Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14683 May 30, 1961
JOAQUIN QUIMSING, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
CAPT. ALFREDO LACHICA, Officer-in-Charge of the PC Controlled-Police Dept., Iloilo City; LT.
NARCISO ALIO, JR., Actg. Chief of Police of the City of Iloilo; and MAJ. CESAR LUCERO, PC
Provincial Commander of the Province of Iloilo, respondents-appellees.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner-appellant.
The City Fiscal of Iloilo City for respondents-appellees.
CONCEPCION, J .:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo dismissing the petition in this case, as well as the
counterclaim of respondents herein, without costs.
Petitioner Joaquin Quimsing is the owner and manager of a duly licensed cockpit, located in the District of
Molo, City of Iloilo. On February 13, 1958, the cockpit was raided by members of the city police force and the
Constabulary under the command of Capt. Alfredo Lachica and Lt. Narciso Alio Jr., upon the ground that it
was being illegally operated on that day, which was Thursday, not a legal holiday. Quimsing claimed that the
cockpit was authorized to operate on Thursday by an ordinance of the City Council of Iloilo, approved on
October 31, 1956. This notwithstanding, Capt. Lachica allegedly threatened to raid the cockpit should
cockfighting be held therein, thereafter, on Thursdays. Moreover, Quimsing and nine (9) other persons were
arrested and then charged in the Municipal Court of Iloilo with a violation of Article 199 of the Revised Penal
Code, in relation to sections 2285 and 2286 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Quimsing, in turn, commenced the present action, in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, against Major Cesar
Lucero, as the then provincial commander of the Constabulary, and Capt. Alfredo Lachica and Lt. Narciso
Alio, Jr., as incumbent PC officer in charge and acting chief of police, respectively, of the Iloilo City Police. In
his petition, Quimsing set up two (2) causes of action: one for the recovery from respondents, in their private
capacity, of compensatory damages, as well as moral and exemplary damages allegedly sustained in
consequence of the raid and arrest effected on February 13, 1958, upon the ground that the same were made
illegally and in bad faith, because cockfighting on Thursdays was, it is claimed, authorized by Ordinances Nos.
5 and 58 of the City of Iloilo, in relation to Republic Act No. 938, and because Quimsing was at odds with the
city mayor of Iloilo; and another for a writ of preliminary injunction, and, after trial, a permanent injunction,
restraining respondents, in their official, capacity, and/or their agents, from stopping the operation of said
cockpit on Thursdays and making any arrest in connection therewith.
In their answer, respondents alleged that the raid and arrest aforementioned were made in good faith, without
malice and in the faithful discharge of their official duties as law enforcing agents, and that, pursuant to the
aforementioned provisions of the Revised Penal Code and the Revised Administrative Code, petitioner cannot
legally hold cockfighting on Thursdays, despite said ordinances of the City of Iloilo. Respondents, likewise, set
up a P150,000 counterclaim for moral and exemplary damages.
After due hearing, the Court of First Instance of Iloilo rendered judgment dismissing the petition, as well as
respondents' counterclaim. Hence this appeal by petitioner herein, who maintains that:
1. The lower court erred in not disqualifying the city fiscal from representing the respondents-appellees
in the first cause of action of the petition where they are sued in their personal capacity;
2. The lower court erred in not disqualifying the city fiscal from asking the invalidity of an ordinance of
the City of Iloilo;
3. The lower court erred in declaring Ordinance No. 51 series of 1954, as amended by Ordinance No.
58, series of 1956, of the City of Iloilo as illegal;
4. The lower court erred in not awarding damages to the petitioner.
The first three assignments of error are related to petitioner's second cause of action, whereas the fourth
assignment of error refers to the first cause of action. Hence, we will begin by considering the last assignment
of error.
At the outset, we note that the bad faith imputed to respondents herein has not been duly established. In fact,
there is no evidence that Major Lucero had previous knowledge of the raid and arrest that his co-respondents
intended to make. What is more, petitioner would appear to have included him as respondent merely upon the
theory of command responsibility, as provincial commander of the constabulary in the province and city of
Iloilo. However, there is neither allegation nor proof that he had been in any way guilty of fault or negligence in
connection with said raid and arrest.
As regards Capt. Lachica and Lt. Alio Jr., the records indicate that they were unaware of the city ordinances
relieved upon by petitioner herein. Indeed, they appeared to have been surprised when petitioner invoked said
ordinances. Moreover, there is every reason to believe that they were earnestly of the opinion, as His Honor
the Trial judge was, that cockfighting on Thursdays is, despite the aforementioned ordinances, illegal under
Article 199 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to sections 2285 and 2286 of the Revised Administrative
Code. Although petitioner maintains that such opinion is erroneous, the facts of record sufficiently warrant the
conclusion that Capt. Lachica and Lt. Alio Jr. had acted in good faith and under the firm conviction that they
were faithfully discharging their duty as law enforcing agents.
In the light of the foregoing and of the other circumstances surrounding the case, and inasmuch as the
assessment of moral and exemplary damages "is left to the discretion of the court, according to the
circumstances of each case" (Art. 2216, Civil Code of the Philippines), it is our considered view that
respondents herein should not be held liable for said damages. Neither should they be sentenced to pay
compensatory damages, the same not having been proven satisfactorily. Hence, the fourth assignment of error
is untenable.
The first assignment of error is based upon section 64 of the Charter of the City of Iloilo (Commonwealth Act
No. 158), pursuant to which the City Fiscal thereof "shall represent the city in all civil cases wherein the city or
any officers thereof in his official capacity is a party." Although this section imposes upon the city fiscal
the duty to appear in the eases specified, it does not prohibit him from representing city officers sued as private
individualson account of acts performed by them in their official capacity, specially when, as in the case at bar,
they claim to have acted in good faith and in accordance with a legal provision, which they earnestly believed,
as the lower court believed, should be construed in the manner set forth in their answer. Again, under
petitioner's second cause of action, respondents are sued in their official capacity. This fact and the
circumstances under which respondents performed the acts involved in the first cause of action sufficiently
justified the appearance of the City Fiscal of Iloilo on their behalf.
We need not pass upon the merits of the second assignment of error, the same not being essential to the
determination of this case, for, regardless of whether or not it is proper for the City Fiscal of Iloilo, as such, to
assail the validity of an ordinance thereof, it cannot be denied that respondents herein may do so in their
defense.
Referring now to the third assignment of error, Article 199 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
The penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court,
shall be imposed upon:
1. Any person who directly or indirectly participates in cockfights, by betting money or other valuable
things, or who organizes cockfights at which bets are made, on a day other than those permitted by
law.
2. Any person who directly or indirectly participates in cockfights, by betting money or other valuable
things, or organizes such cockfights at a place other than a licensed cockpit.
Respondents maintain that this legal provision should construed be in relation to sections 2285 and 2286 of the
Revised Administrative Code, reading:
SEC. 2285. Restriction upon cockfighting. Cockfighting shall take place only in licensed cockpits
and, except as provided n the next succeeding section hereof, only upon legal holidays and for a period
of not exceeding three days during the celebration of the local fiesta. No card game or games of
chance of any kind shall be permitted on the premises of the cockpit.
SEC. 2286. Cockfighting at fairs and carnivals. In provinces where the provincial board resolves that
a fair or exposition of agricultural and industrial products of the province, carnival, or any other act
which may redound to the promotion of the general interests thereof, shall be held on a suitable date or
dates, the council of the municipality in which such fair, exposition or carnival is held may, by resolution
of a majority of the council, authorize the cockfighting permitted at a local fiesta to take place for not to
exceed three days during said exposition fair, or carnival, if these fall on a date other than that of the
local fiesta. Where this action is taken, cockfighting shall not be permitted during the local fiesta unless
a legal holiday occurs at such period in which case cockfighting may be permitted upon the holiday.
Petitioner assails, however, the applicability of these two (2) provisions to the case at bar, upon the ground that
said provisions form part of Chapter 57 of the Revised Administrative Code which chapter is entitled
"Municipal Law" governing regular municipalities, not chartered cities, like the City of Iloilo, for, "except as
otherwise specially provided", the term "municipality", as used in that Code and in said section 2286, "does not
include chartered city, municipal district or other political division" (Section 2, Revised Administrative Code).
Petitioner's contention is well-taken but it does not follow therefrom that he was entitled to hold cockfightings
on Thursdays.
Pursuant to section 21 of Commonwealth Act No. 158, otherwise known as the Charter of the City of Iloilo:
Except as otherwise provided by law, the Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers . .
. to tax, fix the license fee for, and regulate, among others, theatrical performances . . . and places of
amusements (par. j) . . . .
