RULE 71: CONTEMPT

1. HALILI V. CIR
Facts:
This case stemmed from a dispute regarding claims for overtime
of more than 500 bus drivers and conductors of Halilia Transit.
While the case was before the Court of Industrial Relations, the
union of the worers and the emplo!er e"ecuted an agreement
whereb! Halili Transit bound itself to deliver a parcel of land and
#$5 to the %nion, as full settlement. &o a deed of conve!ance was
e"ecuted transferring the land to the union, in trust for the
members therein.
The union, through 'tt!. #ineda (led an urgent motion with the
)inistr! of *abor re+uesting for the authorit! to sell the land.
)otion was granted but the bu!er was hesitant to purchase the
land because there was a law that re+uires an order from a court as
authorit! to sell properties in trust. &o 'tt!. #ineda (led a motion
with the &C re+uesting authorit! to sell. The &C merel! noted the
motion in a resolution. ,evertheless, 'tt!. #ineda (led and was
granted an authorit! to sell b! the labor arbiter. &o the sale was
consummated resulting in the e"ecution of an escrow agreement
wherein the purchase price was deposited with )anila -an. The
amounts due the claimants were eventuall! released. This included
attorne!.s fees released to 'tt!. #ineda, and union e"penses
released to the union.
,ow, 'tt!. /spinas, alleged original counsel for the union (led a
motion for a temporar! mandator! restraining order to re+uire both
'tt!. #ineda and the union to deposit the amounts received b! them
with the ,*RC. )anila -an was impleaded. Thereafter, the &C
issued the temporar! mandator! restraining order. *ater on, the &C
also declared the decision of the labor arbiter to grant the authorit!
to sell null and void. ' da! before the said declaration, 'tt!. /spinas
(led a motion to cite 'tt!. #ineda, Capuno 0acting administrator of
the union1, and )anila ban in contempt for non2compliance with
the restraining order.
'tt!. #ineda, Capuno, and )anila -an (led a motion stating that
the! had alread! transmitted the mone! to the ,*RC, thereb!
rendering the motion to cite them in contempt moot and academic.
'pparentl!, the amounts delivered to the ,*RC were incomplete. &o
'tt!. /spinas, in representation of the worers involved, (led a
comment reiterating their plea to declare the 3 parties in contempt.
Issue:
W4, 'tt!. #ineda, Capuno, and )anila -an should be cited for
contempt5
Held and Ratio:
'tt!. #ineda should be cited for indirect contempt under paragraphs
0b1, 0c1 and 0d1 of &ection 3, Rule 67, R8C.
)anila -an substantiall! complied with the temporar! mandator!
restraining order, hence cannot be cited for contempt.
Contempt against Capuno was withdrawn.
oct!ines:
Contempt of court 9 de(ance of the authorit!, :ustice or dignit! of
the court which signi(es not onl! a willful disregard or disobedience
to the court.s orders, but such conduct as tends to bring the
authorit! of the court and the administration of law into disrepute
or in some manner impede the due administration of :ustice.
Power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts. It is essential
to the preservation of order in :udicial proceedings and to the
enforcement of :udgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and
conse+uentl!, to the due administration of :ustice.
Reason for this is to guarantee the stabilit! of the :udicial
institution.
Twofold aspect
071 #roper punishment for the disrespect to the court or its
order; and
0$1 To compel the guilt! part!.s performance of some act or
dut! re+uired of him b! the court.
Civil Contempt
<ailure to do something ordered to be done b! a court or a
:udge for the bene(t of the opposing part! therein.
Where punishment is b! (ne directed to be paid to a part! in
the nature of damages, or b! imprisonment as a coercive
measure to enforce the performance of some act for the
bene(t of the part! or in aid of the (nal :udgment or decree
rendered in his behalf
The contempt :udgment will, if made before the (nal decree,
be treated as in the nature of an interlocutor! order, or, if
made after, as remedial in nature, and ma! be reviewed
onl! on appeal from the (nal decree, or in such other
appropriate mode.
Criminal contempt
Conduct directed against the authorit! and dignit! of the
court or of a :udge, as in unlawfull! assailing or discrediting
the authorit! or dignit! of the court or :udge, or in doing a
dul! forbidden act.
