Politics

Aristotle
Discussion Points
One of the questions that the Aristotle scholars concern themselves with is the apparent
dichotomy they perceive in Aristotle regarding the status of the entity called the state:
Is the city state a natural entity or a product, a craft? Is there a contradiction in
Aristotles philosophy in describing it?
Why is this question salient for contemporary scholars and what does this question
hold for us?
As a starting point, we may consider obbes theory of the state! "he question for
obbes is #i$ %how does the state come into being?& and #ii$ %what is the essence of the
state?& We can say that, for obbes, the 'tate is a natural outcome of the fears of men
and their need to create a structure which will assuage these fears and grant the security
of society!
It is important to note that these are precisely the questions that Aristotle does not deal
with! "hat is, his question is not historical(political in the obbesian sense that, he does
not see) to answer the question about why and how does the state come into e*istence!
Instead Aristotle as)s the following questions: +what is a good way of governing?,
+what goals must the state pursue? ,or Aristotle its function is to develop
virtue-happiness, and it must be organi.ed in order to reali.e that goal! "hat is, the
/ity state is organi.ed in such a way that it reali.es noble actions which are in the
pursuit of happiness!
obbes as)s +what is the essence of the city state and answers it by saying, fear or
power! #"he entire tradition of modern political thin)ing in the West seems to turn
around this fundamental assumption of obbes$! ,or Aristotle, on the contrary, the
essence of the city state is lin)ed to the problem of moral perfection, that is, the
question of ethics! We can also note that both theorists #and traditions$ grant that the
state is in some way prior or primal to the life of a community! owever the difference
is that, for obbes the state comes prior historically! "hat is, the 0eviathan is
historically situated at the very 1uncture where man emerges from the shac)les of brute
force! "hat is, the 0eviathan historically inaugurates the birth of the political 2an in his
full maturity! On the contrary, for Aristotle, the state is not historically prior but
logically prior! "hat is, the state is prior in the sense that the whole is prior to the parts!
Aristotle seems to apply himself to this problem at some length, which does not
necessarily address our issue: he classifies as natural those entities which have the
conditions of change within themselves and non(natural entities as those which have
the conditions of change outside themselves! "he state according to Aristotle is a
natural entity by this definition! 3lsewhere, he refers to the state as being a product of
human activity! What is 1arring for the modern scholars is that, if something is natural,
then it cannot also be historical, that is, the product of intelligible human actions! ere
again there is a terminological s)ew which might give us some clue: for Aristotle, what
is natural #which has the source of change within itself$ is against what is unnatural,
whereas for the modern theorist, the natural is pitted against the historical!
"herefore, when modern theorists are as)ing about the status of the entity called the
'tate and seeing in Aristotle a contradiction, they are showing up a limitation in their
tradition: it is that of having an impoverished notion of human action! uman actions,
in the modern tradition, needs to be e*plained in one of these two ways: On the one
hand, people try to e*plain human actions as caused by certain forces which can be
shown to have law(li)e regularities #behavioural psychology being the most vulgar
e*pression of this approach$! If, on the other hand, we ta)e recourse to the fact that
human action is not governed by forces and law(li)e regularities e*ternal to itself, then
we need to provide for a basic normative essence called the +human, which will then
become a blac) hole into which we pump in all sorts of values, altruistic attitudes and
morals and volition to do good actions even at the cost of self(destruction!
As against this, we can see the Aristotelian tradition as operating with a different
framewor): it considers human action as sui generis! 4either does it see in human
actions an e*planandum #as in the behavioural approaches$ nor does it see in human
action a reflection of the human essence! Instead it sees human action as the starting
point: the tas) is not to e*plain away human action #li)e the preceding two approaches
do$! "hat tas) is to attend to it! uman action is not a cognitive pu..le5 li)e the falling
of an apple on 4ewtons head is a cognitive pu..le! #It would be ridiculous, for
e*ample, to as), why is there human action? how does human action come about? what
causes human action and so on! Whereas, it is not ridiculous to as), why does the apple
fall?$ It is the basic stuff, the clay which needs to be molded into progressively better
shape! uman action is +natural insofar as it is this basic stuff! It is a +craft insofar as
our very relation to human action is ethical: that is, when we say human action we are
already implying an action orientation! #2uch li)e when we say +cric)et, we already
imply a game that is played and not simply a description of a particular arrangement of
people, equipment and sports gear on a circular(shaped playing field$!
If thin)ing about the state is thin)ing about human action of a particular )ind, as it is
for Aristotle, then, by the preceding discussion it becomes clear why the problem of
whether the state is natural or not would not be a genuine problem for Aristotle!
Additionally, it also shows why it appears as a genuine problem for the modern
theorist!