Moreover, under section 1 of Republic Act No. 938, as amended by Republic Act No. 1224:
The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city and the municipal council of each
municipality and municipal district shall have the power to regulate or prohibit by ordinance the
establishment, maintenance and operation of nightclubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits,
bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of amusements within its territorial
jurisdiction:Provided, however, That no such places of amusement mentioned herein shall be
established, maintained and/or operated within a radius of two hundred lineal meters in the case of
night clubs, cabarets, pavilions, or other similar places, and fifty lineal meters in the case of dancing
schools, bars, saloons, billiard pools, bowling alleys, or other similar places, except cockpits, the
distance of which shall be left to the discretion of the municipal or city board or council, from any public
building, schools, hospitals and churches: Provided, further, That no municipal or city ordinance fixing
distances at which such places of amusement may be established or operated shall apply to those
already licensed and operating at the time of the enactment of such municipal or city ordinance, nor will
the subsequent opening of any public building or other premises from which distances shall be
measured prejudice any place of amusement already then licensed and operating, but any such place
of amusement established within fifty lineal meters from any school, hospital or church shall be so
constructed that the noise coming therefrom shall not disturb those in the school, hospital or church,
and, if such noise causes such disturbance then such place of amusement shall not operate during
school hours when near a school, or at night when near a hospital, or when there are religious services
when near a church: Provided, furthermore, That no minor shall be admitted in any bar, saloon,
cabaret, or night club employing hostesses: And provided, finally, That this Act shall not apply to
establishments operating by virtue of Commonwealth Act Numbered Four hundred eighty-five nor to
any establishment already in operation when Republic Act Numbered Nine hundred seventy-nine took
effect.
The question for determination is whether the power of the Municipal Board of Iloilo, under section 21 of its
charter to "regulate . . . places of amusement", as broadened by Republic Act No. 938, as amended, to include
"the power to regulate . . . by ordinance the establishment, maintenance, and operation of . . . cockpits," carries
with it the authority to fix the dates on which "cockfighting" may be held. In this connection, it should be noted
that said Republic Act No. 938, as amended, applies, not only to "the municipal or city board or council of each
chartered city", but, also, to "the municipal council of each municipality or municipal district." Consequently, an
affirmative answer to the question adverted to above would necessarily imply, not merely an amendment of
sections 2285 and 2286 of the Revised Administrative Code, but, even, a virtual repeal thereof, for then local
boards or councils could authorize the holding of cockfighting, not only on legal holidays, but on any day and
as often as said boards or councils may deem fit to permit, whether it be during a fair, carnival, or exposition of
agricultural and industrial products of the province, or not. Thus, the issue boils down to whether Republic Act
No. 938, as amended, gives local governments a blanket authority to permit cockfighting at any time and for as
long as said governments may wish it.
Upon mature deliberation, we hold that the answer must be in the negative. To begin with, repeals and even
amendments by implication are not favored, whereas an affirmative answer would entail a vital amendment,
amounting, for all practical purposes, to a repeal, of sections 2285 and 2286 of the Revised Administrative
Code. Secondly, grants of power to local governments are to be construed strictly, and doubts in the
interpretation thereof should be resolved in favor of the national government and against the political
subdivisions concerned. Thirdly, it is a matter of common knowledge that cockfighting is one of the most
widespread vices of our population, and that the government has always shown a grave concern over the need
of effectively curbing its evil effects. The theory of petitioner herein presupposes that the Republic of the
Philippines has completely reversed its position and chosen, instead, to place the matter entirely at the
discretion of local governments. We should not, and can not adopt, such premise except upon a clear and
unequivocal expression of the will of Congress, which, insofar as said premise is concerned, is not manifest
from the language used in Republic Act No. 938, as amended.
Lastly, "cockpits" and "cockfighting" are regulated separately by our laws. Thus, section 2243 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code empowers municipal councils "to regulate cockpits". Yet, the authority of said council over
"cockfighting" is found in sections 2285 and 2286 of said Code, not in said section 2243 (i). Similarly, Article
199 of the Revised Penal Code punishes, not illegal "cockpits", but "illegal cockfighting". What is more,
participation in cockfights "on a day other than those permitted by law", in dealt with in said article separately
from participation in cockfights "at a place other than a licensed cockpit." .
So, too, the authority of local governments, under Republic Act No. 938, as amended, to "regulate . . . the
establishment, maintenance and operation of . . . cockpits", does not necessarily connote the power to regulate
"cockfighting", except insofar as the same must take place in a duly licensed "cockpit". Again, the first and
second proviso in section 1 of said Act, regulating the distance of cockpits and places of amusement therein
mentioned from "any public building, schools, hospitals and churches" and the third proviso of the same
section, prohibiting the admission of minors to some of those places of amusement, suggest that the authority
conferred in said provision may include the power to determine the location of cockpits, the type or nature of
construction used therefor, the conditions to persons therein, the number of cockpits that may be established in
each municipality and/or by each operator, the minimum age of the individuals who may be admitted therein,
and other matters of similar nature as distinguished from the days on which cockfighting shall be held and
the frequency thereof.
In short, we are of the opinion that the city ordinances relied upon by petitioner herein, authorizing cockfighting
on Thursdays, are invalid.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is
so ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24022 March 3, 1965
ILOILO PALAY AND CORN PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE, Y. FELICIANO, ET AL., respondents.
Jose C. Zulueta and Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J .:
On December 26, 1964, Jose Y. Feliciano, Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn
Administration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of 595,400 metric tons
of rice, thru a government agency which the President may designate, pursuant to the recommendation of the
National Economic Council as embodied in its Resolution No. 70, series of 1964.
On December 27, 1964, the President submitted said letter to his cabinet for consideration and on December
28, 1964, the cabinet approved the needed importation. On January 4, 1965, the President designated the
Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency authorized to undertake the importation pursuant to
which Chairman Jose Y. Feliciano announced an invitation to bid for said importation and set the bidding for
February 1, 1965.
Considering that said importation is contrary to Republic Act 3452 which prohibits the government from
importing rice and that there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same, the Iloilo Palay and Corn
Planters Association, Inc., together with Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as taxpayer, filed the instant
petition before this Court seeking to restrain Jose Y. Feliciano, in his capacity as Chairman and General
Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration, from conducting the bid scheduled on the date abovementioned,
and from doing any other act that may result in the contemplated importation until further orders of this Court.
For reasons that do not clearly appear, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Auditor General were made co-
respondents.
Pending decision on the merits, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, which, in
due course, this Court granted upon petitioners' filing a bond in the amount of P50,000.00. This bond having
been filed, the writ was issued on February 10, 1965.
Respondents, in their answer do not dispute the essential allegations of the petition though they adduced
reasons which justify the importation sought to be made. They anchor the validity of the importation on the
provisions of Republic Act 2207 which, in their opinion, still stand.
It is petitioners' contention that the importation in question being undertaken by the government even if there is
a certification by the National Economic Council that there is a shortage in the local supply of rice of such
gravity as to constitute a national emergency, is illegal because the same is prohibited by Republic Act 3452
which, in its Section 10, provides that the importation of rice and corn is only left to private parties upon
payment of the corresponding taxes. They claim that the Rice and Corn Administration, or any other
government agency, is prohibited from doing so.
It is true that the section above adverted to leaves the importation of rice and corn exclusively to private parties
thereby prohibiting from doing so the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency, but from
this it does not follow that at present there is no law which permits the government to undertake the importation
of rice into the Philippines. And this we say because, in our opinion, the provision of Republic Act 2207 on the
matter still stands. We refer to Section 2 of said Act wherein, among other things, it provides that should there
be an existing or imminent shortage in the local supply of rice of such gravity as to constitute a national
emergency, and this is certified by the National Economic Council, the President of the Philippines may
authorize such importation thru any government agency that he may designate. Here there is no dispute that
the National Economic Council has certified that there is such shortage present which, because of its gravity,
constitutes a national emergency, and acting in pursuance thereof the President lost no time in authorizing,
after consulting his cabinet, the General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration to immediately
undertake the needed importation in order to stave off the impending emergency. We find, therefore, no
plausible reason why the disputed importation should be prevented as petitioners now desire.
The contention that Republic Act 2207 has already been repealed by Republic Act 3452 is untenable in the
light of the divergent provisions obtaining in said two laws. Admittedly, Section 16 of Republic Act 3452
contains a repealing clause which provides: "All laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly." The question may now be asked: what is the nature of this
repealing clause ? It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the Act
or Acts that are intended to be repealed [ Sutherland, Statutory Construction, (1943) Vol. 1, p. 467]. Rather, it
is a clause which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in
existing and prior Acts. Such being the case, the presumption against implied repeals and the rule against
strict construction regarding implied repeals apply ex proprio vigore. Indeed, the legislature is presumed to
know the existing laws so that, if a repeal is intended, the proper step is to so express it [Continental Insurance
Co. v. Simpson, 8 F (2d) 439; Weber v. Bailey, 151 Ore. 2188, 51 P (2d) 832; State v. Jackson, 120 W. Va.
521, 199 S.E. 876]. The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any
existing law (Crawford, Construction of Statute, 1940 ed., p. 631), unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and
repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. Here there is no such inconsistency.
To begin with, the two laws, although with a common objective, refer to different methods applicable to
different circumstances. Thus, the total banning of importation under normal conditions as provided for in
Republic Act 2207 is one step to achieve the rice and corn sufficiency program of the Administration. The
philosophy behind the banning is that any importation of rice during a period of sufficiency or even of a minor
shortage will unduly compete with the local producers and depress the local price which may discourage them
from raising said crop. On the other hand, a price support program and a partial ban of rice importation as
embodied in Republic Act 3452 is another step adopted to attend the sufficiency program. While the two laws
are geared towards the same ultimate objective, their methods of approach are different; one is by a total ban
of rice importation and the other by a partial ban, the same being applicable only to the government during
normal period.
