Vadanyaya of Dharmakirti

Bibliotheca Indo-Buddhica Series
Sunil Gupta, Editor

Bibliotheca Indo-Buddhica Series No. 126
V D A N Y Y A
O F
D H A R M A K I R T I
T h e L o g i c o f D e b a t e
Critically edi t ed and translated
with I nt r oduct i on and Not es
by
Pradeep P. Gokhal e
Sr i S a t g u r u P u b l i c a t i o n s
A Division of
I n d i a n B o o k s Ce n t r e
Shakt i Na ga r , De l hi
INDIA
Published by:
Sri Satguru Publications
Indological and Oriental Publishers
A Division of
Indian Books Centre
40/5, ShaktiNagar,
Delhi-110007
(INDIA)
First Edition: Delhi, 1993
ISBN 81-7030-380-X
No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner
whatsoever without written permission except in the case of
brief quotations embodied in critical articles
and reviews.
PRINTED IN INDIA
P r e f a c e
I am happy to pr esent a t ransl at i on of Dharmaki rt i ' s
Vdanyya before t he st udent s and r eader s of Indology and
I ndi an phi l osophy. When I read t he text for t he pur pose of
t ransl at i on, I f ound t hat t he text is still in need of critical
edi t i on because it cont ai ns some cor r upt readi ngs. So I have
edi t ed t he text in t he light of t he edi t i ons of Rahul
Sankrityayan and of Dvarikadas Shastri and also in t he light
of Sntaraksita' s comment ar y Vipancitrih.
In my t ransl at i on of t he text I have tried to be nei t her too
literal nor t oo liberal. The former, because I want ed to make
Dhar maki r t i ' s Vdanyya intelligible to t hose English
readers who do not under st and Sanskrit. And t he latter,
because I want ed to be useful to t hose who would like to
r ead t he t ext with t he hel p of a t ransl at i on. I have also
i ncl uded expl anat ory not es at t he end of this work in or der
to facilitate a cl earer under st andi ng of t he text and t he
t ransl at i on.
The cent ral t heme of Vdanyya is t he nat ur e and
classification of nigrahasthnas. I had written on this topic in
t he cont ext of Nyya and Buddhi st t heori es of i nference and
fallacies, as a small par t of my Ph. D. dissertation. Ar ound
t he same t i me my colleague Dr. Mangal a Chi nchor e had
t aken u p t he t heme as t he cent ral topic of her Ph. D.
vi VDANY YA OF DHARMAKIRTI
dissertation. ( Coi ndi ci dent l y bot h t he di ssert at i ons have
been publ i shed in t he Bi bl i ot heca I ndo- Buddhi ca series of
I ndi an Books Cent r e) . Dr. Chi nchor e has discussed t he
t heme with a great l engt h and dept h in her work. But while
r eadi ng her work I f ound t hat my appr oach to Vdanyya is
basically different from her appr oach. In my I nt r oduct i on
to this work, t herefore, I t ook an oppor t uni t y t o express my
appr oach as clearly as possible and also to discuss one of t he
crucial poi nt s made by Dr. Chi nchor e in her book. Thanks
to Dr. Chi nchor e' s wri t i ng whi ch pr ovoked me to do so.
I am grateful to Shri Sunil Gupt a who asked me to
translate Vdanyya for Indi an Books Cent r e and
encour aged me from t i me to t i me. I am also grateful to my
parent s, wife, col l eagues and fri ends who gave me
encour agement and mor al suppor t when it was needed.
Pradeep P. Gokhale
November 15, 1992
C o n t e n t s
Preface v
Abbreviations xi
Introduction xiii
Part i
(Definition of Occassion of Defeat) 3-63
Section Nos.
1. The definition and classification of
nigrahasthna; t he first type of 'asdhannga-
vacana.'
2-7 The justification of a const i t uent of pr oof i n
t he case of self-nature as reason.
8 The justification of a const i t uent of pr oof in
t he case of effect as reason.
9 Justification of a const i t ut ent of pr oof in t he
case of non- appr ehensi on as reason,
( cont i nued upt o section 29).
10-12 What ki nd of non- appr ehensi on proves t he
pract i ce of non-existence?
13-18 Do all cogni t i ons and verbal usages ( and
i dent i t i es and differences amongst t hem)
viii VDANY YA OF DHARMAKl RTI
prove exi st ence of objects ( and i dent i t i es
and differences amongst t hem) ?
19 Does pragmat i c funct i on prove existence?
Do i dent i t i es and differences amongst
pr agmat i c funct i ons prove i dent i t i es and
differences amongst t he objects?
20 The nat ur e of non- appr ehens i on as reason.
21-26 Refutation of t he Siikhya view t hat not hi ng
can be said to be non-exi st ent .
27-28 Refut at i on of Satkryavda of Sankhya.
29 Concl usi on of t he discussion on non-
appr ehens i on.
30 Second type of asdhanngavacana.
31 Thi r d type of asdhanngavacana. In what
way are Decl arat i on et c. non-const i t uent s of
proof?
32 Four t h type of asdhanngavacana.
33-35 Fifth type of asdhanngavacana.
36 The first type of adosodbhvana
37 Condemnat i on of cheat i ng pract i ces
( qubbl i ng etc.) i n t he cour se of debat e.
38 Second type of adosodbhvana.
Part II
(Refutation of the NyayarVicw) 65-149
39-41 Criticism of Pratijnhni as nigrahasthna.
42-45 Criticism of Pratijnntara.
46-58 Cri ticism of Pratijnvirodha
59 Criticism of Pratijnsamnysa.
60 Criticism of Hetvantara.
CONTENTS
61
62
63
64
65-68
69
70
71-74
75-78
79-80
81
82-84
85
86-87
89-91
92
93
IX
On Arthntara.
Criticism of Nirarthaka.
Criticism of Avijntrtha.
Criticism ofAprthaka.
Cri ticism of Aprptakla.
Do incorrect words make sense via
the recollection of correct words?
Criticism of Nyna
On Adhika.
On Punarukta.
Criticism of Ananubhsana.
Criticism ofAjnna.
On Aprtibh.
Criticism of Viksepa.
Criticism of Matnujn
Criticism of Niranuyojynuyoga.
Criticism of Apasiddhnta
On Hetvbhsa as nigrahasthna.
Epilogue.
Notes 151-181
Glossary 183
A b b r e v i a t i o n s
D
(D)
Lit.
NBh
NS
NV
R
(R)
V
(V)
VN
Dvarikadas Shastri' s edi t i on of Vdanyya.
Readi ng accept ed in D.
Literally
Nyyabhsya of Vtsyyana
Nyyastra of Gaut ama
Nyyavrtika of Udyot akara
Rahul Sankrityayan' s edi t i on of Vdanyya
Readi ng accept ed in R
Vipandtrth, t he Santaraksita' s comment ar y
of Vdanyya as i ncl uded i n D.
Readi ng of Vdanyya as accept ed in V.
Vdanyya as i ncl uded in this work.
I n t r o d u c t i o n
Vdanyya is an i mpor t ant work by Dharmakl rt i , t he
Buddhi st phi l osopher and logician of seventh cent ury A.D..
The work is devot ed to t he rules of victory and defeat in
debat e. The t erm 'Vdanyya! means t he logic of debat e in
t he br oad sense of t he t erm ' logic
1
. ' Logi c' in its restricted
sense means a formal discipline which systematises the rul es
governi ng validity of valid ar gument s or logical t rut h of t he
logically t r ue proposi t i ons. But logic in its br oad sense coul d
mean a discipline whi ch deals with t he quest i ons of
Tightness and wrongness from a rat i onal poi nt of view (t hat
is, wher e ' ri ght ' st ands for rat i onal or reasonabl e and
' wr ong' st ands for i rrat i onal or unr easonabl e) in t he
cont ext of any given enqui ry. When, for i nst ance, a debat e
takes place bet ween two persons it is a legitimate quest i on as
to whose st and in t he debat e is rat i onal and whose
i rrat i onal . Wi nni ng and losing in a debat e woul d be
gover ned by t he consi derat i on of Tightness or wrongness in
this sense, if one has to look at ' debat e' as a rational
ent erpri se. Naturally t he discipline whi ch deals with t he
rul es governi ng rationality of wi nni ng or losing a debat e
coul d be called t he logic of debat e. Vdanyya is a work in
t he logic of debat e in this br oad sense.
xiv VDANY YA OF DHARMAKIRTI
The concept of ni grahast hna
Dharmaki rt i ' s const ruct i on of t he logic of debat e can be
bet t er under st ood on t he backgr ound of Nyya discussion
of debat e. Dhar maki r t i has used t he Nyya account of
debat e, not only as a puruapaksa, a posi t i on to be refuted,
but also, at least partly, as a raw mat eri al for r econst r uct i on.
His criticism of Nyya is not purel y destructive but it has a
constructive aspect also. Gaut ama i n his Nyyastra
(hereafter, NS) states t he rul es r egar di ng wi nni ng and
losing a debat e in t er ms of t he not i on of nigrahasthna.
Gaut ama present s t he not i on of nigrahasthna (' t he poi nt of
defeat' ) in his work in two places. First he gives t he general
concept of nigrahasthna as vipratipatti and apratipatti
(Mi sapprehensi on and non- appr ehensi on) in A 1.2.19 and
in t he latter par t of his work he gives an el aborat e
classification of nigrahasthnas. Dhar maki r t i seems to
develop over t he gener al concept of nigrahasthna given in
NS. His line of appr oach coul d be spelt out as follows:
Dharmaki rt i suggest ed t hat nigrahasthnas of t he di sput ant
(Vdin) a nd t hose of t he oppone nt (prativdin) are not t he
same. The j o b of t he di sput ant (as di sput ant ) is to pr esent a
good ar gument for provi ng his posi t i on a nd to justify it,
whereas t he j o b of t he oppone nt as oppone nt is to poi nt out
t he faults in t he ar gument . They woul d be failing in t hei r
jobs it they suffer from non- appr ehensi on or false
apprehensi on rel evant to t hei r respective j obs. The non-
i ppr ehensi on t hat t he di sput ant has consists in his failure to
)resent or justify a s ound ar gument and t he false
i pprehensi on he has consists in his pr esent at i on of
allacious ar gument s or i rrel evant or r e dunda nt st at ement s.
Jl these types seem to be cl ubbed by Dhar maki r t i i nt o one
irm -' asdhanhgavacanc?. Similarly t he non- appr ehensi on
lat t he oppone nt has consists in his inability to find out t he
*nuine fault in t he faulty ar gument advanced by t he
sput ant . The false appr ehens i on he has consists in his
)inting out a non-fault as fault. Bot h t hese types seem to
INTRODUCTION xv
be cl ubbed by Dhar maki r t i in one t erm - * adosodbhvana\ In
this way it is possible to argue t hat Dharmakl rt i ' s account of
nigrahasthna is not radically opposed to t he Nyya
defi ni t i on of nigrahasthna but it is a devel opment over it.
That is why, it seems, Dharmaki rt i does not criticise t he
gener al definition of nigrahasthna t hough he criticises
ot her aspects of t he Nyya account of nigrahasthna. Two
such aspects come to t he foreground-
(1) The Nyya concept i on of debat e in t he cont ext of
whi ch t he quest i on of nigrahasthnas becomes
relevant.
(2) The el aborat e classification of nigrahasthna given i n
NS.
Dharmaki rt i on the Nyaya-concept of debat e
Dhar makl r t i ' s account of t he nat ur e of debat e differs
significantly from t he Nyya account . The first poi nt of
difference is t hat of t ermi nol ogy. What Naiyyikas call Vda
is not t he same as what Dhar maki r t i calls Vda. Naiyyikas
classify kath (discussion) i nt o t hr ee ki nds: vda, jalpa a nd
vitand. 'Vda! roughl y st ands for a friendly discussion
bet ween a t eacher and his disciple or bet ween two co-
disciples wher e t he quest i on of victory or defeat does not
arise, 'jalpa' st ands for a debat e bet ween two part i es wher e
bot h t he part i es try to justify t hei r own positions against
each ot her . In jalpa t he quest i on of victory and defeat is
most relevant. 'Vitand' st ands for a debat e similar to jalpa,
t he difference bei ng t hat in Vitand one of t he part i es does
not pr esent any position of its own, but it only at t empt s to
refute t he posi t i on of t he ot her party.
What Naiyyikas call vda resembl es what Dharmaki rt i
calls prapancakath or vistarakath (see, for i nst ance, sections
70, 72, 73). Prapancakath is a diffuse discussion whi ch is not
gover ned by any rul es concer ni ng defeat or victory. But
unl i ke vda it is not rest ri ct ed to t he discussion bet ween
xvi VDANY YA OF DHARMAKIRTI
t eacher and his disciple or bet ween two co-disciples. It can
take pl ace bet ween any two persons i nt er est ed in a subject.
What Naiyyikas call jalpa resembl es what Dhar maki r t i
calls vda. Vda of Dhar maki r t i (let us call it vda (D)) is a
debat e bet ween two part i es trying t o ar gue out t hei r own
cases and refute t he cases of each ot her . The quest i on of
victory and defeat does arise in t he case of vda ( D) . But
vda (D) may be di st i ngui shed from jalpa .in at least two
i mpor t ant ways -
(1) The pur pose behi nd jalpa is t he pr ot ect i on of
one' s own phi l osophi cal det er mi nat i on (
4
. 2. 50). In fact Naiyyikas associated t hei r
concept s of victory a nd defeat with this goal of self-
pr ot ect i on. Jalpa and vitand are t he weapons t o b used for
def endi ng onesel f and for defeat i ng ot her s. Th e pur pose
behi nd vda(D), on t he ot her hand, is to per s uade t he
ot her debat er rationally, t o hel p hi m achieve t he knowl edge
of t r ut h and to r emove his mi sconcept i ons. Dhar maki r t i
associates his concept s of victory and defeat with this goal of
vda
f ^f t ^H yfci<*iIVi:l - VN, Section 37). The ot her
difference follows from this difference.
(2) Si nce jalpa ( and also vitand) is to be used as a
weapon for self-defence ( and for wi nni ng over ot her s) , t he
use of bot h rat i onal as well as i rrat i onal devices i n t he course
of debat e was per mi t t ed by Naiyyikas. On t he cont rary
Dhar maki r t i c onde mne d t he use of any i rrat i onal means
(such as chala, a form of decei vi ng t he ot her debat er ) in t he
course of debat e, because for hi m t he pur pose of vda(D)
was not to def end one' s own posi t i on by any hook or crook,
but t o benefit t he ot her debat er by r emovi ng his
mi sconcept i on and l eadi ng hi m to knowl edge.
The t hi r d type of kath viz., vitand whi ch was
r e c omme nde d by Naiyyikas as a means to self-defence was
INTRODUCTION xvii
disapproved totally by Dharmaklrti. (nc$<=i fcid
u
si
- VN, Section 83).
Dharmakirti on classification of nigrahasthnas
We have seen that Dharmakirti does not seem to be
critical about the general definition of nigrahasthna as
given in NS, which he develops further. But he is vehemently
critical about the elaborate Nyya classification of
nigrahasthnas. He devotes the second half of his work to the
criticism of this classification. He gives his own classification
of nigrahasthnas along with their definitions, in the first
half of his work. Let us first consider his own classification
and then turn to his criticism of the Nyya classification.
