Independence for the Afars and Issas: Complex Background; Uncertain Future

Author(s): Said Yusuf Abdi

Source: Africa Today, Vol. 24, No. 1, New and Emerging Small States in Africa (Jan. - Mar.,
1977), pp. 61-67
Published by: Indiana University Press
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Independence for the Afars and Issas:
Complex Background; Uncertain Future
Said Yusuf Abdi
The French Territory of the Afars and the Issas (TFAI, formerly
French Somaliland), an arid patch of coastal land, a little smaller than
Maryland, provides a vital outlet to the sea for Ethiopia, furnishes a staging
post and base for the French, is claimed by the Somalis, whose fervent
desire for Pan-Somali unity is symbolized by their five starred flag, and is
inhabited by rival ethnic groups of near equal size. This volatile mix could
produce a major conflict involving the whole Horn of Africa in a costly
armed confrontation. As France's last possession on the African mainland,
the territory is a place where ethnic and ideological rivalries, big power
influence and territorial ambition provide all the ingredients of an explosive
situation. This short review will examine the political dynamics of the
internal and external situation of the territory as independence draws near.
The Internal Scene
There is no evidence that the Danakil (Afars) and northern Somali
coasts which comprise the present TFAI have ever been part of Ethiopia.'
The lack of centralized government among Somalis prior to the colonial
era leaves ethnic considerations the main base for Somalia's claims to the
territory. France's need for a coaling station subsequent to the construction
of the Suez Canal led to French occupation of the enclave. Britain, the
occupier of northern Somalia, recognized the French presence when
boundaries were fixed between the protectorates in 1888. The Djibouti-
Addis Ababa railroad, begun in 1897 and completed in 1917, established
a strong French link with Ethiopia, and remains vital to Ethiopia's
economy.
Local politics have been greatly influenced by the ethnic diversity of
the Territory. The population includes Somalis (mostly Issas), Afars,
Europeans, Arabs and a small number of residents from various former
1. See: John brysdale, "The Problem of French Somaliland" in Africa Report 1966. Three useful
references dealing with the history and politics of the area are: Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff's
Djibouti and the Horn of Africa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968); Bruno Francolini's Djibouti,
published by Societa Italiana Arti Grafische, Rome; and Afars et Somalis: Le Dossier de Djibouti, (Paris:
Presence Africaine, 1971).
Dr. Abdi is an independent researcher based in Denver,
Colorado.
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French colonies.2 French census
figures, showing
the Afars in the
majority,
are widely disputed, and most other sources claim a numerical
majority for
Somalis.
Both Somalis and Afars adhere to Islam and are
pastoral people,
though sizeable numbers in both groups have been urbanized. More than
half of the population lives in Djibouti. In rural areas
they are
geographically separated and speak different languages.
Until 1956, the local political scene was dominated by racialism with
French nationals and some Arabs, who had gained wealth and influence in
commerce, being the principal active participants. But indigenous
politicians who had acquired French
citizenship rapidly gained influence
after Mohamoud Harbi, a Somali, was elected to the National
Assembly in
1956, and for some time now have been the dominant political actors.
Europeans and Arabs increasingly came to
operate through indigenous
politicians, using the historic ethnic rivalries, especially that between
Somalis and Afars, for their own
purposes.2
A major shift in internal politics occurred in 1958 when General de
Gaulle's government called for a referendum on the Constitution of the
Fifth Republic to be held in September of that year. Overseas territories
were offered a choice. The options were total independence or joining a
new Franco-African community in which they either could become semi-
autonomous states or maintain their present relationship to the metropole.
These options brought Somali nationalism to the fore. Aware of the
rising nationalism among Somalis in neighboring territories, Somalis in
Djibouti espoused the cause of independence with a view to eventual
union in a free and united Greater Somalia. The balloting, supervised by
French civil servants and taking place in the presence of armed French
troops, resulted in a majority vote for the new constitution and against
independence. Somali leaders contended that electioneering by the pro-
independence party had been obstructed and the election rigged.
The election alerted the French to the power of Somali irredentism
and steps were soon taken to reduce the Somali predominance in local
politics. The Kamil Electoral Law of 1963 downgraded the Somalis and
rewarded the Afars, who on the whole had voted against independence,
by enhancing their political position and Ali Aref's in particular.