There is another area where the two laws find a common point of reconciliation: the normalcy of the time
underlying both laws. Thus, with respect to the matter of importation Republic Act 2207 covers three different
situations: (1) when the local produce of rice is sufficient to supply local consumption; (2) when the local
produce falls short of the supply but the shortage is not enough to constitute a national emergency; and (3)
when the shortage, on the local supply of rice is of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency. Under
the first two situations, no importation is allowed whether by the government or by the private sector. However,
in the case of the third situation, the law authorizes importation, by the government.
Republic Act 3452, on the other hand, deals only with situations 1 and 2, but not with. Nowhere in said law can
we discern that it covers importation where the shortage in the local supply is of such gravity as to constitute a
national emergency. In short, Republic Act 3452 only authorizes importation during normal times, but when
there is a shortage in the local supply of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, we have to turn to
Republic Act 2207. These two laws therefore, are not inconsistent and so implied repeal does not ensue.
Our view that Republic Act 3452 merely contemplates importation during normal times is bolstered by a
consideration of the discussion that took place in Congress of House Bill No. 11511 which was presented in
answer to the request of the Chief Executive that he be given a standby power to import rice in the Philippines.
On this matter, we quote the following views of Senators Padilla and Almendras:
SENATOR PADILLA: But under Republic Act No. 3452 them is a proviso in Sec. 10 thereof "that the
Rice and Corn Administration or any government agency is hereby prohibited from importing rice and
corn."
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: That is under normal conditions.
SENATOR PADILLA: "Provided further", it says, "that the importation of rice, and corn is left to private
parties upon payment of the corresponding tax." So therefore, the position of the Committee as
expressed by the distinguished sponsor, is that Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 3452 is applicable under
normal conditions.
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: "Yes". (Senate Debate, June 16, 1964).
Much stress is laid on the content of Section 12 of Republic Act 3452 which gives to the President authority to
declare a rice and corn emergency any time he deems necessary in the public interest and, during the
emergency, to conduct raids, seizure and confiscation of rice and corn hoarded in any private warehouse or
bodega subject to constitutional limitations, to support the claim that said Act also bans importation on the part
of the government even in case of an emergency. The contention is predicated on a misinterpretation of the
import and meaning of said provision. Note that the section refers to an emergency where there is an artificial
shortage because of the apparent hoarding undertaken by certain unscrupulous dealers or businessmen, and
not to an actual serious shortage of the commodity because, if the latter exists, there is really nothing to raid,
seize or confiscate, because the situation creates a real national emergency. Congress by no means could
have intended under such a situation to deprive the government of its right to import to stave off hunger and
starvation. Congress knows that such remedy is worthless as there is no rice to be found in the Philippines.
Seizure of rice is only of value in fighting hoarding and profiteering, but such remedy cannot produce the rice
needed to solve the emergency. If there is really insufficient rice stocked in the private warehouses and
bodegas such confiscatory step cannot remedy an actual emergency, in which case we have to turn to
Republic Act 2207.
The two laws can therefore be construed as harmonious parts of the legislative expression of its policy to
promote a rice and corn program. And if this can be done, as we have shown, it is the duty of this Court to
adopt such interpretation that would give effect to both laws. Conversely, in order to effect a repeal by
implication, the litter statute must be irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant to the prior existing law [United
States v. Greathouse,. 166 U.S. 601, 41 L. Ed., 1130; In re Phoenix Hotel Co., 13 F. Supp. 229; Hammond v.
McDonald, 32 Cal. App. 187, 89 P (2d) 407; Sutherland, Statutory Construction, supra, p. 462]. The old and
the new laws must be absolutely incompatible (Compaia General de Tabacos v. Collector of Customs, 46
Phil. 8). A mere difference in the terms and provisions of the statutes is not sufficient to create a repugnancy
between them. There must be such a positive repugnancy between the provisions of the old and the new
statutes that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand together (Crawford, Construction of Statute, supra, p.
631). The clearest case possible must first be made before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn
[Nagano v. McGrath, 187 F (2d) 759]. Inconsistency is never presumed.
Republic Act 3848 entitled "An Act Providing for the Importation of Rice During the Calendar Year Nineteen
Hundred Sixty-Four in the Event of Shortage in Local Supply" cannot be given any nullifying value, as it is
pretended, simply because Section 6 thereof provides that "except as provided in this Act, no other agency or
instrumentality of the Government shall be allowed to purchase rice from abroad." The reason is that it is a
mere temporary law effective only for a specific year. As its title reads, it is merely an authority to import
rice during the year 1964. The same, therefore, is now functus officio at least on the matter of importation.
Neither can petitioners successfully pretend that as Section 4 thereof provides that pending prosecutions for
any violation of Republic Acts 2207 and 3452 shall in no way be affected by said Act 3848 the implication is
that the aforesaid Acts have already been repealed. That provision is merely a safeguard placed therein in
order that the prosecutions already undertaken may not be defeated with the enactment of Republic Act 3848
because the latter provides for penal provisions which call for lesser penalty. The intention is to except them
from the rule that penal statutes can be given retroactive effect if favorable to the accused.
To further bolster our view that Republic Act 2207 has not been impliedly repealed by Republic Act 3452, we
wish to briefly quote hereunder the views expressed by some senators during the discussion of House Bill
11511 already mentioned above. It should be here repeated that said bill was presented to accede to the
request of the President for a stand-by power to import in case of emergency in view of the uncertainty of the
law, but that during the discussion thereof it was strongly asserted and apparently upheld that such request for
authority was not necessary because Republic Act 2207 was still in force. It is probably for this reason that said
bill, after having been approved by the Senate, was killed in the conference committee that considered it.
These views, while not binding, are of persuasive authority and throw light on the issue relative to the effectivity
of Republic Act 2207.
SENATOR LIWAG: ... Now Mr. Chairman, is it the sense of the Committee that in the case of
emergency, in case of an impending shortage, we can import rice under the provisions of R.A. No.
2207?
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, that is what we mean, your Honor, in this paragraph (c), Section 2,
page 2, that when we say "under the provisions of existing law," we are referring to R.A. No. 2207.
x x x x x x x x x
SENATOR PADILLA: I notice, Mr. Senator, that Section 2 paragraph (c) of the amendment by
substitution reads:
Importation of rice and/or corn should be resorted to only in cases of extreme and under the provisions
of existing law.
I suppose that the existing laws referred to are Republic Act No. 2207 and Republic Act No. 3452. Does
this section in the proposed bill by substitution recognize the continued existence of the pertinent
provisions of Republic Act No. 2207 and Republic Act No. 3452 on rice importation ?
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, that is the reason, Your Honor, why we struck out the stand-by power
on the part of the President to import rice.
x x x x x x x x x
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: The position of your Committee, Your Honor, because of the existing law
that is, Republic Act No. 3452 and Republic Act No. 2207 that is the reason your Committee
eliminated that stand-by power of the President to import rice. Because you know, Your Honor, what is
the use of that stand-by power, inasmuch as under Republic Act No. 3452 and Republic Act No. 2207
the President can designate any government agency to import rice?
SENATOR PADILLA: Well, it is good to make that clear because in the decision of the Supreme Court,
as I said, there was no clear-cut holding as to the possible co-existence or implied repeal between
these two Acts.
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, Your Honor, but the gentleman from Nueva Ecija, Senator Liwag,
informed me that Republic Act No. 2207 has never been repealed.
SENATOR PADILLA: Well, I also concur with that view, but we want to make that clear ... .
SENATOR PADILLA: "Provided, further," it says, "That the importation of rice and corn is left to private
parties upon payment of the corresponding taxes." So, therefore, the position of the Committee, as
expressed by the distinguished sponsor is that Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 3452 is applicable under
normal conditions.
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes.
SENATOR PADILLA: So, both provisions of law are in existence.
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes.
SENATOR PADILLA: One is not repealed by the other.
x x x x x x x x x
SENATOR TOLENTINO: Mr. President, there are two views already expressed on whether Republic
Act No. 2207 has been repealed by Republic Act No. 3452. One view sustains the theory that there has
been a repeal of Republic Act No. 2207 by Republic Act No. 3452 insofar as rice importation is
concerned. The other view is that there is no repeal. The Supreme Court does not state clearly which
side prevails. I take the view that the two laws can be reconciled ... .
Now, Mr. President, reading those two provisions together, I maintain that they are not totally repugnant
to each other, that it is possible for them to stand together except on certain points: First, is importation
in case of a national emergency certified by the National Economic Council permissible? By reading the
two provisos together I would say yes because there is nothing in the proviso contained in Republic Act
No. 3452 which would be inconsistent with importation during a shortage amounting to a national
emergency.
Another circumstance that strengthens our view is that when said House Bill No. 11511 was finally approved
by the Senate, it carried a clause which expressly repeals, among others, Republic Act No. 2207 (Section 14),
but which bill, as already said, was later killed in the conference committee. This attitude clearly reveals that
Congress preferred to fall back on Republic Act 2207 with regard to future importations.
Anent the point raised relative to the lack of necessary appropriation to finance the importation in question,
suffice it to state that under Republic Act 663 the National Rice and Corn Corporation is authorized to borrow,
raise and secure the money that may be necessary to carry out its objectives. We refer to Section 3 (e) of said
Act which empowers said corporation to secure money and to encumber any property it has as a guaranty, and
Republic Act No. 3452, which creates the Rice and Corn Administration, transferred its functions and powers to
the latter, including the power to borrow money under Section 3(e). This provision gives the RCA enough
power with which to finance the importation in question.
