International Journal of Advanced Engineering Research and Technology (IJAERT)

Volume 2 Issue 2, May 2014, ISSN No.: 2348 8190

79


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AODV Security and energy efficiencys pitfalls- A Review

Sheetal
1
, Kamaljit Singh Saini
2

1
(M.Tech. Scholar, Department of Computer Science & Engineering, Guru Nanak Institute of Technology, Ambala)
2
(Associate Professor & Head of Department of Computer Science & Engineering, Guru Nanak Institute of Technology, Ambala)



ABSTRACT :
AODV (Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector) routing
protocol is popular in wireless Ad hoc network. In this
paper we describe the AODV operation, the design and
the pitfalls left in the (AODV) routing protocol structure.
This paper is meant to aid the knowledge about AODV
and how we can improve AODV. The two issues are
focused in this paper viz. security and energy efficiency.
Security have important roll in delivering the
information to the desired destination while energy
efficiency creates an impressive step towards the new
developments and improvements.

Keywords AODV, RREQ, RREP, REER.

I. INTRODUCTION
Ad hoc network is also known for its features like multi-
hop network, infrastructure less network and self-
organizing network [1]. There is no fixed infrastructure
in this network, and every node is mobile. Every node
can connect other nodes by any way [2]. With the
advancement of the mobile terminal performance, power
demand for Ad hoc network increases constantly. So, it
has become an emerging research on reducing the
energy consumption of Ad hoc network. AODV is used
in wireless ad hoc networks based on distance vector on
demand plane. When the node is inactive, AODV does
not need to update routing and AODV can obtain
smaller network overhead [3]. So AODV is becoming
the routing protocol widely used in Ad hoc network [4].
Broadcast mechanism does not need to maintain the
network topological structure and correlative routing
calculation. Only receiver need transmit data packets by
broadcast. In AODV, every node need to transmit RREQ
packets when they were received by the network first
time. So flooding mechanism is especially suitable for
AODV [5]. When network traffic is heavy for router, the
conflict probability of RREQ packet will increase and




protocol efficiency will reduce in flooding mechanism.
Then network load will increase, the delay of end-to-end
packet will increase, and the node energy will be wasted
greatly. For this reason, a lot of broadcast restraining
algorithms had been proposed to improve efficiency of
AODV routing protocol and save power energy of the
whole Ad hoc networks. However, there are some
problems in these methods according to actual
implementation. Restraining algorithm based on area
may encounter a black hole and lead to broadcast failure
[6]. When the number of neighbor nodes to source node
is few, gossip message quickly will disappear fast and
restraining algorithm based on gossip will fail [7].
Restraining algorithm based on survival time is simple,
but its efficiency is low and it may lead to broadcast
storm problem. [8]. an independent distributed algorithm
need be run in restraining algorithm based on smallest
connected set [9]. Intelligent antenna and other
intelligent device need be used in restraining algorithm
based on angle and direction [10].
Aimed on the different pitfalls in this paper, we tried to
get the issues which can be addressed and improved in a
new AODV protocol.

II. AODV ROUTING PROTOCOL
The AODV [11, 12] routing protocol is a reactive
routing protocol; therefore, routes are determined only
when needed.


Fiqure 1 : AODV Protocol Massaging [12]
International Journal of Advanced Engineering Research and Technology (IJAERT)
Volume 2 Issue 2, May 2014, ISSN No.: 2348 8190
80


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Figure 1 shows the message exchanges of the AODV
protocol. Hello messages may be used to detect and
monitor links to neighbors. If Hello messages are used,
each active node periodically broadcasts a Hello
message that all its neighbors receive. Because nodes
periodically send Hello messages, if a node fails to
receive several Hello messages from a neighbor, a link
break is detected. When a source has data to transmit to
an unknown destination, it broadcasts a Route Request
(RREQ) for that destination. At each intermediate node,
when a RREQ is received
a route to the source is created. If the receiving node has
not received this RREQ before, is not the destination and
does not have a current route to the destination, it
rebroadcasts the RREQ. If the receiving node is the
destination or has a current route to the destination, it
generates a Route Reply (RREP). The RREP is unicast
in a hop by hop fashion to the source. As the RREP
propagates, each intermediate node creates a route to the
destination. When the source receives the RREP, it
records the route to the destination and can begin
sending data. If multiple RREPs are received by the
source, the route with the shortest hop count is chosen.
As data ows from the source to the destination, each
node along the route updates the timers associated with
the routes to the source and destination, maintaining the
routes in the routing table. If a route is not used for some
period of time, a node cannot be sure whether the route
is still valid; consequently, the node removes the route
from its routing table.
If data is owing and a link break is detected, a Route
Error (RERR) is sent to the source of the data in a hop-
by- hop fashion. As the RERR propagates towards the
source, each intermediate node invalidates routes to any
unreachable destinations. When the source of the data
receives the RERR, it invalidates the route and
reinitiates route discovery if necessary.