Nevertheless, the drive for independence gained momentum and
international support between the first referendum in 1958 and a second in
1967, augmented by independence for neighboring Somalia in 1960. In
1963 the Liberation Front of the Somali Coast (FLCS) was formed, and,
in response, with strong Ethiopian support and initiative, The Movement
2. Subunit conflict among both the Somalis and Afars are present, but can easily be overemphasized.
In addition to the Iss, Gadaboursis and Issaq are represented in the Somali population of TFAI. Within
the Isa majority, some differences exist between the subunits of the Abgals, Dahols, and Wardik. Afar
factionalism is found in the traditional jealousy between the Afars of Obock and those of Todjoura.
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Said Yusuf Abdi
for the Liberation of Djibouti, was organized in 1964. In the same year the
Conference of Non-Aligned Nations came out for independence, and in
1965 a similar demand was made by the African Liberation Committee of
the Organization of African Unity (OAU).
When General de Gaulle arrived in Djibouti in August 1966, he was
confronted with pro-independence demonstrations and riots which, by
official tally, left four dead and seventy wounded. De Gaulle's reaction was
to declare that if it were the wish of the majority, the territory could become
independent. But no policy changes were initiated immediately and the
disorders were blamed on alien agitators, especially Somali nationals.
However, at the end of September de Gaulle announced a second
referendum, to be held March 19, 1967, in which the population's wishes
in respect to independence could be freely expressed. A choice was
offered between total independence and remaining a part of France under
a revised statute that supposedly allowed more local autonomy. The Party
of Popular Movement (P.M.P.) which had emerged as the major pro-
independence party, and the FLCS demanded UN supervision, alleging
that the French had falsified election outcomes in the mandated Territories
of Togo and Cameroon, as well as in the 1958 referendum in Djibouti.
The French adamantly opposed this, however.
The outcome of the election seemed a foregone conclusion.
Europeans and Arabs would clearly vote against independence, and the
Somali electorate had been substantially reduced by disenfranchisement
and deportation, leaving the Afars in the majority. The official tally
confirmed these predictions, reporting
that 60.74% of the population
voted to remain with France, with the division coming mainly along ethnic
lines. Analysts cited as reasons of the outcome the absence of democratic
safeguards with independence, tribal and personal rivalries that prevented
cooperation and unity against the French, fears of merger with Somalia or
of Ethiopian military occupation, and the unwillingness of some to give up
the French connection.
The pro-independence, Somali-based parties contested the results,
arguing that the intimidating presence of inordinate numbers of French
troops and the disenfranchisements and expulsions has prevented a true
expression of the wishes of the majority. All realized that the referendum
had settled nothing and had led, at best, to a temporary truce. It had
further exacerbated the deteriorating relations between the two main
ethnic groups and increased Somali distrust of the French administration.
The rift was deepened by the new dominance of the Afars in the politics of
the Territory and the controversial name change from French Somaliland
to the French Territory of the Afars and the Issas.
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External Relations
The interest of a variety of external actors in the future of the TFAI
has already been indicated. Somalia, Ethiopia and France, of course, head
the list, but, in addition, the two superpowers, the United States and the
Soviet Union, have become concerned as well as a variety of international
organizations, including the United Nations, the Organization of African
Unity, and the Arab League.
Since 1966, when the territory was first put on the agenda of the
decolonization committee, the UN has expressed support for
independence. Its resolution of December 21, 1966, calling for UN
supervision of the 1967 referendum, was rebuffed by France, but ultimate
decolonization has remained a UN objective.
Despite its reluctance to involve itself in issues on which member
states disagree, the OAU has been a forum in which the future of the
Territory has been extensively discussed. The opposition of Ethiopia and
Kenya to Somalia's territorial ambitions and the close ties most French-
speaking states have maintained with Paris long muted application of the
Organization's principle of total continental decolonization to the TFAI.
However, in October of 1966, Somalia and the more radical states pressed
for an unequivocal endorsement of independence.
A resolution calling on the population to vote for independence in the
1967 referendum and condemning alleged French intimidation was
passed by the OAU's eleven-nation African Liberation Committee. But a
sharp debate ensued on the resolution at the Council of Ministers meeting,
where a compromise version was adopted expressing the hope that the
referendum would be free and impartial, and pledging the member states
to accord the population all necessary assistance in case of need. The
matter was next discussed by the heads of states who added a statement
asserting OAU solidarity with efforts to bring about and consolidate
independence for the people of the Territory. After the referendum on
July 22, 1968, at a meeting at Algiers, the African Liberation Committee
officially recognized both the Somali-backed FLCS and the Ethiopian-
supported MLD, thus indicating its full support for the independence of the
region, though unable to reconcile the Somali/Ethiopian positions.