WHEREFORE, petition is dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court is hereby dissolved.
Costs against petitioners.
Paredes, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.



Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967
BARA LIDASAN, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Suntay for petitioner.
Barrios and Fule for respondent.
SANCHEZ, J .:
The question initially presented to the Commission on Elections,
1
is this: Is Republic Act 4790, which is entitled
"An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios
located in another province Cotabato to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate
that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in
the title of the bill"? Comelec's answer is in the affirmative. Offshoot is the present original petition
for certiorari and prohibition.
On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247, known as Republic Act 4790, now in
dispute. The body of the statute, reproduced in haec verba, reads:
Sec. 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo,
Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamakawan, Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis,
Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and Magolatung, in the Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, Province
of Lanao del Sur, are separated from said municipalities and constituted into a distinct and independent
municipality of the same province to be known as the Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del
Sur. The seat of government of the municipality shall be in Togaig.
Sec. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the new municipality shall be elected in the
nineteen hundred sixty-seven general elections for local officials.
Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the municipality
of Buldon,Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo,
Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality
of Parang, also in theProvince of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.
Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec adopted its resolution of August 15, 1967, the pertinent portions of
which are:
For purposes of establishment of precincts, registration of voters and for other election purposes, the
Commission RESOLVED that pursuant to RA 4790, the new municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur
shall comprise the barrios of Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain,
Matimos, and Magolatung situated in the municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, the barrios of
Togaig and Madalum situated in the municipality of Buldon, Cotabato, the barrios of Bayanga,
Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan
situated in the municipality of Parang, also of Cotabato.
Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato are
transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two
provinces.
Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Office of the President, through the Assistant
Executive Secretary, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified
by correcting legislation."
Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own interpretation, declared that the statute
"should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court."
This triggered the present original action for certiorari and prohibition by Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer
of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections. He prays that
Republic Act 4790 be declared unconstitutional; and that Comelec's resolutions of August 15, 1967 and
September 20, 1967 implementing the same for electoral purposes, be nullified.
1. Petitioner relies upon the constitutional requirement aforestated, that "[n]o bill which may be enacted into
law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill."
2

It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon
legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous
subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the
public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.
Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be "expressed in the title" of the bill.
This constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of command."
3
Compliance is imperative, given the fact that
the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the
bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which became Republic Act 4790, only its title was read from its
introduction to its final approval in the House of Representatives
4
where the bill, being of local application,
originated.
5

Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the
title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested
in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its
operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take
appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.
6

In our task of ascertaining whether or not the title of a statute conforms with the constitutional requirement, the
following, we believe, may be taken as guidelines:
The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is
not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the
details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of
the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in
referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in
omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.
xxx xxx xxx
In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance rather than its form should be considered, and
the purpose of the constitutional requirement, of giving notice to all persons interested, should be kept
in mind by the court.
7

With the foregoing principles at hand, we take a hard look at the disputed statute. The title "An Act Creating
the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur"
8
projects the impression that solely the
province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that
communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase
"in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive.
For, the known fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the
municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the
province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from
Lanao del Sur.
The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform
the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon
and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away
from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the
dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. These are the pressures which heavily
weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act 4790.
Respondent's stance is that the change in boundaries of the two provinces resulting in "the substantial
diminution of territorial limits" of Cotabato province is "merely the incidental legal results of the definition of the
boundary" of the municipality of Dianaton and that, therefore, reference to the fact that portions in Cotabato are
taken away "need not be expressed in the title of the law." This posture we must say but emphasizes the
error of constitutional dimensions in writing down the title of the bill. Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory
from one province to another of necessity involves reduction of area, population and income of the first and the
corresponding increase of those of the other. This is as important as the creation of a municipality. And yet, the
title did not reflect this fact.
Respondent asks us to read Felwa vs. Salas, L-16511, October 29, 1966, as controlling here. The Felwa case
is not in focus. For there, the title of the Act (Republic Act 4695) reads: "An Act Creating the Provinces of
Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao." That title was assailed as unconstitutional upon the
averment that the provisions of the law (Section, 8 thereof) in reference to the elective officials of the provinces
thus created, were not set forth in the title of the bill. We there ruled that this pretense is devoid of merit "for,
surely, an Act creating said provinces must be expected to provide for the officers who shall run the affairs
thereof" which is "manifestly germane to the subject" of the legislation, as set forth in its title. The statute
now before us stands altogether on a different footing. The lumping together of barrios in adjacent but separate
provinces under one statute is neither a natural nor logical consequence of the creation of the new municipality
of Dianaton. A change of boundaries of the two provinces may be made without necessarily creating a new
municipality and vice versa.
As we canvass the authorities on this point, our attention is drawn to Hume vs. Village of Fruitport, 219 NW
648, 649. There, the statute in controversy bears the title "An Act to Incorporate the Village of Fruitport, in the
County of Muskegon." The statute, however, in its section 1 reads: "The people of the state of Michigan enact,
that the following described territory in the counties of Muskegon and Ottawa Michigan, to wit: . . . be, and the
same is hereby constituted a village corporate, by the name of the Village of Fruitport." This statute was
challenged as void by plaintiff, a resident of Ottawa county, in an action to restraint the Village from exercising
jurisdiction and control, including taxing his lands. Plaintiff based his claim on Section 20, Article IV of the
Michigan State Constitution, which reads: "No law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be
expressed in its title." The Circuit Court decree voided the statute and defendant appealed. The Supreme
Court of Michigan voted to uphold the decree of nullity. The following, said in Hume, may well apply to this
case:
It may be that words, "An act to incorporate the village of Fruitport," would have been a sufficient title,
and that the words, "in the county of Muskegon" were unnecessary; but we do not agree with appellant
that the words last quoted may, for that reason, be disregarded as surplusage.
. . . Under the guise of discarding surplusage, a court cannot reject a part of the title of an act for the
purpose of saving the act. Schmalz vs. Woody, 56 N.J. Eq. 649, 39 A. 539.
A purpose of the provision of the Constitution is to "challenge the attention of those affected by the act
to its provisions." Savings Bank vs. State of Michigan, 228 Mich. 316, 200 NW 262.
The title here is restrictive. It restricts the operation of the act of Muskegon county. The act goes
beyond the restriction. As was said in Schmalz vs. Wooly, supra: "The title is erroneous in the worst
degree, for it is misleading."
9

Similar statutes aimed at changing boundaries of political subdivisions, which legislative purpose is not
expressed in the title, were likewise declared unconstitutional."
10

We rule that Republic Act 4790 is null and void.
2. Suggestion was made that Republic Act 4790 may still be salvaged with reference to the nine barrios in the
municipalities of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, with the mere nullification of the portion thereof which
took away the twelve barrios in the municipalities of Buldon and Parang in the other province of Cotabato. The
reasoning advocated is that the limited title of the Act still covers those barrios actually in the province of Lanao
del Sur.
We are not unmindful of the rule, buttressed on reason and of long standing, that where a portion of a statute is
rendered unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the parts will be separated, and the constitutional portion
upheld. Black, however, gives the exception to this rule, thus:
. . . But when the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions,
considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the
legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would
not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are
thus dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with them,
11

In substantially similar language, the same exception is recognized in the jurisprudence of this Court, thus:
The general rule is that where part of a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another
part is valid, the valid portion if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. But in order to
do this, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that
the Legislature would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they could not constitutionally
enact the other. . . Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries
out the legislative intent. . . . The language used in the invalid part of the statute can have no legal force
or efficacy for any purpose whatever, and what remains must express the legislative will independently
of the void part, since the court has no power to legislate, . . . .
12

Could we indulge in the assumption that Congress still intended, by the Act, to create the restricted area
of nine barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur into the town of Dianaton, if the twelve
barrios in the towns of Buldon and Parang, Cotabato were to be excluded therefrom? The answer must be in
the negative.
Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly. They serve as an instrumentality of the State in carrying
out the functions of government. Secondly. They act as an agency of the community in the administration of
local affairs. It is in the latter character that they are a separate entity acting for their own purposes and not a
subdivision of the State.
13

Consequently, several factors come to the fore in the consideration of whether a group of barrios is capable of
maintaining itself as an independent municipality. Amongst these are population, territory, and income. It was
apparently these same factors which induced the writing out of House Bill 1247 creating the town of Dianaton.
Speaking of the original twenty-one barrios which comprise the new municipality, the explanatory note to
House Bill 1247, now Republic Act 4790, reads:
The territory is now a progressive community; the aggregate population is large; and the collective
income is sufficient to maintain an independent municipality.
This bill, if enacted into law, will enable the inhabitants concerned to govern themselves and enjoy the
blessings of municipal autonomy.