Prima facie it appears that Dharmaklrti's classification of
nigrahasthnas is just two-fold. But the two types of
nigrahasthnas that Dharmakirti mentions (viz.
asdhanngavacana and adosodbhvana) in fact indicate
many more types because Dharmakirti himself derives and
interprets the two terms in various ways. By interpeting the
terms variously Dharmakirti himself makes room for five
kinds of asdhanngavacana and two kindsôf adosodbhvana.
His classification may be tabulated as follows-
Nigrahasthna
1
Of the disputant
{Asdhanngavacana)
(N,)
(N
s
)
(N
5
)
<N
4
)
(N.)
Non-justification of a (N
e
)
constituent of proof
Non-statement of a
constituent of proof (N
?
)
Statement of what is
redundant as a part of proof
Statement of a fallacious
constituent of proof
Statement of something
irrelevant
i
Of the opponent
(Adosodbhvana)
Not pointing out a
fault in disputant's
argument
Pointing out a non-
fault as fault
xviii VDANY YA OF DHARMAKlRTI
[For t he types N
x
t o N
7
based on different derivations of
t he t erms asdhanngavacana and adosodbhavana> see
sections 1, 30, 31, 32, 33, 36 and 38 respectively]
Thi s amount s to a seven-fold classification. If we
under st and this classification, t hen we can under s t and t he
poi nt in Dhar makl r t i ' s criticism of Nyya -classification also
in a bet t er light. Dharmakl rt i is not very critical, for
i nst ance, about two Nyya - nigrahasthnas - Apratibh (Non-
i magi nat i on) and Hetvbhsa (Fallacies of pr obans) . (Of
course Dhar makl r t i woul d differ with t he Nyya concept i on
and classification of hetvbhsas in t hei r details, but not with
t he basic concept of hetvbhsa). It is not surpri si ng because
Dhar makl r t i has i ncl uded t hem in his own classification i n
some form or t he ot her . Apartibh, takes t he form of N^ N
2
or N
6
i n Dhar makl r t i ' s classification and Hetvbhsas are
i ncl uded in N
4
. In fact Dhar makl r t i in one pl ace goes to t he
ext ent to say t hat t he two nigrahasthnas viz. Hetvbhsa and
Apratibh cover all t he nigrahasthnas. (^T
fd, VN, Section 80) .
'j'
Dhar makl r t i accept s t he Nyya nigrahasthna Punarukta
(See sect i ons 71-73) with some qualifications and
modi fi cat i ons. It is nat ural because Punarukta in its
modi fi ed form i mpl i es N
s
of Dhar makl r t i . He clearly accept s
'Arthntara* of Nyya (see sect i on 61) whi ch i mpl i es his N
5
.
In gener al we can say t hat when Dhar makl r t i is critical
about t he Nyya classification, he is not opposed to each
and every type of nigrahasthna of Nyya. He is ready to
accept t hose Nyya nigrahasthnas, whi ch ar e formally
mat chi ng to his classification whi ch is mor e systematic. Still
he is critical about t he Nyya classification to a large ext ent
for t he following reasons-
(1) The Nyya classification is not mutually exclusive: Many
nigrahasthnas whi ch ar e ment i oned separat el y in t he Nyya
INTRODUCTION
list due to mi nor differences, coul d be cl ubbed i nt o a few of
t hem. For exampl e Pratijnvirodha in its refi ned and
cor r ect ed form coul d be i ncl uded in Hetvbhsa.
Section 53) Arthntara, Nirarihaka and Aprthaka insofar as
they are genui ne nigrahasthnas are different ki nds of
irrelevant talks; so they coul d be cl ubbed i nt o one.
Ananubhsana> Ajnna and Apratibh need not be
di st i ngui shed from each ot her insofar as their essence is
concer ned. In this way t her e is a great scope for economy in
Nyya classification.
(2) Nor is the Nyya - classification collectively exhaustive:
Because, if one allows i nvent i on of new types on t he basis of
mi nor differences, t hen any number of types can be
i nvent ed, whi ch are not t her e presently in t he Nyya list.
(See section 80) .
(3) DharmakTrti is critical about the Nyya framework of
anumna: When Naiyyikas were not clear about t he
constitutive el ement s of a sound pr obans, Dharmaki ri
i nt r oduced t he scheme of t hr ee constitutive el ement s.
Correspondi ngl y he poi nt ed out t hr ee basic fallacies of
pr obans : Asiddha, Viruddha and Anaikntika. Thi s was a
systematic count er-t hesi s to t he Nyya scheme of five
Hetvbhsas, Naiyyikas talked of five el ement s {avayavas) of
i nferent i al st at ement . Dharmaki rt i systematically criticised
this view and poi nt ed out t hat only two el ement s (t he
st at ement s of paksadharmat and vypti) are necessary and
sufficient and also t hat t he or der bet ween t hese two
el ement s is of no i mpor t ance.
1
Whereas t he Nyya scheme of
nigrahasthnas pr esupposes t he Nyya framework of
anumna, Dhar makl r t Ps criticism of t he former reflects his
criticism of t he latter. So Aprptakla is no mor e a
nigrahasthna because it presupposes t he specific or der of
t he el ement s of t he i nferent i al st at ement . If an inferential
st at ement lacks Pratijn or Nigamana t hen t he occasion of
XX VDANY YA OF DHARMAKIRTI
defeat called Nyna occurs accor di ng to Nyya. Dhar maki r t i
rejects this possibility because, Pratijn and Nigamana as
el ement s of inferential st at ement s are r edundant accor di ng
to hi m. And if Pratijn itself is not necessary in any
i nferent i al st at ement , t hen many nigrahasthnas such as
Pratijnntara, Pratijnhniy Pratijnsamnysa lose t hei r
significance.
(4) Other defects: Apar t from t he above defects in t he
Nyya account , t her e are ot her defects. Ther e ar e many
places wher e Naiyyikas ar e i ncor r ect or vague or confused
in t hei r account . Somet i mes they pr esent i mpl ausi bl e cases
as t he i nst ances of nigrahasthna. (For i nst ance, see section
44) . They undul y ext end t he scope of Pratijnavirodha and
mi x up Drstntavirodha with it. They t reat s ome of t he
unnecessary convent i ons r egar di ng debat e as t he essential
rul es (see section 78) . Dhar maki r t i poi nt s out many such
cases i nt o t he details of whi ch we need not go her e.
A problem: Is hetvbhsa a nigrahasthna?
I have poi nt ed out t hat Dhar maki r t i in his classification
of nigrahasthnas i ncl udes Hetvbhsa as one of t he
deri vat i ons of t he t er m asdhanngavacana. (It is N
4
i n his
classification t abul at ed above) . But this view is not
accept abl e to all. Dr. Mangal a Chi nchor e in her t hor ough-
goi ng account of Vdanyya repeat edl y claims that
hetvbhsa is not a nigrahasthna accor di ng to Dharmakl rt i . *
As a mat t er of fact t her e ar e many st at ement s of Dhar maki r t i
himself whi ch ar e clearly cont rary to her claim.
3
But t her e is
one passage which appar ent l y suppor t s Dr. Chi nchor e' s
view.
:l
M
(Section No. 36) .
INTRODUCTION xxi
Her e Dharmakl rt i is poi nt i ng out t hat commi ssi on of a
Hetvbhsahy t he di sput ant does not by itself result i nt o his
defeat. He will be defeat ed if t he fallacy of pr obans has been
poi nt ed out by t he opponent . Nor woul d it be correct to say:
The commi ssi on of Hetvbhsa, if it r emai ns undi scovered by
t he opponent , woul d resul t in to t he di sput ant ' s victory,
because his posi t i on st ands proved insofar as it is not
di sproved. The di sput ant does not win because due to his
fallacious ar gument , he fails to per suade his opponent
rationally (^c^rfcfT^^Mc^ - Literally - t her e is no realisation
of t r ut h (by t he oppone nt ) ) .
Now t he quest i on is: If hetvbhsa is an occasion of defeat
accor di ng to Dhar makl r t i why does t he commi ssi on of
Hetvbhsa does not necessarily result i nt o defeat accordi ng
to hi m?
Dr. Chi nchor e' s answer seems to be: Since commi ssi on of
a Hetvbhsa does not necessarily result i nt o defeat,
Hetvbhsa must not be a nigrahasthna accordi ng to hi m.
But is this appr oach satisfactory?
The fact is: Wher e Dharmakl rt i calls Hetvbhsa a
nigrahasthna
y
he does so literally and vividly.
4
But t he
passage which apparent l y support s Dr. Chi nchor e' s
i nt er pr et at i on, does not cont ai n t he word *nigrahasthna'
at all. (Dr. Chi nchor e has apparent l y overl ooked t he direct
and clear evidences unfavourabl e to her thesis, but tried to
expl oi t uncl ear and i ndi rect evidences apparent l y
favourable to her. ) If t he two evidences are put t oget her, we
have t he following pi ct ure: Hetvbhsa is a nigrahasthna but
commi ssi on of Hetvbhsa does not necessarily cause t he
defeat.
Thi s is i nt erest i ng. If Dharmakl rt i is consi st ent in this,
t hen his not i on of nigrahasthna is in need of further
clarification. I suggest t he following clarification.
xxii
t
VDANY YA OF DHARMAKlRTI
Nigrahasthna, i.e., an occasion of defeat or a gr ound of
defeat is so called because when it is commi t t ed by a
di sput ant or an oppone nt i n t he debat e situation, it can
cause t he defeat (subject to its discovery by t he ot her
debat er ) . But nigrahasthna is not always t he sufficient
condi t i on of defeat (i.e. it need not necessarily l ead to one' s
defeat); it is possible t hat a nigrahasthna is commi t t ed but
t he actual defeat does not occur.
5
Hetvbhsa is a
nigrahasthna accor di ng to Dhar makl r t i in this rest ri ct ed
sense. In fact this si t uat i on is not pecul i ar to hetvbhsa, it
coul d be general i sed and appl i ed to ot her nigrahasthnas as
well. In gener al , one coul d say, it coul d be appl i ed to
asdhanngavacana and adosodbhvana. (We will consi der a
pr obl em with this pr oposal a little later.)
Dhar makl r t i i n this way realises a gap bet ween wi nni ng
and losing - a si t uat i on wher e none of t he debat er s is to be
decl ared as defeat ed t hough one of t hem is certainly at
fault, and t hough a nigrahasthna has been commi t t ed. Why
does Dhar makl r t i take this stand? He himself gives t he
answer-
The debat er who commi t s a fallacy but whose fallacy
r emai ns undet ect ed by t he opponent , is not defeat ed,
because wi nni ng and losing is det er mi ned relative to t he act
of surpassing each ot her ' s st r engt h t hat takes pl ace among
t he two debat er s. That one debat er loses a poi nt or fails to
score a poi nt is insufficient. Whet her the ot her debat er
scores a poi nt by surpassi ng hi m is equally i mpor t ant . If t he
di sput ant commi t s a fallacy, he has lost a poi nt , but if t he
opponent does not discover t he fallacy, he is equally a loser,
he will score a poi nt over t he di sput ant , if he poi nt s out t he
fallacy commi t t ed by hi m. Commi t t i ng a nigrahasthna
amount s to losing a poi nt , but it will not be t ransl at ed i nt o
act ual defeat unl ess t hat is compl ement ed by t he ot her
debat er by scoring a point. Here Dhar makl r t i is insisting
INTRODUCTION xxiii
that result of a debate should not be based on a one-sided
judgement, but it should always be made in the light of
reciprocal or competitive character of the debate. This
contenti on in no way affects Dharmaklrti's view that
Hetvbhsa is a nigrahasthna.
But if the judge cannot declare the disputant as defeated
in the situation described above, what else can he do? It is
possible to claim that the j udge may declare the disputant as
the winner. Because if the j udge has discovered a fault in the
disputant's argument which the opponent has not, but if
the j udge is partial to the disputant, then he could take
advantage of the situation and tell the opponent, "See, the
disputant has presented an argument which you are not in a
position to refute. So you have lost; the disputant has won."
Dharmakirti condemns this possibility because it would be a
case of cheating the opponent on the part of the judge. And
no cheating practice is in order in a philosophical enquiry.
: | Section 36).
This approach of Dharmakirti is important as a response
to Nyya approach also. Naiyyikas do not talk of any gap
between occurrence of a nigrahasthna and actual defeat.
This sometimes may generate a paradoxical situation.
Consider, for instance, the two Nyaya-nigrahasthanas -
Hetvbhsa and Paryanuyojyopeksana. Suppose a disputant
commits a fallacy of probans and the opponent fails to
discover it. Then the disputant has committed the former
nigrahasthna whereas the opponent has committed the
latter. According to Nyaya, both will have to be declared as
defeated. Dharmakirti tries to avoid this paradox by creating
a gap between occurrence of nigrahasthna and declaration
of defeat.
But the problem reappears in a different form in
Dharmakirti's framework also. Consider the first type of
adosodbhvana (N
6
), according to which the disputant is
xxiv VDANYYA OF DHARMAKIRTI
faulty, but t he oppone nt fails to discover t he fault. Thi s is an
occasion of t he opponent ' s defeat. But t he di sput ant has
already commi t t ed a fault (which t he oppone nt fails to
discover), so it is an occasion of di sput ant ' s defeat as well. So
t here is an occasion (or two occasi ons at t he same t i me) of
t he defeat of bot h di sput ant and opponent . But none of
t hem is to be decl ar ed as defeat ed! What will happen now?
Adosodbhvana cannot cul mi nat e i nt o t he actual defeat of
t he opponent unl ess this incapasity of t he oppone nt (to
discover t he di sput ant ' s fault) has been poi nt ed out by t he
di sput ant himself. (Because, an incapasity of a debat er
cannot by itself l ead to his defeat! Thi s is by t he same t oken
as in t he case of Hetvbhsas.) But if t he di sput ant poi nt s out
t he opponent ' s incapasity to discover t he di sput ant ' s own
fault, t hen he in a way acknowl edges t he real fault
commi t t ed by himself. In di scoveri ng opponent ' s incapasity
he is discovering his own fault.
6
He is acknowl edgi ng
asdhanngavacana commi t t ed by himself and
adosodbhvana commi t t ed by t he opponent . Again a
paradoxi cal si t uat i on! Dhar maki r t i may per haps say: Such a
situation of i ndeci si on is wel come, because occur r ence of a
nigrahasthna does not by itself play a decisive rol e! But still
t he quest i on is: Why di d Dhar maki r t i i nt r oduce
adosodbhvana of t he first type (i.e.. N
6
) as t he occasion of
t he opponent ' s defeat, whi ch never l eads to t he actual
defeat of t he opponent ?
On the present edition of the text
The Sanskrit t ext of Vdanyya was first edi t ed by Rahul
Sankrityayan a nd was publ i shed by Mahabodhi Society of
Sarnat h in 1936. It was furt her edi t ed by Swami Dvarikadas
Shastri in t he light of Snt araksi t a' s comment ar y
Vipancitrth a nd publ i shed by Buddha- bhr at I of Varanasi
in 1972. Thi s l at t er edi t i on is certainly an i mpr ovement over
Rahulji' s version a nd is closer to t he ori gi nal text. Yet it
cont ai ns many cor r upt r eadi ngs and leaves r oom for furt her
INTRODUCTION xxv
improvement.
