JURISDICTION

MA. IMELDA M. MANOTOC vs. HONORABLE COURT

OFAPPEALS and AGAPITA TRAJANO on behalf of the Estate of
ARCHIMEDES TRAJANO
The courts jurisdiction over a defendant is founded on a valid
service of summons. Without a valid service, the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction over the defendant, unless the defendant
voluntarily submits to it. The defendant must be properly apprised
of a pending action against him and assured of the opportunity to
present his defenses to the suit. Proper service of summons is used
to protect ones right to due process.
SIXTO N. CHU vs MACH ASIA TRADING CORPORATION, G.R. No.
184333, April 1, 2013
Also, impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown by
stating that eforts have been made to fnd the defendant personally
and that such eforts have failed. This is necessary because
substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service.
It is a method extraordinary in character, hence, may be used only
as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. The
statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed
strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than
that authorized by statute is considered inefective.
Thus, service on the security guard could not be considered as
substantial compliance with the requirements of substituted
service.
LEAH PALMA vs. HON. DANILO P. GALVEZ, in his capacity as
PRESIDING JUDGE of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOILO
CITY, BRANCH 24; and PSYCHE ELENA AGUDO G.R. No. 165273,
March 10, 2010
1
We have held that a dwelling, house or residence refers to the place
where the person named in the summons is living at the time when
the service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the
country at the time.. It is, thus, the service of the summons
intended for the defendant that must be left with the person of
suitable age and discretion residing in the house of the
defendant. Compliance with the rules regarding the service of
summons is as important as the issue of due process as that of
jurisdiction. Section 7 also designates the persons with whom
copies of the process may be left. The rule presupposes that such a
relation of confdence exists between the person with whom the
copy is left and the defendant and, therefore, assumes that such
person will deliver the process to defendant or in some way give him
notice thereof.
In addition, we agree with petitioner that the RTC had indeed
acquired jurisdiction over the person of private respondent when
the latter's counsel entered his appearance on private respondent's
behalf, without qualifcation and without questioning the propriety
of the service of summons, and even fled two Motions for Extension
of Time to File Answer. In efect, private respondent, through
counsel, had already invoked the RTCs jurisdiction over her person
by praying that the motions for extension of time to fle answer be
granted. We have held that the fling of motions seeking afrmative
relief, such as, to admit answer, for additional time to fle answer,
for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default
with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
1
RAPID CITY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS.
ORLANDO VILLA and LOURDES PAEZ-VILLA G.R. No. 184197
February 11, 2010
It is settled that if there is no valid service of summons, the court
can still acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by
virtue of the latters voluntary appearance. Thus Section 20 of Rule
14 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. The defendants
voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to
service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss
of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the
person shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.


And Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Wilson
Dy Hong Pi and Lolita Dy, et al. enlightens:

Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil
case is acquired either by the coercive power of legal
processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary
appearance in court. As a general proposition, one who
seeks an afrmative relief is deemed to have submitted to
the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule
that we have had occasion to declare that the fling of
motions to admit answer, for additional time to fle
answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to
lift order of default with motion for reconsideration,
is considered voluntary submission to the courts
jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of
conditional appearance, such that a party who makes
a special appearance to challenge, among others, the
courts jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered
to have submitted to its authority.

Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:
(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the
general rule on voluntary appearance;

(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the
court over the person of the defendant must be explicitly
made , i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and