When the foregoing bill was presented in Congress, unquestionably, the totality of the twenty-one barrios
not nine barrios was in the mind of the proponent thereof. That this is so, is plainly evident by the fact that
the bill itself, thereafter enacted into law, states that the seat of the government is in Togaig, which is a barrio
in the municipality of Buldon in Cotabato. And then the reduced area poses a number of questions, thus: Could
the observations as to progressive community, large aggregate population, collective income sufficient to
maintain an independent municipality, still apply to a motley group of only nine barrios out of the twenty-one? Is
it fair to assume that the inhabitants of the said remaining barrios would have agreed that they be formed into a
municipality, what with the consequent duties and liabilities of an independent municipal corporation? Could
they stand on their own feet with the income to be derived in their community? How about the peace and order,
sanitation, and other corporate obligations? This Court may not supply the answer to any of these disturbing
questions. And yet, to remain deaf to these problems, or to answer them in the negative and still cling to the
rule on separability, we are afraid, is to impute to Congress an undeclared will. With the known premise that
Dianaton was created upon the basic considerations of progressive community, large aggregate population
and sufficient income, we may not now say that Congress intended to create Dianaton with only nine of the
original twenty-one barrios, with a seat of government still left to be conjectured. For, this unduly stretches
judicial interpretation of congressional intent beyond credibility point. To do so, indeed, is to pass the line which
circumscribes the judiciary and tread on legislative premises. Paying due respect to the traditional separation
of powers, we may not now melt and recast Republic Act 4790 to read a Dianaton town of nine instead of the
originally intended twenty-one barrios. Really, if these nine barrios are to constitute a town at all, it is the
function of Congress, not of this Court, to spell out that congressional will.
Republic Act 4790 is thus indivisible, and it is accordingly null and void in its totality.
14

3. There remains for consideration the issue raised by respondent, namely, that petitioner has no substantial
legal interest adversely affected by the implementation of Republic Act 4790. Stated differently, respondent's
pose is that petitioner is not the real party in interest.
Here the validity of a statute is challenged on the ground that it violates the constitutional requirement that the
subject of the bill be expressed in its title. Capacity to sue, therefore, hinges on whether petitioner's substantial
rights or interests are impaired by lack of notification in the title that the barrio in Parang, Cotabato, where he is
residing has been transferred to a different provincial hegemony.
The right of every citizen, taxpayer and voter of a community affected by legislation creating a town to
ascertain that the law so created is not dismembering his place of residence "in accordance with the
Constitution" is recognized in this jurisdiction.
15

Petitioner is a qualified voter. He expects to vote in the 1967 elections. His right to vote in his own barrio before
it was annexed to a new town is affected. He may not want, as is the case here, to vote in a town different from
his actual residence. He may not desire to be considered a part of hitherto different communities which are
fanned into the new town; he may prefer to remain in the place where he is and as it was constituted, and
continue to enjoy the rights and benefits he acquired therein. He may not even know the candidates of the new
town; he may express a lack of desire to vote for anyone of them; he may feel that his vote should be cast for
the officials in the town before dismemberment. Since by constitutional direction the purpose of a bill must be
shown in its title for the benefit, amongst others, of the community affected thereby,
16
it stands to reason to say
that when the constitutional right to vote on the part of any citizen of that community is affected, he may
become a suitor to challenge the constitutionality of the Act as passed by Congress.
For the reasons given, we vote to declare Republic Act 4790 null and void, and to prohibit respondent
Commission from implementing the same for electoral purposes.
No costs allowed. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16704 March 17, 1962
VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC., petitioner-appellant,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, respondent-appellee.
Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General and Ernesto T. Duran for respondent-appellee.
BARRERA, J .:
On October 15, 1958, the Social Security Commission issued its Circular No. 22 of the following tenor: .
Effective November 1, 1958, all Employers in computing the premiums due the System, will take into
consideration and include in the Employee's remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the
cash value of other media of remuneration. All these will comprise the Employee's remuneration or
earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 2-1/2% contributions will be based, up to a maximum of P500 for
any one month.
Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Social
Security Commission in effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to a previous Circular No. 7,
dated October 7, 1957 expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the employers' and
employees' respective monthly premium contributions, and submitting, "In order to assist your System in
arriving at a proper interpretation of the term 'compensation' for the purposes of" such computation, their
observations on Republic Act 1161 and its amendment and on the general interpretation of the words
"compensation", "remuneration" and "wages". Counsel further questioned the validity of the circular for lack of
authority on the part of the Social Security Commission to promulgate it without the approval of the President
and for lack of publication in the Official Gazette.
Overruling these objections, the Social Security Commission ruled that Circular No. 22 is not a rule or
regulation that needed the approval of the President and publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but
a mere administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of general policy or opinion as to how the
law should be construed.
Not satisfied with this ruling, petitioner comes to this Court on appeal.
The single issue involved in this appeal is whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation, as
contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering the Social Security Commission "to adopt,
amend and repeal subject to the approval of the President such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act."
There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and an
administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body. When an
administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force and effect of a
valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law
(Parker, Administrative Law, p. 197; Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194). Rules and regulations when
promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law,
partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in
the law. This is so because statutes are usually couched in general terms, after expressing the policy,
purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the manner of
carrying out the law are often times left to the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this
sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or
additional legal provisions that have the effect of law. (Davis, op. cit., p. 194.) .
A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is
within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy
stated therein or its innate wisdom (Davis, op. cit., 195-197). On the other hand, administrative interpretation of
the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.
Circular No. 22 in question was issued by the Social Security Commission, in view of the amendment of the
provisions of the Social Security Law defining the term "compensation" contained in Section 8 (f) of Republic
Act No. 1161 which, before its amendment, reads as follows: .
(f) Compensation All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid
in any medium other than cash except (1) that part of the remuneration in excess of P500 received
during the month; (2) bonuses, allowances or overtime pay; and (3) dismissal and all other payments
which the employer may make, although not legally required to do so.
Republic Act No. 1792 changed the definition of "compensation" to:
(f) Compensation All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid
in any medium other than cash except that part of the remuneration in excess of P500.00 received
during the month.
It will thus be seen that whereas prior to the amendment, bonuses, allowances, and overtime pay given in
addition to the regular or base pay were expressly excluded, or exempted from the definition of the term
"compensation", such exemption or exclusion was deleted by the amendatory law. It thus became necessary
for the Social Security Commission to interpret the effect of such deletion or elimination. Circular No. 22 was,
therefore, issued to apprise those concerned of the interpretation or understanding of the Commission, of the
law as amended, which it was its duty to enforce. It did not add any duty or detail that was not already in the
law as amended. It merely stated and circularized the opinion of the Commission as to how the law should be
construed. 1wph1.t
The case of People v. Jolliffe (G.R. No. L-9553, promulgated on May 30, 1959) cited by appellant, does not
support its contention that the circular in question is a rule or regulation. What was there said was merely that a
regulation may be incorporated in the form of a circular. Such statement simply meant that the substance and
not the form of a regulation is decisive in determining its nature. It does not lay down a general proposition of
law that any circular, regardless of its substance and even if it is only interpretative, constitutes a rule or
regulation which must be published in the Official Gazette before it could take effect.
The case of People v. Que Po Lay (50 O.G. 2850) also cited by appellant is not applicable to the present case,
because the penalty that may be incurred by employers and employees if they refuse to pay the corresponding
premiums on bonus, overtime pay, etc. which the employer pays to his employees, is not by reason of non-
compliance with Circular No. 22, but for violation of the specific legal provisions contained in Section 27(c) and
(f) of Republic Act No. 1161.
We find, therefore, that Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise employers-members of the System of what,
in the light of the amendment of the law, they should include in determining the monthly compensation of their
employees upon which the social security contributions should be based, and that such circular did not require
presidential approval and publication in the Official Gazette for its effectivity.
It hardly need be said that the Commission's interpretation of the amendment embodied in its Circular No. 22,
is correct. The express elimination among the exemptions excluded in the old law, of all bonuses, allowances
and overtime pay in the determination of the "compensation" paid to employees makes it imperative that such
bonuses and overtime pay must now be included in the employee's remuneration in pursuance of the
amendatory law. It is true that in previous cases, this Court has held that bonus is not demandable because it
is not part of the wage, salary, or compensation of the employee. But the question in the instant case is not
whether bonus is demandable or not as part of compensation, but whether, after the employer does, in fact,
give or pay bonus to his employees, such bonuses shall be considered compensation under the Social
Security Act after they have been received by the employees. While it is true that terms or words are to be
interpreted in accordance with their well-accepted meaning in law, nevertheless, when such term or word is
specifically defined in a particular law, such interpretation must be adopted in enforcing that particular law, for it
can not be gainsaid that a particular phrase or term may have one meaning for one purpose and another
meaning for some other purpose. Such is the case that is now before us. Republic Act 1161 specifically
defined what "compensation" should mean "For the purposes of this Act". Republic Act 1792 amended such
definition by deleting same exemptions authorized in the original Act. By virtue of this express substantial
change in the phraseology of the law, whatever prior executive or judicial construction may have been given to
the phrase in question should give way to the clear mandate of the new law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant.
So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
June 30, 1970
G.R. No. L-25619
DOMINGO B. TEOXON, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF ADMINISTRATORS, PHILIPPINE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION,
respondents-appellees.
Ulpiano S. Masallo for petitioner-appellant. Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor
General Isidro C. Borromeo and Perfecto O. Fernandez for respondents-appellees.