Where the punishment imposed, whether against a part! to
a suit or a stranger, is wholl! or primaril! to protect or
vindicate the dignit! and power of the court, either b! (n
pa!able to the government or b! imprisonment, or both, it is
deemed a :udgment in a criminal case.
The +uestion of whether the contempt committed is civil or criminal
does not a=ect the :urisdiction or the power of a court to punish the
same.
". PER#IN$ V. IRECTOR OF PRI$ON$
>sorr!, too long. &uper important asi !ong distinctions e?
FACT$: #erins was ad:udged guilt! of contempt b! the C<I of
)anila for disobedience of the (nal :udgment thereof re+uiring her
to render accounting and to conve! some properties in favor of her
husband. The court ordered the petitioner to be imprisoned until
she compl! with the orders of the court contained in said :udgment.
The petitioner now claims that her imprisonment under said order
of commitment for contempt was unlawful, and that she is,
therefore, entitled to be discharged b! a writ of habeas corpus.
It is admitted that petitioner was in the custod! of the
@irector of #risons b! virtue of an order of commitment for
contempt b! the C<I of )anila. The issue now is limited to an
in+uir! into the :urisdiction of the C<I to mae the aforesaid order.
HEL: T%e CFI o& Manila %ad 'u!isdiction o(e! t%e o)ense
c%a!*ed a*ainst t%e +etitione! , conte-+t o& cou!t. It had
:urisdiction over the person of the petitioner who was properl!
brought before the court. It has :urisdiction to hear and to decide
upon the defenses o=ered b! her. The general rule is that when the
court has :urisdiction over the o=ense and over the person, its
:udgments, orders or decrees cannot be collaterall! attaced b!
habeas corpus.
The power to punish contempt is inherent in all courts; its
e"istence is essential to the preservation of order in :udicial
proceedings and to the enforcement of :udgments, orders and
mandates of the courts, and conse+uentl!, to the administration of
:ustice. &tatutes recogniAe the power of the C<I and of the :udges
thereof to punish contempts of court. There $ inds of contemptsB
71@irect contempts, which ma! be punished summaril!; and $1
constructive contempts, which ma! be punished onl! after due
hearing. @irect contempt is misbehavior in the presence of or so
near the court or :udge as to obstruct the administration of :ustice,
including the refusal of a person present in court to be sworn as a
witness or to answer as a witness when lawfull! re+uired.
)eanwhile, an! of the following acts constitutes an indirect
contemptB a1 disobedience or or resistance to a lawful writ, process,
order, :udgment, or command of a court, or in:unction granted b! a
court or :udge; b1 misbehavior of an oCcer of the court in the
performance of his oCcial dutiesD; c1 a failure to obe! a subpoena;
d11the rescue or attempted rescue of a person or propert! in the
custod! of an oCcer b! virtue of an order of the court held b! him;
e1 the person defeated in a civil suitD shall entern or attempt to
enter upon the real estate for purpose of e"ecuting acts of
ownership or possessionD. 's to constructive contempts, the court
shall determine whether the accused is guilt! of the contempt
charged; and if he be ad:udged guilt!, he ma! be (ned or
imprisoned. If contempt consists in violation of in:unction, he ma!
be ordered to mae restitution to the part! in:ured; when contempt
consists of omission to do an act, he ma! be imprisoned until he
performs it.
/"ercise of contempt has $2fold aspectB 71 the proper
punishment of the guilt! part! for his disrespect to the court or its
order, and $1, to compel his performance of some act or dut!
re+uired of him b! the court, which he refuses to perform. @ue to
this $2fold aspect, contempts are classi(ed as civil or criminal. Civil
contempt is the failure to do something ordered to be done b! a
court or :udge in a civil case for the bene(t of the opposing part!
therein; and a criminal contempt is a conduct that is directed
against the authorit! and dignit! of a court or of a :udge acting
:udiciall!, as in unlawfull! assailing or discrediting the authorit! and
dignit! of the court or :udge, or in doing a dul! forbidden act.
-ecause of this $2fold attribute, contempt is sui generis although it
being largel! criminal in nature is universall! conceded.
