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De Jesus vs Syquia

FACTS:

Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a cashier in a barber shop owned by the
defendants brother in law Vicente Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the defendant, 23 years of age and an
unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila was accustomed to have his haircut in the said
barber shop. He got acquainted with Antonio and had an amorous relationship. As a consequence,
Antonia got pregnant and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931.

In the early months of Antonias pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor. On February 1931, he
even wrote a letter to a rev father confirming that the child is his and he wanted his name to be
given to the child. Though he was out of the country, he continuously wrote letters to Antonia
reminding her to eat on time for her and juniors sake. The defendant ask his friend Dr. Talavera
to attend at the birth and hospital arrangements at St. Joseph Hospital in Manila.

After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in Camarines Street Manila
where they lived together for about a year. When Antonia showed signs of second pregnancy,
defendant suddenly departed and he was married with another woman at this time.

It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was in charge of the
arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr.
that was first planned.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other letters written by defendant to
Antonia during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity.

2. Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted
possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and that as
a consequence, the defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael
Loanco.

HELD:

The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of paternity and the other letters
are sufficient to connect the admission with the child carried by Antonia. The mere requirement is
that the writing shall be indubitable.

The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status of
a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to reveal the father's resolution to
admit the status.

Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court in refusing to provide damages to Antonia
Loanco for supposed breach of promise to marry since action on this has no standing in civil law.
Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to
recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco. Finally, SC found no necessity to modify the judgment as
to the amount of maintenance allowed to Ismael Loanco in the amount of P50 pesos per month.
They likewise pointed out that it is only the trial court who has jurisdiction to modify the order as
to the amount of pension.

Bisig ng Manggagawa sa Concrete Aggregates, Inc. v. NLRC

Pet: Bisig ng Manggagawa sa Concrete Aggregates, Inc. (BIMCAI) is the union representing the ees
of Private Respondent: Concrete Aggregates, Inc.

Facts:
1.6 Apr 1992 The union picketed several (6) premises of their employer (Bagumbayan and Longos
in Q.C.; Angono and Antipolo in Rizal; San Fernando, Pampanga; and San Pedro Laguna.)a. The
union was protesting : ULP and Union Busting.2.8 Apr
Employer FILED =: Injunction to stop the illegal strike, with the NLRC alleging among others: a. The
April 6 strike was a Wild-cat strike, in that there was no notice of strike, it did not comply with the
cooling off period, and there was a pending mediation proceeding scheduled on 10 Apr. b. That
during the strike the union impeded the ingress and egress to the premises by setting up
makeshifts, tents, banners, streamers, and other man-made obstructions. c. That the union had (and
still is) doing other illegal acts such as threats =, intimidation, and coercions against persons with
lawful business with the employer.
3. 13 Apr NLRC heard the petition ex parte, for failure of the union to appear, NLRC issued a TRO a.
Apparently the union was not notified of the petition, the company misrepresented its address b
.Neither did the union get a copy of the TRO, it only learned of it when it was posted on 15 Apr in
the premises of the company

4. 24 Apr the Union in turn FILED: Injunction, to enjoin the company from asking the aid of police
and military to escort scabs (Case really said scabs, but it should probably have been people and
vehicles) from entering the establishment.
5. 30 Apr the employer filed a Motion for the Immediate Issuance of Preliminary Injunction
alleging: that the union was still committing illegal acts complained of despite the TRO.
6. 4 Mar: Union was notified of the motion. a. Next day (5 Mar) the union opposed the motion on the
ground that they were never furnished a copy of the petition for injunction.
7. NLRC (Same day that union opposed, just one day after the union was notified): issued the
disputed order, GRANTED Employers Preliminary Injunction against the union, based on
testimonies, that: a. Despite TRO strike continued b. By forming a human blockade, the union
prevented vehicles from entering the premises c. By force and intimidation prevented the non
striking employees from going to workd.Wala kaming pakielem sa TRO ninyoBubugbugin namin
kayo pagkayo nagpilit e. Ramon Bana, Union President: sisimentuhin naming ang gates
ngConcrete Aggregate na kahit ipis as hindi makakpasok

8. Union filed the instant petition for certiorari

Issue: W/N the issuance of the Preliminary Injunction against the union was proper? NO. It violated
their right to strike, and it did not comply with the LCs requirements for the issuance of an
injunction.

