasant sensation that arises from damage to a par-
animal pain 59
ticular part of the body.
3
There are two components typically associated with
pain: the physiological experience of physical sensations (typically related to
the presence of nociceptors) and the conscious emotional experience of pain,
involving nerve pathways in the highest part of the brain, the cerebrum.
4
It is
precisely this emotional aspect that is part of the problem in dening pain,
specically because some want to disallow any affective or emotional compo-
nents to animals since they involve mental capacity.
5
It is undisputed that there
is at least a physical component to pain: it must be processed in the central
nervous system, and nerve impulses that indicate pain must pass down
through the nerves.
6
The physiological experience of pain is typically believed
to be related to the presence of a complex nervous system, and for those ani-
mals that have such a nervous system, we can probably safely conclude that
they can experience pain, at least on a sensory level.
For pain to be experienced in the sensory way, there generally must be the
presence of what are called nociceptors. Nociceptors are a group of nerve end-
ings, typically found in mammals and in birds, and they respond to stimuli
that can potentially cause tissue damage. When the nociceptors are stimulated,
they send a message down the nerve bers that may or may not result in a
response, such as a reex action. However, the mere presence of a reex action
is not sufcient to conclude that pain has been experienced. For example,
insects also withdraw from aversive stimuli, although it is probably a simple
startle reex rather than a response to pain, because they lack the nervous
system processing mechanisms found in higher animals.
7
Thus, a reaction to
sensory stimulus is not the equivalent of a capacity to feel pain.
8
The lack of a
centralized nervous system and the subsequent inability to experience pain are
why the line is often drawn between vertebrates and invertebrates. However,
the question has arisen about the possibility of nociceptors in invertebrates, or
at least whether they can experience pain in some other way. The primary test
for postulating pain mechanisms in these animals is by exposing them to
stimuli typically associated with nociception and to observe whether they pre-
sent clearly aversive behavior. There is evidence that some invertebrates (the
cephalopods, including the squid, cuttlesh, and octopus) do feel pain. Al-
though they may not possess nociceptors, they do possess large nerve clusters
and demonstrate aversive behavior in the presence of negative stimuli.
9
In addition to animals physiological experience of pain, there is also suf-
cient evidence to argue for an emotional component of pain. The vast majority
of commentators support this position. Since cognitive development is nec-
essary for pain perception in humans, this is probably true for animals as
well.
10
Thus, if the creature in question is unable to mentally process pain for
some reason (typically due to some lack of mental capacity, such as conscious-
ness), then it is questionable whether they are indeed able to feel, or experience,
pain. Examples would be humans with prefrontal lobotomies
11
or perhaps the
comatose.
12
If animals lack this capacity for consciousness, then they may be
unable to experience pain as well, and those who argue against the capacity of
animals to experience pain argue in such a fashion. However, since it was
argued in the last chapter that animals do have simple consciousness, then
they would also have the emotional capability to experience pain, in addition
to the sensory capability.
13
There may be many different kinds of experiences of pain; it is not suf-
cient to simply claim that animals can feel pain. One way of distinguishing
different kinds of pain is by talking about thresholds. The nociceptor threshold
refers to the strength that the stimulus must have to cause the generation of
a nerve impulse.
14
The pain detection threshold is that point in humans when
the smallest stimulus can be felt half the time; for animals it is evidenced by
attempts to escape.
15
The pain tolerance threshold is the upper limit of pain
that an individual will accept voluntarily.
16
In animals, it is evidenced by their
unwillingness to pursue a reward in the face of painful stimulation.
17
The pain
tolerance threshold varies considerably among individuals and cultures, and it
can be affected by the individuals prior background, environment, stress, and
drugs.
18
This third level appears to be the crucial one in the discussion of how
much pain we can cause animals, with some suggesting that in order to avoid
suffering, we should not go above this pain tolerance threshold in laboratory
animals.
19
Another way that pain levels have been differentiated has been by distin-
guishing between acute and chronic pain. Acute pain is usually short-lived and
primarily warns about injury; this is generally considered a benecial effect of
pain. Chronic or persistent pain is more difcult to recognize because its onset
is slow and not necessarily associated with an obvious pathological condition.
It is chronic pain that can often lead to distress and other maladaptive behaviors
in laboratory animals.
20
Different signs are associated with the presence of
these different kinds of pain. For example, restlessness and sweating may be
signs of acute pain, whereas reluctance to move or loss of appetite may indicate
chronic pain.
21
Distinctions between different levels of pain and between the
kinds of procedures that can result in different levels of pain have resulted in
calls for the use of pain scales for animals, both to assess the degree of pain
and to help determine when to use pain-relieving drugs.
Clinical assessment of animal pain has yielded the conclusion that differ-
ent species of animals experience pain differently. The determination of pain
is based on clinical assessments of particular physiological features, such as
weight, temperature, heart rate, respiration, vocalizing, posture, locomotion,
and temperament. Different signs have been observed for particular species.
For example, dogs in pain tend to vocalize in whimpers, growls, or howls; their
posture is cowered or crouched; and they are reluctant to move or move only
with apparent difculty. Pigs in pain, on the other hand, can squeal excessively
or be completely silent; their posture is a stance with all four feet close together
under the body; and they are unwilling to move and often unable even to
stand.
22
The National Research Council recognizes the important differences
among species by devoting individual books to some species. Those working
with animals must know the species well enough to determine if in fact an
individual animal is in pain.
In addition to pain, other words related to assessing the well-being of
animal pain 61
animals in experimentation have also been dened, such as anxiety, fear, dis-
tress, and suffering. Unlike pain, these other terms are generally considered
to be solely mental states, although they can be related to or a result of physical
states. Because there is some controversy as to whether animals can experience
mental states, the denitions related to these seem to be more general and are
in greater ux, subject to new ndings;
23
they also tend to be more contro-
verted, although many do acknowledge their existence.
24
Because these terms
have been explored in other discussions on pain, they will be included here as
well. My position is that, given the conclusions of the previous chaptersthat
animals have at least simple mental statesanimals do experience at times
the negative states to be discussed here.
It is often difcult to separate anxiety, fear, and suffering.
25
In particular,
fear and anxiety are not easily distinguished; however, causes of fear are con-
sidered more specic than causes of anxiety.
26
Fear is a response to a particular
object or previous experience, whereas anxiety is a generalized response to the
unknown.
27
Both anxiety and fear are believed likely to be present in all ver-
tebrates
28
and in some invertebrates as well.
29
The experience of anxiety in
animals has been suggested by the very presence of nervous system receptors
for chemicals that alleviate anxiety,
30
the possession of a structure similar to
the human cerebral cortex, and particular behaviors. Some behaviors typically
associated with anxiety are motor tension (e.g., jumpiness), hyperactivity (e.g.,
increased pulse rate, frequent urination), inhibited behavior in novel situations,
and hyperattentiveness to the environment. Animals are also believed to ex-
perience anxiety because antianxiety drugs appear to work similarly in humans
and animals.
31
Although the experience of anxiety in animals is not as straight-
forward or as empirically veriable as that of pain, the presence of anxiety can
lead to animal stress, distress, and ultimately suffering.
Stress is another word lacking a universally accepted denition.
32
How-
ever, it is important to attempt to dene and understand it because prolonged
stress is believed to lead to distress in laboratory animals. Stress can be dened
as a reaction to stressors in ones environment that negatively affect biological
equilibrium.
33
Pain is one source of stress but by no means the only one.
34
Stressors include both husbandry factors (e.g., noise, inadequate ventilation,
variable temperature, and stale food) and experimental design features (such
as deprivation of food, water, or social contact; use of restraint devices; and
inadequate caging).
35
There is some controversy as to whether stress is a mental
state as well as a physical one.
However, as stress researchers on humans have noted, not all stressors
are bad, and not all stress is bad; a stress-free environment is neither possible
nor desirable. Animals even in their wild state experience stressors on a regular
basis, and the presence of stressors can result in a more stimulating environ-
ment.
36
What is more important to consider is the level of stress and how well
the animal can adapt to it. Like pain, stress can be acute or chronic. It is the
persistence of stressors from which animals cannot escape that can lead to
distress, and this should be the concern of laboratories, rather than trying to
eliminate all sources of stress.
37
What seems likely, though, is that while the
concept of stress is not as denitive as that of pain, most vertebrates and some
invertebrates probably experience stress somewhat similarly to humans.
38
Although it is generally acknowledged that some stress is necessary, dis-
tress is generally dened as the point at which an animal is no longer able to
adapt to the stressors in her environment, and therefore it is considered an
undesirable state. It is often evidenced by maladaptive behaviors such as hair
pulling or self-mutilation.
39
Acute stress can be relieved by tranquilizers, but
sustained or chronic stress is not responsive to drug therapy; a change in
environment or behavior is warranted.
40
Thus, experimenters should strive to
identify and eliminate extreme forms of stress through some change in the
animals environment or in experimental procedures. One of the reasons for
the concern with stress in laboratory animals is not just that it adversely affects
the animals but that it can also adversely affect research results.
41
Although considered related, the term suffering is often distinguished
from pain. Suffering is a mental state resulting from an inability to cope with
pain or distress.
42
Suffering is an unpleasant subjective state and differs from
stress, which is more related to physiological changes.
43
One of the key differ-
ences between pain and suffering is that suffering does not necessarily involve
tissue damage and therefore is considered more of a mental than a physical
experience. However, there is a relationship between pain and suffering in that
prolonged or considerable pain is thought to lead to suffering, although pain
is not the only source of suffering.
44
Virtually all denitions of suffering call it
an emotional state, and for this reason some who are willing to attribute pain
to animals are unwilling to attribute suffering to them. This reluctance is some-
times also seen with regard to anxiety and distress.
45
Because animals do have
at least simple mental states, my view is that they are capable of suffering.
46
In spite of the fact that some have devised means for assessing suffering
in animals, the concept of suffering continues to be a controversial one. In the
United States, the word suffering is never used in ofcial policies on labo-
ratory animals because it is considered too emotional a word; rather, the less
controversial word distress is used.
47
Since suffering is not something that
can be denitively indicated, some have called for further research on this
concept.
48
This is a topic where fruitful research by animal ethologists and
behaviorists can prove invaluable.
More positive concepts related to animals mental states have also been
dened in the literature. Comfort, happiness, and well-being are exam-
ples of terms that describe the opposite of some of the concepts just considered.
In general, though, there seems to be greater stress in the literature on the
concept of well-being than on happiness, for example, although it is usually
put in negative terms (how to minimize negative features rather than how to
maximize positive features).
49
Without going into detail on the denitions of
these terms, it is important to note their existence because they demonstrate
that there is more to good laboratory animal husbandry than simply avoiding
pain and negative stressors; it is important to be concerned with trying to create
a positive environment as well.
50
Thus, in addition to the stressors listed pre-
viously, animal well-being is considered to be compromised by either the ex-
animal pain 63
istence of a boring environment or by a frustration of the normal behavior of
a species that it would exhibit in a wild state. What is clear, though, is that an
animals state can vary across a continuum from comfort to distress and that
an animal moves from comfort to distress when it is not able to maintain a
state of equilibrium.
51
It is also clear that there are different degrees for each
of these concepts. In addition, these concepts are not static, and they can be
affected by numerous variables.
Notwithstanding some of the difculties inherent in dening pain and
other related concepts, particularly suffering, more stringent efforts should be
made to arrive at universal denitions that can be used by those who conduct
or assess research. Since animals may be suffering even if not actually in pain,
it seems that suffering should be as strong, if not a stronger, focus of attention
by the scientic community than is pain. Attempts should be made to provide
criteria for animal suffering. While no one method of assessing animal pain
and suffering may be sufcient on its own, better denitions would go a long
way in helping to clarify these concepts and to identify when animals are ex-
periencing these states. It would also be helpful to put more stress on how to
address laboratory animal pain and distress in a proactive way, by accentuating
how we can create a more positive environment for laboratory animals, instead
of having a minimalist ethic.
Do Animals Experience Pain?
Most people think that both humans and animals experience pain and
therefore depart for the most part from Descartes legacy. His mind-body du-
alism enabled him to postulate the animal-machine theory, in which he argued
that animals were like machines due to their inability to reason, think, and
respond
52
and that the groans of seemingly suffering animals were like the
movement of the springs of a clocka response to a stimulus but not a mental
event and therefore not a signicant (painful) bodily event. For Descartes, it
was simpler to explain animal responses in a mechanistic manner, without
regard to consciousness.
53
With regard to animal actions, he says in Discourse,
Part V, that what it shows is that they are destitute of mind and that it is nature
which acts in them according to the disposition of their organs, just as a clock,
which is composed only of wheels and weights, can number the hours and
measure time more exactly than we can with all our knowledge.
54
Those who
maintain today that animals do not feel pain argue along similar lines, although
for others it seems obvious that animals do feel pain.
Yes, Animals Can Feel Pain
Common sense dictates that animals can experience pain. The idea that ani-
mals can feel pain is foundational to medical science and the very reason that
at least some experiments are carried out on animals. Most people accept that
mammals and birds are capable of experiencing pain because they have the
nerves and the centrally organized brain necessary for this;
55
in fact, pain has
been studied extensively in mammals.
56
However, as was indicated earlier, ev-
idence suggests that all vertebrates, as well as some invertebrates, probably feel
pain.
The overall basis on which people assume that animals can feel pain is by
analogy with human beings. But the prior question of other minds emerges:
How can we know the subjective experience of another, even of another human
being? How can we know if and how another human being is experiencing
pain, since all mental experiences are considered subjective and private? As
was argued in the previous chapter, we can know that other humans have
mental experiences, and we can conclude that this is true related to the expe-
rience of pain and suffering as well. This problem is important in regard to
the question of animal pain, because if we cannot even know for sure that
other human beings, who are so similar to us, feel pain, how can we possibly
understand the mental state of another species? We generally do assume that
other human beings experience pain in situations where we do. We assume
that when faced with the same stimulus, their reactions will be quite similar
to ours. This does not mean that there cannot be great variety in pain thresholds
among individuals; however, there is basic agreement among humans on what
constitutes painful stimuli and pain responses in humans. By observing be-
havior, through the verbal utterances of the one in pain, or due to the simple
recognition that we are physiologically constructed similarly, we believe that
we can know fairly well when another human being is experiencing pain. In
fact, not believing that another human experiences pain could have severe
negative consequences in our treatment of them,
57
and it also ies in the face
of common sense.
Even assuming that we can know when other humans are experiencing
pain, how can we know whether animals experience pain? Admittedly, our
ability to assess animal pain has limitations, but medical science, animal ethol-
ogy, and philosophy have offered theories and devised methods for this as-
sessment. There are several criteria by which we can judge whether animals
experience pain, all of which operate by way of analogy with human beings
similar cognitive processes, physiology, and behavior. If we can be fairly certain
that other humans experience pain, then it may not be such a stretch to assume
that animals can experience pain in a similar way.
Evolutionary theory has most often been marshaled to account for the
similarities between humans and animals on a number of levels. Evolutionary
theory posits a continuity among animal species, both physically and mentally,
although biological science seems readier to accept evolutionary theory for
physiological processes than for mental processes.
58
One of the questions with
relation to evolutionary theory developed in the last chapter is whether the
differences between humans and animals are differences of kind (emphasizing
discontinuity) or differences of degree (emphasizing continuity). But which-
ever position on this one chooses to hold, it is still fairly obvious that there are
considerable similarities in behavior, physiology, and even some mental ex-
periences of humans and animals. While there are obvious differences between
animal pain 65
some animals and humans, there are enough similarities to make assumptions
about animal experiences, including their pain experiences.
59
The rst criterion for determining pain is the cognitive processes of ani-
mals. Whereas the previous chapter more fully examined the question of ani-
mal minds and consciousness, the focus here highlights the question of con-
sciousness as the mental state most pertinent to the discussion of pain, and
those who argue that animals can feel pain on an emotional or affective level
often do so on the basis of their possession of consciousness. As was noted,
consciousness is a very controversial issue, and it is difcult to nd an agreed-
on denition. However, many do agree that animals have some kind of con-
sciousness, meaning at the very least that they have some kind of awareness
of what is going on around them and what is happening to them. It is not
necessary to posit self-consciousness for the experience of pain.
One of the reasons for the controversy and discomfort with discussing the
concept of consciousness is that it is intangible and cannot be measured or
observed in an objective way. Strict behaviorists deny consciousness to animals
because they do not believe that mental states can be conrmed by other ob-
servers, and therefore they have no real signicance in the study of behavior.
60
The importance of the issue of consciousness for pain is that the presence of
consciousness means that one is aware of ones feelings and sensations and
that pain not only is a physical sensation but also has an affective component,
as was mentioned previously. Since animals do possess consciousness, then
their response to a painful stimulus is more than simply a reex action. It
means that an animal makes a mental connection between the physical stim-
ulus and what he subsequently experiences. It means that an animal experi-
ences pain as a subjective experience and not just as a physical experience.
Thus, the possession of consciousness by animals, on the basis of analogy with
humans, is one of the criteria for the position that animals do feel painand
feel pain much as humans do. No one is arguing that animals experience pain
exactly in the same way as do humans, for there are even differences among
humans. However, the gist of the argument is that there is enough similarity
to warrant similar concerns about inicting unnecessary pain on animals. It
is also important to note that some philosophers consider pain to be a mental,
or subjective, experience; for this reason, higher cognitive capacities are be-
lieved necessary for its experience, rather than simply the ability to experience
physical sensations.
The second criterion involves the physiological level, which is probably the
strongest reason for supposing that animals can feel pain similarly to humans.
This conclusion is reached on the basis of obviously similar physiological struc-
tures.
61
The phylogenetic scale has been widely used to demonstrate the de-
velopmental history and relationship of species on a continuum. Vertebrates
differ from invertebrates in that the former have a backbone and a central
nervous system with a brain and spinal cord. Instead of a backbone and central
nervous system, invertebrates have nerve clusters throughout their bodies.
62
It
is the presence of a highly developed nervous system that is foundational for
the experience of pain sensations, in particular the presence of nociceptors,
which have been found in mammals and other vertebrates.
63
The similarity in
this regard between humans and animals is what permits us to extrapolate
from human pain experience to animal pain experience.
64
In fact, it is the very
presence of a nervous system in some animals that sometimes justies the
performance of particular experiments on them.
65
The issue of the possibility
of pain sensation in invertebrates has been addressed in the literature, although
Orlanss general conclusions on particular species seem to be representative
of the literature in general: because sh avoid aversive stimuli yet appear to
act completely normally when seriously injured, we should be cautious in con-
cluding they can feel pain; mollusks have not generally been subjects of con-
cern, although there is strong evidence that due to the existence of complex
nervous systems, the cephalopods, which include squid and octopus, might
experience pain; and some entomologists have even raised the question of pain
perception in insects, although here one also needs to maintain caution.
66
The third criterion for assessing animal pain is at the behavioral level. One
of the problems with animals expression of pain is that they cannot verbalize
it in the same ways as do humans (e.g., in human language); however, non-
verbal communication can be as expressive, if not more so, than verbal com-
munication. In addition, although animals cannot speak our language, they do
verbalize in other ways,
67
particularly in nonlinguistic ways.
68
Although we have
seen that the relationship between higher mental states and language is an
important one in the discussion of animal minds, it is not as signicant in the
discussion of pain, because pain is a more primitive state than abstract rea-
soning and therefore does not require the presence of language. The responses
to pain in humans are similar to those in animals and include verbalizations
(cries, squeals, groans),
69
attempts to avoid the source of the stimuli, aggres-
siveness,
70
generally miserable and dejected appearance, abnormal posturing,
lack of grooming behavior, change in appetite, and absence of usual social
behavior, although no one criterion is sufcient to indicate animal pain.
71
Other
indicators of chronic pain include weight loss, sleep loss, decreased mating,
changes in bowel and urinary activities, and teary eyes.
72
Although there are
some guidelines for general behavioral pain responses for animals, particular
species have their own ways of indicating pain or discomfort. In addition,
animals are individuals, and what may be normal for one may not be normal
for another of the same species.
73
Those working with animals must be familiar
with the usual or normal behavior for a particular animal (and not just the
species alone) to know when an animal is deviating from her normal behavior,
which may be an indication that she is in pain or experiencing discomfort. On
the basis of similarities between humans and animals on cognitive, physiolog-
ical, and behavioral levels, a good rule of thumb in assessing animal pain is
that if it causes pain to humans, it probably causes pain to animals as well.
74
No, Animals Cannot Feel Pain
In spite of this evidence, a small minority persist in arguing that animals do
not feel pain, or at least that we cannot know with certainty that animals feel
animal pain 67
pain.
75
These assertions differ from arguments that acknowledge that animals
feel pain but not that their pain is comparable to human pain, or acknowledge
that animals feel pain but assert it does not really matter because the benets
to humans take precedence over the suffering of animals. Those who argue
that animals do not feel pain generally do so on the supposed lack of mental
states in animals, particularly consciousness, since they consider pain to be
primarily a mental experience rather than a physical or sensory experience.
This argument accepts evolutionary theory, although the differences be-
tween humans and animals are considered to be differences of kind rather
than of degree. Animals do bear signicant resemblances to humans in phys-
iological ways, but, the argument goes, animals do not have our cultural
achievements or other higher cognitive capacities. This makes humans differ-
ent from and superior to animals in signicant ways. Of course, it has already
been argued in the previous chapter that humans are superior to animals in a
number of ways on the basis of advanced cognitive states. With regard to the
discussion of pain, though, the crucial difference specically comes down to
the presence or absence of consciousness in animals. It is for this reason that
those arguing against animal pain must likewise argue against animal con-
sciousness. The focus of this discussion will not be that of the scientic com-
munity, which was discussed in the previous chapter, but the arguments of
philosophers, which proceed somewhat differently.
Some philosophers have made a distinction between conscious and non-
conscious mental experiences. They argue as follows: Examples of noncon-
scious experiences in humans would be when one is engaged in activities in
which one is not aware of what one is doing, such as might happen when
washing dishes or driving a car.
76
Human performance of these actions without
really being aware that they are performing them is considered analogous to
the kind of nonconscious mental experiences that animals have. Animals do
not have conscious mental experiences because they lack second-order beliefs
(beliefs about beliefs) and a language.
77
Animals, then, have only nonconscious
mental experiences. Therefore, this lack of consciousness means that they can-
not experience pain or at least that it is unlikely that they experience pain.
Thus, when animals exhibit aversive behavior in the face of a stimulus, it
may simply be a reex action. These philosophers argue that it is better to
speak of animal responses to pain, rather than animal expressions or reactions
to pain; that is, their responses are adaptive rather than expressive of an inter-
nal state.
78
Thus, it is possible for one to experience a painful stimulus and yet
not feel pain. Even single-celled organisms may withdrawfrompainful stimuli,
but this does not mean that they are feeling pain.
79
Although animals may act
as if they are in pain, they do not actually feel pain. This is because they have
no continuity of consciousness, no self-concept that would allow them to con-
nect the pain to something.
80
Because pain is a mental state, we simply cannot
infer that animals feel pain on the basis of behaviors or the physiological struc-
ture of the brain.
81
Finally, there is controversy as to whether pain should be categorized only
as a sensation, although this idea has a long history in the Western tradition.
Rather, pain is not simply a function of neuroanatomy but of psychological
and cultural factors that play a signicant role in human lives but only a min-
imal one in animal lives. For example, cultures vary in the way they deal with
pain, so that in our culture childbearing is a very painful experience, but this
is not necessarily true in all cultures. In addition, people can experience pain
relief from placebos, suggesting that their experience of pain is more than just
physical; there is a mental dimension to it.
82
Obviously, then, the differences
between humans in the experience of pain becomes even sharper when one
is comparing humans and animals. Those arguing that animals cannot or
probably do not feel pain conclude that we have a moral imperative to suppress
moral sympathy toward animals and direct it instead toward humans
83
or that
when balancing human and animal interests, we should tip the scale in favor
of humans, although this does not mean that we should mistreat animals.
84
There are a number of problems with the argument that animals (proba-
bly) do not feel pain on the basis of a lack of consciousness. The difference
between conscious and nonconscious mental experiences is a weak one. First
of all, it is unclear what it means for a human to have a nonconscious expe-
rience. The fact that a person driving a car, for example, may for short periods
not seem to be paying attention does not mean that he is temporarily non-
conscious. After all, he is usually able to avoid having an accident, so there
must be some level of awareness. Second, it is a big leap to presume that these
allegedly nonconscious experiences in humans are the way that animals ex-
perience the world. It would make more sense to posit a lower kind of con-
sciousness for animals than to suggest the presence of nonconsciousness.
What Can We Conclude about Whether or Not Animals Feel Pain?
We can be fairly sure that animals experience pain in much the same way as
do humans. It is interesting to note that it is a minority of philosophers, and
scientists only during certain periods of time, that have held that animals do
not have consciousness. This raises two problems. First, from a philosophical
perspective, it underscores the danger of arguing only from a philosophy of
mind rather than from observation; one trip to a laboratory where painful
experiments were being performed and where animals were vocalizing their
pain and suffering would seem sufcient to undermine their position. Their
very unwillingness to consider animal behavior is perhaps the strongest in-
dictment against their thesis. To imply that Benthams question Can they
suffer? is merely a rhetorical device seems absurd in the face of common
sense, simple observation, and empirical evidence. With regard to science, a
recognition that the ideology of science regarding issues such as animal pain
is driven by considerations other than empirical facts should also humble sci-
ence in its assertions of theories as facts.
85
Even if one were to agree that
sentience is not the only or the best basis for moral consideration, there is
good reason to believe that animals can feel pain. As the history of animal
experimentation has amply demonstrated, the limits of what is considered
acceptable treatment of animals can be directly correlated with ones views on
animal pain 69
animal pain; it is no accident that Descartes philosophy and those of some of
his followers paved the way for atrocities perpetrated on animals in the name
of science. However, to acknowledge that animals feel pain is still far from
addressing the question of whether they should ever be subjected to pain and
how to best manage their pain.
Experiments That Cause Pain
While there is considerable disagreement about what percentage of animal
experiments cause pain to animals and the degree of pain caused, there is
virtual agreement that at least some experiments and some procedures do
cause pain.
86
The writings of some animal activists and ethicists contain nu-
merous descriptive examples of gruesome experiments performed on animals
that leave no doubt, except possibly in the mind of a die-hard Cartesian, that
they have caused considerable pain, often for questionable ends.
87
In fact, pub-
lic knowledge and outrage about some of these experiments that have been
brought to media attention have come about as a result of exposes done by
animal activists inltrating science laboratories, whose activities have resulted
in actually helping laboratory animals. Karen Snow Guillermo recounts one of
the most famous cases, known in the popular literature as the Silver Springs
Monkey case, in which an animal rights activist (who later founded one of the
most aggressive animal rights organizations, PETA, or People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals) worked undercover at the lab of Dr. Edward Taub, who
was later charged with abuse of his animals in a court case that dragged on
for almost a decade.
88
Another high-prole case involved head trauma admin-
istered to baboons at the University of Pennsylvania. A videotape showed the
researchers laughing and ridiculing the animals they were working on. Ashort-
ened version of the videotape was eventually shown on TV, and the case pro-
voked considerable outrage even among many in the scientic community,
with the laboratory losing its funding for this experiment as a result. These
two cases are recent examples that helped to refuel interest in the plight of
laboratory animals. Making the public aware of particularly painful experi-
ments is helpful in creating ultimate changes in legislation for the protection
and well-being of laboratory animals, or at least in ending funding for partic-
ular experiments. However, it should be emphasized at the outset that not all
experiments cause animals pain, and the scientic community has become
rightfully upset with attempts by some animal activists to portray all experi-
mentation as causing considerable unnecessary pain. What kinds of experi-
ments and procedures do cause pain?
Painful experiments can be divided into three different types based on their
relationship to pain: experiments designed to study the nature of pain itself
and/or its relief through drugs,
89
experiments that are painful by nature but
that are not done to study the phenomenon of pain in particular, and experi-
ments in which the procedures done in the course of experiments can cause
pain.
The rst type of experiment is designed specically to study the phenom-
enon of pain. Much of our scientic understanding of pain has come from
comparative studies in animals in which pain was the experimental variable.
Since the main purpose of these experiments is extrapolation to the under-
standing of pain in humans, it is fairly obvious that at least some of those
conducting the experiments do believe that animals are capable of experiencing
pain.
90
These experiments involve administering pain to animals by various
means and then trying to nd ways to alleviate the pain, usually through med-
ication.
In the second type of painful experiment, pain is incidental to the exper-
iment in that the purpose is to study some other phenomenon, but the exper-
iment may involve inicting signicant pain. The head trauma experiment on
baboons cited earlier would be an example: baboons were tted with helmets
and then had a considerable weight come crashing down on their heads for
the purpose of inducing brain damage. The helmets were then removed and
the brains of the animals examined. Although the purpose was not to inict
pain but rather to study brain damage with the ultimate intention of extrapo-
lating results to humans, there is no doubt that the experiment itself caused
considerable pain. Other examples where pain is incidental to the experiment
include burn experiments (where an animal is burned by immersion in hot
water or through the use of hot plates or blowtorches), radiation research (often
used by the military in connection with weapons development), drumming
(animals are used to study traumatic shock by placing them in a revolving
drum in which protuberances break their bones and bruise their esh), and
brain research (often through the use of electrodes to inuence behavior).
Other experiments that are painful by nature include punishment experiments
(often through the use of electric shock), immobilization research (animals
restrained for hours on end), sensory deprivation experiments (such as blind-
ing of animals), and aggression research (animals are induced by researchers
to ght among themselves).
91
Other areas where pain is especially problematic
are product testing, pain experienced after operations, and induction of ill-
nesses in animals (e.g., tumors). This is not an exhaustive list, just examples
of experiments that most would agree do cause animals pain.
Finally, pain can be caused by procedures within experiments themselves.
Thus, even for experiments that would not be considered painful in and of
themselves, some of the procedures routinely performed can be sources of
pain, such as withdrawing blood and giving injections. These procedures can
be made more or less painful, depending on the training of the personnel who
administer the procedures.
It is obvious that there are many potential sources for pain in animal
experiments, even if not all or even a majority fall into this category. Because
there is potential for great pain either in the actual experiment or in the stan-
dard husbandry procedures, every effort should be made to minimize the
amount of pain in experiments. If experiments that cause pain cannot be ad-
equately rened, then perhaps they should not be performed at all. However,
animal pain 71
even for those experiments that are not believed to cause pain, the question of
animal suffering still is a signicant issue.
How Animals Suffer in Experiments
An earlier section demonstrated that animals do suffer, despite some contrary
arguments. Evidence points to several sources of suffering in laboratory ani-
mals. In addition to procedures within experiments and some experiments
themselves, animal husbandry is often implicated in animal suffering. Animal
husbandry refers to all nonexperimental care of animalsin other words, the
conditions in which they live, which are separate from (though related to) the
features of the experiment itself. Animal husbandry issues, for both laboratory
animals in general and for particular species, are dealt with extensively in the
guidebooks established by the National Research Council. Animal husbandry
includes some of the following concerns: cage size, construction, types of clean-
ing methods, lighting, temperature, food availability and type, the way animals
are housed (together or separately), noise, location of other animals, the pres-
ence or absence of items with which to play (to relieve boredom; this is espe-
cially an issue with primates since the inclusion of the stipulation into the law
that laboratories provide for their psychological well-being), and adequate ex-
ercise (this is especially an issue for dogs since the inclusion of the stipulation
in the law that they be walked). In particular, the fact that laboratory animals
lack freedom and often the space to engage in what has been called typical
species-specic behavior (behavior an animal would engage in if he was not
conned, such as in the wild) has been considered a source of stress and
suffering in laboratory animals. Some examples illustrate how husbandry is-
sues can cause suffering.
Caging is a very important husbandry issue, since this is where the labo-
ratory animal spends virtually all of her time. The National Research Council
has laid down very specic guidelines for the minimum cage sizes for partic-
ular species. However, the specications tend to be on the small size, and thus
the space is often not large enough for the animal to move around; in fact, it
is signicantly less space than an animal would have if in the wild. Also, cages
seem to be constructed for the convenience of the human handler rather than
with the concerns of the animal in mind (e.g., for easy observation of and
access to the animal, for easy cleaning). Studies of rodents have demonstrated
that they typically like to burrow but are unable to do so in many laboratory
cages. This also leads to a frustration of their species-specic nesting behavior.
In addition, the question of whether to house animals individually or in groups
can be problematic. For those animals that are solitary by nature (e.g., cats and
hamsters), it is not necessarily harmful to house them alone. However, animals
that are more sociable by nature (e.g., rats, chimps) may suffer from the ab-
sence of cage mates. This is considered especially problematic for nonhuman
primates, whose social and psychological needs are believed to be very similar
to those of humans.
Noise is another example of an animal husbandry issue that can lead to
animal suffering. For example, some animals can hear above the frequency of
human hearing. In some laboratories, there may be equipment in the room
where the animals are kept that creates a continual droning noise that humans
cannot hear but that could be very stressful for the animals housed there.
Although caging and noise levels have been briey considered, virtually any
aspect of an animals environment can cause stress as well. In addition, some
of the procedures routinely carried out on animals, such as cleaning cages or
handling by humans, have been shown to cause stress in laboratory animals.
There is even evidence to suggest that the very attitude of the handlers toward
the animals can signicantly affect their stress levels.
Animal husbandry seems to be an easy place to make changes that might
reduce animal stress and suffering, since these factors are relatively easy to
adjust and do not entail an abolition of experimentation in general. Two ques-
tions are generally raised about husbandry concerns: What are the behavioral
needs of animals, and do they suffer if these needs are frustrated?
92
Sometimes
the term boredom is used rather than suffering when referring to the ab-
sence of a stimulating environment.
93
However, in spite of the guidelines pub-
lished on animal husbandry issues, surprisingly few scientists pay attention to
these concerns, partly because the animals appear to be healthy.
94
Cost is an-
other factor often cited against making signicant husbandry changes, partic-
ularly in regard to changes in cage construction.
95
Animal husbandry is an
especially fruitful place to focus attention, since this is where many problems
seem to occur and because it is probably the easiest to correct, nancial costs
notwithstanding. Although improved conditions in the animal environment
might occur voluntarily, experience shows the need for enforced legislation. In
addition, training should be mandatory for all personnel who work directly
with animals, especially training in the particular species with which people
are working.
In addition to husbandry issues, though, the nature of some experiments
or even particular features in experiments can cause suffering in animals. For
example, in the discussion on denitions, aside from its physical component,
pain can also cause suffering, so that painful experiments can be assumed to
result in suffering as well as pain. Thus, any experiments that maim, cause
deformities, or otherwise make animals ill can typically be said to cause suf-
fering.
96
In addition, there are some experiments that, while they do not cause
pain, can be said to cause suffering. Some examples are psychological experi-
ments such as maternal deprivation studies (e.g., Harry Harlows famous ex-
periments in which infant monkeys were separated from their natural mothers
and either kept alone or with harmful surrogate mothers) and learned help-
lessness studies (often done with dogs who are continually subjected to shocks
from which they cannot escape so that they nally stop trying to escape, even
when the shocks cease; this is considered helpful in understanding depression
in humans). In addition, shock treatments, prolonged restraint, and food,
animal pain 73
sleep, or water deprivation can cause suffering as well as pain. We can probably
postulate the presence of suffering as well when species are denied opportu-
nities to engage in species-specic behavior, or fulllment of their telos. Ber-
nard Rollin has emphasized in several of his writings the importance of allow-
ing an animal to live according to its telos. Again, this goes beyond simply
applying a minimalist ethic, focused only on eliminating negative features in
the animals environment, to including positive features that will result in
greater animal well-being.
Although the difculty of assessing suffering is a real one, some have
devised objective methods for measuring this, with the ultimate intention of
reducing animal suffering. One approach tries to determine as best we can the
animals opinion, or perspective, on what is being done to him rather than
trying to see things only from our own perspective.
97
In this approach, there
are principally ve areas in which we can assess whether an animal is suffering:
physical health, physiological signs, behavior, comparisons with wild animals,
and analogies with ourselves. Although problems in one area may not be suf-
cient to determine the presence of suffering, problems in multiple areas pro-
vide considerably stronger evidence.
The rst criterion is poor physical health, which can generally be deter-
mined by observation alone. Symptoms of poor physical health include loss of
appetite, poor appearance, and weight loss. On the basis of a general poor
appearance, we can surmise that animals are suffering.
98
As indicated previ-
ously, the National Research Council books offer guidelines for the assessment
of pain that can also be utilized to assess suffering or distress.
The second criterion is physiological changes. Sometimes seemingly
healthy animals may be experiencing stress that is not evident by mere obser-
vation but can be ascertained through measurements, such as heart rate or
brain activity. However, the presence of stress does not necessarily mean the
presence of suffering, and therefore this may not be the best method for as-
sessing animal suffering. Some physiological changes may simply indicate that
an animal is adapting to its environment. Another problem with this criterion
is that the very testing of physiological factors may themselves cause suffer-
ing.
99
The third criterion is animal behavior. Animals often act maladaptively,
sometimes harming themselves and acting aggressively toward other animals,
when they are suffering. One specic way of studying how an animal may
suffer is by putting the animal in a mildly stressful situation and observing
her signs.
100
In particular, abnormal behavior needs to be distinguished from
unusual behavior; the former is more problematic and typically refers to a
persistence in manifesting undesirable actions, even in the absence of the
initial stressors.
101
The fourth criterion is comparing the behavior of laboratory animals with
that of their counterparts in the wild. Animals kept in captivity are often pre-
vented from engaging in behavior normal for those in the wild. Comparisons
with wild animals can help us learn more about behavior that is typical for
animals in their natural habitat and thus ultimately assist us in designing
laboratories that can allow for at least more of these activities. There are some
controversial aspects to this approach, however. First, domestication has sig-
nicantly modied the behavior of certain species, and there may be actual
genetic differences between wild and captive animals.
102
Second, it is by no
means a given that animals suffer if not allowed to behave naturallythat
is, to engage in activities natural for their wild counterparts. Third, this com-
parison suggests that wild animals do not suffer. Obviously, then, comparison
with wild animals is not sufcient in itself as a criterion, but it may serve as a
warning sign of the presence of suffering.
103
The nal criterion is analogies with ourselves, one of the same bases on
which it was determined that we can assess animal pain. As mentioned earlier,
there are considerable physiological similarities between some animals and
humans. The basis for analogy with ourselves in relationship to suffering is
that animals can also have unpleasant subjective experiences when prevented
from doing something they are strongly motivated to do. Some problems with
the argument from analogy are that we can misinterpret the behavior of ani-
mals (for example, a small rodent remaining still may seem to us to be resting,
but may in actuality be frozen in fear), it may be more physiologically difcult
to compare ourselves with certain species (e.g., birds), and basic biological facts
about other animals are simply very different from ours.
104
There is some
legitimacy in comparing animals with ourselves and drawing similar conclu-
sions, but this should be the last step in the assessment of animal suffering.
105
The benets of assessing animals suffering have been noted,
106
although
the concept of animal suffering is by no means as clear-cut as that of animal
pain. Even if one does not use the term suffering, the scientic community
itself in guidebooks is willing to talk about distress and stress, which are not
necessarily related to pain. Those conducting experiments need to pay attention
to the criteria noted previously and recognize that sometimes the very nature
of experimentation in general (rather than the specics of particular experi-
ments) can cause suffering to animals.
Approaches in Science to the Problem
of Animal Pain and Suffering
Subsequent chapters will argue, on philosophical and theological grounds, for
a more restrictive approach to animal experimentation. However, the steps
already accepted in the scientic community (to be discussed here) serve as a
minimal moral restriction on animal experimentation. Society at large and the
scientic community in general do not yet accept the more restrictive position
that will be developed later, but from my perspective those restrictions that do
currently exist today (primarily in the form of legislation) are acceptable as an
interim ethic while working toward a more restrictive approach to animal ex-
perimentation. Some initial proposals for legislative changes will be noted in
the appropriate sections here.
animal pain 75
Alternatives to Experiments
The concept of alternatives to the use of animals is generally called the 3Rs.
107
The 3Rs are replacement, reduction, and renement, all of which together
comprise the approach to alternatives. When animal activists refer to alterna-
tives, they often tend to focus specically on replacement of animal models
with other models. Because of this tendency, some scientists oppose the con-
cept of the 3Rs because of the implication that we can eventually do away with
using animals in experimentssomething they deny is possible. In fact, the
NIH and research advocacy organizations prefer to use instead the terms ad-
junct or complementary methods rather than alternatives.
108
However,
there does seem to be a general commitment to the concept of the 3Rs in the
scientic community, if it is understood as encompassing replacement, reduc-
tion, and renement. Although for purposes of denition and explanation it
is helpful to consider them individually, they do have a chronological progres-
sion and cannot always be so easily separated.
109
Replacement means replacing sentient animals with nonsentient animals
in experiments, if at all possible.
110
It can also refer to the use of plants and
humans.
111
Again, for some, the notion exists that animals can be completely
replaced with other models, but this has not been the way that replacement
has been traditionally understood. Replacement requires that if a researcher
believes that he can get the same result by utilizing a worm rather than a dog,
for example, then he should utilize the worm. There are obvious advantages
to the concept of replacement in that it has the potential to result in superior
research, it can reduce animal suffering, it can be cheaper, it can conserve wild
species, and it may be politically advantageous.
112
Reduction is the easiest and least controversial aspect of the 3Rs. It simply
means that, if in a particular experiment one cannot replace a sentient animal
with a nonsentient one, then one should make an attempt to use the least
number of animals necessary to yield accurate results. Statistical analysis is
generally utilized to assess the least number of necessary animals. Reduction
can also refer to the notion of actually reducing the number of experiments
performed, which is important in light of the problem of unnecessary dupli-
cation in experiments.
Renement comes in after replacement and reduction; once the rst two
have been attempted, then one is obligated to rene the experimental proce-
dure to inict the minimum amount of pain and distress on laboratory ani-
mals. Renement also includes the use of pain medication and humane de-
struction of animals at the conclusion of experiments, as well as rening
techniques within the research protocol itself to minimize causation of pain.
Although the terms 3Rs and alternatives are generally used inter-
changeably, the term alternatives is also frequently used in the literature to
refer to any methods by which whole living animal models can be replaced;
thus, alternatives sometimes refers only to different kinds of replacement
techniques. A number of organizations and journals are devoted to the pursuit
of alternatives to live animal models, in at least some experiments.
113
For an
alternative to animals to be seriously considered, the results must be satisfac-
tory, even though they might be somewhat less satisfactory than results from
the use of animals.
114
The search for alternatives to animals continues, with
additional monies being provided to research organizations, and the availability
of nonanimal sources is continually growing.
115
One alternative is the use of humans. Obviously, humans are already util-
ized in some experiments, and this issue has its own set of controversies,
particularly with regard to the issue of informed consent.
116
Notwithstanding
this problem, there may be some experiments currently conducted on animals
that can be performed on humans without signicant harm to them. In ad-
dition, the use of humans can also refer to the utilization of human tissue,
organs, and cells, such as corneas, blood, and fetal brain tissue,
117
or even to
the use of human cadavers.
A second alternative is in vitro tests, which can be contrasted with in vivo
tests. In vivo tests utilize whole intact animals, whereas in vitro tests utilize
parts of animals (such as organs or tissues).
118
One of the arguments against
in vitro tests is that it is generally not considered sufcient to study a tissue or
organ in isolation; it is important to see the interconnectedness of the entire
organism.
119
However, in vitro tests are often performed, in particular with
animal embryos. A test growing in popularity, especially in toxicity testing, is
the chick embryo test (referred to as the CAM assay test), in which an opening
is made in the shell of a partially developed chick and a potentially toxic sub-
stance is inserted to test the reaction. The early chick embryo is used because
it is not believed to have nerve sensations so early in its development. However,
ethical issues accompany even the use of animal embryos and fetuses. The
rst concern is that they should be used only if they have not yet reached a
developmental level where they are able to experience pain. The second con-
cern is that their use necessitates keeping reproductive adult animals.
Therefore, instead of using animal fetuses, it may be preferable to use the
tissues from animals already dead, such as the corneas of cows from slaugh-
terhouses.
120
A third alternative is the use of computer models. The principle here is
that the experiment can in a sense be done on the computer, with the re-
searcher varying the data on the computer rather than using actual animals to
determine how the data will change. Computer models tend to be more helpful
where physiological systems are well understood and are denable in mathe-
matical terms.
121
However, this method has been criticized on the same
grounds as in vitro tests and the use of alternatives in general: that they cannot
replicate a living, breathing organism in all its complexity. In addition, the use
of computers still requires that animal experiments be conducted initially, after
which the computer can be used to test different variables. However, computers
are being more widely used in medical education, especially with their increas-
ingly sophisticated graphic and interactive capabilities. The principal concern
in education regarding computers is whether using computers is pedagogically
more valuable than traditional hands-on methods.
