Philosophy of Science

VOL. 28 April, I 96 I NO. 2

AN INTRODUCTION TO SIMPLICITY
RICHARD RUDNER
Michigan State University
The f our papers which f ollow this introductory essay were presented at
the 1960 meetings of the A.A.A.S. in New York City. They were given at
a session devoted to the topic of Simplicity of Scientif ic Theories, and spons-
ored jointly by Section L and the Philosophy of Science Association.
For good reasons, each of the papers appears in this issue essentially in
the f orm in which it was of f ered at the session.' Each of the papers was written
independently of the others-indeed, the occasion of the meeting was the
f irst time any of the authors had access to all of the other papers. None of
the essays, theref ore, evidences the luxury, af f orded the present introductory
remarks, f or ref lection on the other papers of the session, or f or response
to the lively discussion which f ollowed the reading of the papers, or f or
second thoughts in general.
In this light, and considering the breadth of interpretation which has
traditionally marked the notion of Simplicity, the relevance which each of
the papers has f or the others is a relatively f ortuitous but nonetheless happy
circumstance f or which we must be gratef ul. I shall comment brief ly below
on the relationships which I f ind noteworthy among the essays. I think,
however, that it will be more appropriate to begin by f ocusing attention on
the importance of contemporary treatments of Simplicity and on what appears
to be a pivotal distinction between two of the relevant senses in which the
term is currently being used.
Whatever may be the case f or the serenity or unself consciousness with which
practicing scientists go about the business of accepting or rejecting theories,
it will surely not be denied that the problem of constructing an adequate
philosophical rationale f or such practice remains in its perennial state of crisis.
The recent past has witnessed monumental and illuminating attempts (such
as those by Reichenbach and Carnap) to provide that rationale essentially
in the f orm of a logic of induction. For the purposes of our present concern
it is not necessary to rehearse considerations of the cogency of the objections
1
Owing to its length it was necessary f or Prof essor Bunge to actually read a somewhat com-
pressed version of the paper he contributed. The complete version is published here.
109
110 RICHARD S. RUDNER
that advocates of "objective" or "statistical" theories of induction have hurled
against advocates of "logical theories of conf irmation" or, conversely, to
consider the objections which advocates of the latter view have hurled against
those of the f ormer. It is not even necessary to go into the arguments which
partizans of neither of these points of view have leveled against both, nor
into those which partizans of either have leveled against such "third" f orces
as recent theories of "Subjective" probability. The unhappy f act is that in
the matter of cogent objections against theories of inductive inf erence, the
recent philosophical literature provides us with an embarrassment of riches.
The reason that none of these considerations need detain us f or the present,
however, is to be f ound in the f act that even if any of the types of programs
f or inductive logic mentioned above could be brought to the successf ul
consummation its proponents apparently envisage, we would still not have
been provided with a complete or general basis f or choice among theories.
There are weights other than that of evidential strength whose assessment
is a necessary condition f or rational (i.e. scientif ically reliable) choice among
hypotheses.2 One of these additional weights we may ref er to as the cost
associated with the acceptability of any hypothesis; and philosophers and many
scientists (e.g., some who are concerned with Decision Theory) have in recent
years come to give the explication of this notion something like the attention
it has always warranted. Whatever the importance or the poignancy of the
problems which attend the explication of cost, however, our concern here
is not with it but with still a third weight whose explication is also a necessary
condition f or the achievement of an adequate theory of inductive
inf erence: I ref er, of course, to simplicity.
Now, allusions to simplicity in the literature of Science and of Philosophy
are innumerable and immensely varied in intent and nuance; and bef ore any
f ruitf ul consideration of the topic or its importance can be undertaken it is
necessary to delimit to some extent the range of our attention. This can be
accomplished by f itting, with a minimum of procrustean f erocity, all of the
varied ref erences to simplicity which we are heir to under a relatively un-
complicated classif icational schema.3 Uses of 'simplicity' tilen, may be
classif ied either as Ontological (i.e., extra-linguistic) or Descriptional (i.e.,
linguistic). Sub-classif ications under these main rubrics are Subjective (i.e.,
psychological) and Objective (i.e., non-psychological). Moreover, under the
rubric, Descriptional, it is also f ruitf ul to distinguish Notational and Logical
(or Structural) as f urther subclassif ications. A f ew examples will be suf f icient
2
In making this claim I do not, of course, intend to minimize the importance of the attainment
of an adequate measure of evidential strength f or hypotheses as a desideratum of Philosophy
of Science. I have urged more f ully than is appropriate here my conclusions about the insuf f i-
ciency of any measure of evidential strength in [23] and [24], and more recently in a paper, "The
Reducibility of Types of Weights in the Acceptance of Scientif ic Theories: Evidence, Cost,
and Formal Simplicity," read in Stanf ord at the 1960 Meetings of the International Congress f or
Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science.