In a case, the court reiterated the $ classes of contemptB 71
criminal and punitive in nature 9 those prosecuted to preserve the
power and vindicate the dignit! of the courts, and to punish for
disobedience of their orders; and $1 civil, remedial, and coercive in
nature 9 those instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of
private parties to suits, and to compel obedience to orders and
decrees made to enforce the rights and administer the remedies to
which the court has found them to be entitled. In criminal
contempt, the government, the courts, and the people are
interested in their prosecution. In civil contempt, the parties chieE!
in interest in their conduct, and prosecution are the individuals
whose private rights and remedies the! were instituted to protect
or enforce. ' criminal contempt involves no element of personal
in:ur!. -ut if contempt consists of refusal to do an act which is
ordered b! the court to do in favor of the other part!, then that
person is committed until he complies with the order of the court.
&uch commitment is in the nature of an e"ecution to enforce
:udgment. In another case, the court said that it is not the fact of
punishment but rather its character and purpose that maes the
di=erence between the $ inds of contempts. <or civil contempt,
the punishment is remedial and for the bene(t of the complainant,
and a pardon cannot stop it. <or criminal, the sentence is punitive
in the public interest to vindicate the authorit! of the court.
In the present case, the distinction between civil and
criminal contempts, is not an important consideration. The +uestion
whether the contempt for which the petitioner was committed is
civil or criminal does not a=ect either the :urisdiction or the power
of the court in the premises. The dividing line between these $
inds of contempts becomes indistinct in those cases where the $
graduall! merge into each other.
.. LIM $E V. AR/EL
Facts: *im &e and -enito *im were leasing from Chiombon, through
her attorne!2in2fact &an #edro, the ground Eoor, meAAanine, and
basement of the Fenancia -uilding in -aguio Cit! from 7GH5 to
7G60. When the lease e"pired, *im &e leased the same premises
from the /states of Re!es, &r. from 7G67 to 7G63.
'n interpleader action was (led b! *im &e and the other tenants
against &an #edro and the /state to determine to whom rentals will
be paid; the Court ruled in favour of the /state.
<rom 7G6I to 7G66, *im &e and his son -enito leased the premises
from the /state. The ,ew *ife CafJ and Restaurant was operated b!
-enito on the premises.
)eanwhile, -ulatano, who claimed to have purchased on @ecember
G, 7G60 the said building from 8campo, who allegedl! bought it
from Chiombon, (led an action for the recover! of rentals and
damages from the /state, *im, 8campo and Remedios for their
occupanc! of the building. He also (led a case in the Caloocan Cit!
-ranch of C<I of RiAal to recover possession against 8campo and
&an #edro. 8campo and &an #edro thus instituted a third part!
complaint against *im &e and -enito to vacate the premises. *im
&e and -enito opposed due to improper venue 0there was a
stipulation in the contract that in case of a suit, it should be (led in
the Cit! of -aguio, which was denied.
' summar! :udgment was granted in favour of 8campo and &an
#edro, in which *im &e and -enito were ordered to vacate the
premises. *im &e and -enito appealed while 8campo and &an #edro
ased for a writ of e"ecution. *im &e and -enito also (led an )R
and to hold the case in abe!ance, which was denied. The summar!
:udgement was declared (nal and e"ecutor!, the appeal not having
been perfected.
' writ of possession instead of the usual writ of e"ecution was
issued b! the -ranch Cler of Court, in which the Cit! &heri= was
ordered to tae possession of the premises occupied b! *im, to
e:ect them and an!bod! claiming under them and to deliver the
possession to 8campo and &an #edro.
&heri= #ar then delivered the writ to *im and issued an ultimatum
that the! should remove all their properties from the premises
within two hours.
#etitioners are claiming that the writ was enforced in a most cruel
and oppressive manner and that the Court acted without
:urisdiction or with grave abuse of :urisdiction in rendering a
summar! :udgment in the e:ectment case 0the third part!
complaint1. 'fter a bond was given b! petitioners, a writ of
preliminar! mandator! in:unction was issued, directing the &heri=
to place petitioners in possession of the premises from which the!
had been ousted.
'tt!. 'daAa, a law!er who never appeared in the lower court and
acted independentl! of both &an #edro.s and 8campo.s law!ers,
(led a motion to lift the in:unction.
Issue: W4, 'tt!. 'daAa should be cited for contempt.
Held: Kes.
'tt!. 'daAa.s characteriAation of the mandator! in:unction as
Lun:ust and a miscarriage of :usticeM and as devoid of factual and
legal basis is unfounded and unwarranted. He treated a resolution
of the Court as if it were a pleading of the adversar! which he could
assail in unrestrained or abrasive language. His un:usti(ed and
disrespectful characteriAation carries with it obvious derogator!
implications or innuendos which clearl! constitute direct contempt
or contempt in facie curiae.