In 1976 the OAU established a fact-finding mission on the French
Territory of the Afars and lssas. Its report contained six main resolutions.
The four more crucial ones ask for the setting up of an ad hoc committee
of Djibouti nationals to decide who should vote in the planned 1977
referendum for independence; an OAU guarantee for the future security
and territorial integrity of Djibouti; a delay in holding of the referendum
until the Ad hoc Committee had been set up; and a call for Djibouti
liberation movements to unite. The Committee called on France to organ-
ize a referendum under completely democratic conditions and to abandon
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Said Yusuf Abdi
all its military bases in the territory, and withdraw all its forces.
A third international
organization
that has followed the
decolonization situation in the Territory has been the Arab
League. A
meeting of Arab.foreign ministers in March 17, 1976 declared total
support for Djibouti's independence and formed a committee to assist the
League's Secretary General to press the French government on the
question. Arab pressures forced France to consult though the talks with
Somalia broke down.
When we turn to relations with nation-states, we first note the
Territory's historic links with
Ethiopia. Franco-Ethiopian friendship has
been a nearly constant factor in the
Territory's
status. The railroad and its
important trade has cemented these links. Before the 1965 resolution of
the OAU supporting independence of the
Territory, Ethiopia tacitly
supported the continuation of French sovereignty in the
Territory in
opposition to increased Somali influence. But since 1964 Ethiopia has
supported the Movement of the Liberation of Djibouti (MLD), as a cover to
facilitate direct Ethiopian intervention if France ever chose to meet Somali
demands. Ethiopia claimed the Afars to be supportive of MLD's demands
for political autonomy for the Territory and close association with or
attachment to Ethiopia.3 In a change of policy the Ethiopian
roiiitary
government in 1975 for the first time renounced its territorial claims4.
Somalia, as has been implied throughout, has also had great impact
on the politics of the Horn because of the dispersal of Somali population
across neighboring borders. The TFAI is one of the five points on the
Somali star and the Somali Republic has made no secret of its claims on
the Territory. Somalia poses the question not explicitly as a territorial
claim, but as a question of decolonization and self-determination:
'We have already made this clear and repeat once more that Somalia does not
want to use force, will not invade and will not claim the Somali coast, but only
want to see the people allowed self-determination and freedom to decide their
future.""
Somalia's position on the 1958, 1967 and the planned 1977
referendums has been to press strongly for the presence of UN and OAU
observers as the only guarantee of impartiality. Even more than before the
Somalis argue that if the planned referendum is not to be a replay of the
pseudo referendums held in 1958 and 1967, guarantees have to be made
for the creation of the atmosphere and conditions for unrestricted and free
excercise of voting rights under democratic procedures:
3
This Ethiopian position seems to gloss over the complexity of Ethiopia's own minority problems,
where the Afars within the country have organized a secessionist Afar liberation movement.
4. Facts on File, October 18, 1975.
5. Statement by Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre quoted in Africa Research BuHletin. February
1976.
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"Granting of unconditional independence to the Somali Coast; allowing the
return of the nationals expelled from the
territory; the removal of barbed
wire
and mines around the city of Djibouti; annulment of the colonial laws and
the
illegal local government; withdrawal of all French
troops
from the
Territory and
immediate cessation of all atrocities against the
people
of
Djibouti, release of
all nationals who are detained and an end to the
bringing
in of
foreigners
and
to
the practice of providing them with birth certificates.
The convening and holding of constitutional conference with
the
participation of all progressive parties and fronts inside the
country
as well
as
outside such as the LPAI, the FLCS, the labor unions, students
and
progressive youth; consultations with the nomads in the Somali coast;
allowing
them to take part in the political process;
and the means
by
which
they
are
to
obtain independence and recognition of their
rights; an end to all
atrocities,
whether by the colonialists,
or their
stooges, against
the nationals of
the
Territory; foreigners such as the French colonial
troops
in the
Territory
not
to
be allowed to participate in the
coming referendum."