7
The present edition is an attempted
improvement over Dvarikadas Shastri's edition of
Vdanyya.
While editing, I have considered Dvarikadas Shastri's
edition (hereafter, D) as the point of departure. Generally, I
have accepted the alternative readings suggested in D in the
light of Vipancitrih (hereafter, V). But in some places I
found that the readings in Rahul Sanskrityayan's edition
(hereafter, R) are more consistent than the readings in D.
Generally, I have benefited from V while improving upon D.
However, since V is not a word to word commentary and
leaves many words and sentences unmenti oned and
unexplained, it cannot come to our rescue while improving
upon many corrupt readings in the available text. I have
suggested alternative readings in some such cases,
considering mainly the question of semantic consistency of
the text.
Since D is my starting point, I have given editorial foot-
notes only where I had to deviate from D. When the
alternative readings suggested by me are based on R or V, I
have altered the text accordingly and explained the source
in the footnotes. But when the source of alternative reading
is not R or V, but my imagination, I have introduced my
suggestions in the text by placing them into brackets, and
have prefixed or suffixed a question mark to them.
The main drawback of my version of Vdanyya is that it,
like R and D, does not take into account any Tibetan version
of the text. My humble request to the scholars of Tibetan
would be to verify the alternative readings suggested by me
in the light of Tibetan versions of Vdanyya. In spite of this
drawback, I would like to claim humbly that my version is
closer than R or D to the original, though it still contains
many doubtful places.
xxvi VDANYYA OF DHARMAKIRTI
Lastly I would like to inform that the division of the text
(and the translation) into sections and the assignment of
section-numbers has been done by me for the conveni ence
of the readers. These sections or section numbers are not
there in the original text.
Notes and References
1. For Dharmakirti's framework of anumna and the way it
differs from Nyya framework, see Chapters II, III and V of
Inference and Fallacies Discussed in Ancient Indian Logic by
Pradeep P. Gokhale, Sri Satguru Publications (Indian
Books Centre), Delhi, 1992.
2. Dr. Man gala Chinchore makes this claim vividly on pp. 83-
84 of her work Vdanyya: A Glimpse of Nyya-Buddhist
controversy ( Sri Satguru Publications, Indian Books Centre,
Delhi, 1988) Elsewhere in her work she makes the point in
different form such as - "Nigrahasthnatva and
Hetvbhsatva should not be confused with each other.
None of the two determines the other." She attributes this
view to Dharmakirti. But I think that, that Hetvbhsatva is a
determiner of Nigrahasthnatva would be acceptable to
Dharmakirti if that amounts to saying that commission of
Hetvbhsa is a nigrahasthna because it is what it is. This is
so because commission of Hetvbhsa is nothing but
asdhanngavacana in one of the senses of the latter (See
section 32) and asdhanngavacanatva is definitely a
determiner of nigrahasthnatva.
3. (i) '
f
(VN,
Sec. 32).
(ii) ^
i
1
(VN, Sec. 80).
(iii)
4
%c^P7Rn# *T*TRlFf Piy^wiifnfa, ^niqî^fMKfnfci' (VN,
Sec. 92).
4. See Note 3 above.
INTRODUCTION xxvii
5. Dr. Chinchore observes that the Nyya concept of
Nigrahasthna was different from Dharmakirti's concept
she points out that Udyotakara uses the term Parjayavastu
(the point of defeat) where as Dharmakirti uses the term
Parjaydhikarana (the ground of defeat). This is an
important observation indeed. But Dr. Chinchore does not
use it while considering the question whether Hetvbhsa is
a nigrahasthna. She could have said: Hetvbhsa is a
nigrahasthna in Dharmakirti's sense. It is a ground of
defeat, which may or may not result into actual defeat. But
it is not a nigrahasthna in Naiyyikas' sense. It is not of
point of defeat (Parjayavastu) which indicates actual
defeat
6. This situation is similar to Matnujn in Nyya terms.
7. Prof. Hajime Nakamura, in his foreword to Wf^JFf: W%
Hindi work by Prof. Ramachandra Pandeya, Dr.
Raghavendra Pandeya and Dr. Manju, congratulates the
authors of the work for editing the Sanskrit text of
Vdanyya successfully. But the Sanskrit text which the
authors include in their work as its second appendix is
nothing but a word to word (and error to error)
reproduction of Dvarikadas Shastri's edition (with the
deletion of his editorial footnotes, but without the deletion
of footnote numbers in the text). The authors do not care
to acknowledge Svami Dvarikadas Shastri anywhere in the
work.
V D A N Y Y A
P a r t i
D e f i n i t i o n o f
' O c c a s i o n o f D e f e a t '
1
ftfe ^fT^FTH^ cTR P H4 C ? * H,
1. The wicked per sons defeat in debat es by empl oyi ng
i mpr oper met hods
2
(Lit. Systems) even t he one who argues
rationally. We start this (work on t he logic of debat e) for
r epudi at i ng t hem.
Asdhanngavacana and adosodbhvand'are t he occasions
of defeat of t he two (debat ers, i.e. t he di sput ant and the
opponent respectively). Any ot her occasion of defeat,
however, is not j ust ; hence we do not accept it.
4 VDANYYA OF DHARMAKIRTI
Sdhana means pr oof of t he matter
4
i nt ended (to be
proved by t he di sput ant ) . Its anga means what const i t ut es it.
Its non-st at ement , i. -eiPnoh-utierance of t hat const i t uent (of
proof), is t he occasion of defeat of t he di sput ant ; (this
occurs) ei t her because t he di sput ant keeps mum because of
Non-i magi nat i on after he pr oposes (to prove t he mat t er) or
because he does not justify t he const i t uent of pr oof (which
he states).
5
t t
^
2. [Justification of the constituent of proof in the case
of self-nature as reason.]
Because, t hr ee ki nds of isfqren' tial. sign (= pr obans)
const i t ut e t he pr oof of an unper cei ved object: self-nature,
effect and non- appr ehensi on. Its justification (i.e.
justification of pr obans) means not hi ng but provi ng its
existence in t he propert y-bearer (= subject of t he thesis),
after provi ng its pervasion with t he pr obandum (= predi cat e
of t he thesis). For exampl e - "All t hat is real or is a pr oduct is
i mper manent , like t he t hi ngs such as pot . And s ound is real
or a pr oduct . "
t t
SZRT 1331 " w -
\. TNs and other subtitles given in brackets have been introduced first in
D. They are not in R.
DEFINITION OF 'OCCASION OFDEFEAT' 5
3. In this t here is no rul e about t he or der (of
premi ses)
1
because t he two cases make no difference as to
t he est abl i shment of t he i nt ended mat t er. Because,
pervasion can certainly be demonst r at ed afterwards, after
provi ng t he existence (of t he probans) in t he property-
bearer. For exampl e - "Sound is real or a pr oduct . And
whatever is of this ki nd is all i mper manent , like t he things
such as pot . " (This also is a legitimate proof).
t t
4. Her e proving pervasion means demonst r at i ng an
evidence
1
(= pramna) which falsifies (t he existence of
pr obans) wher e t her e is absence (of pr obandum) .
2
(It is as
follows.) If all t hat is real or a pr oduct is not subject to
dest ruct i on at every moment , t hen t he defining
characteristic (of t he real) viz. ' capacity to funct i on' gets
excl uded from it. Because a non- moment ar y object cannot
have any funct i on (= artha-kriya) ei t her in succession or in
simultaneity. Hence it (= t he non-monet ary object) will be
unr eal . Because t he entity, which by definition is destitute of
all t he descri pt i ons in t erm of capacity,lis i ndescri babl e (as
real et c. ).
If t he evi dence, which falsifies t he existence of pr obans i n
t he absence of pr obandum, is not shown in this way, it (=
6 VDANYYA OF DHARMAKlRTI
t he possibility t hat pr obans may exist in t he absence of
pr obandum) is not cont r adi ct ed (by any means of
knowl edge). And hence when it (= pr obans) is not seen to
exist in t he absence (of pr oba ndum) , t her e is no suspensi on
of t he doubt t hat t he sound may be real or a pr oduct and yet
per manent .
t t
5. Not every (ki nd of) non- appr ehensi on falsifies t he
exi st ence of an object. In t he given case capasity of an object
is est abl i shed as per vaded by ' t he association with succession
or lack of succession
1
, because t her e is no ot her mode.
Ther ef or e (in this case) t he non- appr ehensi on of pervadi ng
charact eri st i c (viz. ' succession or no successi on' ) falsifies
t he capasity in t he case of t he non- moment ar y object.
1
Because t he pervasion of t he ' non-associ at i on with
succession or simultaneity* with t he absence of capacity is
proved, t her e is no occur r ence of infinite regress.
2
t t
DEFINITION OF 'OCCASION OF DEFEAT
6. [An Objection-]
"But her e non- appr ehensi on is not t he means to
knowl edge because t he pervasion of t he non-association
with succession or simultaneity with the absence of capasity
is itself not proved.
1
Hence t her e is no pervasion of the
earlier pr obans (' real ness' ) (with t he pr obandum
' moment ar i ness' ) . If you pr oceed to accept ( anot her )
pr obans for (proving) this (second pervasi on), t hen t here
will be t he danger of infinite regress. "
[Answer] That is not correct . Because you have not deni ed
(successfully) t he non- appr ehensi on as t he
means to prove absence.
(Which ki nd of non- appr ehensi on is called the
falsifying evi dence in this case?) That non-
appr ehensi on, which proves t he absence of
pr obans in t he case in which t her e is absence of
pr obandum, is called t he falsifying evidence
because it establishes t he opposi t e of t hat (=
existence of pr obans in t he absence of
pr oba ndum) .
In this way t he pr obans will be proved as absent
from t he case in which pr obandum is absent , if it
(= its existence) is falsified by t he authoritative
cont rary evi dence. Otherwise if t he evi dence
falsifying it (= t he existence of pr obans) in t hat (=
t he absence of pr obandum) is not established,
VDANY YA OF DH ARMAKIRTI
t hen t he doubt (t hat t he pr obans may exist
wi t hout pr oba ndum) is inevitable.
In that case t her e will be a fallacy of pr obans
called ' Inconcl usi ve' because of t he doubt ful ness
of negative concomi t ance.
Nor is t he excl usi on (of pr obans from t he case of
t he absence of pr obandum) pr oved merel y on
t he basis of non- appr ehensi on. Because in t he
case of r emot e objects non- appr ehensi on does
not prove t hei r absence to a non-omni sci ent
bei ng; and because a per son with downword
vision
2
does not percei ve some objects al t hough
they are real.
t t
V9.
3TfeT
t ^T f^HS
7. The falsifying evi dence, however, is (expressed as
follows)
1
: Anyt hi ng which lacks association with succession
and simultaneity does not have capacity to do anyt hi ng. And
t he non- moment ar y object has this char act er (t hat it lacks
association with succession a nd si mul t anei t y). The falsifying
evi dence whi ch goes onwar ds in this way entails (Lit.
attracts)
4
the absence of capacity' whi ch is t he defi ni ng
DEFINITION OF 'OCCASION OF DEFEAT 9
characteristic of ' unr eal ' . By that (t he pervasion-) ' what is
real or a pr oduct is definitely i mper manent ' is proved.
By this (justification) t he positive concomi t ance of
t he whole
2
probans-charact eri st i c with t he pr obandum-
characteristic is proved.
In this way t he const i t uent of proof becomes justified in
t he ar gument s based on self-nature as reason. Not justifying
it is non-st at ement of a const i t uent of proof. It is an
occasi on of defeat of t he di sput ant because it amount s to
non-fulfilment of t he pur pose under t aken (by t he
di sput ant ) . Because, t he soundness of t he reason has not
been br ought out (by t he di sput ant ) t her e, al t hough in fact
a sound reason has been empl oyed.
t t
L.
f ? ci
8. [Justification of the constituent of proof in the case
of effect as reason.]
In t he case of effect-as-reason t oo, a const i t uent of pr oof
needs justification. ( The nat ur e of this justification is as
follows:) It is t he est abl i shment of cause-effect-relation
(bet ween pr obans and pr obandum) wher e t he effect is used
as pr obans for provi ng t he cause. Thi s is done by giving two
ki nds of evi dences (= pramnas), one est abl i shi ng existence
(i.e. positive concomi t ance) and t he ot her non-exi st ence
(i.e. negative concomi t ance) such as Th i s (= smoke etc.)
occurs (only) when this (= fire etc.) exists' and ' In spite of
t he pr esence of ot her powerful causal condi t i ons,
1
this
(= smoke etc.) does not occur in t he absence of this (= fire
et c. ) ' .
In this way t he fact t hat this (= smoke etc.) is t he effect of
this cause (= fire etc.) (and not of any ot her t hi ng) becomes
justified indubitally. Ot herwi se if (while establishing the
negative concomi t ance) only this much is demonst r at ed,
t hat Th i s does not occur in t he absence of this, ' t hen t he
(causal) efficacy of it (= of the al l eged cause) will be
doubt ed, if ot her t hi ngs are also absent t her e (when t he
effect is absent ) . The doubt will be as follows: ' Some ot her
t hi ng is efficient in pr oduci ng it (= t he effect), and it (= t he
effect) di d not occur because of t he absence of t hat ( ot her
t hi ng) ' .
2
' Absence of this while t hat is absent ' amount s to
acci dent al coi nci dence. For exampl e t he fact t hat marri age
with one' s own mot her is gr ant ed in a part i cul ar place is
rel at ed with t he gener at i on of dat e-t rees in t hat pl ace and
t he fact t hat t her e is absence of dat e-t rees in ot her places
wher e mar r i age with one' s own mot her is not gr ant ed, is a
DEFINITION OF 'OCCASION OF DEFEAT' 11
mat t er of mer e coi nci dence. Thus t he effect is proved if
justified properl y.
When any real t hi ng is proved, it proves t he gener at i on of
its cause t hr ough its own gener at i on. Because t he effect has
invariable rel at i on with t he cause. Ther e is t he common law
(of causat i on) in so far as t he invariable rel at i on of all effects
with t hei r causes is concer ned.
(Like in t he case of self-nature as reason: ) In t he case of
effect as reason t oo, not justifying (t he casue-effect-relation)
in this way is ' non- st at ement of a const i t uent of pr oof and is
t he occasion of t he di sput ant ' s defeat.
Because when it (= t he cause-effect-relation) is not
justified, t he pr oposed thesis r emai ns unpr oved, because
t he effect-hood of t he effect is unpr oved, as t her e is no rul e
by which somet hi ng (Lit. t hat ) exists when some ot her
object whi ch has no bi ndi ng rel at i on with it, exists; because
al t hough effect (as reason) is empl oyed as a mat t er of fact,
its effect hood is not proved.
t i t
. (V); dl^l^li xii^qcri^ - (R);
12 VDANYYAOF DHARMAKIRTI
9. [The justification of a constituent of proof in the
case of non- appr ehensi on (as r eason) ]
In t he case on non- appr ehensi on (as reason) t oo,
(justification of a const i t uent of pr oof means) provi ng non-
appr ehens i on of t he object fulfilling t he condi t i on of
' apprehensi bi l i t y
1
by t he knower.
2
Because it is only by this
ki nd of non- appr ehensi on t hat t he pract i ce of non-
exi st ence
3
is proved.
If t he object does not fulfil t he condi t i on of
apprehensi bi l i t y, t hen its absence is not pr oved even if it is
not a ppr e he nde d percept ual l y by t he knower.