0. AN/ V. CA$TRO
FACT$: In relation to a prior adverse decision b! respondent :udge,
petitioner (led an administrative complaint against respondent
:udge for ignorance of the law, gross ine"cusable negligence,
incompetence, manifest partialit!, grave abuse of discretion, grave
misconduct, rendering un:ust decision with the 8Cce of the
#residential 'ssistant on *egal '=airs. #etitioner was subse+uentl!
found guilt! of @irect contempt of court 0with a sentence of 5 da!s
imprisonment and order of his arrest for his failure, despite notice,
to appear on the scheduled hearing of the contempt charge against
him1, on the basis of malicious, insolent, ine"cusable disrespect and
contemptuous attitude towards the court and towards respondent
:udge.
I$$UE: W4, petitioner is guilt! of direct contempt
HEL: ,o, petitioner is guilt! of indirect contempt. Respondent
Nudge Castro erroneousl! argued that failure of petitioner to appear,
despite notice, on the scheduled hearing of the contempt charge
for the use of derogator! language in his two letters addressed to
the 8Cce of the #residential 'ssistant on *egal '=airs in an
administrative complaint against him constitutes direct contempt
as the acts actuall! impeded, embarrassed and obstructed him in
the administration of :ustice. The use of disrespectful or
contemptuous language against a particular :udge in pleadings
presented in another court or proceeding is indi!ect , not direct,
contempt as it is not tantamount to a misbehavior in the presence
of or so near a court or :udge as to interrupt the administration of
:ustice. If the pleading containing derogator!, o=ensive or
malicious statements is submitted in the same court or :udge in
which the proceedings are pending, it is direct contempt because it
is e+uivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so
near a court or :udge as to interrupt the administration of :ustice.
-eing guilt! of indirect contempt, petitioner ma! he ma! appeal
pursuant to &ection 70, Rule 67
7
of the Rules of Court.
1
SEC. 10. Review of judgment or order by Court of appeals or Supreme Court; bond
for stay. The judgment or order of a Court of First Instance made in a case of
contempt punished after written charge and hearing may be reiewed by the Court of
!ppea"s or the Supreme Court# but e$ecution of the judgment or order sha"" not be
suspended unti" a bond is fi"ed by the person in contempt# in an amount fi$ed by the
Court of First Instance# conditioned that if the appea" be decided against him he wi""
abide by and perform the judgment or order. The appea" may be ta%en as in crimina"
cases.
1. IN RE: #ELL2
Facts: Oell! was charged and found guilt! of contempt b! the
&upreme Court. 8n <ebruar! $I, 7G7H he (led a motion for
reconsideration of the contempt on order. While the said case was
under reconsideration, he composed a letter to @on Ficente &otto,
the editor of the independent, criticiAing the action of contempt
before the court. The Court found that the said letter was intended
to obstruct or interfere with and impede the administration of
:ustice in the Contempt proceedings and the motion made therein.
It also held that Oell!.s publication of the said letter tended to
inEuence and a=ect the decision of the Court. It ordered Oell! to
appear before it and show cause wh! a contempt order should not
be issued against him. Oell! argued that there was no law in the
#hilippines authoriAing the &upreme Court to punish him for the
alleged contempt committed.
Issue: Whether or not the Court has authorit! to punish Oell! for
contempt for his o=ense5
Held: Kes. The power to (ne for contempt, imprison for
contumac!, or enforce the observance of order, are powers which
cannot be dispensed with in the courts, because the! are necessar!
to the e"ercise of all others. Courts of :ustice are universall!
acnowledged to be vested, b! their ver! creation, with power to
impose silence, respect, and decorum in the presence and
submission to their lawful mandates, and as corollar! to this
provision, to preserve themselves and their oCcers from the
approach of insults and pollution.
3. IN RE: LO4ANO
FACT$:
' closed door investigation against Nudge ParduQo was
being held at the C<I of CapiA b! the &ol2Pen 0Alexander
Reyes1 for an administrative case pending against the said
:udge.
@espite its close door nature, El Pueblo, a newspaper
published in Iloilo and edited 56 &everino Lo7ano, printed
an account of the investigation 8!itten 56 'nastacio
9ue(edo, said to be an emplo!ee in the oCce of the Nudge
under investigation.