'hashi:
a$ In Aristotle, much of the discussion is about action-phronesis-practical wisdom! "hus
the ruler of the city state is an embodiment of practical wisdom which deals with not
only with the conception of the universals but more with so how to deal wisely with
particular cases! owever, one sees an erasure of this tradition of thin)ing in the post(
cartesian era! In short, ethical action which is configured as )nowledge in the
Aristotelian tradition and is a sub1ect of elaborate discussion disappears! 3ven in
egel, the discussion is around the )nowledge as essentially cognitive and the
development of the mind is the focus #I am unsure how 6action )nowledge6 figures in
egel! Is alive more alive than others to this form of )nowledge?$! Why does this
happen? 2any have captured this shift in terms of mind(body dualism but Aristotle
gives us another way of capturing this shift! What are the implications of this erasure?
When we bring it bac) into focus, what is it we are bringing bac) #in contemporary
terminology$?
b$ /ompeting conceptions of ultimate good ( appiness it is for utilitarians and
Aristotelians, though very differently so! 7ut for liberals it is freedom! #Are there any
western theories which are not teleological other than say anarchism?$! Are they 1ust
competing ethical theories or is there a similar shift in the way ethical action is
understood #happiness to freedom as a goal of human life$ whose implications are
under(researched!
0i.:
,or 0oc)e( society or civil society is prior to the state, a prior contractual arrangement!
According to him individuals in the +state of nature give themselves a society! "his
society further sets up a government as a trust( so if the trust is violated, society can
revolt and achieve its freedom bac)! "his 8re(political society or community has
natural god given law( which is converted into the notion of sub1ective rights! All
positive law needs to ta)e account of these rights! 8artha /hatter1ee comments about
this history and says that all subsequent history of 3urope is trying to wor) out the lin)
between rights and community!
Apparently egel re1ected this notion of state or family being founded on a contract,
because neither is dissolvable at will! e argues instead that family is based on a notion
of ethical life! And an individual is already born into a society, so no individual is prior
to a society! /hatter1ee reads egel as showing how sub1ective rights are negotiated
within the ethical life of a community and not outside it! In egel, civil society is seen
as an e*tension of the family, it is a )ind of universal family, and it is e*emplified in
the quintessential community, namely, the nation!
9iven this, I was wondering about what we were saying, why is +what is the state, or
how does the state come into being not a question for Aristotle! :oes this have
anything to do with the idea of the nation? "hat is only with the conception of the
nation, or national communities as specific entities, does the question of the state #and
its relation to this community$ form in the way that we )now it today! Whereas the idea
of the 9ree) nation, or of a national interest, did not e*ist in Aristotles scheme! Is this
correct- /an we say this, as in is it useful to pursue this line?
'hashis response to 0i.s comments:
At a first glance, that seems li)e a fair assumption to ma)e! 7ut it is not clear how it
answers the question that you are trying to as) which is 6why the state has come into
being6 not a question for Aristotle! ;ou are suggesting that since the idea of the nation
did not e*ist in Aristotle<s scheme and since the idea of the state coming into being
rides on the idea of nation being present, this was not a question for Aristotle! "wo
questions here:
a$ Is the idea of the state as obbes and 0oc)e discuss and which Aristotle discuss at a
higher level of generality ( are they only tal)ing about the 'tate at an highest level of
abstraction #nation state and city states being two differently types of state ( which is
why maybe it helps to use the term political community which encompasses both
without confusing us$? 'o what is the nature of political community - the sovereign
body other than yourself and the family and community is what they are tal)ing abt?
obbes says its not a natural entity but a product of art, of human intervention!
Aristotle seems to say that it is a natural entity but when he says this he does not rule
out human wor)! #people who see a contradiction in Aristotle who according to them
says the polis is a natural entity but shows it be an artefact of practical reason at various
parts of his te*t miss his point about second nature and about entities which are both
given by nature but require human wor) to reali.e its essence through second nature! $
b$ how to govern well or govern in a way so that we promote the well being of the
people in the city state and not why something does or does not e*ist seems to bother
Aristotle! Why this shift happens might not necessarily lie in specifically the idea of
state but 1ust about everything??? because, from within the frame with which we as)
our question, it becomes obvious to say that the notion of state-self-equality -rights did
not e*ist then, and therefore something is not a question for a particular thin)er! Of
course, one could as) why having the idea of a nation necessarily necessitates the
question of the state and at what historical point and why! #'ince the two become
hyphenated only recently$
c$ 'o perhaps 1ust to clarify for ourselves, maybe we should as) ( why was something
which was a question for obbes #why the state has come into e*istence$ not a
question for Aristotle? ( a useful question? I thin) it might be useful to lay down why
you thin) this is an important question for you to answer! What does it help you do-
clarify?Why, for e*ample, is it not enough, to start with ( o)ay, ,or Aristotle, the
central problematic is * while for obbes it is ;! Or Why as) a question anterior to it
as to why was it * for A and y for ? 4ot that you cant as) that question but it would
be a step ahead to )now what motivates the question, is what I thin)!