3 The one we are about to employ is suggested though not in precisely this f orm in Chapter 1
of Dr. Ackermann's searching thesis, [1].
AN INTRODUCTION TO SIMPLICITY 111
to provide the very rough degree of clarity which is all we presently require
f or these six category terms.
Consider, f irst, ontological simplicity. It is quite clear that a great many
people who have employed 'simplicity' or its cognates have used the term
to attribute certain characteristics to the Universe rather than to our descrip-
tions of the Universe. For such individuals it has been the extra-linguistic
universe, or some segment of it, which is said to exhibit or to f ail to exhibit
some degree or other of simplicity. Moreover, these attributions of ontological
simplicity may be classed as objective or subjective in accordance with whether
their import was that the universe is (or is not) simple independently of how
we perceive it or whether the (extra-linguistic) universe is (or is not) perceived
by us to be simple. If the intent of the usage is that 'simplicity' is a predicate
of the universe independently of the perception of it, we shall classif y that
usage as objective-ontological; if 'simplicity' is taken as a predicate of our
(extra-linguistic) responses to the (extra-linguistic) universe, we shall classif y
it as subjective-ontological. Attributions of simplicity both to the universe and
our extra-linguistic responses to it, of course, abound in the literature of
science and metaphysics. Such attributions have always seemed f undamentally
obscure to me. Yet, having reminded ourselves of their occurrence, we need
linger no longer over them than is required to note that it is not ontological
simplicity but descriptional simplicity which is the f ocus of interest of theories
of inductive inf erence and particularly of the f our essays here being in-
troduced.4
Turning f rom ontological to linguistic considerations, then, we may, under
the category of Descriptional Simplicity, at once distinguish two kinds:
Notational and Logical. Whether any general distinction between the
Notational and the Logical simplicity of descriptions is ultimately tenable
is, again, not in point here. In employing it, I wish merely to call attention
to such dif f ering properties of descriptions as, say, their brevity in contrast
with the degrees of the predicates they contain. An attribution of simplicity
to a description on the basis of such a notational property of it as the number
of (e.g., alphabetical) characters it contains, independently of anyone's
psychological responses to such a property, will be classed as an instance
of Objective-Notational simplicity. On the other hand, an attribution of
simplicity to a description on the basis of the f amiliarity of the notation, or
its elegance, or its convenience, or its ef f iciency f or manipulation, or any
aesthetic quality it has, etc., will count as an instance of Subjective-Notational
Simplicity.
In the sense just indicated, then, neither objective nor subjective notational
simplicity is our topic of concern in what f ollows. What is being attended
to is the logical (or, alternatively, the f ormal) simplicity of descriptions-and
especially those descriptions which constitute scientif ic theories. Moreover,
4
This remark should be qualif ied: the survey of various types of simplicity in Prof essor
Bunge's essay doubtless encompasses more than what is ref erred to as "descriptional simplicity"
above.
112 RICHARD S. RUDNER
since our interest is not in how people psychologically respond to logical
properties of theories, we may characterize our f ield of attention as Objective-
Logical Simplicity. Hereaf ter in these comments ref erences to simplicity,
unless otherwise qualif ied, are intended as ref erences to Objective-Logical
Simplicity.
Realization of the importance of considerations of simplicity f or the Philos-
ophy of Science is a phenomenon of the relatively recent past. This is not
altogether surprising in view of the f act that advances in Logic, upon
application of which much of the signif icant work accomplished has depended,
are themselves phenomena of this century. Despite the importance of achieving
an adequate explication of the concept, sustained and signif icant work on its
accomplishment has thus f ar been undertaken by only a relatively small circle
of philosophers. In the quite recent past this circle has slowly widened as
interest in the problem has come to be quickened or inspired under the impetus
of the positive and detailed results achieved especially by Prof essor Goodman.