122
Although these are the most common alternatives traditionally urged,
animal pain 77
other alternatives exist as well, including using wax models, using plants in-
stead of animals, using mathematical models (sometimes in conjunction with
computer models), and using lm and video recordings, particularly in edu-
cation.
123
It is likely that additional alternatives, or renements on existing
ones, will continue, and should continue, to be developed.
Although the concept of alternatives is widely accepted in theory, there is
still much resistance to the notion that we can ultimately completely do away
with animal models, for a number of reasons: there is a lack of training in
alternatives, there may be nancial constraints prohibiting the development of
alternatives, a conservative mind-set in the scientic community prefers to
stick to status quo methods (that is, the use of animal models in experi-
ments),
124
and a pressure to publish, with animal experiments bringing much
quicker results and thus more frequent papers for publication.
125
However,
there does seem to be a place for alternatives in the discussion on animal
experimentation, although their use in education and toxicity testing seems to
be more generally accepted than their use in biomedical research.
The concept of the 3Rs, and its adoption and incorporation by many, is a
positive sign. If animals indeed suffer and experience pain, then anything we
can do to reduce their numbers, replace them with alternative methods, and
rene procedures is laudatory. However, most of the effort in the scientic
community focuses on renement rather than replacement. In this regard,
increasing the nancial incentive for nding alternatives to traditional experi-
ments might move us in the direction of nonanimal alternatives, at least in
those experiments that we know cause pain and suffering. The emphasis on
in vivo use of animals is understandably strong, due to tradition and to the
entrenched belief that the best way to understand biological processes is by
viewing them in their entirety in a whole organism. However, the reluctance
of some to even consider the possibility that animals could be replaced, at least
in some experiments, will ultimately decrease creativity in the consideration
of alternatives and ensure that painful animal experimentation will be with us
for a long time to come.
Legislation
Legislation governing animal experimentation does address the issue of animal
pain to a certain extent.
126
In particular, the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) and
guidelines provided by the NIH to laboratories receiving funding serve a leg-
islative function in that they limit in some ways what can be done to research
animals. Although the NIH guidelines do not have the force of law behind
them, violations of these guidelines can result in the cessation of funding or
the closing of laboratories. According to some of the guidelines, all laboratories
administered by the USDA are supposed to be visited at least once a year (to
address problems in husbandry conditions), laboratories are supposed to con-
tact the National Agricultural Library before conducting research in order to
avoid the unnecessary duplication of experiments by reference to its data
bank,
127
the institutional animal care and use committee (IACUC) must in-
clude at least one noninstitutional member and a veterinarian, and research
facilities are supposed to train all personnel in the proper care of animals.
128
The presence of the veterinarian is to ensure that sources of distress are iden-
tied and eliminated, although this is also the responsibility of the investiga-
tor.
129
However, there are certain limitations to legislation at the present time.
Animals are still primarily considered property under the law.
130
Some of the
criticism is leveled particularly at IACUCs. All research protocols in funded
laboratories must receive their approval, but little guidance is provided to them
to determine the potential harmfulness of experiments, and there is no ofcial
policy for disallowing an experiment that is deemed harmful.
131
Thus, the re-
searcher has tremendous discretion and ultimately the nal say in research
design.
132
Although IACUCs are intended to enhance renement, they have
not been very effective in terms of replacement or reduction.
133
Interviews
conducted with IACUC members in an independent study found some addi-
tional problems: a bias toward approving research protocols, conicts of inter-
est by committee members, lack of tolerance for opposing voices, lack of ac-
countability to the public, and little participation from those representing
public concerns.
134
Finally, in experiments involving pain or distress, only one
member of the committee is needed to approve it. Ultimately, the veto power
of IACUCs is limited because they are not allowed to interfere in the design,
outline, or guidelines of the experiment. Thus, in effect, the prohibition of
unnecessary suffering in the act is determined by what is considered necessary
by the researcher.
135
Although somewhat difcult to legislate, strengthening
the power of IACUCs would go a long way in reducing animal pain and suf-
fering, in particular by including the presence of a committee member rep-
resenting the animals interest who would be free from intimidation, and by
allowing the IACUCs to have a greater impact on research protocols. One
specic way they could minimize animal pain would be through the presence
of more than one member on the committee who is an advocate for the ani-
mals, because sometimes the IACUC is primarily viewed as a rubber-stamping
process, and the voices of those advocating for the animals are largely silenced.
Another major problem with the current legislation is that the USDAoften
does not do its job in enforcing the AWA in a number of different areas: facil-
ities are not inspected as often as required, inadequate training is provided for
inspectors, and there is inadequate follow-up on facilities with problems.
136
Apparently the USDA has been unhappy from the beginning with having to
enforce the AWA, and therefore it is not surprising that its compliance has
been minimal and unenthusiastic. As mentioned in the previous chapter, there
are signicant problems with data collection. Finally, pharmaceutical compa-
nies and toxicity testing labs are not covered by the Act because they do not
receive federal funding.
137
For the legislation to respond more directly to the
issues of animal pain and suffering, these problems need to be resolved. Di-
verting some research money to the enforcement of the AWA would enable
the USDA to perform its job with regard to procedures required by the fed-
eral law.
animal pain 79
The scientic community, whether on its own initiative or due to pressure
from without, seems to have a growing concern for animal pain and suffering.
Legislation continues to increasingly rene existing regulations for the treat-
ment of animals in laboratories and thus ensure that some restrictions are in
place on what can be done to at least some animals, with the exception of the
last amendment. As an interim ethic, the current legislation should be more
strictly adhered to, and severe penalties administered for any violations. In
addition, several additional legislative positive changes should eventually be
made: combine the AWA and Public Health Service policy into one law so that
the guidelines on the treatment of laboratory animals are consistent; extend
protection to all experimental animals believed likely to feel pain, namely, all
vertebrates and the invertebrate cephalopods (it is a glaring omission that the
animals utilized in approximately 75 to 90 percent of animal experiments
namely, rodentsare not covered by the AWA); extend protection to all animals
used in experiments (including the junior high, high school, and college levels)
where federal funding is not provided; and work toward signicantly improving
husbandry conditions by taking into account not only the minimal physical
needs of animals but also their emotional and species-specic well-being. It is
especially problematic that the 2002 AWA amendment has the effect of per-
manently excluding certain species from protection, rst of all because of its
resultant continued deleterious effects on these species and, second, because
the nature of law is usually understood to be changing and evolving, not static.
Use of Pain Scales
Another method for minimizing animal pain is requiring the use of pain
scales. Although not mandatory in the United States or most other countries,
pain scales have been adopted by some countries as part of their public policy
and by some IACUCs in the United States. Pain scales provide a classication
system for rating pain inicted on animals in experiments, and their purpose
is to reduce animal pain, convey concern about animal pain, and emphasize
the need to justify every experiment. In addition, the use of pain scales can
provide a category for procedures that might be unacceptable from the per-
spective of animal pain and suffering.
138
Pain scales are designed to measure
not only pain but also suffering and other harms. Therefore, they should prob-
ably be called categories of invasiveness (as they are in Canada) rather than
pain scales.
139
Generally, pain or invasiveness scales are divided into several categories
representing the level of pain experienced. An example of one categorization
is as follows: Category A (involves use of nonsentient organisms and thereby
involves no suffering), Category B (experiments on vertebrates that produce
little or no discomfort), Category C (experiments on vertebrates that involve
some short-term pain or discomfort), Category D (experiments on vertebrates
that involve signicant distress or discomfort), and Category E (experiments
on conscious vertebrates involving severe pain with no pain relief ).
140
In ad-
dition, the categories also include descriptions of the kinds of procedures that
would t into a particular category. One of the ways this kind of scale can be
used is to incorporate it into a research protocol that would ultimately be as-
sessed by an IACUC.
For pain scales to be truly effective, researchers must be willing to use
them to rule out certain experiments and procedures, and they would need to
be utilized universally by researchers as well as by IACUCs. Of course, some
problems would need to be addressed in the utilization of pain scales: assessing
animal pain requires subjectivity; it does not address the problem of animals
killed; it does not address other procedural issues (such as husbandry con-
cerns);
141
the same procedure could cause mild or severe pain, depending on
the skill of the researcher;
142
and any attempt to compile statistics on percent-
ages of animals utilized in each of the different categories (for those institu-
tions that use them) is insufcient, partly because institutions vary in the way
they report their use of animals by pain category.
143
In addition, the way they
are set up now excludes from consideration and protection invertebrates that
feel pain.
In spite of some of these shortcomings, the use of pain scales, if made
mandatory in reviewing research protocols, would be a tangible way to decrease
animal pain and suffering. Although there is an element of subjectivity in this
assessment and though there may still be pressure to approve a particular
experiment, the presence of specic criteria could establish a level beyond
which we could not go in animal experimentation.
Use of Drugs
The use of pain-relieving drugs is another important component in the man-
agement of animal pain. There are several important terms to be dened,
representing different kinds of medication and their relief of pain. Curariform
agents produce muscle relaxation or paralysis but have no effect on pain. Al-
though widely used in experimentation at one time, they have generally fallen
into disuse unless combined with another drug because, even though the an-
imal is rendered impotent, she can still experience pain but cannot commu-
nicate that pain. Thus, the researcher may not realize the extent of pain the
animal is experiencing. Analgesics are what we typically mean by pain relievers.
They are drugs that do not cause sleep or unconsciousness, such as aspirin.
Anesthesia is used to induce unconsciousness and is generally administered
before surgery.
144
Historically, anesthesia for either humans or animals was
not widely used until 1850,
145
and in veterinary practice it was little used until
the twentieth century.
146
While it is now standard practice to administer an-
esthesia for animals undergoing surgery, the use of analgesics has been more
sporadic. In particular, they are often not provided in the postoperative period,
especially for rodents. Whereas virtually all researchers use anesthesia, the use
of analgesics is left to the discretion of the researcher, and they are thereby
infrequently used. This is also partly because the researchers do not perceive
that animals are suffering or in pain.
147
Several other reasons generally given
for not administering analgesics are that the animal might injure herself, the
animal pain 81
drugs may have undesirable side effects, it is difcult to determine dosages,
and the drugs might adversely affect the experimental results.
148
Thus, while
drugs are sometimes used to minimize pain and suffering in laboratory ani-
mals, their use appears to be sporadic and inconsistent.
Drugs should be used wherever they can possibly minimize or eliminate
animal pain. Although some argue that using drugs could skew the results of
the experiment, to know or even strongly suspect that an animal is experiencing
severe pain that could be mitigated with anesthetics but not use them is un-
conscionable. Although there may be a very few exceptional circumstances in
which animals would not be given pain relievers, withholding pain relievers
should be the exception and not the rule.
Use of Preference Tests
One empirical method used for assessing potential animal suffering that is
specically a result of husbandry conditions is the use of preference tests.
Preference tests provide a group of animals choices about a certain feature in
their environment. The idea behind preference tests is that we are in a sense
asking the animals for their opinionstheir likes and dislikesof their ex-
perimental environment, because they may be in a better position to know this
than we are. They are a way of allowing animals to vote with their feet.
149
Preference tests thus provide an objective basis by which to assess animal
suffering. If an animal will work hard to escape from a particular environment
or work hard to get into a particular environment, we might have a good sense
of what his preferences are. The real advantage of these tests is that they seem
to provide the animals perspective.
A number of different preference tests have been utilized. In one test,
battery hens were allowed a choice of which kind of ooring on which they
would prefer to stand.
150
In another test, in an effort to determine preference
for caging conditions, three different groups of hamsters were housed sepa-
rately, one of which was the control group, one of which included a jar in their
cage, and one of which included a pipe in their cage. On the basis of obser-
vations of reduced aggression, the researchers concluded that the animals pre-
ferred an enriched environment (presence of the pipe and jar), with a prefer-
ence for the jar over the pipe.
151
Another study on barbering in mice (the activity
by which mice bite the fur and whiskers of other mice) found that when en-
vironmental enrichment is provided, the incidence of barbering signicantly
decreased.
152
On the basis of many such experiments, it has been determined
that, when given a choice, animals prefer a more stimulating environment.
153
Like everything else related to improving conditions for laboratory ani-
mals, though, a number of problems with preference tests have been pointed
out: they do not measure the strength of a preference (although tests can be
designed to do so); an animals short-term preferences may be different from
his long-term preferences; preferences can vary depending on the testing
method, breed of animal, and the individual animal; and animals do not always
choose what is best for their long-term well-being. Thus, preference tests
should be used in conjunction with other methods.
154
However, in spite of these
shortcomings, more preference test studies should be done as long as we con-
tinue to experiment on animals, since their laboratory environment is where
they will spend most, if not all, of their lives, and anything we can do to make
it more pleasant will be of ultimate value to the animals.
Despite the particular problems with preference tests, they should be more
widely used, and their results should be taken more seriously by those working
with animals, especially with regard to husbandry concerns. The idea of seeing
things from the animals perspective, as best as possible, might result in a
more empathetic approach that, while at least partly based in subjectivity, could
go a long way toward reducing animal pain and suffering.
Euthanasia
Finally, animal death has also become an important concern of those working
with animals, since animals are generally put to death at the conclusion of an
experiment. The term euthanasia is generally used in medical situations to
refer to a kind of mercy killing in which the animal or human in question has
its life ended prematurely, and ideally painlessly, due to the possibility of an
extended period of pain and suffering. Thus, euthanasia is often implicitly
understood to mean a painless death, generally for the well-being of the one
undergoing it. The National Research Council denes it in the following way:
Euthanasia is the act of inducing death without pain. Humane death of an
animal may be dened as one in which the animal is rendered unconscious,
and thus insensitive to pain, as rapidly as possible with a minimum of fear
and anxiety.
155
However, the term euthanasia has also been used to refer to
the convenience killing of animals, such as when there is an excess number
of animals, such as in shelters and zoos. Because of the virtual inevitability of
animals being put to death in research laboratories, there is a concern that the
method of death be painless. In cases where humane killing is not carried out,
the very process of death is simply one more opportunity for animals to ex-
perience further pain and suffering. Although by denition euthanasia is hu-
mane, this has not always been true in practice. In fact, much of the literature
on this subject addresses the most humane methods of euthanasia for partic-
ular species.
156
One of the general concerns with euthanasia for animals relates to if and
how death harms animals. It is obvious that we consider death to be harmful
to humans for a number of reasons, including that it prevents a persons future
(usually pleasurable experiences) and because of the effect that the death will
have on others close to the deceased. The killing of humans by other humans
is usually considered a violation of a persons rights (the most foundational
one being the right to life), as well as of his autonomy. Euthanasia for humans
has recently garnered much discussion in medical ethics textbooks, where the
argument is generally presented in terms of quality versus quantity of life and
also in terms of whether humans are playing God by making these decisions
animal pain 83
about their own or others deaths. Considerable discussion has ensued with
regard to how death might hurt animals.
The reasons for which animals are put to death in research laboratories
vary: to collect tissue, to humanely end their suffering from illness or disease,
to conduct autopsies because they are not suited for other experiments, and
due to an overstock from breeding.
157
One of the reasons for the controversy
related to euthanasia is that no guidelines are available to indicate precisely
when an animal needs to be euthanized. The emphasis on euthanasia methods
generally relates to the particular species, but the sensibilities of the human
participants in the procedure need to be considered as well. However, the well-
being of the animal should be the principal concern. For this reason, it is
generally recommended that animals not be killed in the presence of other
animals.
158
Another interesting point to note in the discussion of euthanasia
in the scientic literature is that the death of animals is usually referred to by
the term sacrice.
159
Using a euphemism in this way may serve the purpose
that all such language does: to obscure the reality of the situation or to objectify
it in some sense.
The emphasis on euthanasia as a humane putting to death can be helpful
in alleviating animal suffering and distress, in that the decision can be made
to end animal life before it becomes too distressing or painful and because
efforts need to be taken to avoid deaths becoming simply one more painful
experience in the lives of experimental animals. However, an issue regarding
euthanasia that needs to be challenged is the practice of routinely putting to
death animals at the conclusion of an experiment, especially when the animals
may still be healthy.
It is regrettable that animal death is the standard end to animal experi-
ments. When this is necessary for the conclusion of the experimentsfor
example, if the animal is to be dissected and a portion of her body analyzed
then it may be more defensible. However, when postmortem dissection is not
a part of the experimental protocol and it is determined after the experiment
that the animal can probably live a healthy life, greater efforts should be made
to adopt out these animals. Obviously, some animals, such as dogs and cats,
have greater adoptive appeal, but this does not foreclose the possibility of nd-
ing homes for other research animals as well.
160
However, when animals must
be put to death, the most humane methods possible should be used, by those
specically trained in these methods, without cost being the most important
consideration.
Conclusion
What, then, can we conclude from this brief overview of animal pain and
suffering, in terms of an ethic of pain management in laboratory animals? My
position is that animals do undergo pain and suffering in many experiments
and that greater attention must be paid to minimizing or reducing the pain
that animals experience. As an interim ethic for the reduction of animal pain
and suffering, the existing legislation needs to be enforced and severe penalties
administered for any violations. Obviously, changes need to be made to AWA
in terms of the animals protected. As a way of providing greater protection,
some other suggestions to be incorporated into legislation include additional
funding for research into alternatives and the promotion of the use of alter-
natives; the mandatory use of pain scales; greater power on the part of IACUCs
to veto or rene experiments; additional funding for the USDA to carry out its
responsibilities in monitoring animal laboratories; having one comprehensive
law that covers all animal experimentation, including protection of those spe-
cies not currently protected (particularly mice, rats, birds, and cephalopods);
mandatory use of pain-relieving medication for at least extremely painful pro-
cedures and experiments, especially in postoperative care; continued use of
preference tests and the incorporation of these results into husbandry condi-
tions; and humane euthanasia in all cases, with an attempt to nd ways to
more humanely dispose of research animals, such as by adoption. A helpful
rule of thumb would be that when there is good reason to believe that particular
animal species can experience pain and suffering, their use should be subject
to the most stringent guidelines, and when the evidence is more ambivalent,
we should proceed very cautiously and be willing to extend greater protection
to any subsequent species that we may eventually nd to be capable of expe-
riencing pain and suffering.
The answer to the question of whether animals should ever be subject to
pain cannot be sufciently addressed in this chapter, and obviously it is not
the only issue to consider in the treatment of laboratory animals. Therefore,
the next chapter will consider the further issue of whether experimental ani-
mals do and should have rights.
4
Animal Rights
The issue of rights, even for humans, is one of the most contro-
verted ones in philosophy.
1
It is not surprising, then, that the spe-
cic question of whether animals have rights is even more problem-
atic. In this chapter, I will argue for the thesis that animals do have
moral and natural rights
2
and that they should have legal rights ex-
tended to them as well. The signicance of the argument that ani-
mals have rights is that it challenges the notion that potentially ben-
ecial consequences to human beings are the only bases for judging
appropriate behavior toward animals, both in science and in other
settings. Possession of rights accords greater protection to rights
holders than what they might have without rights. Although the
question of animal rights applies to the use of animals in general,
the focus here will be on rights with regard to experimental animals
in particular. The chapter will proceed as follows. In the rst section,
I will argue for the position that animals have rights by dening
what is meant by rights, by distinguishing between moral and legal
rights, and by presenting grounds for animal rights. In the second
section, I will present the arguments against my position and my re-
buttal of these arguments. In the third section, I will lay out some of
the specic rights that experimental animals should have. In the -
nal section, I will offer some concluding remarks.
Arguments for Why Animals Have Rights
What It Means to Say That Animals Have Rights
Before arguing for why animals have rights, I will briey dene
what is meant by a right. Rights have been dened in many differ-
ent ways, but in its simplest understanding, a right is something that is due
to someone as ones own. After asserting that rights typically include notions
of entitlements to be treated in certain ways, valid claims an individual can
make or have made on his behalf, and having ones interests and welfare taken
into account, Tom Regan ultimately denes what rights are as simply justied
limitation or constraint upon how others may act.
3
It is something that is
owed to the rights holder by others in the community, based on the intrinsic
nature of the rights holder rather than simply being a means for something
else. Two generic distinctions of rights are natural rights and positive rights.
Natural rights are those based on nature or, for theists, those based on Gods
gift to us. Positive rights, on the other hand, come from the free will of the
peoplethose rights acknowledged and bestowed on the rights holders by
others in the community.
First, the most basic way in which rights can be understood in regard to
animals is to say that animals can be wronged.
4
Of course, it is possible to
assert this without resorting to rights language, as, for example, those might
do who believe that our obligations to animals are just treating them with
kindness and abstaining from cruelty. However, arguing from the perspective
of rights puts a stronger foundation under the notions of kindness and absence
of cruelty; it states in a much more emphatic way that there are restrictions on
what we can do with and to animals and that these restrictions arise from
something within the nature of the animals themselves.
Second, arguing for animal rights means that our duties to animals are
direct rather than indirect. Rights and duties are typically reciprocal, so that if
we say that a creature has rights, then others have the duty to protect those
rights. Having indirect duties to animals means that what is wrong with harm-
ing animals is not primarily the harm resulting to an animal but the harm
potentially resulting to a human being. It means that the reason, or motivation,
for refraining from cruelty to animals is the effect that the action will have on
the human being engaging in the action or on the human being whose animal
is on the receiving end of the cruel treatment. From an indirect duties per-
spective, in the former case, when a person acts cruelly toward and harms an
animal, the real problem is that her behavior may ultimately lead to practicing
cruel behavior toward other humans, so that her very nature can become de-
sensitized to suffering in general. In the latter case, having only indirect duties
to animals means that when a person harms anothers animal (such as a pet),
he is actually doing harm to the owner of the animal, because the animal is
her property and therefore she does not want to see her animal harmed. Al-
though in both cases the end result of prohibiting such behavior would be
abstaining from cruelty to animals (and therefore the animal would benet),
the motivation for such action is human centered. However, even acknowledg-
ing that harming an animal could result in harm to humans does not prohibit
us from arguing as well that what is really wrong with being cruel to animals
is that it harms the animals themselves. Thus, rights implies a direct duty
to animals themselves because of the effect the negative treatment will have
on them directly.
animal rights 87
Third, to say that animals have rights means that animals have intrinsic
rather than instrumental value. Intrinsic value means that animals have value
in themselves, apart from any benet that they may yield for humans. To say
that an experimental animal in particular has intrinsic value means that her
entire worth is not tied up with what she can yield for humans in terms of
scientic knowledge and advances in the ght against disease and that she
should not be regarded or treated as such. However, intrinsic value does not
necessarily mean the absence of instrumental value. Thus, experimental ani-
mals can be used for human purposes at times (instrumental value), but what
will likely safeguard their well-being and protect them from excessive harm is
the position that they have value, worth, and integrity in and of themselves
(intrinsic value), which places constraints on what we can do to them. To assert
intrinsic value for animals is to mean something like Kants categorical im-
perative put in language related to animals: We should treat animals as ends
in themselves and never only as means to our ends.
Fourth, to say that animals have rights is to say that they have interests
that should not routinely be sacriced for human benet.
5
This means that
animals have a well-being, or quality of life, which should place some con-
straints on how we can interfere with this well-being, just as in the case of
humans. Although there are several different ways of understanding interests
and different bases for interests (such as interests based on sentience, prefer-
ences, or desires), in the most elementary sense, it means that animals have
a well-being that can be interfered with. If animals have an interest in avoiding
pain and suffering (as will be argued later in this chapter), then our assigning
them rights is a way of protecting their interests.
Fifth, asserting that animals have rights means more than saying that we
should use the language of rights with reference to animals. In other words,
there is a distinction between actually saying that animals have rights (which
is what is being argued) and saying that we should use rights language with
reference to animals. An example of the latter would be Peter Singers conten-
tion that although animals do not have rights, using this kind of language may
be a convenient political shorthand, since people understand what we mean
when we use rights language.
6
Although Singers position is certainly tenable,
it does fall short of what the actual assertion of rights maintainsthat we
should not simply talk as if animals have rights, but, rather, we need to assert
that animals do have rights. Thus, while rights language is important, it is the
attribution of rights that is the more important consideration.
Another way to explain what is meant by rights is considering what is not
meant when saying that animals have rights. Obviously, to say that animals
have rights is not to say that they do have or should have identical rights to
humans. One way that the notion of animal rights is ridiculed is by pointing
to a right of humans (such as voting) and, by way of analogy, demonstrating
the absurdity of assigning that right to animals.
7
However, we do not believe
that even all humans have the same rights. Although there are certain general
rights that we would accord to all humans (such as life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness), there are more specic rights applicable to particular groups of
individuals. Thus, in our society we have decided that women should have the
right to an abortion, but obviously we would not say that men have this same
right, because it does not make sense to assign this right to men. In the same
way, just as men and women may have some but not all of the same rights,
the same case can be argued with regard to animals. To argue for animal rights
is also not to say that all animals have the same rights as other animals. As
with the previous example regarding men and women, all animals have some
of the same general rights, but some species may have greater rights or dif-
ferent kinds of rights than others.
There are numerous benets to asserting that animals have rights. As
mentioned previously, the existence of rights generally provides a stronger
foundation for protection of the individuals who are granted them. It provides
signicant restrictions or constraints on howothers may treat the class of rights
holders. Rights give one greater status in the moral community than one would
have without the possession of rights; they confer a dignity that might other-
wise be lacking. Rights tend to be justice oriented rather than based on charity
and thus can be enforceable, especially legal rights. In fact, the laws of society
depend on the enforcement of such rights.
However, there are limitations to the use of rights language in general,
whether with regard to humans or to animals. Rights cannot cover all possible
contingencies. This is simply another way of saying that rights by nature must
be generic, or general. With regard to human rights, we often assert them in
general terms, such as the right to life, without carefully delineating every
exigent circumstance. In the same way, although an attempt will be made to
delineate the rights that animals should have, an underlying assumption is
that these rights can be stated only in general terms. Even when it comes to
human rights, such as the right to life, we certainly allow for circumstances in
which this right can or should be trumped, such as in cases of war or self-
defense. This is just another way of saying that rights are not absolute.
8
In addition, rights cannot eliminateor even adequately addressall con-
ict cases. It is inevitable that the rights of some individuals will conict with
the rights of others. With regard specically to the issue of animal experimen-
tation, the conict will generally come down to one between humans and
animals. Does the right of a human always trump the right of an animal? Does
it matter which rights are being considered? Obviously, the problem of conict
cases is not something unique to animals but arises in relation to humans as
well, such as when the rights of one group (e.g., the right of individuals to own
private property) conicts with the rights of another group (e.g., the needs of
the state to use the property for the common good). In the chapter on burden/
benet analysis, I will delineate some guidelines that would govern at least
some of the conict cases, but it is inevitable that when we use rights language,
conicts will arise that cannot always be easily adjudicated.
Finally, it is important to point out that there is considerable resistance to
the idea of animals having rights. Some reasons are physical (the sheer number
of animals we regularly kill), economic (the large amount of money invested
in animal use), political (some treatment of animals has often been compared
animal rights 89
to human slavery), religious (particularly the dominion argument), historical
(animals have never had rights before), legal (the law usually divides the phys-
ical universe into persons and things), and psychological (the belief that ani-
mals do not have mentality corresponding to that in humans).
9
The Relationship between Moral and Legal Rights
Oftentimes in discussions of animal rights, it is unclear whether moral or legal
rights are the subject, which tends to confuse the issue.
10
For this reason, it is
important to distinguish between themto explain what is meant by each one
and to demonstrate the relationship between them. As mentioned earlier, the
thesis of this chapter is that animals have moral rights and should have legal
rights as well.
Another way of talking about moral rights is to call them natural rights.
Moral rights are those rights that are somehow inherent in the nature of being
itself. Even when it comes to human beings, the traditional ways of arguing
for the bases or grounds of rights is to say that they come from God, they are
self-evident, or they come from or are there by nature. With regard to animals,
the basis of rights for animals is best asserted on grounds of their nature.
Arguing for rights as coming from God at this point unnecessarily limits the
discussion to theists,
11
and it is certainly problematic to say that it is self-evident
that animals should have rights. Obviously, to most people in the contemporary
period, it seems absurd to suggest that animals have or should have rights. To
say that animals have rights by nature means simply that they have moral rights
on the basis of the criteria they possess.
12
Legal rights, on the other hand, are those rights that are enforceable by
law. One way of understanding them is to say that legal rights are any theo-
retical advantage conferred by recognized legal rules.
13
While there is a dif-
ference of opinion as to whether animals have moral rights, it is indisputable
that animals do not have legal rights. In fact, twentieth-century judicial deci-
sions have reconrmed the legal thinghood rather than the legal person-
hood of animals.
14
However, this does not mean that they do not have protec-
tion under the law. As discussed in chapter 1, numerous laws protect animals,
including laws governing laboratories that receive government funding, the
federal Animal Welfare Act, and various state laws. Animals do have some
protection under the law, but it is insufcient and not generally based on the
notion that animals have rights. Thus, legal protection does not equal legal
rights.
15
Under the law, animals are merely considered property.
16
Therefore,
they have no legal standing in court. This lack of legal standing extends even
to humans who might wish to bring a lawsuit on behalf of animals they believe
to have been mistreated or harmed. People can do this only if they have been
directly harmed themselves by the action to the animal, and since this would
be virtually impossible to demonstrate in the case of experimental animals,
people would always be prohibited from suing on behalf of experimental ani-
mals in particular.
17
One of the legal problems with protection for research
animals in particular is that scientic research is exempt from many state
anticruelty statutes,
18
so that we allow treatment toward research animals that
we would never allow for pets. Providing legal rights to animals could circum-
vent this problem.
19
Obviously, there are differences between moral and legal rights, although
there is a relationship between them. Whereas moral rights are discovered,
legal rights are conferred or ascribed. Moral rights do not have the force of
law, whereas legal rights are conferred by a legal system.
20
Moral rights tend
to be universal and inalienable, whereas legal rights depend on the law of the
country. Although both moral and legal rights are important in the discussion
of animals, moral rights are the more foundational issue, for several reasons.
First, animals already have some protection under the law. While it is not as
strong as the protection they could have by possessing legal rights, there are
still some restrictions on how we can treat them. Second, moral rights are
often used as a reason for obtaining legal protection for the interests they
protect.
21
Thus, moral rights are often viewed as the basis for legal rights. It is
difcult to argue that animals should have legal rights if we cannot rst dem-
onstrate that they have moral rights. Therefore, we must rst discover the moral
rights that animals have and then ascribe legal rights to them on this basis.
However, even if moral rights do not result in legal rights, they are still im-
portant because, as was noted earlier, the existence of rights tends to raise the
dignity, status, and protection of these rights holders above what they would
have if they did not have moral rights. Tom Regan notes that the notion of
rights with regard to animals is abolitionist by nature, but it can also consis-
tently support incremental steps,
22
which I am arguing in this book. When the
word rights is used in this book, it refers to moral rights unless otherwise
indicated, since demonstrating the existence of moral rights is the more con-
troversial and basic issue. However, the presumption also exists that the next
step after demonstrating moral rights is ascribing legal rights.
Grounds for Rights
As argued here, the basis for moral rights for animals should primarily be
grounded in their nature. There are three bases for the natural rights of ani-
mals: sentience, cognitive criteria, and miscellaneous arguments, each of
which will be examined separately. The rst and most important is the criterion
of sentiency, by which is meant the capacity to experience pain and suffering.
23
Although pain can lead to suffering, it is also possible for suffering to be
present without the causation of pain, such as with regard to husbandry con-
ditions. Therefore, it is important to include both notions in talking about
sentiency. I have previously argued that animals experience pain in a sensory
way (physically) and emotionally as well, due to the presence of nociceptors, a
central nervous system (or nerve clusters), and aversion in the face of painful
stimuli. Animals can also experience suffering (e.g., anxiety, stress, fear, dis-
tress), although animals with higher cognitive states may suffer more than
other animals. In addition, animals have at least simple desires, such as the
animal rights 91
desire to be free from pain and the desire for food and water, the lack of which
can lead to pain and suffering.
For all of these reasons, to say that animals are sentient and that sentiency
is an important criterion means that animals can be harmed as research ani-
mals because of pain caused to them, the suffering they undergo directly or
indirectly by virtue of being research subjects, and by being deprived of what
they need and desire. Therefore, sentiency is the bottom-line criterion on the
basis of which animals should be permitted into the moral arena. Sentiency is
basic to the discussion of rights of animals because we tend to believe that
pain and sufferingat least unnecessary pain and sufferingare evils in
themselves. In addition, the harms visited on experimental animals tend to
cause them pain and suffering, and therefore their capacity to experience these
negative states must be foundational in assigning them rights. In fact, the word
animal has been dened for the purpose of this project to include all animals
that are believed to already have this capacity. Thus, all animals capable of
experiencing pain and suffering (all vertebrates and some invertebrates) should
be extended rights. In addition, any animals that we subsequently discover to
experience pain and suffering should also be extended rights. In this regard,
the criterion of sentiency must be an elastic one. Finally, while cognitive states
are also important in the consideration of rights, there is considerable dis-
agreement as to the extent of cognitive states of animals, whereas there is more
general agreement that animals can at least experience pain and possibly suf-
fering as well. In addition, one of the reasons for extending rights to marginal
humans is their ability to experience pain, although they may have limited
cognitive states, often well below that of normal adult humans. What the cri-
terion of sentiency does with regard to the rights of animals, then, is to extend
at least basic protection to all sentient animals, with the basis of protection
being the possession of sentiency. Just as with humans, though, the absence
of pain and suffering is not sufcient; we must also move in the direction of
well-being. To put this in terms of rights, rights must have a positive as well
as a negative component.
However, sentiency is not the only basis for animal rights. Although there
is controversy regarding cognitive states of animals, I have already argued that
animals do have minds, that animals mental experiences are similar to those
of humans, that the differences between humans and animals in terms of
cognition are differences of degree rather than kind, that there is a continuum
of cognitive ability, that animals weak sense of autonomy at the very least puts
some restrictions on what we can do to them in experiments, and that their
ability to communicate enables them to make known their nonconsent.
There are several reasons for introducing cognition as an additional basis
for the possession of rights. One reason is related to the question of what would
happen if animals were unable to feel paindoes this mean that it would not
matter how we treat them? Thus, the introduction of the criterion of cognition
allows for pain and suffering to be the most basic criterion, but if for some
reason an animal lacked sentiency, the possession of certain mental states
should certainly accord them some rights. Obviously, it is difcult to imagine
a case where an animal would be unable to experience pain but still have
cognitive states, but the possibility that this could theoretically happen is suf-
cient to make a case for a second criterion. A second reason for an additional
criterion to be added to that of sentiency is that assigning rights on the basis
of cognitive states enables us to be able to distinguish between animals and
subsequently to distinguish among rights assigned to particular animals. Thus,
all animals should have some rights based simply on sentiency, but ner lines
of distinction can be made among species based on their cognitive ability. Thus,
animals with greater cognition should be afforded greater protection, especially
with regard to suffering and death.
Finally, the third grounds for rights are based on two miscellaneous ar-
guments, which I will mention only briey. One argument brings together
James Rachelss notion that animals have a biographical (and not simply a
biological) life
24
and Tom Regans notion that animals (at least mammals one
year or older) are subjects-of-a-life, meaning that they have perception, mem-
ory, beliefs, self-consciousness, intention, and a sense of the future.
25
Some of
these characteristics I have already included in the discussion of cognitive cri-
teria, but what I mean by this is that animals have rights because they are
beings who have a life that matters to them. They are not simply creatures of
instinct but can make some choices about their lives, and they seek to avoid
that which is harmful and to pursue that which is helpful. They have the
capacity to enjoy life, and therefore we should extend the legal right to them
to be able to do this to a certain degree, especially when we have virtually
ultimate control over their destiny and well-being, as in the case of experimen-
tal animals. In addition, as mentioned earlier, the idea that animals have been
created by God could provide at least intrinsic value to animals, on the basis
of which we can infer rights.
Arguments of Those Who Disagree with My Position
Obviously, not everyone agrees with my contention that animals have rights
or with the basis upon which rights should be granted. The disagreements can
be grouped into three different areas: those who maintain that rights language
is problematic in itself and therefore is not particularly helpful with regard to
protection for either animals or humans; those who argue that animals in
particular cannot have rights because of the signicant differences between
humans and animals; and those who argue for a different basis for rights for
animals.
Problems with Rights in General
Although the language and notion of rights have been widely used with regard
to humans, especially since the Enlightenment period, not all have agreed that
rights is the best way to talk about protection for other beings. There are two
animal rights 93
basic positions within this approach: the idea that rights language is problem-
atic in and of itself and the utilitarian idea that the existence of basic moral
rights would require an obligation other than consequences in determining
right moral action.
With regard to rights language in particular, rights have been criticized for
being individualistic (and, in particular, part of liberal-individualist capitalist
societies)
26
and adversarial, predominantly negative rather than positive, essen-
tialist, minimalistic, paternalistic (assigned by those with power and also tend-
ing to favor the powerful),
27
and therefore easily withdrawn, difcult to enforce,
and subject to slippery-slope arguments. As noted previously, there are limi-
tations to rights language, and therefore it is difcult to disagree with some of
the challenges raised. However, instead of arguing why these contentions are
wrong, I will argue why these challenges are not insurmountable obstacles in
the discussion of rights in general and animal rights in particular.
The issue with regard to the individualistic and adversarial nature of rights
is that it can eliminate concern for the common good by focusing only or
especially on the individual and the violation of his rights and by setting people
against each other or, in the case of animals, in setting people against animals.
While this is certainly a danger, particularly in our contemporary overly liti-
gious society, the actual benets to be gained are greater than the potential
harms. When it comes to issues of morality and justice, conicts are unavoid-
able. Conict in and of itself is not necessarily a problem, but rather how the
conict is resolved. Rights language must by its very nature be adversarial
because some individuals or groups take advantage or trample the rights of
others, and, if the others object, an adversarial relationship will be estab-
lished. However, adversarial relationships will exist even without the use of
rights language, and one of the signicant benets of rights language is that
it can help to highlight and redress this adversarial relationship.
Although rights language is typically predominantly negative rather than
positive, this is not even always true with regard to rights for humans, and
certainly rights by their very nature do not need to be negative. The most basic
rights of humans are usually stated in positive terms: that humans have the
right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Of course, whether stat-
ing rights positively or negatively, the opposite is always implied. Thus, having
the right to life implies that one has the right to not have ones life taken away
(except in certain extreme circumstances). With regard to the rights of exper-
imental animals that I will delineate here, both negative and positive rights
will be argued for.
The charge that rights are essentialist is a challenge to the search from
virtually the beginning of the history of philosophy for the one criterion that
can dene the essence of a creature.
28
Once this essence or essential nature
is discovered, then it has typically been used to draw the line of separation
between those possessing this criterion and those not possessing it and, in
particular, drawing the line between humans and animals. This essentialist
approach ignores the complex nature of creatures, especially their relational
naturethat they can and should be dened by more than one characteristic,
such as the totality of their selves, especially in relation to others. This challenge
of essentialism is very valid and may be applicable to certain theories of rights,
such as those based on the possession of one criterion (such as rationality) as
a reason to establish rights. However, it is not necessarily in disagreement with
my own position, arguing for multiple criteria for the establishment of rights.
One could argue, though, that the emphasis on sentiency can be considered
essentialist. There are two ways to respond to this challenge: rst, in my own
argument, sentiency is not the only criterion to be taken into consideration.
Second, sentiency is not being presented as the essence of a creature (since
many species of animals are sentient) but merely as a baseline for protection
from actions that would potentially adversely affect that sentiency, such as by
causing pain and suffering.
Rights language has also been criticized as being minimalistic. The con-
cern seems to be that such language can only narrowly proscribe treatment
toward other creatures by establishing minimum requirements or standards
for moral action. However, it certainly seems better to set minimum standards
than no standards at all. Further, even if one argues that current legislation
provides some minimumstandards of protection, arguing on the basis of rights
has the effect of drawing very clear lines for treatment, beyond which we should
not go. One could certainly argue that the human rights to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness are minimalistic, since we do not always lay out all of the
particulars regarding what we mean by each of these terms. This does not
mean, however, that we cannot offer some general guidelines. In addition, the
critique of minimalism is not something peculiar to rights language; it is a
problem with laws in general. We cannot set out rules or guidelines for be-
havior that will govern every possible situation, and laws must allow for exten-
uating circumstances, as must rights. The charge of paternalism is also some-
thing not unique to rights language. Laws in general tend to be made by the
powerful for their benet, over and against the disempowered, and like the
exercise of any power, it can be abused. However, the possibility of abuse or
paternalism does not negate the general benet that can ensue, and in fact
rights can and have been used to protect the weak.
The difculty of enforcing rights most often comes in with regard to con-
ict cases. I already argued that conict cases are inevitable when rights lan-
guage is used but that conict will exist even where rights language is not
used. We do not seem to have much difculty in our attempts to enforce
human rights in spite of their conictual nature; as a global community, we
have agreed that all humans have rights, that we can delineate what these rights
are, and that these rights should be protected.
29
Of course, we should not min-
imize the difculty of enforcing human rights in the global community. Even
though there is general agreement in theory, human rights are widely violated
in practice. However, having documents specifying the rights we theoretically
believe belong to all humans provides us not only with an ideal but also with
a concrete goal to shoot for. It is possible to do the same thing with regard to
rights for animals.
A nal concern with rights language has to do with the slippery-slope
animal rights 95
argument: where should we draw the line with regard to the possession of
rights, and will we be able to maintain the line? As with all slippery-slope
arguments, we can answer by saying that ultimately there may be a point
beyond which we may not want to go. However, as with the particular criterion
of sentiency, we may need to maintain some elasticity in the position of where
the line for the possession of rights should be drawn. Even in relatively recent
human history, some humans were accorded rights that other subgroups of
humans were denied (e.g., women and minorities). Before that time, there
were certainly individuals who ridiculed the idea of certain groups of humans
possessing the same rights as other humans. Thus, not until very recently were
women granted some of the same rights that men had enjoyed for years, such
as the right to vote. What the assertion of rights does is to say that all beings
who have the same criteria should have rightsthe idea embedded in the
notion of justice that similar cases should be treated similarly. If the same basis
for rights exists in both animals and humans, such as sentiency and cognitive
criteria, then both should be accorded rights, although the particular rights that
they have will be somewhat different. This does not necessarily lead to the
position, however, that plants should have rights, a position that is not being
maintained here, primarily due to their lack of sentiency. If one day, however,
we discover that plants are sentient or have some other characteristic whereby
we believe that they should have rights extended to them, then we should be
willing to do so, with the understanding that they would not necessarily have
the same rights as either humans or animals.
30
Some utilitarians also have problems with the use of rights language, al-
though for different reasons than those discussed previously. In addition to
moral rights being considered unhistorical, abstract, and inexplicable,
31
some
utilitarians reject rights because they would require an obligation other than
consequences in evaluating moral arguments.
32
Rule utilitiarians, at least in
theory, could very well accept rights, but act or preference utilitarians would
probably not. Because most utilitarians fall into the latter category, it is their
views that I am considering here. The essence of act utilitarianism is that the
morality of an action is solely determined on the basis of consequences, such
that an action that would bring about the greatest good for the greatest number
would be superior to an action that did not. Thus, acts can be right or wrong
without resorting to rights language, and rights language may even be a dis-
traction. Obviously, not all utilitarians have included animals in the calculus,
but those who do would be more restrictive regarding the treatment of animals
(e.g., Peter Singer), whereas those who do not include animals in the calculus,
or who give animals much less weight than people, would be less restrictive
regarding the treatment of animals (e.g., R. G. Frey). However, this rejection
of rights in general and of animal rights in particular could be true regardless
of whether the utilitarian was concerned primarily with arguing for or against
better treatment for animals. For Singer, attributing rights is not the only way
to change the moral status of animals; we can attribute interests to them, with
the capacity to feel pain as the basis of interests. However, while Singer does
not believe that animals have rights, he thinks that it is ne to talk that way,
and if we do argue for animal rights, then the one right animals should have
is the right to equal considerationnot to have pain gratuitously inicted on
them.
33
Obviously, it is difcult to argue against these views by saying that utili-
tarianism should include rights as part of its ethical theory. Instead, a brief
assessment of utilitarianism as a theory with regard to the treatment of animals
is in order. Obviously, utilitarianism can greatly restrict what we do to animals
since, from its inception, it has usually permitted animals as part of the cal-
culus in determining the rightness or wrongness of a moral action: that the
greatest good for the greatest number includes animals. Thus, Singers posi-
tion in particular would restrict the treatment of animals and come to many
of the same positions as a rights theory with regard to specic practices in the
treatment of animals. However, one of the problems with utilitarianism is that
not all utilitarians give the same weight to the interests of animals or even
include animals in the calculus, so the same theory can yield different conclu-
sions. In addition, even for those utilitarians such as Singer, who want to
greatly restrict what we do to animals, their conclusions can be problematic in
terms of what they would allow in the treatment of animals. On the issue of
animal experimentation, while both a rights theory and utilitarianism could
severely restrict or eliminate many of the same harmful experiments, utilitar-
ianism could still allow experimental animals to be subject to excruciatingly
painful experiments if the benecial results obtained were expected to out-
weigh the animal pain and suffering. Therefore, while utilitarianism for some
could be a good rst step in deciding what would and would not be permitted
in terms of research on animals, the use of rights language could further
restrict what we can do to animals, and indeed should do so. As I will argue
in chapter 6, my position is that some things should never be done to animals,
regardless of the expected benets for humans.