Held:
1. Phil. History of the right to Strike
a.Justice Punos opening statement at the start of the case:
Therestoration of the right to strike is the most valuable gain of labor after the EDSA revolution. It
is the employees sole weapon. In recognitionof its importance, our Consti has accorded this right a
distinct status while our laws have assured that its rightful exercise will not be negated by the
issuance of unnecessary injunctions.
b. Industrial Peace Act: congress have statutory recognition to the right to strike. c.Martial Law:
prohibited the right to strike for 14yearsd.1987 Consti: treated labor with a favored eye. For the
first time in our history the consti mandated: Par.2, 9, Art XIII to guarantee the rightsof all workers
to self-org, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities,
including the right to strike in accordance with law.
e. Labor Code, implementing law of the consti provision, provided 218(e)giving specific requisites
for issuance of injunctions. (see LC for full provision)2.
NLRCs Preliminary injunction was improper. Non-compliance with218(3) subpar 4 and 5
a. Affidavits used by the company in proving the continued strike despite the TRO was controverted
upon presentation to the labor abiter. b. No less than the companys operations manager, Mr.
Mercado, further testified that after the issuance of the TRO, the barricades were removed. c. Mr.
Mercado and Atty. Jolo (personnel manager) also testified that public authorities charged to protect
the companys properties were neither unwilling nor unable to furnish adequate protection. As a
matter of fact, police assistance was never requested.3.Records reveal
continuing misuse of unfair strategies by the company
to secure the ex-parte TRO.a.The union was never furnished a copy of the petition for
injunctionb.They were denied the right to attend the 13Apr hearing where the TRO was issued
4. Issuance of ex-parte TRO is not per se prohibited BUT it must be clearly justified by
considerations of extreme necessity.
a. Because imprudently issues TROs can break the back of employees engaged in a legal strike. b.
The deleterious effects of such a TRO on the rights of striking employees can no longer be repaired
for they defy simple monetization. c. As such it behooves officers receiving evidence to support ex-
part eevidence to take a more active stance seeing to it that the right to social justice is in no way
violated.

5.Nor does the court find baseless the allegation by the union that NLRC had neglected to resolves
their injunction. a. The companys prayer for ex-parte TRO was heard and granted on the same day
.b. The companys petition for preliminary injunction was filed april 30 and was granted less than a
week after May5.c.On the other hand, the unions petition has not yet been heard nor decided. d.
The disparate treatment is inexplicable considering the subject matters of their petition are of
similar importance to the parties and to the public.
WHEREFORE GRANTED: PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (against striking workers) ANNULED & SET
ASIDE
Further: NLRC is ordered to hear and resolve with deliberate speed unions petition for injunction
filed on 30 April 1992.

EBRALINAG VS. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF CEBU [219 SCRA 256 ; G.R. NO. 95770; 1 MAR
1993]

Facts: Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were filed and
consolidated for raising same issue. Petitioners allege that the public respondents acted without or
in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. Respondents ordered expulsion of
68 HS and GS students of Bantayan, Pinamungajan, Caracar, Taburan and Asturias in Cebu. Public
school authorities expelled these students for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem
and recite the Panatang Makabayan required by RA1265. They are Jehovahs Witnesses believing
that by doing these is religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry against their teachings. They
contend that to compel transcends constitutional limits and invades protection against official
control and religious freedom. The respondents relied on the precedence of Gerona et al v.
Secretary of Education. Gerona doctrine provides that we are a system of separation of the church
and state and the flag is devoid of religious significance and it doesnt involve any religious
ceremony. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not mean exception
from non-discriminatory laws like the saluting of flag and singing national anthem. This exemption
disrupts school discipline and demoralizes the teachings of civic consciousness and duties of
citizenship.

Issue: Whether or Not religious freedom has been violated.

Held: Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority. The 2 fold aspect of right to
religious worship is: 1.) Freedom to believe which is an absolute act within the realm of thought. 2.)
Freedom to act on ones belief regulated and translated to external acts. The only limitation to
religious freedom is the existence of grave and present danger to public safety, morals, health and
interests where State has right to prevent. The expulsion of the petitioners from the school is not
justified.