He r e 'fulfilling t he condi t i on of apprehensi bi l i t y' means
(1) t he specific nat ur e (of t he object) and (2) t he aggregat e
of all t he r emai ni ng condi t i ons (of appr ehens i on) . The
specific nat ur e of t he object means t hat t he object is not
r emot e (from senses) due to (any of t he) t hr ee ki nds of
remot eness.
4
It is t he nat ur e whi ch appear s in t he per cept ual
appear ance to t he knower, in cont radi st i nct i on with t he
appear ance of somet hi ng ot her t han self-nature. When t he
object is not a ppr e he nde d in spite of t he pr esence of ot her
condi t i ons of t he appr ehens i on of such an object, t he non-
a ppr e he nde d object is t he object of t he pract i ce of non-
exi st ence. Ot herwi se t her e arises a doubt ( about non-
exi st ence) in spite of ( non- appr ehensi on as) t he reason.
t t
cTPT
10. The pervasion her e is of t he form, "Everything of
this ki nd is t he object of t he pract i ce of non-exi st ence;
because (for i nst ance) t he same characteristic (viz. non-
appr ehensi on associated with fulfilment of t he condi t i on of
apprehensi bi l i t y) commonl y exists in t he accept ed case of
some non-exi st ent object."
Because unless non-exi st ence of t he object of this ki nd is
accept ed, non-exi st ence will not be obt ai nabl e in ot her
cases. Because if t he object of this ki nd exists and t he ot her
condi t i ons of appr ehensi on are present , , t hen t here will not
be non- appr ehensi on. If on t he ot her hand t he object of
this ki nd is not appr ehended, t hen i t . does not exist. Thi s
much is t he (sufficient) condi t i on of t he practice of non-
exi st ence, because t her e is no ot her condi t i on.
t t
^ yol fti :, 3PFFT
11. A possible objection:
"Exclusion of all capasities (from t he object) is t he
condi t i on (of non-exi st ence)"
[Answer] That is right. But t he experi ence of t he non-
exi st ent object, whi ch (as, you say,) excludes all
capasities, takes place in this way (i.e. in t he way
expl ai ned by us), because t here is no ot her
means to its exper i ence. And when t he non-
exi st ent object is exper i enced in this way, it is
pract i sed as non-existent. That is why we call this
as its condi t i on.
t t
3?PT
12. A possible objection: "The pract i ce of existence (of
an object) ori gi nat es from cogni t i on, verbal usage and
pragmat i c funct i on (of t he object) wher eas t he practice of
non-exi st ence ori gi nat es from t he absence of t hem. "
[Answer] (Yes) The practice of exi st ence originates from
t he cogni t i on, t he appear ance of which takes
pl ace as has been st at ed above.
1
And t he practice
of non-exi st ence ori gi nat es from its opposi t e. But
when t he object is not t he obj ect of per cept i on,
t he pract i ce of exi st ence coul d ori gi nat e from an
i nferent i al cogni t i on.
But t he pract i ce of non-exi st ence is uncer t ai n
(= inconclusive) in t he case of absence of it
(= per cept ual cogni t i on) (i.e. i n t he case of non-
per cept ual obj ect ). Because i n t he case of a
r emot e object al t hough t he knower ' s per cept i on
or some ot her means to knowl edge becomes
i noperat i ve, t he doubt (t hat t he object may be
exi st ent ), r emai ns.
t t
DEFINITION OF 'OCCASION OF DEFEAT
1
15
Traf st ,
13. It is also not t he case t hat all cogni t i ons and
linguistic usages or t he distinctions or i dent i t i es amongst
t hem prove t he existence of t hi ngs or t he existence of
distinctions or i dent i t i es amongst t he t hi ngs. Because t her e
are cogni t i ons and linguistic usages to i ndi cat e t he
existence of objects whi ch are non-exi st ent somehow,
because they bel ong ei t her to past or fut ure or t he objects
which have mul t i pl e or singular functions; (similarly) t her e
are (cogni t i ons or linguistic usages with) mul t i pl e or
singular form, al t hough t he objects (i ndi cat ed by t hem)
lack multiplicity or singularity (respectively). (For exampl e)
- (i) (Past object-) The ki ng Mahsammat a, t he ori gi nat or of
t he monastry. (ii) (Fut ure object-) The emper or Sankha
woul d elevate t he sacrificial post established by
Mahsammat a. (iii) ( Unr eal object-) The hor n of a har e (iv)
(Singular object with mul t i pl e functions-) col our t hat is
percept ual and restrictive (v) (composi t e object with a
singular function-) Pot.
1
t t
:? ] "
(V); ^-(R)and(D).
(V); ^fRP^T^ ti^r^PT - (R) and (D).
16 VDANY YA OF DHARMAKJRTI
14. In this t he words like pe r c e pt ua l ' ('sanidarsana')
(which are used for descri bi ng col our) do not desi gnat e
many objects because they consol i dat e in one object.
[A possible objection by Vaisesikas:] "Many descri pt i ons,
al t hough t hey cor r es pond to many objects, consol i dat e in
one object because t he objects causi ng t hem (= t hose
descriptions) are rel at ed by I nher ence {samavya) with t he
respective (single) object. "
[Answer] The poor fellow object (such as colour-object) has
fallen i nt o a bur dens ome task, because it directs
many words from many rel at ed factors towards
itself, when it favours a mul t i -t ermed rel at i on
(called I nher ence)
1
! Why does not t he object
(col our) st i mul at e different words, with respect
to t he same different capasities, t hr ough which it
favours t he mul t i -t erned rel at i on (called
I nher ence) ? By this t he strain of following
(endless) series* can be avoi ded by it (= by t he
object such as col our ) .
If (accordi ng to you, t he Vai sesi ka, )
3
one and t he
same obj ect cannot st i mul at e di fferent words,
t hen let it not favour t he mul t i -t ermed rel at i on as
well. And if it does not favour it, t hen it (= t he
object) cannot be proved to be r el at ed with t hem
(= many t er ms of t he r el at i on) . Similarly many
ent i t i es such as col our et c. whi ch have one
(collective) pragmat i c funct i on may be named by
a singular word namely ' pot ' . What is t he use of
i magi ni ng a different entity (pot, over and above
col our etc.)? Many entities can have one
pragmat i c funct i on, like (t he entities such as) eye
etc. (which have percept ual cogni t i on as their
collective f unct i on) . So we t hi nk it pr oper t hat a
single word may be appl i ed to many entities to
i ndi cat e t he single capasity (t hat they have).
t i t
15. Moreover, peopl e do not apply words for objects
wi t hout any pur pose. What will be t he har m if for many
objects which serve a single pur pose ei t her collectively or
distributively, a single wor d is used for i ndi cat i ng t hat t he
objects are like t hat (i.e. t hat they serve common purpose)?
Similarly t her e is no cont radi ct i on in using a group-word
(for many entities) in singular, when it is used for indicating
Suggested in R
;
ctftc^ - mentioned in R
;
cfM - (D); Grammatically <i Jft
-) would be correct.
t hei r common pragmat i c funct i on, because they have t hat
single efficacy collectively and not distributively.
So t he group-word is used in singular, when it denot es a
single gr oup of objects, as t he word ' pot ' .
But in t he case of class-words, t he objects (bel ongi ng to
t he same class) may have single ( common) capasity ei t her
individually or collectively or they may have many different
capasities or t he same capasity. Hence t he class-word can be
used ei t her in pl ural or in singular, accor di ng to one' s
desi re, if one i nt ends to talk of many capasities or one
capasity (respectively). For exampl e one may use t he word
' t r ees' or ' t r ee' (accordi ng to one' s i nt ent i on) .
Whi l e (accordi ng to you) it is t he rul e t hat pl ural form is
used only when objects are many (i.e. mor e t han two in
number ) and si ngul ar form is used when t he object is one,
our view is t hat t he two (ki nds of words) are used by
convent i on in t hei r convent i onal senses. So it (= what you
are saying) is only an ( undue) adher ence (on your par t ) .
t t
ifcr
s. (R); *iH^tll - (D).
y\*i Wl H : , Sift c^fÎRT
:; eft"
16. [A possible objection by Vaisesikas:]
"( The characteristics of t he pot viz.) col our etc., which
are pl ural in number cannot stimulate a single word. "
[Answer:] Do t he objects themselves st i mul at e t he words
irrespective of t he i nt ent i on of t he person (i.e.
t he speaker) or it is t he persons who use t he
words for objects, in or der to conduct practises?
Because t he quest i on whet her t he objects have
real capasity or no capasity can be t hought about
only if objects themselves give rise (t o words). But
this (posi t i on) is not r easonabl e. The n what is
your censur e, when you say t hat if t he words are
appl i ed by persons, t hen they will be appl i ed by
t hem at will (i.e. wi t hout any rule)?
We have already told t he efficient cause of t he
appl i cat i on of words.
Moreover, if col our etc. (bei ng many) do not
have rel at i on with a single word, t hen how can
they (= col our etc.) have any rel at i on with t he
single subst ance whi ch is r egar ded as t he
subst rat um of t hem?
1
Ther ef or e this is not hi ng
but t he ghost of falsehood
2
possessing you.
- (R) and (D).
20 VDANYYA OF DHARMAK1RTI
[The Opponent Vaisesika says:] "We do not i nt end to say
t hat one word shoul d not be used for many objects as they
are opposed to any rel at i on with a single object. But we say
t hat col our etc., when they are non-di fferent (i.e. one and
t he same) in pot s, bl anket s etc., are opposed to differential
pr agmat i c funct i ons and to (t he use of) different words.
Hence when they (= col our etc.) are one and t he same in
nat ur e, they will not have t he pr agmat i c funct i on which
ot her collections of objects cannot have.
3
Ther ef or e, in
or der to i ndi cat e it (i.e. t he sameness of col our in spite of
diversity of collections which share it) t he col our etc. can be
ment i oned by a single word."
4
[Answer:] One coul d have an i ncl i nat i on to say, "colour etc.
woul d be t he same t hr ough all t he col l ect i ons. "
( her e we ask) Does t he per cept ual knowl edge of
t he mut ual l y distinct appear ances of col our set
aside this i ncl i nat i on?
5
Moreover, this view (of our
opponent s ) is not desi rabl e because col our etc.
are accept ed to be different in nat ur e from one
col l ect i on to anot her .
t t
vs. (V); fcld<51il*W: - (R) and (D).
17. [The opponent asks:] "What (wrong) will happen if
pot woul d be distinct from col our etc.?"
[Answer] All right. What t hen is t he obstacle
1
t hat obstructs
t he appear ance of t he real percept i bl e t hi ng (like
pot ) , which is not of t he form of col our etc., in its
own form distinct from t hem (= col our et c. ), in
our cognition?
2
The percept i bl e objects such as odour and taste
are seen to appear distinctly even when they do
not have separat e location (i.e. even when they
bel ong to the same t hi ng) . And t he objects such
as t he t ouch of t he wi nd and t he t ouch of sun' s
heat are seen to appear distinctly even if they are
sensible by t he same sense organ.
3
Thi s is what makes per cept i on a percept i on,
namel y, t he submi ssi on of object' s own nat ur e, as
distinct from t he nat ur e of what it is not , to t he
cogni t i on. But this t hi ng such as pot (as
concei ved by you) is a free-of-cost-purchaser,
4
who does not exhi bi t its own (distinct) nat ure,
but wants to appr opr i at e (distinct) perceptibility.
t t
cR^T^HRf
WL:
22 VDANY YA OF DHARMAKIRTI
18. Thi s (= above expl anat i on) also expl ai ns t he
(distinct) cogni t i on, t he (distinct) wor d (i.e. verbal usage)
etc. , if it desi red (by t he opponent ) to prove k (= distinct
exi st ence of t he pot etc.) on t he basis of t hem.
1
Moreover, it is not correct to say t hat t he col our is not
identified (distinctly) when t he per cept i on (of t he
composi t e object such as pot ) is not domi nat ed (by some
ot her obj ect ), in whi ch case (i.e. only if t he col our is not
identified distinctly,) a pr obans will be st at ed for provi ng it
(= t he distinct composi t e object such as pot ) .*
When it (= t he composi t e object) is not per cept i bl e, it is
not pr oper to assert t he exi st ence of a t hi ng, for t he
knowl edge of whi ch t her e is no aut hori t at i ve means.
Ther ef or e pot is not different from col our et c.
In this way one cannot talk of exi st ence j ust on t he basis
of cogni t i on and verbal usage, nor can one talk of
distinctness or i dent i t y of exi st ence ( on t he basis of t hem) .
For t he same reason t he obsence cannot be established
on t he basis of t he absence of t hem (= cogni t i on, verbal
usage etc. ).
3
t i t
"2JT
, Claris
:, cT^TT
19. One can talk of existence on t he basis of pragmat i c
funct i on, but one cannot talk of distinctness or identity of
existences on t he basis of it. Because a single object is seen
to have many pr agmat i c functions. For exampl e a l amp has
t he following funct i ons: (hel pi ng) cogni t i on, transfor-
mat i on of t he wick and pr oduci ng anot her flame.
(Distinctness or identity of existences cannot be established
on t he basis of pragmat i c functions. ) Because, (for
exampl e) al t hough eye and t he ot her (causal) factors are
many in number , they are seen to have a single funct i on viz.
(percept ual ) cogni t i on.
[The opponent says:] "We are not saying t hat distinctness
of existences is est abl i shed merel y on t he basis of
distinctness of pragmat i c funct i ons. But (it can be so
est abl i shed) on t he basis of distinctness of some unseen
pr agmat i c funct i on. The pr agmat i c funct i on which is not
seen in one t hi ng (at one poi nt of t i me) but is seen t her e
agai n, establishes distinctness of exi st ence. For exampl e t he
funct i on of carrying wat er whi ch is not seen in mud is seen
in t he ear t hen pot and t he funct i on of covering body whi ch
is not seen i n t hr eads is seen in t he cl ot h. In this way t her e is
t he distinctness of exi st ences. "
[Answer:] In this way (t he existence of) some ot her object
may be established, but t he composi t e whol e (=
ayayavi) is not establihsed. The difference in
- (R)and(D).
pragmat i c funct i on (in t he cases cited by you) is
due to t he difference of nat ur e (= svabhva)
whi ch occurs in a series of modifications in
accor dance with its causal condi t i ons.
1
For
exampl e, when t he fire is in t he stage of r ubbi ng
of t he fire-producing sticks, t he pr agmat i c
funct i on of fire differs due to whet her it is
pr oduced in thick cow-dung or in grass or in
wood. In t he same way different pragmat i c
funct i on can be f ound in t hr eads et c. because t he
nat ur e of a t hi ng differs in accor dance with t he
difference in causal condi t i ons.
Thi s expl ai ns t he di st i nct ness and identity of
cogni t i ons and verbal usages (as t he alleged
evi dences of di st i nct ness and identity of
existences).
2
t t
ifcf; <H<âqJ "ST
ffcT "^ftsfq "^TT^ ^ftf
20. [Objection:] "But it has been said (by you yourself)
t hat t he (linguistic) pract i ce of existence is proved on t he
basis of pr agmat i c function and its (i.e. former' s) absence is
proved on t he basis of its (i.e. latter 's) absence. "
[Answer:] That is right. But t hat absence is not proved in
t he case of t hose objects which do not fulfil t he
condi t i on of apprehensibility.