Fernando, J .:
The pivotal question raised by petitioner, a veteran who suffered from permanent physical disability, in this appeal from a
lower court decision dismissing his suit formandamus, is its failure to accord primacy to statutory provisions fixing the
amount of pension to which he was entitled. 1 Instead, it sustained the plea of respondent officials, members of the board
of Administrators of the Philippine Veterans Administration, relying on the administrative rules issued by them
presumably in pursuance of their duty to enforce the Veterans' Bill of Rights. We have to resolve, then, whether or not
there has been a failure to apply the doctrine to which this Court has been committed that if it can be shown that there is
repugnancy between the statute and the rules issued in pursuance thereof, the former prevails. Unfortunately, as will be
hereafter shown, the lower court did not see it that way. It found nothing objectionable in respondents following a
contrary norm and thus disregarding petitioner's legal right for which mandamus is the proper remedy. We cannot lend our
approval then to such conclusion especially so in the light of our decision barely two months ago, Begosa v. Chairman,
Philippine Veterans Administration, 2 where we categorically held that a veteran suffering from permanent disability is
not to be denied what has been granted him specifically by legislative enactment, which certainly is superior to any
regulation that may be promulgated by the Philippine Veterans Administration, presumably in the implementation thereof.
We reverse.
Petitioner, on April 23, 1965, filed his suit for mandamusbefore the Court of First Instance of Manila alleging that he filed
his claim for disability pension under the Veterans' Bill of Rights, Republic Act No. 65, for having been permanently
incapacitated from work and that he was first awarded only P25.00 monthly, thereafter increased to P50.00 a month
contrary to the terms of the basic law as thereafter amended. 3 His claim, therefore, was for a pension effective May 10,
1955 at the rate of P50.00 a month up to June 21, 1957 and at the rate of P100.00 a month, plus P10.00 a month, for each
of his unmarried minor children below 18 years of age from June 22, 1957 up to June 30, 1963; and the difference of
P50.00 a month, plus P10.00 a month for each of his four unmarried minor children below 18 years of age from July 1,
1963. He would likewise seek for the payment of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees. 4 The answer
for respondents filed on May 25, 1965, while admitting, with qualification, the facts as alleged in the petition, would rely
primarily in its special and affirmative defenses, on petitioner not having exhausted its administrative remedies and his
suit being in effect one against the government, which cannot prosper without its consent. 5 In the stipulation of facts
dated Oct. 13, 1965, it was expressly agreed: "That the petitioner sustained physical injuries in line of duty as a former
member of a recognized guerilla organization which participated actively in the resistance movement against the enemy,
and as a result of which petitioner suffered a permanent, physical disability." 6 Mention was likewise made in the
aforesaid stipulation of facts that while petitioner would rely on what is set forth in the Veterans' Bill of Rights, as
amended, respondents in turn would limit the amount of pension received by him in accordance with the rules and
regulations promulgated by them.
In the decision now on appeal, promulgated on Dec. 4, 1965, the lower court, in dismissing the petition, expressed its
conformity with the contention of respondents. Thus: "Upon examination of the issues involved in this case, the Court
believes that a case for mandamus will not lie. The respondent Board has authority under the Pension law to process
applications for pension, using as guide the rules and regulations that it adopted under the law and their decisions, unless
shown clearly to be in error or against the law or against the general policy of the Board, should be maintained." 7 The
lower court went even further in its recognition of the binding force to be given the administrative rules and regulations
promulgated by respondents. Thus: "As mentioned above, under the provisions of the Veterans Law as subsequently
amended, the Board is authorized to promulgate regulations to carry into effect the provisions of the law. In accordance
with said law, the Board has promulgated rules and regulations which are considered in the approval of the claims for
pension. The court sees no reason why the case of petitioner should be considered as an exception. There is no question
that his disability is not complete, and, therefore, he cannot be entitled to complete disability allowance. That the decision
of the Board is based on its regulations is also, according to the Court, justified because that is how the Board functions."
8
Hence, this appeal, which, as noted at the outset, calls for an affirmative response. Petitioner's contention that his right as
conferred by law takes precedence to what the administrative rules and regulations of respondents provide is indisputable.
So our decisions have indicated with unfailing uniformity.
1. The recognition of the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of the statute,
necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment, may be found in the early case of United States v.
Barrias 9 decided in 1908. Then came, in a 1914 decision, United States v. Tupasi Molina, 10 a delineation of the scope of
such competence. Thus: "Of course the regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be
in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such
regulations, of course, the law itself can not be extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into
effect the provisions of the law, they are valid." In 1936, in People v. Santos, 11 this Court expressed its disapproval of an
administrative order that would amount to an excess of the regulatory power vested in an administrative official. We
reaffirmed such a doctrine in a 1951 decision, where we again made clear that where an administrative order betrays
inconsistency or repugnancy to the provisions of the Act, "the mandate of the Act must prevail and must be followed." 12
Justice Barrera, speaking for the Court in Victorias Milling Company, Inc. v. Social Security Commission, 13 citing
Parker, 14 as well as Davis 15 did tersely sum up the matter thus: "A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure
fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory granted by the legislature, even if the courts are
not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom .... On the other hand, administrative interpretation of
the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means."
It cannot be otherwise as the Constitution limits the authority of the President, in whom all executive power resides, to
take care that the laws be faithfully executed. 16 No lesser administrative executive office or agency then can, contrary to
the express language of the Constitution, assert for itself a more extensive prerogative. Necessarily, it is bound to observe
the constitutional mandate. There must be strict compliance with the legislative enactment. Its terms must be followed.
The statute requires adherence to, not departure from, its provisions. No deviation is allowable. In the terse language of
the present Chief Justice, an administrative agency "cannot amend an act of Congress." 17 Respondents can be sustained,
therefore, only if it could be shown that the rules and regulations promulgated by them were in accordance with what the
Veterans' Bill of Rights provides.
We examine, then, the original act approved in 1946 18 and its later amendments. The Veterans' Bill of Rights, as it read
when enacted in 1946, insofar as pertinent, provides: "The persons mentioned in sections one and two hereof, who are
permanently incapacitated from work owing to sickness, disease, or injuries sustained in line of duty, shall be given a life
pension of fifty pesos a month unless they are actually receiving a similar pension from other government funds, and shall
receive, in addition, the necessary hospitalization and medical care." The act took effect upon its approval, on Oct. 18 of
that year. Then, in 1955, came the first amendment in these words; "[Sec.] 9; The persons mentioned in sections one and
two hereof who permanent incapacitated from work owing to sickness, disease, or injuries sustained in line of duty, shall
be given a life pension of fifty pesos a month, and ten pesos a month for each of his unmarried minor children below
eighteen years of age, unless they are actually receiving a similar pension from other government funds, and shall receive,
in addition, the necessary hospitalization and medical care." 19 The present Section 9, as again amended in 1957, reads as
follows: "The persons mentioned in sections one and two hereof who are permanently incapacitated from work owing
sickness, disease, or injuries sustained in line of duty, shall be given a life pension of one hundred pesos a month, and ten
pesos a month for each of his unmarried minor children below eighteen years of age, unless they are actually receiving a
similar pension from other Government funds, and shall receive, in addition, the necessary hospitalization and medical
care." 20
To the extent, therefore, that petitioner would base his suit on the legal rights thus conferred on him by the above statutory
provisions, he is entitled to a favorable judgment. That is what was decided in Begosa v. Chairman, Philippine Veterans
Administration, referred to by us earlier in the opinion as decisive of a controversy of this nature. We do so again. Hence,
a reversal of the appealed decision is indicated.
2. The affirmative defenses as to non-exhaustion of administrative remedies as well as a proceeding of this character being
a suit against the State were considered and rejected in the aforesaid Begosa decision.
WHEREFORE, the decision of December 4, 1965 of the lower court is reversed, and another one entered granting this
petition for mandamus. Respondents are ordered to pay petitioner a pension effective as of May 10, 1955 at the rate of
P50.00 a month up to June 21, 1957 and at the rate of P100.00 a month, plus P10.00 a month for each of his unmarried
minor children below 18 years of age from June 22, 1957 up to June 30, 1963; and the difference of P50.00 a month plus
P10.00 a month for each of his four unmarried minor children below 18 years of age from July 1, 1963 until the statutory
rate has been satisfied. Thereafter petitioner is entitled to the amount of P100.00 a month plus P10.00 a month for each of
his four unmarried minor children below eighteen years of age, in accordance with law. Without pronouncement as to
costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro and Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-35694 December 23, 1933
ALLISON G. GIBBS, petitioner-appelle,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, oppositor-appellant.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE CITY OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellants.
Allison D. Gibbs in his own behalf.

BUTTE, J .:
This is an appeal from a final order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, requiring the register of deeds of
the City of Manila to cancel certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331, covering lands located in the City
of Manila, Philippine Islands, and issue in lieu thereof new certificates of transfer of title in favor of Allison D.
Gibbs without requiring him to present any document showing that the succession tax due under Article XI of
Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code has been paid.
The said order of the court of March 10, 1931, recites that the parcels of land covered by said certificates of
title formerly belonged to the conjugal partnership of Allison D. Gibbs and Eva Johnson Gibbs; that the latter
died intestate in Palo Alto, California, on November 28, 1929; that at the time of her death she and her
husband were citizens of the State of California and domiciled therein.