Animals in Particular Cannot Have Rights
Many who maintain that humans have rights, however, do not want to extend
the possession of rights to animals. The arguments typically made have to do
with the ontological status of animals as compared with that of humans. How-
ever, two pragmatic issues that are frequently raised should be briey addressed
before moving on to the arguments as to why animals should be denied rights:
that animal rights debase human rights because they deect concern away
from humans
34
and the difculty of assigning rights to animals even if they
did have them. With regard to the rst issue, no necessary connection exists
between the attribution of rights to animals and the debasement of human
rights. In fact, empirical studies of animal rights activists have demonstrated
that these people also tend to be involved in issues of concern to humans, such
as poverty and the environment.
35
Therefore, the extension of rights to animals
may not entail a devaluing of human life or rights as much as the demonstra-
tion of the interconnectedness of these kinds of concerns. Arguing that one
must either be for human rights or for animal rights is setting up an arbitrary
animal rights 97
dichotomy and this suggests that one must choose either humans or animals.
It is both preferable and reasonable, instead, to maintain a both-and position.
The issue of the difculty of which rights to ascribe to animals is also not an
insurmountable problem. This difculty can exist even with regard to humans,
and yet there is now substantial agreement on which rights humans do or
should have. Even if not all animal rights theorists could agree on which rights
animals have, this does not preclude them from trying to specify which rights
they should have. Thus, although it may be difcult, it is not impossible, as
the later section on which rights animals should have will demonstrate.
The strongest arguments against attributing rights to animals, though, are
based on what are often considered the obvious differences between humans
and animals. The most common arguments against animal rights can be
grouped into four categories: that animals are not part of the human species,
that animals lack rationality and other attendant cognitive features possessed
by humans, that animals specically do not have language and thus cannot
claim rights, and that animals cannot reciprocate in extending rights.
The argument that animals are not part of the human species is quite
obvious on the face of it, and therefore it is difcult to argue against this
contention.
36
One of the advantages of the position of allowing rights for only
and all humans is that it extends protection to all humans, including marginal
humans, since being a member of the species Homo sapiens is all that matters.
Of course, it is due to the problem with this position that the notion of per-
sonhood is often introduced into moral arguments regarding the treatment of
animals, and also of marginal humans. What is implied in the position that
only humans have rights, though, is that there is something unique and special
about humans that entails the attribution of rights to them as a class and
subsequently prohibits the attribution of rights to any nonhumans. One of the
ways even in human history by which certain human subgroups were prohib-
ited from rights extended to other humans was by arguing that they were not
fully humans, as in the example of slaves, who were considered by some to be
three-fths human. From a Christian theological perspective, the reason that
humans are considered superior to animals is ultimately because they are the
only creatures believed to be created in the image of God. Although this the-
ological position does not necessarily entail rights, it provides a stronger foun-
dation for theists, at least as to why humans are superior to animals and may
thereby have rights extended to them. However, for those arguing from a non-
theistic perspective, the inevitable question that arises once one asserts that
only humans can have rights is, What is it about humans that makes them
unique and so different from animals? Species membership is a morally rel-
evant criterion, but it is certainly not the only one. Ultimately, then, one must
resort to a discussion of other criteria.
The subsequent answer, then, as to why humans should be extended rights
denied to animals has to do with humans possession of rationality and other
cognitive features that are not believed to be possessed by animals, or that are
believed to be possessed by animals to a signicantly lesser degree. Thus, it is
because humans possess these criteria that they should have rights. However,
as I already argued in chapter 2, the difference between humans and animals
is a difference of degree rather than a difference of kind, so that not only do
animals possess some of these criteria believed to be the unique province of
humans but also some animals possess them to a higher degree than some
humans. If we do grant rights on the basis of cognition, then we must admit
animals to the class of rights holders, unless we want to retreat to a position
where only species membership matters. In fact, the argument from marginal
cases is a strong one with regard to why animals should be extended rights. If
we dene rights so narrowly for humans that they can be possessed only by
those with high degrees of rationality, then children and marginal humans
would be excluded, which we prefer not to do. We concede that children and
marginal humans do have rights even if they lack the cognitive criteria pos-
sessed by normal adult humans, and we often protect their rights through a
proxy, such as a parent or guardian. However, even though these rights are
exercised on their behalf, we still consider that the right belongs directly to the
individual being protected and not to the proxy. In addition, a problem with
the argument from cognition is that it is presented as the primary reason for
granting humans rights. Of course, one of the problems with violating the
rights of people is the violation of their autonomy. However, as I have already
argued, the criterion of sentiency is the foundational one for attribution of
rights because it suggests that what is wrong with infringing upon a creatures
right is not primarily that it is an offense against his rationality but rather that
it causes him harm. In addition, even if autonomy is the primary consideration
with regard to rights possession, it has already been argued that animals have
at least a weak sense of autonomy that should put some restrictions on what
we can do to them in experiments.
In particular, the cognitive criterion most often marshaled in defense of
denying rights to animals is language. Because animals do not have language
and thus cannot speak, they cannot claim rights, and the ability to claim rights
is considered foundational to the notion of rights.
37
While in most cases rights
are exercised and asserted through speech, particularly by the person whose
rights are violated, this is not a necessary condition for rights. As I argued in
chapter 2, animals do have communication that is functionally analogous to
human language, such that they are able to communicate at least some of their
desires to us. Animals, like humans, can express their nonconsent nonverbally
as well. Therefore, although most rights holders exercise their rights through
speech, the fact that we extend rights to humans who do not have this capacity
seems to demonstrate that it should not be a necessary condition for rights.
In addition, marginal humans who cannot speak are not denied rights but,
rather, are provided with proxies who can speak on their behalf. If we do believe
that speech is so necessary for claiming rights, then another way to redress
this with regard to animals is to provide them with proxies who can assert their
rights on their behalf. To a certain extent, this is done for experimental animals
in that at least one member of the institutional animal care and use committee
is required to represent the interests of the animals. Therefore, even if speech
animal rights 99
is necessary for the exercise of rights, it seems that it is not necessary that the
actual rights holder have this capability.
The nal argument for denying rights to animals is that they cannot re-
ciprocate with regard to rights, and that rights by their very nature entail re-
ciprocal responsibilities.
38
In other words, those to whom rights are granted
must also be capable of respecting the rights of others. To say that someone
has rights means that others have a duty or obligation not to interfere with
those rights. Thus, if we say that humans have the right to life, then we mean
that all humans should both have this right respected in their own person and
also be expected to respect this right in others. Therefore, the argument goes,
if humans extend rights to and subsequently are expected to respect the rights
of animals, then animals should be capable of respecting the rights of humans.
If animals are incapable of doing this, then they cannot be the possessors of
rights. Animals, to put it in other words, cannot be moral patients because
they cannot be moral agents.
39
The most obvious challenge to this argument is to deny that rights by
nature must be reciprocal. As I argued earlier, we ascribe rights to marginal
humans, although they are certainly incapable of moral agency in the same
way as normal adult humans. Even though they cannot respect the rights of
others, this does not mean that they do not have rights themselves. In addition,
if we do believe that humans are uniquely capable of moral agency, then hu-
mans have a greater burden to protect the rights of those who cannot protect
themselves. Greater power suggests greater responsibility, and thus it seems
childish to argue that we should be exempt from our moral responsibility sim-
ply because others cannot respond in kind. Just because animals do not and
cannot operate in the same moral arena as humans does not mean that hu-
mans should lower their own ethical standards and thereby relinquish their
obligation to protect the rights of animals. Therefore, animals can be moral
patients even if they are not moral agents.
Different Bases for Animal Rights
There are others who also want to argue for animal rights but whose positions
differ from mine with regard to two points. First, many tend to argue on the
basis of a single criterion. Second, some want to draw the line somewhere
differently between those animals that possess rights and those that do not.
With regard to the rst point, some who want to argue either for rights for
animals or for greater protection of animals even if it is not couched in rights
language (such as Peter Singer) tend to do so on the basis of a single criterion,
such as the ability to experience pain. However, as I argued earlier, pain alone
is not a sufcient basis for protecting animals, although it is a good rst step.
Although pain is the strongest reason for extending rights to animals, causing
pain is not the only thing that can harm animals. In addition, the criterion of
pain in and of itself does not permit us to distinguish among treatments for
different species. It seems preferable to introduce cognition as a second cri-
terion because it enables us to act in accord with our intuitions that, for ex-
ample, harming a sh is not exactly the same (is not as morally problematic)
as harming a chimpanzee. If pain is the only criterion, then we are unable to
do this. In addition, as I have already argued, extending rights on the basis of
any other single criterion mentioned, such as species membership or advanced
cognitive criteria, is insufcient as well.
The place where the line should be drawn for rights for animals is also
subject to varying opinions. It is clear that any line drawing is going to be
subject to criticism, since it is difcult to be exact and also because the different
points will vary according to the basis upon which the distinctions are being
made. Obviously, those who want to deny rights to animals but extend them
to humans draw the line at the human species boundary, although as was
argued previously, this seems rather arbitrary, and other criteria must ulti-
mately enter in. Steven Wise wants to draw the line for now at those animals
he believes possess autonomy and consciousness, in particular, chimpanzees
and bonobos.
40
Paul Waldau, while not specically arguing for rights for ani-
mals, believes that the animals to be protected should include all great apes,
whales, dolphins, and elephants.
41
Peter Singer maintains that, since pain is
the most important criterion, the line should be drawn somewhere (approxi-
mately) between a shrimp and an oyster.
42
My own position, therefore, is quite
similar to Singers on this point because although he rejects rights, the line
for protection is drawn at sentience. However, Tom Regans position needs to
be addressed here, both since his position with regard to the rights of animals
is closest to my own and because he has been the strongest and most systematic
spokesperson for the rights of animals.
Regan argues that animals who have rights are those who are subjects-of-a-
life, a position that I briey touched on earlier. However, once he has estab-
lished his criteria for these animals, he maintains that the line should be drawn
at mammals aged one year and older.
43
Even on the basis of Regans own
criteria, drawing the line at one year of age seems arbitrary. It seems fairly
obvious that even mammals below the age of one can be subjects-of-a-life. In
addition, it is difcult to compare different species. Is a one-year-old mouse
mentally equivalent to a one-year-old dog or to a one-year-old human, if the
life spans of these species differ so greatly? On average, a one-year-old mouse
is one-third to one-half of the way through its life, the dog not even one-tenth,
and the human just one-seventieth. Thus, drawing the line at the same place
for all species seems discriminatory toward those species whose development
occurs later and whose life span is shorter. In addition, if the reason for ex-
tending rights to animals begins with sentience instead of being subject-of-a-
life, then there are not only problems with drawing the line beginning with
one-year-old mammals but also problems with even drawing the line
specically at mammals. Since some animals other than mammals can expe-
rience pain, then these animals need to have rights extended to them as well.
One other important distinction that exists between myself and TomRegan
and therefore is important to mention at this point has to do with the practical
implications of extending rights to animals, particularly experimental animals.
animal rights 101
Regan believes that the ways in which research is currently conducted make it
impossible to sufciently protect the rights of animals. Therefore, he says spe-
cically that the answer is not reform (better cages) but liberation (empty
cages). He does make one exception, though: if we could envision and put into
practice a benign form of animal experimentation in which the rights of ani-
mals were certain to be protected, then he could support it. However, because
he thinks it is impossible to practice such benign animal experimentation, he
believes the practice of experimentation should be completely abolished.
44
Al-
though he is probably correct in terms of the unlikelihood that benign exper-
imentation could be practiced, my later discussion of which rights experimen-
tal animals should have is an attempt to carefully describe what benign
experimentation would look like. Although my proposals may be idealistic and
hence unrealistic in the minds of many, including Regan, it does seem possible
to outline such guidelines and urge people to follow them. Therefore, it is not
that there is something inherent in the practice of animal experimentation that
violates the rights of animals as much as some of the ways animals are treated
in the process of experimentation.
Rights That Experimental Animals Should Have
One way to address the question of the importance of assigning rights to an-
imals is to ask what is to be accomplished by extending rights to animals.
45
What are the implications for experimentation in particular if animals have
rights? Obviously, as I argued earlier, extending rights to animals would have
the effect of greatly improving their lives. However, it is important to go beyond
theoretical discussion and to lay down specic rights that animals should have.
Others have offered their own suggestions for which rights animals should
have, but I am arguing here for the ve that are essential, particularly for
experimental animals. The rst three are negative rights (freedom from inter-
ference), whereas the next two are positive rights (assistance of some sort). In
regard to their rights in general, though, experimental animals should at least
have the same kinds of protection that we currently extend to pets. It is obvious
from even a cursory reading of the scientic literature that experimental ani-
mals in general are not treated in the same ways as those domesticated animals
with whom humans have relationships. In fact, the treatment of any particular
species can vary considerably, depending on the environment in which it lives
and the purpose for which it is kept.
46
Thus, a rabbit will receive very different
treatment if he is a family pet as opposed to a research subject or even a zoo
animal.
47
If we are to respect the integrity of animals based on the possession
of particular criteria, then it seems that a greater degree of consistency is re-
quired, particularly when we assert that animals have rights. However, since
it is beyond the scope of this project to address the rights of animals in general,
the focus in the discussion here will be on what rights experimental animals
in particular should have.
48
In addition, the rights listed are moral rights and
in my judgment should also be legal rights.
49
Freedom from Unnecessary Pain and Suffering
Every effort must be made to minimize painful experiments or those that cause
considerable suffering. Thus, we have a prima facie responsibility to experi-
mental animals not to cause them pain and suffering. Although it is difcult
to specify precisely what is meant by unnecessary pain and suffering, this
term is used because it suggests that there may be times when iniction of
pain and suffering can be justied. However, because the iniction of pain and
suffering on experimental animals is a frequent occurrence, it is important to
distinguish between when it is and is not necessary. This can be determined
partly by weighing the benet gained to humans against the harm caused to
animals. However, other ways to ensure that this right is protected is to insist
on the use of drugs for considerable pain, the use of pain scales to determine
points beyond which we should not go, husbandry conditions that do not in
and of themselves cause suffering, and humane euthanasia by those speci-
cally trained in such methods when death as the end point is unavoidable. A
helpful rule of thumb would also be to prohibit any kind of pain and suffering
to experimental animals to which a pet owner would be unwilling to expose
her own pet.
One important distinction needs to be made with regard to pain and suf-
fering. When it comes to iniction of pain, all animals capable of experiencing
pain should be extended similar treatment. Thus, all other factors being equal,
we cannot justify doing a painful procedure on a mouse instead of a chimpan-
zee if we know that both will experience pain similarly. However, due to dif-
ferent cognitive levels, some animals may have a greater capacity to suffer than
others, and when we can determine this, then those animals capable of greater
suffering should be extended greater protection so that when we have a choice,
animals with lesser capacities for suffering should be used in experiments
instead.
Not to Have Liberty So Restricted
All animals have a simple desire for mobility that is greatly restricted in a
laboratory setting. Obviously, in a natural wild state, animals would have con-
siderable mobility, although it would vary greatly depending on the particular
species. We usually cannot accord most experimental animals the same degree
of mobility as their wild counterparts, but we should extend to them at least
what would we extend to them if we kept them as pets. While the practice of
keeping pets has its own set of problems, what is simply being argued here is
that even if most pets have a more restricted life than their wild counterparts,
they generally have a signicantly better life than their experimental counter-
parts. Therefore, when it comes to mobility, a helpful rule of thumb would be
that signicant efforts should be made to extend to laboratory animals an equiv-
alent kind of mobility that we extend to pets. In practical terms, this would
necessitate larger cages for rodents and perhaps large rooms or pens for ani-
animal rights 103
mals not typically kept in cages, with outdoor facilities where this is a possi-
bility. Obviously, the requirements would depend on the specic needs of the
species in question.
50
Not to Have Their Lives Unnecessarily Shortened
It is regrettable that most experimental animals will be put to death at the
conclusion of the experiments. Obviously, there are times when this may be
warranted, as in cases of postmortem dissection to ascertain the results of the
experiment or when the animals will experience considerable pain and suffer-
ing in living out the rest of their lives. However, one of the most striking
differences between human and animal experimentation is that experimental
animals usually spend their entire lives living in a laboratory. Most people
would probably be opposed to all human experimentation if the only way for
it to occur would be by conning humans for life in a laboratory, regardless of
whether they were subjected to pain and suffering, but especially if they were
killed at the conclusion of the experiment. Of course, just because humans
have a right to life does not mean that animals should have this same right.
However, the fact that experimental animals must often lead such diminished
lives and then have them unnecessarily shortened seems unavoidable in cur-
rent practice, but there are practical suggestions for averting this problem. The
rst way is making concerted attempts to adopt out experimental animals no
longer needed as experimental subjects,
51
and the second way is allowing peo-
ple to volunteer their pets for short-term experiments.
52
Granted, there are
obvious logistical problems with both of these solutions. In addition, there may
be times when this would not work for medical reasons, as in cases where
animals as a result of their experiments are carrying diseases that can spread
to humans or other animals, or when the postoperative care required would
be too much of a burden on the human owner. However, just because these
solutions would not work in some cases does not mean that they cannot work
in other cases, and attempts should be made to implement them if they will
provide a longer and better quality of life for experimental animals.
The right to not have their lives unnecessarily shortened is obviously quite
different from having a right to life, which is not being argued for most ani-
mals. When it comes to animals, the right to life is not as strong a right as the
right not to be treated cruelly or the right to be free from unnecessary pain
and suffering. That animals may not have a right to life does not mean that
they do not have a right to a good life while they are alive. However, there
should be a stronger presumption against taking the lives of animals with
higher cognitive levels, especially nonhuman primates, both because they have
at least enough understanding of the concept of death to be capable of grieving
over the death of conspecics and because they have the capacity to engage in
a rich cognitive life. Therefore, when animals such as these are not easily
adopted out, stringent efforts should be made to enable them to live out the
remainder of their lives in sanctuaries with conspecics.
53
To Engage in Species-specic Behavior
This right means that animals should be enabled, as far as is practically pos-
sible in experimental settings, to live according to the nature of the species to
which they belong, according to their telos.
54
In general, this right is compro-
mised or violated by a boring, barren environment and by frustration of their
normal behavior. For us to enable animals to live according to their natures in
laboratories, we must rst learn what their natures are. There are two ways
that we can do this: one is by observing the behavior of these species in the
wild, to in a sense determine how they behave in more natural settings (or
even in some cases by observing these species kept as pets), and to utilize
preference tests (notwithstanding some attendant problems with these tests,
which were discussed in chapter 3). Some attempts to permit animals to engage
in species-specic behavior are already enforced legislatively, such as the re-
quirements that dogs be walked and primates be provided with items to create
a more stimulating environment for them. However, even these requirements
are limited with regard to these species and certainly exclude other animals
from consideration. It is obvious that many species are prohibited from en-
gaging in normal behavior for their species by virtue of being kept in small
cages, and the right that animals liberty not be unnecessarily restricted is part
of what is required to enable them to engage in species-specic behavior. Two
examples should sufce to explain what is meant here. Rodents such as rats
are social creatures that like to burrow. However, being kept in laboratories in
often individual, sanitary cages devoid of bedding prohibits them from these
natural actions. In fact, virtually all experimental animals, even social ones, are
kept isolated from conspecics. Cats, while typically solitary, enjoy jumping
and climbing, which their small cages prohibit them from doing. Although it
may be impossible and even impractical to enable laboratory animals to have
the same quality of life that their natures would dictate, attempts should be
made to move in this direction.
To Be Treated with Respect as Individuals
This is the one right that would be the most difcult or in some cases even
impossible to enforce legislatively, since it ultimately goes to the attitude and
motivation of the experimenter.
55
Even when it comes to humans, we can le-
gally draw acceptable boundaries for treatment, but we cannot with the same
legislation force people to respect others or to relinquish their prejudices to-
ward them. However, even when we cannot enforce respect, it is often obvious
when it is present and when it is missing. It is even more difcult, though, to
express what it means to say that animals have the right to be treated with
respect, but there are some general attitudes and practices that could engender
respect toward experimental animals. First, experimenters must move beyond
seeing animals only as resources to be used and toward seeing them as crea-
tures with an integrity and purpose aside from their use as experimental sub-
jects. This is another way of saying that to respect animals is to see them as
animal rights 105
having intrinsic and not only instrumental value.
56
Second, experimenters
should try to view the species they work with and the way they treat them as
they would if these animals were their pets. Third, experimenters need to make
an attempt to empathize with the suffering of the animals they experiment on,
so that an initial question before even submitting an experimental procedure
for approval would be whether they would be willing to allow such treatment
to be accorded to themselves, if it would result in a comparable level of suf-
fering.
57
Fourth, a practical way to begin to see animals as individuals worthy
of respect would be to name all animals in experiments. While this is done
with some species, especially where the number of animals used is smaller
and the individual animals have discernible personalities (such as primates),
and while it may not be practical in all cases to relinquish the use of numbers,
naming individuals is an important way of recognizing them as individuals.
The use of numbers instead of names with regard to humans is usually seen
as a depersonalization of the individuals, from the perspective of both the
victims and the victimizers, such as in prison settings. This idea echoes the
well-known adage in farming communities: If you are going to eat them, then
do not name them. Naming a creature is one way that experimenters can keep
in mind that research animals are not just numbers and therefore must not
be treated as such.
58
Conclusion
Obviously, to grant experimental animals rights, whether moral or legal, is not
the solution to all problems with regard to their treatment. Of course, to have
general agreement that animals have rights, as we do with humans, would be
extremely helpful in moving us toward greater protection, but it will not solve
all of the problems. A particularly thorny problem that would remain is how
to protect the rights of animals when they come into conict with the rights
of humans or with benets that are believed likely to result for humans as a
result of these rights violations. To say that animals have rights ultimately
means that, when it comes to conict cases, we should not automatically
choose in favor of humans. However, the use of animals in experiments is a
classic case of the rights of humans versus the rights of animals. Instead of
arbitrarily always favoring the rights of humans, though, we need to ascertain
more precisely the burdens and benets for each group, and therefore in chap-
ter 6 I will attempt to provide such an analysis. Before that, though, we will
examine how Christian theology can provide an even stronger foundation for
the recommendations being made in this project to further restrict animal
experimentation, before addressing a specic burden/benet analysis.
5
Christian Theology
The Christian tradition is often criticized as not having played a very
positive role with regard to the treatment of animals and, in fact,
has sometimes been charged with contributing to the negative treat-
ment of animals.
1
This charge is generally made about its concept of
dominion, which seems to suggest that animals have only instru-
mental value in relationship to human beings. In addition, until re-
cent times, there has been very little serious academic interest ad-
dressing the positive role and treatment of animals. However,
Christianity has not been completely negative in its approach to ani-
mals. Although they have been minority voices, throughout the ages,
there have been saints, mystics, and theologians who have been vo-
cal advocates for animals, such as Francis of Assisi and Albert
Schweitzer, and some theologians have recently focused on the issue
of animals.
2
Thus, even if Christianity may have a mixed history on
its view toward and treatment of animals, this does not negate the
possibility of creating a more positive theology regarding animals.
3
In this chapter, I will argue that Christian theology contains the re-
sources from which one can construct a more positive theology for
animals, and I will do so by examining some of the principal doc-
trines within systematic theology, specically creation, sin, Christol-
ogy, and eschatology. While I am certainly not claiming to be the
rst to do so, I will be constructing my own theology regarding ani-
mals and will derive implications for the treatment of experimental
animals. This theology will not necessarily provide a completely dif-
ferent ethic from other religious or nonreligious sources also trying
to establish a more positive ethic for animals. Rather, it will simply
conceptualize one Christian way for Christians to think about the
treatment of experimental animals, which will provide a stronger
foundation for the arguments already made on the subject in previous chap-
ters.
4
Creation
Creation is probably the most important doctrine regarding the role and treat-
ment of animals in relationship to human beings. This doctrine is largely
derived from and dependent on the creation narratives in the book of Genesis,
and therefore in this section I will examine certain elements within these nar-
ratives and within the traditional doctrine of creation itself to address speci-
cally the relationship between God and animals, the relationship between God
and humans, and the relationship between humans and animals. There are
actually two creation narratives in the book of Genesis, one found in Genesis
1:12:4a and the other in Genesis 2:4b25. The rst account is the one more
commonly cited about the relationship between humans and animals, so it will
be the focus in this chapter, but comments about the other account will be
addressed as well.
5
The Creation Narratives
To explore the doctrine of creation, it is important to rst examine the actual
creation narratives primarily found in Genesis, acknowledge the limitations of
the biblical text in general and of the creation narratives in particular, and then
derive certain general principles from it. In the rst creation narrative, every-
thing is presented as being created through the spoken word of God. God
brought order out of chaos, beginning with inanimate matter and then moving
on to vegetation, animals, and humans, in that order. God created the world
in six days and rested on the seventh, with animals created on the fourth, fth,
and sixth days of creation and humans on the sixth day. After each day of
creation, God noted that it was good, and on the sixth day, with the creation
of the land animals and human beings, God saw that it was very good. The
same word, nephesh, is used to indicate the matter with which God endowed
all creatures.
6
Humans (Adam and Eve) were specically created in the image
of God, as male and female. They were blessed by God and were told to be
fruitful and multiply, to replenish and subdue the earth, and to have dominion
over all living things.
The second creation account begins in the garden with the existence of
Adam, who at that point did not have a companion for himself. After Adams
creation and placement in the garden, God creates the rest of the animals.
Adam is permitted to name all of the animals, and he viewed them to see if
there was a companion suitable for himself from among the animals. Because
there was not one, God created Eve as Adams companion. There is no mention
of the concept of dominion in this account, which is frequently cited as the
justication for many treatments of animals. The third chapter of Genesis
follows with what has come to be known as the Fall in Christian theology.
christian theology 109
Before this Fall, all of creation appeared to peacefully coexist and had a vege-
tarian diet (1:2930). The evidence for the latter is that eating meat is not
mentioned until after the Fall, and the creation narrative itself specically men-
tions God giving vegetation for food not only to Adam and Eve but also to all
animals (1:2930). It was not until after the expulsion from the garden that
Adam and Eve used the skins of animals for clothing (3:21), and Abel is the
rst person mentioned to engage in animal sacrice (4:14). The only signif-
icant point related to animals found in the second creation narrative is that
humans (Adam) were specically given the task of naming animals.
These narratives have had a signicant impact on conceptualizing the re-
lationship between humans and animals. However, before examining what
they can contribute to a theology for animal experimentation, I will acknowl-
edge limitations in the use of the biblical text in general and with these nar-
ratives in particular. With regard to the biblical text, it should not be regarded
as an infallible, inerrant guide containing specic timeless truths for faith and
morals. Rather, as many religious scholars now acknowledge, the Bible should
be viewed as a historically and culturally conditioned text, as all texts are, writ-
ten at specic points in history and addressing specic concerns. Since the
Bible itself is actually a collection of books, written by many different authors
over a long span of time, the problems are even greater, because there are
sometimes even contradictions and discrepancies among these different au-
thors. Therefore, the Bible cannot simply be taken literally in such a way that
biblical commands can always unilaterally and specically be applied to con-
temporary situations. Some of the practices the Bible either supported or com-
manded we would consider abhorrent today, such as slavery, oppression of
women, and certain aspects of the Holiness Code (e.g., stoning homosexuals
and putting to death children who disobey their parents). In addition, there
are other serious contemporary ethical issues the Bible does not specically
address, such as nuclear war, cloning, and even animal experimentation. How-
ever, this does not mean that the Bible can be of no help to us with regard to
contemporary issues, including the treatment of animals. What, then, can be
concluded about the use of the Bible for shedding light on ethical concerns?
First, the Bible is only one resource among many, and therefore the Wesleyan
quadrilateral in Methodism with tradition, reason, and experience comple-
menting the biblical text is more helpful than reliance on the Bible alone.
7
Thus, while it is important to see what the biblical text has to say about the
treatment of animals, it must be supplemented by these other sources. Second,
the Bible is more helpful with regard to general guidelines rather than specic
laws, given the context-driven nature of many of the narratives and prescrip-
tions. Third, the hermeneutic of suspicion utilized by liberation theologians
with regard to women and other marginalized minorities is important in re-
minding us that the biblical text has been written from the perspective of and
by the powerful rather than the disenfranchised.
The creation narratives should not be understood as presenting a literal
account of the origin of the universe. These narratives (and many other nar-
ratives in the Bible as well) are now considered to be primarily myths rather
than literal accounts of the way things happened. A myth is simply a symbolic
story whose primary purpose is to convey religious rather than empirical truth.
In particular, the creation account is a means by which people tried to arrive
at a religious understanding of and meaning for creation, as something that
uniquely proceeded from God. Obvious problems exist with an attempt to
accept this story as literally true, such as how we can actually know how the
world came into existence since no one was there with God at the creation of
the universe, and howthe creation of the world in six days squares with theories
from science on the origins and particularly the age of the universe. Subse-
quently, then, the biblical account of creation need not be at odds with a theory
of evolution, particularly theistic evolution. It is possible to maintain a theistic
account of evolution, in which God is viewed as somehow involved in directly
fashioning creation at the beginning of the process but since then works from
within creation through evolution. Thus, theistic evolution maintains what is
most important in the doctrine of creationthat God is the ultimate origin of
the whole created order, regardless of the specic manner in which it came
into being. Therefore, since the purpose of the creation narrative is religious
understanding and meaning, we are able to derive certain principles from its
account that can prove useful in the development of a Christian theology for
animals.
The creation narratives were and are often cited as theological justication
for the domination of humans over animals and for the belief that animals
existed only (or primarily) for human use. However, we can derive several
general observations from these narratives that can inform a more positive
theology for animals. First, the inherent goodness of creation: Everything God
has created is good because it comes from the hand of God, such that nothing
is intrinsically evil. God takes pleasure in all of Gods created order, and all of
creation reveals the goodness and glory of God. Second, the relationship be-
tween God and all of creation: All of creation is necessarily dependent on God
not only for its origin but also for its continuance. Everything not God derives
its existence from God. Thus, implicit in the doctrine of creation is not only
the idea that God created the world but also the concept that God continues to
sustain the world through Gods providential care. Third, the largest gap is not
between humans and animals but between God and the rest of creation. All
of creation is completely other than God. This suggests a closer relationship
between humans and animals, and it emphasizes the continuity of all creation.
This continuity is also suggested by the idea that all of creation was endowed
with the same nephesh, which is usually understood to mean the animating
force that came forth from God and now resides in all creatures.
The Relationship between God and Animals
The doctrine of creation can aid us in several ways to provide a better under-
standing of what the relationship is between God and animals. First of all, if
all of creation has inherent goodness and thereby inherent value, then God has
endowed animals as well with this inherent goodness and value. Animals are
considered good by God by simple virtue of the fact that God has brought
them into existence. One of the questions that is sometimes raised with regard
to theodicy is whether this is the best possible world that God could have
created. It is impossible for humans to answer this question with satisfaction,
but it is apparent that God could have created a world without animals. The
fact that they were brought into existence suggests that Gods ideal of a world
includes the existence of beings other than humans. In addition, the notion of
the goodness of creation suggests that for God, all of animal creation has
valuenot just nonhuman primates, dolphins, and dogs but rats, mice, and
birds as well. It seems logical to argue that God cares about all animals and
does not make the same kind of distinctions among animals that humans tend
to make. Of course, one could argue that perhaps we should not even make
distinctions between sentient and nonsentient creatures, if God loves all crea-
tures. However, even if God does not make these same kinds of distinctions
as humans sometimes make, God is concerned with the suffering of Gods
creatures, and it makes sense to say that God has a particular concern for those
animals that are sentient. This does not commit one to the view that God loves
these sentient creatures better, but to the extent that they can experience harm,
pain, suffering, and other deprivations, then it seems logical to say that God
would be concerned especially but not necessarily exclusively that these sen-
tient animals (as well as nonsentient animals) enjoy a life of well-being as much
as is possible.
Second, the doctrine of creation includes both Gods original act of creation
and Gods continuing providential care of Gods creatures, including animals.
If animals have value by virtue of their creation, then it follows that God would
be concerned about their continued well-being. It does not make sense for God
to have created animals with goodness and value to simply leave them to the
whims of nature, life, and, especially, humans. This is simply another way of
saying that God cares about the suffering of all of Gods creatures, and thus
God continues to care about the well-being of all animals.
8
The Christian un-
derstanding of God puts a strong emphasis on God as personal, loving, and
compassionate, and these characteristics result in God extending this personal
loving care toward all individuals. It is not necessary that this personal care be
restricted to humans; it can extend to animals as well. Again, this does not
mean that God cares only about those animals able to experience pain and
suffering, just as God does not love only those humans who experience pain
and suffering. Rather, to say that God is compassionate and empathizes with
the pain of all creatures is to say that God carries a special burden for those of
Gods creatures who suffer more than those who do not, even though God
may equally love them all.
This providential care of God is also contained in the notion of covenant.
The notion of covenant binds God to all of Gods creatures, not just to humans.
9
Although the covenant is typically understood as relating only to humans, at
least a couple of biblical texts militate against this position. One text is the
Noahic covenant: After the ood, Gods covenant included not only Noah, his
family, and all of his descendants but also all of the creatures in the ark with
him and his family.
10
Another is the story of Jonah: Jonah is commanded by
God to preach to the people of Nineveh, and the book concludes with Gods
concern not only for the people of that city but also for the cattle of that city.
This suggests at the very least that the destinies of humans and animals are
interrelated.
11
Finally, the second creation narrative offers a perspective that
emphasizes the interrelationship between humans and animals with regard to
their shared destiny.
12
These examples suggest that an exclusively human-
centered approach to covenant can be challenged by at least some biblical
narratives.
Third, since animals were created before humans (at least in the rst cre-
ation account), their purpose must be something other than, or at least in
addition to, their relationship to humans. This would be true whether or not
animals were created in the literal six days of creation or over millions or
billions of years through an evolutionary process. It seems ludicrous to argue,
especially on the basis of evolutionary theory, that animals exist largely or only
for human use if they predate us by such a long period of time. It also raises
the question of what purpose these animals had before humans entered on
the scene. Certainly, any animals that existed before humans but are now ex-
tinct, such as dinosaurs, would have to have had a purpose completely unre-
lated to human beings, or why would they have existed in the rst place?
However, other animals as well must have intrinsic and not only instrumental
value. Of course, this was already argued in an earlier chapter on the basis of
their natures, but the doctrine of creation undergirds this idea. We can then
ask the subsequent question of what the original purpose of animals was. It
seems that it can easily be answered in the same way as we can for humans:
that the dual purpose of all creation is to live in relationship with God and to
give glory to God. Specically in regard to the relationship between God and
animals, then, we can say that animals were created by God with the original
intention of giving glory to God simply by virtue of their existence.
Fourth, animals can be said to have rights because they are creatures of
God. In chapter 4, I argued that animals do have moral rights and should have
legal rights as well on the basis of their natures, most specically, due to their
cognitive ability and sentience. However, I also suggested that God is another
source for the grounding of rights. If indeed all of creation has intrinsic value
and goodness simply by virtue of its creation by God, then it seems logical to
assert that God has endowed not only humans but also animals with rights.
Theologian Andrew Linzey has argued for the notion of what he calls theos-
rights. His view is that God has rights in Gods creation and that these rights
bear witness to the sacredness of all life. Although I am in agreement with
much of Linzeys theology, one of the troubling aspects of his view of rights is
that he seems to suggest that the rights of animals are indirect rather than
directthat what is wrong with harming animals is that it harms their Creator.
He does not specically state this, but his emphasis on Gods rights in crea-
tion rather than on the actual rights of animals strongly suggests this.
13
If this
is true, then not only are our duties to animals indirect rather than direct but
also we are arguing on the contemporary human model of animals as property,
whose only real harm is in terms of its effect on its owner, in this case with
the property owner being God. However, as has already been argued, to say
that animals have rights on the basis of their nature and that humans subse-
quently have direct duties to them is simply to say that what is wrong with
harming animals is not just that God will be grieved but that the actual animals
themselves will suffer harm. Of course, to say that animals have been endowed
with rights by God does not mean that rights are the only basis of moral
obligation within Christian theology. The notion of rights must be supple-
mented by the presence of other qualities, such as reverence and responsibil-
ity.
14
However, at the very least, the Christian doctrine of creation reinforces
the notion of animal rights.
What are the implications for animal experimentation? The most impor-
tant issue is how the treatment of experimental animals fares from Gods
perspective. If God values, loves, and cares about all animals, then the setting
in which they are found should not affect Gods view toward them. With regard
to experimental animals, it means that God does not care less about animals
kept in cages in laboratories than about those in the wild. To the extent that
experimentation harms animals, to that extent does God care about what is
done to them and how they are treated? As I noted in an earlier chapter, hu-
mans often discriminate between the kinds of treatment accorded to particular
animals on the basis of their relationship to humans, so that a pet would
ordinarily receive better treatment than a laboratory animal, and some species,
regardless of the context, are afforded better treatment. If God loves all of Gods
creatures, then God is concerned about the treatment accorded even to less
favored species, including those animals not currently protected in research
under the Animal Welfare Act (e.g., rats, mice, birds) but who are sentient.
Finally, if God does not desire the suffering of Gods creatures, then God must
will well-being and lack of pain and suffering even for laboratory animals. If
animals have intrinsic value and ultimately exist for the glory of God, then it
is difcult to see how the treatment accorded to many laboratory animals would
be in keeping with Gods original purposes for them, especially in light of the
fact that in experimentation animals are viewed primarily in terms of their
instrumental value to humans.
The Relationship between God and Humans
To derive implications from the doctrine of creation for the relationship be-
tween humans and animals, it is important to examine rst the relationship
between God and humans. Humans are considered to be the only creatures
made in the image of God (imago dei), meaning that there is something unique
about humans that differentiates them from all other creatures.
15
There has
been considerable speculation as to what it means to say that humans are
created in the image of God, focusing on two broad areaswhether the dif-
ferences are ontological or functional. To argue that the differences are onto-
logical is to assert that there is some innate capacity or nature at the foundation
of the difference, such as the possession of morality, rationality, soul, personal
existence, or responsibility.
16
To argue that the differences are functional is to
assert that it is something that humans do, such as a particular task assigned
to them by God, that distinguishes them from the rest of creation.
A functional model seems to be a more helpful way of understanding what
it means to say that humans are created in the image of God.
17
It has already
been argued that at least some cognitive capacities traditionally considered to
be ontologically unique to humans can be located on a spectrum, thereby rep-
resenting differences of degree rather than differences of kind with relation to
animals. Thus, there is no cognitive capacity present in humans that is absent
in animals. If this is true, then we cannot point to any one cognitive ontological
difference between humans and animals that would conclusively indicate that
this is what it means for humans to be created in the image of God. Of course,
this is not to say that there are not signicant differences between humans
and animals, and it is likely that the higher capacities of humans are the prin-
cipal basis for their unique function. However, this does not necessarily mean
that ontological differences should be the primary basis for an understanding
of what it means for humans to have been created in the image of God. It may
be more difcult to argue one way or the other on the basis of other typical
criteria that have been proposed, such as the possession of a soul and the
possession of a moral sense, because they are less available to empirical test-
ing.
18
Regarding the issue of animals lacking a moral sense, there are two ways
to respond to this. The rst way is to argue that at least some animals do have
a moral sense.
19
This is a very broad topic that has recently garnered much
attention. Some examples typically offered of animal behavior that may indicate
a moral sense are animals taking care of orphaned babies within their own
species, monkeys willing to suffer themselves rather than harm conspecics,
and even interspecies acts of helpfulness, such as dolphins rescuing humans
from drowning. The second way is to question the actual moral virtue typically
practiced by humans. While acknowledging the fact that humans certainly are
capable of and often choose to engage in right moral actions, sometimes even
supererogatory actions to help their fellow humans, the existence of moral evil
in the world should at the very least make us a bit humble in our assertions
about the moral superiority of human beings.
20
Finally, another challenge to the argument from cognitive criteria is that
the biblical text does not specically express what this ontological criterion (or
criteria) would be, so the discussion is quite speculative. However, it does
explicitly address a particular task assigned to humansthat of dominion.
Before considering precisely what dominion means in relationship to humans
treatment of animals, dominion suggests that Gods rulership in the world is
largely exercised through the power, decisions, and actions of human beings.
What primarily makes humans the crowning point of Gods creation is that
they have been given responsibility to be Gods agents in this world, vessels
through whom God works Gods purposes for all of creation.
The Relationship between Humans and Animals
The doctrine of creationand specically the concept of dominioncan con-
tribute to our understanding of the relationship between humans and animals
in several ways. First, as I previously mentioned, if animal existence predates
human existence, then we have to be careful about assuming or asserting that
animals exist only or primarily for human use. While this does not completely
rule out an instrumental understanding of animals, it is an insufcient basis
on which to build a theology for animals. In support of this, the biblical nar-
rative also states that on the sixth day of creation, said by God to be very good,
land animals were created on the same day as human beings. The narrative
also states that all of creation was made from or with the same substance. All
of this suggests that humans and animals both have their common origin in
God, everything created by God has its own value, and thus animals cannot
simply be seen as a means to the end of the rest of creation. Second, the original
relationship between humans and animals was one of peace. This is evident
in the vegetarian diet charged to both humans and animals. Meat eating and
subsequent violence are a result of the Fall, and they do not appear to have
been part of Gods original plan for creation, as they rst appear in the story
of Cain and Abel (Gen. 4:17). Obviously, the existence of sin has adversely
affected not only relationships among humans but also relationships between
humans and animals. At the very least, this means that we must engage in
whatever efforts we can to restore the original peace to our disordered exis-
tence. Third, we need to reconceptualize precisely what is meant by dominion.
The understanding of dominion derives from the biblical narrative in
which humans were commanded by God to subdue the earth and have do-
minion over all living things, and it is also implied by the activity of naming
animals, which suggests the power of the one doing the naming over the one
who is named. In particular, the word dominion has been translated or un-
derstood on a spectrum, ranging from despotism to benign stewardship. Al-
though despotism was probably never specically asserted as part of the Chris-
tian doctrine of creation, the ways in which animals have been treated in
human history certainly suggest that interpretation, at least by some. Of course,
the entire history of the mistreatment of animals cannot be laid at the doorstep
of Christian theology, although it can be argued that a more negative interpre-
tation of the term dominion certainly has not helped and suggests that do-
minion has not always been understood in a benevolent way. The typical un-
derstanding of dominion in Christian theology does not mean that any kind
of cruelty was permitted and supported toward animals. However, as evident
in the writings of people such as Aquinas and Kant, the principal concerns for
acts of cruelty toward animals were the effects they would ultimately have on
human beings, whether on the human animal owner being harmed, or by the
cruel dispositions of the ones who harmed animals subsequently coming to
express their cruelty toward humans. If dominion means that Gods exercise
of power and inuence toward all creation is mediated through human beings,
then this dominion must be a reection of the character of God. If, as in
Christian theology, God is conceived of as loving and compassionate, then the
view of dominion as benevolent stewardship seems a better understanding of
the term than despotism. The concept of stewardship implies caring for that
which is actually the property of another.
21
If animals (and ultimately all of
creation) in a sense belong to or are owned by God, then dominion, in-
terpreted as benign stewardship, implies a careful treatment of what belongs
to God, precisely because it does belong to and is subsequently cared about
by God.
What, then, are the implications of dominion for understanding the rela-
tionship between humans and animals? While one can justify some instru-
mental use of animals, since humans have been given the responsibility for
animals, it certainly does not justify any treatment of animals. This use does
need to be moderated by some restrictions on their treatment. The task of
naming animals in the biblical narrative supports the contention previously
made that animals in laboratory settings should be named. Although in the
biblical narrative it was likely a manifestation of the power of humans over
animals, it can also be argued that naming was a way of individuating animals,
since it was how Adam decided that none of these animals was t for him as
a companion.
22
In addition, if the functional task of humans in relation to the
rest of creation has been given to them by God, then our theology toward
animals needs to be a theocentric one rather than an anthropocentric one,
meaning simply that when considering attitudes and actions toward animals,
the primary question should not be how they can be of use to humans but
how this use of animals measures against Gods original and ultimate purposes
for them. At the very least, humans should attempt to demonstrate the care
and concern toward Gods creatures that God has toward them, and it seems
that special care should be taken in the practice of experimentation in which
the possibility for great harm toward animals exists. Although to have domin-
ion can allow for the use of animals in experiments, it certainly does not justify
utilizing them in harmful ways simply because of the possible or even certain
benets to humans.