So one has to accept even against one' s will: Th a t
is t he object of t he pract i ce of non-existence, t he
capasity of which fulfils t he condi t i on of
apprehensi bi l i t y and yet is not appr ehended.
Because capasity is t he mark of existence. '
But what does this st at ement score over t he
earlier one? Because, capasity is not a different
object from self-nature. So t he non- appr ehensi on
of t he capasity fulfilling t he condi t i on of
apprehensi bi l i t y is not hi ng but t he non-
appr ehensi on of t he self-nature of the object. So
this non- appr ehensi on is t he same as t he earlier
one.
1
Ther ef or e t he one who accepts t he practice of
non-exi st ence of somet hi ng in some place,
shoul d accept it on t he basis of this (kind of)
non- appr ehensi on.
Thi s (nonâpprehensi on) is common to ot her
similar cases.
2
So let t hem be like t hat (i.e. let t he
ot her cases be equally t he cases of non-
exi st ence). Or let it be (i.e. let non-existence be
proved) in no case, because t her e is no difference
(amongst these cases insofar as non-
appr ehensi on is concer ned) . The pervasion
( her e is as follows): Every t hi ng which is of this
ki nd (i.e. whi ch fulfils t he condi t i on of
apprehensi bi l i t y) and is not a ppr e he nde d is t he
object of t he pract i ce of ' non-exi st ence.
>s
t t
21. [A possible obj ect i on by a Sahkhya opponent
1
]
"Not hi ng is an object of t he pract i ce of ' non-existence*
whatever it may be and wherever and in what ever way it may
r emai n non- appr ehended. "
[Answer:] In t hat case everything will be appl i cabl e every-
' wher e all t he t i me, because every form of
everyt hi ng will r emai n i ncessant all t he t i me.
Moreover, t he following (situations) will not
occur - Th i s (is) out of this;' Th i s (is) not out of
this;' Th i s (is) her e' ; Th i s (is ) not her e' ; Th i s
(exists) now' ; Th i s (does) not (exist) now' ; Th i s
(is) of this ki nd' ; Th i s (is) not of this kind*.
Because t her e will not be any distinct cause of any
(particular) form of an object in any way,
anywhere, any t i me. The universe will be wi t hout
co-existences and co-absences because t her e will
not be any distinction.
[A possible objection:] "There will be or der (in t he
uni verse) on t he basis of t he distinctions bet ween
di sappear ance and appear ance of states (= avasth) (of
t hi ngs)".
[Answer:] These distinctions themselves are not possible in
your system on the basis of which t her e will be
order; because t he pract i ce of non-exi st ence of
anyt hi ng is unt enabl e (accordi ng to you) .
2
If you accept t he linguistic pract i ce of non-
exi st ence in t he case of some objects, t hen you
will have to tell how t hat is t enabl e. Because t here
is no pr obans provi ng non-exi st ence except non-
appr ehensi on. When non-exi st ence is proved
ei t her on t he basis of positive evidences or
negative evidences
3
, non- appr ehensi on is always
t he pr obans.
If one accept s t he thesis t hat it (= t he practice of
non-exi st ence) is on t he basis of non-
appr ehens i on only, t hen one has to say t hat
everything is t he object of t he pract i ce of non-
exi st ence, wherever t hat (= non- appr ehensi on) is
t her e. Because t her e is no difference among
t hese cases (in so far as they are t he cases of non-
appr ehens i on) .
t t
28 VDANY YA OF DHARMAKlRTI
33.
JE
22. [Another opponent says:] "Non- appr ehensi on
means cessation (i.e. inapplicability) of all t he means of
knowl edge. We r egar d somet hi ng as an object of t he
pract i ce of non-exi st ence if it is not a ppr e he nde d in this
sense. "
[Answer:] Oh! You t he bel oved of gods have so del i cat e
i nt el l i gence t hat you cannot t ol erat e t he exert i on
of t hi nki ng about means of knowl edge. That is
why you di d not pay seri ous at t ent i on to it.
(V); yHi
u
iP^-dioqc(5K - (R) and (D).
(V); d<ci^r^l^R<< - (R) and (D).
(V); rTFRT^cfr^fcR^r - (R) and (D).
Because, t he cessation of i nference etc. does not
l ead us to t he knowl edge of absence because
t her e is variability of rel at i on (= vyabhicra)
(bet ween, say, non-inferability and absence).
1
Nor
does / t he cessation of per cept i on by all (bei ngs)'
l ead us to t he knowl edge of absence, because t hat
(= t he cessation of per cept i on by all beings) is
unproved.
2
Even t he absolute (= avisesa) cessation of t he
per cept i on by oneself cannot (lead to t he
knowl edge of t he absence of objects), when t he
objects are r emot e.
Ther ef or e t he cessation of only t hat means of
knowl edge can prove t he practice of non-
exi st ence (of an obj ect ), on t he basis of which the
specific nat ur e of t he object is invariably called
existent. Because t he existence of t he (specific)
nat ur e is expect ed to be proved by the existence
of t he (specific) means to knowledge.
3
Nor is it t he case t hat if t he object which reaches
t he condi t i on of apprehensi bi l i t y is not
perceived,
4
t hen its appr ehensi on will be of
different nat ur e (i.e. ot her t han per cept i on) , in
t he case of which its appr ehensi on coul d be
t hr ough i nference! Nor can an object (which is
t her e and percept i bl e) r emai n unpercei ved,
unless t he nat ur e of t he object has under gone
t ransformat i on. But in t he case of transformation
t he object will not r emai n t he same.
Moreover, wherefrom has t he fellow (i.e. t he
Snkhya opponent ) l earnt this magic-without-
chant i ng-and-medi ci ne? Because (accordi ng to
t he Snkhya opponent ) t he same object is
somet i mes the object of per cept i on, somet i mes
not , in whi ch case its appr ehensi on is somet i mes
t he same as i nference; somet i mes it is per cept i on,
somet i mes knowl edge by verbal testimony! And
this happens even t hough no excess in t he nat ur e
of objet is gener at ed or dest royed; t he object is
not ei t her conceal ed or r emot e and t he per son
(= t he observer) is t he same with t he sense-organs
et c. in t he same condi t i on as before!
Because when t he object is one and t he same
wi t hout any excess, t hese characteristics (viz.
somet i mes per cept i bl e, somet i mes not
percept i bl e, but i nferabl e etc.) ar e i ncompat i bl e.
t t
' !Rl^NI,
\. This is how the interpretation in V goes.
^=bi^*i PicjcfniH:! - Interpretation in V ... i^qcl (R).
cTT
HHIccj,
23. [Another opponent says:] "The object is not wi t hout
an excess. Because t he objects assume different (linguistic)
practices (such as t he practice of existence and t he pract i ce
of non-exi st ence) on account of cessation' of one excess and
gener at i on of anot her. "
1
[Answer:] If t he excess in t he object is identical with t he
object itself, and it ceases to exist and comes i nt o
existence wi t hout continuity,
2
t hen how does it
not ent ai l diversity in t he nat ur e of t he object? -
For exampl e pl easure and pai n (lack cont i nui t y
and are diverse in nat ur e) .
On t he ot her ha nd if t he t hi ng has continuity,
t hen what is (its) gener at i on or cessation and
what is it t he gener at i on or cessation of? So this
( =your ar gument ) is insignificant.
Or if you yourself accept gener at i on or cessation
of a cert ai n self-nature (of t he obj ect ), t hen why
donot you approve of t he same t hi ng when it is
stated by your opponent ?
[The Shkhya opponent may say:] "That is because he (=
our opponent , i.e. t he Buddhi st ) accept s gener at i on and
dest ruct i on dest i t ut e of any cont i nui t y. "
[The author asks:] What is this Continuity* (= anvaya)?
[Opponent answers:] "It is t he capasity of a t hi ng to get
gener at ed and dest royed. It exists even before
t he gener at i on and after t he dest ruct i on.
Ther ef or e this (= Continuity* or ' cont i nuous
capasity
1
) is not such t hat it di d not exist before
but gets gener at ed all t he way or it existed before
but gets dest royed. "
[The author asks:] If t hat capasity does not under go any
change (Lit. excess) at any t i me, t hen what does under go
t he change due to whi ch t her e ifc t he di st i nct i on bet ween
t he (linguistic) practices?
3
[The opponent may say:] "It is t he states (= avasih) ( and
not t he capasities) t hat under go change. "
[The author asks:] Are t he states a nd t he capasity one
and t he same t hi ng, or are they different?
[The opponent may answer:] "One and t he same t hi ng. "
[The author asks:] Now, how can you apply mutually
cont radi ct ory predi cat es such as gener at i on, dest ruct i on;
cessation, non-cessat i on; oneness, manyness; perceptibility,
i mpercept i bi l i t y; having pr agmat i c funct i on and not having
it, to one and t he same uni form object, wi t hout relativising
t hem t o different modal i t i es (= nisparyyam)?
t t
cTFT * J - H ( C MI ^ "*FR ^ eft
x. (R); ^ - (V) and (D).
ffcf
' eft'
:l f^T crff ?
flfn lei I
: "^fcf cTRI:
24. [The Opponent may answer:] "There is a (considera-
tion of) modality, namel y state and capasity (are t he two
modalities) / Ther ef or e t her e is no cont radi ct i on. "
*. (R);
[The author says:] You, t he bel oved of gods, are forgetful,
as you are not not i ci ng t he cont ext . What a cont radi ct i on
you have made, as you have said t hat capasity and state are
one and t he same t hi ng wi t hout any di st i nct i on!
Even if t her e is a di st i nct i on bet ween t hem (= state and
capasity), t her e is no cont radi ct i on (by itself), but t hen it
only woul d not be t he case t hat gener at i on a nd dest ruct i on
of a t hi ng are qualified by (its) cont i nui t y.
Ther ef or e t he t hi ng whi ch has cont i nui t y, does not have
gener at i on or dest ruct i on and t he t hi ng whi ch has t he
latter, does riot have cont i nui t y.
[The opponent may say:] "Ther e is no fault (in our
ar gument ) because t her e is no difference bet ween t hem. "
[Answer:] The respect abl e fellow (i.e. t he Sftkhya
opponent ) is bei ng r ushed i nt o a crowd of faults
due to his at t achment to his own view; yet he is
not maki ng himself aware (of i t ). Because non-
difference means oneness. But r ef er r i ng to t hem
as ' t hey two' (= tau) is t he genui ne (linguistic)
pract i ce based on (t hei r) di fference. Ther e is also
t he defi ni t i on of manyness (di fference), "If t he
t hi ng lacks cessation and or i gi nat i on inspite of
t he ( ot her t hi ng under goi ng) cessation and
ori gi nat i on, if it lacks staticity i nspi t e of t he
staticity (of t he ot her t hi ng) et c. ( t hen t hat t hi ng
is different from t he ot her t hi ng. ) " How is (all)
this co-tenable?
[The opponent might say:] "The di fference amongst
t hi ngs and t he absence of such a di fference, t hat is, non-
differences (= abheda) are (exempl i fi ed) as follows -
pl easure, ( pai n) , etc. (are different from each ot her and)
capasity and state of one and t he same t hi ng (are non-
different from each ot her ) . If we don' t accept this, t hen,
due to t he absence of distinctive mar ks of difference and
non-difference, t her e will be di sorder bet ween difference
and non-difference everywhere.
"So (we accept t he distinctive marks of difference and
non-difference as follows)- arising in a thing-itself is non-
difference; to t he cont rary is difference. For exampl e pot
arises in mud-itself, so it is non-di fferent from mud. But
t her e is difference if t he case is to t he contrary; (for
i nst ance) pl easure and pai n (do not arise from each ot her,
so t her e is difference bet ween t hem) . These are the
distinctive marks of difference and non-difference. Hence
t her e is no cont radi ct i on. "
[Answer:] The pot does not arise in t he mud-itself. But
some mud-itself is called pot . Because t he nat ur e
(= tm) of mud is not t he same everywhere in
t he universe. The difference between reflective
cogni t i ons (prativijnapti) (of a t hi ng) and
bet ween appear ances (of it) are due to the
difference bet ween t he nat ur es of things. That is
how it is possible for hi m (= t he Srikhya
opponent ) also to know t hat pl easure, (pain, )
etc. (are different) and consciousnesses (i.e.
pursusas accordi ng to Snkhya) are different.
2
If t hat is so, t hen t her e will be difference
(bet ween pot and t he whol e mud etc.)
[The opponent might say:] "It (= The non-difference
bet ween pot and mud etc.) is t he case inspite of this
(difference), because of t he cont i nui t y of some (part of t he)
nat ur e. "
[Answer:] The same consequence will follow in t he case of
pl easure et c. and also in the case of
consci ousnesses.
Even in t he case of pot etc. t her e is no cont i nui t y
(of mu d etc.) in all respects. Because (otherwise)
t he following difficulties will result -
(i) (avavarpya -) Ther e cannot be (t he
gener at i on of) all t he forms (if t he whol e mud
has cont i nui t y with a pot onl y).
(ii) {sahotpati-) Ther e will be si mul t aneous
pr oduct i on (of different states of a t hi ng)
- and ot her difficulties.
Moreover, nobody observes t he pot and its mud-
nat ur e distinctly, in t he case of whi ch it woul d
have been possible (to say:) ' this (pot ) has arisen
in this ( mud) ' .
Because, it does not become possible when t he
subst r at um and t he super st r at um are not
observed distinctly.
Moreover, it is not t he case t hat a capasity arises
in t he locus (lit. self, nat ur e) of t he capasity.
3
Ther ef or e t her e will not be non-di fference
bet ween capacity and its locus.
t t
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HR
U
I RI : I
M^P d: ,
FTRÎ cT
25. The same ( ar gument ) answers (t he doct ri ne of)
t ransformat i on (parinma). Because whosoever i magi nes
Vhat ever is a t ransformat i on of somet hi ng is non-different
from it' is like t hat (i.e., is liable to t he above criticism).
Because, t he capacity of a t hi ng is not (t he same as) its
t ransformat i on.
Moreover, it happens to be said (by Siikhyas):
"Transformat i on (of a subst ance) is cessation of some
pr oper t y of t he subsisting subst ance. Transformat i on is also
t he arisal of a different pr oper t y in t hat subst ance. "
(Now we ask:) Is that part i cul ar propert y which ceases or
arises, t he same as t he subsisting substance or it is different
from it.? Because t her e is no ot her alternative.
If it (= arising or ceasing propert y) is t he same as t hat (=
subst ance), t hen, because t he substance subsists, t her e will
38 VADAATKAKAOFDHARMAKIRTI
not be cessation or arisal (of any of its pr oper t i es) . So tell us,
to whom do they (= cessation and arisal) bel ong?
Nor can it be pr oved t hat t he subsistent t hi ng has got
anot her pr oper t y (which arises or ceases), because t he t hi ng
itself cannot be anot her pr oper t y of itself, unless it is
(at t ri but ed to t he t hi ng) dependi ng upon a different
enquiry.
1
If ( on t he cont rary) a pr oper t y is a different object from
t he subst ance, t hen t he cessation and arisal of t hat pr oper t y
do not const i t ut e t he t ransformat i on of t he subst ance.
Because cessation and arisal of one object cannot a mount to
t ransformat i on of anot her object. Because (by t he same
t oken) , it (= t ransformat i on) will have to be accept ed in t he
case of consci ousness also.