In any case, however slowly launched, work by an increasing number of able
men, is now under way and we can look f orward with hopef ul excitement
to the solution of problems about simplicity which once appeared well nigh
insuperable.
Perhaps the importance of attaining an adequate explication of simplicity
can best be indicated by pointing out some aspects of its connection with
systematism. On this score, Goodman's opening remarks in a recent article
are as illuminating and pithy as any which have been made on the topic:
All scientif ic activity amounts to the invention of and the choice among systems of
hypotheses. One of the primary considerations guiding this process is that of simplicity.
Nothing could be much more mistaken than the traditional idea that we f irst seek a
true system and then, f or the sake of elegance alone, seek a simple one. We are inevitably
concerned with simplicity as soon as we are concerned with system at all; f or system
is achieved just to the extent that the basic vocabulary and set of f irst principles used
in dealing with the given subject matter are simplif ied. When simplicity of basis vanishes
to zero-that is, when no term or principle is derived f rom any of the others-system
also vanishes to zero. Systematization is the same thing as simplif ication of basis.
Furthermore, in the choice among alternative systems, truth and simplicity are not
always clearly distinguishable f actors. (p. 1064, [12]).
System is no mere adornment of Science, it is its very heart. To say this
is not merely to assert that it is not the business of Science to heap up
unrelated, haphazard, disconnected bits of inf ormation, but to point out that
it is an ideal of science to give an organized account of the universe-to
connect, to f it together in logical relations the concepts and statements
embodying whatever knowledge has been acquired. Such organization is, in
f act, a necessary condition f or the accomplishment of two of Science's chief
f unctions: explanation and prediction.
The work that has been done, and the work currently being done so f ar
as it is manif est, on objective-f ormal simplicity cannot plausibly be viewed
AN INTRODUCTION TO SIMPLICITY 113
to have brought us to a complete and adequate explication of the concept.
It has, f or its students, had the contrary ef f ect of bringing a clearer realization
of precisely how its problems ramif y and of how much remains to be done.
Nevertheless, if much remains to be done, what has already been done can
f airly be said to have gotten the enterprise well under way and to give great
promise of continued progress. And this is a towering accomplishment; f or,
hopelessness in the f ace of the problem of clarif ying simplicity or (more or
less disguised) f light f rom the problem have been the almost universal
responses of the keenest intelligences which in the past have conf ronted it
and its manif estations in the literature. Let us, even if brief ly and too
simply,
review this accomplishment.
Each of two major avenues of approach, has been f requently ref erred to
as a concern with f ormal simplicity. Yet, the two are f undamentally distinct
and there is reason to regard with some misgiving (as I shall try to show
below), this classif ication f or one of the approaches. One of these lines of
inquiry, the newer of them, has led toward an explication of the notion of
the measurement of the f ormal simplicity of conceptual (i.e. predicate) bases
of descriptional systems or theories. The considerable positive results which
have been f orthcoming are essentially the contribution of one man, Nelson
Goodman; and they are, without doubt, results which f all under the category
of objective-logical simplicity as it has been delineated above. The second
line of inquiry, an older one, is associated with "the problem of curve f itting."
The notion that in conf rontation with data, representable as a set of graph
points, the scientist should "induce to" the simplest ("smoothest") curve or
f unction descriptive of that data, is of course, not unhackneyed. Such an
admonition obviously raises the problem of how the simplest f unction among
the alternatives available is to be discriminated. What would be cogent criteria
of simplicity here? In light of what has been said above our interest will
not be engaged by attempts to provide answers which are essentially ontological
or subjective in character. In connection with criteria of objective simplicity,
f or the curve f itting problem over the past f ew decades, the work of
three men, Harold Jef f reys, K. R. Popper, and John Kemeny, (see
bibliography appended), is especially noteworthy. Their problem is so of ten
ref erred to as work on "the problem of inductive simplicity" that I shall f or
the present adopt this term though I believe it to be somewhat misleading.
