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over signed copies of statements of count (Form XIV and XV) to the agents of each
contestant The !!! complained after the "##$ elections that the presiding officers did
not put their original signatures on the statements so that these couldn%t &e used as
evidence in courts The complaint was redressed and the rules amended requiring the
presiding officers to also put their thum& impressions on the statements
The rule was made watertight &ut the pro&lem has persisted in all later elections The
'lection (ommission of !akistan ('(!) had to issue a directive, one month after the
polling in )$"*, asking the returning officers to make the forms pu&licl+ availa&le ,ut
this was simpl+ not followed in man+ cases
-aking the rules impregna&le is onl+ half the .o& done/ it is the other half 0 their
implementation 0 that is where the real pro&lems lie There are two ma.or drags on the
'(!%s resolve and capacit+ to implement the law and deliver credi&le and non1
controversial elections
First is the '(!%s relationship with the .udiciar+ (onducting elections is first and last an
administrative .o&, and those who are .udges &+ training and description do not qualif+ to
perform it The misconception a&out their proficienc+ pro&a&l+ originates from the
constitutional provision that calls for appointing retired .udges as election commissioners
The underl+ing sense is that since .udges are perceived as non1partisan, elections under
their leadership will &e non1controversial
Former president 2hulam Ishaq 3han improvised upon this to hand over constituenc+1
level duties to .udicial officers as well, in the "#44 elections 5ince then, seven elections
have &een held practicall+ &+ the .udiciar+ under the same scheme &ut ironicall+ none
escaped &eing tainted The writing on the wall is that the experiment has failed/ and this
must &e acknowledged and corrected
The administration of elections &+ the .udiciar+ also forms a clear case of conflict of
interest &ecause as an institution, it administers these and then itself ad.udicates upon
conflicts arising out of their administration 6cknowledging this, the 7ational 8udicial
!olic+ -aking (ommittee had in )$$# decided not to lend its personnel to the '(! &ut
retracted its decision &efore the )$"* elections in the 9larger national interest%
The involvement of the .udiciar+ in elections has confused two separate constitutional
spaces reserved for two different constitutional &odies It has made the elections appear
like an auxiliar+ function of the .udiciar+ while the .o& of the '(! has &een reduced to
issuing notifications, directives and statements
In this confusion, the 'lection (ommission has lost its freedom to make decisions and
act The two functions not onl+ need to &e separated from each other, the '(! also needs
some kind of immunit+ from .udicial intervention 'lections are a time1&ound exercise
and their administrators need a&ilit+, agilit+ and creativit+ in order to &e a&le to respond
to an+ unpredicta&le situation at an+ hour If solutions are to &e su&.ected to long
procedural dela+s, the+ are &ound to prove useless
The second most important area where the '(! needs to &e empowered is its control over
the civil administration It needs the services of an arm+ of government emplo+ees to
perform duties at the polling station level It needs to wean these seconded personnel off
an+ political affiliations, guard them against threats of violence from vested interest
groups, check an+ negligence on their part and make them work efficientl+
:eveloping other stakes in civil administration is important as peace and order in societ+
are a prerequisite for elections The '(! also needs the support of all government
departments, including the law1enforcement agencies to ensure that the (ode of (onduct
for pre1election campaigns is strictl+ followed, that voters are not &ri&ed or coerced, and
that there is a level pla+ing field for all contestants
The '(! has not &een a&le to ensure all of this to the satisfaction of the parties ;ne
likel+ reason is that this area too is contested &+ two constitutional &odies, the '(! and
the caretaker government The+ are &oth entrusted with the same responsi&ilit+ of
ensuring neutralit+ in government This duplication not onl+ creates confusion &ut also
works as a disincentive for the '(! to take the initiative, &esides allowing the two to
&lame failures on each other
Interim set1ups have traditionall+ served as a constitutional window for the esta&lishment
to intervene in the electoral process The s+stem of appointment was changed
su&stantiall+ through the "4th 6mendment &ut caretaker set1ups too have failed to meet
expectations
The '(! thus needs a new legal framework for its engagement with the civil
administration There is no harm in taking a leaf from the Indian experience where no
caretakers are appointed and the election commission virtuall+ takes over the entire state
machiner+, as soon as the election process &egins and until the results are announced
The 'lectoral <eforms (ommittee will have to avoid indulging in rephrasing old laws
and show some creativit+ <eaders should &e reminded that !akistan achieved an
important milestone in its first1ever democratic transition, from one elected government
to the next, in )$"* The su&sequent milestone should not &e the next transition &ut
electoral reforms as onl+ these can take polls and democrac+ a qualitative step forward
The writer works with Punjab Lok Sujag, a research and advocacy group.
Published in Dawn, July 2th, 2!"#
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