'ttorne!2Peneral petitioned the court to re+uire the editor
and the reporter to show cause, if an! the! have, wh! the!
should not be punished for contempt. The answer of the
editor pleads good faith, while the answer of the reporter
relies on no less than ten reasons, some material and some
puerile, wh! the petition should be dismissed.
o *oAano and Ruevado argued, thatB behind the screen
which shut the door of the investigation room,
something could be heard of what transpired within,
and to this circumstance, together with the
comments in his social circles, are his basis for the
report made.
o 'tt! Peneral allege thatB facts therein contained are
Sfalse, malicious, and untrueS and that Ssaid report
too sides with the respondent :udge . . . and
e"pressed an opinion as to the merits of the same,
with the ob:ect undoubtedl!, to inEuence the action
of the investigator and the public in general and to
obstruct, embarrass or impede the course of the
present investigation.
I$$UE: W4, the &C has the power to punish for contempt, the
editor and the reporter of a newspaper, for publishing and
inaccurate account of the investigation of a C<I :udge
notwithstanding the investigation was conducted behind closed
doors and its con(dential nature5
HOLIN/ AN RATIO: 2E$
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in the &C of
the #hil. This power e"tends to administrative proceedings
as well as to suits at law.
,ewspaper publication tending to impede obstruct
embarrass or inEuence the courts in administering :ustice in
a pending suit or proceeding constitute criminal contempt
which is summaril! punishable b! the courts. The rule is
otherwise after the cause is ended.
o It is regarded as an interference with the wor of the
courts to publish an! matter, which their polic!
re+uires should be ept private.
The constitutional guarant! of freedom of speech and press
must be protected in its fullest e"tent; but license or abuse
of libert! of the press and of the citiAen should not be
confused with libert! in its true sense. As i-+o!tant as its
-aintenance o& an un-u77led +!ess and t%e &!ee
e:e!cise o& t%e !i*%ts o& t%e citi7en is t%e
-aintenance o& t%e inde+endence o& t%e ;udicia!6.
The administration of :ustice and the freedom of the press,
though separate and distinct, are e+uall! sacred and neither
should be violated b! the other. T%e !i*%t o& le*iti-ate
+u5licit6 -ust 5e sc!u+ulousl6 !eco*ni7ed and ca!e
ta<en at all ti-es to a(oid i-+in*in* u+on it. 8n the
other hand, t%e cou!ts -ust 5e +e!-itted to +!oceed
8it% t%e dis+osition o& t%ei! 5usiness in a o!de!l6
-anne! &!ee &!o- outside inte!&e!ence o5st!ucti(e o&
t%ei! constitutional &unctions. =>ALANCIN/ OF
INTERE$T$ 5et8een " i-+o!tant !i*%ts?
The editor and the reporter of a newspaper who published
an inaccurate account of the investigation of a C<I :udge
notwithstanding the investigation was conducted behind
closed doors, notwithstanding a resolution of the &C which
maes such proceedings con(dential in nature.
Lozano and uevedo were found guilty of contempt of court!
7. PEOPLE V. /OO2
FACT$: This case stems from a complaint (led b! Nudge /sta+uio
Pascott, Nr. of RTC #alawan for indirect contempt against a
columnist named )auricio Re!noso and /va #once @e *eon, the
publisher of #alawan Times.
Re!noso, on his column L8n the -eatM, wrote that Nudge Pascott
was claiming that he received death threats from Wilmar Podo!,
whose criminal case was being tried b! Nudge Pascott. Podo!, in
the article however, denied that he made threats. There is also a
statement there sa!ing L"Pero isang warning din sa may mga
nobya, na magingat sa pag2brea sa in!ong girlfriend, dahil baa
mademanda a!o at masentens!ahan ng double death penalt!,
lalo na ung a! Nudge Pascott, dahil alam na nin!o, tagilid ang
laban di!an.M
Nudge Pascott avers that the article tends to impede, obstruct,
belittle and downgrade the administration of :ustice because of the
disrespectful and insulting averments made. It casts doubt on the
integrit! and honest! of Nudge Pascott and on his abilit! to
administer :ustice ob:ectivel!.
Re!noso however contends that his article does not intend to
impede nor obstruct administration of :ustice because the article
was published after Nudge Pascott had promulgated his decision.