The 30 yr old previous GERONA decision of expelling and dismissing students and teachers who
refuse to obey RA1265 is violates exercise of freedom of speech and religious profession and
worship. Jehovahs Witnesses may be exempted from observing the flag ceremony but this right
does not give them the right to disrupt such ceremonies. In the case at bar, the Students expelled
were only standing quietly during ceremonies. By observing the ceremonies quietly, it doesnt
present any danger so evil and imminent to justify their expulsion. What the petitioners request is
exemption from flag ceremonies and not exclusion from public schools. The expulsion of the
students by reason of their religious beliefs is also a violation of a citizens right to free education.
The non-observance of the flag ceremony does not totally constitute ignorance of patriotism and
civic consciousness. Love for country and admiration for national heroes, civic consciousness and
form of government are part of the school curricula. Therefore, expulsion due to religious beliefs is
unjustified.

Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED. Expulsion is ANNULLED.

Gerona, et. al v SEC. OF EDUCATION
106 Phil 2 Aug. 12, 1959

FACTS:
1. Petitioners belong to the Jehovas Witness whose children were expelled from their schools when
they refused to salute, sing the anthem, recite the pledge during the conduct of flag ceremony. DO
No. 8 issued by DECS pursuant to RA 1265 which called for the manner of conduct during a flag
ceremony. The petitioners wrote the Secretary of Education on their plight and requested to
reinstate their children. This was denied.

2. As a result, the petitioners filed for a writ of preliminary injunction against the Secretary and
Director of Public Schools to restrain them from implementing said DO No. 8.

3. The lower court (RTC) declared DO 8 invalid and contrary to the Bill of Rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not DO 8 is valid or constitutional

DO 8 is valid. Saluting the flag is not a religious ritual and it is for the courts to determine, not a
religious group, whether or not a certain practice is one.

1. The court held that the flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an
emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it
and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering the complete separation of church and
state in our system of government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting
the flag consequently does not involve any religious ceremony.

After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious ceremony must rest
with the courts. It cannot be left to a religious group or sect, much less to a follower of said group or
sect; otherwise, there would be confusion and misunderstanding for there might be as many
interpretations and meanings to be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are religious
groups or sects or followers.

2. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean
exemption form or non-compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and
regulations promulgated by competent authority. In enforcing the flag salute on the petitioners,
there was absolutely no compulsion involved, and for their failure or refusal to obey school
regulations about the flag salute they were not being persecuted. Neither were they being
criminally prosecuted under threat of penal sacntion. If they chose not to obey the flag salute
regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education being maintained at the expense of
their fellow citizens, nothing more. According to a popular expression, they could take it or leave it.
Having elected not to comply with the regulations about the flag salute, they forfeited their right to
attend public schools.

3. The Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious veneration; rather it is symbol of the
Republic of the Philippines, of sovereignty, an emblem of freedom, liberty and national unity; that
the flag salute is not a religious ceremony but an act and profession of love and allegiance and
pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for; that by authority of the legislature, the
Secretary of Education was duly authorized to promulgate Department Order No. 8, series of 1955;
that the requirement of observance of the flag ceremony or salute provided for in said Department
Order No. 8, does not violate the Constitutional provision about freedom of religion and exercise of
religion; that compliance with the non-discriminatory and reasonable rules and regulations and
school discipline, including observance of the flag ceremony is a prerequisite to attendance in
public schools; and that for failure and refusal to participate in the flag ceremony, petitioners were
properly excluded and dismissed from the public school they were attending.


In Re: Argosino B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995
FACTS: This is a matter for admission to the bar and oath taking of a successful bar applicant.
Argosino was previously involved with hazing that caused the death of Raul Camaligan but was
sentenced with homicide through reckless imprudence after he pleaded guilty. He was sentenced
with 2 years imprisonment where he applied for a probation thereafter which was granted by the
court with a 2 yr probation. He took the bar exam and passed but was not allowed to take oath. He
filed a petition to allow him to take the attorneys oath of office averring that his probation was
already terminated. The court note that he spent only 10 months of the probation period before it
was terminated.
ISSUE: WON Argosino may take oath of office.

RULING: The court upheld the principle of maintaining the good morals of all Bar members, keeping
in mind that such is of greater importance so far as the general public and the proper
administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Hence he was asked
by the court to produce evidence that would certify that he has reformed and have become a
responsible member of the community through sworn statements of individuals who have a good
reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time to
certify he is morally fit to the admission of the law profession. The court also ordered that said a
copy of the proceeding be furnished to the family/relatives of Raul Camaligan.