FLCA concurs also with most of these demands.
Finally we must examine the convergence of the local conflict
situation with the interest of the superpowers, their competition with each
other, and assistance to their allies that greatly enhance the potential for
conflict. France has been hesitant to give up this miniscule territory with no
resources in an age of decolonization because of its alleged strategic
significance. Due to Britain's departure from South Yemen and Russian
friendship with Somalia and the Yemeni Democratic Republic in Aden,
French presence has been depicted as filling an essential vacuum in
Western Indian Ocean strategy. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are militarily
supporting Ethiopia and Somalia respectively. Because of this, the U.S.
and the Soviet Union are being dragged into a proxy confrontation
through attachments to their clients
-
Ethiopia and Somalia.
If the local problems of the area are not seen for what they are, the
result could only be uncontrollable superpower confrontation. If a conflict
develops, either superpower can easily understand the other to be
exploiting detente to stake out new positions for itself beyond its normal
sphere of interest. Continued U.S. support of Ethiopia in its disputes with
Somalia cannot be justified by the belief that Somalia is essential for the
Soviet Union's Indian Ocean strategy.
I
In an appearance before the Sub-Committee of African Affairs, U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, William Schaufele (who
seems likely to retain the position in the new administration), stressed that
the U.S. had informed Ethiopia of its views of peaceful transition to
independence for TFAI and hoped that the Soviet Union would likewise
6. Ratio Mogadishu, April 29, 1976.
7. Helen Desfosses in a well thought-out article entitled "Naval Strategy and Policy: A Study of Soviet
Somali Relations" in Chinese and Soviet Aid to Africa, edited by Warren Weinstein, questions the thesis
that Soviet-Indian Ocean position relates to some long-range policy of achieving an offensive posture on
the world oceans and concludes that an examination of realities reveals a much less dynamic and
successful policy.
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Said YusufAbdi
tell Somalia to practice moderation.8 This obviously is not
enough. The
U.S. should actively initiate an accomodation between the local
protagonists. The appearance of a patron-client relationship with the
present Ethiopian government does not serve U.S. interests. The U.S.
must avoid framing local issues solely in terms of big power rivalry. Somali
interests cannot be dismissed and the most prudent course involves U.S.
drawing the Soviets, the OAU, and amenable Arab states into an active
effort to resolve the Somali-Ethiopian conflict, not only
in
Djibouti,
but in
the whole of the Horn.
Conclusion
Challenged by the UN, OAU, and the Arab League,- France had
finally made it plain it is ready to give the colony its independence.
Obviously, France's intention to decolonize the territory and the
subsequent endorsement of all parties to the conflict of the territory's
independence is welcome development. What remains in dispute is the
nature of such independence. The new coalition government of the TFAI
has demonstrated a conciliatory approach towards its neighbors: Somalia
and Ethiopia. Somalis who felt excluded from the government during
Aref's reign were propitiated some by being welcome back to the politics of
the territory; this is reflected in the composition of the new government in
which the Somali have a majority ratio of 6 to 4. What remains to be
resolved are the guarantees for a democratic referendum. It behooves
neutral international organizations as well as the superpowers to impress
upon the French the importance of a consensus from Ethiopia and
Somalia on the
safeguards
for
self-determination. The appointed
commission must consult with Somalia and Ethiopia about preconditions
for a just and peaceful referendum. Unless the conditions for the
referendum are so free and open that neither Somalia or Ethiopia will be
able to contend that it has not reflected the will of the people, the aim of
securing the peace of the region may not be attained.'
A long and tortuous road towards a stable future for the territory may
come to a successful end if the referendum in March results in a clear
expression of the will of the people, followed by the formal granting of
independence under a genuinely representative government later in the
year. But the outcome is as yet far from clear.
S. Africa Research BlletIn, January, 1976.
9. For more detailed prognosis of the problems of the Horn and Somali nationalism, see David Laitin's
"Somali Territorial Claims in International Perspective" in Afrka Today, Vol. 23 No. 2, April-June 17M;
and the new Carnegie Endowment report by Tom J. Farer entited War Clo the Ho ofl Afria: A
Crisis for Detente. For possible scenarios of an overall resolution of the problems, Somali nationalism
raises in the Horn, Leonard Doob's Resolving Conflit In Afrki (New Haven: Tale University Pres, 1970)
is still useful.
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