He also contends that it will not a=ect appeal to &C because
#alawan Times was being circulated in #uerto #rincesa onl!. He also
claims it as an e"ercise of freedom of e"pression and press. 'lso,
he claims that he was :ust giving a reaction to the I,T/RFI/W given
b! Nudge Pascott in the show L)agandang Pabi -a!anM where he
defended his decision in the said case.
I$$UE: @AN Re6noso and e Leon s%ould 5e cited &o!
conte-+t.
HELARATIO: No. @%at is in(ol(ed %e!e is a situation 8%e!e
t%e state-ents %a(e 5een ta<en out o& conte:t. No !eason
&o! conte-+t +!oceedin*s. Constitutes -e!e &ai! c!iticis-s.
The article written b! Re!noso does not deal with the merits of the
case but rather, with the public accusations being made b! Nudge
Pascott that he is receiving death threats from Podo!. It is a report
of rumors, not presented as facts. He merel! gave a reaction, not to
the decision made in the case, but to the interview given b! N.
Pascott to )agandang Pabi -a!an.
&nide remars or sarcastic innuendoes do not necessaril! assume
that level of contumel! which is actionable under Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court. There has not been shown that there e"ists a
substantive evil which is e"tremel! serious and imminent as to
warrant punishment for contempt and suCcientl! disregard
freedom of speech and press.
BT%en t%e $C *oes on to set do8n *uidelines &o! conte-+t
+!oceedin*s in cases li<e t%eseC
I$$UE: @AN t%e!e can 5e conte-+t o& cou!t in case o& +ostD
liti*ation state-ents o! +u5lications.
@%ic% cou!t %as 'u!isdiction o(e! conte-+t co--itted
a*ainst t%e t!ial cou!t 8%ile case is +endin* on a++eal.
HELARATIO: /"ercise of power to punish for contempt has a dual
aspectB proper punishment for the part! who disrespects the court
and compulsor! performance of an act or dut! re+uired of him
which he refuses to perform. Contempts are classi(ed as civil or
criminalB
Criminal contemptT conduct that is directed against the dignit!
and authorit! of the court or a :udge acting :udiciall!; it is an act
obstructing the administration of :ustice which tends to bring the
court into disrepute or disrespect. #unitive in nature. Intent is
necessar!.
Civil contemptT failing to do something ordered to be done b! a
court in a civil action for the bene(t of the opposing part! therein
and is, therefore, an o=ense against the part! in whose behalf the
violated order is made. Remedial in nature. Intent is immaterial.
The proceeding for criminal contempt is sui generis because it has
some elements of both civil and criminal procedures but it is
neither. #unitive in nature. Civil contempt proceedings are generall!
held to be remedial4 civil in their nature to enforce some dut!, and
a remed! for coercing a person to do the thing re+uired to preserve
rights of parties and compel obedience. In general, civil contempt
proceedings should be instituted b! an aggrieved part!, or his
successor, or someone who has a pecuniar! interest in the right to
be protected. In criminal contempt proceedings, it is generall! held
that the &tate is the real prosecutor.
As to Issue E": Peneral RuleB Contemptuous publications were
actionable onl! if committed with respect to pending suits.
However, this general rule is not necessaril! all2embracing under
certain situations. The termination of the case is not a guarant! of
immunit! from a contempt charge for publications or utterances
which are defamator! or libelous, depending on the purpose and
e=ects thereof. In other words, one ma! still be cited for contempt
of court even after a case has ended, where such punitive action is
necessar! to protect the court and its dignit! and to vindicate it
from acts or conduct intended or calculated to degrade, ridicule or
bring the court into disfavor and thereb! erode or destro! public
con(dence in that court.
In case of a post2litigation newspaper publication, fair criticism of
the court, its proceedings and its members, are allowed. However,
there ma! be a contempt of court, even though the case has been
terminated, if the publication is attended b! either of these two
circumstancesB 071 where it tends to bring the court into disrespect
or, in other words, to scandaliAe the court; or 0$1 where there is a
clear and present danger that the administration of :ustice would
be impeded.
As to issue E.: Where the entire case has alread! been appealed,
:urisdiction to punish for contempt rests with the appellate court
where the appeal completel! transfers the proceedings thereto or
where there is a tendenc! to a=ect the status +uo or otherwise
interfere with the :urisdiction of the appellate court.
