Torin Alter, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, USA
Qualia are the subjective aspects, the characteristic properties, of conscious experience. There is exten- sive philosophical debate about how qualia relate to the physical world, and in what terms they can be characterized. INTRODUCTION Conscious experiences involve neural activity and information processing. They also feel a certain way. Consider your visual experience of reading these words, or the auditory and tactile sensations you had when you turned the previous page. There is something it is like to have those experiences. That is, the experiences have certain properties characterizing what it is like to have them. Those properties are known as qualia (singular: quale). C. I. Lewis coined the term in 1929. Common synonyms include `phenomenal properties' and `phenomeno- logical properties', among others. Phenomenally conscious states, by definition, are states with qualia. Recent decades have witnessed vigorous philo- sophical debate about qualia. Most of the contro- versy concerns whether qualia can be adequately characterizedin physical or functional terms. If they cannot, then physicalism and functionalism, two leading theories of mind, are incomplete or false. Other issues include whether qualia exist, which mental states have qualia, how qualia relate to cog- nition, how physical systems such as brains give rise to qualia, how qualia can be scientifically stud- ied, what the neural correlates of qualia are, which creatures have mental states with qualia, and how qualia are known. All of these issues have empirical components. In some cases, such as the neural cor- relates issue, scientific investigation is under way. DO QUALIA EXIST? `Qualia' is sometimes defined narrowly, in ways that give rise to substantive issues about their existence. For example, some reserve the term for properties that are nonphysical by definition. On that usage, the debate over whether conscious ex- periences have irreducibly nonphysical properties (discussed below) is a debate over whether qualia exist. And, to take a second example, Daniel Den- nett (1988) reserves `qualia' for properties that are by definition ineffable, intrinsic, private, and im- mediately apprehensible in consciousness. He at- tributes belief in their existence to various errors. For instance, he argues that conscious experiences seem to have ineffable properties because they have practically ineffable properties. Even the most detailed descriptions one can fathom might fall short of capturing what it is like to, say, taste a pomegranate. Nevertheless, on Dennett's view, a sufficiently detailed, accurate physical/functional description would leave nothing about such an experience unexplained. Thus, Dennett concludes, qualia do not exist. But if qualia are defined broadly, as the proper- ties characterizing what it is like to have conscious experiences, then their existence is hard to deny. Here `qualia' should be understood in the broad sense. QUALIA AND OTHER MENTAL PHENOMENA Mental states with qualia include bodily sensations such as pains, itches, and orgasms, and perceptual experiences such as seeing, hearing, and hallucin- ating. Candidates for other states with qualia in- clude at least: emotions such as lust, fear, and grief; moods such as depression, euphoria, and anxiety; thoughts one thinks silently but explicitly; percep- tion of sentences of a language one understands; and cognitive attitudes such as desire, regret, and even belief. Some use `qualia' in such a way that by definition only sensory states can have qualia. On that usage, CONTENTS Introduction Do qualia exist? Qualia and other mental phenomena Are qualia irreducible? Qualia and causation Qualia and cognitive science Knowledge of qualia Qualia 807 even if there is something it is like to have a belief, beliefs do not have qualia. But on the most common usage, nonsensory states are not excluded from having qualia by definition. There may be a sub- stantive issue about whether there is something it is like to have a belief, and therefore about whether beliefs have qualia. Many believe that sensations have their qualia essentially. On that view, for example, no state that lacks pain qualia would count as pain. Opin- ions vary widely on whether the same should be said of emotions, moods, and other mental states. Disagreements over that issue tend to reflect diver- gent attitudes towards the overall relationship be- tween qualia and cognition. The assumption that qualia and cognition are closely linked has a distinguished history. It was more or less standard in seventeenth- and eight- eenth-century Western philosophy, including espe- cially (though not only) British empiricism and the Kantian tradition. In a different form, it pervades the writings of Brentano and other phenomenolo- gists. (None of those figures used the term `qualia', which was introduced in 1929. The preferred term was `consciousness', and the assumption was usu- ally implicit.) Attitudes have since changed dramatically, due in part to the influence of behaviorism and the subsequent development of cognitive psychology. Many have come to believe that cognition and in- tentionality can and should be investigated without paying attention to qualia. Indeed, that opinion predominates in contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science, and has done so for more than half a century. But there are prominent dissenting opinions. John Searle argues that inten- tionality depends essentially on consciousness, which on his view entails qualia by definition. He writes: There is a conceptual connection between conscious- ness and intentionality that has the consequence that a complete