In discussing results accomplished by Goodman on the problem of
simplicity of predicate bases and by the others mentioned on the problem
of inductive simplicity I can, of course, here do no justice at all to the
f ormidability of the specif ic and detailed problems they address, or the
complexity and precision of their ef f orts, or the perspicacity of their
conclusions. Accordingly, no such justice will be aspired to; I shall be content
to convey only the most general impression of the nature of each of these
lines of inquiry in the hope that it may lead those unf amiliar with the relevant
literature to items of the appended bibliography.
It might be thought that attempts such as Goodman's to clarif y the notion
114 RICHARD S. RUDNER
of systemic simplicity would have an obvious f ocus on the simplicity properties
of sets of postulates. Thus, a normal f irst impulse might be to say that of
two otherwise equally adequate theories the one with the f ewer postulates
was objectively the simpler. But little ref lection is needed to show both that
this suggestion is unhelpf ul and also that its very lack of promise leads naturally
to consideration of the simplicity of a theory's set of primitive predicates.
For, the f inite number of postulates of any theory can be trivially reduced
to 1 by the simple operation of conjunction. By the criterion of number of
postulates every theory would be equivalent to some theory which was
maximally simple. Nor would it be possible to ameliorate this unwelcome
result by any evident stipulation regarding the number of conjuncts in a set
of postulates. For if the import of such a stipulation is, f or example, that a
postulate whose f orm is
(1) f *gX
is less simple than a postulate whose f orm is
(2) hx
then the def ectiveness of that stipulation becomes clear as soon as it is realized
that it is always trivially possible to construct, i.e., to def ine or explicate a
predicate, h, such that
(3) hx=- (f - g$)
will be logically true. Accordingly, any postulate of f initely many conjuncts
is trivially reducible to a postulate of one conjunct and by such a criterion
all postulates must be regarded as equally simple. Even this unelaborate
example indicates that to get at a relevant sense of 'simplicity' we must go
beyond considerations of the number of , or gross logical structure of , postulates
and come to grips with the logical structure of the predicate bases of theories.
Since it is plausible to assume that the theories we are interested in all
share a common logical apparatus this means that attention turns to the f ormal
simplicity of the extra-logical predicates. And this is, indeed, the route which
Goodman f ollows. In the course of several years of work and through a process
of increasingly successf ul modif ications he has been able to construct a calculus
of predicate simplicity which provides a measure of the simplicity of predicate
bases of every relevant logical kind.5 In general, and necessarily vaguely,
Goodman's assignments of simplicity values may be thought of as depending
on the manner in which the extra-logical predicates of a theory organize, by
virtue of such of their logical properties as ref lexivity or symmetry, the
entities comprising the total extension of the theory.
In coming to understand the import of Goodman's work it is
especially
important to avoid a conf usion (not always avoided by earlier commentators
on his work (see [1], [20], [25], and again especially [9]) between the simplicity
of a basis and its power. The sets of predicates of two systems, S and S'
5
For an explanation of the crucial notion of relevant kind, see [12], and especially [9].
AN INTRODUCTION TO SIMPLICITY 115
are equally powerf ul if the sets are interdef inable. Suppose that no predicate
of the set in S is def ined by any other in S. If the power of a basis were the
same thing as its simplicity, "no simpler basis f or S . . . [could be arrived
at than] . . . by taking all the predicates of S as primitive" (p. 430 [9]). But,
it is precisely the greater simplicity of an S' whose primitive basis is "narrower"
(i.e., whose basis systematizes through def ining the remainder of the predicates
by a subset of the total number in the system,) over an S whose basis is the
"widest" possible which we desire to measure. In the last analysis what we
are af ter is the economy of a system; and just as we get an indication of the
economy of an automobile not f rom its having gone a certain distance but
f rom how much gasoline it requires to go that distance, so too with the
economy of systems. The power of a system is strictly analogous to the distance
driven of our car in that knowing it alone will not give us a measure of
economy. To arrive at the economy of a system we require also some measure
of the simplicity of its basis-and it is this that Goodman's calculus attempts
to provide.
What has been said above must here suf f ice as an indication of the sort
of concern that the topic of simplicity of predicate bases involves. In connec-
tion with inductive simplicity I shall not linger on any exposition since three
of the f our panel papers which f ollow scrutinize the major work done on it.