It appears further from said order that Allison D. Gibbs was appointed administrator of the state of his said
deceased wife in case No. 36795 in the same court, entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Eva
Johnson Gibbs, Deceased"; that in said intestate proceedings, the said Allison D. Gibbs, on September
22,1930, filed an ex parte petition in which he alleged "that the parcels of land hereunder described belong to
the conjugal partnership of your petitioner and his wife, Eva Johnson Gibbs", describing in detail the three facts
here involved; and further alleging that his said wife, a citizen and resident of California, died on November
28,1929; that in accordance with the law of California, the community property of spouses who are citizens of
California, upon the death of the wife previous to that of the husband, belongs absolutely to the surviving
husband without administration; that the conjugal partnership of Allison D. Gibbs and Eva Johnson Gibbs,
deceased, has no obligations or debts and no one will be prejudiced by adjucating said parcels of land (and
seventeen others not here involved) to be the absolute property of the said Allison D. Gibbs as sole owner. The
court granted said petition and on September 22, 1930, entered a decree adjucating the said Allison D. Gibbs
to be the sole and absolute owner of said lands, applying section 1401 of the Civil Code of California. Gibbs
presented this decree to the register of deeds of Manila and demanded that the latter issue to him a "transfer
certificate of title".
Section 1547 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code provides in part that:
Registers of deeds shall not register in the registry of property any document transferring real property
or real rights therein or any chattel mortgage, by way of gifts mortis causa, legacy or inheritance, unless
the payment of the tax fixed in this article and actually due thereon shall be shown. And they shall
immediately notify the Collector of Internal Revenue or the corresponding provincial treasurer of the
non payment of the tax discovered by them. . . .
Acting upon the authority of said section, the register of deeds of the City of Manila, declined to accept as
binding said decree of court of September 22,1930, and refused to register the transfer of title of the said
conjugal property to Allison D. Gibbs, on the ground that the corresponding inheritance tax had not been paid.
Thereupon, under date of December 26, 1930, Allison D. Gibbs filed in the said court a petition for an order
requiring the said register of deeds "to issue the corresponding titles" to the petitioner without requiring
previous payment of any inheritance tax. After due hearing of the parties, the court reaffirmed said order of
September 22, 1930, and entered the order of March 10, 1931, which is under review on this appeal.
On January 3, 1933, this court remanded the case to the court of origin for new trial upon additional evidence
in regard to the pertinent law of California in force at the time of the death of Mrs. Gibbs, also authorizing the
introduction of evidence with reference to the dates of the acquisition of the property involved in this suit and
with reference to the California law in force at the time of such acquisition. The case is now before us with the
supplementary evidence.
For the purposes of this case, we shall consider the following facts as established by the evidence or the
admissions of the parties: Allison D. Gibbs has been continuously, since the year 1902, a citizen of the State of
California and domiciled therein; that he and Eva Johnson Gibbs were married at Columbus, Ohio, in July
1906; that there was no antenuptial marriage contract between the parties; that during the existence of said
marriage the spouses acquired the following lands, among others, in the Philippine Islands, as conjugal
property:lawphil.net
1. A parcel of land in the City of Manila represented by transfer certificate of title No. 20880, dated March 16,
1920, and registered in the name of "Allison D. Gibbs casado con Eva Johnson Gibbs".
2. A parcel of land in the City of Manila, represented by transfer certificate of title No. 28336, dated May 14,
1927, in which it is certified "that spouses Allison D. Gibbs and Eva Johnson Gibbs are the owners in fee
simple" of the land therein described.
3. A parcel of land in the City of Manila, represented by transfer certificate of title No. 28331, dated April 6,
1927, which it states "that Allison D. Gibbs married to Eva Johnson Gibbs" is the owner of the land described
therein; that said Eva Johnson Gibbs died intestate on November 28, 1929, living surviving her her husband,
the appellee, and two sons, Allison J. Gibbs , now age 25 and Finley J. Gibbs, now aged 22, as her sole heirs
of law.
Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code entitled "Tax on inheritances, legacies and other
acquisitionsmortis causa" provides in section 1536 that "Every transmission by virtue of inheritance ... of real
property ... shall be subject to the following tax." It results that the question for determination in this case is as
follows: Was Eva Johnson Gibbs at the time of her death the owner of a descendible interest in the Philippine
lands above-mentioned?
The appellee contends that the law of California should determine the nature and extent of the title, if any, that
vested in Eva Johnson Gibbs under the three certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331 above referred
to, citing article 9 of the Civil Code. But that, even if the nature and extent of her title under said certificates be
governed by the law of the Philippine Islands, the laws of California govern the succession to such title, citing
the second paragraph of article 10 of the Civil Code.
Article 9 of the Civil Code is as follows:
The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition, and legal capacity of persons,
are binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a foreign country." It is argued that the conjugal
right of the California wife in community real estate in the Philippine Islands is a personal right and
must, therefore, be settled by the law governing her personal status, that is, the law of California. But
our attention has not been called to any law of California that incapacitates a married woman from
acquiring or holding land in a foreign jurisdiction in accordance with the lex rei sitae. There is not the
slightest doubt that a California married woman can acquire title to land in a common law jurisdiction
like the State of Illinois or the District of Columbia, subject to the common-law estate by the courtesy
which would vest in her husband. Nor is there any doubt that if a California husband acquired land in
such a jurisdiction his wife would be vested with the common law right of dower, the prerequisite
conditions obtaining. Article 9 of the Civil Code treats of purely personal relations and status and
capacity for juristic acts, the rules relating to property, both personal and real, being governed by article
10 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, article 9, by its very terms, is applicable only to "Spaniards" (now, by
construction, to citizens of the Philippine Islands).
The Organic Act of the Philippine Islands (Act of Congress, August 29, 1916, known as the "Jones
Law") as regards the determination of private rights, grants practical autonomy to the Government of
the Philippine Islands. This Government, therefore, may apply the principles and rules of private
international law (conflicts of laws) on the same footing as an organized territory or state of the United
States. We should, therefore, resort to the law of California, the nationality and domicile of Mrs. Gibbs,
to ascertain the norm which would be applied here as law were there any question as to her status.
But the appellant's chief argument and the sole basis of the lower court's decision rests upon the second
paragraph of article 10 of the Civil Code which is as follows:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to
the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the
property or the country in which it may be situated.
In construing the above language we are met at the outset with some difficulty by the expression "the national
law of the person whose succession is in question", by reason of the rather anomalous political status of the
Philippine Islands. (Cf. Manresa, vol. 1, Codigo Civil, pp. 103, 104.) We encountered no difficulty in applying
article 10 in the case of a citizen of Turkey. (Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil., 867.) Having regard to the practical
autonomy of the Philippine Islands, as above stated, we have concluded that if article 10 is applicable and the
estate in question is that of a deceased American citizen, the succession shall be regulated in accordance with
the norms of the State of his domicile in the United States. (Cf. Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52
Phil., 130, 137; In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil., 156, 166.)
The trial court found that under the law of California, upon the death of the wife, the entire community property
without administration belongs to the surviving husband; that he is the absolute owner of all the community
property from the moment of the death of his wife, not by virtue of succession or by virtue of her death, but by
virtue of the fact that when the death of the wife precedes that of the husband he acquires the community
property, not as an heir or as the beneficiary of his deceased wife, but because she never had more than an
inchoate interest or expentancy which is extinguished upon her death. Quoting the case of Estate of Klumpke
(167 Cal., 415, 419), the court said: "The decisions under this section (1401 Civil Code of California) are
uniform to the effect that the husband does not take the community property upon the death of the wife by
succession, but that he holds it all from the moment of her death as though required by himself. ... It never
belonged to the estate of the deceased wife."
The argument of the appellee apparently leads to this dilemma: If he takes nothing by succession from his
deceased wife, how can the second paragraph of article 10 be invoked? Can the appellee be heard to say that
there is a legal succession under the law of the Philippine Islands and no legal succession under the law of
California? It seems clear that the second paragraph of article 10 applies only when a legal or testamentary
succession has taken place in the Philippines and in accordance with the law of the Philippine Islands; and the
foreign law is consulted only in regard to the order of succession or the extent of the successional rights; in
other words, the second paragraph of article 10 can be invoked only when the deceased was vested with a
descendible interest in property within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands.
In the case of Clarke vs. Clarke (178 U. S., 186, 191; 44 Law ed., 1028, 1031), the court said:
It is principle firmly established that to the law of the state in which the land is situated we must look for
the rules which govern its descent, alienation, and transfer, and for the effect and construction of wills
and other conveyances. (United States vs. Crosby, 7 Cranch, 115; 3 L. ed., 287; Clark vs. Graham, 6
Wheat., 577; 5 L. ed., 334; McGoon vs. Scales, 9 Wall., 23; 19 L. ed., 545; Brine vs. Hartford F. Ins.
Co., 96 U. S., 627; 24 L. ed., 858.)" (See also Estate of Lloyd, 175 Cal., 704, 705.) This fundamental
principle is stated in the first paragraph of article 10 of our Civil Code as follows: "Personal property is
subject to the laws of the nation of the owner thereof; real property to the laws of the country in which it
is situated.
It is stated in 5 Cal. Jur., 478:
In accord with the rule that real property is subject to the lex rei sitae, the respective rights of husband
and wife in such property, in the absence of an antenuptial contract, are determined by the law of the
place where the property is situated, irrespective of the domicile of the parties or to the place where the
marriage was celebrated. (See also Saul vs. His Creditors, 5 Martin [N. S.], 569; 16 Am. Dec., 212
[La.]; Heidenheimer vs. Loring, 26 S. W., 99 [Texas].)