2
Moreover, t he linguistic expressi on ' t he pr oper t y of a
subst ance' cannot be justified because t her e is no rel at i on
(bet ween subst ance and pr oper t y) . Because, t her e is no real
rel at i on except cause-effect-relation.
And t her e is no cause-effect rel at i on bet ween t hem (=
subst ance and pr oper t y) , because (accordi ng to you) a
t hi ng whi ch itself is not of t he same nat ur e as t hat (= effect)
is not t he cause of t hat , and because a pr oper t y is a different
object from a subst ance.
If (you say t hat ) somet hi ng coul d be a cause of its
pr oper t y even if it is different (from t hat ) , t hen this will
amount to your admi ssi on t hat t he subst ance has
unde r gone t ransformat i on by way of pr oduci ng t he effect
which is a different object (from t hat ) . (But this is
i mpr oper ) . Because your oppone nt (= Buddhi st ) woul d also
accept t he linguistic pract i ce "The mud-subst ance is
t ransformed (i nt o a pot ) " r egar di ng t he cause-effect-series
called mud-subst ance when from t he earl i er subst ance
namel y t he l ump of mud, whi ch is t he cause, t he later pot-
subst ance, which is t he effect, is pr oduced.
3
Nor is t her e any (t hi rd) alternative position of a propert y
with respect to a subst ance apart from sameness and
ot herness, so t hat t ransformat i on woul d be justified in any
of t he two cases.
4
t t
f?
(V); ^rr^TTf^r^^ - (D)
26. [The Snkhya opponent might object:]
"It is not t r ue to say t hat t he undi fferent i at ed
1
(=
nirviveka) subst ance is itself t he pr oper t y. Nor is t he
pr oper t y a different object from t he subst ance. What is a
pr oper t y t hen? It is an ar r angement of t he subst ance, i.e., a
different state of it. For exampl e, fist of fingers (is an
ar r angement or a different state of fingers). The fingers
themselves wi t hout differentiation do not make a fist,
because (, for i nst ance, ) t he spread fingers do not make a
fist.
Nor is it (= a fist) a different object from t hat (= fingers),
because it is not observed as distinct in nature.**
2
[Answer] No. Because, fist is fingers in part i cul ar form.
Cert ai n fingers are themselves a fist, but not all
fingers make a fist. Because (for i nst ance) spr ead
fingers i n undi fferent i at ed nat ur e are not t he
fingers in t he form of a fist. Ot herwi se one will be
forced to accept t he exper i ence of bot h (t he
forms of fingers) in bot h t he states.
Because, when differentiation (i.e. t he specific
qualification) is t he very nat ur e of t he t hi ng, t he
same becomes a mar k of di st i nct i on of t he t hi ng,
like pl easur e and pai n.
If ( on t he ot her hand) t he specific qualification
(= viveka) (of fingers) arises as alien (from
t he m) , t hen t he fingers will be a ppr e he nde d as
spr ead only. Because t he object whi ch does not
itself deviate from its own nat ur e, is not
a ppr e he nde d as different (from itself) (even)
when some ot her object is pr oduced, as t hat (=
cl ai mi ng t hat it is a ppr e he nde d as different)
woul d a mount to t ransgressi on (of r eas on) .
[The Opponent says:] "But we have said t hat a state (of a
subst ance) is ( nei t her ) t he subst ance itself wi t hout
differentiation, nor an obj ect ot her t han t he substance."*
[Answer:] You have said this but what you have said is not
correct . Because t her e is no (t hi rd) possibility
apart from t hat ness and ot her ness in t he case of
any real t hi ng. Because t hat ness and ot her ness
stay in a real object by excl udi ng each ot her
essentially. Ther ef or e abandoni ng one of t hem is
invariably concomi t ant with accept i ng t he ot her .
Arid fingers bei ng subject to dest ruct i on every
moment , t he spread fingers are different and t he
fist is different.
Her e t he words like 'fist' have t he particulars as
t hei r objects; t he word ' fingers' has the universal
as its object. For exampl e t he words like seed,
sprout (apply to t he particular states of rice) and
t he words like rice (are general t er ms) . Ther ef or e
t he spread fingers are not t he same as t he fist.
Nar
t i t
c. (V); <Rr - (R) and (D).
42 VHZ)AAraKAOFDHARMAKIRTI
27. [The opponent asks:] "So if t he effect is not pre-
exi st ent in t he cause, why is not everything pr oduced from
everything? Because t her e is no difference (bet ween various
cases) in so far as (previous) non-exi st ence (of t he effect) is
concer ned. "
[Answer] Even if ( one concedes t hat ) t he effect has
(previous) exi st ence in all t he cases (of
causat i on), t he same fault is t her e. Because t her e
woul d be no difference (bet ween vari ous cases)
in so far as (previous) exi st ence (of t he effect) is
concer ned.
1
and if t her e is difference (bet ween
different cases because anyt hi ng cannot be
pr oduced from everything) t hen t hat real
difference (i.e., t he specific charact eri st i c of an
effect) will be distinct from t he t hr ee st rands (=
gunas, of prakrti). Because in spite of t he
exi st ence of t hem (= t he t hr ee st ands of prakrti)
(in all t he effects), t he specific charact eri st i c of
an effect does not ext end (t o ot her cases).
And what is pr oduced from a t hi ng whi ch is
exi st ent in absol ut e sense of t he t erm (=
sarvtman), like somet hi ng whi ch is in t he
accompl i shed state?
2
Moreover, (if t he effect is
pre-exi st ent in t he cause, ) t he means (to t he
pr oduct i on of t he effect) will be futile, because
(accordi ng to you) t her e is not hi ng to be br ought
about .
[The opponent might say:] "Some special characteristic
(Lit., excess) whi ch was non-exi st ent t her e somehow, could,
be pr oduced. "
[Answer] How coul d t hat special charact eri st i c whi ch was
not exi st ent t her e, be pr oduced? And if it coul d
be pr oduced, t hen every-thing (which was non-
existent) coul d be pr oduced from everything.
The objection is common (to your posi t i on and
mi ne) .
[The opponent might say:] "The special characteristic is
not totally absent , because somet hi ng can come i nt o
exi st ence only if it is (already) existent in some form. "
[Answer] ( Though exi st ent in some form, t he
characteristic was non-exi st ent in some ot her
form. Now t he quest i on is:) How can t he
characteristic be pr oduced in t he form in whi ch it
was non-existent?
t t
f?
"^TRRFT
28. We have said hat if a t hi ng exists in absolute sense of
t he t er m (= sarvath) t hen t her e is no poi nt in its
gener at i on. Even in t he case of t he pr oduct i on of t he non-
exi st ent effect, t her e is a law t hat t he effect is pr oduced only
from t hat t hi ng which has a nat ural t endency to pr oduce
t hat effect, not from any ot her t hi ng.
Again t hat causal factor is pr oduced only from its own
cause and not anyt hi ng else. Thi s is t he law of nat ur e. In this
way t he (causal) law of nat ur e is begi nni ngl ess.
Moreover, if t he pot exists in t he l ump of mud, why is it (=
pot ) not a ppr e he nde d in t hat state (i.e. mud-state) as it is
a ppr e he nde d later? Or why is its pr agmat i c funct i on not
pr esent in t hat state, as it is pr esent later?
[The opponent might say:] "That is because t he part i cul ar
mani fest at i on (vyakti) has not arisen so far."
[Answer] How can you say t hat t he pot exists (in t he l ump-
of-mud-state)? Because t hat part i cul ar mani -
festation al ong with t he pr agmat i c funct i on etc.
const i t ut es t he pot and t hat form of t he pot was
not exi st ent previously.
Nor is it pr oper to r egar d (two) t hi ngs as one
when t her e is a di fference in t hei r appar ent
forms. Because, t hat amount s to t ransgressi on (of
r eason) .
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u
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[ ?
29. [Conclusion:] Ther ef or e t he object, t he nat ure of
which is not appr ehended but which fulfills t he condi t i on of
apprehensi bi l i t y is not t her e at all. Because, t he non-
appr ehensi on is not justified when t he t hi ng exists al ong
with t hat nat ur e. Its not bei ng (in t hat nat ur e) means its not
bei ng t he same t hi ng (as itself). For exampl e
1
pl easure and
pai n are mutually like tha,t. In this way t he non-
appr ehensi on of specific nat ur e is pervaded by (= vypti) t he
det er mi nat i on of t he (linguistic) practice of non-exi st ence.
Hence t he one who is provi ng t he non-existence
(= vyavaccheda) of somet hi ng on t he basis of non-
appr ehensi on has to show t hat t he object ( under
consi derat i on) by its nat ur e fulfils t he condi t i on of
apprehensi bi l i t y as stated above.
Havi ng demonst r at ed ' t he non-justification of t he
i ndi cat i on of non- appr ehensi on (as r eason) ' in t he case of
' non- appr ehensi on of self-nature' ,
2
t he justification in t he
case of "non- appr ehensi on of t he per vader ' may be
expl ai ned as provi ng pervaded-pervader-rel at i on bet ween
two pr oper t i es and t hen showing t he non-exi st ence of t he
pervader.
In t he case of non- appr ehensi on of cause also
justification (of pr obans) means provi ng cause-effect-
rel at i on and t hen showing t he non-exi st ence of t he cause.
In t he cases of ' appr ehensi on of t he cont rary' t oo t he
justification (of pr obans) means showing t he existence of
one cont rary (= i ncompat i bl e) object out of t he two
(mutually) cont rary objects.
In this way non-justification of a const i t uent of proof in
t he case of non- appr ehensi on is ' non- st at ement of a
const i t uent of pr oof (= sdhanngvacana). Thi s is an
occasion of di sput ant ' s defeat. Because, i n t he absence of
(such a) justification, t he ' pervaded* (i.e.. reason or
pr obans) does not get proved.
t t
30. [Second meaning of asadhanangavacana]
Or sdhana ( ar gument ) means ' t hat by whi ch t he object
not exper i enced by ot her s is est abl i shed' , t hat is, ' t he set of
st at ement s stating t he pr obans with t ri pl e char act er / The
anga (= const i t uent ) of t hat sdhana is ' t he st at ement t hat
t he pr obans is a characteristic (= dharma) of t he thesis-case
(= paksaY et c. Not stating any one of t hem (= t he t hr ee
characteristics) is 'asdhanngavacand! (= non- st at ement of
a const i t uent of t he ar gument ) . That t oo is an occasion of
di sput ant ' s defeat. Because not st at i ng sdhannga (=
const i t uent of ar gument ) (in this sense) is ' not stating a
charact eri st i c of pr obans ' and if it (= a characteristic of
pr obans) is not st at ed t hen t her e is no pr oof of t he thesis.
t t
. [
31. [Declaration etc. are non-constituents of proof!]
[Third meaning of asdhanrigavacana]
Or asdhanrigavacana means empl oyi ng asdhanhga,
i.e., a st at ement whi ch is not a pr oper const i t uent of t hat
proof, in t he st at ement of proof. (For i nst ance) Decl arat i on
(= pratijna), Appl i cat i on (of i nst ance to t he thesis-case) (=
upanaya), concl usi on (= nigamana) etc. (are non-
const i t uent s of pr oof ) . It is an occasion of di sput ant ' s
defeat, because it is a case of unnecessary st at ement .
Or since t he concl usi on is proved by t he expressi on of
any one st at ement out of t he st at ement of positive
concomi t ance and t hat of negative concomi t ance in t he
ar gument cont ai ni ng similarity or dissimilarity
(respectively), t he st at ement of t he ot her ki nd (of
concomi t ance) , (when one concomi t ance is st at ed), has no
significant rol e. Hence t he ot her st at ement , which is not a
pr oper const i t uent of proof, is an occasion of defeat for t he
same reason namel y unnecessary st at ement .
[The opponent, Naiyayika, says:] "But it is necessary to
empl oy t he st at ement of Decl arat i on in or der to i ndi cat e
t he object (of enqui ry) even if it is not a pr oper const i t uent
of proof."
[Answer] No, because it is unnecessary. Because t he
i nt ended object does get pr oved from t he
i nferent i al st at ement as expressed above, even if
t he Decl arat i on is not made. Hence empl oyment
of it (= Decl arat i on) is wi t hout any significance.
[The opponent asks:] "Even if t he (inferential)
exper i ence can be pr oduced wi t hout i ndi cat i ng t he object
(of i nf er ence) , how is not t he Decl arat i on a const i t uent of
proof?
1
Because ' t he st at ement t hat t he pr obans
charact eri ses t he thesis-case' (= paksadharmavacana) does
not have any ot her pur pos e in proof apar t from causi ng t he
(i nferent i al ) exper i ence. And t he same pur pos e lies behi nd
t he Decl arat i on also. How is (= Decl arat i on) not t he (part
of) pr oof t hen?"
[The Buddhist might answer:] "Declaration al one is not
capabl e (of provi ng t he pr oba ndum) and hence
does not const i t ut e t he proof."
[The opponent responds:] "The case is c ommon with t he
st at ement of pr obans charact eri si ng thesis case. So t hat
st at ement t oo woul d be a non-const i t uent of proof. Because
t he (inferential) cogni t i on cannot be pr oduc e d merel y
from t he st at ement of pr obans charact eri si ng thesis-case."
[The author's answer:] ( The st at ement of pr obans
charact eri si ng thesis-case al ong with t he
st at ement of pervasi on const i t ut es t he proof. But
t hat is not t he case with t he Decl arat i on.
Decl arat i on al ong with t he st at ement of
pervasi on does not const i t ut e t he proof. )
2
Thi s
answers t he arisal of doubt (in t he case of
Decl ar at i on) , because t he doubt ( about t he
pr obandum) can arise from t he mer e st at ement
of pr obans charact eri si ng t he thesis case, when
t he rel at i on (of pervasion) is not shown.
Ther ef or e t he empl oyment of t he st at ement of
Decl arat i on is definitely unnecessary and is t he occasion of
di sput ant ' s defeat.
t t
32. [Fourth meaning of asdhanhgavacana]
Or asdhanhgavacana means t he st at ement of what is not
t he const i t uent of sdhana, i.e., proof. For i nst ance t he
fallacious pr obans such as Unpr oved, Cont rary or
Inconclusive pr obans (is like t hat ) . Thi s t oo is t he occasion
of di sput ant ' s defeat, because it amount s to t he
empl oyment of somet hi ng i ncapabl e (of provi ng t he
pr oba ndum) .
Likewise, a st at ement of a fallacious i nst ance, which is not
a const i t uent of proof, is also an occasion of di sput ant ' s
defeat. For exampl e, * (Positive) i nst ance lacking
pr obandum- pr oper t y' etc.; * (Positive) i nst ance without
positive concomi t ance' , /(Positive) i nst ance wi t hout t he
i ndi cat i on of t he positive concomi t ance' etc. They are
occasions of defeat for t he same reason, viz., t hat they
amount to empl oyment of somet hi ng i ncapabl e (of proving
t he pr oba ndum) . Because such fallacious i nst ances cannot
demonst r at e t he rel at i on of pr obans (with t he pr oba ndum) ;
and because they do not demonst r at e ( t he rel at i on), they
are i ncapabl e (of playing their rol e in t he pr oof ) .
t t
: W H , cR^ tfflf
33. (Fifth meani ng of asadbanangavacana)
Or sdhana means proof. And sdhannga means t he
obj ect whi ch has t he pr oof as its anga meani ng
charact eri st i c. That is, t he object whi ch is t he basis (or root )
of t he debat e, ( t hat is,) whi ch causes t he pr oposal of debat e
is called sdhannga. So asdhannga also means expressi ng
and announci ng some special subject different from
sdhannga, not enqui r ed by t he opponent , under t he
pr et ext of claiming t hat he (= t he opponent ) is not
following t he discipline (= sstra). Thi s is done with t he
i nt ent i on of confusing t he oppone nt and i mpedi ng his
power to r epeat (t he st at ement made by t he di sput ant ) etc.