theory of intentionality requires an account of consciousness (1992, p. 132). ARE QUALIA IRREDUCIBLE? How qualia relate to the physical world is contro- versial. Some doubt they can be explained in phys- ical terms at all. The discussions usually centre on thought experiments, to which we now turn. The Knowledge Argument Perhaps the most widely discussed thought ex- periment about qualia is Frank Jackson's (1982) case of Mary, the brilliant scientist. Mary is raised in a black-and-white room, but learns all the phys- ical information (all the physical facts) about human color vision by watching lectures on black- and-white television. That includes all the informa- tion in completed physics, chemistry, and biology, and everything that follows from that information (including functional information). Then she leaves the room and sees colors for the first time. Intui- tively, it would seem that she thereby learns some- thing new. For example, she learns what it is like to see red. So, Jackson concludes, there is nonphysical information about qualia. That is the knowledge argument against physicalism, the view that every- thing, mental and nonmental alike, is physical. Physicalists have challenged each of the know- ledge argument's assumptions. Some question whether one can learn all the physical information without experiencing color first-hand (e.g. Dennett, 1991). That objection is natural but unpopular; physical information as traditionally conceived is fully explicable in the objective language of science. Others (e.g. Lewis, 1988) argue that what Mary acquires when she leaves the room is not informa- tion but rather abilities: abilities to imagine, re- cognize, and remember color experiences. That objection is also relatively unpopular. As many note, what Mary gains when she finally sees red bears characteristic marks of informational know- ledge. For example, the present author (Alter, 2001) argues that she might retain her new knowledge even if she loses the corresponding abilities, which is generally true of informational knowledge. A third objection to the knowledge argument runs as follows: when Mary leaves the room she ac- quires only new ways to represent information al- ready in her possession. Before leaving the room, she uses physical concepts to represent the facts about color qualia. After leaving the room, she uses phenomenal concepts to represent those same facts (e.g. Loar, 1990). That objection is popu- lar. But many remain unconvinced that phenom- enal concepts pick out physical properties rather than distinctive properties of their own. The knowledge argument has much in common with an argument advanced in Thomas Nagel's classic paper `What is it like to be a bat?' (1974). Nagel argues that our inability to adopt the subject- ive viewpoint of echolocating bats prevents us from understanding essential aspects of their mental lives, and that no amount of objective, physical information would render our understanding com- plete. His reasoning is so similar to Jackson's that the knowledge argument is often attributed to both philosophers. 808 Qualia Absent Qualia Another familiar thought experiment is usually discussed in connection with functionalism, the view that mental states consist in their causal rela- tions to one another and to sensory stimuli and behavioral responses. The thought experiment is designed to show that the functional organization of a sentient creature could be realized in a system that has no mental states with qualia. In Ned Block's (1978) example, China's population organ- izes itself in a way that is isomorphic to the functional organization of a human brain. Individ- ual citizens simulate the behavior of individual neurons, radio links correspond to synapses, and the system controls a robotic body. In Block's view, such a system might feel nothing, despite being a functional duplicate of a conscious human being. For example, it might feel no pain. If so, then qualia cannot be explained solely in functional terms. David Chalmers (1996) argues that the absent- qualia hypothesis challenges not only functional- ism but also any version of physicalism. Just as a qualia-free functional duplicate of a conscious human being seems possible, a qualia-free physical duplicate seems possible. Such creatures are known as phenomenal zombies (not to be confused with the Hollywood variety, which may have qualia and are functionally unlike ordinary humans). Functionalists and physicalists sometimes re- spond by challenging the coherence of the absent- qualia hypothesis. For example, Shoemaker (1975) argues that a true functional duplicate of a con- scious human must have introspective beliefs about its own sensory states, which on his view entails that some of its states have qualia. Another reply is to concede that the absent-qualia hypo- thesis is coherent, but deny that it undermines functionalism or physicalism. Here many invoke the Kripkean (Kripke, 1972) notion of a posteriori necessity, which may be explained as follows. That water is H 2 O is a metaphysically necessary truth, which would obtain even if the laws of nature were different. Yet we know that truth only a posteriori; conceptual reflection alone cannot reveal the metaphysical impossibility of water existing without H 2 O. Likewise, the argument runs, conceptual reflection cannot reveal whether absent-qualia cases are metaphysically possible. And, the argument continues, in fact they are not (e.g. Loar, 1990). The latter response, though popular, has its prob- lems. The Kripkean reasoning depends on the clear-cut distinction between the ordinary concept of water, which is given by its superficial features, and water itself, the essence of which consists in its molecular structure. Yet there appears to be no analogous distinction between the ordinary con- cept of pain and pain itself. There might be some- thing, in some possible world, with the superficial appearance of water that is not H 2 O. But, on most views, in any possible world if something feels like pain, then it is pain. Inverted Qualia A third familiar thought experiment, which Locke mentions (1690, bk II, chap. 32), involves inverted qualia. Imagine that your color experiences are inverted relative to mine. For example, ripe toma- toes look to me the color grass looks to you, and vice versa. We both call ripe tomatoes `red' and grass `green', but our qualia are inverted. There is empirical evidence that such cases may actually occur (Nida-Rumelin, 1996). The inverted-qualia hypothesis is that the whole range of one's color qualia could be inverted relative to a functionally identical twin. The debate over inverted qualia parallels the debate over absent qualia in at least three respects. First, like the absent-qualia hypothesis, the in- verted-qualia hypothesis is often used in argu- ments against functionalism. Second, some gener- alize the inverted-qualia hypothesis in the same way, arguing that physically indistinguishable creatures could have inverted qualia just as func- tionally indistinguishable creatures could. Third, reductionists reply in similar ways to the objections based on absent and inverted qualia; they argue that the cases are incoherent or metaphysically impossible. It does not follow, however, that the absent- qualia and inverted-qualia hypotheses stand or fall together. On Shoemaker's view, the former is incoherent but the latter is not. Also, the two hy- potheses raise different problems for reductive ex- planation. The absent-qualia hypothesis challenges reductive explanations of the existence of qualia (of having mental states with any qualia), whereas the inverted-qualia hypothesis challenges reductive explanations of the nature of specific qualia (of having red qualia as opposed to green qualia, for example). Inverted Earth and Swampman Recently, philosophers have been reflecting on two further thought experiments. One is the case of Inverted Earth (Block, 1990). Inverted Earth is just Qualia 809 like Earth, except the sky is yellow, grass is red, and so on. In the middle of the night, kidnappers drug you, transport you to Inverted Earth, and place you in your counterpart's bed. They also change your body pigments and put color- inverting lenses in your eyes, so that you are un- aware of any difference (the two inversions cancel each other out). According to Block, your new linguistic and physical environment will eventually produce changes in the intentional contents of your mental states. In time, your blue experiences will be about yellow things, your red experiences will be about green things, and so on, just like the other inhabit- ants of Inverted Earth. In Block's view, you will then be both intentionally and functionally inverted with respect to your former self, but your qualia will remain invariant. Inverted Earth thus creates another problem for functionalism. Inverted Earth also challenges representational- ism, the view that qualia are just representational or intentional properties. On that view, blue experi- ences are equated with perceptual states that rep- resent blue things. Representationalism is popular among reductionists, who combine it with an ap- propriately reductionist account of mental repre- sentation (e.g. Tye, 1995). But if Block is right about Inverted Earth, then qualia can vary inde- pendently of, and thus fail to reduce to, intentional properties. In response, some reductionists argue that the move to Inverted Earth affects qualia in ways that are not subjectively evident. And many deny that the move affects intentional content. The latter reply sometimes involves an appeal to a teleofunc- tional account of intentionality, on which the inten- tional content of color qualia is determined by the evolutionary history of one's species. Nature designed a certain type of human perceptual state to track blue things. That remains true even though, after enough time on Inverted Earth, that type of perceptual state is usually produced in you by seeing yellow objects. Therefore, the reply runs, your color experiences' intentional content never switches. The idea that qualia are teleofunctional-represen- tational properties encounters a difficulty from an- other thought experiment, devised by Donald Davidson (1986). In Davidson's story, lightning hits a dead tree in a swamp and creates Swamp- man, a molecule-for-molecule duplicate of a normal human being. Swampman has no evolu- tionary history. A fortiori, its experiences did not evolve for any biological purpose. Therefore, the teleofunctional-representation theory seems to lead to the conclusion that Swampman's states lack qualia, which many find counterintuitive. QUALIA AND CAUSATION The Hard Problem and the Explanatory Gap The thought experiments discussed in the previous section relate closely to what Chalmers calls the hard problem of consciousness: how could a phys- ical system such as the brain give rise to qualia? That problem has long seemed intractable, despite substantial progress in neuroscience and cognitive psychology. We are learning much about how the brain processes sensory stimulation, how it inte- grates information, and related matters. But why is such processing accompanied by qualia? There appears to be (in Joseph Levine's (1983) phrase) an explanatory gap: it seems that no amount of func- tional or physical information we might acquire about the brain would explain how it generates conscious experience. Those who deny