F. IN RE: $OTTO
FACT$: 'tt!. Ficente &otto 0aano ano a!a s!a ni Fic &otto51 was
ordered b! the Court to show cause wh! he shouldn.t be held in
contempt of court in his statement published in )anila Times in
connection with the decision of the &upreme Court in In Re #araAo.
In that statement, &otto said that the &C erroneousl! interpreted
the #ress <reedom *aw 0which is authored b! &otto himself1 in
appl!sing such law in #araAo case. <urthermore, he said that such
decision proved that incompetenc! and narrow2mindedness of the
&C. He also threatened to reorganiAed the membership of the &C in
the ne"t session of the Congress. 'lso, he said that in the recent
!ears, the &C has committed so man! blunders and in:ustices
deliberatel! done. In the course of the proceeding, &otto mainl!
contended that the &C has no power to impose correctional
penalties, and that the &C can onl! impose (nes and punishments
b! virtues of a law. He liewise invoed good faith as a defense
when he made such statement.
I$$UE:
7. w4n the &C can punish him for contempt of court;
$. w4n his defense of good faith e"onerates him from the
contempt charge.
HEL: ,o to both. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in
all courts of general :urisdiction independentl! of an! special
e"pression of statute. It is an essential element of :udicial authorit!.
In In Re Oell!, the court said that the publication of a criticism of the
court to a pending case has alwa!s been considered as
misbehavior tending to obstruct the administration of :ustice,
sub:ects such person to contempt proceeding. )ere criticism or
comment of the correctness or wrongness, soundness or
unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in
good faith ma! be tolerated since it might enlighten the Court and
contribute to correction of the error committed. However, in this
case, &otto did not onl! criticiAe the decision of the Court. He even
intimidated the Court to change its members, and reorganiAed it.
&otto attaced the honest! and integrit! of the Court especiall!
when he said that the &C has committed in the past few !ears for
man! blunders and in:ustices. It tends to undermine the con(dence
of the peoplt in the integrit! of the Court.
His defense of good faith is not convincing because in his petitione
he even alleged that the principal promoter of this contempt
proceeding was Nustice #erfecto, conve!ing the idea that the &C
onl! acted in the case through the instigation of Nustice #erfecto.
This Court added that as important as the freedom of the press is
the maintenance of the independence of the :udiciar!. The court
must be permitted to proceed with its business without the
obstruction from outside.
-esides, as a law!er, and thus, an oCcer of court, &otto is under
special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and
communication to the courts
In view of the foregoing, &otto was found guilt! of contempt b!
virtue of such publication in )anila Times.
G. 4ALIVAR V. $ANI/AN>A2AN
Facts: Ualdivar is one of the defendants in the criminal cases for
violation of the 'nti2graft and Corrupt #ractices 'ct, which was
investigated and instituted b! Respondent Paldivar, who is the
Tanodba!an. Ualdivar alleged that the Tanodba!an had no authorit!
to investigate and institute the said cases and therefore, the
informations (led were null and void.
&everal restraining orders to stop investigation were granted b! the
Court, but a criminal case was instituted before the restraining
order was issued. Ualdivar thus (led a motion to cite in contempt
PonAaleA for 071 having caused the (ling of the information before
the &andiganba!an and 0$1 issuing certain allegedl! contemptuous
statements to the media in relation to a case. The said statements
were published in the 30 ,ovember 7GV6 issue of the #hilippine
@ail! Plobe, in which PonAaleA e"pressed his fear that people might
thin that the rich people can prevent progress of a trial.
-asicall!, PonAaleA is being cited for contempt for having made in
his )otion for Reconsideration the following statements which were
totall! unrelated to the issueB 7. that he had been approached twice
b! a leading member of the court and ased to go slow on Ualdivar
and not be too hard on him; $. that he was approached and ased
to refrain from investigating the C8' report on illegal
disbursements in the &C because it will embarrass the Court; and
that in several instances, he was called over the phone b! a leading
member of the Court and ased to dismiss the cases against the
two )embers of the Court. 3 handwritten notes supposedl! sent b!
members of the Court were attached to the petition. He (led man!
other petitions, including one which ased for the inhibition of the
members of the Court from deciding the contempt case as the! had
lost the cold neutralit! of an impartial :udge.
Issue: W4, PonAaleA should be cited for contempt.
Held: Kes.