Thi s t oo is asdhanngavacana and is t he occasion of
di sput ant ' s defeat, because it amount s to irrelevant
st at ement .
Such occurrences do a mount to breaki ng t he discussion.
Because t he object as qualified by t hat special characteristic
was not enqui r ed by t he opponent . If t her e is an enqui ry
( about it) t hen t her e is no fault. That t he characteristic is
enqui r ed means t hat it is enqui r ed by t he opponent and by
enqui r er s (= arbitrators) who know logic,
1
by drawing a
series of implications.
On t he occur r ence of t hem (= such irrelevant st at ement s)
t he discussion shoul d be br oken. Because (otherwise)
not hi ng is i nappl i cabl e in some made-up cont ext . The
uphol der of No-self-doctrine, for i nst ance, while provi ng his
doct r i ne coul d even dance and sing (and t hat will have to be
r egar ded as rel evant )!
It coul d happen as follows: On e will make a Decl arat i on
and perform as follows - "Ther e is no self." We t he
Buddhi st s say this. Who are t he Buddhists? Those are t he
Buddhi st s who take recourse to t he t eachi ng of t he Lor d
Buddha. Who is t he Lor d Buddha? Lord Buddha is t he one,
on following whose t eachi ng t he Buddhi st Asvaghosa
became a monk. Who is t he Buddhi st Asvaghosa? The
aut hor of t he play called 'Rstrapla*. What sort of a play is
'Rstrapla? By creat i ng an occasion (in this way) t he
di sput ant shoul d r ead "After t he Prol ogue ent ers t he
Di rect or" and t hen shoul d dance and sing. The opponent
bei ng i ncapabl e of i mi t at i ng t he whol e per f or mance will be
defeat ed. What a cour t eous way of phi l osphi si ng followed by
t he well-recognised savants!
2
[ ? * *
: ? 1 ^ ^
34. The pr opos ed topic cannot get concl uded in this
way because det er mi nat i on (of t r ut h) is t he ( pr oper ) result
of a debat e. But ( her e) t her e is no begi nni ng of t he debat e
at all. How are victory and defeat possible in this way?
Because t he oppone nt himself t oo can give anot her
per f or mance unde r t he pr et ext of r epeat i ng t he di sput ant ' s
per f or mance and cr eat e a si t uat i on of *Non-reproduct i on'
of this kind.
1
Secondl y t her e will be no det er mi nat i on (of
t r ut h) in this si t uat i on.
Ther ef or e stating t he Decl arat i on itself is not reasonabl e.
What to say of openi ng some special topics whi ch are not
(V); T*% - (D).
enqui r ed? And what to say of t he futile chat t eri ng under t he
pr et ext of expl ai ni ng t hat topic?
Thi s whol e (unreasonabl e) way has been i nt r oduced by
mal i gnant and deceitful persons i ncapabl e of stating t hi ngs
with t he st rengt h of logic.
For exampl e one first makes t he Declaration: "Body,
eart h, i nst rument s etc. are pr eceded by excellence of a Self*
and t hen announces t he whol e of Vaisesika discipline under
t he pr et ext of expl ai ni ng t he t erms ' body' , ' i nst rument s
1
and ' ear t h' .
Or in t he debat e over t he quest i on whet her sound is
per manent or i mper manent , one makes a Declaration: "Pot
is coupl ed with ei t her of t he two t hi ngs viz. sound and pot ,
out of which sound is t he locus of ' per manence' , which is a
category decl ared by Jai mi ni , who was t he aut hor of t he
discipline, which i l l umi nat es t he expl anat i on of twelve
defi ni t i ons. " And t hen one goes on expl ai ni ng the twelve
defi ni t i ons etc.
All this is a device used by mal i gnant peopl e for hi di ng
t hei r incapability. It is not accompani ed by t rut hs. Because
(for i nst ance), t he practices such as offering fruits etc. and
appl i cat i on of r ods et c. are i mpr oper in a critical
exami nat i on of Trut h.
2
t t ,
*i^fcT? ^ ftr
' q|fc;il
35. [The opponent might say:] "One gets defeat ed
by announci ng a dr ama ( and per f or mi ng it) et c. in a debat e
(, but t hat is so) because t her e one shifts to a different
t opi c. "
[Answer] Does not t he same t hi ng happen if one
announces some ot her t hi ng whi ch is not
enqui r ed? That ot her t hi ng t oo has no invariable
rel at i on with t he pr oof of t he i nt ended
pr obandum- pr oper t y, as (for i nst ance, t her e wa n
invariable rel at i on in t he following case:)
i mper manence (of composi t e objects) does not
get proved unl ess t he unpl easant ness of
composi t e objects, t hat is, t hei r de pe nde nc e
upon cause and ot her condi t i ons is proved.
1
But al t hough such a charact eri st i c (of
pr obandum) (which is rel evant to t he pr oof of
t he pr oba ndum) is not st at ed separately, it is not
to be pr esent ed or expl ai ned separat el y ei t her.
Because, as it is i ncl uded i n t he pr obandum-
propert y, is becomes (a par t of t he) thesis itself.
fc3 is probably more consistent with the context.
Therefore (separate) presentation or
explanation even of such a (relevant)
characteristic which is not enquired by the
opponent,
2
made during Declaration or some
other time is definitely an occasion of defeat
because it is a case of shifting to a Different
Topic.
Therefore only that constituent of the proof
should be uttered which refers to the inquired
characteristic (of probandum). No allied topic (=
prasanga) should be opened. Because, if we open
it, then there would be transgression (of the rules
of debate).
Hence asdhanngavacana (in any of the senses
stated above) is the occasion of disputant's
defeat, when it is shown to be so by the opponent.
Otherwise (i.e. if it is not shown to be so by the
opponent) then there will be neither victory nor
defeat of any of the two debaters.
3
t t
f f
:,
?
MRi^Tl
J
36. [Adosodbhvana as an occasi on of defeat ]
Adosodbhvana, i.e., not poi nt i ng out t he fault (of t he
di sput ant ) is t he occasi on of opponent ' s defeat. When t he
di sput ant pr esent s t he proof, but t he opponent who has
accept ed t he opposi t e view, does not poi nt out any fault i n
(t he ar gument per t ai ni ng t o ) t he object of enquiry,
1
t hen
t he oppone nt is to be called defeat ed.
The faults in proof are (1) Deficiency (2) Unpr ovedness
(3) Inconclusiveness (4) t he pr obans provi ng cont rary of
t he object i nt ended by t he di sput ant to prove and (5-22) t he
ei ght een fallacies of i nst ance. Not poi nt i ng t hem out , i.e.
not i ndi cat i ng t hem is t he gr ound of opponent ' s defeat.
\. (R); cRT: - (D).
*. This is more consistent. But ^fcTzft^^^^ftr^^rcTPTi - (D).
This
2
(occasion of defeat) takes place ei t her because t he
proof (given by t he di sput ant ) is wi t hout any fault or
because t he pr oof is faulty but t he opponent does not
under st and t he fault or because he (= opponent ) is
i ncapabl e of i ndi cat i ng it.
Even if t he di sput ant states a fallacious proof, it is not
pr oper to ascertain t he defeat (of the di sput ant ) in case t he
fault (in t he proof) is not i ndi cat ed by t he opponent .
Because t he ascert ai nment of victory and defeat is relative to
vitiating each ot her ' s capasity.
Nor does t he one (= t he opponent ) who does not i ndi cat e
(t he fault of t he di sput ant ) get victory only on account of
fallacious pr obans (stated by t he di sput ant ) because t he
knowl edge of t rut h is not ( r eached by any one) t her e.
Because, no pract i ce of cheat i ng is in or der in a
phi l osophi cal enquiry.
[The opponent might ask:] "If t hat is t he case (i.e. if t he
oppone nt cannot be decl ar ed as having won if he does not
discover t he di sput ant ' s fault), woul d it be t he case of
(di sput ant ' s) defeat t hen? Because, he (= t he di sput ant ) has
failed to establish t he t r ut h. "
[Answer] No, because her e t he r epudi at i on (of di sput ant ' s
ar gument ) does not take place. Because, his (=
di sput ant ' s) defeat by t he ot her debat er consists
in t he r epudi at i on (of his ar gument by t he ot her
defeat er). It does not consist in his not
establishing (t he t r ut h) . Because, it (= defeat)
requi res t he (presence of an) opponent .
Because, t her e can be absence of (a sound) proof
when t her e is no (sound) pr obans, even if t her e
is no opponent . So t her e is no defeat, because
t her e is no occur r ence thereof, because t he
opponent is i ncapabl e of r e p u d i a t i n g (t he
di sput ant ' s ar gument ) . Ther ef or e even if t he
di sput ant states an i nadequat e (= asamartha)
proof, he is to be called non-defeat ed if t he
i nadequat eness of t he pr oof is not i ndi cat ed by
t he opponent -
t t
? ]
P=lPn^ll ^frftfcl
(R); yPdMa^fd - (D).
37. [Prohibition of cheating - practices in debate]
[A possible objection:] "But t he pract i ce of cheat i ng can
be (an accept abl e part of) debat e bet ween persons desirious
of vi ct oryr
[Answer] No, Because, any science written by nobl e
persons oper at es in its . pr oper domai n (=
adhikra), namely, t he mi sconcept i ons of i gnobl e
persons. (It operat es in or der to remove these
mi sconcept i ons. ) Persons i ncl i ned to favour
ot hers do not (themselves) prescri be i gnobl e
practices like elevating oneself and spoiling
ot hers
1
by starting false chat t eri ng. Gai ni ng
profit, felicitation and fame by spoiling ot hers is
not a conduct of nobl e persons. Nor is it pr oper
for t he member s of t he assembly, who are expert s
in t he science (of debat e) (Lit. aut hor s of t he
science; sstrakra) and who are recogni sed by
nobl e per sons, to t roubl e creat ures by giving a
hel pi ng hand to t hose who are i ncl i ned in t hat
way (i.e. i ncl i ned t use cheat i ng t echni ques in
debat e) . Moreover, t he scientific works on logic
are not creat ed by nobl e persons in or der to gain
profit etc.
Ther ef or e, t her e is no such t hi ng as a legitimate
debat e bet ween per sons desi rous of victory.
2
The
nobl e persons, on t he ot her hand, who are
i ncl i ned to favour ot hers, shoul d follow logic
while stating (t hei r argument s) to the persons
having mi sconcept i on (about t r ut h) , ei t her by
stating a sound pr obans or by poi nt i ng cut t he
real fault (of t he opponent ) . Witnesses'
60 VDANY YAOF DHARMAKIRTI
observat i on is also meant for enl i ght eni ng t he
same (ki nd of pract i ce). The same act of
following logic is t he debat e of nobl e persons. (It
follows t he di ct um: ) When t he r easoni ng is stated
(by one debat er ) , he (= t he ot her debat er)
shoul d under s t and it, if he want s t o know t he
t r ut h; and even if he does not under s t and it, (at
least) s omeone else (say, t he audi ence) shoul d
not appr ehend it wrongly.
3
[A Naiyayika might object:] "The nobl e per sons desi rous
of victory shoul d certainly empl oy qui bbl i ng and ot her
t echni ques for pr ot ect i ng t he t r ut h. "
[Answer] In t hat case you shoul d also say t hat ( one shoul d
try to prot ect t he t r ut h) also by means of hitting
with nails, slaps and weapons or by bl azi ng hi m
up! Ther ef or e this means to pr ot ect i on of t rut h is
no bet t er.
The nobl e per son' s means to pr ot ect i on of t rut h
is: pr esent i ng t he ( sound) pr oof and refuting t he
fallacious proof. Because, t he t r ut h does not get
est abl i shed in t he absence of t hem, even if t he
ot her per son is per t ur bed by maki ng false
chat t er i ng. If (on t he ot her hand) one descri bes
( t he t r ut h) logically, t hen he is respect ed
amongst l ear ned per sons even wi t hout it (i.e.
even wi t hout per t ur bi ng t he ot her debat er byway
of false chat t er i ng) .
Ther ef or e establishing t r ut h for favouri ng ot hers
is t he victory of t he di sput ant and prevent i ng
false concept i on by showi ng real faults is t he
victory of t he opponent .
t t
<1<W
l|eH
1
ffcT cT^[ yPaîiHc;<ilfcf<l^ ^fcf
Milf^di
38. [Second meaning of adosodbhvana]
Or (adosodbhvana means) poi nt i ng out that (as a fault)
whi ch is not t he (real) fault in t he proof. Because, in spite of
t he pr esence of t hat (= t he accused fault), t here is no har m
in t he est abl i shment of t he object i nt ended to be proved by
t he di sput ant . It is a gr ound of opponent ' s defeat because it
is a case of giving a false answer. For exampl e, some
pr oper t y which is not i nt ended to be proved by t he
di sput ant is cl ai med (by t he opponent ) to be provable, on
t he gr ound t hat it is accept ed in t he di sput ant ' s system
(= sstra), and then its contrariety (with the probans) is
shown At that time the fallacy of contrariety is not (really)
brought out (by the opponent ) .
(Other examples of adosodbhvna are)- (1) Pointing out
the fault of Declaration in (the Declaration:) "Self does not
exist" by saying that the terms in your Declaration are
mutually contradictory. (2) Pointing out the fallacy of
unproved probans in the argument, "The sound generated
through efforts is i mpermanent because it is generated
through efforts" saying that this probans is a specific
characteristic (of the probandum) and hence a part of the
Declaration. (3) All the analogical responses (= jtyuttara;
psendo-refutations)
1
referred to (in Nyyastra) as:
"SdharmyasamOy Vaidharmyasama etc. are the analogical
responses." Pointing out (pseudo) faults of this kind is
adosodbhvna (= pointing out non-fault as fault). When it is
shown to be a pseudo-fault by the disputant, the opponent
should be declared as defeated, because the probans
(employed) in the first position (by the disputant) is
faultless.
But if the probans (or argument) (used by the disputant)
is faulty, neither of the two parties has gained either victory
or defeat. Because that (faulty) character (of the probans or
the argument) has not been shown and yet a non-fault has
been poi nted out (as faul t).
2
One becomes a winner when
one establishes one' s position and there is no contrary
position.
Therefore the person desirous of victory should establish
his own position and repudiate the position of the other.
Even when the disputant states a faultless proof and the
opponent points out a pseudo-fault, victory and defeat can
be declared only when it is shown that there is no (real)
fault, not otherwise. Because, in the latter case although the
disputant in fact states the truth, he is unable to show the
t r ut h by r epudi at i ng t he cont rary posi t i on. Nor does t he
oppone nt win her e because he (= t he opponent ) has in fact
a false under st andi ng.