23
Sin
The actions by which the ideal portrayed in the opening chapters of Genesis
has been destroyed have been called sin in the Christian tradition. Although
sin has been analyzed in many different ways in Christian theology, in this
section I will address the doctrine of original sin and liberation theology with
regard to the implications for the treatment of animals, as well as possible
solutions to the sin problem toward animals.
Original Sin
The peaceful and idyllic garden portrayed in the opening chapters of Genesis
was very short-lived. What the creation and subsequent narratives on the dis-
obedience of Adam and Eve toward God suggest is that the world in which we
now live is not the world as God intended it to be. We do not live in an ideal
world, but one characterized by many problems. The Christian understanding
of the departure from Gods original purpose for creation has been called the
Fall, and its reality is manifested through the presence of sin in the world.
Original sin is typically viewed as the reason or the basis for the manifestation
of sinful actions. Although the narrative in the third chapter of Genesis pro-
vides a mythical account of how the Fall occurred, the importance of the doc-
trine of original sin is not so much in its origin as in its reality. Even if we do
not believe in any literal way in the biblical account of the Fall, and even if we
cannot subsequently explain the origin of sin in any other satisfactory way, this
doctrine provides us with an explanation for the continuing and pervasive re-
ality of sin in the world. This reality is expressed toward both animals and
humans.
Recently some theologians have wanted to discount or downplay the doc-
trine of original sin. Some reasons why some theologians have rejected the
doctrine of original sin are as follows: that it expresses a predominantly neg-
ative rather than a positive view of human nature (that humans are basically
evil rather than good); that this doctrine is not that clear even in the biblical
text; and that it focuses too much on sin, which has been too much of an
emphasis in Christian theology in the past. For a number of reasons, I think
that it is a very important doctrine to retain. It provides a way of explaining
the universality of sin, in its individual, social, historical, and cosmic dimen-
sions. It explains the ever-present reality of sin and the tendency of humans
to so often make wrong moral choices. It is obvious that the world in which
we live is beset by disorder, violence, and selshness of all kinds and is thereby
in sharp contrast with the way that God or even humans in their utopian
dreams would want the world to be. Of course, the reality of original sin does
not negate the potential and even actual goodness of human beings to make
right moral choices. It simply expresses the immense freedom humans have,
both for good and evil, with an inclination to often choose the latter.
Although the doctrine of original sin is primarily understood as having
implications for relationships among human beings, it also has signicant
implications for the relationship between humans and animals. Although only
humans are believed to be capable of sin, animals suffer the effects of sin as
well, such that the ideal peaceful relationship between humans and animals
has been marred. Thus, the doctrine of original sin provides the backdrop for
the existence of disharmony in human-animal relationshipsand possibly
even for the disharmony in relationships among animals. It seems obvious
that much of human disorder, violence, and selshness has been manifested
toward the animal kingdom. In the biblical account, early evidence of the ef-
fects of the Fall and thus original sin upon animals was that the human diet
changed from a vegetarian to a meat-based one, and animals became routinely
utilized in sacrices to God.
24
Subsequent biblical narratives indicate that an-
imals eventually were also extensively used in agriculture, for transportation,
and in warfare. In fact, one of the ways in which the treatment of animals has
been justied in the Christian tradition, in addition to the creation injunction
on dominion, has been by pointing to such examples in the biblical text in an
attempt to demonstrate that animals do seem primarily to have been created
for their instrumental value to humans.
While the doctrine of original sin can be used to explain the disharmony
between humans and animals, the question can be raised as to why there is
disharmony within the animal kingdom. After all, some might argue, animals
do harm and kill other animals, implying some kind of hierarchy. If some
animals can engage in such acts against other animals, then does this not
justify human superiority over other animals, and is not this superiority jus-
tied by evolutionary theory itself as opposed to the reality of original sin? My
position is that the disharmony even within the animal kingdom is a result of
sin. As I argued before, the diet of all beings was a vegetarian one before the
Fall, and the eschatological hope of Isaiah (11:6) presents an ideal in which the
lion will lie down with the lamb. This suggests that the harm animals do to
one another is not part of Gods original plan, but rather it is a result of the
fallen condition of the entire cosmos.
However, even if the disharmony within the animal kingdom is not due
to sin, there are very signicant differences between what animals do to one
another and what human beings do to animals in experimentation. First, one
can argue that the only reason for some animals to kill others is that they are
biologically constituted to do so, on the basis of their instincts. Although we
can agree that humans have some instincts, it seems a stretch to suggest that
humans have an instinct to kill animals. Second, even when animals do kill
one another, it is in a controlled situationone animal against another ani-
maland does not result in an institutional slaughter or mistreatment of a
large group of animals. Third, when a carnivorous species seeks food, it tends
to prey on a limited number of species that specically will fulll its food
requirements, unlike the case of humans, who tend to cause harm to virtually
all animal species. Fourth, when animals do kill others, they usually kill the
weakest rather than the healthiest specimens of the particular species they are
pursuing; they pick out the most vulnerable, who, for example, are not able to
run as fast or who wander from the protection of the herd. This is in sharp
contrast to humans, who routinely utilize and kill healthy animals. Fifth, when
animals kill each other, it is usually a quick death that is not preceded by a
long period of suffering, such as is the case in experimentation. Sixth, while
this argument of animal violence might have more validity with regard to eat-
ing animals, there is nothing in the animal kingdom analogous to experimen-
tation upon another species. Thus, the argument from the survival of the ttest
does not adequately challenge the notion that original sin is the principal rea-
son for disorder in all relationships among species.
Again, one does not need to rely on a literal understanding of the Bible to
demonstrate the signicance of the doctrine of original sin for the treatment
of animals. However, this does not mean that the treatment of animals has
been unilaterally negative. The Bible itself contains numerous prescriptions
regarding their treatment, such as Sabbath rest for animals as well as humans,
and injunctions on taking care of and expressing kindness toward ones ani-
mals.
25
However, it is clear that the predominant message of the biblical text,
the history of the Hebrew people, archaeological evidence of other groups dur-
ing that time, and the subsequent record of the treatment of animals in human
history all bear extensive witness to the poor treatment humans afford animals.
Animals often were and continue to be treated primarily as resources for hu-
man beings.
The doctrine of original sin has implications for the treatment of experi-
mental animals in particular. Animal experimentation provides evidence of the
disorder in the relationship between humans and animals. The entire practice
demonstrates that animals are largely viewed and treated as existing primarily
for the purposes of human beings. The very fact that animals in this setting
are seen virtually only in terms of their potential contribution to human life
and health is problematic enough. In addition, the often poor treatment af-
forded many experimental animals and the subsequent lack of legal protection
extended toward some species also demonstrate the existence of this dishar-
mony. Many of the procedures done on animals in the course of experiments
that cause signicant suffering and pain seem inexplicable if not for the reality
of human sin. Original sin also provides us with an explanation for the attitudes
of at least some scientists (but certainly not all), who seem to put their careers
and reputations above the interests of animals.
26
Liberation Theology and Sin
The traditional understanding of dominion, as well as the doctrine of original
sin, can be understood as explanations for the ill treatment often afforded to
animals, although primarily in terms of individual sin. However, sin can also
be understood in social terms, through the oppression of one group by another,
and as residing within the structures of institutions themselves. Animal ex-
perimentation can be considered an example of the exploitation of the pow-
erless by the powerful, and therefore it is worth briey mentioning the contri-
bution that liberation theology can make to this issue. Although liberation
theology is traditionally understood with regard to humans, I will argue that
application can be made to the situation of animals as well.
Liberation theology is a relatively recent development in Christian theol-
ogy, rooted in Marxist ideology. It attempts to highlight the plight of and thereby
the special interest of God in the economically and politically disadvantaged
groups in human society. Liberation theology begins with the assumption that
history has been written and promulgated from the viewpoint of the dominant
class, primarily male humans. The exodus story in the Old Testament provides
the foundation for this theology, in which God helped to free the Israelites
from slavery and bring them into the promised land. This story provides the
metaphor for how God continues to be concerned with and work on behalf of
the poor, oppressed, marginalized, and powerless in society. This does not
mean that God loves the marginalized better but simply that they require a
special kind of protection not needed by some other groups, particularly the
powerful. This work of freedom and empowerment, obviously, needs to be
done through the work of other humans, both by those who suffer the op-
pression but especially by those who are the oppressors. Sin, then, in addition
to being understood as individual acts, is primarily viewed as a larger social
sometimes even institutionalproblem, in which some groups tend to mar-
ginalize and exploit others.
Liberation theology, in its various forms, also includes a biblical herme-
neutic of suspicion, which brings a critical eye to the biblical text in light of
the fact that biblical history has been written from the perspective of the pow-
erful and not the powerless. Because of this bias, feminist theologians, for
example, search for the sometimes obscure clues both in the text and in human
history to demonstrate that the biblical account of the treatment of and attitude
toward women is not the whole picture and thereby represents a distortion of
Gods purposes. Since men wrote the history and held the ultimate positions
of power, it was inevitable that their views and values would predominate, and
thus it was also inevitable that women would be marginalized. All presenta-
tions of truth, therefore, are somewhat suspect because they cannot be ob-
jective but are molded by the perspectives of the ones presenting this truth. It
is for this reason that liberation theology maintains that it is important to listen
to all voices in the creation of theology, especially those whose voices have
largely been silenced in human history because of their disadvantaged position.
How can liberation theology help us in the understanding of sinful treat-
ment toward animals and in the formulation of a more positive ethic for ani-
mals in general and for experimental animals in particular?
27
First and most
important, liberation theology can extend to the treatment of animals because
they, too, are a marginalized and oppressed group in society. Obviously, many
experimental animals are exploited by those more powerful who are in a po-
sition to do so, even if the motive is a good one, such as for human benet.
Of course, many who embrace liberation theology for humans would balk at
the idea of including animals, in the belief that this step will ultimately result
in the debasement of oppressed humans. However, as I have previously argued,
it is not necessary to pit humans against animals in such a way. Instead of
viewing animal liberation as competing with or deecting attention away from
human liberation, it is preferable to view oppression as a kind of seamless
garment, since all forms of oppression include victimization of the powerless
by the powerful. If animals are such a marginalized group, and if God is on
the side of the marginalized, then God must be on the side of oppressed ani-
mals, and ultimately we must be, too. To the extent that experimental animals,
then, are oppressed and victimized (and certainly not all of them are), they,
too, represent a group in need of liberation. In addition, as previously noted,
many who work for the liberation of animals tend to work for the liberation of
humans as well, suggesting that many people already see the connection be-
tween human and animal liberation. Finally, it can be argued that just as there
are some people who devote themselves to ghting against particular forms of
human oppression (e.g., environmental problems, abortion, poverty), some
people can devote themselves to the issue of animal oppression. The model of
the Christian church as the body of Christ in which each part has a different
gift supports the notion that not all people are called to the same task of mission
in the world, and I would argue that, for some people, their task is the liberation
of animals.
Second, the liberation of animals is supported by the exodus story. Al-
though it is not a focal point, the ocks of the Israelites are included in the
departure from Egypt. Certainly, the primary reason was so that the people
would have a means of food and livelihood in their new life, but nevertheless
they are included in the exodus as part of the human community. Third, we
need to view the biblical text with regard to animals with a hermeneutic of
suspicion. Biblical history was not written from the perspective of animals but
from the perspective of humans, who had express purposes in mind for the
use of these animals, primarily understood in terms of service to humans.
Obviously, the analogy with the plight of women falls short here somewhat,
since it seems absurd to talk about how history would have been written from
the perspective of animals. However, what a hermeneutic of suspicion does is
highlight questions about the history of and attitudes regarding the treatment
of animals, and it suggests that there may be more to the story than the way
it has been recorded. Thus, although the references to animals are primarily
negative in the biblical text (such as assuming their use in sacrice and war-
fare), we need to mine the text more carefully for clues to a more positive ethic
for animals.
28
In addition, numerous extrabiblical sources throughout human
history suggest that the treatment of animals certainly has been more positive
by some. For example, both apocryphal stories about the life of Jesus and
legends of some of the saints and mystics provide a more positive ethic for the
treatment of animals, suggesting at the very least that some in the Christian
tradition held animals in higher esteem than many of the biblical texts would
suggest.
29
Finally, liberation theology suggests that sin is broader than simply
the acts of individuals. Although social sin was a concept before the dawn of
liberation theology, it especially supports and highlights the notion that sin can
be understood as a force larger than the cumulative acts of the individuals
involved. With regard to animal experimentation, this suggests that what is
wrong with much of it cannot be laid at the doorstep of the sinful motives of
individual scientists who do not care at all about animals but rather that the
entire institution of animal experimentation supports some practices that
many scientists in their personal lives would both abhor and avoid.
30
This is
simply another way of saying that the problem is much larger than any of the
individuals involved, and it thereby needs to be addressed as a social sin, or
problem, and not simply as an individual one.
Solutions to Sin
We need to actively work against the reality and manifestation of sin in the
practice of experimentation and the subsequent treatment of experimental an-
imals. It is insufcient to look at some of the treatment of experimental animals
and to justify it theologically by a ready appeal to dominion or simply to say
that it is the price that we must pay for progress in human health. Obviously,
the world is not the way God intended it to be, nor is it as ideal as humans
would like it to be, and Christian theology uses sin to explain this gap between
what is and what could be.
31
Although humans have been and certainly are
capable of tremendous good, we are also capable of tremendous evil, and some
of this evil has been manifested in the practice of animal experimentation.
However, regardless of the extent of the disordered relationship between hu-
mans and animals, sin is not the nal word in Christian theology, and therefore
the current treatment of animals in general and in laboratories in particular is
capable of change. The doctrines of Christology and eschatology will help to
provide some of the answer to the problem of sin, the former by demonstrating
the answer that the person of Jesus provides not only to the sin problem in
general but also to the treatment of animals in particular, and the latter by
offering the ultimate hope for the return of all creation to Gods original pur-
poses. However, there are some preliminary suggestions with regard to animal
experimentation that can be made, based on the preceding discussion.
First, there needs to be a recognition at the outset that the motivations of
scientists, as with all human beings, are not always altruistic, even when it
comes to animal experimentation. This is simply another way of saying that
human beings often, if not always, work from mixed motives. Certainly many,
if not all, scientists want to improve human health and extend human life, but
many are also interested in furthering their careers and reputations, sometimes
in ways that cause great harm to animals. To suggest, as the scientic literature
often seems to, that the concern of scientists is almost always altruistic not
only belies what I have argued about human nature but also does not explain
many of the seemingly unnecessary and sometimes even trivial harmful ex-
periments that are often undertaken on animals. Of course, this does not mean
that we should paint a caricature of all scientists as self-interested people who
care only about their own careers, as much of the animal rights literature seems
to suggest. However, the Christian doctrine of sin reminds us that even sci-
entists need to be careful in assessing their motives and actions.
Second, lest those who are not scientists simply point the self-righteous
accusing nger at those who actually engage in animal experiments, it is im-
portant to recognize that sin is not only wrong actions that are done but also
good actions that are omitted, hence the common distinction made in Christian
theology between sins of commission and sins of omission. Thus, it is not
only some scientists who need a change of heart but also all people who are
affected by and the beneciaries of the results of experimentation, which is all
of us. Those of us who stand by silently in the face of the mistreatment and
subsequent suffering of animals are also guilty. As Edmund Burke once noted,
the only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men [sic] to do
nothing.
32
It is very easy for those who are concerned about the plight of ani-
mals to become self-righteous toward those engaging in actions they oppose,
but a healthy dose of humility by both parties and the recognition that sin can
be found in oppressors as well as in the oppressed (or in the case of the animal
experimentation, in those who are advocates for the oppressed) could go a long
way at least in modifying attitudes and judgments about others whose actions
we may not like. It is also important to mention that sin also tarnishes our
capacity to correctly judge other people, and we need to be careful about claim-
ing to know, let alone judge, the motives of others.
Third, we need to remember that human beings, while often choosing
wrongly, are certainly capable of right intentions, motives, and actions. If mo-
tives are mixed, then certainly motives are good most of the time, and perhaps
are present all of the time, even in what may seem to some to be questionable
or even evil actions. This is simply another way of saying that humans are not
bound by their sinful inclinations but have the capacity to rise above them as
well and to be capable of truly heroic and self-sacricing actions. It is the latter
tendency that needs to be cultivated and embraced more fully, both by those
who engage in and support experimentation and by those who oppose it.
Fourth, as I previously mentioned briey, we need to regard animal ex-
perimentation not simply as a problem due to the actions of individual scien-
tists but as part of a larger institutional problem that cannot simply be solved
through change by these individual participants. This is why change is required
on a legislative level, change that can be enforced.
Christology
The Historical Jesus
The doctrine of Christology is commonly divided into two main sections deal-
ing with Jesus life and ministry: the historical Jesus, which focuses on Jesus
earthly life and views him as a model for moral behavior, and Christ as Re-
deemer, which focuses on Jesus work of redemption for the world. With regard
to the historical Jesus, it is important to examine the biblical texts, as well as
extrabiblical sources, specically for hints of Jesus relationship with animals,
as well as the overall life and character of Jesus to see if how he lived and what
he taught can guide us in the development of a more positive ethic for animals
in general and for research animals in particular. What emerges from exam-
ining the historical life of Jesus as far as what we can know (since the biblical
text completely omits most of the events of Jesus life up to the age of thirty
and after that focuses primarily on his religious mission and message) is a
mixed picture, with conclusions supporting a foundation for a more positive
treatment of animals, as well as a more traditional status quo approach to
animals. However, I will argue that the life of Jesus can provide a positive model
for the treatment of animals and answer possible objections to my position.
The limited biography of Jesus that we have in the Gospels does not con-
tain numerous references to animals in general, but the Gospels still contain
some positive hints about the role of animals in the life of Jesus. Jesus grew
up in a time and place where animals were integral to daily life, and therefore
he would have come into regular contact with them, so it is not surprising that
he utilized examples from the animal kingdom to illustrate his religious teach-
ing. He most likely would have inherited the Jewish tradition of treating ani-
mals humanely.
33
Many injunctions in the Old Testament regard the impor-
tance of treating animals well, as, for example, the fact that Sabbath rest was
commanded for both humans and animals. The humane injunctions in the
Hebrew Bible certainly did not eliminate the use of animals in Hebrew society,
nor did it forestall some abuses of animals, as least by some individuals. How-
ever, the emphasis still seemed to be that even if animals could legitimately be
utilized by humans in various settings, a mark of religious people was practic-
ing kindness and abstaining from cruelty toward animals. In Jesus own teach-
ing on Sabbath observance, he challenged the legalism of some of the religious
leaders of his day by suggesting that one had a duty to help an injured animal
on the Sabbath, even though one was not technically supposed to do any work.
At the very beginning of his life and ministry, animals were believed to be
present. Although the biblical text makes no mention of animals present at his
birth, apocryphal literature suggests that animals were indeed present at the
manger. His baptism by John the Baptist was sealed by a dove (Matt. 3:1617).
In his Sermon on the Mount teaching, in which Jesus tried to emphasize the
concern of God for human beings, he used the example of birds, who, though
certainly not worth more than humans, had their needs taken care of by God
(Matt. 6:2526). One of the titles used to refer to Jesus was the Good Shepherd,
and Jesus often used the shepherd as an example to demonstrate Gods love
and concern for humans. The sheep know the voice of the shepherd, the good
shepherd lays down his life for the sheep, and the shepherd will leave behind
the ninety-nine sheep in his care in order to seek the one sheep who was lost
and rejoice greatly on nding that sheep (John 10:718). Jesus also challenged
the sacricial system of his day when he entered the temple, overturned the
tables of the money changers, and drove out all those who exploited people in
their attempts to worship God, which was partly done through the use of an-
imal sacrices (John 2:1317). It is important to note, though, that Jesus prin-
cipal concern would probably not have been the animals themselves as much
as the perversion of worship that was taking place.
In addition to the biblical text, some of the apocryphal literature, such as
the Gospel of Pseudo-Matthew and the Infancy Gospel of Thomas, provide
other stories, particularly of Jesus miracles, some in childhood, with regard to
animals. Because their reliability is less substantial than that of the Gospels,
they cannot be of much help with regard to a historical reconstruction of Jesus
life. However, they at least attest to the fact that legends grew up around Jesus
regarding his unique relationship with and ministry to animals.
34
In addition, the character and virtue of Jesus can also aid us in the devel-
opment of a model for the treatment of animals, since his life is considered to
be a model for Christians. During his earthly sojourn, Jesus demonstration of
the virtues of love of, compassion for, and service to others can certainly provide
a foundation for a more positive ethic toward animals. While directed speci-
cally toward people, it seems that these qualities can certainly extend toward
the multitudes of animals, particularly in science laboratories, some of whom
are in desperate need of compassion. In addition, while Jesus did not speci-
cally offer a teaching on ethics for the treatment of animals, he certainly was
a radical in that he clearly challenged some of the prevailing historical and
cultural denitions of his time, particularly with regard to those toward whom
justice and mercy should extend. Jesus accepted and included among his fol-
lowers those typically denigrated or rejected by the society of his time, such as
women and the poor. While Jesus, then, was not actually a vocal advocate for
animals, it is certainly possible to argue that Jesus ministry of challenging the
conventions and status quo practices in his own time can provide a model for
Christians to do the same for comparable issues of injustice today. We do not
even need to go so far as to say that, if Jesus lived today, he would be an animal
activist, but it does not strain credulity to argue for that possibility. But even if
that would not be the case, Christian ministry today can certainly extend toward
animals if they are part of the masses in need of advocacy. Jesus was vocal in
speaking up on behalf of those in his society who had no real voice themselves.
While some of those same groups of people continue to be disadvantaged in
our own society and therefore still require special attention, so, too, as I have
argued previously, it is a forced dichotomy to have to choose ministry to people
or ministry to animals. We can adopt a both-and approach, based on the char-
acter demonstrated by Jesus in his earthly life.
There are at least two ways in which one can argue against viewing Jesus
as having anything positive to contribute with regard to the treatment of ani-
mals. The rst is by pointing out some of the negative references in the biblical
text, and the second is by challenging the extrapolation of Jesus teachings
about justice and mercy to animals. With regard to the rst, it can be pointed
out that whereas Jesus was certainly a radical with regard to many issues in
his society, he did not single out animals for special attention. In fact, the text
indicates that in his eating habits, Jesus was not a vegetarian.
35
Rather, he
specically eats the Passover meal with his disciples more than once, and his
meals at the houses of at least the rich would have included meat on other
occasions. In addition, not only did Jesus eat sh with his disciples in one of
his post-Resurrection appearances (Luke 24:3643) but also included among
his miracles his disciples catch of a great number of sh. He used a coin in
the mouth of a sh to demonstrate the importance of obeying earthly laws, in
this case with regard to paying taxes (Matt. 17:27). It can also be argued that
Jesus participated in many of the feasts in Jerusalem, which would certainly
have involved animal sacrices, and yet there is no record of Jesus opposing
this practice, which seems odd if indeed he was so concerned for animals.
Finally, the miracle whereby Jesus exorcised demons and sent them into a herd
of pigs, who then rushed off a cliff and drowned (Matt. 8:2834), seems to
indicate that, rather than Jesus having concern for animals, he may have even
had a positive disregard for them. It seems to follow, then, that not only does
it contradict the biblical text to try to present Jesus as an advocate for animals
but also Jesus ministry to and concern for humans in need was directed toward
humans for a reasonbecause they are the ones toward whom Jesus believed
ministry should extend. In that case, to extrapolate his teachings to animals
violates not just Jesus actual teaching but even the spirit of Jesus teaching.
In some ways, it is difcult to challenge these objections, particularly those
with regard to the biblical text. As was acknowledged earlier, the stories of Jesus
and animals certainly do present a mixed scenario, so that it is difcult to argue
that there is a unilateral approach in the text to this issue. In addition, because
the Gospels are presenting a biography of Jesus, as with all biographies, many
stories and details are left out. The Gospel writers were primarily concerned
with presenting Jesus salvic teaching, and therefore it is not surprising that
only a few references to animals are included. Of course, this does not mean
that we can make a strong argument from silence either, since arguments from
silence can go both ways. Jesus obviously was a product of his time, as we all
are, and so it is not surprising that he would have participated in the practices
of his day, some of which may even have involved harm to animals, and it is
highly speculative to even suggest that Jesus would do differently if he lived
today. However, these objections can principally be responded to by saying that
Christian thought and life need not be fully grounded on the historical recon-
struction of the life of Jesus. Aside from the problem of using the biblical text
as the only source for Christian ethics, there is the additional problem at the
outset of the impossibility of even fully engaging in such a reconstruction of
Jesus life. Thus, it seems more important than trying to apply in too literal a
way the actual attitudes, teachings, and actions of Jesus to focus more on Jesus
general teaching and, most especially, the spirit of his teaching. Therefore, it
seems more helpful in regarding Jesus as a resource for Christian ethics that
we not slavishly try to apply living in our society precisely as Jesus did in his,
but that we rather attempt to inculcate the virtues Jesus manifested and apply
them to the concrete historical situations in which we nd ourselves. There
are obviously many issues in the contemporary period about which Jesus had
nothing to say but to which we certainly still feel that the life and teaching of
Jesus can make a contribution. Although they have been a minority in the
Christian tradition, particular individuals who used Jesus as a model for their
lives have extended their compassion and mercy toward animals, and thus it
is not a stretch to believe that Jesus can provide such a model for people today.
To the extent that experimental animals are in need of justice and mercy, par-
ticularly in research laboratories, then to that extent can the model of Jesus
love and compassion motivate at least those individuals with a particular con-
cern for animals.
Christ as Redeemer
If the idea is controversial that Jesus life can aid us in the development of an
ethic toward animals, then the idea that Jesus death and resurrection are some-
how signicant for animals as well is an even more controversial notion. Al-
though in Christian theology salvation has typically been understood as the
unique province of humans, and although Jesus life is certainly more helpful
to us than Jesus death in terms of an ethics for animals, I will argue, without
pushing it too strongly, that it is at least within the realm of possibility that
salvation is cosmic rather than only human centered, and thus Jesus death,
and particularly his resurrection, has implications for animals as well.
36
I will
rst examine briey how Christianity understands salvation and then draw
some implications for animals.
The distinction between the historical Jesus and Christ as Redeemer is an
important one, especially in relatively recent Christian theology. The historicity
of Jesus life and death is undisputed, even for those who are not Christians,
and many even from outside Christianity have found in Jesus a powerful ex-
ample of a virtuous life.
37
However, it is what Christians believe about Jesus
death and resurrection that elevates his status above that of any other mortal.
38
In particular, redemption through the death and resurrection of Jesus is the
Christian answer to sin. As was discussed earlier, sin is responsible for the
disordered state in which we nd the world, but sin has particularly affected
the relationship between God and humans. Unlike some other world religions
that believe people can attain their own salvation solely or primarily through
their own efforts, Christianity has typically taught that human effort is insuf-
cient (with some saying that human nature is completely depraved, and others
simply that it is deprived), and so a radical action on Gods part was necessary,
in particular the resurrection of Jesus. This radical action, called the atonement
(of which there are several theories), is believed by Christians to effect the
reconciliation of sinful humankind with God. Thus, Jesus death and resur-
rection have had several redemptive effects, including the restoration of the
relationship of human beings with God in the present, the empowering of
humans to overcome sin in their lives and thus live a moral life, and an ultimate
reunion with God, for at least those who believe, in some kind of heavenly
paradise at the conclusion of their earthly sojourn. The last benet can be more
accurately understood as the fullness of redemption.
There are obviously signicant limitations that must be acknowledged at
the outset with suggesting that Jesus death and resurrection have implications
for animals. With regard to reconciling animals with God in the present, it can
be objected that since animals are amoral creatures, incapable of either virtue
or vice, they are incapable of sin and subsequently are not in need of being
restored in their relationship to God, as are humans. Subsequently, since an-
imals are incapable of moral choice, the notion of moral growth also makes
little sense with regard to animals. In addition, many do not believe that ani-
mals have souls, and therefore talk of the fullness of redemption, particularly
with regard to an afterlife, is completely illogical. Although I will address the
third objection in the section on animal souls, it is not necessary to defend
against the other two points in order to make an argument that the work of
Jesus still has implications for animals. What, then, are some of the implica-
tions of the work of Christ as Redeemer for animals?
First, the Bible itself suggests some kind of cosmic redemption, in which
all of creation is involved. In particular, the book of Romans talks about the
groaning of all creation as it awaits its redemption (8:2223), and the book of
Isaiah foreshadows a time when the lion will lie down with the lamb, the latter
verse typically cited to indicate that Gods ultimate purpose for animals is not
one of predation and violence but one of peace and harmony. Although the
idea of the cosmic redemption of Christ (with the phrase cosmic Christ some-
times used) is a relatively new idea, it seems logical that if all of creation has
been disordered by sin, then all of creation is in need of restoration. If the
work of Christ effects this salvation for humans, then why cannot it extend to
animals? Although some Christians still believe that faith in Jesus is necessary
for salvation, many others believe (especially in light of the ecumenical move-
ment) that what Jesus did had cosmic effects for all people, regardless of
whether people believe this to be the case (others believe that Jesus is only one
of many paths to God). If actual faith in Jesus work is not necessary to effect
salvation for people, then it is certainly not necessary for animals. Second,
while the idea of moral growth has no direct relevance for animals, it certainly
should have indirect relevance, with some positive repercussions for the animal
kingdom. If the death and resurrection of Jesus have effected the possibility of
conversion, and hence moral growth and change in humans, then this change
should somehow be reected in a better attitude toward the rest of creation,
so that exploitation is not the ruling motif. Third, the Christian understanding
of the fullness of redemption reminds us that there is more to existence than
the world in which we nd ourselves, such that in a sense this is not the best
of all possible worlds, but there is such an ideal in the eschaton.
39
With regard
to animal experimentation, the implications of Christ as Redeemer are that
this is an issue where change can certainly take place. To the extent that hu-
mans are willing to move beyond their own agendas, mixed motives, and gen-
eral selshness, through the work and model of Jesus, to this extent will the
practice of experimentation and the plight of laboratory animals, as well as that
of all other animals, be signicantly improved.
Eschatology
Biblical Eschatology
To gain an understanding of Christian eschatology and its implication for an-
imals, it is important to examine the biblical text and see how it relates to other
doctrines already covered. The Christian doctrine of eschatology typically is
understood as having to do with end times, or last things. Christianeschatology
ultimately points to the idea of some kind of fullness of redemption, to the
reality of an existence beyond this earthly one. Although theologians differ with
regard to how this redemption should be conceptualizedwhether it should
be regarded primarily as a future and ultimately different kind of life than this
one, and to what extent this new life can be at least partially inaugurated and
realized in our timeit is foundational to Christian theology that the earthly
sojourn as we experience it is not all there is to reality and that there is hope
for something better in the future.
According to the biblical understanding, there is both an individual and a
cosmic aspect to eschatology. The individual aspect has to do with the destiny
of the individual human and is related to what happens to individuals after
death, with an emphasis on concepts such as heaven, hell, and even purgatory.
Too often in the past, the Christian tradition has emphasized only this individ-
ual aspect, to the neglect of the cosmic. The cosmic aspect of eschatology
reminds us that all creation will share in the newness of life and existence after
this life. Therefore, animals are a part of this creation, and so animals, too,
will share in this eternal life.
There is ample biblical evidence to support this notion of cosmic redemp-
tion, some of which has already been mentioned in the doctrines discussed in
this chapter. Although this redemption has typically been considered restricted
to humans, the biblical evidence does not support this idea. The biblical ac-
count of creation provides us with a vision of an ideal world whose original
peace and harmony was disturbed by human sin. This Fall has negatively af-
fected not only humans but also the rest of creation, in particular animals. Sin
itself cannot be understood only in an individual sense, because it also has a
cosmic and social dimension. However, this fallen state of nature is not the
nal word in Christian theology, and Jesus death and resurrection has been
understood to effect a reconciliation between God and all of creation. This
reconciliation, typically understood as redemption, includes restoration not just
in the present but in the future as well, which anticipates some kind of reunion
with God for all of Gods creation. To the extent that all of creation is fallen,
then, it seems clear that all of creation is in need of restoration. To the extent
that the destiny of all creation is interrelated and similarly affected both by the
effects of sin and by the love of God, then all creation will be restored. Thus,
all creation will ultimately share in the new life, in the new heaven and the
new earth.
40
This social and cosmic understanding of future life thus responds to the
argument that creatures cannot have eternal life because they are not able to
perform moral actions deserving of eternal life. Too often in the past, from a
narrow perspective, too many Christians have seen the afterlife as what hu-
mans deserve because of their good deeds in the world, and thereby animals
have often been excluded because they were believed to be incapable of moral
virtue. However, the cosmic aspect of eschatology reminds us that eternal life
is primarily Gods gift and God intends to give it to all of creation, including
animals. Of course, the question can be raised as to whether a line should be
drawn anywhere in the created order with regard to this cosmic dimension.
For example, some might consider it absurd to include insects as part of the
new creation. While I specically address sentient animals in this project, I
would argue that if redemption is actually cosmic, then it necessarily encom-
passes all of creation, including insects. If all of creation is loved by God and
will ultimately be somehow restored by God, why is it so absurd to include all
of creation within this realm?
Immortality
Some in the Christian tradition, inuenced by Greek philosophy and not by
the biblical understanding, have understood eternal life on the basis of im-
mortality. The principle of immortality in the human person is the soul. Thus,
they argue that animals, because they do not have a rational or spiritual soul,
are not able to have immortality and eternal life. Three generic responses can
be made to this argument.
The rst and most important argument is that immortality and an im-
mortal soul are not the necessary basis for eternal life, as the biblical evidence
proves. Instead, the fullness of redemption is a gift of God that is provided
freely on the basis of Gods love for and desire to restore all of creation. Thus,
it is not possession of an individual soul that is the most important consider-
ation in the Christian understanding of redemption, but the gift of God
achieved through the reconciling work of Jesus death and particularly his res-
urrection. This redemption is primarily a cosmic one, affecting the whole cre-
ated order, and so the possession of an individual soul is not even necessary
for an understanding of the fullness of redemption. If redemption is ultimately
the gift of God and is cosmic in scope, then there is also no need for all creation
to earn eternal life through good deeds, which the possession of a soul might
presuppose.
Second, it is possible to argue that animals indeed do have souls.
41
Obvi-
ously, it is not possible to demonstrably prove that animals have souls, and it
is not even necessary to do so. However, for those who maintain that humans
have souls, it does not seem a far stretch to assume the existence of animal
souls as well. Some in the Christian tradition have typically assumed that an-
imals lack the kind of souls possessed by humans and thereby use this as a
reason to exempt them from the fullness of redemption. The principal reason
offered for the lack of animal souls is their lack of rationality. This linking of
rationality and soul possession is probably the strongest theological reason
against the notion that animals possess souls, but it is certainly not the only
one. The most obvious response to this argument is to challenge the idea that
there is a necessary connection between rationality and soul possession. It is
possible instead to maintain, as Aristotle did, that humans and nonhumans
have different kinds of souls
42
and therefore that the kind of soul one has does
not determine ones ultimate fate as much as does the mere existence of some
kind of soul. In addition, the existence of marginal humans also undermines
the necessary connection between these two concepts, because the Christian
tradition has not typically exempted from immortality human beings who do
not have rationality or who have it to a lesser degree than do other humans.
Finally, even if rationality and soul possession are necessarily linked, I have
already argued in an earlier chapter that rationality, like other cognitive criteria,
lies on a spectrum, such that at least some animals do possess rationality, even
if not to the same extent as normal adult humans. Obviously, though, the
strongest argument against those addressing the question of whether animals
have souls is to respond that the possession of an individual soul, as evidenced
by the biblical record, is not necessary for the fullness of redemption.
A third response to the argument that animals do not have souls, and even
to the notion in general that animals do not experience the fullness of re-
demption, is that there are still implications for the treatment of experimental
animals. As C. S. Lewis has argued, the possibility that animals may not have
souls and thereby not experience redemption as do humans does not decrease
our responsibility to experimental animals but increases our responsibility to
them.
43
If indeed it is possible that this earthly existence is the only existence
they will know, and to the extent that we know or suspect that this life will
predominantly be full of pain and suffering or at least deprivation of signicant
benets, then it seems that we do have an increased burden to ensure that the
short life they do have is not solely comprised of pain and suffering, but that
we do what we can to actively enhance their well-being.
Further Consequences of Eschatology
The Christian doctrine of eschatology ultimately points to the reality of an
existence beyond this earthly one. There are two implications of the Christian
view of redemption for animals in general and for experimental animals in
particular. The rst has to do with the Christian view toward death. Our culture
in particular seems to be a death-defying one, not so much that death is denied
as much as we will make every effort possible to thwart its ultimate advance.
In the realm of medical technology, we continue to seek to make progress
against all manner of human sickness and disease, with the pursuit of a longer
life span (sometimes regardless of the quality of that life) often seeming to be
the ultimate goal. To do this, we seem willing to make questionable ethical
advances, or at least proceed in areas where the ethical questions and impli-
cations have not even been fully addressed, such as cloning and xenotransplan-
tation, to name just two. Whereas we tend to live in ultimate fear and dread
of death (both that of our own and that of others as well), the Christian per-
spective is quite different. While Christianity is certainly a life-afrming faith,
it does not view death as the ultimate enemy. In fact, the voluntary martyrdom
of many in the Christian tradition, as well as numerous biblical texts, supports
the idea that, if not that death is to be welcomed, then certainly it is not to be
feared. This does not militate against a normal human fear of the unknown
but simply demonstrates that death is the dreaded enemy only when one has
no hope of anything after that death. To the extent that death signals only the
end of one kind of existence in return for another kind of existence, the all-
out effort to eradicate the sources leading to that death may not need to be so
extensive. With regard to animal experimentation, this does not mean that we
should not continue the ght against sickness and disease, since even if death
is the ultimate end point for all of us, there may be much that we can do to
alleviate the earthly pain and suffering of both humans and animals. However,
it does call into question the extent to which we do utilize animals, such that
even minimal human medical benet can justify often harmful animal exper-
imentation.
Second, to the extent that earthly life is full of suffering, and because all
of creation has its ultimate source in God, it makes sense that all of creation,
including experimental animals, can one day be restored as well. The Christian
understanding of redemption includes the notion of recompense for suffering.
Although it has often been used far too glibly in the past to pacify oppressed
peoples (such as slaves) with hopes of a better life, the Christian view of re-
demption is a reminder that there is a glorious reality to which the sufferings
of the present cannot be compared. It offers hope to those who suffer for
reasons beyond their understanding. If humans often cannot understand the
reasons for their suffering, then we can certainly expect that animals have not
the vaguest notion. To the extent that some laboratory animals are doomed to
a life of pain and suffering, the hope that there may indeed be something more
for them after their short and miserable earthly lives can at least provide hope
for those humans particularly interested in the welfare of animals, as well as
attest to a view of divine justice that includes animals within its scope. In
addition to recompense for suffering, though, redemption ultimately contains
within it the idea of the restoration of all creation to its Creator. If all of creation
originates in God, then it makes sense to suggest that all of creation will ulti-
mately return to God as well. If we believe that this redemption, or the inau-
guration of the kingdom of God, can happen at least to a limited extent even
now, then we have a moral responsibility to do what we can to help achieve
this ideal. Humans are not alone in having been affected by the presence of
sin in creation, but because we have moral freedom in a way that animals
probably do not, we have an obligation to reduce the suffering of both humans
and animals to the extent to which we are able. The reality of living in the
tension between the already and the not yet assumes that the vision of the
latter is predominantly what drives us in the pursuit of the ultimate vision,
which we now can only conceive of in our minds. To the extent that laboratory
animals suffer in their brief earthly sojourn, to this extent do humans have an
obligation to minimize this suffering, and to this extent is the idea of divine
recompense for their suffering within the realm of both logic and possibility.
Conclusion
While Christian theology may not have any dramatically new insights into the
treatment of animals, it is helpful in two ways: by providing a theological un-
dergirding for at least some of the arguments made in previous chapters and
by providing Christians with a theological framework within their own tradi-
tion for considering the issue of animal experimentation.
44
It seems that more
work needs to be done with regard to a Christian theology for animals, but
what has already been examined can address at least some of the more signif-
icant issues.
45
The doctrine of creation demonstrates that Gods covenantal
relationship with and continuing providential care of animals, exercised
through human dominion, should be understood as benevolent stewardship
rather than as autocratic despotism. Although human sin, both personal and
social, is partially responsible for the existence of pain and suffering for some
experimental animals, this sin can be overcome in Christian individuals and
in society by a focus on the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus. Finally, the
Christian eschatological hope suggests that this earthly life is but a temporary
sojourn and a precursor of the ultimate glory that is to come. But as was argued
earlier, even if animals are excluded from this heavenly paradise, however it is
understood, this simply puts a greater burden on us to ensure their benevolent
treatment in this life. The most important argument Christian theology sup-
ports, though, is that the purpose of animals is much more than simply their
instrumental value to humans. However, in spite of the positive contribution
of Christian theology, it is a reality in our disordered world that the well-being
of humans and animals are often at odds with one another, such that we must
often choose one over the other. The next chapter will therefore offer a burden/
benet analysis by means of which the competing interests of humans and
laboratory animals can be adjudicated.
6
Burden/Benet Analysis
As I mentioned in the rst chapter, there are three possible posi-
tions with regard to experimentation: approval of all experimenta-
tion, abolition of all experimentation, and permissibility of some ex-
perimentation. Most want to allow for some experimentation,
although there are very signicant differences of opinion as to what
should be permitted.
1
All those advocating coming under this third,
very broad, umbrella employ a burden/benet analysis.
2
My thesis is
that the benets humans experience as a result of experimentation
are not sufcient to justify most experiments done on animals.
Thus, the burdens to animals cannot ordinarily be justied on the
grounds of benets to humans, and therefore experimentation
should be greatly restricted in comparison with its present practice.
Great human benet can at times come from animal experimenta-
tion, but there are limits on achieving this good, and very restrictive
experimentation will not necessarily eliminate some future benets
for humans. This thesis is grounded on the arguments I made in
earlier chapters, in particular that animals have mental states and
are sentient, that animals have rights (so that human rights cannot
always automatically trump animal rights), and that animals have in-
trinsic value in the sight of God. In this chapter, I will proceed as
follows. In the rst two sections, I will dene burdens and benets,
present the positions of those who disagree with my position on
both the burden and the benet sides, and respond to those argu-
ments. In the third section, I will provide guidelines for casuistry,
and in the fourth section apply these guidelines to specic types of
experiments. In the last section, I will offer some concluding re-
marks.
Arguments from the Burden Side
It is important at the outset to dene what precisely is meant by burdens
with regard to experimentation. Burdens can be dened as the harms, pains,
sufferings, or deprivations experienced as a result of the experimentation. It is
clear that in animal experimentation, animals are the ones who bear the brunt
of the burdens. The rst and most important burden caused to animals is that
many (although certainly not all) experiments cause pain and suffering to an-
imals. For this reason, the most basic right that animals should have is freedom
from unnecessary pain and suffering, although what would be considered nec-
essary can be determined only in the context of a burden/benet analysis. Pain
can occur in three ways, as I discussed in chapter 2: whether directly through
the study of the phenomenon of pain itself, indirectly and incidentally in the
course of the experiment itself, and/or through routine medical procedures or
problems specically related to husbandry conditions. Even though the degree
and duration of pain may vary considerably, there is no question that many
laboratory animals are subjected to pain in the course of their usually brief
lives.
In addition, many experimental animals also suffer considerably, often due
to husbandry conditions or exposure to long-term pain. When animals spend
their entire lives as experimental subjects, in conditions less optimal than they
would live in if they were not experimental animals, then we can certainly talk
about the animals lives as often being signicantly impoverished. Thus, al-
though burdens usually focus on pain and suffering, they can include depri-
vations as well, which often cause suffering. Suffering is especially a burden
for those animals who are more cognitively advanced. This suffering is partly
the result of thwarted desires and is an infringement on the limited autonomy
of animals, many of whom certainly would not consent to the conditions under
which they must live in laboratories. Animals are also burdened by a denial of
some of the fundamental moral rights they have, most especially freedom from
unnecessary pain and suffering, but also having their liberty so restricted,
having their lives unnecessarily shortened, not being able to engage in species-
specic behavior, and not being treated with respect as individuals. Although
we live in a world beset by sin, it is incumbent upon humans to relieve the
burdens placed on other sentient creatures whenever possible, especially in
light of Gods love and concern for them.