III. IMPLEMENTATION POSSIBILITIES
For the AODV routing daemon to function it must
determine when to trigger AODV protocol events. Since
the IP stack was designed for static networks where link
disconnections are infrequent and packet losses are
unreported, most of these triggers are not readily
available. Therefore, these events must be extrapolated
and communicated to the routing daemon via other
means.
There are many ways to design the AODV protocol to
extrapolate the needed AODV events. Possible
opportunities for obtaining the events include:
1. Snooping
2. Kernel modification
3. Net filter
We are going to use kernel modification in our approach.

KERNEL MODIFICATION
Code can be placed in the kernel to communicate the
events. For example, to initiate route discovery, code is
added in the kernel at the point where route lookup
failures occur. Given this code in the kernel, if a route
lookup failure happens, then a method is called in the
user-space daemon.

Figure 2: Kernel modification Architecture [12]

Figure 2 shows the architecture of the AODV daemon
and the required support logic used for kernel
modification. The advantages of this solution are that the
events are explicitly determined and there is no wasted
overhead. The main disadvantages of this solution are
user installation and portability. Installation of the
necessary kernel modifications requires a complete
kernel recompilation. This is a difficult procedure for
many users. Also, kernel patches are often not portable
between one kernel version and the next. Finally,
International Journal of Advanced Engineering Research and Technology (IJAERT)
Volume 2 Issue 2, May 2014, ISSN No.: 2348 8190
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understanding the Linux kernel and network protocol
stack requires examining a significant amount of
uncommented, complex code.

IV. SECURITY ISSUE
We analyze the security issues concerning MANETs. A
node is malicious if it is an attacker that cannot
authenticate itself as a legitimate node due to the lack of
valid cryptographic information. The attack on MANET
can be classified as the active and passive attacks:
Passive attacks: A passive routing attack does not disrupt
the operation of a routing protocol, but only attempts to
discover valuable information by listening to the routing
traffic. Hence such attacks are difficult to detect.
Active attacks: An active attack attempts to improperly
modify data, gain authentication, or procure
authorization by inserting false packets into the data
steam or modifying packets transition through the
network. Active attack are of two types: external and
internal. An external attack is one caused by nodes that
do not belong to the network. An internal attack is one
from compromised or hijacked nodes that belong to the
network. As malicious nodes already belong to the
network as authorized parties, and hence are protected
with network security mechanisms and services,
therefore, internal attacks are more severe.
Black hole: An attacker can project itself as having
shortest route to a destination, whose data packets it
wants to intercept, thereby causing the source to send
data packets via this node. A malicious node receiving
the RREQ may claim to have route to the desired
destination by sending RREP back to the originator. If
the source receives this RREP first then it sends all data
packets via this malicious node and thereby leaving the
fate of those data packets on the malicious node. The
malicious node now discards or consumes all the data
packets, leading to the complete loss of all data packets.
Gray hole: An attacker forwards all RREQs and RREPs
but forwards only a few data packets, dropping all other
data packets. Clearly it points out a lapse in the routing
protocol. This type of attack is known as gray hole
problem. By nature, it belongs to the set of internal
active attacks.
Worm hole: Worm hole is a collection of two or more
malicious nodes belonging to the ad hoc network that are
connected by a private network connection. Suppose two
nodes A and B make a wormhole. Then A forwards all
packets that it receives to B through the worm hole to be
forwarded by B normally, similarly, B forwards all
packets to A, that it receives, through the wormhole. It
clearly disrupts routing by short circuiting the normal
flow of routing packets [14] .
Denial of service (DoS): The DoS attack results when
the network bandwidth is hijacked by a malicious node.
It can be done in several ways. One way is to flood any
centralized resource so that the network crashes or no
longer operates correctly. For example, a malicious node
by generating frequent route requests can make the
network resources unavailable to other nodes.
Routing table overflow: A malicious node, by
generating route requests to several non-existent
destinations, causes other nodes to create several entries
in their routing table, one for each desired (non-existent)
destination to keep the address of the sender in the
precursor field so that it can transmit RREP or RERR
back to the originator, and leads to the overflow of their
routing table. When the routing table of a node
overflows, then it doesnt entertain any further route
requests (including those for existent destinations from
non-malicious nodes). As a result the route discovery
process gets adversely affected.

V .ENERGY CONSUMPTION
Energy is a critical parameter in MANETs. Battery-
powered nodes try to conserve energy by transmitting
only when absolutely necessary. An attacker, by sending
route requests (frequent and unnecessary) or forwarding
unnecessary packets, makes other nodes consume energy
leading to useless consumption of energy.

VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have viewed the AODV protocol along
with the suggested modification methods. On a platform
like NS2, the method of Kernel modification can be
implemented easily by having access to the definition
files of the AODV protocol. Security issues motivate
many ideas for the improvement of existing AODV
protocol. New protocol can be more secure and energy
efficient than that of existing AODV protocol.

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