Under this broad principle, the nature and extent of the title which vested in Mrs. Gibbs at the time of the
acquisition of the community lands here in question must be determined in accordance with the lex rei sitae.
It is admitted that the Philippine lands here in question were acquired as community property of the conjugal
partnership of the appellee and his wife. Under the law of the Philippine Islands, she was vested of a title equal
to that of her husband. Article 1407 of the Civil Code provides:
All the property of the spouses shall be deemed partnership property in the absence of proof that it
belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Article 1395 provides:
"The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules of law applicable to the contract of partnership in all
matters in which such rules do not conflict with the express provisions of this chapter." Article 1414 provides
that "the husband may dispose by will of his half only of the property of the conjugal partnership." Article 1426
provides that upon dissolution of the conjugal partnership and after inventory and liquidation, "the net
remainder of the partnership property shall be divided share and share alike between the husband and wife, or
their respective heirs." Under the provisions of the Civil Code and the jurisprudence prevailing here, the wife,
upon the acquisition of any conjugal property, becomes immediately vested with an interest and title therein
equal to that of her husband, subject to the power of management and disposition which the law vests in the
husband. Immediately upon her death, if there are no obligations of the decedent, as is true in the present
case, her share in the conjugal property is transmitted to her heirs by succession. (Articles 657, 659, 661, Civil
Code; cf. alsoCoronel vs. Ona, 33 Phil., 456, 469.)
It results that the wife of the appellee was, by the law of the Philippine Islands, vested of a descendible
interest, equal to that of her husband, in the Philippine lands covered by certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336
and 28331, from the date of their acquisition to the date of her death. That appellee himself believed that his
wife was vested of such a title and interest in manifest from the second of said certificates, No. 28336, dated
May 14, 1927, introduced by him in evidence, in which it is certified that "the spouses Allison D. Gibbs and Eva
Johnson Gibbs are the owners in fee simple of the conjugal lands therein described."
The descendible interest of Eva Johnson Gibbs in the lands aforesaid was transmitted to her heirs by virtue of
inheritance and this transmission plainly falls within the language of section 1536 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of
the Administrative Code which levies a tax on inheritances. (Cf. Re Estate of Majot, 199 N. Y., 29; 92 N. E.,
402; 29 L. R. A. [N. S.], 780.) It is unnecessary in this proceeding to determine the "order of succession" or the
"extent of the successional rights" (article 10, Civil Code, supra) which would be regulated by section 1386 of
the Civil Code of California which was in effect at the time of the death of Mrs. Gibbs.
The record does not show what the proper amount of the inheritance tax in this case would be nor that the
appellee (petitioner below) in any way challenged the power of the Government to levy an inheritance tax or
the validity of the statute under which the register of deeds refused to issue a certificate of transfer reciting that
the appellee is the exclusive owner of the Philippine lands included in the three certificates of title here
involved.
The judgment of the court below of March 10, 1931, is reversed with directions to dismiss the petition, without
special pronouncement as to the costs.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heir-
appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J .:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding,
in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among things the final
accounts of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600
paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the
residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of said
residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the
testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following
provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard
Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at No.
665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my above named
daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
x x x x x x x x x
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia,
about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is
not in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and who, from all
information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the said
Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the
rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the principal thereof as well
as any interest which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..
x x x x x x x x x
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young
Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my
property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever
situated, of which I may be possessed at my death and which may have come to me from any source
whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account and project of
partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the
estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it
deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us in G.R.
Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of
opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said
order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged
natural children, one-half of the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged
that the law that should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of
California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the
Philippines and even if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which
requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria
Helen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all
purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of
California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to
be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his
property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and
inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49
Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed
various motions for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT
THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND,
CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE
EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE
APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,
PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY
DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN
SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION
SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN
CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of
California at the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the time of his death he was domiciled
in the Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee's brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that the deceased
Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival
in the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army
Transport "Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of California,
U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there for the following
nine years until 1913, during which time he resided in, and was teaching school in Sacramento,
California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913. However, in 1928, he
again departed the Philippines for the United States and came back here the following year, 1929.
Some nine years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country, and came back to the Philippines
the following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved
by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case
not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military Forces in the
Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United States but returned
to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as
Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21,
1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after the making of his
last will and testament (now in question herein) which he executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila on
March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact
that he was born in New York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and since he came to
the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and
considering that he appears never to have owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would
indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in the State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporary presence to the
most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote something more than mere physical
presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he resided in
Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a
territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have considered himself as
a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of
that State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring
another. This conclusion is in accordance with the following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of
Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a place of
permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may
be domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he may reside in a place where he has no
domicile. The man with two homes, between which he divides his time, certainly resides in each one,
while living in it. But if he went on business which would require his presence for several weeks or
months, he might properly be said to have sufficient connection with the place to be called a resident. It
is clear, however, that, if he treated his settlement as continuing only for the particular business in
hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a
domicile of choice requires the exercise of intention as well as physical presence. "Residence simply
requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in
that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term used with
many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the most permanent abode, and it is
not safe to insist that any one use et the only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the term "national
law" is used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States, each
state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state.
The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or
apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property? The decision
of the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code, a
testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of
McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil
Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow
the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have checked it in the
California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and
testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as
the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in
the abovecited case, should govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of
Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen.
Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and
following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should
be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural
matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law of the foreign
system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied
the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law. But once having
determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference
back should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the "endless chain
of references" which has so often been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would
have looked merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet
there seems no compelling logical reason why the original reference should be the internal law rather
than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but
those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second
reference and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit more
consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule of reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that greater uniformity
will result from adoption of their respective views. And still more strange is the fact that the only way to
achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the two states whose laws form the
legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both
accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated
above, had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been against the woman; if the
suit had been brought in the Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the
woman. The same result would happen, though the courts would switch with respect to which would
hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land is in question, and
where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the
situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any
further reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a person's title to land, recognized by the situs,
will be recognized by every court; and every divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid
everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable property in
Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises as to how this property is to be distributed
among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict of laws as
to intestate succession to movables calls for an application of the law of the deceased's last domicile.
Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts court to do
would be to turn to French statute of distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and
decree a distribution accordingly. An examination of French law, however, would show that if a French
court were called upon to determine how this property should be distributed, it would refer the
distribution to the national law of the deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute of
distributions. So on the surface of things the Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of
action: (a) either to apply the French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French
court and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is what a French
court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoi doctrine, it will follow the latter course, thus applying its
own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers
to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the law of the
forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this judicial process is
'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing a particular
case, the further question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in such foreign
law also to be resorted to? This is a question which, while it has been considered by the courts in but a
few instances, has been the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the
doctrine involved has been descriptively designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the
"Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the question postulated
and the operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many cases result in returning the
main controversy to be decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of the doctrine
ofrenvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must take into account the
whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the
actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The
doctrine of the renvoi has generally been repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in a country
explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The
pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be understood as
incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules of the
conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a country' means the whole of its law.
x x x x x x x x x
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900,
in the form of the following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad as
regards their personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shall be determined by the
law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where the act in question occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one of them is
necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a question to the same
system of law.
x x x x x x x x x
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an Englishman who
has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first inquire whether
the law of Belgium would distribute personal property upon death in accordance with the law of
domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the distribution in accordance with the law of
nationality that is the English law he must accept this reference back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re
Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be
enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should
apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in
California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the
determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law
that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will directing the
manner of distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at the time of his
death will be looked to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as completely as the law of
situs is consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules
control devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate succession, the same rules should
determine the validity of an attempted testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that
the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are
recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the
recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine. The New
York court has said on the point: 'The general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at
the domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had its origin in that
international comity which was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business
intercourse and the process of accumulating property take but little notice of boundary lines, the
practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec.
164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national law is the
internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its
citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that
We should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the
conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of California as in comity we
are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in
accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents
therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place where the
property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national
law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in the various
authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in
the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of
the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the
case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at
bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave
the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth
between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his
domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the
decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California
provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines,
makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs.
Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil.
293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important
reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but with
domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there exists in the state of which the
subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines,
the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be
governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the
internal law of California..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower court with
instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with
costs against appellees.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J .:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089
therein.1wph1.t
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife,
Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-
deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet
Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy
Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma
Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes,
obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in
the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three
illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c)
after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his
first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman,
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1wph1.t
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was
admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the
amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate
children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00
each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time
according as the lower court approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three
requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's
Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction
of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the
legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or
a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the
testator's Last Will and Testament divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of
the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the
project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and,
therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is evidenced by the
registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.
1

After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30,
1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and
administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the
decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964,
oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply Texas law or
Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this
Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the
decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the
decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.
2
So that even assuming
Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the
same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of
the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved
are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should
not be presumed different from ours.
3
Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As
stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls
under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil
Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in
intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of
successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They
provide that
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely,
Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they
incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without
substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have
been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied
in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new
provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the
decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes,
Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically
chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific
provisions must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills one to govern his Texas estate and the
other his Philippine estate arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate.
Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the
law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect
that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal
and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 now Article 16
of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under
the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision
of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered