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Imbong v Comelec Case Digest (consti-1)

Imbong v Comelec September 11, 1970


RA 6132: delegates in Constitutional Convention

Petitioner: Imbong
Respondents: Ferrer (Comelec Chair), Patajo, Miraflor (Comelec Members)
Petitioner: Gonzales
Respondent: Comelec
Ponente: Makasiar

RELATED LAWS:
Resolution No 2 (1967) -Calls for Constitutional Convention to be composed of 2 delegates from each
representative district who shall be elected in November, 1970.
RA 4919 -implementation of Resolution No 2
Resolution 4 (1969)-amended Resolution 2: Constitutional Convention shall be composed of
320delegates a proportioned among existing representative districts according to the population.
Provided that each district shall be entitled to 2 delegates.
RA 6132-Concon Act 1970, repealed RA 4919, implemented Res No. 2 & 4.
Sec 4: considers all public officers/employees as resigned when they file their candidacy
Sec 2: apportionment of delegates
Sec 5: Disqualifies any elected delegate from running for any public office in the election or from
assuming any appointive office/position until the final adournment of the ConCon.
Par 1 Sec 8: ban against all political parties/organized groups from giving support/representing a
delegate to the convention.

FACTS:
This is a petition for declaratory judgment. These are 2 separate but related petitions of running
candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention assailing the validity of RA 6132.Gonzales:
Sec, 2, 4, 5 and Par 1 Sec 8, and validity of entire law Imbong: Par 1 Sec 8

ISSUE:
Whether the Congress has a right to call for Constitutional Convention and whether the parameters set
by such a call is constitutional.

HOLDING:
The Congress has the authority to call for a Constitutional Convention as a Constituent Assembly.
Furthermore, specific provisions assailed by the petitioners are deemed as constitutional.

RATIO:

- Sec 4 RA 6132: it is simply an application of Sec 2 Art 12 of Constitution

-Constitutionality of enactment of RA 6132:

Congress acting as Constituent Assembly, has full authority to propose amendments, or call for
convention for the purpose by votes and these votes were attained by Resolution 2 and 4

- Sec 2 RA 6132: it is a mere implementation of Resolution 4 and is enough that the basis employed for
such apportions is reasonable. Macias case relied by Gonzales is not reasonable for that case granted
more representatives to provinces with less population and vice versa. In this case, Batanes is equal to
the number of delegates I other provinces with more population.
- Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters to qualify/disqualify members thereof.
Furthermore, this disqualification is only temporary. This is a safety mechanism to prevent political
figures from controlling elections and to allow them to devote more time to the Constituional
Convention.
- Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral process and also to assure candidates equal
opportunity since candidates must now depend on their individual merits, and not the support of
political parties. This provision does not create discrimination towards any particular party/group, it
applies to all organizations.



IMBONG VERSUS COMELEC

RELATED LAWS: Resolution No 2 (1967) Calls for Constitutional Convention to be composed of 2
delegates from each representative district who shall be elected in November, 1970.
RA 4919 implementation of Resolution No 2
Resolution 4 (1969) amended Resolution 2: ConCon shall be composed of 320 delegates proportioned
among existing representative districts according to the population. Provided that each district shall be
entitled to 2 delegates.
RA 6132Concon Act 1970, repealed RA 4919, implemented Res No. 2 & 4.
Sec 4: considers all public officers/employees as resigned when they file their candidacy
Sec 2: apportionment of delegates
Sec 5: Disqualifies any elected delegate from running for any public office in the election or from
assuming any appointive office/position until the final adjournment of the ConCon.
Par 1 Sec 8: ban against all political parties/organized groups from giving support/representing a
delegate to the convention.

FACTS: This is a petition for declaratory judgment. These are 2 separate but related petitions of running
candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention assailing the validity of RA 6132.

Gonzales: Sec, 2, 4, 5 and Par 1 Sec 8, and validity of entire law

Imbong: Par 1 Sec 8

ISSUE: Whether the Congress has a right to call for ConCon and whether the parameters set by such a
call is constitutional.

HOLDING: The Congress has the authority to call for a Constitutional Convention as a Constituent
Assembly. Furthermore, specific provisions assailed by the petitioners are deemed as constitutional.

RATIO:

Sec 4 RA 6132: it is simply an application of Sec 2 Art 12 of Constitution
Constitutionality of enactment of RA 6132:
Congress acting as Constituent Assembly, has full authority to propose amendments, or call for
convention for the purpose by votes and these votes were attained by Res 2 and 4
Sec 2 RA 6132: it is a mere implementation of Res 4 and is enough that the basis employed for such
apportions is reasonable. Macias case relied by Gonsales is not reasonable for that case granted more
representatives to provinces with less population and vice versa. In this case, Batanes is equal to the
number of delegates I other provinces with more population.
Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters to qualify/disqualify members thereof.
Furthermore, this disqualification is only temporary. This is a safety mechanism to prevent political
figures from controlling elections and to allow them to devote more time to the Concon.
Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral process and also to assure candidates equal
opportunity since candidates must now depend on their individual merits, and not the support of
political parties. This provision does not create discrimination towards any particular party/group, it
applies to all organizations.

















GONZALES VS. COMELEC [21 SCRA 774; G.R. No. L-28196; 9 Nov 1967]

Facts: The case is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction.
The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives
passed the following resolutions:
1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution of
the Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a
maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned
among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective
inhabitants, although each province shall have, at least, one (1) member;
2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be
composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in the general
elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and
3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, be amended so as to
authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the
aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967, became
Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the
aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general
elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967.


Issue: Whether or Not a Resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates the
Constitution.

Held: Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913 and R. B. H.
Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases must be, as they are
hereby, dismiss and the writs therein prayed for denied, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is
so ordered.

As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally. It may not be contested
except directly, by quo warranto proceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts be questioned upon
the ground that he is merely a de facto officer. And the reasons are obvious: (1) it would be an indirect
inquiry into the title to the office; and (2) the acts of a de facto officer, if within the competence of his
office, are valid, insofar as the public is concerned.

"The judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the
proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent
units thereof."

Article XV of the Constitution provides:
. . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate
and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or
call a contention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when
approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the
people for their ratification.

From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as the
electorate knows that R. B. H. No. 3 permits Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators, even if they
should run for and assume the functions of delegates to the Convention.


Gonzales vs COMELEC
G.R. No. L-28196
21 SCRA 774
November 9, 1967

Petitioner: Ramon A. Gonzalez / Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA)
Respondent: Commission on Elections (COMELEC)

FACTS: This case is composed of consolidated cases filed separately by Petitioner Gonzalez and
PHILCONSA assailing for the declaration of nullity of RA. No. 4913 and R.B.H. No. 1 and 3. On March 16,
1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following resolutions (Resolution of Both
Houses/R.B.H.):

1. R.B.H No. 1: Proposes that Sec 5, Art VI of Constitution be amended so as to increase the membership
of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120 in accordance with the present Constitution, to
a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among several provinces and that each province shall have at
least one (1) member.

2. R.B.H. No. 2: Calls for a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution, which will be
composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in the general
elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November 1971.

3. R.B.H. No. 3: Proposes that Sec 16, Art VI of the Constitution be amended so as to authorize Senators
and Members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned
constitutional convention, without the need to forfeit their respective seats in Congress.

Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which became RA No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the
Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the
people at the general elections on November 14, 1967. This act fixes the date and manner of elevtion
for the proposed amendments to be voted upon by the people, and appropriates funds for said election.

Petitioners assail the validity/constitutionality of RA No. 4913 and for the prohibition with preliminary
injunction to restrain COMELEC from implementing or complying with the said law. PHILCONSA also
assails R.B.H No. 1 and 3.

ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not RA No. 4913 is unconstitutional.
2.) Whether or not the issue involves a political question.

HELD:

1.) Pursuant to Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, SC held that there is nothing in this provision that
states that the election referred to is special, different from the general election. The Congress deemed
it best to submit the amendments for ratification in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.
Petition is therefore DENIED.

2.) SC also noted that the issue is a political question because it attacks the wisdom of the action taken
by Congress and not the authority to take it. A political question is not subject to review by the Court.
























TOLENTINO VERSUS COMELEC

Facts: Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in January 2001, President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo nominated then Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
(Senator Guingona) as Vice-President. Congress confirmed the nomination of
Senator Guingona who took his oath as Vice-President on 9 February 2001.
Following Senator Guingonas confirmation, the Senate on 8 February 2001 passed
Resolution 84 certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate. Resolution 84
called on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held
simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Twelve Senators, with
a 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that election. Resolution 84 further
provided that the Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of
votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr., which ends on 30 June 2004. On 5 June 2001, after COMELEC had
canvassed the election results from all the provinces but one (Lanao del Norte),
COMELEC issued Resolution 01-005 provisionally proclaiming 13 candidates as the
elected Senators. Resolution 01-005 also provided that the first twelve (12)
Senators shall serve for a term of six (6) years and the thirteenth (13th) Senator
shall serve the unexpired term of three (3) years of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona,
Jr. who was appointed Vice-President. Ralph Recto (Recto) and Gregorio
Honasan (Honasan) ranked 12th and 13th, respectively, in Resolution 01-005.
On 20 June 2001, Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as voters and taxpayers,
filed the petition for prohibition, impleading only COMELEC as respondent.
Tolentino and Mojica sought to enjoin COMELEC from proclaiming with finality the
candidate for Senator receiving the 13th highest number of votes as the winner in
the special election for a single three-year term seat. Accordingly, Tolentino and
Mojica prayed for the nullification of Resolution 01-005 in so far as it makes a
proclamation to such effect. Tolentino and Mojica contend that COMELEC issued
Resolution 01-005 without jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the
electorate of the position to be filled in the special election as required under
Section 2 of RA 6645; (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in
their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election under the special or
regular elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of BP 881; and,
consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the
candidates seeking election under the special or regular senatorial elections as
purportedly required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of RA 6646. Tolentino and
Mojica add that because of these omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes
cast for the senatorial candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections without distinction
such that there were no two separate Senate elections held simultaneously but
just a single election for thirteen seats, irrespective of term. Tolentino and Mojica
sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order during the pendency of their
petition. Without issuing any restraining order, the Supreme Court required
COMELEC to Comment on the petition. Honasan questioned Tolentinos and
Mojica's standing to bring the instant petition as taxpayers and voters because
they do not claim that COMELEC illegally disbursed public funds; nor claim that
they sustained personal injury because of the issuance of Resolutions 01-005 and
01-006.
Issue: Whether Tolentino and Mojica have standing to litigate.
Held: Legal standing or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest
in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of
the challenged governmental act. The requirement of standing, which necessarily
sharpens the presentation of issues, relates to the constitutional mandate that
this Court settle only actual cases or controversies. Thus, generally, a party will be
allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered
some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the
injury is likely to be redressed by a favourable action. Applied strictly, the doctrine
of standing to litigate will indeed bar the present petition. In questioning, in their
capacity as voters, the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001, Tolentino
and Mojica assert a harm classified as a generalized grievance. This generalized
grievance is shared in substantially equal measure by a large class of voters, if not
all the voters, who voted in that election. Neither have Tolentino and Mojica
alleged, in their capacity as taxpayers, that the Court should give due course to
the petition because in the special election held on 14 May 2001 tax money [was]
x x x extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against
abuses of legislative power or that there [was] misapplication of such funds by
COMELEC or that public money [was] deflected to any improper purpose. On the
other hand, the Court has relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised our
discretion to give due course to voters suits involving the right of suffrage. The
Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the
requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved. In not a few
cases, the court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner
where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the
people. Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public,
the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. The Court accords the same
treatment to Tolentino and Mojica in the present case in their capacity as voters
since they raise important issues involving their right of suffrage, considering that
the issue raised in the petition is likely to arise again.




TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-34150, October 16 1971, 41 SCRA 702

FACTS:
The 1971 Constitutional Convention came into being by virtue of two resolutions of
the Congress approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of
calling a convention to proposeamendments to the Constitution. After election of delegates held
on November 10, 1970, the Convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. In the
morning of September 28, 1970, theConvention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which is
entitled as, "A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION 1 OF ARTICLE V OF THE
CONSTITUTION SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO 18." On September 30, 1971,
the COMELEC "resolved" to follow the mandate of the Convention, that it will hold the said
plebiscite together with the senatorial elections on November 8, 1971 .

Petitioner, Arturo Tolentino, filed a petition for prohibition, its main thrust being
that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the necessary implementing resolutions
subsequently approved have no force and effect as laws in so far as they provide for the holding
of a plebiscite co-incident with the senatorial elections, on the ground that the calling and
holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in Congress as a
legislative body and may not be exercised by the Convention, and that, under Article XV Section
1 of the 1935 Constitution, the proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the
people for ratification separately from each and all other amendments to be drafted and proposed
by the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Organic Resolution No. 1 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention violative
to the Constitution.

HELD:
NO. All the amendments to be proposed by the same Conventionmust be submitted to the
people in a single "election" or plebiscite. In order that a plebiscite for the ratification of a
Constitutional amendment may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time
but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se but as well as
its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole.
In the present context, where the Convention has hardly started considering the merits, if not
thousands, of proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to present to the people any single
proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this requirement.


TOLENTINO VS COMELEC

The case is a petition for prohibition to restrain respondent Commission on Elections
"from undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which the proposed
constitutional amendment "reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of Article V of the
Constitution of the Philippines to eighteen years "shall be, submitted" for ratification by
the people pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of
1971, and the subsequent implementing resolutions, by declaring said resolutions to be
without the force and effect of law for being violative of the Constitution of the
Philippines. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of two
resolutions of the Congress of the Philippines approved in its capacity as a constituent
assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to
the Constitution namely, Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions of Congress held on
March 16, 1967 and June 17, 1969 respectively. The delegates to the said Convention
were all elected under and by virtue of said resolutions and the implementing legislation
thereof, Republic Act 6132.
Issue

Is it within the powers of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order the holding of a
plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendment/s?
Decision

The Court holds that all amendments to be proposed must be submitted to the people in
a single "election" or plebiscite. We hold that the plebiscite being called for the purpose
of submitting the same for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is not
authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, hence all acts of the
Convention and the respondent Comelec in that direction are null and void. lt says
distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention called
for the purpose "may propose amendments to this Constitution,". The same provision
also as definitely provides that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the
amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification," thus leaving no room for
doubt as to how many "elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or
amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention,
and the provision unequivocably says "an election" which means only one.
The petition herein is granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional
Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention,
insofar as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as
the resolution of the respondent Comelec complying therewith (RR Resolution No. 695)
are hereby declared null and void. The respondents Comelec, Disbursing Officer, Chief
Accountant and Auditor of the Constitutional Convention are hereby enjoined from
taking any action in compliance with the said organic resolution. In view of the peculiar
circumstances of this case, the Court declares this decision immediately executory.

OCCENA VERSUS COMELEC
Facts: The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions
proposing constitutional amendments, goes further than merely assailing their alleged constitutional infirmity. Samuel
Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is
the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the contrary notwithstanding.
I ssue: Whether the 1973 Constitution was valid, and in force and effect when the Batasang Pambansa resolutions and the
present petitions were promulgated and filed, respectively.
Held: It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the dispositive portion of
Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its ratification,
this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six to four. It then concluded: "This being the vote of the majority, there is no
further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect." Such a statement served a useful
purpose. It could even be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the atmosphere. It made manifest that as of 17
January 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect. With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and
with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also
be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973
Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as simple as that. What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the function of
judicial review has both a positive and a negative aspect. As was so convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black and
Murphy, the Supreme Court can check as well as legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts of
coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is an affirmation that what was done cannot
be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That is the meaning of the
concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court has invariably applied the present Constitution. The latest case in
point is People v. Sola, promulgated barely two weeks ago. During the first year alone of the effectivity of the present
Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited.








DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC

Facts: Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials, through
Peoples Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII,Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of the
people to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an
order directing the publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the
hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, PublicInterest Law Center, and Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors.Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the
ground that one which is cognizable by the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and
Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the Delfin
petition rising the several arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision onpeoples initiative to amend
the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) the peoples
initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a
revision, therefore it is outside the power of peoples initiative. The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention.

Issues :(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.
(3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or an amendment of the Constitution.

Held: Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without implementing legislation the same cannot
operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not
provide for its implementation.
The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule that what has been delegated, cannot be
delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). The delegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter
cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right to peoples initiative.
The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would affect other provisions of the
Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities for public
service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative. However, considering the Courts
decision in the above Issue, the issue of whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment has become academic.




DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997

FACTS:
In 1996, Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with COMELEC a petition to amend Constitution, to
lift term limits of elective officials, by peoples initiative. Delfin wanted COMELEC to
control and supervise said peoples initiative the signature-gathering all over the
country. The proposition is: Do you approve of lifting the term limits of all
elective government officials, amending for the purpose Sections 4 ) and 7 of Article
VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article 8 of Article X of the 1987
Philippine Constitution? Said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the
people, and after it is signed by at least 12% total number of registered voters in the
country, it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.

COMELEC in turn ordered Delfin for publication of the petition. Petitioners Sen. Roco
et al moved for dismissal of the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the
initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.

a. Constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the Constitution can only
be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed.
b. Republic Act No. 6735 provides for 3 systems on initiative but failed to provide any
subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative. This
deliberate omission indicates matter of peoples initiative was left to some future
law.
c. COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of
peoples initiative. Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the
implementing law.
d. Peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision
thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision.
e. Congress nor any government agency has not yet appropriated funds for peoples
initiative.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the people can directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the
1987 Constitution.

HELD:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735

It was intended to include or cover peoples initiative on amendments to the
Constitution but, as worded, it does not adequately cover such initiative. Article XVII
Section 2 of the 1987Constitution providing for amendments to Constitution, is not
self-executory. While the Constitution has recognized or granted the right of the
people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution via PI, the people cannot
exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.

FIRST: Contrary to the assertion of COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest
an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The inclusion of the word
Constitution therein was a delayed afterthought. The word is not relevant to the
section which is silent as to amendments of the Constitution.

SECOND: Unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide
for the contents of a petition for initiative onthe Constitution. Sec 5(c) does not
include the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case
of initiative on the Constitution.

THIRD: No subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous
silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and
referendum on national and local laws. The argument that
the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is not accepted to be subsumed
under the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in
scope. Under Subtitle II and III, the classification is not based on the scope of
the initiative involved, but on its nature and character.
National initiative what is proposed to be enacted is a national law, or a law which
only Congress can pass.
Local initiative what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance or
resolution which only legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous
regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass.
Potestas delegata non delegari potest

What has been delegated, cannot be delegated. The recognized exceptions to the rule
are: [1] Delegation of tariff powers to the President; [2] Delegation of emergency
powers to the President; [3] Delegation to the people at large; [4] Delegation to local
governments; and [5] Delegation to administrative bodies.

COMELEC

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi judicial functions,
to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority. In
every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation
itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein
the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes
a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable to
which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Republic Act
No. 6735 failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation
of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.


COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300

Insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is void. COMELEC cannot validly
promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people
to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative.
It does not have that power under Republic Act No. 6735.
Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition
solely intended to obtain an order: (a) fixing the time and dates for signature
gathering; (b) instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfins movement and
volunteers in establishing signature stations; and (c) directing or causing the
publication of the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution.

DELFIN PETITION

COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION. Even if it be conceded ex gratia that RA 6735 is
a full compliance with the power of Congress to implement the right to initiate
constitutional amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the COMELEC the power
of subordinate legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining
the Delfin Petition.

The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters.
Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated. The
COMELEC requires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The
petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the
COMELEC, sitting en banc.

Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under RA6735 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC.
The petition was merely entered as UND, meaning undocketed. It was nothing more
than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6
December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and
the oppositors to file their memoranda to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so
dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.

Therefore, Republic Act No. 6735 did not apply to constitutional amendment.







LAMBINO VS. COMELEC [G.R. No. 174153; 25 Oct 2006]
Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to
change the 1987 constitution; they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify
their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M
individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the
1987constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the
proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of government to unicameral-
parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions
and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative
petitions.
Issues: (1) Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative; (2)Whether
or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential iterms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend
the Constitution; (3) Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
due course to the Lambino Groups petition.
Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for
conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on
dismissing the Lambino petition.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
Direct Proposal by the People
The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of
the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders
the initiative void.
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through
Initiatives
The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and revision, it
is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only
amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change,
therefore a constitutes a revision.
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition
violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution before
complying with RA 6735
Petition is dismissed

Lambino Vs. Comelec Case Digest
Lambino Vs. Comelec
G.R. No. 174153
Oct. 25 2006

Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change
the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their
initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M
individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987
constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the
proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of government to unicameral-
parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and
invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.

Issue:

Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative.

Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate
or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend
the Constitution.

Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino
Groups petition.

Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for
conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on
dismissing the Lambino petition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct
Proposal by the People

The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the
signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders the initiative
void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through
Initiatives

The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and revision, it is
intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only amendments
to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change, therefore a
constitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition violated
Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution before complying with RA
6735

Petition is dismissed.

SANIDAD VERSUS COMELEC

Facts:
On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 991 calling for a
national referendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among
other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such
replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of
his present powers.
20 days after or on 22 September 1976, the President issued another related decree, Presidential
Decree 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree 991, by declaring the provisions of
Presidential Decree 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays"
(Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of 16 October 1976. Quite
relevantly, Presidential Decree 1031 repealed inter alia, Section 4, of Presidential Decree 991.
On the same date of 22 September 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree 1033, stating the
questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976. The Decree
recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the interim
National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional
amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people
in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October
1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite. On 27 September 1976, Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V.
Sanidad, father and son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to
enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October
16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose
amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree 1031, insofar as it directs the
Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled
on 16 October 1976. They contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the
incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new
Constitution.
As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. On 30
September 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L-44684, was
instituted by Vicente M. Guzman, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that the
power to propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is
expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under action 16, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on 5 October 1976 by Raul M.
Gonzales, his son Raul Jr., and Alfredo Salapantan, docketed as L-44714, to restrain the
implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October
16.

Issue: Whether the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution.

Held: Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1) Any
amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote
of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may,
by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all
its Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election." Section
2 thereof provides that "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months a after
the approval of such amendment or revision." In the present period of transition, the interim National
Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of
the Transitory Provisions reads "The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime
Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such
amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof." There are,
therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy and
period of transition. In times of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by the proposals of
the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a
Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly.
However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election
voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition,
amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the interim National Assembly
upon special call by the interim Prime Minister. The Court in Aquino v. COMELEC, had already settled
that the incumbent President is vested with that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially
convene the interim National Assembly. The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the
President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly,
consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country. When the Delegates to the
Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under
the same, the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when he could convene the interim
National Assembly. The President's decision to defer the convening of the interim National Assembly
soon found support from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the
ratification of the 1973 Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the convening of the
interim National Assembly. In the referendum of 24 July 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays")
reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the
referendum of 27 February 1975, the proposed question of whether the interim National Assembly
shall be initially convened was eliminated, because some of the members of Congress and delegates of
the Constitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically members of the interim National
Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973 the people had already
resolved against it. In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of
amendment to a Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not legislating
when engaged in the amending process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by
the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973
Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the
interim National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the
nation by virtue of constitutional conferment, amending of the Constitution is not legislative in
character. In political science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic
character and that of a legislative character. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. Such
being the case, approval of the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative
of the President to approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The
President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution.

On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on
16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (barangays) to resolve, among other
things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the
powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period
for the exercise by the President of his present powers. Twenty days after, the
President issued another related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the previous
PD No. 991, by declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner
of voting and canvass of votes in barangays applicable to the national
referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed
inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos
issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the
referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its whereas
clauses that the peoples continued opposition to the convening of the interim
National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and
replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative
body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite
of October 16.
On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction
seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the
Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect
Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to
the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the
Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the
Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that
under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent
President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new
Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has
no constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the question is
political in nature hence the court cannot take cognizance of it.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the
Constitution.
HELD: The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a
judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the
Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a
function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the
terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the
Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly during the period of
transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular
National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments
becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1,
pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course has not been
followed. Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute itself into
a constituent assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal of
amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree
1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the
regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very
Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The
implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly
purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the
issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the
competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new
Constitution provides: All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty,
executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court
en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared
unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. . . .. The
Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and
statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers
organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power,
so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine whether that
power has been discharged within its limits.
This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to
the Constitution and he was able to present those proposals to the people in
sufficient time.
JAVELLANA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. L-36142, March 31 1973, 50 SCRA 33

FACTS:
On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided the sequel
of plebiscite cases, Javellana filed this suit against the respondents to restrain them
from implementing any of the provisions of the proposed Constitution not found in
the present 1935Constitution. This is a petition filed by him as a Filipino citizen and
a qualified and registered voter and as a class suit, for himself and in behalf of all
citizens and voters similarly situated. Javellana also alleged that the President had
announced the immediate implementation of the new constitution, thru his Cabinet,
respondents including.

Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said
proposed constitution upon ground the thatthe President as Commander-in-Chief of
the AFP is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies; without power to
approve proposed constitution; without power to proclaim the ratification by the
Filipino people of the proposed constitution; and the election held to ratify the
proposed constitution was not a free election, hence null and void.

Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification ofProclamation No. 1102 and
any order, decree, and proclamationwhich have the same import and objective.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a
justiciable or political question, and therefore non-justiciable.
2. Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention has been ratified validly conforming to the applicable
constitutional and statutory provisions.
3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in (with
or without valid ratification) by the people.
4. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief.
5. Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention in force.
HELD:
First. To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force depends upon
whether or not the said new constitution has been ratified in accordance with the
requirements of the 1935Constitution. It is well settled that the matter of
ratification of an amendment to the constitution should be settled applying the
provisions of the constitution in force at the time of the alleged ratification of the
old constitution.
The issue whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified in accordance
with the provisions of Article XV of the 1935 Constitutionis justiciable as
jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom we patterned our 1935 Constitution)
shall show.

Second. The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest in those
lacking the qualifications and having the disqualifications mentioned in
the Constitution the right of suffrage.

The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the proceedings in the
Citizens assemblies void. Proceedings held in such Citizens Assemblies were
fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the qualifications prescribed in
Article V Section 1 of the 1935Constitution were allowed to vote in said Assemblies.
And, since there is no means by which the invalid votes of those less than 21 years
of age can be separated or segregated from those of the qualified voters, the
proceedings in the Citizens Assemblies must be considered null and void.

Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is void. Article XV of the
1935 Constitution envisages with the term "votes cast" choices made on ballots
not orally or by raising hands by the persons taking part in plebiscites. This is but
natural and logical, for, since the early years of the American regime, we had
adopted the Australian Ballot System, with its major characteristics, namely,
uniform official ballots prepared and furnished by the Government and secrecy in
the voting, with the advantage of keeping records that permit judicial inquiry, when
necessary, into the accuracy of the election returns.

The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under the supervision
of COMELEC is void. The point is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies as were held
took place without the intervention of the COMELEC and without complying with the
provisions of theElection Code of 1971 or even of those of Presidential Decree No.
73. The procedure therein mostly followed is such that there is no reasonable
means of checking the accuracy of the returns filed by the officers who conducted
said plebiscites. This is another patent violation of Article X of the
1935 Constitution which form part of the fundamental scheme set forth in the
1935 Constitution, as amended, to insure the "free, orderly, and honest" expression
of the people's will. For this, the alleged plebiscite in the Citizens Assemblies is null
and void, insofar as the same are claimed to have ratified the revised Constitution.

Third. Proclamation No. 1102 is not an evidence of ratification. Article X of the
1935 Constitution places COMELEC the "exclusive" charge to the "the enforcement
and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections," independently of
the Executive. But there is not even a certification by the COMELEC in support of
the alleged results of the citizens assemblies relied upon inProclamation No. 1102.
Also, on January 17, 1973 neither the alleged president of the Federation of
Provincial or City Barangays nor the Department of Local Governments had certified
to the President the alleged result of the citizens' assemblies all over the
Philippines. The citizens assemblies did not adopt the proposedconstitution. It is to
my mind a matter of judicial knowledge that there have been no such
citizens assemblies in many parts of Manila and suburbs, not to say, also, in other
parts of the Philippines.

Fourth. The Court is not prepared to concede that the acts the officers
and offices of the Executive Department, in line withProclamation No. 1102,
connote recognition of or acquiescence to the proposed Constitution.

A department of the Government cannot recognize its own acts. Recognition
normally connotes the acknowledgment by a party of the acts of another. Individual
acts of recognition by members of Congress do not constitute congressional
recognition, unless the members have performed said acts in session duly
assembled. This is a well-established principle of Administrative Law and of the Law
of Public Officers. The compliance by the people with the orders of martial law
government does not constitute acquiescence to the proposed Constitution. Neither
does the Court prepared to declare that the people's inaction as
regards Proclamation No. 1102, and their compliance with a number of Presidential
orders, decrees and/or instructions, some or many of which have admittedly had
salutary effects, issued subsequently thereto, amounts to a ratification, adoption or
approval of said Proclamation No. 1102. The intimidation is there, and inaction or
obedience of the people, under these conditions, is not necessarily an act of
conformity or acquiescence.

As regards the applicability to these cases of the "enrolled bill" rule, it is well to
remember that the same refers to a document certified tothe President for his
action under the Constitution by the Senate President and the Speaker of the House
of Reps, and attested to by the respective Secretaries of both Houses, concerning
legislative measures approved by said Houses. Whereas, Proclamation No. 1102 is
an act of the President declaring the results of a plebiscite on the
proposed Constitution, an act which Article X of the 1935Constitution denies
the executive department of the Government.

In all other respects and with regard to the other respondent in said case, petitions
therein should be given due course, there being more than prima facie showing that
the proposed Constitution has not been ratified in accordance with Article XV of the
1935 Constitution, either strictly, substantially, or has been acquiesced in by the
people or majority thereof; that said proposed Constitution is not in force and
effect; and that the 1935 Constitution is still the Fundamental Law of the Land,
without prejudice to the submission of said proposed Constitution to the people at a
plebiscite for its ratification or rejection in accordance with Articles V, X and XV of
the 1935Constitution and the provisions of the Revised Election Code in force at the
time of such plebiscite.

Fifth. Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio
and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof; 4
members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and
Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third
question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have
accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and 2 members of the Court, namely,
Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result, there are not enough
votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.
The Ratification Case

On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed Case G.R. No. L-36142 against the
Executive Secretary and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance,
to restrain said respondents "and their subordinates or agents from implementing
any of the provisions of the propose Constitution not found in the present
Constitution" referring to that of 1935. The petition therein, filed by Josue
Javellana, as a "Filipino citizen, and a qualified and registered voter" and as "a class
suit, for himself, and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated," was
amended on or about January 24, 1973. After reciting in substance the facts set
forth in the decision in the plebiscite cases, Javellana alleged that the President had
announced "the immediate implementation of the New Constitution, thru his
Cabinet, respondents including," and that the latter "are acting without, or in
excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed Constitution" upon the
ground: "that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies"; that the same
"are without power to approve the proposed Constitution ..."; "that the President is
without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed
Constitution"; and "that the election held to ratify the proposed Constitution was
not a free election, hence null and void."

The Issue:

1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and
therefore non-justiciable, question?

2. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been
ratified validly (with substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the
applicable constitutional and statutory provisions?

3. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without
valid ratification) by the people? (acquiesced - "permission" given by silence or
passiveness. Acceptance or agreement by keeping quiet or by not making
objections.)

4. Are petitioners entitled to relief?

5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force?

The Resolution:

Summary:
The court was severely divided on the following issues raised in the petition: but
when the crucial question of whether the petitioners are entitled to relief, six
members of the court (Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra) voted to dismiss the petition. Concepcion, together Justices Zaldivar,
Fernando and Teehankee, voted to grant the relief being sought, thus upholding the
1973 Constitution.

Details:
1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and
therefore non-justiciable, question?

On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the
Court, hold that the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 presents a
justiciable and non-political question. Justices Makalintal and Castro did not vote
squarely on this question, but, only inferentially, in their discussion of the second
question. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "inasmuch as it is claimed
there has been approval by the people, the Court may inquire into the question of
whether or not there has actually been such an approval, and, in the affirmative,
the Court should keep hands-off out of respect to the people's will, but, in negative,
the Court may determine from both factual and legal angles whether or not Article
XV of the 1935 Constitution been complied with." Justices Makasiar, Antonio,
Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that the issue is political and
"beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry."

2. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been
ratified validly (with substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the
applicable constitutional and statutory provisions?

On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court also hold
that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not
validly ratified in accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the 1935 Constitution,
which provides only one way for ratification, i.e., "in an election or plebiscite held in
accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters.

Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "(A)s to whether or not the 1973
Constitution has been validly ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in
the light of traditional concepts regarding the meaning and intent of said Article,
the referendum in the Citizens' Assemblies, specially in the manner the votes
therein were cast, reported and canvassed, falls short of the requirements thereof.
In view, however, of the fact that I have no means of refusing to recognize as a
judge that factually there was voting and that the majority of the votes were for
considering as approved the 1973 Constitution without the necessity of the usual
form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications, I am constrained to hold that, in the
political sense, if not in the orthodox legal sense, the people may be deemed to
have cast their favorable votes in the belief that in doing so they did the part
required of them by Article XV, hence, it may be said that in its political aspect,
which is what counts most, after all, said Article has been substantially complied
with, and, in effect, the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionally ratified."
Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold
that under their view there has been in effect substantial compliance with the
constitutional requirements for valid ratification.

3. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without
valid ratification) by the people?

On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned
proposed Constitution, no majority vote has been reached by the Court.
Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra
hold that "the people have already accepted the 1973 Constitution."
Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that there
can be no free expression, and there has even been no expression, by the people
qualified to vote all over the Philippines, of their acceptance or repudiation of the
proposed Constitution under Martial Law. Justice Fernando states that "(I)f it is
conceded that the doctrine stated in some American decisions to the effect that
independently of the validity of the ratification, a new Constitution once accepted
acquiesced in by the people must be accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at
this stage prepared to state that such doctrine calls for application in view of the
shortness of time that has elapsed and the difficulty of ascertaining what is the
mind of the people in the absence of the freedom of debate that is a concomitant
feature of martial law." 88
Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or
competence to rule on the question. Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by
Justice Teehankee in their statement that "Under a regime of martial law, with the
free expression of opinions through the usual media vehicle restricted, (they) have
no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have
accepted the Constitution."

4. Are petitioners entitled to relief?

On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely, Justices
Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS the
petition. Justice Makalintal and Castro so voted on the strength of their view that
"(T)he effectivity of the said Constitution, in the final analysis, is the basic and
ultimate question posed by these cases to resolve which considerations other than
judicial, an therefore beyond the competence of this Court, 90 are relevant and
unavoidable." 91
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee
and myself voted to deny respondents' motion to dismiss and to give due course to
the petitions.

5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force?

On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in force:
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof;
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and
Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third
question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have
accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and
Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the
Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with
the result that there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is
not in force.
ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal,
Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes
of the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all the
aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being the vote of the majority,
there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in
force and effect.

It is so ordered.













LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. PRES. AQUINO
G.R. NO. 73748, May 22, 1986

FACTS:
President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 on February 25, 1986 announcing
that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power. On March 25,
1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government
assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a
direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed
Forces of the Philippines."

Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is illegal because it was not established
pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to
the realm of politics where only the people are the judge.

The Supreme Court further held that:
1. The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective
control of the entire country;
2. It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure
government; and
3. The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new
government.

FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1
announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino
government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was
installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by
units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but
belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge.

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO(G.R. No. 73748
- May 22, 1986)
FACTS:
1.On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1
announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.2.On March 25,
1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government
assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed througha
direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New
Armed Forces of the Philippines."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but
belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. The Court
further held that:

1.The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of
the entire country;
2. It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government;
and
3. The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government


















DE LEON VERSUS ESGUERRA

Facts: Alfredo de Leon won as barangay captain and other petitioners won as councilmen of Barangay
Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. On February 9, 1987, de leon received memo antedated December 1, 1986
signed by OIC Gov. Benhamin Esguerra, February 8, 1987, designating Florentino Magno, as new
captain by authority of minister of local government and similar memo signed February 8, 1987,
designated new councilmen.

Issue: Whether or not designation of successors is valid.

Held: No, a memorandum has no legal effect.

1. Effectivity of memoranda should be based on the date when it was signed. So, February 8, 1987
and not December 1, 1986.
2. February 8, 1987, is within the prescribed period. But provisional constitution was no longer in
efffect then because 1987 constitution has been ratified and its transitory provision, Article XVIII, sec.
27 states that all previous constitution were suspended.
3. Constitution was ratified on February 2, 1987. Thus, it was the constitution in effect. Petitioners now
acquired security of tenure until fixed term of office for barangay officials has been fixed. Barangay
election act is not inconsistent with constitution.

DE LEON VERSUS ESGUERRA

Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay
Captain together with the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay
Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal in a Barangay election held under
Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as Barangay Election Act of 1982.

On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum antedated
December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on
February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain
of Barangay Dolores and the other respondents as members of Barangay Council of
the same Barangay and Municipality.

Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of February 8,
1987 be declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited by taking over
their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen.

Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982
(BP Blg. 222), their terms of office shall be six years which shall commence on June
7, 1988 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have
qualified. It was also their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them
and to designate their successors.

On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and
appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue
of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution and not because their term of six
years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing
the term of office of Barangay officials to six years must be deemed to have been
repealed for being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution.


Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was
validly made during the one-year period which ended on Feb 25, 1987.


Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Gov
on Feb 8, 1987 designating respondents as Barangay Captain and Barangay
Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal force and effect.

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the
Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have superseded. Having become
inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no longer rely on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to
designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners. Relevantly,
Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution further provides in part:

"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years x x x."

Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw, therefore,
the term of office of 6 years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982
should still govern.

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