Finally, an additional burden for animals is that most experiments result
in their premature deaths, often well before their lives would have ended under
more natural conditions, either due to the necessity of continuing the research
begun in the experiment when the animal was still alive (through dissection),
because the animal is so ill that he cannot live a normal life anymore, or
sometimes simply because there is no further use for him and subsequently
no real interest or incentive in nding him a home beyond the laboratory. In
addition, this death is not always as humane as it could be, so that the expe-
burden/benefit analysis 137
rience of death sometimes becomes simply another form of pain and suffering
for the animal.
While the primary burdens in experiments are to animals, there are three
possible burdens for humans as well. First, experiments can desensitize the
researcher to pain and suffering in others. While there is not a necessary
relationship between involvement in experimentation and insensitivity on the
part of the researcher, there is at least cause for concern, and thus it is certainly
a minor, if not a major, burden of experimentation.
3
After all, we often give
scientists permission to do to laboratory animals what we would label and
judge as cruel if people did the same to their pets. Second, money is diverted
from preventive medicine to nding cures for diseases such as cancer, stroke,
and heart disease, which are often a result of humans poor lifestyle choices.
Third, spending on alternatives is minimized when the available funds are
primarily utilized on live animals, which also means that humans may not be
getting the best care that we can because of the problems associated with
animal models.
Obviously, not all agree with the extent of burdens experienced by animals
in experiments, and therefore it is important to consider the arguments of
those who disagree with my position. Especially for those in the troubled
middle, a burden/benet analysis of experimentation with regard to animals
generally assumes that pain and suffering are undesirable, that animals can
experience at least pain, that we can make some kind of rough comparison of
animal pain with human pain,
4
that the pain of animals is very real to them,
and that there must be a weighing of this pain against the benets. However,
even for those who agree with all of these premises, there are signicant dif-
ferences of opinion as to where to draw the line for experimentation. Those
who disagree with my thesis do not give as much value to animals as I do, so
that animal burdens are subsequently not given as much serious consideration,
primarily for four reasons.
First, despite an acknowledgment that animals can experience pain, it is
not considered as important as human pain, so that when it comes down to a
weighing of animal and human pain, human pain is given precedence in most
cases. Second, they may deny animal suffering, minimize it, or not give it
enough importance. As was mentioned in chapter 3, the question of animal
suffering is much more controversial than that of animal pain, so the word
suffering is usually not used, and the assumption is made that as long as
animals are not subjected to pain, there is nothing wrong with experimenta-
tion. Even for those who may acknowledge negative animal states, such as
stress or anxiety, these states are not generally the focus of attention in evalu-
ating the negative impact of particular experiments on animals. Third, they
believe that virtually any animal interest can be overridden by any human
interest or, to put it in terms of rights, that human rights must always take
precedence over animal rights (even if they are acknowledged) in conict cases.
There are some exceptions, such as cosmetics testing on animals, which many
would argue should be outlawed because of the comparatively insignicant
human interests it addresses. However, in general, whenever a burden/benet
analysis is undertaken by those supporting all or even most experiments, an-
imal burdens are generally not the focus of the discussion, but rather the
benets to humans. In fact, one of the problems with the way in which argu-
ments for animal experiments are usually made is that there is no real attempt
to weigh the burdens and benets; rather, the benets to humans are simply
declared or assumed de facto, so as to justify most experiments on animals.
Finally, as was discussed in chapter 5, many maintain that humans have do-
minion over animals, so we can justify their use if the benets to humans are
deemed great enough, because animals primarily have instrumental rather
than intrinsic value.
The response to these arguments regarding burdens will take the form of
some general observations. First, most of these arguments have already been
responded to in previous chapters, in which I argued that animals can expe-
rience pain and suffering, that animals have rights that should not automati-
cally be trumped by human rights or interests, and that theological dominion
should be interpreted in a more benign manner than it has been in the past.
This is not to say that all those who utilize animals in experiments believe that
animals have no value and are mere tools to be used in whatever ways humans
desire (although there may be a minority who feel this way), but they tend not
to regard animals as valuable, or valued, in their own right.
5
Second, we must
recognize that, when weighing burdens and benets, we are talking about
denite burdens versus possible benets.
6
This is a very important consideration.
Therefore, it seems that more weight should be put on the burdens rather than
on the benets, at least at the outset, since the burdens are certain whereas the
benets are simply possible or intended. The arguments of those allowing for
more permissive experimentation tend to focus almost exclusively on the ben-
ets to humans, and therefore it is important to emphasize the specic burdens
to animals. Third, we cannot talk about burdens and benets in the abstract
but rather of degrees of burdens and benets. If burdens and benets are
specic and concrete (as opposed to general and theoretical), then we must
make these more specic kinds of distinctions. We must be able to accurately
determine the degree of burdens experienced versus the degree of benets
expected in order to engage in a more accurate assessment. In a later section,
I will develop guidelines that will enable us to distinguish among both burdens
and benets that can be determined to be minimal, moderate, serious, or very
grave. Fourth, although radical speciesism, as was discussed in chapter 3, main-
tains that species membership is all that matters and so we should give pref-
erence to humans in conict situations with animals, I have argued for qual-
ied speciesism, in which species membership is morally relevant but other
signicant criteria must be correlated as well.
Arguments from the Benet Side
It has already been noted that most of those arguing for the status quo with
regard to experimentation tend to focus on the benets for humans, rather
than on the burdens to animals. It is thus important to dene benets, to
present the arguments from benets of those who disagree with my position,
and then to provide a rebuttal to these arguments. Benets with regard to
experimentation can refer to any advance in medical knowledge or practice,
for either humans or animals, that serves to provide one or more of the fol-
lowing: improvements in lifestyle or convenience; better medical and surgical
techniques; advances in knowledge of psychology, behavior, or physiology;
eradication and treatment of diseases; and contributory factors toward a longer
life span.
The principal argument of those arguing for the status quo in experimen-
tation is primarily that of necessity, although it is supported in a number of
different ways. Simply put, the argument from necessity maintains that animal
experimentation is considered necessary to help in the battle against disease
and premature death and in providing general improvements in life, such that
the ends can usually justify the means. In essence, the argument from neces-
sity maintains that the results cannot be achieved in any other manner. The
kinds of benets generally used to justify the argument from necessity are
human benet, animal benet, and advancement in knowledge.
7
The argument from human benet is the strongest justication for exper-
imentation, and it has both a backward- and a forward-looking component; that
is, the advances made in the past provide the justication for continued ex-
perimentation in the future. The backward-looking argument generally pro-
ceeds by resorting to specic past examples of what is believed to have been
achieved through experimentation. Experimentation is often credited with an
impact on virtually every major medical advance for humans.
8
Experiments
have resulted in the elimination or management of certain diseases and have
contributed to increased longevity for humans. Specic medical advances for
humans typically cited include the development of antibiotic drugs, vaccines
for many serious and infectious diseases (such as diphtheria, tetanus, rabies,
whooping cough, tuberculosis, polio, measles, mumps, and rubella), organ
transplantation, open-heart surgery and replacement valves, treatments for kid-
ney failure,
9
treatment of physiological diseases such as diabetes and epilepsy,
surgical procedures, and correction of congenital heart defects.
10
In addition,
it is frequently noted that forty-one Nobel prizes have been awarded to scien-
tists whose research depended at least in part on animal experimentation.
11
The benet to animals is often added as providing additional incentive for
experiments: that not only do humans benet from experiments but also an-
imals do, because the same procedures and treatments used in humans can
be used in animals as well,
12
even though virtually all experiments are specif-
ically undertaken with the intention of applying the results to humans.
13
In addition to this backward-looking argument, a forward-looking argu-
ment is also used to justify continued experimentation. Results of experimen-
tation have not only advanced human and animal life and well-being in the
past but also are likely and necessary to provide subsequent and additional
improvements in the future if we continue to experiment on animals.
14
Strong
statements are often made in this regard. Scientists sometimes claim that it
would be immoral not to continue with animal research, and dire predictions
are often made about medical advances that will not be achieved if experimen-
tation is either eliminated or severely curtailed.
15
The advancement of knowledge is often provided as an additional human
benet to basic as opposed to applied research (where the results are more
tangible). Those arguing from this perspective sometimes seem to assume that
the quest for knowledge is not only a basic good but also virtually a right in
and of itself.
16
Obviously, the argument goes, it is unrealistic for the public to
believe that every single experiment undertaken can be done only if it imme-
diately results in a tangible benet. Some experiments, while not yielding con-
crete benets at the moment, provide the foundation upon which future ex-
periments may build and eventually lead to a signicant benet. This is simply
to say that it is probably unlikely that one experiment will help us discover the
cure for cancer, for example. All scientic knowledge builds on the work of
predecessors, so it may not be fair to judge each experiment individually by
such stringent criteria as whether it will certainly (which is impossible to know)
lead to concrete benets for humans.
17
In addition, sometimes going in a
wrong direction can ultimately lead us in the right direction, which we may
never have discovered if not for the wrong turn in the road.
There is certainly validity to some of these arguments. Experimentation
has resulted in medical advances for both humans and animals, whether
through design or serendipitously, and future experimentation is likely to con-
tinue to yield results that may not be obtainable in any other manner. However,
any actual benets gained cannot obfuscate deeper concerns, and I would like
to respond to these arguments by way of two overarching observations, each
of which can be supported in several ways: there is an exaggeration of the
benets that will be lost, and a good end does not justify a bad means.
Although animal experimentation has resulted in some knowledge that we
may not have been able to gain in other ways, the benets gained have at times
been exaggerated. First, animal studies have often been misleading in the past
because animals are simply not the best models for human disease. Although
there are considerable similarities between humans and animals, particularly
with regard to mental states and sentiency, this does not eliminate the problem
that each species is also unique, and what works in one species may not, and
often does not, work in another species. Thus, there is a problem of species
differentiation and transferability.
18
The same studies on different species often
yield empirically diverse results. For example, of the nineteen chemicals be-
lieved to cause cancer when ingested by humans, only seven caused cancer in
mice and rats, using the standards set by the National Cancer Institute. A
review by the U.S. General Accounting Ofce discovered that 198 of the 209
new drugs marketed between 1976 and 1985 had serious risks associated with
them in 52 percent of the cases, risks that were not predicted by animal tests.
19
In addition, the following substances have resulted in different reactions in
various animal species, especially in comparison with their effects on humans:
penicillin is poisonous to guinea pigs, strychnine is safe for guinea pigs, ar-
senic is safe for sheep, and aspirin is toxic to some species (it even causes fetal
abnormalities in rats).
20
There are numerous other examples in the literature
of animal experiments for which it was concluded that for some of these rea-
sons animal models may not be the best models for humans, at least not in
all circumstances.
21
In addition, many diseases are articially induced in ani-
mals, and they are not particularly helpful in understanding the naturally oc-
curring diseases in both humans and animals.
22
Many experimental protocols
also inict pain, suffering, and stress, which may affect the results.
23
In fact, animal studies have not only been misleading sometimes with
regard to human health but also even downright dangerous at times. The most
commonly cited example is that of thalidomide, which had proven safe in
animal studies but caused severe deformities in human fetuses when taken
during pregnancy. Some proponents of experimentation maintain that the tha-
lidomide case is a good example of insufcient animal testing (that if it had
been tried on even more species, these negative results would have shown up),
but in any case, the drug was allowed on the market because of the animal
studies undertaken at that point in time, and one cannot know in advance
when that kind of serious mistake could happen again. It is even likely that
the preoccupation with animal experiments may be part of the problem with
the lack of success in the ght against certain diseases, such as the war on
cancer, initiated in 1971.
24
In fact, a cure for cancer has been found for mice
but not for humans.
25
We also do not know what advances could have been or will be achieved
without the use of animals, which implies that some of the claims about the
importance of past animal testing may be inated. Some specic medical ad-
vances achieved without the use of animals are the isolation of the AIDS virus,
development of x-rays, and discovery of the relationship between chemical
exposures and birth defects, to name just a few.
26
It is also possible that past
or future benets could be achieved in other ways, in particular through the
use of clinical investigations in humans. In fact, some advances in knowledge
have come about through the use of humans as subjects,
27
both in clinical trials
and by using cadavers. What about the increased use of humans as a way to
reduce animal experimentation? Of course, this raises its own set of signicant
ethical questions, most especially with that of consent, particularly with regard
to vulnerable populations (such as the poor, developmentally delayed, impris-
oned, and children). However, there must be some experimentation now un-
dertaken with animal subjects that could easily be done on humans (psycho-
logical experiments are an obvious example), although we must obviously
proceed very carefully in the utilization of humans. In addition, as I discussed
in chapter 3 regarding the 3Rs, particularly the one of replacement, we need
to put more money and effort into not only utilizing more fruitfully the re-
placement techniques we already have at our disposal (such as human cadav-
ers, in vitro tests, computer and math models, CAM test, use of nonsentient
animals) but also trying assiduously to develop additional alternatives, so that
we may be able to gain the same benets with considerably less experimen-
tation. With ever increasing advances in computer technology, using comput-
ers seems an especially worthwhile avenue to explore.
Moreover, public health measures, such as improvements in diet and san-
itation, have probably done more to decrease mortality than has the develop-
ment of vaccines.
28
Many diseases we are trying hard to nd cures for with
animals are largely lifestyle related and thus somewhat preventable.
29
It is a
common and valid criticism that Western medicine is more focused on cure
than on prevention. If much of the money and energy that is currently put into
experimentation were instead diverted both to educate people on lifestyle de-
cisions that affect health and to improve the living conditions for all humans,
this would prove signicantly benecial to humans and thereby decrease our
reliance on animal experimentation.
The argument from animal benet has some problems as well, primarily
because the experimental animals themselves are not the direct beneciaries
of these benets. This is not always the case with humans who volunteer for
experiments either but is sometimes the case (e.g., AIDS patients who are
willing to try an experimental drug). However, with humans we (ideally) have
their informed consent; further, humans are in a position to determine whether
they are willing to take the risks associated with experimental treatments in a
way that animals are not. Thus, we can question whether animals, if given the
choice, would consent to living as experimental subjects, under sometimes
distressing conditions, on the grounds that it will help their conspecics or
members of other species. Since most experiments are designed and under-
taken to enhance human well-being, the fact that animals have sometimes
beneted is fundamentally serendipitous. Certainly, if there were never any
benets for animals, the justication for experimentation would not be con-
siderably lessened. Thus, the argument from animal benets sounds disin-
genuous, almost an afterthought. Although animals can and certainly have
beneted from experimentation, it would be fair to say that virtually all exper-
imentation is undertaken with a view toward improving human life and health.
Even if it is granted that signicant benets have been achieved in the
past, this does not commit us to continued experimentation at the same level
for the future.
30
Very restrictive experimentation will not completely eliminate
some future benets for humans and animals. While my proposal would se-
verely restrict experimentation, I am not advocating complete abolition of ex-
perimentation, and therefore some experiments would be permitted, as I will
develop in the following sections.
The second broad way to respond to arguments from those who support
the experimental status quo is to maintain that a good end does not justify a
bad means. In contrast to act or preference utilitarianism, which looks to con-
sequences as the single mitigating concern in assessing moral actions, many
ethicists maintain that some actions are wrong in and of themselves, regardless
of the consequences. Although utilitarians and nonutilitarians may come to
some of the same conclusions on many issues, including many of the restric-
tions that should be placed on experimentation, one stark difference is some
of the experiments that a utilitarian ethic would allow. Many who engage in a
burden/benet analysis, even if they are not utilitarians, tend to make judg-
ments about experimentation according to the ends that are expected to be
achieved, such that a good end often seems to justify virtually any means. My
position is that just because benet results does not make the means necessary,
or even good. There are many things in life that may have a good end that we
should not attempt to achieve precisely because of the bad means necessary to
achieve this end, or at least we should consider alternative means to achieve
the same end.
Many examples illustrate this notion that a good end cannot justify a bad
means. For example, it has long been part of the just war tradition that it is
wrong to specically target civilians, even if it means a quicker end to war and
certain military victory. Some would argue that capital punishment is too se-
vere a means to punish some criminals, even if it means that they will never
again be able to perpetrate their crimes. We would not justify doing experi-
ments on humans against their will, especially if they were certain to cause
them harm, even if the benets would be great for other humans. Finally, the
classic example often used in opposition to utilitarian reasoning is that if a riot
was going on and the civil authorities had the wrong man in custody, it would
not be justiable to punish him, even if it meant that the riots would cease.
Thus, we should not do something inherently morally wrong simply because
there is a possibility or even a likelihood of it resulting in a benecial outcome.
This is another way of saying that there are limits on achieving the good and
that there are many things in life we should not attempt to do because of the
bad means involved. I maintain that some of the practices within animal ex-
perimentation can be considered these bad means that are often justied by a
good end.
A consequence of believing that there are limits on the means to achieve
good ends by experimentation is that human benet is going to suffer some-
what by more restricted experimentation. There may not be cures for certain
diseases, there may be some increased pain and suffering for humans and
animals as a result of diminished medical advances, and attempts to increase
longevity may be curtailed. Although I argued previously that some of the
advances made through experimentation might be achieved with fewer animal
experiments, particularly by focusing on the use of alternatives, my position is
that even if we cannot achieve these ends with other means, we cannot justify
all of the burdens animals bear in experimentation.
Also, there are limits on the way in which we pursue human knowledge.
Do scientists have an absolute right to engage in any kind of experimentation
(and this would include excruciatingly painful experimentation) just to advance
scientic knowledge, even theoretical knowledge?
31
The absolute right to
knowledge could justify the use of animals for any kind of bizarre experiment
or at the cost of extreme suffering for sentient creatures. All recognize that the
privacy rights of people put limits on how researchers can acquire knowledge
of human beings.
Before I provide guidelines for casuistry, some general comments are in
order about weighing burdens and benets. First, there seems to be an un-
questioned assumption by scientists (and probably by many laypeople as well)
that human health and life are the ultimate end and good in life. This has
already been argued against from a theological position in the previous chapter,
but there are even nontheological reasons to question the notion that longer
human life is always a good. One of the ways to challenge this argument is to
ask what the price might be for humans with increased longevity in human
life. This raises the issue of quality versus quantity of life. The human life span
has increased greatly in the past century, and it is likely to increase in the
future. Unfortunately, however, ways to address the additional medical, nan-
cial, and social problems brought about by increased age have not kept pace
with this life span advance, and it becomes legitimate to ask whether there
might not be a point at which increased longevity is an increased burden rather
than a benet. If life expectancy increases to ninety but the last ten years are
miserable, with many of these individuals coming down with Alzheimers dis-
ease or other debilitating illnesses, for example, then this is not necessarily
better than people living only to seventy-ve in reasonably good health.
Second, scientists need to make stronger cases for their positions without
simply resorting to a laundry list of past benets achieved if they are to address
the issue of experimentation with the attention it deserves and with the com-
plexity it warrants.
32
As one philosopher has astutely observed: Doubtless we
live, in part, under necessity, but we give that goddess more honour than she
deserves.
33
Third, it is not fair for one group to bear all or most of the burdens
and the other to gain all or most of the benets. Although animals themselves
have beneted to a certain extent from experimentation, it is indisputable that
they are the ones most adversely affected, and, as I noted previously, the ex-
perimental animals are not themselves usually the direct beneciaries of the
experiments. Fourth, if the benets can be arrived at in a less burdensome
way, then we should do so. It is not sufcient simply to say that there are no
realistic alternatives to animals; instead, serious efforts should be made to
determine how we can minimize the burdens on animals. Fifth, both burdens
and benets cannot be vague but should be specic enough to demonstrate
the expected and likely burdens to the animals, as well as the expected and
likely benets to humans. They both must be concrete, which would thereby
enable them to be of some practical use in assessing particular experiments.
Thus, we need to assess the likelihood of achieving helpful benets from ex-
periments in order to justify particular burdens. An extreme view would be
that, for the purposes of an experiment to be legitimate, we must be able to
predict in advance that it will certainly result in the prevention, diagnosis, or
treatment of disease or ill health in humans or animals. In fact, some opposed
to all experimentation often argue in this way. However, this position is un-
realistic because it is impossible to always accurately predict in advance pos-
sible benets, and therefore this approach sets the standard unnecessarily high,
although it would logically follow that this standard would eliminate virtually
all animal experimentation. I am arguing for a more moderate view, which
suggests that all that is needed is to assert that the benets are expected or
intended, based on some kind of objective evidence since we cannot predict
with certainty.
34
Thus, we must determine the likelihood that a particular ex-
periment will result in benetsbenets sufcient to offset animal burdens.
The benets cannot simply be unsubstantiated wishful thinking but based on
scientic evidence pointing in the direction of this likelihood. Therefore, the
burden of proof should be on the experimenter to make the case for permis-
sible experiments as opposed to being on those who want to restrict them.
However, even when this burden of proof can be met, further factors must be
considered. Even if benets are expected, possible, intended, likely, or even
certain, this is not sufcient to justify an experiment in and of itself.
Guidelines for Casuistry
A burden/benet analysis requires guidelines or principles to govern specic
cases. To arrive at these guidelines, in this section I will proceed with some
brief comments about guidelines in general, delineate different degrees of
benets and burdens, and then outline guidelines that can be used in a casu-
istry for experimentation. In the next section, I will then apply these guidelines
to specic hypothetical experiments in order to discriminate between accept-
able and unacceptable types of experiments.
With regard to guidelines in general, it is important to point out that, as
with rights, there will be gray areas. This is simply another way of saying that
these guidelines should not be viewed as rules that must be legalistically ap-
plied. Rather, guidelines by their nature must be somewhat exible. These
guidelines are also broader than simply utilizing a pain or invasiveness scale.
Although this kind of scale would be helpful perhaps at the outset in deline-
ating boundaries beyond which we would not want to go with regard to pain
in animals, it would not be helpful in addressing issues of suffering, rights,
and theological considerations regarding the nature of animals. Therefore,
these guidelines are proposed as a means by which we can take into account
the signicant factors that have already been discussed with regard to the na-
ture and treatment of experimental animals. These guidelines assume that we
have a prima facie responsibility not to cause animals unnecessary pain and
suffering, and this section is my attempt to specify what is meant by unnec-
essary, since there may be times when iniction of pain and suffering can be
justied.
As I discussed in chapter 3, animals are believed to experience painto
have the physiological mechanisms to experience pain sensations. Suffering,
however, which is more of a mental state, may be more of a problem for more
cognitively advanced animals. For that reason, a general principle before even
getting to the guidelines is that, as I discussed under the 3Rs as replacement,
when considering experiments that involve not only pain but also suffering (or
only suffering), the presumption would be in favor of the more intelligent
animals so that, all things being equal, it is worse to conne a monkey to a
small cage than a rodent. However, the same restrictions would apply with
regard to pain: where pain experience is similar, we may not decide that it is
worse to cause pain to a chimpanzee than to a dog. In addition, while it has
been argued that death as the automatic end point for all animals seems tragic,
the presumption against a premature death should be especially strong in the
cases of cognitively advanced animals, such as dolphins and primates.
Benets have already been dened with regard to experimentation as any
advance in medical knowledge or practice, either for humans or animals, and
they include the general advances mentioned previously, such as improve-
ments in lifestyle or convenience; better medical and surgical techniques; ad-
vances in knowledge of psychology, behavior, or physiology; education and
treatment of diseases; and contributory factors toward a longer life span. Al-
though experiments can benet animals as well as humans, benets should
predominantly be understood as positively affecting humans. However, we
cannot talk simply about benets in the abstract but need to specify different
levels of benets. Hence, we need to talk about minimal, moderate, serious,
and very grave benets.
Minimal benets are those that do not make important contributions to
advancement in human life or health but do increase our knowledge in prac-
tical ways regarding less signicant features of life, particularly greater lifestyle
convenience. Minimal benets include additional convenience items or more
improved consumer products on the market, knowledge gained simply to sat-
isfy curiosity that has no serious application to health issues, and knowledge
gained that demonstrates or conrms what we already know. The following
general kinds of experiments illustrate examples of these minimal benets:
studies done with the intention of providing additional nonessential consumer
products, such as a new oven cleaner or improved shampoo; frog dissections
done in high school biology classes; school science projects; studying how long
rats can swim continuously before they drown; and studies designed to illus-
trate the connection between cigarette smoking and cancer. In this and other
examples of experiments exemplifying particular benets, I am by no means
necessarily approving these experiments; I am simply showing what the ben-
ets would be.
Moderate benets are those that make important contributions to improve
the quality of human life and health in the areas of both basic and applied
knowledge but that would not necessarily contribute much to serious health
issues. Examples of moderate benets would be improved drugs to deal with
minor ailments, new and better methods of birth control, improved surgical
techniques, understanding of psychological processes in humans, and knowl-
edge gained with regard to healthy lifestyle practices, such as diet and exercise.
Examples of experiments that would provide moderate benets include testing
a new aspirin for headaches or a new birth control method, using cats in
surgery for veterinary students to practice nonessential surgical techniques,
utilizing dogs in learned helplessness experiments, and exposing rats to
anxiety-producing situations to see how they cope with their anxiety.
Serious benets are those that make signicant and substantial contri-
butions to the health, length, and quality of human life, not necessarily in the
form of cures, but as a result of which pain and suffering would be greatly
reduced. Examples of serious benets would be new drugs to treat more se-
rious illnesses for which current drug therapies are insufcient or problematic,
either due to side effects or the inability to treat the underlying symptoms;
development of better prosthetic devices; advances in transplantation tech-
niques; and advances in the treatment of other serious illnesses not specically
or only caused by lifestyle decisions. Examples of experiments potentially yield-
ing serious benets are studies done to try to develop better medication for
the treatment of schizophrenia, operating on pigs with the intention of utilizing
their valves for victims of heart disease, and creating animals with tumors to
better understand the progress of and treatments for cancer.
Very grave benets can lead to very important or very signicant improve-
ments in health and the quality and quantity of human life, particularly cures
for serious illnesses for which none exists and for which the continued lack of
a cure would otherwise be likely to lead to extreme pain and suffering and
untimely deaths. Examples of very grave benets would include studies de-
signed to nd cures for diseases such as cancer, heart disease, and AIDS,
especially those that require deliberately infecting an otherwise healthy exper-
imental animal with the disease as opposed to studying it in animals who may
naturally have developed the disease in question. Examples of experiments that
could result in very grave benets are infecting chimpanzees with the HIV
virus to see if they develop AIDS, with the intention of trying to nd a cure;
and inducing cancer in mice so that different potential remedies could be tried.
Burdens have already been described with reference to experimentation
as harms, pains, sufferings, or deprivations, and they should be understood as
primarily negatively affecting animals. Burdens include iniction of pain and
suffering, denial or restriction of rights, denial of intrinsic value as creatures
of God, and an unnecessarily premature death. Arule of thumb that has already
been argued for is that where there is good reason to believe that a particular
animal species can experience pain and suffering, their use should be subject
to the most stringent guidelines, and where evidence is more ambivalent, we
should proceed very cautiously. Burdens thus can be understood as the denial
of the most basic freedom of animalsthat is, freedom from unnecessary pain
and sufferingas well as the additional rights already discussed, such as the
freedom to not have their liberty so restricted, to not have their lives unnec-
essarily shortened, to engage in species-specic behavior, and to be treated with
respect as individuals. Burdens can also be distinguished by reference to the
categories of minimal, moderate, serious, and very grave.
Minimal burdens are those that cause only minimal pain or suffering and
that do not deny animals basic rights. Minimal burdens involve no signicant
imposition on the animals lifestyles and include keeping animals, even if for
the duration of their lives, in a situation or environment comparable with that
of pets, and in which only routine medical procedures were administered by
trained people that caused no or limited short-term pain and suffering. Ex-
amples of minimal burdens would include studying wild lions in Africa to
understand mating rituals, observing chimpanzees already in captivity in an
outdoor sanctuary to explore expressions and patterns of dominance and sub-
mission, and experiments designed to explore medical conditions whose only
really invasive practice is routine medical procedures such as taking blood and
giving injections.
Moderate burdens are those that would have a deleterious impact on an
animals well-being and thereby would result in some short-term pain and
suffering or in a partial or temporary restriction of animal rights. Moderate
burdens violate the rights of animals temporarily without long-term or signif-
icant imposition of pain and suffering. Moderate burdens generally have to do
with housing conditions and could include individual housing of social ani-
mals, restricted liberty such as living in small cages or enclosures, and denial
of other species-specic behavior. Moderate burdens would include keeping
animals in housing that restricted their rights and administering the following
procedures: minimal burden procedures (such as taking blood and giving in-
jections) carried out by inexperienced people, iniction of short-term minimal
pain without pain relief, iniction of long-term pain with pain relief, and short-
term deprivation of basic necessities of life, such as food, water, and sleep. The
key issue with moderate burdens is that this kind of housing, as well as the
experiments themselves, would be temporary, so that the animals ideally would
not be killed but either be adopted out after the experiment or returned to an
owner who volunteered him. Death of the animal in these cases should be a
last resort and obviously done as painlessly as possible. Examples of experi-
ments causing moderate burdens would be performing surgery on cats kept
in individual cages with pain relief and restricting food intake for pigeons kept
in small cages to see how learning was affected by food deprivation.
Serious burdens are those that would have a signicant impact on an
animals well-being because of extended or long-term pain and suffering, with
a signicant and permanent restriction of animal rights, and with death as the
automatic end point, whether performed humanely or not. Thus, serious bur-
dens would include violating the basic rights of animals with regard to hus-
bandry conditions, in particular by denying them the following: engagement
in species-specic behavior, opportunity for liberty, contact with conspecics
for social animals, and a noncaged environment for a long period. Serious
burdens can include some of the same experiments done in moderate burden
experiments but with systematic violation of animals rights and conditions,
including long-term and signicant pain and suffering. Examples of serious
burdens would be taking endangered species from the wild, particularly pri-
mates, and caging them, regardless of the purpose of the experiment (both
because of the suffering and death of the many animals involved in the trans-
port process, as well as the diminished capacity for a happy life for those ani-
mals eventually utilized in experiments); being kept as experimental subjects
by those who cannot or do not care for them properly, such that the impov-
erished treatment results in signicant suffering or pain not necessarily the
result of the research design; and subjecting animals, particularly more cog-
nitively advanced ones, especially to psychological but also to medical experi-
ments that cause signicant and long-lasting pain and suffering. Experiments
that cause serious burdens always involve signicant restriction or denial of
animal rights, with the attendant suffering, and could include the following:
capturing chimpanzees from the wild and conning them for life to individual
cages in order to perform any number of experiments that could cause pain
through the actual procedures, but especially suffering as a result of the hus-
bandry conditions; utilizing dolphins in military procedures; forcing rats to
become addicted to heroin; and inducing cardiovascular disease in pigs.
Very grave burdens would cause very signicant harm to the actual ex-
perimental animals during their lives, with death as the automatic end point.
Very grave burdens would include the following procedures, whether or not
the animals were kept in inadequate husbandry conditions and even if the
experiments were only short-term and temporary: long-term deprivation of the
basic necessities of life, such as food, water, and sleep; use of restraining de-
vices for many hours or days on end; and iniction of long-term and chronic
pain and suffering with little or no pain relief. Specic examples that would
involve very grave burdens include sleep deprivation studies in which cats are
forced to stay awake for many days through having their brains stimulated with
electrodes whenever they fall asleep, restraining squirrels in devices for nu-
merous hours a day to study their brain activity, and utilizing dogs in radiation,
burn, drumming, or shock therapy experiments with little or no relief.
To assess which experiments would be permissible and which would not
be, it is necessary to develop guidelines that would offset the benets and
burdens in such a way as to determine which benets can justify which bur-
dens. Obviously, as I discussed earlier, these guidelines can be only general
and must remain somewhat exible. It is impossible to cover all possible con-
tingencies that could arise with regard to specic experiments, and thus it is
difcult to make these discriminations with regard to all features of an exper-
iment. Although many who address the issue of animal experimentation do
not engage in such a careful attempt at a burden/benet analysis, I want to
demonstrate here that important distinctions in experiments can and should
be made, with regard to both benets and burdens.
To engage in a burden/benet analysis, I propose several guidelines, and
the next section will apply these guidelines to specic cases. First, very grave
benets can justify both minimal and moderate burdens. Because very grave
benets include very important or very signicant improvements in the quality
and length of human life, it does not seem especially burdensome to expect
animals to bear minimal or moderate burdens. When for humans the benets
could include cures for deadly diseases commonly linked to both signicant
pain and suffering, as well as early death, it does not seem problematic to
utilize animals for such gains, as long as the burdens are not too severe. In
the case of minimal burdens, animals would not experience any signicant
impact on their rights or any invasive procedures, and in the case of moderate
burdens, although the animals rights are restricted or denied and they can be
subjected to short-term pain, suffering, or deprivations, it is only temporary,
and the animals will ultimately happily live out the remainder of their lives.
Second, serious benets can also justify minimal or moderate burdens.
Although not as important as very grave benets, serious benets for humans
include contributions toward a signicant decrease in human pain and suffer-
ing, often dealing with serious illnesses not currently capable of helpful treat-
ment. Imposing minimal or moderate burdens on animals, whose well-being
would not be sufciently adversely affected and certainly not for an extended
period of time, does not seem excessive in light of the signicant health gains
for humans. Third, moderate benets can justify minimal burdens. Since mod-
erate benets for humans include important contributions primarily to the
quality of human life but with no specic impact on serious health concerns,
it seems that only minimal burdens can justify such benets and that no
greater burdens should be placed on animals. Thus, even placing moderate
burdens on animals for moderate benets seems excessive because the cost in
pain and suffering to animals would be too high to offset the relatively con-
servative gains for humans. Fourth, minimal benets cannot justify any bur-
den. Since minimal benets are mostly in the area of basic knowledge and
often demonstrate the obvious, exposing animals to even minimal burdens
seems excessive because their well-being is still compromised, although not in
any signicant way.
What cannot be justied by these guidelines is the imposition of any se-
rious or very grave burdens on animals, no matter what the intended outcome
is for humans, since the cost in animal pain, suffering, and death is too high.
Often in discussions of experimentation, these are precisely the kinds of ex-
periments that are used as the paradigm cases, such that virtually any treatment
of animals is permissible if it would result in either serious or very grave
benets for humans. However, my position is that experiments that go beyond
a certain point in terms of negatively affecting animals should not be under-
taken, regardless of the benets expected, even if this means that there will be
no cures for certain diseases, a cessation of a longer life span, and some in-
creased pain and suffering for both humans and animals, especially since we
are talking about certain burdens for animals and intended benets for hu-
mans. It is particularly in this area that many others might have signicant
disagreements, but my basic problem with both serious and very grave burdens
on animals is that they are too excessive to be mitigated by any returns for
humans.
One of the difcult areas to incorporate into these guidelines is how to
treat more cognitively advanced animals. To reiterate and emphasize what I
argued for earlier, more cognitively advanced animals are probably capable of
greater suffering than are other animals, and therefore, whenever it is possible
to choose to use a less cognitively advanced animal for an experiment, scientists
should be obligated to do so. Of course, it is extremely difcult to know where
to draw the line, but the use of obviously highly intelligent animals such as
primates and dolphins should be subject to greater restriction, particularly in
experiments that would might seriously compromise their mental well-being.
Application of Guidelines to Experiments
To use these guidelines in assessing experiments, they must be applied to
specic types of experiments. In chapter 1, three categories of experiments were
identied: education, testing, and research. Each of these categories includes
within it specic types of experiments. Examples of experiments that would be
permitted by each of the guidelines will be examined within each category.
However, because it is often easier to determine which experiments would be
disallowed within each category than to describe those that would be allowed,
examples of excluded experiments will be included as well.
Educational experiments refer to the use of animals in educational insti-
tutions at any level. With regard to very grave benets justifying minimal bur-
dens, it is difcult to envision such an experiment within this or even any other
category, because it is unlikely that a major cure for humans could be discov-
ered primarily by observing animals. An example of an experiment in which
very grave benets justify moderate burdens would be one in which veterinary
students deprived rats of food for a short period of time to ascertain the effects
of diet on heart disease, with the expectation that the rat would live out the
remainder of his life outside the laboratory. With regard to serious benets
that justify minimal burdens, an example would be one in which medical
students observed chimpanzees already known to have diabetes in a sanctuary
setting to gain insights into how diet affects their blood sugar, with the only
invasive procedure being the routine taking of blood by those properly trained
to do so. An example of an experiment in which serious benets could justify
moderate burdens might be medical doctors utilizing cats kept in individual
cages who are submitted to short-term painful procedures that create anxiety
in the animals in order to better understand situations that provoke anxiety in
humans.
An educational experiment allowing for moderate benets with minimal
burdens would be psychiatrists observing chimpanzees in a sanctuary setting
to understand how group dynamics contribute to depression. As I have already
argued, any experiments that would yield information of minimal benet for
humans would be disallowed. In addition, other examples of experiments that
would not be allowed under these guidelines within education would be most
experiments done by children in school science fairs, unless we could ascertain
that the animal was receiving good care and was not subject to invasive pro-
cedures by inexperienced hands; harmful experiments done by medical stu-
dents simply to satisfy human curiosity; frog dissection experiments in high
school biology classes for which the point is simply to see how frogs are ana-
tomically structured; and any experiments in school settings that subjected
animals to long-term pain and suffering without relief for any reason.
Testing includes any experiments in which substances are administered
rst to animals to determine their toxicity or benet to humans. It is frequently
referred to as toxicity testing. Examples of product testing include drugs (often
through use of the LD50 test or the Draize test), cosmetics, chemical household
products, and pesticides. Testing drugs could fall under the category of either
drugs or research but, for the sake of examples, will be considered within this
category. It is difcult to envision a testing experiment that could result in very
grave benets from minimal burdens, but an example of an experiment in
which very grave benets could justify moderate burdens might be studying
the effects of drugs in the treatment of cancer in cats who already have cancer.
An experiment in which serious benets could justify minimal burdens might
be the administration of a drug believed to be comparatively harmless to a
group of dogs temporarily housed together to study its effects on depression.
An experiment in which serious benets could justify moderate burdens would
be administering experimental drugs to a group of hamsters housed individ-
ually for the potential treatment of Alzheimers disease in humans.
An experiment in which moderate benets could justify minimal burdens
would be administering a potentially new birth control pill to chimpanzees in
sanctuaries to determine if and how it affected their fertility both by observing
their behavior and by relatively minor invasive procedures, such as testing their
urine to determine pregnancy. Any testing experiments that could yield infor-
mation of minimal benet for humans would be disallowed. Other examples
of experiments that would not be permitted under these guidelines include
forcing mice to stay awake for days on end, primarily through the use of shock
therapy, in order to better understand sleeping disorders in humans and with
the intention of developing a drug to help deal with this problem; force-feeding
oven cleaner to a group of dogs to determine its toxicity level so that we might
have one more oven cleaner on the market; applying a new shampoo product
directly into the eyes of immobilized rabbits so that the animals develop painful
ulcerations in order that we might have a new shampoo on the market; delib-
erately inicting chimpanzees taken from the wild with the AIDS virus to test
potential drug therapies for the disease; subjecting octopuses to long-termpain
without pain relief to see how they deal with pain; and addicting rats to cocaine
to see if they would prefer drugs to food, if given a choice.
Research has two components: basic and applied research. The former is
an attempt to study for the sake of knowledge to better understand how bio-
logical systems function, and the latter has practical ramications that can be
ascertained once the experiment is ended and the specic goal to improve the
life and health of humans and animals. Research includes a broad range of
experiments, including medical research, development and deployment of
weapons, space research, agricultural research, ethology, behavioral and psy-
chological research, and learning experiments. Again, it is difcult to envision
a very grave benet justifying a minimal burden, but an example might be
observing a group of animals in a sanctuary setting who had developed tumors
to determine how we might proceed with a cure for cancer. An example of an
experiment in which very grave benets could justify moderate burdens might
be utilizing pigs for a heart transplant procedure that was expected to cause
them only short-term discomfort, after which they would be left to live out their
normal lives if in good enough health to do so. An experiment in which serious
benets would justify minimal burdens might be attaching temporary pros-
thetic devices to chimpanzees (without rst disguring them) in a sanctuary
setting to see how well they could manage with them, with the intention of
trying to signicantly improve the quality of prosthetic devices for humans.
An experiment in which serious benets could justify moderate burdens would
be engaging in short-term deprivations of basic life necessities in guinea pigs
to study their impact upon diet and its effect on the development of diabetes.
An experiment in which moderate benets could justify minimal burdens
might be utilizing rats in mazes to better understand how learning takes place.
Any testing experiments that could yield information of minimal benet for
humans would be disallowed. Examples of other research experiments that
would not be permitted under these guidelines include burn and radiation
experiments on any species of animal; sending monkeys into space in restrain-
ing devices from which they cannot move; the head trauma experiment on
baboons, in which a huge weight came crashing down on their heads so ex-
perimenters could better understand how impact negatively affects brain func-
tion; and using dolphins to help in military expeditions by carrying explosives
attached to their bodies.
Conclusion
The primary reason it is easier to develop examples of experiments that would
be disallowed than to list permitted experiments is that the developed guide-
lines are meant to greatly restrict animal experimentation. Most of the exper-
imentation currently undertaken would probably be prohibited by these stan-
dards, and only truly benign experimentation would be allowed. However, just
as we expect humans to bear the burdens at times of experimentation, it can
be argued that animals can assume some burdens in experiments as well. But
these burdens should not be excessive. Because animals are sentient, have
mental states, possess rights, are valued creatures in the sight of God, and
cannot verbally consent, there must be greater restrictions on their use than
those that exist in experimentation at the present time.
Obviously, some will disagree with my conclusions, in terms of how I have
set up the categories of minimal, moderate, serious, and very grave and in
particular with the fact that these guidelines would allow for so little experi-
mentation. One way I would respond to those who disagree is not to argue so
much on the basis of the actual guidelines I have established, even though I
think they are very good and ow naturally from the arguments made in pre-
vious chapters, but with a challenge to establish their own guidelines that could
be applied to concrete experiments. One of my principal contentions is that
experimentation is traditionally justied by a simple appeal to human benet,
without exploring or eshing out what that means, and also that pro-
experimentation arguments tend to ignore or seriously minimize the extent of
the burdens to animals. It is my hope that the guidelines presented in this
chapter, if not actually followed, would provoke other thoughtful experiments
in the direction of concretely weighing burdens and benets in experimenta-
tion, keeping in mind the often negative impact on animals.
Conclusion
Guidelines for casuistry such as I proposed in the previous chapter
obviously cannot cover every situation, and they may seem difcult
to enforce or even idealistic. However, even if that is the case, the
purpose of ideals is to move us beyond where we are to a point
where we would like to be. In terms of experimentation, the end re-
sult of all of the proposals outlined in previous chapters is an at-
tempt to move us in the general direction of these guidelines, which
would result in more humane experimentation. Even if these guide-
lines were never adopted, though, I would recommend that those es-
pecially who argue in favor of largely unrestricted experimentation
would engage in establishing guidelines that truly weigh animal
burdens against human benets. In addition to these guidelines,
though, there are some incremental steps I previously proposed that
could ultimately move us forward in the direction of a true weighing
of benets and burdens, in order to greatly reduce the burdens on
animals in experimentation. Thus, I would like to offer an interim
ethic that would greatly restrict experimentation by taking seriously
the burdens to animals.
I have basically two concrete proposals with regard to an in-
terim ethic that might lead up to the kind of burden/benet analysis
I am recommending. First, an interim ethic, as I proposed in chap-
ter 3, should at the very least focus on the restrictions and standards
that already exist in the form of legislation and guidelines, while
working toward a more restrictive approach to experimentation.
These existing guidelines and laws need to be enforced, and severe
penalties administered for any violations. Some good legislation al-
ready protects experimental animals, but if the rules are disregarded
or if people are not censured for their violations, then the legislation
is virtually useless. Two specic examples illustrate this point. The USDA is
currently entrusted with inspecting facilities and with following up on and
reprimanding those guilty of violations, but it often does not do so. Allowing
the continued functioning of laboratories that are violating the guidelines al-
ready in place for humane treatment of experimental animals will ensure that
violation of such guidelines will continue. Humane euthanasia is another as-
pect of experimentation for which clear guidelines exist, but if some scientists
do not follow these guidelines, then animal pain and suffering at the point of
death will continue to be a reality for at least some animals.
The second concrete proposal for an interim ethic requires a modication
of some of the existing guidelines and legislation, some of which I have already
presented. They can be summarized briey under six categories: the search
for alternatives, nancial incentives, specic changes to current legislation, the
use of pet keeping as a model, the practice of temporarily volunteering pets as
research models, and attempts to ascertain the animals perspective. First, the
exploration of alternatives to the use of animals should be more assiduously
pursued and rewarded. There is a need to reduce both the number of experi-
ments and the number of animals used in experiments. Fortunately, great
strides are being made in the development of alternatives, but there still re-
mains a strong bias in favor of animal models. There is a need to replace animal
models whenever possible, particularly by utilizing nonsentient animals in-
stead of sentient animals whenever possible, but also through the use of non-
animal models, including the possibility of increased use of humans. There is
also a need to rene experiments such that animal pain and suffering are
minimized whenever possible, including the use of pain medication, humane
destruction of animals, and allowing institutional animal care and use com-
mittees (IACUCs) greater discretion when it comes to rening research pro-
tocols.
