You are on page 1of 3

SOLID HOMES, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No.

84811-1989

FACTS:
This is a Petition to reverse a decision of the Court of
Appeals sustaining the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City over a complaint filed by a buyer, the herein private
respondent, against the petitioner, for delivery of title to a
subdivision lot.
The complaint was filed Teresita Payawal against Solid
Homes, Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Solid
Homes moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
court had no jurisdiction, this being vested in the National Housing
Authority under PD No. 957. The motion was denied. The
defendant repleaded the objection in its answer. After trial,
judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff.
ISSUE: Whether the CA has jurisdiction over the case.
RULING:
The applicable law is PD No. 957, as amended by PD No.
1344, entitled "Empowering the National Housing Authority to
Issue Writs of Execution in the Enforcement of Its Decisions Under
Presidential Decree No. 957."
SECTION 1. ...the National Housing Authority shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following
nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision
lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractuala statutory
obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit
against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
The language of this section leaves no room for doubt that
"exclusive jurisdiction" over the case between the petitioner and
the private respondent is vested not in the Regional Trial Court but
in the National Housing Authority.
DELBROS HOTEL CORPORATION, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, G.R. No. 72566 April 12, 1988

FACTS:
HILTON and Chapman went to the Intermediate Appellate
Court on a petition for certiorari to which the petition was
assigned, issued a temporary restraining order.
DELBROS filed in a motion to admit Supplemental
Complaint. The Supplemental Complaint impleaded as an additional
defendant Flaviano Mosquera, Jr., in his capacity as Comptroller of
the Manila Hilton and sought the confirmation by the trial court of
the termination of the Management Contract effected by DELBROS
through the service upon HILTON of the five-day notice of
termination. However DELBROS had filed a motion to declare
defendants HILTON and Chapman in default with respect to the
supplemental complaint. This was granted on even date and
DELBROS was allowed to present its evidence ex-parte in support
of its supplemental complaint.

ISSUE:
Whether the order of default valid for failure to plead to the
Supplemental Pleading.

RULING:
"A supplemental pleading is not like an amended pleading
substitute for the original one. It does not supersede the
original, but assumes that the original pleading is to stand, and the
issues joined under the original pleading remain as issues to be
tried in the action." There was no necessity for requiring them to
plead further to the Supplemental Complaint. Consequently, the
trial judge did not have a legal ground for declaring them in default
for such failure to plead.



REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No.
90478 November 21, 1991

FACTS:
Republic of the Philippines(through PCGG) filed a complaint
against Jose L. Africa, Manuel H. Nieto, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos,
Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, and
Potenciano Ilusorio (collectively, the respondents)
for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution,and damages before the Sandiganbayan.
Africa, as an ETPI stockholder, filed a petition for certiorari,
with prayer for a temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction
with the Sandiganbayan seeking to nullify the order of the
Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE:
Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
jurisdiction on holding that the 1998 resolution already attained
finality and that the 3
rd
motion for reconsideration of the petitioner
is prohibited.

RULING:
A judgment or order is considered final if the order disposes
of the action or proceeding completely, or terminates a particular
stage of the same action; in such case, the remedy available to an
aggrieved party is appeal.
The Sandiganbayan undoubtedly erred on a question of
law in its ruling, but this legal error did not necessarily amount to a
grave abuse of discretion in the absence of a clear showing that its
action was a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
affecting its exercise of jurisdiction.
[62]
Without this showing, the
Sandiganbayans erroneous legal conclusion was only an error of
judgment, or, at best, an abuse of discretion but not a grave one.



CHARLES N. UY, vs. JUDGE NELIDA S. MEDINA,

FACTS:
The records show that complainant filed a complaint against
his parents, spouses Carlos and Nelia Uy, for recovery of personal
property. A Preliminary Conference Order was issued after the
termination of the preliminary conference. Defendants served a
copy of their Position Paper upon the complainant by registered
mail and filed its original copy with the trial court. An Affidavit of
Service/Filing was attached to the said Position Paper with an
explanation that personal service was not resorted to because of
time constraint, lack of manpower and in order to minimize
expenses. Complainant's Position Paper, on the other hand, was
personally served upon the defendants and filed with the court.
Complainant filed a Motion to Consider Defendants' Position
Paper as Not Filed for their alleged failure to comply with Section
11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. Respondent judge denied the
motion.
ISSUE:
Whether the Respondent Judge committed gross ignorance
of the law by violating Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court.

RULING:
Under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil procedure,
personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other
modes of service or filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever
personal service or filing is practicable, in light of the circumstances
of time, place and person, personal service or filing is
mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable
may resort to other modes be had, which must then be
accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service
or filing was not practicable to begin with.
The respondent judge found defendants' explanation as to
why they did not personally serve their position paper
plausible. We do not find any abuse in the exercise of such
discretion properly accorded to the respondent judge.
VIEWMASTER CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, vs. HON. MAULIT
G.R. No. 136283. February 29, 2000Y

FACTS:
In affirming the ruling of the LRA, the Court of Appeals held
that petitioner failed to adequately describe the subject property in
the Complaint and in the application for the registration of a notice
of lis pendens. CA also ruled that a notice of lis pendens may be
registered only when an action directly affects the title to or
possession of the real property. In the present case, the
proceedings instituted by petitioner affected the title or
possession incidentally only, not directly.
Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner failed to adequately describe
the subject property in its complaint and in the notice of lis
pendens.

RULING:
The Petition is meritorious. We agree with the petitioner. A
notice of lis pendens, which literally means "pending suit," may
involve actions that deal not only with the title or possession of a
property, but even with the use or occupation thereof.
A notice of lis pendens may be registered when an action or a
proceeding directly affects the title to the land or the buildings
thereon; or the possession, the use or the occupation thereof.
Hence, the registration of such notice should be allowed if the
litigation involves the enforcement of an agreement for the co-
development of a parcel of land.



ALC/02-03-2014/civprocasedigests

Smile though your hand is aching!!!