that qualia exist dismiss the explanatory gap as illusory. But, as noted earlier, those philosophers characteristically use `qualia' in a narrow sense in which qualia are irreducible by definition. Even qualia eliminativists recognize that there is a problem, if only an empirical one, of how the brain generates conscious experience. Many qualia reductionists also regard the hard problem as unremarkable, according it the status of other unsolved problems in science. Eliminativists and reductionists sometimes compare the contrary in- clination to the mindset of the vitalist, who puzzles over how life could emerge from mere physical processes and insists that nothing we could learn from biology or chemistry would remove the mys- tery (e.g. Dennett, 1988). Such comparisons may have value, but they can mislead. In the case of life, the phenomena requiring explanation are plainly complex functions, such as how a living system reproduces and how it adapts to its envir- onment. But whether qualia can be explained func- tionally is a central point of controversy. Other qualia reductionists agree that there is an explanatory gap, but attribute the problem to the distinctive character of phenomenal concepts. Those philosophers deny that the gap has strong metaphysical consequences. In particular, they argue, it does not undermine physicalism, because qualia can be identified a posteriori with physical properties (Loar, 1990). Some are convinced that the hard problem is insoluble. For example, Colin McGinn (1989) argues 810 Qualia that, although there must be a naturalistic solution, we are constitutionally incapable of comprehend- ing it not because it is intrinsically difficult to grasp (though it might be), but rather because our distinctive cognitive capacities are ill suited to the task. Others are more optimistic. On Chalmers' view, a complete explanation will require psycho- physical principles that connect physical processes and qualia. He proposes a framework for such principles, on which information is treated as basic and has both phenomenal and physical aspects. Nagel (1998) also suggests that qualia and physical properties may be manifestations of some deeper phenomenon, but he thinks our present concepts distort the underlying reality. He pro- poses that we try to develop new concepts to close the explanatory gap, modeled on Maxwell's devel- opment of the concept of a magnetic field, which enabled us to comprehend the relationship be- tween electricity and magnetism. Epiphenomenalism The hard problem concerns how qualia are caused. There is also a problem concerning their effects. If qualia reduce to physical properties, then they have the effects of those properties. But what if qualia do not so reduce? How could they affect the physical world? Most agree that the physical world is caus- ally closed, or nearly so; with the exception of some quantumindeterminacy, every physical event has a physical explanation. There would thus seem to be no room for qualia to do any independent causal work. Non-reductionism seems to imply epipheno- menalism, the view that qualia have physical causes but no physical effects. Many find that con- sequence unpalatable, and some consider it a strong argument for reductionism. Some non-reductionists respond by defending epiphenomenalism, but more try to block the infer- ence. One way to do that is to reject the assumption that the physical world is causally closed. Some interactionist dualists (e.g. Eccles, 1986) argue that qualia affect brain processes by filling in gaps resulting from quantum indeterminacy. But few contemporary philosophers or scientists accept interactionist dualism. Many non-reductionists accept the causal closure of the physical, and argue that qualia nevertheless have physical effects. That strategy has been pur- sued in various ways. For example, some claim that certain physical events are causally overdeter- mined: that those events have both phenomenal and physical causes. By causal closure, any phys- ical event has a sufficient physical cause. Therefore, any phenomenal cause it might also have would be causally redundant. That is an odd result, which some find as unacceptable as epiphenomenalism. But most non-reductionist strategies for avoiding epiphenomenalism involve substantive, sometimes surprising, views about causation. Consider a second example. Chalmers describes a view, once proposed by Bertrand Russell (1927), on which the causal powers of qualia derive from intrinsic properties of the physical world. Physical theory characterizes its basic entities relationally. Basic particles, for example, are described in terms of how they interact with other particles and forces. Perhaps fundamental physical entities have intrinsic properties, which ultimately account for their relational properties. If so, then those in- trinsic properties might be phenomenal properties. Or perhaps they are protophenomenal properties, from which both physical and phenomenal proper- ties are constructed. Those ideas may sound strange, but either of them would explain how qualia could have physical effects. Evolution How did qualia come to exist? Many suspect that they provide organisms with evolutionary advan- tages. One hypothesis is that they supply an effi- cient way for organisms to acquire information about their bodies and environments. For example, pain qualia might help creatures capable of loco- motion to avoid bodily damage, and olfactory qua- lia might help them distinguish nutritious food from poison. Such hypotheses can be instructive (see below), but the extent to which they explain the origins of qualia is controversial. Phenomenal zombies, who lack qualia, have exactly the same informational sensitivities as their conscious counterparts. If phe- nomenal zombies are possible, then natural selec- tion alone cannot explain why conscious creatures rather than phenomenal zombies evolved. Further principles may therefore be required to explain why qualia exist (Chalmers, 1996). Additionally, until more is understood about qualia and the brain, many will regard speculation on the evolu- tionary benefits of qualia as premature. QUALIA AND COGNITIVE SCIENCE Cognitive science often concerns qualia, or at least subjective reports of qualia, in some way. Consider three examples. First, studies of the splitting of auditory attention tend to rely on first-person reports of what the subject consciously experiences. Qualia 811 Second, consider the search for the neural correl- ates of consciousness. Some of that research con- cerns the neural correlates of the general state of being conscious, in a sense of `conscious' that im- plies having qualia. And many studies concern the neural correlates of specific qualia. For example, experiments on rhesus macaques, trained to give bar-press reports, indicate strong correlations be- tween specific kinds of visual sensation and activ- ity in the inferior temporal cortex (Logothetis and Schall, 1989). A third example is psychophysics. The Weber Fechner law and Stevens's power law, typical results in the field, relate the intensity of percepts, or qualia, to the intensity of corresponding physical stimuli (e.g. luminance). Or consider studies of sensory illusions such as those produced by the Kanisza square, depicted in Figure 1. Normal sub- jects report seeing a square in the middle of the diagram, with a border as real as if it had been inscribed in ink. They also report perceiving the interior of the square as slightly brighter than the background, although there is no corresponding difference on the printed page. Many regard qualia such as those associated with such illusions as con- stituting a significant part of what psychophysics seeks to explain. Studying qualia scientifically presents methodo- logical difficulties. In general, we have only indir- ect access to a subject's conscious states. We have direct access to our own qualia, but introspective investigation also has well-known problems, which plagued the introspectionist tradition of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Further, first-person reports tend to employ coarse-grained and imprecise language such as `an image of hori- zontal lines' or `a high-pitched tone'. Substantial progress will presumably require developing more precise forms of expression. There may be principled limitations to any such endeavor; some claim, for example, that qualia are ineffable. But it may be possible to devise precise languages that capture at least the structural features of qualia. Indeed, there have been attempts along those lines, such as the quantitative techniques used in psychophysics. Many of the difficulties for the scientific investi- gation of qualia concern the phenomenal character of particular experiences, rather than the existence of qualia. Therefore, studying whether there is something it is like to be a bat is in certain respects more tractable than studying what it is like to be a bat (Allen and Bekoff, 1997). Here evolutionary hypotheses can be of use. For example, if we assume qualia evolved to allow adaptively flexible behavior, we may infer that adaptively flex- ible behavior provides evidence of qualia. Philo- sophical views can also help determine criteria for attributing qualia to other creatures. For example, functionalists might be more inclined than others to base attributions on the presence of certain func- tional properties. KNOWLEDGE OF QUALIA We have direct, first-person knowledge of our own qualia. That much is relatively uncontroversial. But what that knowledge consists in is unclear. Most accept that one can know about one's qualia non- inferentially. For example, one need not infer one's qualia from one's behavior. Beyond that, opinions differ. In the early twentieth century, the heyday of sense-data theories, particularly strong epistemic claims about qualia were common. For example, three sentences after C. I. Lewis coins the term`qua- lia' he writes: `The quale is not the subject of any possible error ' (1929, p. 121). One seldom finds such unqualified claims in contemporary philo- sophy, though philosophers continue to discuss attenuated variants. Philosophical arguments sometimes rely on appeals to first-person knowledge of qualia. The knowledge argument (see above) provides one clear example. The literature on representational- ism provides another. Some representationalists claim that experience is diaphanous: that when you attend introspectively to your experience of the color patch you perceive, you `see right through' your qualia to the features of the patch itself, such as blueness and roundness. And that, they argue, suggests that qualia are just representa- tional properties such as representing blue and representing roundness. But the legitimacy of such appeals to introspection is much disputed. Figure 1. Kanisza square. 812 Qualia References Allen C and Bekoff M (1997) Species of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Alter T (2001) Know-how, ability, and the ability hypothesis. Theoria 67(3): 229239. Block N (1978) Troubles with functionalism. In: Savage CW (ed.) Perception and Cognition: Issues in the foundation of Psychology. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 9, pp. 261325. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. [Reprinted in Block N (ed.) (1980) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1. 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