Perhaps, however, some f urther light may be thrown on its relationship to
predicate simplicity and the propriety with which it has been placed in the
category of Objective-Logical Simplicity, by the f ollowing considerations.
First, as Dr. Ackermann points out in his paper (and in more complete
detail in [1]), the concept of inductive simplicity as elaborated by Jef f reys,
Popper, and Kemeny comes to depend on some such notion as the number
of "f reely adjustable parameters" which occur in alternative hypotheses. Now,
Ackermann's discussions have revealed very grave def ects in these specif ic
treatments of inductive simplicity on, so to speak, their own grounds. But,
the viability of some specif ic treatment is not what is at issue here. Even
if such treatments were otherwise wholly successf ul, it is doubtf ul that they
would f urnish any tenable criterion or test of simplicity-especially of f ormal
simplicity. Thus, f or example, there seems to be no good reason f or believing
that a hypothesis with n + 1 parametric expressions is less simple in the sense
of Goodman's calculus than a hypothesis with n parametric expressions.
Goodman's calculus of simplicity is, of course, not even applicable to hypo-
theses. Moreover, the obvious suggestion to classif y one hypothesis as
"simpler" than another if the sum of the complexity values of its predicates
is less than that of the other is, on a little ref lection, seen to be of no avail.
Apart f rom the f act that the sets of predicates, which are constituents of each
of the alternative hypotheses to be assessed, will not in general be identif iable
with sets of primitive predicates of theories, there are perhaps more decisive
reasons f or the f ailure of the suggestion. For one thing, it will not in general
be the case that the set of predicates f rom the hypothesis of n + I parameters,
will have a higher complexity value than sets of predicates f rom alternative
116 RICHARD S. RUDNER
hypotheses of less than n + I parameters. This will depend among other
things, on whether or how some of the predicates in such sets are def inable
by others in the same set. Thus, the criteria urged by proponents of inductive
simplicity will yield judgments in conf lict with what might be thought of
as the obvious application of Goodman's concept in the same situations.
Of course, all that this indicates is that the two concepts6 are not identical;
and this f act would probably not discomf ort the proponent of inductive
simplicity. He would very likely maintain that he had always been aware his
technique measured some other type of simplicity than simplicity of predicate
bases-one whose assessment is, nevertheless, at least equally important. But
if some other kind of simplicity, then what kind? Ontological simplicity surely
is not at issue here; and if it were, could scarcely be def ended. Again, despite
our initial characterization of inductive simplicity as f alling within the
category
of Formal Simplicity, it is puzzlingly dif f icult to make out just what f ormal
or logical properties of hypotheses, i.e., statements, are involved. If con-
siderations of gross logical structure (such as those discussed earlier in
connection with postulational simplicity) are at issue, then we are at once driven
to the f ormal structure of the constituent predicates. And here the logical
characteristics, other than those indexical of simplicity in Goodman's sense,
seem to have relevance to such measures as power rather than simplicity. On
the other hand, if the relevant f ormal properties of hypotheses are construed
as those having to do with their logical strength, then Goodman's and Barker's
criticisms (and especially the counter-examples adduced by the f ormer,) in
the papers which f ollow show decisively that it is a mistake both to identif y
degree of logical strength of a hypothesis with simplicity and also to advocate
the choice of the simplest hypotheses in the relevant situations.
Goodman's arguments and especially his suggestion that simplicity of
hypotheses is associated with their projectibility or the entrenchment of their
predicates, are illuminating and stimulating. Yet, the suggestion, if cogent,
seems to me only to show that in situations, to which some proponents of
inductive "simplicity" have addressed themselves, projectibility, or predicate
entrenchment, rather than the criteria adduced by those proponents will order
our selection of hypotheses. What is not shown is that either projectibility
or entrenchment are identical with, or even reliable indices of , simplicity in
any tenable sense. To be sure, one might take the course of just identif ying
entrenchment with simplicity in some special sense, but in the absence of
any independent evidence f or supposing that degree of entrenchment is a
f unction of the simplicity, in any plausible sense, of the predicates entrenched,
this would seem to be merely a way of undesirably trivializing the entire
problem. In point of f act, Goodman's explication of entrenchment (see [13],
Chapter 4), gives us no reason to suppose any such connection.