Second, nancial incentives need to be greater to increase the likelihood
that more humane experimentation will take place. There need to be nancial
incentives to nd alternatives to animal models for experiments. Some re-
search funding should be funneled to the USDA to provide the personnel to
carry out the departments responsibilities in overseeing much of the experi-
mentation. More money should be diverted to preventive medicine, especially
for illnesses believed to result from poor lifestyle choices. Some research fund-
ing should go toward the development of better husbandry conditions for an-
imals, such as larger cages or pens. In addition, cost should not the principal
factor in the development and deployment of humane euthanasia methods.
Third, some of the legislation needs to be modied. The Animal Welfare
Act and Public Health Service (PHS) policy should be combined into one law
for consistency. In particular, animals not typically covered by these laws should
be protected. For example, the Animal Welfare Act currently excludes rats,
mice, birds, and all invertebrates, and the PHS policy includes all vertebrates
but excludes invertebrates. The ideal combined legislation should include pro-
tection for all vertebrates, as well as for all invertebrates believed capable of
conclusion 157
experiencing pain, such as the cephalopods. Thus, legal protection should be
extended to all experimental animals believed to be capable of experiencing
pain and suffering. Animals should be provided with legal rights and protec-
tion, so that their legal status is upgraded from mere property. Treatment of
animals in experiments for which there is no federal funding (such as in private
laboratories or in school settings) should be subject to the same conditions as
those for which federal funds are provided. In addition, there should be con-
sistency between what is permissible in private ownership of pets and in sci-
entic settings; thus, one should not be able to do to an animal in a laboratory
something that would be against the law if done by a private citizen. Husbandry
conditions should be signicantly improved, especially with regard to species-
specic requirements. Finally, the power of IACUCs should be strengthened,
so that their evaluations of experiments become more than simply a rubber-
stamping process.
Fourth, pet keeping should be the model for experimentation, since it
would underscore the reality that animals have intrinsic rather than only in-
strumental value. Although it could be argued that pet keeping is a very good
example of an instrumental use of animals, my contention is that pet keeping
under the best of circumstances, while including the idea of an instrumental
use of animals, also appreciates the intrinsic value of animals. In the chapter
on rights, I argued that experimental animals can be used for human purposes
at times (instrumental value), but that what will likely safeguard their well-
being and protect them from excessive harm is the position that they have
value, worth, and integrity in and of themselves (intrinsic value), which places
constraints on what we can do to them. Therefore, we should treat animals as
ends in themselves and not only as a means to an end, and in comparison with
most practices involving animals, pet keeping seems to be the best model for
this, assuming, of course, that the human owner is kindly disposed toward his
animal. In practical terms, pet-keeping behavior would include the naming of
experimental animals (whenever this is feasible), the expectation that experi-
menters treat experimental animals as they would their own pets (not exposing
animals to pain and suffering that they would be unwilling to expose their own
animals to), adopting out research animals as pets, greater mobility for animals
in laboratories, and an avoidance of premature death whenever possible.
Fifth, we could institute a policy by which people could temporarily vol-
unteer their pets for use in medical experiments. Obviously, not all individuals
would be so willing, and not all kinds of experiments would lend themselves
to such a limited use, but it could be a solution in some cases. This policy
would allow for the fact that people relinquishing their pets are individuals
who have the animals best interests at heart (ideally) and would also grant
that, just as humans need to be willing to volunteer at times in the ght against
disease, so can animals. The logistics of instituting a policy like this may seem
insurmountable, and it might be difcult to persuade individuals to let their
pets be used in such situations. However, it could help to reduce the long-term
pain and suffering to which many experimental animals are subject. Pet own-
ers could be persuaded by appealing to the similarities between their own pets
and those traditionally experimented upon. Again, this would not be the ulti-
mate solution, but it should at least be considered.
Sixth, we need to continue to seek the animals perspective regarding her
treatment, primarily through the use of preference tests and incorporating the
results into improved husbandry conditions. While animals cannot commu-
nicate with us in our language, they do have other ways of making themselves
understood. If a small change on our part could contribute to a signicant
benet for them, it does not seem a large price to pay.
When addressing the issues of whether and to what extent animal exper-
imentation should be permitted, we must ultimately return to the original
question of how to reconcile the values of the good of science, human advance-
ment, and concern for all sentient beings. This project has been an attempt to
reconcile these values, although admittedly with an emphasis on concern for
all sentient beings, particularly nonhuman animals, since they bear the brunt
of the burdens of experiments and their concerns are generally minimized in
most discussions on experimentation. I have argued for a more restrictive
approach to experimentation that need not completely eliminate future benets
to humans. My proposal for restricting animal experimentation includes the
following basic steps to minimize the burdens on animals without greatly in-
creasing the burdens on humans. First, there must be adherence to the guide-
lines and laws already in place to protect experimental animals, with censure
for those guilty of violations. Second, we need to move in the direction of
further restrictions and modications of the laws and guidelines that already
exist. Third, we need to continue to raise philosophical and theological ques-
tions with regard to the nature of animals in such a way that we simply do not
accept arguments based on questionable assumptions, such as animal mental
states are completely different from human mental states, animals cannot suf-
fer, animals do not have and should not have rights, and animals need to be
viewed primarily in terms of their instrumental value for humans. Fourth, we
need to move in the direction of creating guidelines for a genuine burden/
benet analysis, which will move beyond merely listing human benets and
truly respect animals as not just human instruments but as the creatures of
intrinsic value they are.
Notes
introduction
1. Both the terms animal and animal experimentation will be de-
ned more precisely in the following chapter.
2. The extremists on both sides are in the minority; most of those in-
volved in the discussion on and practice of animal experimentation nd
themselves in what has been called the troubled middle; see Strachan
Donnelley, Introduction. The Troubled Middle In Medias Res, in Animals,
Science, and Ethics, ed. Strachan Donnelley and Kathleen Nolan, special
supplement, Hastings Center Report, MayJune 1990, 132, in which they at-
tempt to work out a position that allows for more humane experimentation.
3. As recently as 1969, there were no articles found in The Philosophers
Index, whereas there were more than forty entries in 1985; see James A. Nel-
son, Recent Studies in Animal Ethics, American Philosophical Quarterly 22,
no. 1 (January 1985): 13. Not only do the number of articles continue to grow
but also there is a steady stream of books written on the subject, and entire
journals are now devoted to the treatment of animals.
4. For a history of vivisection and the antivivisectionist movement, see
Nicolaas A. Rupke, ed., Vivisection in Historical Perspective (London: Rout-
ledge, 1987); Coral Lansbury, The Old Brown Dog: Women, Workers, and Vivi-
section in Edwardian England (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985);
and E. Westacott, A Century of Vivisection and Anti-Vivisection (Ashingdon,
UK: C. W. Daniel Company, 1949). For an excellent reader of selections on
the ethical treatment of animals by well-known writers from ancient Greece
to the contemporary period, see Paul A. B. Clarke and Andrew Linzey, eds.,
Political Theory and Animal Rights (London: Pluto Press, 1990).
5. For a particularly helpful and thorough collection of essays on the
history of human-animal relationships, see Aubrey Manning and James Ser-
pell, eds., Animals and Human Society: Changing Perspectives (London: Rout-
ledge, 1994); and Tim Ingold, ed., What Is an Animal? One World Archae-
ology Series (London: Routledge, 1994).
160 notes to pages 46
6. For three somewhat different conceptualizations, see Andrew Linzey, Animal
Rights, in Dictionary of Ethics, Theology and Society, ed. Paul Barry Clarke and An-
drew Linzey (London: Routledge, 1996); Tom Regan, Treatment of Animals, in En-
cyclopedia of Ethics, vol. 1 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1992); and Louis P. Pojman,
Animal Rights, Egalitarianism, and Nihilism, in Ethical Issues in Contemporary Soci-
ety, ed. John Howie and George Schedler (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University
Press, 1995).
7. Steve F. Sapontzis, The Evolution of Animals in Moral Philosophy, Between
the Species 3, no. 2 (Spring 1987): 65.
8. In contrast, Eastern culture has generally viewed humans as being within
rather than above nature; see Rod Preece and Lorna Chamberlain, Animal Welfare and
Human Value (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1993), 57.
9. Ibid.
10. Andreas-Holger Maehle and Ulrich Trohler, Animal Experimentation from
Antiquity to the End of the Eighteenth Century: Attitudes and Arguments, in Vivisec-
tion in Historical Perspective, ed. Nicolaas A. Rupke (London: Routledge, 1987), 15.
11. James C. Whorton, Animal Research: Historical Aspects, Encyclopedia of Bio-
ethics, rev. ed., 5 vols. (New York: Simon & Schuster, Macmillan, 1995).
12. Ruth Ellen Bulger, Use of Animals in Experimental Research: A Scientists
Perspective, in The Ethical Dimensions of the Biological Sciences, ed. Ruth Ellen Bulger,
Elizabeth Heitman, and Stanley Joel Reiser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1993), 187.
13. Whorton, Animal Research: Historical Aspects.
14. Preece and Chamberlain, Animal Welfare and Human Values, 9; see also
Richard Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).
15. A fuller discussion of the two creation accounts in Genesis and their implica-
tions for the treatment of animals can be found in chapter 5. A particularly good dis-
cussion of these accounts can be found in Theodore Hiebert, The Yahwists Landscape:
Nature and Religion in Early Israel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
16. Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: A History of the Modern Sensibility
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1983), 32.
17. Maehle and Trohler, Animal Experimentation, 17.
18. For an interesting account of this phenomenon, see E. P. Evans, The Crimi-
nal Prosecution and Capital Punishment of Animals: The Lost History of Europes Animal
Trials (1906; repr., Boston: Faber and Faber, 1988); and chapter 3 of Gerald Carson,
Man, Beasts and Gods: A History of Cruelty and Kindness to Animals (New York:
Charles Scribners Sons, 1972). For a detailed account of the attitudes to animals dur-
ing the Middle Ages, see Joyce E. Salisbury, The Beast Within: Animals in the Middle
Ages (New York: Routledge, 1994).
19. Ibid., 38. Another writer made the following observation: It is surely not an
accident that the practice of vivisecting animalsnailing them to boards and then
dissecting them while still alivewas begun by followers of Descartes at Port Royal
(Sapontzis, Evolution of Animals in Moral Philosophy, 63).
20. It is interesting that England continues to be in the forefront on the issue of
humane treatment of animals. For histories of the animal protection movement, see
Lawrence Finsen and Susan Finsen, The Animal Rights Movement in America: From
Compassion to Respect, Social Movements Past and Present Series (New York: Twayne
Publishers, 1994); and James M. Jasper and Dorothy Nelkin, The Animal Rights Cru-
sade: The Growth of a Moral Protest (New York: Free Press, 1992).
notes to pages 67 161
21. For an interesting history of this phenomenon, see Lansbury, Old Brown Dog.
22. Carson, Men, Beasts, and Gods, 4754.
23. Andrew N. Rowan, Of Mice, Models, & Men: A Critical Evaluation of Animal
Research (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), 49.
24. Susan E. Lederer, The Controversy over Animal Experimentation in Amer-
ica, 18801914, in Vivisection in Historical Perspective, ed. Nicolaas A. Rupke (London:
Routledge, 1987), 237238.
25. Carson, Men, Beasts, and God, 9698.
26. Rowan, Of Mice, Models, & Men, 49.
27. Ibid.
28. Jack H. Botting and Adrian R. Morrison, Animal Research Is Vital to Medi-
cine, Scientic American 276, no. 2 (February 1997): 8384. A critique of sciences
claim that human health has been advanced by animal experimentation can be found
in C. Ray Greek and Jean Swingle Greek, Sacred Cows and Golden Geese: The Human
Cost of Experiments on Animals (New York: Continuum, 2000).
29. For a fuller discussion of these movements and the concept of animal rights,
see Gary Francione, Animal Rights: An Incremental Approach, in Animal Rights:
The Changing Debate, ed. Robert Garner (New York: New York University Press,
1996); see also two works by Steven M. Wise: Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rights
for Animals (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 2000) and Drawing the Line: Science and
the Case for Animal Rights (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 2002).
30. Because of their often strong opposition to many contemporary practices in-
volving animals, including and perhaps especially animal experimentation, a number
of writers have studied the animal rights movement to better understand this phe-
nomenon and to attempt to create a prole of the typical animal activist. This prole
has been quite consistent throughout the studies: animal activists tend to be highly
educated, predominantly female, white, middle to upper middle class, socially active
in other political causes, and generally vegetarians opposed also to hunting, wearing
fur, and most animal experimentation. For some interesting works on the subject, see
Harold A. Herzog Jr., The Movement Is My Life: The Psychology of Animal Rights
Activism, Journal of Social Issues 49, no. 1 (1993): 103119; Wesley V. Jamison and
William M. Lunch, Rights of Animals, Perceptions of Science, and Political Activism:
Prole of American Animal Rights Activists, Science, Technology, & Human Values 17,
no. 4 (Autumn 1992): 438458; Richard J. Traystman, Commentary: The Goal of
Animal Welfare, Animal Rights, and Antivivisectionist Groups in the United States,
Journal of Neurosurgical Anesthesiology 2, no. 3 (September 1990): 153158; and Richard
P. Vance, An Introduction to the Philosophical Presuppositions of the Animal Liber-
ation/Rights Movement, Journal of the American Medical Association 268, no. 13 (Oc-
tober 7, 1992): 17151719. The latter two are especially interesting in that their pur-
pose is to raise the consciousness of the medical community about the goals of the
animal rights groups in an effort to force them to view these groups as serious oppo-
nents. For histories on the animal protection movement, see Finsen and Finsen, Ani-
mal Rights Movement in America; and Jasper and Nelkin, Animal Rights Crusade.
31. Jasper and Nelkin, Animal Rights Crusade, 3.
32. Ibid., 90. Singer has continued to write extensively on the ethical treatment
of animals; one of his more recent works is Ethics into Action: Henry Spira and the
Animal Rights Movement (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littleeld, 1998), where he pro-
vides a biography of one of the most famous American animal activists of the twenti-
eth century, partly with the hope of demonstrating to others how they, too, can be-
come activists.
33. For a book of essays devoted to critiquing the work of Peter Singer, see Dale
Jamieson, ed., Singer and His Critics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
34. Madhusree Mukerjee, Trends in Animal Research, Scientic American 276,
no. 2 (February 1997): 88.
35. It is apparent from reading the history of opposition to animal experimenta-
tion that the arguments have actually changed very little; the only exception is that of
the discussion of alternatives to animals; see Andrew N. Rowan and Franklin M.
Loew, with Joan C. Weer, The Animal Research Controversy, Center for Animals and
Public Policy (North Grafton, MA: Tufts University School of Veterinary Medicine,
1995), 1.
36. A separate chapter will not be devoted to utilitarianism because many of the
same arguments used in this theory are utilized in the burden/benet analysis.
37. For a comprehensive social contract view that excludes animals from the
moral community, see Peter Carruthers, The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice,
reprint (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
38. For a helpful introduction to feminist approaches, see Carol J. Adams and
Josephine Donavan, eds., Animals and Women: Feminist Theoretical Explorations (Dur-
ham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995.)
chapter 1
1. Although many countries conduct animal experimentation, this book will fo-
cus on animal experimentation in the United States only.
2. Rosemary Rodd, Biology, Ethics, and Animals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990),
17.
3. Michael Allen Fox, The Case for Animal Experimentation: An Evolutionary and
Ethical Perspective (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 3. For a fuller dis-
cussion on the issue of how to dene an animal, see Tim Ingold, ed., What Is an
Animal? One World Archaeology Series (London: Routledge, 1988, 1994); and Paul
Waldau, The Specter of Speciesism: Buddhist and Christian Views of Animals (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002), chapter 5.
4. For a helpful chart, see Christoph A. Reinhardt, ed., Alternatives to Animal
Testing: New Ways in Biomedical Sciences, Trends and Progress (Weinheim, Germany:
VCH Publishers, 1994), 38. The source for this chart is the Ofce of Technology As-
sessment.
5. Margaret Rose and David Adams, Evidence for Pain and Suffering in Other
Animals, in Animal Experimentation: The Consensus Changes, ed. Gill Langley (New
York: Chapman and Hall, 1989). See also David DeGrazia and Andrew Rowan, Pain,
Suffering, and Anxiety in Animals and Humans, Theoretical Medicine 12, no. 3 (S
1991): 193211; and Jane A. Smith and Kenneth M. Boyd, eds., Lives in the Balance:
The Ethics of Using Animals in Biomedical Research, Report of a Working Party of the
Institute of Medical Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 66.
6. The distinction commonly made between vertebrates and invertebrates exists
largely due to the lack of a central nervous system in invertebrates. However, the octo-
pus and the squid have large nerve clusters and, based on clinical observation, are
believed by many to experience pain. This distinction accounts for the often-quoted
place where Singer would draw the line, namely, somewhere between a shrimp and
an oyster. The issue of animal pain will be discussed more fully in chapter 3.
7. The issue of cognition will be more fully explored in chapter 2.
8. In the following chapter, we will see that in the consideration of alternatives
to the use of animals in experiments, other models are suggested (e.g., computer
models, mathematical models).
9. Some of the benets of animal experimentation also help animals, although
the expressed purpose for most experiments is their potential benet for humans. A
more detailed analysis of the burdens and benets of animal experimentation will be
addressed in chapter 6.
10. Edward C. Melby Jr., Overview of the State of the Art in Development and
Utilization of Animal Models in the U.S.A., in Animal Models: Assessing the Scope of
Their Use in Biomedical Research, ed. Junichi Kawamata and Edward C. Melby Jr. (New
York: Alan R. Liss, 1987), 1.
11. Marie Fox, Animal Rights and Wrongs: Medical Ethics and the Killing of Non-
Human Animals, in Death Rites: Law and Ethics at the End of Life, ed. Robert Lee and
Derek Morgan (London: Routledge, 1994), 133.
12. However, the term anti-vivisection is often used by organizations opposed
to animal experimentation, probably partly because of the pejorative sense that the
term vivisection conjures up (e.g., The New England Anti-Vivisection Society).
13. In much of the animal rights literature, basic research often comes under
harsher criticism than applied research, since the results of the former seem more
intangible, and much needless suffering of animals may occur without any perceived
direct benet to human beings. However, many scientists maintain that basic re-
search is germane to the scientic enterprise and that one cannot necessarily know in
advance which experimental results will ultimately be helpful. The book by the Na-
tional Research Council entitled Use of Laboratory Animals in Biomedical and Behav-
ioral Research (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1988) states this position
well: It is important to emphasize that there is no way to predict in advance what
will and will not be productive research. What is important to recognize is that at the
time it is undertaken, competent research has the potential to be productive (48).
14. F. Barbara Orlans, In the Name of Science: Issues in Responsible Animal Experi-
mentation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 39.
15. There does not appear to be the same legal mandate in the case of cosmetic
testing, since many cosmetic companies have now abandoned animal tests and often
advertise their products as cruelty-free.
16. For further discussion on toxicity tests in general, and on the LD50 and Dra-
ize eye irritancy tests in particular, see chapters 1317 of Andrew N. Rowan, Of Mice,
Models, & Men: A Critical Evaluation of Animal Research (Albany: State University of
New York Press, 1984); and James M. Jasper and Dorothy Nelkin, The Animal Rights
Crusade: The Growth of a Moral Protest (New York: Free Press, 1992), 105109. For a
discussion of alternatives to toxicity testing, see Orlans, In the Name of Science, 153
168.
17. For a critique particularly of the use of animals in testing with regard to hu-
man health, see Alix Fano, Lethal Laws: Animal Testing, Human Health and Environ-
mental Policy (London: Zed Books, 1997); and C. Ray Greek and Jean Swingle Greek,
Specious Science: How Genetics and Evolution Reveal Why Medical Research on Animals
Harms Humans (New York: Continuum, 2002), particularly chapter 4.
18. Although some criticize the use of animals in education in general, the case
of dissection in high school biology classes is a particularly controversial issue that
has been widely written about from both moral and legal standpoints; see especially
Alan D. Bowd, Dissection as an Instructional Technique in Secondary Science:
Choice and Alternatives, Society and Animals 1, no. 1 (1993): 8389; Gary L. Fran-
cione and Anna E. Charlton, Vivisection and Dissection in the Classroom: A Guide to
Conscientious Objection (Jenkintown, PA: American Anti-Vivisection Society, 1992);
and Jonathan Balcombe, Education by Extermination, Animals Agenda 14, no. 5
(SeptemberOctober 1994): 2225.
19. New types of animal experimentation that have recently emerged do not nec-
essarily t into the three traditional categories: xenotransplantation (the use of animal
organs in humans) and the creation of transgenic animals (injecting some of the ge-
netic material from one animal species into another). For a good discussion on the
issue of transgenic experiments, see Strachan Donnelley, Charles R. McCarthy, and
Rivers Singleton Jr., The Brave New World of Animal Technology, special supple-
ment, Hastings Center Report 24, no. 1 (JanuaryFebruary 1994): S1S31; and Evelyn
Pluhar, On the Genetic Manipulation of Animals, Between the Species 1, no. 3 (Sum-
mer 1985): 511546. For an excellent discussion on genetic engineering of animals,
see Bernard E. Rollin, The Frankenstein Syndrome: Ethical and Social Issues in the Gene-
tic Engineering of Animals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
20. National Research Council, Use of Laboratory Animals, 2223.
21. Greek and Greek, Specious Science, 31.
22. C. Ray Greek and Jean Swingle Greek, Sacred Cows and Golden Geese: The
Human Cost of Experiments on Animals (New York: Continuum, 2000), 83.
24. Greek and Greek, Sacred Cows and Golden Geese, 86.
26. It is well known that the statistics on animal use in the United States are
unreliable, and it is important to note that though some of the articles assessing this
problem are a bit dated, the problem continues to the present; see Andrew N. Rowan
and Franklin M. Loew, with Joan C. Weer, The Animal Research Controversy, Center for
Animals and Public Policy (North Grafton, MA: Tufts University School of Veterinary
Medicine, 1995), i. The problem with statistics has to do with data collection. Barbara
F. Orlans provides a very helpful analysis of this problem in her article, Data on Ani-
mal Experimentation in the United States: What They Do and Do Not Show, Perspec-
tives in Biology and Medicine 37, no. 2 (Winter 1994): 217231. She concludes that the
ofcial data on the use of laboratory animals is decient in important respects, and
she calls for substantial reforms.
27. National Research Council, Use of Laboratory Animals, 2. However, there has
been a steady increase in the number of research facilities and sites; see Orlans, In
the Name of Science, 67.
28. Orlans, In the Name of Science, 66.
29. Lawrence Finsen and Susan Finsen, The Animal Rights Movement in America:
From Compassion to Respect, Social Movements Past and Present Series (New York:
Twayne Publishers, 1994), 268. Two authors estimate that up to 100 million mice
and rats are used each year; see Greek and Greek, Sacred Cows and Golden Geese, 92.
32. National Research Council, Laboratory Animal Management: Rodents (Wash-
ington, DC: National Academy Press, 1996), 17.
33. National Research Council, Laboratory Animal Management: Dogs (Washing-
ton, DC: National Academy Press, 1994), 4.
34. National Research Council, Laboratory Animal Management: Rodents, 1720.
35. Orlans, In the Name of Science, 7072. For example, animals traditionally kept
as pets (e.g., dogs, cats, horses), those admired for their intelligence or beauty (e.g.,
primates, dolphins), or those with beguiling characteristics (e.g., deer, seals) often are
replaced with less favored species, such as rodents, pigs, and ferrets; if the more fa-
vored species are utilized in experiments, they usually have a better chance of receiv-
ing more humane treatment.
36. The term pound animal is generally used to refer to animals that can be
obtained from two different kinds of facilities: pounds, which are generally estab-
lished by local ordinance to hold lost, abandoned, or stray animals for a short, speci-
ed period of time until their owners can claim them or new homes can be found for
them; and shelters, which are primarily established facilities; see National Research
Council, Use of Laboratory Animals, 64. Orlans notes that this distinction has become
blurred over time; see In the Name of Science, 210.
38. It has been estimated, for example, that for every animal captured in the
wild that actually is utilized in an experiment, another ve to ten die in the trapping
and transport process; see Deborah Blum, The Monkey Wars (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1994), 250.
39. The issue of the use of pound animals is widely discussed in both the scien-
tic and animal rights literature. The key issue at stake is that most states allow sell-
ing unwanted pound animals to research labs (it is estimated that in most pounds or
shelters, 90 percent of the animals eventually have to be put to sleep if not placed in
homes; see National Research Council, Use of Laboratory Animals, 64). Those in favor
of selling pound animals to research laboratories argue that only one animal rather
than two will have to die; that it is cheaper than purposely breeding animals; and that
sometimes not knowing the genetic background of the animal is more helpful for the
experiment. Those against selling pound animals argue that this practice undermines
the concept of a shelter or pound as a sanctuary for lost or abandoned animals; that
they will suffer more as a result of being experimented on rather than simply being
put to sleep; that former pets are ill suited to life in a lab; and that knowing about
this practice may discourage people from turning animals in to shelters and pounds.
For further discussion of this issue, see Andrew Rowan, Of Mice, Models, & Men,
chapter 10, and Orlans, In the Name of Science, 209220.
40. The topic of animal law has become a very serious one in recent years, with
many law schools now offering courses. In 1995, the journal Animal Law came into
existence, and it is now published annually. In the past few years, it has an entire
section in each issue devoted specically to legislation with regard to animals. For
some books dealing with animals and the law, see two by Steven M. Wise: Drawing
the Line: Science and the Case for Animal Rights (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books,
2002), and Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rights for Animals (Cambridge, MA: Per-
seus Books, 2000); see also Gary L. Francione, Animals, Property, and the Law (Phila-
delphia: Temple University Press, 1995).
42. Richard Crawford, A Review of the Animal Welfare Enforcement Report
Data 1973 through 1995, Animal Welfare Information Center Newsletter 7, no. 2 (Sum-
mer 1996): 2. This act was originally entitled the Laboratory Animal Welfare Act of
1966, but its name was changed to the Animal Welfare Act with its rst amendment;
see National Research Council, Use of Laboratory Animals, 49.
43. Esther F. Dukes, The Improved Standards for Laboratory Animals Act: Will
It Ensure That the Policy of the Animal Welfare Act Becomes a Reality? Saint Louis
University Law Journal 31, no. 3 (September 1987): 520521.
44. Crawford, Review, 2.
48. Dukes, Improved Standards, 522.
53. Crawford, Review, 9. Considerable discussion has taken place within the
scientic community as to what psychological enhancement for nonhuman primates
actually means, since even among primates there are signicant differences. How-
ever, it usually refers to social grouping (for those primates who naturally live in
groups), maintaining them in some kind of open habitat rather than in cages, and the
presence of tools or toys to play with in order to relieve boredom.
54. Issues related to pain and legislation will be addressed in more detail in
chapter 3.
55. The PHS policy also requires an institutional animal care and use committee
(IACUC) for each institution. The person on an IACUC not afliated with the institu-
tion is supposed to represent the general public. The IACUC is required to perform
inspections twice a year and is also responsible for reviewing procedures on animals
involving pain; see National Research Council, Use of Laboratory Animals, 52. For a
comprehensive guideline for the proper establishment and maintenance of an IA-
CUC, see M. Lawrence Podolsky and Victor S. Lukas, eds., The Care and Feeding of an
IACUC: The Organization and Management of an Institutional Animal Care and Use
Committee (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 1999). For a discussion on some of the con-
troversies regarding IACUCs, see Lawrence Finsen, Institutional Animal Care and
Use Committees: A New Set of Clothes for the Emperor? Journal of Medicine and
Philosophy 13 (May 1988): 145158.
60. Animal Law, no. 8 (2002), 2001 Legislative Review, 259288.
61. Animal Law, no. 9 (2003), 2002 Legislative Review, 331356.
62. National Research Council, Laboratory Animal Management: Rodents, 1.
63. Orlans, Data on Animal Experimentation, 222.
64. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1996.
66. Other books that contain specic information and suggestions on adequate
and humane animal husbandry issues (some of which have previously been men-
tioned) include: Laboratory Animal Management: Dogs; Laboratory Animal Manage-
ment: Rodents; Nutrient Requirements of Laboratory Animals, 4th rev. ed. (Washington,
DC: National Academy Press, 1995); Recognition and Alleviation of Pain and Distress in
Laboratory Animals (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1992); and Use of Lab-
oratory Animals in Biomedical and Behavioral Research (Washington, DC: National
Academy Press, 1988). A good nongovernmental resource is Bernard E. Rollin and
M. Lynne Kessel, eds., Care, Husbandry and Well-Being: An Overview by Species,
vol. 2 of The Experimental Animal in Biomedical Research (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press,
1995).
67. Judith Hampson, Legislation and the Changing Consensus, in Animal Ex-
perimentation: The Consensus Changes, ed. Gill Langley (New York: Chapman and Hall,
1989), 221. She contrasts this with the system in the United Kingdom, which is more
centrally controlled.
68. It is beyond the scope of this book to address the controversy surrounding
animal legislation; for further discussion of some of the perceived deciencies, see
Charles R. McCarthy, Improved Standards for Laboratory Animals? Kennedy Insti-
tute of Ethics Journal 3, no. 3 (September 1993): 293302; Wendell Stephenson, De-
ciencies in the National Institute of Healths Guidelines for the Care and Protection
of Laboratory Animals, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 18, no. 8 (August 1993):
375388; Orlans, Data on Animal Experimentation in the United States; George E.
Brown Jr., 30 Years of the Animal Welfare Act, Animal Welfare Information Center
Newsletter 8, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 12, 23; and Bonnie Burtain, Future Development
of USDA Standards for Animals under the Authorities of the Animal Welfare Act,
Animal Welfare Information Center Newsletter 5, no. 1 (Spring 1994): 1415. Perhaps the
most important issue of concern to many is that the Animal Welfare Act still excludes
from protection rats, mice, and birds in all research, as well as farm animals in cer-
tain kinds of research, although all of these animals are protected by the PHS policy.
An animal protection group, the Animal Legal Defense Fund, brought a legal case in
1990 against the USDA, requesting that they protect these excluded animal groups.
As a result, the USDA had to reconsider its exclusionary policy, for which they
claimed cost as the principal factor, but the USDA has appealed; see Orlans, In the
Name of Science, 5960. The decision was ultimately overturned in favor of the
USDA, because the court argued that the Animal Legal Defense Fund had no stand-
ing in court.
69. The Animal Welfare Information Center Newsletter is published by the Na-
tional Agricultural Library, and provides general information on animal welfare, in-
cluding current legislative efforts.
72. Ibid., 257.
chapter 2
1. Roger Paden, Deconstructing Speciesism: The Domain Specic Character of
Moral Judgments, International Journal of Applied Philosophy 7, no. 1 (Summer 1991):
61.
2. For an excellent and comprehensive philosophical discussion on this topic,
see Mary Anne Warren, Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); and David DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously: Men-
tal Life and Moral Status (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
3. See Tom Beauchamp, The Moral Standing of Animals in Medical Research,
Law, Medicine & Health Care 20, nos. 12 (SpringSummer 1992): 716. In this arti-
cle, he maintains that differences of opinion on the morality of animal experimenta-
tion are specically a result of differences in views on moral standing.
4. The next chapter will address the question of animal pain and suffering.
5. Of course, this is not an exhaustive listing of the proposed criteria over the
centuries. Others include temporal awareness, awareness of complex issues, ability to
deliberate, culture (Steve F. Sapontzis, Morals, Reason, and Animals [Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1987], 131), progressive improvement, ability to form con-
cepts, a sense of beauty, conscience (Denise Radner and Michael Radner, Animal Con-
sciousness [Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1989], 125), and soul, moral virtue, long-
range planning, and adaptation. In an attempt to point out how absurd some of the
criteria have been, Keith Thomas notes that humans have been described by Aristotle
as the political animal, by Thomas Willis as the laughing animal, by Benjamin Frank-
lin as the tool-making animal, by Edmund Burke as the religious animal, and by
James Boswell as the cooking animal; see Man and the Natural World: A History of the
Modern Sensibility (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983), 31.
6. James Rachels, in his book Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of
Darwinism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), argues that evolutionary theory
has serious implications for the ethical treatment of animals; see also Niall Shanks,
Animals and Science: A Guide to the Debates (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2002),
chapter 6.
7. Donald R. Grifn, Foreword to Interpretation, Intentionality, and Communica-
tion, vol. 1 of Interpretation and Explanation in the Study of Animal Behavior, A West-
view Special Study, ed. Marc Bekoff and Dale Jamieson (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1990), xiv.
8. For a good discussion of the similarities between some of the great apes and
humans, see Paul Waldau, The Specter of Speciesism: Buddhist and Christian Views of
Animals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), chapter 4. These similarities are the
basis of what has been called the great ape project, the goal of which is get nonhu-
man great apes admitted into the moral sphere by granting them rights; see Paola
Cavalieri and Peter Singer, eds., The Great Ape Project: Equality beyond Humanity (New
York: St. Martins Press, 1993).
9. The question of hierarchy will be addressed later in the chapter.
10. Chapter 5 will address religious arguments related to the treatment of ani-
mals.
11. For a fuller discussion on behaviorism during this time period, see Howard
Gardner, The Minds New Science: A History of the Cognitive Revolution (New York: Ba-
sic Books, 1985), chapter 2; see also Marc Bekoff and Colin Allen, eds., Species of
Mind: The Philosophy and Biology of Cognitive Ethology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1997) for a broader discussion, especially chapters 14.
12. In his book Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, in arguing against
creationist accounts of origins, Darwin stated: On the view that species are only
strongly marked and permanent varieties, and that each species rst existed as a vari-
ety, we can see why it is that no line of demarcation can be drawn between species,
commonly supposed to have been produced by special acts of creation, and varieties
which are acknowledged to have been produced by secondary laws (Great Books of
the Western World, 49, Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952), 234.
13. Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (New York: Philosophical Li-
brary, 1955).
14. The problem of other minds is an important one in philosophy; a good dis-
cussion of it can be found in Daniel C. Dennett, Kinds of Minds: Toward an Under-
standing of Consciousness (New York: Basic Books, 1996).
15. Donald R. Grifn, The Question of Animal Awareness, rev. ed. (New York:
Rockefeller University Press, 1981), 118; see also his book Animal Minds (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1992).
16. Colin G. Beer, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Ethology, in Cognitive
Ethology: The Minds of Other Animals, ed. Carolyn A. Ristau (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates, 1991), 20.
17. For a fuller account of the eld of cognitive ethology, see Mark Bekoff, Colin
Allen, and Gordon M. Burghardt, eds., The Cognitive Animal: Empirical and Theoretical
Perspectives on Animal Cognition, a Bradford Book (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
2002).
18. Grifn, Animal Minds, viii.
19. David DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 85.
20. However, some have noted methodological problems even in studying ani-
mals in the wild. First, simply observing animals in their habitat can affect their be-
havior, if they somehow sense they are being watched. Second, it is difcult to study
animals in the wild, and therefore animals must often be trapped, marked, and re-
leased back into their environment. Sometimes the tracking devices that have been
used have adversely affected the animals well-being; e.g., particular colors of bands
on zebra nches affected reproductive success; see Dale Jamieson and Marc Bekoff,
Afterword: Ethics and the Study of Animal Cognition, in Readings in Animal Cogni-
tion, ed. Marc Bekoff and Dale Jamieson (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 361
362.
21. Ibid.
22. Steven M. Wise, Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rights for Animals (Cam-
bridge, MA: Perseus Books, 2000), 122123.
23. The next chapter will address mental states in relation to pain.
24. DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously, 9798. For a more recent discussion of
the concept of consciousness, see Anthony R. Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens:
Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness (New York: Harcourt Brace & Com-
pany, 1999); Wise, Rattling the Cage, where Damasios work on consciousness is cited
with reference to legal issues; Bekoff and Allen, Species of Mind, chapter 8; and Den-
nett, Kinds of Minds.
25. Radner and Radner, Animal Consciousness, 8. See the rest of this book for a
fuller discussion of Descartes view of consciousness.
26. Ibid., 117.
27. John Hummer, Human and Animal Intelligence: A Question of Degree and
Responsibility, Between the Species 1, no. 2 (Spring 1985): 29.
28. Grifn, Animal Minds, 13; see also Rosemary Rodd, Biology, Ethics, and Ani-
mals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 4243.
29. The philosopher David DeGrazia denes it as follows: a conscious experi-
ence is one such that there is something that it is like to be in it. If an experience
feels like something, it is conscious (Taking Animals Seriously, 115). The cognitive
ethologist Donald Grifn offers this more expansive denition: thinking about ob-
jects and events. The content of conscious experience may ordinarily be limited to
what the animal perceives at the moment of its immediate situation, but sometimes
its awareness probably includes memories of past perceptions, or anticipation of fu-
ture events. . . . A conscious organism must ordinarily experience some feeling about
whatever engages its attention (Animal Minds, 3).
30. Grifn, Question of Animal Awareness, 3032.
31. Hummer, Human and Animal Intelligence, 3435.
32. Donald R. Grifn, Progress toward a Cognitive Ethology, in Cognitive Ethol-
ogy: The Minds of Other Animals, ed. Carolyn A. Ristau (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erl-
baum Associates, 1991), 12.
33. Ibid., 82.
34. Charles Birch and Lukas Vischer, Living with the Animals: The Community of
Gods Creatures (Geneva: WCC Publications, 1997), 39.
35. Grifn, Animal Minds, 27.
36. Rodd, Biology, Ethics, and Animals, 63.
37. Birch and Vischer, Living with the Animals, 39.
38. Radner and Radner, Animal Consciousness, 121.
39. DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously, 105.
40. Shanks, Animals and Science, chapter 10.
41. Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1983), 28.
42. Peter Carruthers argues this way in his book Language, Thought and Con-
sciousness: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996).
43. Grifn, Animal Minds, 27.
44. The dances of bees are the ruling metaphor in Jonathan Bennetts book Ra-
tionality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964), in which he argues that although
these dances may provide evidence of some kind of intelligence and language, they
do not provide evidence of rationality. Although my work is not addressing insects, it
is signicant that if this kind of consciousness may exist this low on the phylogenetic
scale, then a case can be made for consciousness in more complex species as well.
For more recent discussions on bee cognition, see Steven M. Wise, Drawing the Line:
Science and the Case for Animal Rights (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 2002), chap-
ter 5; and James L. Gould, Can Honey Bees Create Cognitive Maps? in The Cognitive
Animal: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives on Animal Cognition, ed. Marc Bekoff,
Colin Allen, and Gordon M. Burghardt, a Bradford Book (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 2002), 4145.
45. Helmut F. Kaplan, Do Animals Have Souls? Between the Species 7, no. 3
(Summer 1991): 139143.
46. Alison Jolly, Conscious Chimpanzees? A Review of Recent Literature, in
Cognitive Ethology: The Minds of Other Animals, ed. Carolyn A. Ristau (Hillsdale, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1991), 235.
47. All of the previous examples come from Grifn, Animal Minds. He has indi-
vidual chapters devoted to each of the main categories (e.g., communication, tool use)
and provides numerous examples within each of behavior that he believes provides
evidence of consciousness.
48. Two people who hold this position are the philosophers Peter Carruthers and
Peter Harrison. Because the possession of consciousness is integrally tied up with the
ability to experience pain and suffering, their views will be considered in the next
chapter.
49. A similar kind of distinction has been made by ethologist Donald Grifn, by
dividing consciousness into the perceptual and the reective, which generally seems
to correspond with the distinction commonly made between the terms conscious-
ness and self-consciousness (Animal Minds, 1011). Another analysis of types of
awareness divides it into three types: bodily self-awareness (awareness of ones own
body as distinct from other things), social awareness (awareness of ones social rela-
tions in ones social group), and introspective awareness (awareness of ones own
mental states). All of these types are found in different degrees, although introspec-
tive awareness may be a higher level than the other two (DeGrazia, Taking Animals
Seriously, 181182). However, it seems that this conceptual scheme can t into that
which divides consciousness into two types, with the rst two belonging to conscious-
ness and the third belonging to self-consciousness.
50. Peter Singer, Animals and the Value of Life, in Matters of Life and Death,
ed. Tom Regan (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980), 241.
51. See Grifn, Animal Minds, especially chapter 10.
52. Jolly, Conscious Chimpanzees, 238246.
53. Dorothy L. Cheney and Robert M. Seyfarth, Truth and Deception in Animal
Communication, in Cognitive Ethology: The Minds of Other Animals, ed. Carolyn A.
Ristau (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1991).
54. Jolly, Conscious Chimpanzees, 233.55. Rodd, Biology, Ethics, and Animals,
65. More recently, some have maintained that dolphins have this ability as well.
56. For an examination of the mind of a specic bonobo, see Sue Savage-
Rumbaugh and Roger Lewin, Kanzi: The Ape at the Brink of Human Mind (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, 1994); and for a discussion of animal minds, see Marc D. Hau-
ser, Wild Minds: What Animals Really Think (New York: Henry Holt and Company,
2000).
58. Regan, Case for Animal Rights, 30.
59. The issue of those humans lacking the cognitive capacities of normal adult
humans will be addressed later in this chapter.
60. Mary Midgley, Beast and Man: The Roots of Human Nature, rev. ed. (London:
Routledge, 1995), 44.
61. James C. Anderson, Species Equality and the Foundations of Moral Theory,
Environmental Values 2, no. 4 (Winter 1993): 358359.
62. Rationality, 5.
63. Rachels, Created from Animals, 140.
64. Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Humans Need the Vir-
tues (Chicago: Open Court, 1999), 96.
65. A more detailed analysis of language will take place later.
66. Sapontzis, Morals, Reason, and Animals, 29.
67. Bennett, Rationality, 46.
68. Beauchamp, Moral Standing of Animals, 11.
69. Birch and Vischer, Living with the Animals, 41.
70. Major C. W. Hume, Man and Beast (London: Universities Federation for Ani-
mal Welfare, 1962), 96.
71. Koyeli Ghosh-Dastidar, The Morality of Animals, Indian Philosophical Quar-
terly 16, no. 4 (October 1989): 420.
72. Adam Drozdek in his book Moral Dimensions of Man in the Age of Computers
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1995) has argued that man [sic], rather
than being a rational being, is primarily a moral being, and that although cognition is
important for moral reasoning, love is the primary affection which makes people per-
sons. For a discussion on the idea of multiple intelligences, see Gardner, Minds New
Science; two of Donald Grifns works: Animal Minds and The Question of Animal
Awareness; and the works of Marc Bekoff, in particular the edited works Species of
Mind and The Cognitive Animal, as well as Minding Animals: Awareness, Emotions, and
Heart (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
73. Midgley, Beast and Man, 157.
74. Marc Bekoff, Deep Ethology and Responsible Science, The Animals Agenda
(JulyAugust 1998): 2021; see also Marc Bekoff, Resisting Speciesism and Expand-
ing the Community of Equals, BioScience 48, no. 18 (August 1998): 640.
75. The origin of this term is not certain, although it may have been coined by
the philosopher Jan Narveson. This is the term typically used in the literature to refer
to those humans who do not have the cognitive capacities of normal adult humans.
This concept will be discussed more fully later in this chapter; for a useful discussion
of this, see Evelyn Pluhar, Beyond Prejudice: The Moral Signicance of Human and
Nonhuman Animals (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995). For the sake of con-
sistency, I will use this expression in this book, although I have serious reservations
about its use, due to its negative connotations and because it suggests that humans
who do not measure up to normal humans are somehow borderline humans and
perhaps not really humans at all. This is a moral judgment that I do not want to
make. Other terms sometimes used are even less attering, such as mental defec-
tives. The philosopher Stephen R. L. Clark makes the same observation; see Utility,
Rights and the Domestic Virtues: Or Whats Wrong with Raymond? Between the Spe-
cies 4, no. 4 (Fall 1988): 239.
76. Grifn, Progress toward a Cognitive Ethology, 9.
79. Rosemary Rodd, Evolutionary Ethics and the Status of Non-Human Ani-
mals, Journal of Applied Philosophy 13, no. 1 (1996): 70.
81. Jack Weir, Radical Translation and Animals: An Argument from the Princi-
ple of Humanity, Southwest Philosophy Review 11, no. 1 (January 1995): 3132.
83. Peter Smith, On Animal Beliefs, Southern Journal of Philosophy 20, no. 4
(Winter 1982): 503.