(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to
the jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances
where a pleading or motion seeking afrmative relief is
fled and submitted to the court for resolution.
[7]
(italics
and underscoring supplied)
[G.R. No. 146553. November 27, 2002]
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner, vs. Spouses
WILLIE and JULIE L. EVANGELISTA and LTS PHILIPPINES
CORPORATION, respondents.
A defect in the service of summons, which is apparent on the face of
the return, does not necessarily constitute conclusive proof that
the actual service has in fact been improperly made. In the interest
of speedy justice, the trial court should immediately
ascertain whether the defect is real and, if so, to cause the service
of a new summons thereafter.
It cannot be gainsaid that because she [sherif] is a public ofcer,
she enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of her
duties. To overcome this presumption, clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary must be presented.
Nonetheless, notwithstanding the RTCs lack of jurisdiction, it has
been held that the absence in the sherifs return of a statement
about the impossibility of personal service does not conclusively
prove that the service is invalid. Proof of prior attempts at personal
service may be submitted by the plaintif during the hearing of any
incident assailing the validity of the substituted service. While the
sherifs return carries with it the presumption, albeit disputable, of
regularity in the sense that inter alia, the entries therein are
deemed correct, it does not necessarily follow that an act done in
relation to the ofcial duty for which the return is made was not
done simply because it [was] not disclosed therein. Besides, the
sherifs neglect in making such a disclosure should not unduly
prejudice the plaintif if what was undisclosed was in fact done.
Even if the defect is apparent on the face of the returns, evidence
that would prove proper compliance with the Rules on substituted
service may be presented. To repeat, evidence may be presented to
ascertain whether prior attempts at personal service have in fact
been done. Resort to substituted service may still be valid, if
properly justifed in a hearing to verify the matter. If not, new
summonses should be issued and served properly.
RAMON S. OROSA, JOSE S. OROSA, LIZA O. TRINIDAD, MYRNA
D. DESTURA and ALFREDO S. MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS, BERTAN PRESS and ANTONIO J.
BERTOSO, respondent. [G.R. No. 118696. September 3, 1996]
Admittedly, the sherif's return dated 8 February 1993 is bereft of
any particulars on the impossibility of personal service on
petitioners within a reasonable time. However, they are deemed to
have waived any faw in the court's jurisdiction arising from a
defective service of summons. For, instead of entering a special
appearance questioning the propriety of the service of summons,
hence, the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court over
petitioners, they fled a motion for additional time to fle answer
on 24 February 1993, which was beyond the reglementary
period. In efect, they voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of
the court. Consequently, whatever defect there was in the mode
of service of summons was deemed waived and the court acquired
jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners by their voluntary
submission thereto.

To overcome the presumption arising from the sherif's return, the
evidence must be clear and convincing. But petitioners failed to
overcome this presumption. Hence, there is no question that the
motion for additional time to fle answer was submitted beyond the
period fxed by law. The granting of a motion to fle an answer after
the prescriptive period had expired is a matter addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court, and once this discretion is
exercised by the denial of the motion this Court will not interfere
therewith unless it can be shown that the trial court has gravely
abused its discretion, something which petitioners failed to do in
the instant case.
It is settled that parties and counsel should not assume that
courts are bound to grant the time they pray for.
[G.R. No. 154295. July 29, 2005]
METROMEDIA TIMES CORPORATION and/or ROBINA
GOKONGWIE-PE, petitioner, vs. JOHNNY PASTORIN, respondent.
A cursory glance at these cases will lead one to the conclusion that
a party who does not raise the jurisdictional question at the outset
will be estopped to raise it on appeal.
As early as Martinez vs. De la Merced, 174 SCRA 182, the Supreme
Court has clearly ruled thus: For it has been consistently held by
this Court that while lack of jurisdiction may be assailed at any
stage, a partys active participation in the proceedings before a
court without jurisdiction will estop such party from assailing such
lack of jurisdiction.
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
YUSEN AIR AND SEA SERVICE PHILIPPINES, INCORPORATED VS.
ISAGANI A. VILLAMOR, G.R. No. 154060 August 16, 2005
While paragraph 3 above refers to all money claims of workers, it
is not necessary to suppose that the entire universe of money
claims that might be asserted by workers against their employers
has been absorbed into the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
Labor Arbiters. For it cannot be presumed that money claims of
workers which do not arise out of or in connection with their
employer-employee relationship, and which would therefore fall
within the general jurisdiction of regular courts of justice, were
intended by the legislative authority to be taken away from the
jurisdiction of the courts and lodged with Labor Arbiters on an
exclusive basis. The Court, therefore, believes and so holds that the
money claims of workers referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 217
embraces money claims which arise out of or in connection with the
employer-employee relationship, or some aspect or incident of such
relationship. Put a little diferently, that money claims of workers
which now fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
Labor Arbiters are those money claims which have some reasonable
causal connection with the employer-employee relationship.
As it is, petitioner does not ask for any relief under the Labor Code.
It merely seeks to recover damages based on the parties contract of
employment as redress for respondent's breach thereof. Such cause
of action is within the realm of Civil Law, and jurisdiction over the
controversy belongs to the regular courts. More so must this be in
the present case, what with the reality that the stipulation refers to
the post-employment relations of the parties.
[G.R. No. 128024. May 9, 2000]
BEBIANO M. BAEZ, petitioner, vs. HON. DOWNEY C. VALDEVILLA
and ORO MARKETING, INC., respondents.
Thus, the jurisdiction of regular courts was upheld where the
damages, claimed for were based on tort, malicious prosecution
]
, or
breach of contract, as when the claimant seeks to recover a debt
from a former employee or seeks liquidated damages in enforcement
of a prior employment contract.