All of these considerations persuade me that whatever the cogent criteria
may be f or ordering our selection of hypotheses in those situations (e.g.,
6
I
am assuming here that the proponents of inductive simplicity have "been af ter" some one
concept-an assumption I shall shortly question.
AN INTRODUCTION TO SIMPLICITY 117
curve f itting") that have hitherto been held to involve inductive simplicity,7
it would be misleading to classif y them as considerations of Objective-Logical
Simplicity.
One f inal category remains whose involvement might warrant the claim
that objective measures of simplicity are being sought by proponents of
inductive simplicity. We have not thus f ar discussed Objective-Notational
Simplicity-but here too, such an obvio-us objective characteristic of a f ormula-
tion as its length, seems whole uninteresting and unequal to the burden any
portentous theory of inductive simplicity would make it bear. Patently, with
the relevant qualif ications, a hypothesis with n parametric expressions is
shorter than one with n + 1. Again, patently, it seems sensible to speak of such
shorter hypotheses as being objectively notationally more simple than longer
ones. But (as Goodman points out) any hypothesis is trivially reducible to
one of minimal length, i.e., may be f ormulated in as brief notational compass
as any other; so that on this criterion all hypotheses become in ef f ect objectively
equally simple. And, in any case, perusal of the literature really precludes
the belief that what the proponents of inductive simplicity have been af ter
is an ordering of hypotheses with respect to their brevity.
The f act is that those who held that there is a weight, properly called
"simplicity," which must be assessed in "curve f itting" situations, seem
initially to have been impelled to their analyses by recognition of the inf luence,
not of objective characteristics of hypotheses, but of such subjective character-
istics of descriptions as f amiliarity, or manipulability, or elegance, or in-
telligibility, etc. No doubt, too, the psychological responses these terms
signalize have, through the processes of "socialization" that entrants to the
community of scientists undergo, come to be f airly standard among scientists;
and perhaps this f act made the notion that there was some objective character-
istic of descriptional simplicity operative in "curve f itting" seem more plausible
than can actually be warranted. Whatever its etiology, however, such a
conclusion seems especially misleading in view of the f act that Goodman has
provided us with a quite distinct explication of objective simplicity.
What I have been saying, then, can be summed up by pointing out that
insof ar as the considerations which inf luence hypothesis acceptance in the
"curve f itting" situation can properly be called considerations of simplicity
they are subjective, while, on the other hand, insof ar as they are objective
they are only misleadingly called considerations of simplicity.
In what has gone bef ore I have already indicated that the papers of Good-
man, Ackermann, and Barker, which f ollow are related through the f act that
7
I am assuming that these will be situations in which well articulated and independently
conf irmed theories, which have as consequences hypotheses that "f it" the data, are not available.
If such theories are available we have another kind of (broadly speaking,) inductive situation
and considerations of say, the simplicity of the predicate bases of such theories may well be
quite relevant. These latter kinds of cases, of course, are not in point here as is clearly revealed
by the f act that not the f ormal properties of the curve f itting hypothesis but rather those of the
theory f rom which it is derived become relevant. For an incisive discussion of this point see
Ackermann, [1], especially the last section of Chapter II.
118 RICHARD S. RUDNER
each critically addresses some proponent of inductive simplicity. They also
appear to be united, it should be mentioned, in holding that simplicity is
an important weight in scientif ic acceptances or rejections. In this
respect,
Bunge's paper serves as an admirable f oil f or the other three (and,
accordingly,
served to spark a lively discussion at the actual session) as well as to provide
an extensive survey (one, moreover, valuably inf ormed by the thoroughness
of his knowledge of physical science) of various possible interpretations of
'simplicity.' I do not f ind his arguments f or the conclusion, that Simplicity
is not an important weight in the acceptability of
theories,
wholly compelling
ones. Nevertheless, those arguments together with the erudition arrayed in
their support stimulate and require the most serious consideration. For me
the conclusions f ail to carry conviction on two counts. Though it would be
inappropriate to argue these here, perhaps I can with propriety indicate what
they are:
First, Prof essor Bunge seems to arrive at his conclusion, concerning the
insignif icance of the simplicity as a weight, on the basis of its f ailing to be
a reliable sign of truth. But this seems to me to be an irrelevance, even if
accurate. As indicated above, systematization seems to me as much a desidera-
tum of science as is truth and nothing that Prof essor Bunge writes seems
ponderably to assail the conclusion that simplicity is an important measure
of systematization.