84. The philosopher R. G. Frey argues in this way.
85. Stephen P. Stich, Do Animals Have Beliefs? Australasian Journal of Philoso-
phy 57, no. 1 (March 1979): 1627.
87. Richard Routley, Alleged Problems in Attributing Beliefs, and Intentionality,
to Animals, Inquiry 24, no. 4 (December 1981): 387.
88. For a fuller discussion on autonomy, see Wise, Rattling the Cage.
90. One psychiatrist attempted to restore dignity to humans, which he believed
had been lost due to increased attention to animals, by arguing that the tremendous
difference of kind between humans and animals is evidenced by the possession of
ve attributes that made humans distinct: conceptual thought (including language,
symbolism, anticipation, and imagination, with language being primary), capacity for
technology, wide range of emotions, ability to make genetic changes, and freedomfrom
instinctual xation; see Willard Gaylin, In Defense of the Dignity of Being Human:
Five Attributes Beyond Autonomy, The Hastings Center Report (August 1984): 1822.
91. Michael Allen Fox, Animal Liberation: A Critique, Ethics 88, no. 2 (January
1978): 112.
92. Lawrence Haworth, Rights, Wrongs, and Animals, Ethics 88, no. 2 (Janu-
ary 1978): 104.
93. For this reason, philosopher David DeGrazia does not think that it is a mor-
ally useful criteria (Taking Animals Seriously, 210, footnote 118).
94. Singer, Animals and the Value of Life, 225.
95. Mary Midgley, Persons and Non-Persons, in In Defence of Animals, ed. Pe-
ter Singer (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), 56.
99. For more detailed discussion on the issue of personhood, see Midgley, Per-
sons and Non-Persons; James W. Walters, What Is a Person: An Ethical Exploration
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997); Warren, Moral Status, chapter 4; Steve F.
Sapontzis, A Critique of Personhood, Ethics 91, no. 4 (July 1981): 607618; and Jus-
tin Leiber, Can Animals and Machines Be Persons? A Dialogue by Justin Leiber (Indian-
apolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1985).
100. Nicholas Wolterstorff, Why Animals Dont Speak, Faith and Philosophy 4,
no. 4 (October 1987): 463485.
104. Some cognitive ethologists argue this way; see Radner and Radner, Animal
Consciousness, 171.
105. John Heil, Speechless Brutes, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
42, no. 3 (March 1982): 403.
106. For a detailed discussion on the cognitive understanding of language, see
Peter Carruthers and Jill Boucher, eds., Language and Thought: Interdisciplinary
Themes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and Carruthers, Language,
Thought and Consciousness.
107. MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, 2930.
108. Heil, Speechless Brutes, 406.
110. For an interesting summary of the intelligence of dolphins, see MacIntyre,
Dependent Rational Animals, chapter 4.
111. James L. Gould and Carol Grant Gould, The Animal Mind (New York: Scien-
tic American Library, 1994), 170.
116. Savage-Rumbaugh and Lewin, Kanzi, 39. For a fuller discussion of the Lana
project, see chapter 7 of this book.
117. Ibid., 182.
118. There are many good works with regard to apes learning human language;
see especially Roger Fouts, with Stephen Tunkel Mills, Next of Kin: My Conversations
with Chimpanzees (New York: Avon Books, 1997), which details the life of Washoe,
who is a chimpanzee and the rst talking nonhuman, whom Fouts worked with for
more than thirty years; Savage-Rumbaugh and Lewin, Kanzi, on the language studies
on this famous bonobo; and the work done with orangutans and gorillas in Sue Tay-
lor Parker, Robert W. Mitchell, and H. Lyn Miles, eds., The Mentalities of Gorillas and
Orangutans: Comparative Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
In addition, the work of Louis Hermann with bottle-nosed dolphins suggest that dol-
phins can learn words and syntax by virtue of a dolphinized gestural language, dis-
tantly related to sign language; see Wise, Drawing the Line, chapter 8.
119. Wise, Drawing the Line, chapter 11. KERA has two very interesting nature
programs focusing on Koko, including A Conversation with Koko, and Inside the
Animal Mind (Part I on animal emotions, and Part II on animal intelligence).
120. Fouts, Next of Kin.
122. R. G. Frey, Interests and Rights: The Case against Animals (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1980), 9798.
123. This phenomenon is so named because at the turn of the twentieth century
a horse named Hans was exhibited in Berlin by his trainer and owner, who sincerely
believed his animal to be capable of doing arithmetic. Whenever problems were pre-
sented to him in the many public appearances to which the owner brought his horse,
Hans would always tap out the correct number on the oor with his hoof or shake his
head the correct number of times. It was eventually discovered that Hans was re-
sponding to inadvertent cueing by those watching him perform.
124. KERA Nature program, Inside the Animal Mind, Part II: Inside Animal Intel-
ligence.
126. Mary Midgley, The Ethical Primate: Humans, Freedom and Morality (London:
Routledge, 1994), 174.
128. Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson and Susan McCarthy, When Elephants Weep: The
Emotional Lives of Animals (New York: Delacorte Press, 1995), 218.
129. Routley, Alleged Problems, 407408.
130. Stephen R. L. Clark, Animals and Their Moral Standing (London: Routledge,
1997), 145.
131. Midgley, Beast and Man, 234. In addition, some have argued that it makes
no sense to talk about animals lacking a language, at least in our cognitive under-
standing of it, because one cannot lack what is not normal for one. Thus, the inability
of primates to speak human language is not a defect but is normal for their species;
see Gene Namkoong and Tom Regan, The Question Is Not, Can They Talk? Jour-
nal of Medicine and Philosophy 13, no. 2 (May 1988): 215.
132. Marian Stamp Dawkins, Animal Suffering: The Science of Animal Welfare
(London: Chapman and Hall, 1980), 91.
134. In his book Dependent Rational Animals, Alasdair MacIntyre argues that
what unites humans and animals is our dependent animal nature. All of us must at
times be dependent on others, as, for example, when we are sick, and we need to
recognize that dependency is part of our nature, that in a sense, although he does not
use this phrase, we are all marginal humans at various points in our lives.
135. The term speciesism was originally coined by Richard Ryder and popular-
ized by Peter Singer in his book, Animal Liberation, new rev. ed (New York: Avon
Books, 1990), of which an earlier version came out in 1975.
136. For an interesting comparison of human and animal slavery, see Marjorie
Spiegel, The Dreaded Comparison: Human and Animal Slavery, 3rd ed. (New York:
Mirror Books, 1996).
137. Mark Bernstein, Speciesism and Loyalty, Behavior and Philosophy 19, no. 1
(SpringSummer 1991): 43.
138. Carl Cohen, in his famous article in favor of research on animals, states
that he is a speciesist, not only because speciesism is plausible but also because to
not make morally relevant distinctions among species is almost certain to lead people
to be misled in regard to their true obligations; see The Case for the Use of Animals
in Biomedical Research, New England Journal of Medicine 315, no. 14 (October 2,
1986): 865870.
139. Bernstein, Speciesism and Loyalty, 49.
140. Singer, Animal Liberation, 2.
141. The issue of pain will be discussed more fully in the next chapter but is
introduced here simply to highlight how speciesist arguments can work with regard
to animal experimentation.
142. It is important to note, though, that there is no one agreed-on denition of
speciesism, and what this discussion is attempting to do is to lay out its basic ideas;
for a fuller discussion on different understandings of this concept, see Waldau, Spec-
ter of Speciesism; and Pluhar, Beyond Prejudice.
143. The concept of the image of God will be discussed more fully in chapter 5.
144. Of course, it is also possible to argue the reverse; that marginal humans
can be subjected to the same kind of experimentation as animals. The philosopher
R. G. Frey argues along these lines, at least that it would be the next logical step.
145. C. S. Lewis, Vivisection, in God in the Dock: Essays on Theology and Ethics,
ed. Walter Hooper (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company,
1970), 227.
146. Some have argued that drawing the boundary line between humans and
animals is not the best place to draw it; rather, it should be drawn between primates
and all other animals; see Cavalieri and Singer, eds., Great Ape Project.
147. Peter Singer argues in this way.
148. One author has made the observation that if earth were colonized by a
species more powerful than human beings, they, too, could set up criteria for
ranking. If, for example, this species was more like a cat and determined that the
ability to see in near-darkness was the determining factor for moral consideration,
then humans would be excluded because they lack this ability (Spiegel, Dreaded
Comparison, 23). It is worth noting in passing that there are many thought experi-
ments in the literature on the possibility of an alien species and the grounds on
which they can be compared with humans. They are almost always presented as
having superior intelligence, which is then justication for our not treating them as
we do animals.
150. Chapter 5 in Waldau, Specter of Speciesism, has a very interesting discussion
on this topic.
152. Hummer, Human and Animal Intelligence, 36.
153. Peter Singer facetiously notes: Why should we not say that we are the only
beings in the universe that have intrinsic value? Our fellow humans are unlikely to
reject the accolades we so generously bestow upon them, and the other species to
whom we deny the honor are unable to object (Animals and the Value of Life,
232).
154. The observation made by Mary Midgley is worth noting: Is it better to be a
wolf than a polar bear, a jackdaw than a wandering albatross, or a human being than
any of them? Well, we are inclined to say, it is certainly more interesting. But for
whom? There is surely one answer: it depends on who you are in the rst place.
What test have the lives of these creatures failed? The answer, though embarrassing,
seems simplethey have failed to become more like ours. If man wants to set up a
contest in resembling himself and award himself the prize, no one will quarrel with
him. But what does it mean? All he can do by these roundabout methods is perhaps
to assert a value-judgment about what matters most in human life (Beast and Man,
163164).
155. Ibid., 206.
156. For a challenge particularly to the notion that only humans have culture,
see Richard W. Wrangham et al., eds., Chimpanzee Cultures (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1994).
157. Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, in Animal Rights: The Changing Debate,
ed. Robert Garner (New York: New York University Press, 1996), 8.
chapter 3
1. The issue of animal death in terms of if and how death harms animals is re-
lated to, but separate from, the problem of pain. There is an especially close relation-
ship in animal experimentation, since most animals are put to death at the conclu-
sion of the experiment. The subject of animal death will be dealt with briey in
subsequent chapters and also at the conclusion of this chapter in the discussion on
euthanasia.
2. Rebecca Dresser, Assessing Harm and Justication in Animal Research: Fed-
eral Policy Opens the Laboratory Door, Rutgers Law Review 40, no. 3 (Spring 1988):
744. The National Research Council, in their Recognition and Alleviation of Pain and
Distress in Laboratory Animals (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1992),
comes to a similar conclusion: There is a lack of agreement of the meaning of such
terms as comfort, well-being, discomfort, stress, fear, anxiety, pain, and distress (3). How-
ever, they go on to say later: There should seldom be a question about the possibility
that a laboratory animal is in pain (33).
3. The American Veterinary Association denes pain as an unpleasant emo-
tional experience perceived as arising from a specic region of the body and associ-
ated with actual or potential tissue damage; see F. Barbara Orlans, In the Name of
Science: Issues in Responsible Animal Experimentation (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1993), 129.
4. Jane A. Smith and Kenneth M. Boyd, eds., Lives in the Balance: The Ethics of
Using Animals in Biomedical Research (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 5866.
See also National Research Council, Recognition and Alleviation, 32.
5. David DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 106107.
6. Andrew N. Rowan and Franklin M. Loew, with Joan C. Weer, The Animal Re-
search Controversy, Center for Animals and Public Policy (North Grafton, MA: Tufts
University School of Veterinary Medicine, 1995), 75.
7. Ibid., 141. However, while a minority opinion, some do believe it possible or
even likely that insects feel pain.
8. R. G. Frey, Interests and Rights: The Case against Animals (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1980), 34.
9. Margaret Rose and David Adams, Evidence for Pain and Suffering in Other
Animals, in Animal Experimentation: The Consensus Changes, ed. Gill Langley (New
York: Chapman and Hall, 1989), 4849. Thus, the cephalopods have been included
in my denition of animal for the purpose of this project precisely because it is
likely that they do experience pain.
10. Smith and Boyd, Lives in the Balance, 5962.
11. Rowan and Loew, Animal Research Controversy, 76.
12. Frey, Interests and Rights, 34.
13. Bernard E. Rollin has an excellent overview of the history of the concept of
consciousness in science with regard to animals in The Unheeded Cry: Animal Con-
sciousness, Animal Pain, and Science, expanded ed. (Ames: Iowa State University
Press, 1998). He also has a recent interesting text on casuistry; see An Introduction
to Veterinary Medical Ethics: Theory and Cases (Ames: Iowa State University Press,
1999).
14. Ralph L. Kitchell and Michael J. Guinan, The Nature of Pain in Animals,
in A Survey of Scientic and Ethical Issues for Investigators, vol. 1 of The Experimental
Animal in Biomedical Research, ed. Bernard E. Rollin and M. Lynne Kessel (Boca Ra-
ton, FL: CRC Press, 1990), 187. See also vol. 2 of this same work, Care, Husbandry,
and Well-Being: An Overview by Species (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 1995), for a con-
sideration of pain experience in individual species.
15. David DeGrazia and Andrew Rowan, Pain, Suffering, and Anxiety in Ani-
mals and Humans, Theoretical Medicine 12, no. 3 (S 1991): 197.
16. National Research Council, Recognition and Alleviation, 6.
17. DeGrazia and Rowan, Pain, Suffering, and Anxiety, 198.
18. Kitchell and Guinan, Nature of Pain in Animals, 187.
19. Joseph S. Spinelli, Preventing Suffering in Laboratory Animals, in A Survey
of Scientic and Ethical Issues for Investigators, vol. 1 of The Experimental Animal in Bio-
medical Research, ed. Bernard E. Rollin and M. Lynne Kessel (Boca Raton, FL: CRC
Press, 1990), 233.
21. Eugene M. Wright Jr. and Judith F. Woodson, Clinical Assessment of Pain
in Laboratory Animals, in A Survey of Scientic and Ethical Issues for Investigators, vol.
1 of The Experimental Animal in Biomedical Research, ed. Bernard E. Rollin and M.
Lynne Kessel (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 1990), 209.
22. Ibid., 210211.
23. Dresser, Assessing Harm, 744.
24. Seymour Levine argues that whereas for most of the twentieth century stress
was viewed strictly in a physiological way, it cannot be adequately understood without
reference to cognitive states; see his Stress and Cognition in Laboratory Animals, in
A Survey of Scientic and Ethical Issues for Investigators, vol. 1 of The Experimental Ani-
mal in Biomedical Research, ed. Bernard E. Rollin and M. Lynne Kessel (Boca Raton,
FL: CRC Press, 1990), 173184.
28. Ibid., 141.
29. For example, evidence suggests that octopuses may experience anxiety
(Smith and Boyd, Lives in the Balance, 73).
30. Bernard E. Rollin, The Unheeded Cry: Animal Consciousness, Animal Pain,
and Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 191. Rollins revised version of
this text focuses more on the history of and reasons for the reluctance of science to
attribute consciousness to animals (expanded ed., Ames: Iowa State University Press,
1998).
31. DeGrazia and Rowan, Pain, Suffering, and Anxiety, 202203; see also
Smith and Boyd, Lives in the Balance, 71.
32. Levine, Stress and Cognition, 175.
33. The National Research Council denes stress as the effect produced by ex-
ternal (i.e., physical or environmental) events or internal (i.e., physiological or psycho-
logical) factors, referred to as stressors, which induce an alteration in an animals bio-
logical equilibrium (Recognition and Alleviation, 3).
34. Ibid., 17.
35. Ibid., 46.
36. For example, one of the criticisms of zoos (and also research laboratories) is
that the environments of some caged animals are so stress-free that they lead to mal-
adaptive behaviors such as excessive pacing or mutilation, due to boredom.
42. The American Veterinary Association denes suffering as an unpleasant
emotional response usually associated with pain and distress; it is an inability to
adapt or cope that causes mental anguish (Orlans, In the Name of Science, 38).
43. Marian Stamp Dawkins, Animal Suffering: The Science of Animal Welfare
(London: Chapman and Hall, 1980), 55.
44. DeGrazia and Rowan, Pain, Suffering, and Anxiety, 199. Tom Regan notes
that the question is not simply can we cause animals pain, but rather, Can we cause
them pain so intense and long lasting as to make them suffer? That is a central moral
question . . .; see The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1983), 96.
45. The recognition of suffering has been linked to the sensitivity of the one ob-
serving it (Orlans, In the Name of Science, 144).
46. In spite of the reluctance of some to attribute suffering to animals, there are
some abnormal behaviors that almost everyone agrees are signs of severe suffering,
such as when it results in actual physical damage (e.g., tail biting in pigs) or death
(e.g., hens suffocating due to mass hysteria) (Dawkins, Animal Suffering, 7778).
48. Andrew N. Rowan, Of Mice, Models, & Men: A Critical Evaluation of Animal
Research (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), 8485.
49. One example is that which was amended in one of the revisions of the Ani-
mal Welfare Actthe requirement that primates be furnished with environments that
contribute to their psychological well-being, such as the presence of playthings or cag-
ing with other members of their species.
50. Bernard Rollin suggests that standards of care, husbandry and use of all
laboratory animals should be based on what makes an animal happy, not merely on
avoiding pain and distress (Unheeded Cry, 1989, 2); see also the 1998 edition, 201
203.
52. Jerod M. Loeb et al., Human vs. Animal Rights, in Animal Rights and Wel-
fare, ed. Jeanne Williams, Reference Shelf series (New York: H. W. Wilson Co., 1991),
73.
53. A couple of writers have challenged this traditional interpretation of Des-
cartes. John Cottingham argues that Descartes may have been misinterpreted on his
theory of the animal-machine and that he may not have been a strict dualist, conclud-
ing, At the end of the day, Descartes may not have been completely consistent, but at
least he was not altogether beastly to the beasts; see A Brute to the Brutes? Des-
cartes Treatment of Animals, Philosophy 53, no. 206 (October 1978): 559.
54. Discourse, selected and translated by Norman Kemp Smith, in The Modern
Library of the Worlds Greatest Books: Descartes Philosophical Writings (New York: Mod-
ern Library, 1958), 127128.
57. Marian Stamp Dawkins, The Scientic Basis for Assessing Suffering in Ani-
mals, in In Defence of Animals, ed. Peter Singer (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), 27.
58. Rollin, Unheeded Cry, 1989, 27.
59. Patrick Bateson, Assessment of Pain in Animals, in Ethics in Research on
Animal Behaviour, ed. Marian Stamp Dawkins and Morris Gosling (Academic Press,
1991), 23.
60. Rosemary Rodd, Biology, Ethics, and Animals (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1990), 4244.
61. For a more detailed discussion on how animals experience pain, see Kitchell
and Guinan, Nature of Pain in Animals. On the basis of physiological similarities,
they conclude that it is likely that animals have subjective experiences of pain as well.
64. Dallas Pratt, Alternatives to Pain in Experiments on Animals (New York: Argus
Archives, 1980), 12.
65. Peter Singer makes the following observation: The experimenter who forces
rats to choose between starvation and electric shock to see if they develop ulcers
(which they do) does so because the rat has a nervous system very similar to a human
beings, and presumably feels electric shock in a similar way; see Animal Liberation,
new rev. ed. (New York: Avon Books, 1990), 40.
66. Orlans, In the Name of Science, 147151. However, one entomologist has ar-
gued that because he thinks it likely that insects feel pain, it is ethically mandatory to
anesthetize them prior to potentially painful treatment in the laboratory and to mini-
mize their harm in other ways; see Jeffrey A. Lockwood, Not to Harm a Fly: Our
Ethical Obligations to Insects, Between the Species 4, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 204211.
68. Stephen R. L. Clark, The Moral Status of Animals (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1977), 39.
69. Some of the important differences between vocalizations of animals in pain
versus humans are that animal vocalizations tend to be repeated rather than just mo-
mentary, that they may be at frequencies above human hearing, and that lack of vo-
calization does not necessarily mean lack of pain (National Research Council, Recogni-
tion and Alleviation, 3435).
70. Wright and Woodson, Clinical Assessment, 213.
71. Bateson, Assessment of Pain, 1820.
73. Rose and Adams, Evidence for Pain and Suffering in Other Animals, 63
64.
75. Peter Carruthers and Peter Harrison are two philosophers who both hold to
this view and have written on the subject; it is their views that will be examined here.
They have been referred to as neo-Cartesians; see Evelyn Pluhar, Arguing Away Suf-
fering: The Neo-Cartesian Revival, Between the Species 9, no. 1 (Winter 1993): 2741,
because although they do not fully embrace Descartes mind-body dualism, they come
to similar conclusions regarding the treatment of animals.
76. Peter Carruthers, Brute Experience, Journal of Philosophy 86, no. 6 (June
1989): 259.
77. Ibid., 261264.
78. Peter Harrison, Theodicy and Animal Pain, Philosophy 64, no. 247 (Janu-
ary 1989): 8384.
79. Peter Harrison, Do Animals Feel Pain? Philosophy 66, no. 255 (January
1991): 26.
80. Harrison, Theodicy and Animal Pain, 91.
81. Harrison, Do Animals Feel Pain? 32.
82. Harrison, Theodicy and Animal Pain, 8687.
83. Carruthers, Brute Experience, 268169; see also Peter Carruthers, The Ani-
mals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice, reprint (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1994), 167169.
84. Harrison, Do Animals Feel Pain? 3940.
85. Rollin, Unheeded Cry, 1998.
86. One of the problems is assessing pain in animal experiments has to do with
data collection. Though the USDA requires that institutions receiving funding report
the degree of pain in experiments by the use of pain categories (those causing no
pain and distress, those causing pain and distress relieved by drugs, and those caus-
ing pain and distress not relieved by drugs), they have never provided institutional
guidelines on how to apply these categories. In addition, rats and mice are not in-
cluded, so that the statistics available exclude most of the research animals used; see
Franklin M. Loew, Animals in Research, in Birth to Death: Science and Bioethics, ed.
David C. Thomasma and Thomasine Kushner (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996), 303. For problems with statistics on assessing animal pain and distress,
see also Andrew N. Rowan, The Use of Animals in Experimentation: An Examina-
tion of the Technical Arguments Used to Criticize the Practice, in Animal Rights:
The Changing Debate, ed. Robert Garner (New York: New York University Press,
1996), 132.
87. There are numerous sources to which one can turn for an account of some
of these experiments, including descriptions of the experiment and results obtained.
Details about experiments can be discovered as a result of the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act, and some are printed in journals in the eld. Some writers in the
popular literature have summarized some of the more gruesome experiments; see
Singer, Animal Liberation, chapter 2; Geoffrey Cowley et al., Of Pain and Progress,
in Animal Rights and Welfare, ed. Jeanne Williams (New York: H. W. Wilson Com-
pany, 1991); and Richard D. Ryder, Victims of Science: The Use of Animals in Research
(London: Davis-Poynter, 1975), chapters 3 and 4. Some of the animal rights literature
also provides reports, photographs, and (occasionally) videos on particular experi-
ments.
88. Kathy Snow Guillermo, Monkey Business: The Disturbing Case That Launched
the Animal Rights Movement (Washington, DC: National Press Books, 1993).
89. For a discussion of the importance of research on pain, see Manfred Zim-
merman, Ethical Considerations in Relation to Pain in Animal Experimentation,
Acta Physiologica Scandanavica 128 (1986): 221233. Suppl. no. 554.
90. Rollin, Unheeded Cry, 1989, 115.
91. Tom Regan, Ill-Gotten Gains, in Health Care Ethics: An Introduction, ed.
Donald VanDeVeer and Tom Regan (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987),
242243.
92. Lynda Birke, Better Homes for Laboratory Animals, New Scientist 3 (De-
cember 1988): 52.
93. Francoise Wemelsfelder, Boredom and Laboratory Animal Welfare, in A
Survey of Scientic and Ethical Issues for Investigators, vol. 1 of The Experimental Animal
in Biomedical Research, ed. Bernard E. Rollin and M. Lynne Kessel (Boca Raton, FL:
CRC Press, 1990), 254.
94. Birke, Better Homes, 50.
95. For a detailed discussion of the relationship between animal well-being and
environmental considerations, see Spinelli, Preventing Suffering, 231242.
96. Dawkins, Scientic Basis, 31.
97. There are several authors who have emphasized this approach: Marian
Dawkins, whose work will be considered in this section and later in the discussion on
preference tests; sociologist Arnold Arluke, who has conducted numerous studies on
the attitude of laboratory workers toward research animals (see his article, The Signif-
icance of Seeking the Animals Perspective, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 [March
1990]: 1314); and David G. Porter, Ethical Scores for Animal Experiments, in Na-
ture 356 (March 12, 1992): 101102.
99. Dawkins, Animal Suffering, 62.
102. Marian Stamp Dawkins, From an Animals Point of View: Motivation, Fit-
ness, and Animal Welfare, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (March 1990): 3.
104. Ibid., 98104.
105. Dawkins, From an Animals Point of View, 4.
106. See especially articles by J. A. Gray (In Defense of Speciesism) and Dale
Jamieson (Science and Subjective Feelings) in Marian Stamp Dawkins, From an
Animals Point of View: Motivation, Fitness, and Animal Welfare, Behavioral and
Brain Sciences 13 (March 1990): 161.
107. The origin of the 3Rs is a relatively recent development, which began with
the publication of a book by two practicing scientists: W.M.S. Russell and R. L. Burch,
The Principles of Humane Experimental Technique, special edition (1959; reprint, St. Al-
bans, UK: Universities Federation for Animal Welfare). This book is considered a
classic in the eld and forms the foundation for the contemporary debate on alterna-
tives. The book was originally written primarily with vertebrates in mind and focused
on the situation in England at that time. For a more detailed discussion of the devel-
opment of this concept, see Andrew N. Rowan, Looking Back 33 Years to Russell and
Burch: The Development of the Concept of the Three Rs (Alternatives), in Alterna-
tives to Animal Testing: New Ways in the Biomedical Sciences, Trends and Progress, ed.
Christoph A. Reinhardt (Weinheim, Germany: VCH Publishers, 1994), 111. In addi-
tion, this book also contains a number of other essays on the 3Rs, including its his-
tory and the discussion of specic alternatives.
108. Loew, Animals in Research, 308.
110. Russell and Burch, Principles of Humane Experimental Technique, 64. This
was originally understood to mean the replacement of vertebrates with either inverte-
brates or with vertebrates not past the halfway point in their gestation (123).
112. Ibid., 125126.
113. One example of such an organization is FRAME (Fund for the Replacement
of Animals in Medical Experimentation), located in Britain and founded in 1969.
However, even in the United States, funding is available from certain organizations
for the purpose of supporting research into the development of alternatives through
several sources: NIH, Ofce of Technology Assessment, and in-house funding by gov-
ernment, industrial, and private research laboratories (Orlans, In the Name of Science,
7781). In addition, the First World Congress on Alternatives and Animal Use in the
Life Sciences was held in Baltimore in 1993; see Paul Cotton, Animals and Science
Benet from Replace, Reduce, Rene Effort, Journal of American Medical Association
270, no. 24 (December 2229, 1993): 29052907.
114. Smith and Boyd have argued that the two requirements necessary for an al-
ternative to animals to be seriously considered is that it must not be more immoral
than the use of animals, and it must produce results at least as satisfactory (Lives in
the Balance, 20).
115. For a thorough recent discussion of alternatives to animals, see the two
books by C. Ray Greek and Jean Swingle Greek, Sacred Cows and Golden Geese: The
Human Cost of Experiments on Animals (New York: Continuum, 2000), chapter 6; and
Specious Science: How Genetics and Evolution Reveal Why Medical Research on Animals
Harms Humans (New York: Continuum, 2002), chapter 8.
116. Other important issues for the use of human volunteers are the method of
recruitment, means and methods of nancial compensation, and establishing accepta-
ble levels of harm (Smith and Boyd, Lives in the Balance, 134).
119. Sir William Paton argues thus in his classic book, Man and Mouse: Animals
in Medical Research, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
121. Sidney Gendin, The Use of Animals in Science, in Animal Sacrices: Reli-
gious Perspectives on the Use of Animals in Science, ed. Tom Regan (Philadelphia: Tem-
ple University Press, 1986), 35.
122. However, it is signicant that a number of schools of veterinary medicine
have done away with the use of animals in their teaching curriculum.
124. Leslie Melville Brown, Cruelty to Animals: The Moral Debt (Houndmills, UK:
Macmillan Press, 1988), 144.
125. Greek and Greek, Sacred Cows and Golden Geese, chapter 5. They quote a
cynics comment, The rat is an animal which, when injected, produces a paper (79).
126. Although independent, the Society for Animal Protective Legislation was es-
tablished in 1955 and registered under the Federal Lobbying Act. Their purpose is to
foster the passage of laws needed to protect animals. The journal Animal Law follows
the progress of this legislation in their annual issues.
127. The National Agricultural Library publishes a quarterly newsletter, The Ani-
mal Welfare Information Center Newsletter, which provides current information on ani-
mal welfare to investigators and technicians.
128. Esther F. Dukes, The Improved Standards for Laboratory Animals Act:
Will It Ensure that the Policy of the Animal Welfare Act Becomes a Reality? Saint
Louis University Law Journal 31, no. 3 (September 1987): 524.
130. For a detailed discussion about the problems of legislation in protecting ani-
mals, see Gary L. Francione, Animals, Property, and the Law (Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1995). Two additional helpful resources are Steven M. Wises books,
Drawing the Line: Science and the Case for Animal Rights (Cambridge, MA: Perseus
Books, 2002); and Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rights for Animals (Cambridge, MA:
Perseus Books, 2000).
131. Dresser, Assessing Harm, 743. However, a recent volume is an attempt to
provide some correct guidelines; see M. Lawrence Podolsky and Victos S. Lukas, eds.,
The Care and Feeding of an IACUC: The Organization and Management of an Institu-
tional Animal Care and Use Committee (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 1999).
132. This is true for the National Research Councils Guide for the Care and Use
of Laboratory Animals (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1996), which, al-
though intended to protect animals, is actually not meant to interfere with research
design; see Nedim C. Buyukmihci, The Use of Nonhuman Animals in Research,
Law Library Journal 82, no. 2 (Spring 1990): 353354.
133. F. Barbara Orlans, Animal Pain Scales in Public Policy, ATLA 18 (Novem-
ber 1990): 8190.
134. Ernest D. Prentice, David A. Crouse, and Michael D. Mann, Scientic
Merit Review: The Role of the IACUC, ILAR News 34, nos. 12 (Winter/Spring
1992): 1519; see also Lawrence Finsen, Institutional Animal Care and Use Commit-
tees: A New Set of Clothes for the Emperor? Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 13
(May 1988): 145148.
135. Francione, Animals, Property, and the Law, 204206.
136. Dukes, Improved Standards, 531532, 541.
137. F. Barbara Orlans, Data on Animal Experimentation in the United States:
What They Do and Do Not Show, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 37, no. 2 (Win-
ter 1994): 222.
138. Orlans, Animal Pain Scales, 4145.
140. This information was taken from a chart in A. F. Fraser, An Analysis of
Suffering, in A Survey of Scientic and Ethical Issues for Investigators, vol. 1 of The Ex-
perimental Animal in Biomedical Research, ed. Bernard E. Rollin and M. Lynne Kessel
(Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 1990), 227. For another example of a similar pain scale,
organized somewhat differently, see Orlans, In the Name of Science, 87.
142. Ibid., 86.
145. Andreas-Holger Maehle and Ulrich Trohler, Animal Experimentation from
Antiquity to the End of the Eighteenth Century: Attitudes and Arguments, in Vivisec-
tion in Historical Perspective, ed. Nicolaas A. Rupke (London: Routledge, 1987), 15.
146. Bernard E. Rollin, Pain, Paradox, and Value, Bioethics 3, no. 3 (1989): 211.
See also Rollin, Unheeded Cry, 1998, chapters 5 and 6.
147. Mary T. Phillips, Savages, Drunks, and Lab Animals: The Researchers Per-
ception of Pain, Society and Animals 1, no. 1 (1993): 6877. In this regard, it is inter-
esting that the National Research guidelines in Recognition and Alleviation warn re-
searchers to guard against anthropomorphizing pain perception, since there are many
differences between humans and animals (41).
148. Paul Flecknell, Assessment and Alleviation of Post-Operative Pain, Ani-
mal Welfare Information Center Newsletter 8, nos. 34 (Winter 19971998): 8.
150. Ibid., 8791.
151. Arluke, Signicance of Seeking the Animals Perspective.
152. Anne Marie DeLuca, Environmental Enrichment: Does It Reduce Barber-
ing in Mice? Animal Welfare Information Center Newsletter 8, no. 2 (Summer 1997):
78.
153. Birke, Better Homes, 55.
155. Recognition and Alleviation, 102.
156. For an example of the assessment of euthanasia methods for different spe-
cies, see the charts in National Research Council, Recognition and Alleviation, 107 and
113. The edited volume by Bernard E. Rollin and M. Lynne Kessel also provides de-
scriptions for the most humane methods of euthanasia for individual species in each
of the chapters (Care, Husbandry, and Well-Being).
157. Larry Carbone, Adoption of Research Animals, Animal Welfare Information
Center Newsletter 7, nos. 34 (Winter 19961997), 12, 910.
159. For an interesting discussion of the ritualistic association of this term, see
Michael E. Lynch, Sacrice and the Transformation of the Animal Body into a Scien-
tic Object: Laboratory Culture and Ritual Practice in the Neurosciences, Social Stud-
ies of Science 18, no. 2 (May 1988): 265289.
160. For further discussion on this issue, see Carbone, Adoption of Research
Animals.
chapter 4
1. Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1983), 268. This book is the most extensive and systematic philosophical treat-
ment of animal rights. He has written a more recent work as well; see Defending Ani-
mal Rights (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2001). However, there were books
written much earlier than this, raising some of the same questions; see especially
Henry S. Salt, Animals Rights Considered in Relation to Social Progress (1892, reprint,
Clarks Summit, PA: Society for Animal Rights, 1980).
2. Since the terms moral rights and natural rights are virtually synonymous,
they will be used interchangeably in this chapter.
3. Introduction, in Animal Sacrices: Religious Perspectives on the Use of Animals
in Science, ed. Tom Regan (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), 23.
4. Andrew Linzey, Christianity and the Rights of Animals (New York: Crossroad,
1987), 97.
5. Interests with regard to animals have been addressed in a variety of ways in
the literature. Interests are typically understood as welfare or well-being. Because
rights potentially can endow a creature with greater protection than simply the protec-
tion of interests will do, it is preferable to focus on rights rather than on interests. For
several helpful works addressing interests, see Steve F. Sapontzis, The Moral Signi-
cance of Interests, Environmental Ethics 4, no. 4 (Winter 1982): 345358; David De-
Grazia, Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1996); and the works of utilitarians R. G. Frey and Peter
Singer.
6. Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, new rev. ed. (New York: Avon Books, 1990), 8.
7. A doctor who is opposed to animal rights asks rhetorically if animals should
have the right to vote and to have equal pay for equal work; see Richard J. Traystman,
Commentary: The Goal of Animal Welfare, Animal Rights, and Antivivisectionist
Groups in the United States, Journal of Neurosurgical Anesthesiology 2, no. 3 (Sept.
1990): 153158. Another author points to the absurdity of following this line of rea-
soning: Translating these [rights] for nonhumans, one arrives at the ridiculous no-
tion of dogs having a right to bark, cats having the right to pray, and cows having the
right to elect political representatives; see Helena Silverstein, Unleashing Rights: Law,
Meaning, and the Animal Rights Movement (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1986), 234.
8. Silverstein, Unleashing Rights, 108.
9. Steven M. Wise, Drawing the Line: Science and the Case for Animal Rights
(Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 2002), 922.
10. Defenders of animal rights are often unclear in their own minds, as well as
in the presentation of their case to the public, whether they are endorsing moral or
legal rights for animals or indeed both; see Michael Allen Fox, The Case for Animal
Experimentation: An Evolutionary and Ethical Perspective (Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1986), 51.
11. The discussion of the rights being given by God will be addressed more fully
in chapter 5.
12. These criteria will be discussed later.
13. Steven M. Wise, quoting Wesley Hohfeld, a professor at Yale Law School dur-
ing World War II; see Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rights for Animals (Cambridge,
MA: Perseus Books, 2000), 53.
14. Ibid., 47.
15. The fact that animals are the intended beneciaries of protective legislation,
however, does not yet prove that they have legal rights; and indeed the prevailing view
of Anglo-American jurisprudence has been that animals do not, indeed cannot, have
rights; see Joel Feinberg, Human Duties and Animal Rights, in On the Fifth Day:
Animal Rights & Human Ethics, ed. Robert Knowles Morris and Michael W. Fox
(Washington, DC: Acropolis Books, 1978), 49. See also Jerrold Tannenbaum, Ani-
mals and the Law: Property, Cruelty, Rights, in Humans and Other Animals, ed. Ar-
ien Mack (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1995), 125193.
16. For an excellent discussion of animal status under the law, see Gary L. Fran-
ciones Animals, Property, and the Law (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995);
and Wise, Rattling the Cage.
17. To satisfy the standing requirement, plaintiffs seeking relief in federal court
must show that they have suffered a concrete, actual injury caused by the alleged le-
gal violation; see David R. Schmahmann and Lori J. Polacheck, The Case against
Rights for Animals, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review 22, no. 4 (Sum-
mer 1995), 774. They go on in the same article to note: State courts have similarly
held that animal rights activists possess no personal legal interest in the use of ani-
mals in experimentation and thus are not proper parties entitled to sue under state
animal cruelty statutes (777).
19. There are some who, although they would support legal rights, are very
skeptical about their effecting any real change for animals: once one considers how
they [legal rights] would work in a real social context it becomes clear that granting
animals formal legal rights is unlikely to effect any real change in their position, just
as granting women, blacks, children and other oppressed groups rights has not led to
equal treatment; see Marie Fox, Animal Rights and Wrongs: Medical Ethics and the
Killing of Non-Human Animals, in Death Rites: Law and Ethics at the End of Life, ed.
Robert Lee and Derek Morgan (London: Routledge, 1994), 153.
20. Feinberg, Human Duties and Animal Rights, 59.
21. Francione, Animals, Property, and the Law, 95.
22. Defending Animal Rights, 24.
23. Peter Singer denes it in this way in his book Animal Liberation, 89.
24. James Rachels, Do Animals Have a Right to Life? in Ethics and Animals,
ed. Harlan B. Miller and William H. Williams (Clifton, NJ: Humana Press, 1983).
26. Ted Benton points out that this was Marxs observation; see Animal Rights:
An Eco-Socialist View, in Animal Rights: The Changing Debate, ed. Robert Garner
(New York: New York University Press, 1996), 33.
28. For a good discussion on the notion of problems with essentialist denition,
see Paul Waldau, The Specter of Speciesism: Buddhist and Christian Views of Animals
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
29. What is meant here are documents such as the United Nations Declaration
on Human Rights and The Declaration toward a Global Ethic.
30. Steve F. Sapontzis observes regarding the slippery-slope argument: In
actual practice, ridiculous consequences do not discredit the basic principles of
moral reform; rather, such consequences lead to a more subtle and practical under-
standing of those principles, an understanding that eliminates the ridiculous conse-
quences; see Morals, Reason, and Animals (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1987), 75.
31. Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1993), 227.
32. Evelyn Pluhar, Must an Opponent of Animal Rights Also Be an Opponent
of Human Rights? Inquiry 24/2 (June 1981): 230.
33. For an excellent discussion on what equal consideration means, see De-
Grazia, Taking Animals Seriously, 3946. For Singer, equal consideration for animals
means giving equal moral weight to relevantly similar interests, which does not mean
that those with relevantly similar interests are equal or that they must be treated
equally; see Singer, Animal Liberation, 2.
34. Herbert Landsell, Laboratory Animals Need Only Humane Treatment: Ani-
mal Rights May Debase Human Rights, International Journal of Neuroscience 42
(1988): 169178. Tom Regan, on the other hand, argues that the animal rights move-
ment is part of the human rights movement, since the theory that rationally grounds
the rights of animals also does so for humans (Case for Animal Rights, 24).
35. Julian McAllister Groves, Hearts and Minds: The Controversy over Laboratory
Animals (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1997), 71.
36. For a short helpful discussion on this issue, see Sapontzis, Morals, Reason,
and Animals, 140156.
37. Carl Cohen argues: this much is clear about rights in general: they are in
every case claims, or potential claims, within a community of agents. Rights arise,
and can be intelligibly defended, only among beings who actually do, or can, make
moral claims against one another. Whatever else rights may be, therefore, they are
necessarily human; their possessors are persons, human beings; see The Case for
the Use of Animals in Biomedical Ethics, New England Journal of Medicine 315, no. 14
(Oct. 2, 1986): 865.
38. For an excellent article containing arguments for and challenges to the tradi-
tional reasons for the attribution of rights to animals, see Richard A. Watson, Self-
Consciousness and the Rights of Nonhuman Animals and Nature, Environmental
Ethics 1, no. 2 (Summer 1979): 99129. He uses reciprocity as his framework for an
analysis of morality. For another good short discussion of reciprocity, see Sapontzis,
Morals, Reason, and Animals, 139144.
39. However, some philosophers do believe that animals are moral patients; see
DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously, 199, and Mary Midgley, The Ethical Primate: Hu-
mans, Freedom and Morality (London: Routledge, 1994), 134.
40. This is the basic thesis and argument of his book, Rattling the Cage. In his
Drawing the Line, he expands the discussion to include an examination of other ani-
mal minds as well.
41. Waldau, Specter of Speciesism.
44. Ibid., 382388; see also his Defending Animal Rights, 43. For another defense
of complete abolition of experimentation, see Susan Finsen, Sinking the Research
Lifeboat, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 13, no. 2 (May 1988): 197212; and Fox,
Animal Rights and Wrongs.
45. Steve F. Sapontzis, Animal Rights and Biomedical Research, Journal of
Value Inquiry 26, no. 1 (January 1992): 7386.
46. Mike Radford, Partial Protection: Animal Welfare and the Law, in Animal
Rights: The Changing Debate, ed. Robert Garner (New York: New York University
Press, 1996), 69.
47. Stephen R. L. Clark makes the following observation: We discriminate
amongst them not for realistic reasons, but for symbolic needs. Those who mourn a
dead rabbit are utterly indifferent to a dead mouse; those who would not kick a dog
readily support the torture of the equally intelligent pig. These discriminations may
sometimes reveal a [sic] total indifference to animals . . .; see The Moral Status of Ani-
mals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 120121.
48. The following discussion will focus on the general nature of these rights, but
the practical restrictions placed upon the existence of these rights will be more fully
discussed in chapter 6, when I undertake a burden/benet analysis.
49. Others have attempted to delineate specic rights for animals as well. For an
example of a general animal bill of rights adopted at a protest march in 1990, the
draft of which was adopted by more than forty national organizations, see Silverstein,
Unleashing Rights, 64. For an example of a bill of rights specically for experimental
animals, see Michael W. Fox, Inhumane Society: The American Way of Exploiting Ani-
mals (New York: St. Martins Press, 1990), 6870.
50. James Rachels argues that animals have at least a prima facie right to liberty
because animals have an interest in being free; see Why Animals Have a Right to
Liberty, in Animal Rights and Human Obligations, 2nd ed., ed. Tom Regan and Peter
Singer (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1976, 1989).
51. Larry Carbone, Adoption of Research Animals, Animal Welfare Information
Center Newsletter 7, nos. 34 (Winter 1996/1997): 12, 910.
52. I have never seen this suggestion in the literature, and, notwithstanding the
problems of implementation, I think that it does have some merit.
53. Jane Goodall currently devotes much of her time in trying to make this a re-
ality for nonhuman primates.
54. With regard to animal experimentation in the foreseeable future, Bernard E.
Rollin argues that: it should be conducted in such a way as to maximize the animals
potential for living its life according to its nature or telos, and certain fundamental
rights should be preserved as far as possible, given the logic of research, regardless of
consideration of cost; see Animal Rights and Human Morality (Buffalo, NY: Prome-
theus Books, 1981), 94; see also his work, The Unheeded Cry: Animal Consciousness,
Animal Pain, and Science (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1998), 196204.
55. Ted Benton notes the difculty of rights in changing motivation: In general,
a rights-based strategy for defending individuals against abuse encounters what is some-
times called the problem of motivation: rights are unlikely to be effective in practice
unless those who have the power to abuse them are already benevolently disposed to
their bearers; see Natural Relations: Ecology, Animal Rights and Social Justice (London:
Verso, 1993), 94.
56. Rosemary Rodd points out the danger in biology of encouraging people to
overcome their natural sympathy for animals: Human beings are incomparably the
most dangerous species of animal which has yet inhabited this planet, and any factor
tending to produce individuals with desensitized inhibitions may perhaps pose an in-
calculable threat to us all; see Biology, Ethics, and Animals (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1990), 186.