Cervantes vs Fajardo

The minor was born to respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are common-law
husband and wife .Respondents offered the child for adoption to Gina Carreon's sister and brother-
in-law, the herein petitioners Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes, spouses, who took
care and custody of the child when she was barely two (2)weeks old. An Affidavit of Consent to the
adoption of the child by herein petitioners, was also executed by respondent Gina Carreon. The
adoptive parents received a letter from the respondents demanding to be paid the amount of
P150,000.00, otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners refused to accede to the
demand. Subsequently, the respondents took the child.

Issue: Can respondents take back their child?

Held: In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latter's
welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (5)
years of age, will not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. In all
controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical
and social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as
social standing of the contending parents. Never has this Court deviated from this criterion.

MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS [177 SCRA 668; G.R. NO. 88211; 15 SEPT 1989]

Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the
respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos
and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's
decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to
return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They
contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses
because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their
right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.

They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is
guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.


Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President
(Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.


Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the
Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would
normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's
country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to
travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the
right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What
the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of
each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and
freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including his own.
Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public
health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be
arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to
return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right
to travel.

The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered
view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International
Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land.

The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by
the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the
Marcos regime.

The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the
Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Reyes vs. Bagatsing

Facts: Petitioner sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on
October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta to the gates of the
United States Embassy. Once there, and in an open space of public property, a short program would
be held. The march would be attended by the local and foreign participants of such conference. That
would be followed by the handing over of a petition based on the resolution adopted at the closing
session of the Anti-Bases Coalition. There was likewise an assurance in the petition that in the
exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all the necessary steps would be
taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally. However the request was denied. Reference was
made to persistent intelligence reports affirming the plans of subversive/criminal elements to
infiltrate or disrupt any assembly or congregations where a large number of people is expected to
attend. Respondent suggested that a permit may be issued if it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum or
any other enclosed area where the safety of the participants themselves and the general public may
be ensured. An oral argument was heard and the mandatory injunction was granted on the ground
that there was no showing of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
could justify the denial of a permit. However Justice Aquino dissented that the rally is violative of
Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding of rallies within a radius of five
hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes. Hence the Court
resolves.

Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of expression and the right to peaceably assemble violated.

Held: Yes. The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the
implication that the right to free speech has likewise been disregarded. It is settled law that as to
public places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use
dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a group. There can be
no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the
choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. Time immemorial Luneta has been
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions.

Such use of the public places has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities,
rights, and liberties of citizens.

With regard to the ordinance, there was no showing that there was violation and even if it could be
shown that such a condition is satisfied it does not follow that respondent could legally act the way
he did. The validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be challenged.

A summary of the application for permit for rally: The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly
should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will
take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal
possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public
official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to
its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification
that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. Notice is given to
applicants for the denial.


OPOSA vs. FACTORAN
FACTS:
The petitioners, all minors, sought the help of the Supreme Court to order the respondent, then
Secretary of DENR, to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to
cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs. They
alleged that the massive commercial logging in the country is causing vast abuses on rainforest.
They furthered the rights of their generation and the rights of the generations yet unborn to a
balanced and healthful ecology.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have a locus standi.

Held:
Locus standi means the right of the litigant to act or to be heard.

The SC decided in the affirmative.

Under Section 16, Article II of the 1987 constitution, it states that:
The state shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
Petitioners, minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generation yet unborn. We
find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the
succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right
to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded considers
the rhythm and harmony of nature. Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm
and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the countrys forest, mineral, land, waters fisheries, wildlife, off- shore
areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the
minors assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
This landmark case has been ruled as a class suit because the subject matter of the complaint is of
common and general interest, not just for several but for ALL CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES.

Bottom line:
These minors have fought for our rights up to the highest level of legal remedy. These minors
thought of our interest and right. These minors battled for our sons and daughters and those yet to
come. These minors were concern for us to live in a balanced and healthful ecology. Sadly, we, who
are learned and with discernment, are oblivious. Until when do we learn our lesson?
Remember, we have an "INTERGENERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY" to our future generations.

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