Second, I f ind Prof essor Bunge's discussion sometimes vitiated by the
opacity of some of his categories. In particular, I f ind myself still quite unclear
about what he intends by "semantic," "epistemological" and "metaphysical"
simplicity. It is doubtless inevitable, that the carrying out of so extensive a
treatment of various types of simplicity in the short compass of an article,
prohibits f ull elucidation of every
category.
These, however, seem so crucial
to his discussion, and so interesting in their own right, that it is to be hoped
that Prof essor Bunge will f ind the time to tell us more about them.
REFERENCES
[1] ACKERMANN, Robert. Simplicity and the Acceptability of Scientif ic Theories, Doctoral
Dissertation, Michigan State University, 1960.
[2] BARKER, S. F., Induction and Hypothesis, New York, 1957.
[31
GOODMAN, Nelson, "Axiomatic Measurement of Simplicity," The
J7ournal
of
Philosophy,
LII
(1955),
pp. 709-722.
[4] GOODMAN, Nelson, "An Improvement in the Theory of Simplicity." The
Yournal
of Symbolic
Logic, XIV (1949), pp. 228-229.
[5] GOODMAN, Nelson, "The Logical Simplicity of Predicates." The Journal of Symbolic Logic,
XIV
(1949),
pp. 32-41.
[6] GOODMAN, Nelson, "New Notes on Simplicity," The J7ournal of Symbolic Logic, XVII
(1952),
pp. 189-191.
[7] GOODMAN, Nelson, "On the Length of Primitive Ideas," The Journal of Symbolic Logic,
VIII (1943), p. 39.
[8] GOODMAN, Nelson, "On the Simplicity of Ideas," The Yournal of Symbolic Logic, VIII
(1943),
pp. 107-121.
AN INTRODUCTION TO SIMPLICITY 119
[9] GOODMAN, Nelson, "Recent Developments in the Theory of Simplicity," Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research,
XIX (1959),
pp.
429-446.
[10]
GOODMAN, Nelson, "Sequences." The J3ournal of Symbolic Logic, VI (1941), pp.
150-153.
[1] GOODMAN, Nelson, The Structure of Appearance, Cambridge, 1951.
[12] GOODMAN, Nelson, "The Test of Simplicity," Science, CXXVIII (1958), pp.
1064-1069.
[13] GOODMAN, Nelson, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, Cambridge, 1955.
[14] JEFFREYS, Harold and Dorothy WRINCH, "On Certain Fundamental Principles of Scientif ic
Inquiry," Philosophical Magazine, XLII (1921), pp.
369-390.
[15] JEFFREYs, Harold, Scientif ic Inf erence, Cambridge, 1957.
[16] JEFFREYS, Harold, Theory of Probability, Oxf ord, 1948.
[17] KEMENY, John G., "A Logical Measure Function," The J7ournal of Symbolic Logic, XVIII
(1953),
pp. 289-308.
[18] KEMENY, John G. "A New Approach to Semantics-Part I." The
J7ournal
of Symbolic
Logic, XXI (1956), pp. 1-27.
[19] KEMENY, John G. A Philosopher Looks at Science, Princeton, 1959.
[20] KEMENY, John G. "Two Measures of Simplicity," The Journal of Philosophy, LII (1955),
pp. 722-733.
[21] KEMENY, John G., "The Use of Simplicity in Induction," Philosophical Review, LVII
(1953), pp. 391-408.
[22] POPPER, Karl R. The Logic of Scientif ic Discovery, New York, 1959.
[23] RUDNER, Richard S., "The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments." Philosphy of
Science, XX (1953), pp. 1-6.
[24] RUDNER, Richard S., "Value Judgments in the Acceptance of Theories." Philipp Frank,
ed. The Validation of Scientif ic Theories, Boston, 1956.
[25] SUPPES, Patrick, "Nelson Goodman on the Concept of Logical Simplicity." Philosophy
of Science, XXIII (1956), pp. 153-159.
[26] SVENONIus, Lars, "Def inability and Simplicity." The J7ournal of Symbolic Logic, XX
(1955), pp. 235-250.