57. Rosemary Rodd also argues that humans, including those in the animal
rights movement, should be willing to serve as subjects in experiments that may not
cause lasting harm (Ibid., 149150).
58. Arnold Arluke, a sociologist who has undertaken research to better under-
stand the point of view of those who conduct or assist with research on animals, ob-
serves that there are two views of scientists toward laboratory animals: that animals
are viewed as pets and that animals are considered devoid of unique personality or
animate nature. The former view is rarer and typically occurs if the animal is known
for a while, if the people are genuinely interested in animals, and if the animal re-
sembles a pet, either psychologically or behaviorally. However, the latter is the more
prevalent view: They are considered tools, models, data, material, or supplies. They
are batched, numbered, used, and dispatched in a disassembly process reminiscent of
the mechanical and routine work of factory mass production; see The Signicance
of Seeking the Animals Perspective, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (March 1990):
13. He concludes that understanding suffering from the animals perspective could
elevate their status (14).
chapter 5
1. For two works arguing that the Christian tradition has primarily been nega-
tive, see Charles Birch, Christian Obligation for the Liberation of Nature, in Liberat-
ing Life: Contemporary Approaches to Ecological Theology, ed. Charles Birch, William
Eakin, and Jay McDaniel (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1991); and Andrew Linzey,
Introduction: Is Christianity Irredeemably Speciesist? in Animals on the Agenda:
Questions about Animals for Theology and Ethics, ed. Andrew Linzey and Dorothy Ya-
mamoto (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998). Other works tracing the history
of the treatment of animals include John Passmore, The Treatment of Animals,
Journal of the History of Ideas 36, no. 2 (AprilMay 1975): 195218; and the important
work by Major C. W. Hume, The Status of Animals in the Christian Religion (London:
Universities Federation for Animal Welfare, 1957). For an article on how our cultural
attitudes toward animals have been reinforced by the Christian tradition, see L. Shan-
non Jung, Animals in Christian Perspective: Strangers, Friends, or Kin? in Good
News for Animals? Christian Approaches to Animal Well-Being, Ecology and Justice Se-
ries, ed. Charles Pinches and Jay B. McDaniel (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1993).
For an overview of the Christian tradition with regard to the environment in particu-
lar, see Dieter T. Hessel and Rosemary Radford Ruether, eds., Christianity and Ecology:
Seeking the Well-Being of Earth and Humans (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2000).
2. Some especially noteworthy books are Charles Birch and Lukas Vischer, Living
with the Animals: The Community of Gods Creatures (Geneva: WCC Publications,
1997); Stephen R. L. Clark, The Moral Status of Animals (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1977); Pinches and McDaniel, Good News for Animals?; Jay McDaniel, Of God and Peli-
cans: A Theology of Reverence for Life (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press,
1989); and Stephen H. Webb, On God and Dogs: A Christian Theology of Compassion
for Animals (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). Andrew Linzey has probably
written most extensively on animals from a classical Christian perspective, and some
of his works include Animal Gospel (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press,
1998); Animal Theology (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994); and Christianity
and the Rights of Animals (New York: Crossroad, 1987). He has also coauthored and
edited several volumes, in addition to having written numerous articles. It is also
worth mentioning that a few Catholic theologians are trying to formulate a more pos-
itive theology for animals from within their tradition; see especially John Berkman,
Is the Consistent Ethic of Life Consistent without a Concern for Animals? in Ani-
mals on the Agenda: Questions about Animals for Theology and Ethics, ed. Andrew Lin-
zey and Dorothy Yamamoto (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998); and two of
James Gaffneys essays: Can Catholic Morality be Good for Animals? in Linzey and
Yamamoto, Animals on the Agenda, and The Relevance of Animal Experimentation to
Roman Catholic Ethical Methodology in Animal Sacrices: Religious Perspectives on the
Use of Animals in Science, ed. Tom Regan (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1986).
3. In a survey published by a sociologist from Fordham University regarding ani-
mal experimentation, the groups giving the lowest rating to animals and the highest
approval to animal experimentation were farmers, hunters, and the clergy; see Mad-
husree Mukerjee, Trends in Animal Research, Scientic American 276, no. 2 (Febru-
ary 1997): 88. Paul Waldau argues that the treatment of and attitudes toward animals
in both the Christian and Buddhist tradition are not monolithic; see The Specter of
Speciesism: Buddhist and Christian Views of Animals (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002).
4. For an excellent book examining the relationship between religion and sci-
ence, see Ian G. Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science, vol. 1 of the Gifford Lecture
Series 19891991 (New York: HarperSanFrancisco, 1990). This topic has become a
very popular one in recent years, with entire organizations devoted to its study, as
well as a plethora of other books also recently published. Mary Midgleys works on
this topic are especially worth noting: Evolution as a Religion: Strange Hopes and
Stranger Fears (London: Methuen, 1995), and Science as Salvation: A Modern Myth and
Its Meaning (London: Routledge, 1992).
5. For an especially interesting discussion of the second creation account and
how it can provide a fuller (and more positive) understanding of the biblical text with
regard to the treatment of animals, see Theodore Hiebert, The Yahwists Landscape:
Nature and Religion in Early Israel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). He ar-
gues that there has been too narrow a concentration on the rst creation account (22
23).
6. The word nephesh has been translated in various ways but can be subsumed
under the general category of that which makes people and animals animated living
beings, including personality, individuality, desire, life, mood, feeling, and soul. The
use of the word in relation to animals suggests that the Israelites recognized that ani-
mals have thoughts, feelings, emotions, desires and self-awareness similar to those of
humans; see Richard Alan Young, Is God a Vegetarian? Christianity, Vegetarianism,
and Animal Rights (Chicago: Open Court, 1991), 24. For a more recent discussion on
Christianity and vegetarianism, see Stephen H. Webb, Good Eating (Grand Rapids,
MI: Brazos Press, 2001).
7. The Wesleyan quadrilateral was actually established by Albert Outler rather
than by John Wesley.
8. Process theology in particular can greatly contribute to the notion that God is
intimately concerned about the suffering of all of Gods creatures because in contrast
to classical Christianitys typically static view of God, the process view of God is that
of a creative participant in the cosmic community who is omni-passable rather than
impassable and thus is affected by the suffering of the world, including animals. Jay
McDaniel argues that God is so empathetic that God is in the skin of each sparrow,
each pelican, and each sentient creature, suffering its sufferings and enjoying its joys
with it (Of God and Pelicans, 24). Of course, it is possible to argue for such an empa-
thetic God from within the classical Christian tradition as well.
9. For a broader understanding of the biblical concept of covenant, see Robert
Murray, The Cosmic Covenant: Biblical Themes of Justice, Peace and the Integrity of Crea-
tion (London: Sheed and Ward, 1992).
10. The establishment of the covenant is found in Genesis 9:812: Then God
said to Noah and to his sons with him, Behold, I establish my covenant with you and
your descendants after you, and with every living creature that is with you, the birds,
the cattle, and every beast of the earth with you, as many as came out of the ark. I
establish my covenant with you, that never again shall all esh be cut off by the wa-
ters of a ood, and never again shall there be a ood to destroy the earth. And God
said, This is the sign of the covenant which I make between me and you and every
living creature that is with you, for all generations . . . (Revised Standard Version
[RSV]).
11. The book of Jonah concludes with God chastising Jonah for his anger at the
people of Nineveh having repented, by saying, And should I not pity Nineveh, that
great city, in which there are more than a hundred and twenty thousand persons who
do not know their right hand from their left, and also much cattle? (Jonah 4:11,
RSV).
12. Hiebert, Yahwists Landscape.
13. Andrew Linzey says explicitly, God is the source of all rights, and indeed the
whole debate about animals is precisely about the rights of the Creator. . . . Animal
rights language conceptualizes what is objectively owed the Creator of animals. From
a theological perspective, rights are not something awarded, granted, won or lost but
something recognized. To recognize animal rights is to recognize the intrinsic value of
God-given life; see The Theological Basis of Animal Rights, The Christian Century
108, no. 28 (Oct. 5, 1991): 908909.
14. Linzey, Animal Theology, 327.
15. Although the argument should not be made too strongly, it is possible to ar-
gue that all of creation in a sense is made in the image of God, insofar as that crea-
tion reects Gods glory and goodness. However, there have been numerous interpre-
tations of what it means to be created in the image of God, restricting it to humans,
including rationality, spiritual nature, responsibility, personal existence, relation of hu-
mans to God, and dominion of humans over other creatures (Barbour, Religion in an
Age of Science, 205206).
16. The Jewish tradition, for example, has held that the human speech faculty is
the signicant difference between humans and animals; see Basil Herring, Speaking
of Man and Beast, Judaism 28, no. 2 (Spring 1979): 170.
17. Stanley Hauerwas and John Berkman argue that what the image of God re-
fers to is the unique purpose that humans have; see The Chief End of all Flesh,
Theology Today 49, no. 2 (July 1992): 196208.
18. The issue of animal souls will be addressed in the eschatology section.
19. Frans de Waal, Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and
Other Animals (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).
20. The issue of sin will be addressed more fully in the next section.
21. For a comprehensive treatment on the issue of stewardship with regard to
creation, see Hessel and Ruether, Christianity and Ecology.
22. . . . to name in the biblical sense certainly involved the power to distin-
guish and describe but, at the same time, it also expresses a profound relationship
and kinship; see Andrew Linzey and Dan Cohn-Sherbok, After Noah: Animals and the
Liberation of Theology (Herndon, VA: Mowbrey, 1997), 21. On the importance of nam-
ing animals, philosopher Stephen R. L. Clark makes this observation: Animals, like
human beings, are identied as individuals in being attended to, in being irreplacea-
ble for good or ill. In that sense even Alexander Beetle is an individual: not that there
is or would have been a beetle of that name without the human act of naming, but
thatonce named and attended to, he is more than just an animal, more than a
replaceable part. Does that naming make a difference to him? Who knows? It makes
a difference to dogs and horses; see Animals and Their Moral Standing (London: Rout-
ledge, 1997), 143.
23. C. S. Lewis makes an interesting comment about the moral burden espe-
cially upon Christian vivisectors: If on grounds of our real, divinely ordained, superi-
ority a Christian pathologist thinks that it is right to vivisect, and does so with scrupu-
lous care to avoid the least dram or scruple of unnecessary pain, in trembling awe at
the responsibility which he assumes, and with a vivid sense of the high mode in
which human life must be lived if it is to justify the sacrices made for it, then
(whether we agree with him or not) we can respect this point of view. But of course
the vast majority of vivisectors have no such theological background; see Vivisec-
tion, in God in the Dock: Essays on Theology and Ethics, ed. Walter Hooper (Grand
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1970), 220. C. S. Lewis has
addressed the issue of animal experimentation and animal pain in some of his other
works as well, most especially The Problem of Pain (New York: Macmillan Company,
1945).
24. Not all would agree that animal sacrices were a result of sin, but it certainly
can be considered a possibility because of the fact that animal sacrice was engaged
in subsequent to the Fall and the expulsion from the garden.
25. See Hiebert, Yahwists Landscape, for a fuller discussion.
26. For a good nonbiblical discussion of the motives often driving scientists in
research, see C. Ray Greek and Jean Swingle Greek, Sacred Cows and Golden Geese:
The Human Cost of Experiments on Animals (New York: Continuum, 2000), chapter 5.
27. Andrew Linzey provides an interesting discussion of this in his article, Lib-
eration Theology and the Oppression of Animals, Scottish Journal of Theology 46, no.
4 (1993): 507525.
28. Some examples, particularly in the life of Jesus, will be mentioned in the
next section.
29. Two books addressing some of the legends about saints and animals and
containing some of the same stories are David N. Bell, Wholly Animals: A Book of
Beastly Tales, Cistercian Studies Series (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications,
1992), and Helen Waddell, Beasts and Saints (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerd-
mans Publishing Company, 1934, 1995). Some of the stories include wild animals be-
ing tamed, the resurrection of animals, animals doing penance, apocryphal stories
about Jesus, animals as object lessons, preaching to animals, and animals worshiping
God.
30. What I have in mind here is Reinhold Niebuhrs notion that group sin is
more serious than individual sin, such that groups are not capable of the same kind
of unselshness as are individuals, in addition to the idea that social sin is more than
the cumulative sin of individuals.
31. For a discussion of theodicy with regard to animals, see L. Stafford Betty,
Making Sense of Animal Pain: An Environmental Theodicy, Faith and Philosophy 9,
no. 1 (January 1992): 6582; Frederick Ferre, Theodicy and the Status of Animals,
in Contemporary Classics in Philosophy of Religion, ed. Ann Loades and Loyal D. Rue
(LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1991); C. S. Lewis, Problem of Pain; and Robert Wennberg,
Animal Suffering and the Problem of Evil, Christian Scholars Review 21, no. 2
(1991): 120140.
32. Although this saying is not specically found in any of Burkes works, it is
typically attributed to him.
33. Richard Bauckman, Jesus and Animals II: What Did He Practice? in Ani-
mals on the Agenda: Questions about Animals for Theology and Ethics, ed. Andrew Lin-
zey and Dorothy Yamamoto (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998), 49. This
same author has another essay in the same volume addressing Jesus teaching con-
cerning animals (Jesus and Animals II: What Did He Teach?).
34. Some of these stories can be found in chapter 4 of Linzey and Cohn-
Sherbok, After Noah.
35. Jesus may have been a vegetarian if he had lived among the Essenes, as
some scholars suggest he did (Webb, Good Eating, 106109); see his discussion in
chapter 5 of this book on the issue of whether Jesus was a vegetarian. However, the
evidence from the biblical text seems to suggest that Jesus ate meat, in contrast to
how some animal rights activists would like to use Jesus to support their cause in that
way. Richard Alan Young devotes the rst chapter in his book Is God a Vegetarian? to
a discussion of this issue. See also Ryan Berry, Food for the Gods: Vegetarianism and
the Worlds Religions (New York: Pythagorean Publishers, 1998).
36. The doctrine of salvation is closely related to that of eschatology, so there will
be some overlap with that section, although that section will more fully explore the
issue of animal souls, whereas this section will briey examine the possible implica-
tions of Jesus death for animals.
37. For example, Gandhis pacism was very much inuenced by Jesus teaching
in the Sermon on the Mount.
38. Ever since the demythologization of Rudolph Bultmann and others who fol-
lowed him, who attempted to remove the miraculous elements from the biblical texts
so as to render them more palatable to modern readers, the notion of the risen Christ
has especially taken hold because within this concept is the notion that even if one
discounts the literal resurrection of Jesus, the signicance of the risen Christ still has
meaning for Christians. Obviously, it is well beyond the scope of this project to dis-
cuss Christology in detail, so the focus will be on the salvation believed to be achieved
in Jesus.
39. The issue of the fullness of redemption with regard to animals will be dealt
more specically in the section on eschatology.
40. Murray, Cosmic Covenant.
41. The question of whether animals have souls has been dealt with specically
in Paul Badham, Do Animals Have Immortal Souls? in Animals on the Agenda:
Questions about Animals for Theology and Ethics, ed. Andrew Linzey and Dorothy Ya-
mamoto (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998); Helmut F. Kaplan, Do Animals
Have Souls? Between the Species 7, no. 3 (Summer 1991): 138147; and Gary A. Ko-
walski in The Souls of Animals (Walpole, NH: Stillpoint Publishing, 1991), as well as
briey in other works on animal theology, some of which have been mentioned previ-
ously.
42. Aristotle himself did not deny souls to animals but believed that they had
different kinds of souls than humans, with plants possessing vegetative souls, ani-
mals possessing sensitive souls, but only humans possessing rational souls.
43. C. S. Lewis has made the argument that if animals do not have souls, then
we have an even greater burden to provide them with an earthly life as free from pain
and suffering as possible: But the absence of soul in that sense makes the iniction
of pain upon them not easier but harder to justify. For it means that animals cannot
deserve pain, not prot morally by the discipline of pain, not be recompensed by hap-
piness in another life for suffering in this. Thus all the factors which render pain
more tolerable or make it less totally evil in the case of human beings will be lacking
in the beasts (Vivisection, 225226). Bernard Rollin makes the same point in
Beasts and Men: The Scope of Moral Concern, The Modern Schoolman 55 (March
1978): 245.
44. It is interesting to note that a widely acclaimed work by two authors ac-
knowledges the value of a theological perspective, while not sharing it personally
themselves: it is not difcult to imagine a religious perspective in which the com-
mon creaturehood of humans and animals is so stressed that all living things are
seen as inviolable, and destruction or harm to any living thing, except in absolutely
inescapable circumstances, viewed as an offense against the sacred. Secular ecological
visions may produce similar results. We can respect such visions without conceding
that they can be normative for general thought about the ethics of animal care; see
Jane A. Smith and Kenneth M. Boyd, eds., Lives in the Balance: The Ethics of Using
Animals in Biomedical Research, Report of a Working Party of the Institute of Medical
Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 326.
45. Thus, Andrew Linzey notes: Theologians have a responsibility in this regard:
to articulate a theological understanding in which the animal question can be fairly
put and answers accessed. What cannot be right is for practitionerswhether they be
biblical scholars, historians, systematizers, or ethiciststo carry on their business as
though the world of animals was invisible, and as if urgent and thoughtful questions
cannot be raised about our theological understanding of the non-human world (In-
troduction: Is Christianity Irredeemably Speciesist? xx).
chapter 6
1. One of the problems in particular with the rst two groups, and even among
those in the third group who have strong disagreements with each other, is that they
often tend to paint a caricature of the other side; see Andrew N. Rowan and Franklin
M. Loew, with Joan C. Weer, The Animal Research Controversy, Center for Animals and
Public Policy (North Grafton, MA: Tufts University School of Veterinary Medicine,
1995), 143145. This chapter is an attempt to seriously weigh the burdens and bene-
ts in experimentation.
2. The philosophical theory of utilitarianism also addresses the issue of experi-
mentation in light of burdens and benets, although the language used is generally
that of utility and the greatest possible good for the greatest number (whether under-
stood in terms of pain and pleasure or in terms of welfare interests). It is important
to note that not all, and certainly not even most, who engage in a burden/benet
analysis of experimentation are utilitarians, even though they utilize consequentialist
arguments for this particular issue. It is for this reason that utilitarianism is not the
primary focus of this chapter, although the arguments proffered in a burden/benet
analysis of experimentation would be some of the same arguments made by utilitari-
ans.
3. In fact, one professional experimenter himself acknowledged and expressed
concern about the very real issue of the blunting of perception of suffering within the
medical eld: It is a particular hazard perhaps of the profession of medicine and al-
lied professions, and it is an exceptional doctor or nurse who can keep alive to the full
throughout his professional career a lively perception of suffering in his patients; see
G. E. Paget, The Ethics of Experimentation, Theology 78 (July 1975): 361. Another
scientist concerned with the effects of desensitization argued even more vehemently:
Human beings are incomparably the most dangerous species of animals which has
yet inhabited this planet, and any factor tending to produce individuals with desensi-
tized inhibitions may perhaps pose an incalculable threat to us all; see Rosemary
Rodd, Biology, Ethics, and Animals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 186.
4. What I have in mind here is the kind of rough comparison Peter Singer has
talked about. He argues that a slap of a certain force will cause pain in an infant.
Now, if a slap of the same force is applied to a horse, it may start but probably would
not feel pain, or at least not as much pain as the infant feels. However, we could
imagine a slap of comparable force administered to the horsefor example, with a
stickthat would cause the same kind of pain in the horse as the slap would in the
infant. He then goes on to assert that if we think it wrong to inict this kind of pain
on an infant for no good reason, then it would be equally wrong to inict the same
level of pain on the horse for no good reason; see Animal Liberation, new rev. ed.
(New York: Avon Books, 1990), 15.
5. One author notes two different views with regard to animals in experimenta-
tion, the former generally held by those in favor of most experimentation, and the
latter generally held by those against most or all experimentation. The rst view is as
follows: Within certain limits, experimental animals may be regarded as delicate in-
struments, or as analogous to them, and are to be used efciently and cared for prop-
erly, but no more than that is demanded. The second view is as follows: Within
certain limits, animals may be regarded as sources of moral claims. These claims
arise from their capacity for an independent life, or perhaps from their sentience, but
in either case, the moral position of animals is seen as having analogies with that of
human beings; see Cora Diamond, Experimenting on Animals: A Problem in
Ethics, in Animals in Research: New Perspectives in Animal Experimentation, ed. David
Sperlinger (Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, 1981), 341.
6. Two authors present the conundrum as follows: Since both the utility and
the probability of the benets of animal experimentation are unknown, and the harm
to animals substantial and denite, it is difcult to know how researchers will morally
defend their practice; see Hugh LaFollette and Niall Shanks, Util-izing Animals,
Journal of Applied Philosophy 12, no. 1 (1995): 13.
8. For example, one scientist notes the necessary involvement of animals to
medical progress in the following way: Animals have been an indispensable tool
one is tempted to say partner, but tool is more accuratein biomedical research.
Their role has been critical to almost every medical achievement. A biomedical estab-
lishment without animals would be like an army without infantry, and it may as well
be admitted that animals are sometimes the cannon fodder in the battle against dis-
ease. People who patriotically cheer on soldiers to political wars should be equally
grateful to those who bear the brunt of medical wars. . . . It cannot be emphasized too
strongly that virtually all the most important medical advances have involved animal
experimentation and would have been impossible without it; see Thomas E. Malone,
The Moral Imperative for Biomedical Research, in The Fundamentals of Biomedical
Research, ed. Roger J. Porter and Thomas E. Malone (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Press, 1992), 20, 22.
9. Jack H. Botting and Adrian M. Morrison, Animal Research Is Vital to Medi-
cine, Scientic American 276, no. 2 (February 1997): 8384.
10. Jerod Loeb et al., Humans vs. Animal Rights, in Animal Rights and Welfare,
ed. Jeanne Williams (New York: H. W. Wilson Co., 1991), 72. For other accounts of
the benets to humans due to experimentation, see Robert W. Leader and Dennis
Stark, The Importance of Animals in Biomedical Research, Perspectives in Biology
and Medicine 30, no. 4 (Summer 1987), 470485; Bernardine Healy, Antonio C. Nov-
ell, et al., National Policy Perspectives, The Crucial Link between Laboratory Animal
Research and Human Health, Academic Medicine 66, no. 9 (September 1991): 526
530; iiFAR (incurably ill for Animal Research, 19941996 Activity Report); and the
various books put out by the National Research Council.
11. Frankie L. Trull, Animal Research Is Critical to Continued Progress in Hu-
man Health, in Animal Rights and Welfare, ed. Jeanne Williams (New York: H. W.
Wilson Co., 1991), 64.
12. National Research Council, Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals
(Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1996), 4.
13. For contrary evidence regarding these claims for animal models, see both
books by C. Ray Greek and Jean Swingle Greek, Sacred Cows and Golden Geese: The
Human Cost of Experiments on Animals (New York: Continuum, 2000), and Specious
Science: How Genetics and Evolution Reveal Why Medical Research on Animals Harms
Humans (New York: Continuum, 2002).
14. Spokespeople for the American Medical Association make the following
sweeping claims about the importance of the future of experimentation: The Ameri-
can Medical Association believes that research involving animals is absolutely essen-
tial to maintaining and improving the health of people of America and worldwide. . . .
The American Medical Association recognizes the moral obligation of investigators to
use alternatives to animals whenever possible, and to conduct their research as hu-
manely as possible. However, it is convinced that depriving humans of medical ad-
vances by preventing research with animals is philosophically and morally a funda-
mentally indefensible position. Consequently, the American Medical Association is
committed to the preservation of animal research and to the conduct of this research
under the most humane conditions possible; see Loeb et al., Humans vs. Animal
Rights, 82. For additional equally strong statements, see also Ron Karpati, I Am
the Enemy, 84; and Malone, Moral Imperative for Biomedical Research, 22.
15. One scientist paints the following bleak picture: When balancing the pleas-
ures and pains resulting from the use of animals in research, we must not fail to
place on the scales the terrible pains that would have resulted, would be suffered now,
and would long continue to had animals not been used. Every disease eliminated, every-
vaccine developed, every method of pain relief devised, every surgical procedure in-
vented, every prosthetic device implantedindeed, virtually every modern medical
therapy is due, in part or in whole, to experimentation using animals. Nor may we
ignore, in the balancing process, the predictable gains in human (and animal) well-
being that are probably achievable in the future but that will not be achieved if the
decision is made now to desist from such research or to curtail it; see Carl Cohen,
The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Ethics, New England Journal of Med-
icine 314, no. 14 (Oct. 2, 1986): 868. In addition, some cite specic advances that will
not be achieved with curtailed experimentation, such as discovery of an effective vac-
cine against AIDS, clarication of the cause of Alzheimers disease, and cures for dia-
betes and many other diseases (iiFAR 19941996 Activity Report).
16. The following is a section from the Animal Research position statement
made in 1989 by the deans of the thirteen medical schools that make up the Associ-
ated Medical Schools of New York: AMS pledges to the faculty in our member insti-
tutions that we will use every resource in our command to protect and preserve the
right of scientists to pursue knowledge for the good of all people. Animal rights activ-
ists, no matter how well intentioned, will not be permitted to subvert the established
mechanisms for conduct of responsible animal research and erode our obligations to
society as physicians and scientists; see Richard H. Schwarz, Animal Research: A
Position Statement, in Animal Experimentation: The Moral Issues, Contemporary Is-
sue Series, ed. Robert M. Baird and Stuart E. Rosenbaum (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus
Books, 1991), 143144.
17. On the issue of the difculty of prediction, one author notes: Some animal
research projects have proved to be more important than others, but experience indi-
cates that it is not possible to predict which research is likely to be more important
than other research in building our understanding of human and animal biology and
disease; see Franklin M. Loew, Animals in Research, in Birth to Death: Science and
Bioethics, ed. David C. Thomasma and Thomasine Kushner (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), 305.
18. Alix Fano argues in her book that this is especially problematic with regard
to the area of testing; see Lethal Laws: Animal Testing, Human Health and Environmen-
tal Policy (London: Zed Books, 1997).
19. Of course, the argument could also be made the other way around, in that
we cannot know how many potentially useful drugs were abandoned because they
demonstrated toxicity in animals (what are called in the eld as false negatives) but
may not have done so in humans; see Neal D. Barnard and Stephen R. Kaufman,
Animal Research Is Wasteful and Misleading, Scientic American 276, no. 2 (Febru-
ary 1997): 81.
20. Deborah G. Mayo, Against a Justication of Animal Experiments, in Ethics
and Animals, ed. Harlan Miller and William H. Williams (Clifton, NJ: Humana Press,
1983), 349352.
21. See Greek and Greek, Sacred Cows and Golden Geese and Specious Science;
Stephen R. Kaufman, Does Vivisection Pass the Utilitarian Test? Public Affairs
Quarterly 9, no. 2 (April 1995): 125137; and two works by Robert D. Sharpe: The
Cruel Deception: The Use of Animals in Medical Research (Glasgow, UK: Thorsons Pub-
lishing Group, 1988) and Science on Trial: The Human Cost of Animal Experiments
(Shefeld, UK: Awareness Publishing, 1994).
22. Mayo, Against a Justication of Animal Experiments.
23. Medical Research Modernization Committee, A Critical Look at Animal Re-
search (New York: n.p. [pamphlet], 1990, new ed., 1998), 128.
24. Ibid.
25. Medical Research Modernization Committee, Mouse Cancer Models Fre-
quently Mislead, MRMC Report 10, no. 6 (June 1998): 57. Another author notes:
Moreover, even if animals were crucial in the development of certain procedures or
discoveries, there are many other human diseases and scientic questions that have
resisted a solution even though millions of animals have been killed in the process;
see Gary L. Francione, Animals, Property, and the Law (Philadelphia: Temple Univer-
sity Press, 1995), 170171.
26. Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine, The Facts about Animal Ex-
perimentation [pamphlet]. February 2, 1994, 15.
27. Sharpe, Cruel Deception, 144; see also Physicians Committee for Responsible
Medicine, Facts about Animal Experimentation, 2. One article points out: Perhaps
clinicians have not given animal experimentation its due, but certainly they provide
reason to doubt that animal experimentation is single-handedly responsible for the
successes of modern medicine; see Hugh LaFollette and Niall Shanks, Animal Mod-
els in Biomedical Research: Some Epistemological Worries, Public Affairs Quarterly 7,
no. 2 (April 1993): 115116.
28. LaFollette and Shanks, Animal Models in Biomedical Research, 113116.
29. Sharpe, Cruel Deception, 4268.
30. Tom Regan has called these benets ill-gotten gains; see Ill-Gotten
Gains, in Health Care Ethics: An Introduction, ed. Donald VanDeVeer and Tom Regan
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986). Marie Fox argues that we have also
proted from other things that we no longer believe in continuing: Undoubtedly it
could be argued that in the past men have proted from denying women equal op-
portunities, and similarly whites in South Africa have proted at the expense of the
black majority, but we no longer feel that this justies male oppression or apartheid
(Animal Rights and Wrongs: Medical Ethics and the Killing of Non-Human Ani-
mals, in Death Rites: Law and Ethics at the End of Life, ed. Robert Lee and Derek Mor-
gan, (London: Routledge, 1994), 164.
31. This kind of concern conjures up images of the mad scientist. Bernard Rol-
lin attempts to dispel this myth with regard to concerns with the genetic engineering
of animals; see The Frankenstein Syndrome: Ethical and Social Issues in the Genetic En-
gineering of Animals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
32. Bernard E. Rollin addresses the importance of scientists engaging in philo-
sophical and even commonsense arguments in The Unheeded Cry: Animal Conscious-
ness, Animal Pain, and Science (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1998).
33. Stephen R. L. Clark, The Moral Status of Animals (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1977), 82.
34. Of course, the question of intentionality is problematic, since individuals are
not always completely forthright about or even aware of their own intentions; see Jane
A. Smith and Kenneth M. Boyd, eds., Lives in the Balance: The Ethics of Using Animals
in Biomedical Research, Report of the Working Party of the Institute of Medical Ethics
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 31.
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Index
activists, animal, 7, 8, 18, 69, 75, 96
Adam (and Eve), 108109, 116117
adoption, of animals, 83, 84, 103
afterlife. See redemption
agencies, of U.S. government, 1415
Alcmaeon, 5
alternatives, to experiments, 8, 58,
7578, 84, 137, 141, 144, 156
American Society for the Prevention
of Cruelty to Animals
(ASPCA), 6
analgesics, 80
anesthesia, 80, 82
animal sacrice, 109, 121
Animal Welfare Act. See legislation
animals
denition of, 1112, 17, 91
distinct from humans, 4
morality in, 114
purpose of, 5
animals, types of
amphibians, 11
apes, 23, 31, 34, 45, 47, 100
baboons, 6970, 153
bacteria, 11
beavers, 32, 50
birds, 11, 17, 18, 2931, 34, 35, 59,
63, 74, 84, 111, 113, 124, 156
bonobos, 23, 45, 100
cats, 1617, 37, 47, 52, 71, 83, 104,
148149, 151152
cattle, 112
cephalopods, 59, 66, 79, 84, 157
chickens, 76
chimpanzees, 12, 16, 2324, 31,
45, 47, 71, 100, 102, 146, 148,
149, 151153
cougars, 52
cuttlesh, 59
dogs, 8, 1617, 34, 3738, 60, 71
72, 75, 83, 100, 104, 111, 146,
149, 152
dolphins, 32, 34, 47, 54, 100, 111,
149, 151, 153
elephants, 52, 100
farm animals, 17
sh, 11, 14, 66, 100, 125
ies, 52
frogs, 16, 151
gerbils, 15
gorillas, 23, 45, 47
guinea pigs, 1517, 141, 153
hamsters, 1517, 71, 152
honeybees, 29, 45, 53
horses, 34, 37
insects, 11, 59, 66
216 index
animals, types of (continued)
invertebrates, 11, 12, 59, 6162,
65, 7980, 91, 156
lions, 148
mammals, 8, 11, 34, 53, 59, 6364, 66,
100
mice, 15, 17, 18, 34, 84, 111, 113, 140,
152, 156
mollusks, 66
monkeys, 31, 52, 72, 153
nonsentient, 79
octopuses, 12, 3435, 59, 66, 152
orangutans, 23, 31, 45
oysters, 100
parrots, 45
pigeons, 34, 148
pigs, 37, 60, 125, 149, 153
primates, nonhuman, 11, 12, 16, 17, 32,
42, 7172, 103105, 111, 151
rabbits, 13, 16, 17, 100, 152
rats, 8, 15, 17, 18, 37, 71, 84, 104, 111,
113, 140141, 149, 151153, 156
reptiles, 11
rodents, 12, 15, 37, 71, 74, 79, 102,
104
seals, 34
sheep, 124, 141
shrimp, 100
single-celled organisms, 67
squid, 12, 59, 66
squirrels, 149
vertebrates, 8, 11, 15, 18, 51, 6162, 65
66, 79, 91, 156
warm-blooded, 17
whales, 32, 42, 54, 100
wildlife, 14, 7375, 102, 148
worms, 75
antivivisection, 67
anxiety, 58, 61, 82, 90, 137
Aquinas, Thomas, 5, 115
argument to best explanation, 27
Aristotle, 5, 33
autonomy, 9, 33, 3940, 43, 49, 5455,
82, 9192
awareness. See consciousness
behavior, of animals, 22, 2537, 68, 71
73, 104
behaviorism, 2324, 62, 65, 68, 73
beliefs, in animals, 33, 3639, 4043, 52
55, 67, 92
benets, of experimentation
arguments for, 139145
casuistry regarding, 145151
denition of, 139, 146147
for humans, 138139
benets, of experiments, 4, 96, 102
Bennett, Jonathan, 33
Bentham, Jeremy, 56, 68
Bernard, Claude, 6
Bible, 23, 109110, 118120
boredom, in animals, 72
burdens, of experiments, 4, 102
to animals, 136137
casuistry regarding, 145151
to humans, 137
Burke, Edmund, 122
CAM assay test, 76
casuistry, guidelines for, 135, 145151, 155
categorical imperative, 87
choice, of species, 1516
Christ. See Jesus; Christology, doctrine of
Christianity, tradition of, 5, 8, 116, 118,
131
and animals, 4, 4950, 57, 105, 107
and rights, 97
Christology, doctrine of, 107, 123128
Clever Hans phenomenon, 4647
cognition. See mentality, of animals
cognitivism, anecdotal, 26
comfort, 6263
communication, in animals, 2629, 32
34, 44, 55, 66, 91, 98
community, moral, 88
consciousness, 2223, 2729, 32, 3637,
43, 54, 6068
and nonconsciousness, 6768
and self-consciousness, 27, 3032, 41,
65, 92
index 217
consent, 39, 4850, 76, 91, 98, 142, 153
conspecics, 23, 2829, 3132, 103104
covenant, 111112, 132
creation
doctrine of, 107116, 129, 132
narratives in Bible, 5, 23, 108110
criteria, for cognition, 30, 37, 43, 5054,
95
cruelty, to animals, 5, 7, 9, 21, 86, 115,
124
culture, 54, 67
curariform agents, 80
Darwin, Charles, 24, 34
death
of animals, 5, 8, 13, 16, 57, 8083, 88,
92, 103, 118, 136137, 146, 148
of humans, 8283, 131
deception, in animals, 2629, 31, 46
Descartes, Rene, 6, 27, 69
desensitization, in researchers, 137
desires, in animals, 33, 3638, 40, 43, 52
55, 87, 9091
differences, between humans and
animals, 5, 97
dignity, 88
discomfort, 66, 153
diseases, 83, 137, 139, 142
in animals, 103
cures for, 7, 87
induction of, 12
purpose-breeding for, 16
dissection. See vivisection
distress, 17, 58, 6163, 74, 78, 83, 90
dominion, 5, 23, 107108, 114116, 118,
121, 132
theological justication for, 5, 23
drugs, 17, 5862, 6970, 8081, 84
duties, to animals, 4, 86, 112113
education, research in, 13, 77
emotions, 2429, 59, 65
Enlightenment, 6, 92
Eristratus, 5
eschatology, doctrine of, 107, 128132
essentialism, 9394
eternal life. See redemption
ethics, environmental, 4, 16
ethology and ethologists, 8, 13, 24, 26,
34, 53, 62
euthanasia, 58, 8283, 156
evil, 57, 114, 122123
evolution, theory of, 2225, 31, 6467,
118
Darwin, 4
differences of degree/kind, 5, 12, 21
23, 35, 55, 6467, 91, 9798, 114
evolutionary continuity, 1112, 28
survival of ttest, 118
and theism, 110, 112
experiences, subjective, 2226, 6465, 75
experimentation,
background on, 318
duplication of, 77
on humans, 39, 141142
limitations to, 140145
types of, 1314, 6974, 102
Fall, doctrine of the, 108109, 115, 117,
129
fear, 61, 82, 90
Federal Drug Administration (FDA), 13
feminism, 9, 120
Francis of Assisi, 107
free will, 5
free will defense, 57
Frey, R. G., 95
funding, for experiments, 69, 75, 7879,
84, 88, 137, 142, 156157
Galen, 5
Genesis, biblical book of, 5, 108, 110111,
116117
God, 23, 57, 82, 92, 108, 147, 153
and creation, 108116
and redemption, 128131
and rights, 112113
and sentient creatures, 111113
and sin, 119123
Gospels, 123126
218 index
Greece, ancient, 5
guidelines, for experimentation. See
casuistry, guidelines for
Guillermo, Karen Snow, 69
happiness. See pleasure, in animals
harm, to animals. See burdens, of
experiments
Hebrew Bible, 123124
Helms, Senator Jesse, 18
hierarchy, 56, 1112, 22, 49, 5355
history, treatment of animals, 49, 24
Hume, David, 35
husbandry conditions, 6163, 7072, 79
84, 90, 136, 156, 158
illness. See diseases
image of God, 5, 51, 97, 108, 113114
immortality, 129131
inferiority, of animals to humans. See
superiority
instinct, 29, 34, 36, 39, 44, 92, 118
Institutional Animal Care and Use
Committee (IACUC), 7880, 84,
98, 156
intelligence, of animals, 29, 3338, 40
43, 4647, 4950
interests, of animals, 21, 41, 51, 8687,
90, 9698, 137
intrinsic vs. instrumental value, 4, 86,
87, 92, 104, 107, 112, 133, 157
in vitro, 7677, 146
in vivo, 7677
Jesus, 121, 122, 132. See also Christology,
doctrine of
and animals, 123126
historical Jesus, 123126
as Redeemer, 126128
Jonah, 112
justice, 95, 125126, 132
Kant, Immanuel, 4142, 87, 115
killing. See death
kindness, to animals, 86, 119, 124
Koko (gorilla), 4142
language, in animals, 5, 22, 27, 29, 32
34, 40, 4555, 97
legislation, 69, 74, 7779, 84, 89, 104,
119, 155
Animal Welfare Act (AWA), 1618, 77
79, 84, 89
for drug testing, 8
enforcement of, 72, 155156
Helms Amendment, 18
Improved Standards for Laboratory
Animals Act, 17
laws, 6, 8, 11, 14, 1618, 58
Public Health Service (PHS), 16, 18,
79, 156
Lewis, C. S., 130
liberation theology, 109, 119121
Magendie, Francois, 6
marginal humans, 22, 4143, 4955, 97
98
medication. See drugs
mentality, of animals, 12, 19, 2227, 37
42, 6567, 8991, 99
mercy killing. See euthanasia
Michael (gorilla), 46
Middle Ages, 5
Mill, John Stuart, 33
models, animals as, 12, 75, 77, 141
moral standing. See status, of animals,
moral
Morgans Canon, 2627
movements, regarding animals, 67
mystics. See saints
myths, 109110
naming, of animals, 105, 108109, 115
116
National Agricultural Library, 77
National Institutes of Health (NIH), 14,
18, 75, 77
National Research Council, 18, 60, 71
72, 82
neobehaviorism, 26
nephesh, 108, 110
nervous system, 11, 23, 2831, 59, 61, 65
66, 90
index 219
Noah, 111112
nociceptors, 5965, 90
Occams Razor, 26
Ofce of Technology Assistance (OTA),
15
Orlans, Barbara, 66
other minds, 2225, 64
pain, 8, 14, 23, 5057, 6162, 65, 68, 75,
82, 87, 9092, 96
in animals, 4, 6, 21, 5055, 99
argument against pain in animals, 66
68
argument for pain in animals, 6366,
6869
and consciousness, 29, 32
husbandry conditions, 70
legislation, 7879
pain scales, 58, 60, 7980, 102
painful stimulus, 3637, 90
perception of, 12, 59, 6568
relief of, 17, 58, 60, 7883
solution to animal pain, 6869
and suffering, 7483
thresholds, 60, 64
Pasteur, Louis, 6
paternalism, 94
People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals (PETA), 69
personhood, 33, 3943, 50, 89, 97
pets, 17, 25, 86, 90, 101105, 113, 156158
philosophy, 57, 64, 6768
phylogenetic scale, 31, 37, 65
placebos, 68
planning, by animals, 29
pleasure, in animals, 4, 21, 57, 62
preference tests, 58, 8182, 84, 87, 104,
158
problem of evil. See theodicy
property, animals as, 78, 89, 112, 157
proxy, 98
psychology, experiments in, 26, 35
Public Health Service (PHS). See
legislation
3 Rs. See alternatives, to experiments
Rachels, James, 92
rationality, 58, 22, 27, 29, 3243, 50, 54
55, 97
redemption, 5, 126133
reduction. See alternatives, to
experiments
renement. See alternatives, to
experiments
Regan, Tom, 86, 93, 100101
relationships
between God and animals, 110113
between God and humans, 113114
between humans and animals, 115116
replacement. See alternatives, to
experiments
research, 13, 89, 152153
researchers. See scientists
responsibility, moral, 5
rights,
of animals, 4, 7, 88, 89, 91, 9597,
105
arguments against, 8889, 96101
arguments for, 8592, 101
criteria for, 39, 91, 94, 9798, 100
denition of, 8589
enumeration of, 101105
grounds for, 8992, 112113
and humans, 9697, 105, 137
species-specic rights, 88, 92, 99
100
of humans, 6, 8588, 9394
in general
arguments for, 86
in Christian tradition, 97
denition of, 8586
and duties, 86, 99
enforcing, 94
history of, 89, 95
language of rights, 8688, 9296
legal rights, 8990, 105
moral rights, 8990, 93, 95, 105
natural rights, 85, 89
negative rights, 101103
and pain, 87, 91, 94
positive rights, 86, 101, 104105
220 index
rights (continued)
problems with, 85, 9296
reciprocity, 99
of plants, 95
Rollin, Bernard, 73
Roman Catholicism, 5
Romans, biblical book of, 127
Rome, ancient, 5
saints, 107, 121
salvation, doctrine of, 126132
Schweitzer, Albert, 107
scientists, 8, 18, 2526, 44, 63, 67, 69,
7475, 7880, 85, 119, 121123,
137140, 143144
self-awareness. See consciousness
self-consciousness. See consciousness
sensations, 30
sentience. See pain
Silver Springs monkey case, 69
similarities, of humans and animals, 28
33, 3637, 42, 52, 55, 6365, 74
sin, doctrine of, 107, 115123, 127128,
132
commission vs. omission, 122123
effects of, 117118
and liberation theology, 119121
original sin, 116119
solutions to, 121123
Singer, Peter, 78, 87, 9596, 99
slippery-slope argument, 9394
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals, 7
souls, 5, 129131
speciesism, 4955, 138
status, of animals, moral, 4, 21, 24, 41
42, 5152, 68, 96
stress, 58, 6162, 7175, 90, 137
subjective experiences. See experiences,
subjective
suffering
in animals, 4, 8, 13, 3132, 41, 5152,
55, 90, 92, 102105
causes of, 7174
in experiments, 7174, 7779
and husbandry conditions, 71
and legislation, 7779
and pain, 5763, 68, 7284
and rights, 82, 84, 91, 94
superiority
among species, 35
of animals, 12
of humans, 46, 2224, 3536, 5155,
97, 118
and inferiority, 2124, 35, 67
Taub, Dr. Edward, 69
telos, 73, 104
testing, on animals, 13, 14, 70, 7778,
137, 141
thalidomide, 141
theists, 97
theodicy, 111
theories, ethical, 3, 8, 9
thinking. See intelligence
tool use, 30, 54
treatment of animals, ethical, 3, 4, 6, 21
24, 32, 79, 90, 9597, 101102,
109, 116, 121
interim ethic, 9, 7479, 84, 155158
negative vs. positive, 86, 88
United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA), 15, 16, 17, 156
University of Pennsylvania, 69
utilitarianism, 9596, 143
veterinarian, 17, 78, 80
vivisection, 12, 83, 103
Waldau, Paul, 100
Washoe, 46
well-being, 6263, 87, 9192, 111, 113,
140142
Wise, Steven, 100
Wittgenstein, 47

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The Ethics of Animal

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