<irst, the &C not onl! has plenar! disciplinar! authorit! over
attorne!s but also has the inherent power to punish for contempt.
The former stems from the Court.s constitutional mandate to
regulate admission into the practice of law, which includes as well
authorit! to regulate the practice itself of law; the latter is
Lnecessar! for its own protection against an improper interference
with the due administration of :ustice.M The disciplinar! authorit!
over members of the -ar is broader than the power to punish for
contempt. ' law!er punished for contempt is also punished for
professional misconduct necessitating e"ercise of the Court.s
disciplinar! power but the latter ma! be e"ercised without the
action constituting contempt as well. 'n! act on the part of the
law!er which visibl! tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and
degrade the administration of :ustice constitutes both professional
misconduct calling for the e"ercise of disciplinar! action against
him, and contumacious conduct warranting application of contempt
power.
PonAaleA.s call for the members to inhibit themselves as the! are
Lacting as o=ended part!, prosecutor, and arbiter all at onceM
misapprehends the nature of the proceeding and the court.s role in
it. @isciplinar! proceedings are sui generis 0neither purel! civil nor
criminal1; it is an investigation of the Court into the conduct of its
oCcers. There is no plainti= or prosecutor therein.
%ndeniabl!, members of the Court are, to a certain degree,
aggrieved parties. -ut in the e"ercise of disciplinar! powers, the
Court acts as an entit! separate and distinct from the individual
personalities of its members. <inall!, the power to e"clude persons
from the practice of law is but a necessar! incident of its power to
admit persons to said practice. This power is vested e"clusivel! in
the Court and it cannot abdicate :ust as much as it cannot
unilaterall! renounce :urisdiction legall! vested upon it. #ublic
polic! demands that as a Court, it should e"ercise the power in all
cases which call for disciplinar! action. <or all the members to
inhibit themselves in this case is to abdicate the responsibilit!
which the Constitution has burdened them.
PonAaleA did not den! that he issued the statements; he
acnowledges that the newspaper reports of the statements
attributed to him are substantiall! correct. He was in e=ect sa!ing
the followingB
7. The &C deliberatel! rendered an erroneous or wrong
decision when its per curiam decision dated $6 'pril 7GVV.
$. The &C has improperl! pressured him to render decisions
favourable to their colleagues and friends, including the
dismissal of two cases against two members of the Court.
3. The &C was preventing him from prosecuting Lrich and
powerful persons.M
I. The &c has allegedl! dismissed :udges without rh!me or
reason and disbarred law!ers without due process.
The total picture that PonAaleA is tr!ing to show is that the Court is
an un:udicial institution able and willing to render clearl! erroneous
decisions b! wa! of reprisal against its critics, and is a bod! that
acts arbitraril! and capriciousl! in den!ing :udges and law!ers due
process of law.
Respondent Ws statements, especiall! the charge that the Court
deliberatel! rendered an erroneous and un:ust decision in the
Consolidated #etitions, necessaril! impl!ing that the :ustices of the
Court betra!ed their oath of oCce, merel! to wrea vengeance
upon respondent here, constitute the grossest ind of disrespect for
the Court. &uch statements ver! clearl! debase and degrade the &C
and, through the Court, the entire s!stem of administration of
:ustice in the countr!.
PonAaleA invoed his constitutional right to freedom of speech and
e"pression. He should be reminded that said freedom of speech
and of e"pression, lie all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute
and that freedom of e"pression needs on occasion to be ad:usted to
and accommodated with the re+uirements of e+uall! important
public interests, in this case being the maintenance of the integrit!
and orderl! functioning of the administration of :ustice, and the
capacit! of the Court to e=ectivel! prevent and control professional
misconduct on the part of law!ers who are indispensable
participants in the tas of rendering :ustice to ever! man.
<urthermore, the right of criticism is not unlimited; it must be bona
(de and not spill over the walls of decenc! and propriet!.
#roof of actual damage sustained b! a court or the :udiciar! in
general is not essential for a (nding of contempt or for the
application of the disciplinar! authorit! of the Court.
*astl!, while the remed! of libel suits b! individual members of this
Court ma! well be available against PonAaleA, it is not an e"clusive
remed!. )oreover, where it is not onl! the individual members of
the Court but the Court itself as an institution that has been falsel!
attaced, libel suits cannot be an ade+uate remed!.