So we have stated this logically pr oper definition of
' occasi on of defeat. '
t t
P a r t I I
R e f u t a t i o n o f t h e
NyyorView
39. ( The second half of t he first verse is:) "Any ot her
occasion of defeat, however, is not j ust ; hence we do not
accept it". Thi s means: The charact er of bei ng an occasion
of defeat does not apply properl y wher e t he definition of
' occasi on of defeat
1
as st at ed by us is not appl i cabl e. So we
have not at t ri but ed t hat charact er t o t hem.
(1) [Pratijnahni: Decl ar at i on- abandonment ]
"' Decl ar at i on- abandonment ' means admi t t i ng a pr oper t y
of t he count er-posi t i on (= pratidrstnta) in one' s own
posi t i on (= drstnta)". [N.S.. 5.2.2.] Th e aut hor of Nyya-
vrtika (i.e. Udyotakava) while writing on this aphor i sm
r epudi at es t he opi ni on of t he aut hor of Nyya-bhsya (i.e.
Vtsyyana) and states his finished posi t i on. We say on this
as follows-
[Udyotakara has said
1
:] "Where t he di sput ant admi t s t he
pr oper t y of prati-drstnta in one' s own drstnta he is to be
known as defeat ed. In this 'drstnta
9
means t hat which is
seen and est abl i shed at t he end (of t he ar gument ) . One' s
own drstnta means one' s own posi t i on. And 'pratidrstnta'
means t he count er-posi t i on. So t he one who admi t s a
charact eri st i c of count er-posi t i on in one' s own posi t i on is
defeat ed. For exampl e when t he debater^who says "Sound is
i mper manent because it is knowabl e t hr ough senses" is
count er ed by t he oppone nt by poi nt i ng out ' uni versal ' (=
smnya) (as t he count er-i nst ance), he (= t he former
debat er ) says, "If universal is knowabl e t hr ough senses and
is per manent , let t he s ound also be like t hat . Thi s is a case of
Decl arat i on - a ba ndonme nt because her e one abandons t he
i mper manence of s ound which one has decl ar ed before. "
t t
REFUTATION OF THE NYYA-VIEW 67
: i mpf
40. [Dharmakirti's response:]
If Decl ar at i on- abandonment occurs her e because t he
Decl arat i on once accept ed is abandoned, t hen why is this
special restriction made t hat Decl ar at i on- abandonment is
at t ri but ed to one who abandons Decl arat i on in this way (i.e.
in t he way st at ed by you)?
Because, it coul d occur in this way also: when t he fault in
one' s pr obans etc. is poi nt ed out and the proof of t he
count er-posi t i on is st at ed (by t he opponent ) , t her e is
abandonment of one' s own position and admission of t he
opponent ' s posi t i on.
In fact this is t he mai n cause of abandoni ng one' s own
Decl arat i on. When one is answered (by t he opponent ) in
t he above way, one has to abandon one' s Decl arat i on and
when one abandons it, one is defeat ed.
t t
:
o|ckJoi|^
\. (V); fc^T^TO: - (R) and (D).
41. "When one (= t he opponent ) says t hat t he universal
is knowabl e t hr ough senses and is per manent , (t he
di sput ant woul d say,) "Let t he s ound also be like t hat . " Thi s
st at ement of yours is qui t e i nappr opr i at e her e. Because,
whi ch sound- hear t ed per son, who himself argues t hat
s ound is i mpe r ma ne nt because it is knowabl e t hr ough
senses like a pot , woul d admi t t hat s ound is pe r ma ne nt
merel y on t he basis of an (opposi t e) i nst ance viz.
' uni ver sal ?
If universal, whi ch is per manent , is knowabl e t hr ough
senses, t he pr obans viz. *knowability t hr ough senses' will be
doubt ful (i.e. Inconcl usi ve), because it is seen in t he
i mper manent pot (al so).
[A possible objection:] "The di sput ant coul d admi t (t hat
t he s ound is per manent ) on t he basis of analogical
ar gument (=jti)
nl
[Answer] What is t he need of pr esent i ng ' uni versal ' as t he
i nst ance t hen?
On e (i.e. t he qpponent ) shoul d bet t er say "sound
is pe r ma ne nt " (This woul d suffice to make t he
di sput ant admi t t he count er-t hesi s) Because an
insensitive per s on does not t hi nk while admi t t i ng
( anyt hi ng) .
Moreover, t he characteristic of count er-t hesi s
does not ha ppe n to be accept ed by t he one who
admi t s a charact eri st i c of t he ( count er - i nst ance
viz.) universal as a charact eri st i c of s ound when
t he pe r ma ne nt univefsal is pr es ent ed as an
(opposi t e) i nst ance.
The closest (= njasah) counter-thesis for t he
di sput ant who says, ' Sound is i mpermanent * is
' Sound is per manent ' and not ' Universal is
per manent ' .
Therefore (in this case) t he di sput ant is worthy of
defeat because he empl oyes a non-consi t uent of
proof, because ' knowability t hr ough senses' ,
which exists in per manent as well as
i mper manent things, has variable rel at i on (with
t he pr obandum viz. i mper manence) . He is not
worthy of defeat because of abandoni ng t he
Decl arat i on in this way by accept i ng some
characteristic of t he counter-thesis.
t i t
. \ . 5 . 23]
1
"?fcT Rt^Hl ^,
42. (2) [Pratijfiantara: Anot her Decl arat i on]
"' Anot her Decl arat i on' means i ndi cat i ng t hat t he object
of Decl arat i on possesses anot her ( pr obandum) -
characteristic; when t he decl ar ed object is r epudi at ed (by
t he opponent ) . " (N.S. 5.2.3)
(R); ^cffcKiî^Riî^- (D).
[Naiyayikas expl ai n: ] "The decl ared object is "Sound is
i mper manent because knowabl e t hr ough senses. " When it
is r epudi at ed by pr esent i ng t he variable rel at i on of pr obans
(with t he pr oba ndum) , one (= t he di sput ant ) makes
anot her Decl arat i on by at t ri but i ng anot her characteristic,
when he i magi nes t he characteristics viz. ubi qui t ousness
and non-ubi qui t ousness in t he cases of universal and pot
(respectively) in t he following way - ' Just as pot is non-
ubi qui t ous and i mper manent , sound t oo is non- ubi qui t ous
and i mper manent . ' Thi s is t he occasion of defeat called
' Anot her Decl arat i on' , because al t hough t he pr obans was
sound, t he di sput ant di d not c ompr e he nd it (= its
soundness) . "
"Her e he (= t he aut hor of t he aphor i sm) uses t he
expressi on ' i ndi cat i ng t he object of that
1
(=
tadarthanirdesah) for referri ng to t he Decl arat i on, ' Sound is
non- ubi qui t i ous' whi ch t he di sput ant states after giving a
pr oof for t he first Decl arat i on, ' Sound is i mper manent
1
.
Her e (in t he expressi on ' i ndi cat i ng t he object of t hat ' ) ' t he
object of t hat ' (= tadarthah) means t he obj ect of t he pr oof of
t he pr oba ndum st at ed before. Indi cat i ng t he object of t hat
means i ndi cat i ng t he later Decl arat i on. And it is an occasion
of defeat because one Decl arat i on is not capabl e of provi ng
anot her Declaration. "
1
t t
cfff ? f^ffTQTÎ ^ f ^ ^ v f ^ F T %cft:
REFUTATION OF THE NYYA-V1EW 71
crff ? ^
43. [DharmakirtTs criticism:] In this st at ement t oo t he
one (= t he di sput ant ) who replies as stated above does not
make anot her Decl arat i on for provi ng earlier Decl arat i on
but he states only a qualification (of pr obans) . When t he
variable relation of t he pr obans viz. ' knowability t hr ough
senses' (with t he pr obandum viz. i mper manence) is poi nt ed
out by i ndi cat i ng t he exi st ence of t he pr obans in t he
universals, t he di sput ant removes t he Variability of t he
relation* by empl oyi ng a qualification of pr obans as
' knowability-through-senses qualified by non-ubi -
qui t ousness' . But he does not make anot her Decl arat i on,
because non-ubi qui t ousness is proved in t he case of sound
and ' Decl arat i on' is defi ned as ' i ndi cat i on of t he provabl e'
(= sdhya) ( and not as i ndi cat i on of t he pr oved) .
What has been said (by you) , namely, ' One makes t he
later Decl arat i on for provi ng earlier Decl arat i on' is also
wr ong. Because t he Decl arat i on which is stated for provi ng
anot her Decl arat i on does not become (t he occasion of
defeat cal l ed). ' Anot her Decl arat i on' . But it is one of t he
el ement s such as pr obans etc. (stated additionally for
provi ng t he first Decl arat i on), (which becomes on occasion
of defeat) because it is this el ement which is empl oyed her e
for provi ng t he pr obandum. But it (= empl oyment of a
different pr obans etc.) will be t he i ndi cat i on of t he pr obans,
and not t he i ndi cat i on of t he provabl e.
Thi s is so also because t he defi ni ng characteristic of a
pr obans such as ' similarity with t he i nst ance'
1
is pr esent in
' non- ubi qui t ousness' but t he defi ni ng characteristic of
Decl arat i on is not pr esent in it. And t he pr obans- hood
at t r i but ed to ' non- ubi qui t ousness' does not amount to
' Anot her Decl arat i on. '
t t
fl"
f?l
44. Moreover, t he st at ement t hat "One makes a
(different) Decl arat i on for provi ng t he (earlier)
Decl arat i on, " is totally irrelevant. The one who knows how
to express t he Decl arat i on first and t hen pr obans, t hen
i nst ance etc., certainly knows t he part i cul ar or der in whi ch
t he pr obans is to be pr esent ed. How in spite of knowi ng it
and in spite of possessing an undi vi ded mi nd, woul d he (=
t he di sput ant ) empl oy a Decl arat i on for provi ng a
Declaration?
And if he does empl oy ( one Decl arat i on for proving
anot her Decl ar at i on) , t hen he desi res t hat a thesis may be
proved by mer e Decl arat i on! In t hat case he woul d not
express pr obans previously (= in t he first ar gument ) also!
REFUTATION OF THE NYK4-VIEW 73
Such irrelevant type of cases bei ng countless, to make a
regul at i on by definition as "The occasion of defeat called
' Anot her Declaration* occurs when anot her Declaration is
made (for provi ng one Decl ar at i on) " is also quite
i nappr opr i at e. Ther e shoul d be stated only one such
definition for covering (all) cases of this type.
Moreover, no such practice (of using one Declaration for
provi ng anot her Decl arat i on) has been observed in debat es
before, in t he case of which one woul d make an at t empt for
covering it. A discipline (= sstra) does not oper at e with
reference to childish chat t ers and if it operat es, t hen what
status will it have? Because they (= childish chatters) do not
have any status.
t i t
PioK1l<=hi&
> f l c^ ^F TTRFt^
45. It is observed t hat even l ear ned persons state
Unpr oved pr obans because (somet i mes) they do not see
very clearly. When such practices are seen, t he gr ound of
defeat is det er mi ned accordingly. Ther ef or e, her e also if t he
oppone nt poi nt s out t he Inconcl usi veness of pr obans when
t he di sput ant stops his i ncl i nat i on (to ar gue) it is t he
occasi on of di sput ant ' s defeat because he ( - t he di sput ant )
has st at ed a non- const i t uent of proof, namel y, Inconclusive
pr obans .
Thus if t he oppone nt is able to state with evi dence (=
pramna), wi t hout referri ng to a non-evi dent source from
his di sci pl i ne, t hat universal is real , knowabl e t hr ough
senses and per manent , t hen, because he states these t hi ngs
with evi dence, this amount s to poi nt i ng out t he real fault in
di sput ant ' s ar gument . No defeat is br ought about merely by
stating a hypot hesi s, because t her e is no pr oof of anyt hi ng
t her e. Also because, t he fault (in di sput ant ' s ar gument ) has
not been poi nt ed out by t he opponent .
And because t he di sput ant has st at ed a pr obans not
justified by evidences, he does not become t he wi nner also.
But if t he di sput ant ' s i ncl i nat i on (to ar gue furt her) is not
over t hen it is not any of his faults, because he may go on
justifying himself by stating t he qualifications of pr obans.
t t
1
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4
[ WR^ T ? ] * f5R?s*Tctl W - WTT "nf^faft, Hl ^ l k^ l d cfTI
REFUTATION OF THE NYYA-VLEW 75
46. (3) [Pratijnvirodha: Cont rary Decl arat i on]
"' Cont rary Declaration* means t he cont rari et y bet ween
Decl arat i on and pr obans" (N.S. 5.2.4.)
[Vtsyayana explains:] "For exampl e t he Decl arat i on is,
' Subst ance is distinct from qual i t y"; pr obans is, ' because no
object ot her t han col our etc. is appr ehended. ' Thi s is t he
cont rari et y bet ween Decl arat i on and pr obans. "
[Udyotakara explains:] "The ' Cont rary Declaration*
wher e Decl arat i on is cont radi ct ed by t he ut t er ance (of t he
Decl arat i on itself), is also i mpl i ed by t he above definition.
For exampl e, T h e nun is pr egnant ' or ' The self does not
exist.'
"The ' Cont rary pr obans' , wher e t he pr obans is
cont r adi ct ed by Decl arat i on is also i mpl i ed (by t he same
defi ni t i on). For exampl e, "Everything is discrete, because
t he t erm denot i ng a real is applicable to an aggregat e only.
"This also expl ai ns t he cont rari et y of i nst ance to
Decl arat i on".
t t
, cTFT
In the light of NV 5.2.4; yr<wid1cfcMq
:
- (R), (V) and (D)
47. "One shoul d also ment i on t he cont rari et y of
pr obans to i nst ance etc. and cont rari et y of Decl arat i on and
pr obans to t he means of knowl edge.
"If one shows variability of rel at i on, (bet ween ' knowability
t hr ough senses
1
and i mper manence) in t he ot her ' s
ar gument , by referri ng to cowness et c. whi ch is pr oved in
one' s own discipline, it is to be under s t ood as a ' cont rary
r epl y/
1
Same is t he case wher e t he pr obans is i ndependent
of one' s own posi t i on.
"When one empl oyes a pr obans irrespective of one' s own
posi t i on as ' Sound is i mper manent , because knowabl e
t hr ough senses' , t hen t hat pr obans is cont rary, because
cowness etc. whi ch is pr oved in ( t he di sput ant ' s) own
discipline is cont rary to i mper manence. In this way if t he
' Inconcl usi veness' is poi nt ed out with r ef er ence to t he case
of cowness etc., t hen it (= t he pr obans) is cont rary.
"But if it (= cowness etc.) is admi t t ed by bot h t he part i es
(t hat is, by di sput ant as well as oppone nt ) , t hen it is a case of
Inconcl usi veness. Because t he claim of Inconcl usi veness is
based on somet hi ng whi ch is admi t t ed by bot h t he part i es. "
t t
ff?r ^ y
REFUTATION OF THE NYEA-VIEW 11
? ] ^ f S a q f ^ f e r ^ ^
[ ? y ^ ? Mf a
48. [Dharmakirti's response:] Her e t oo ( t her e is
not hi ng like) t he meani ng of Declaration (which is
supposed to be cont rary to pr obans) ! Because, empl oyi ng
Decl arat i on in t he inferential st at ement is prohi bi t t ed. So
t her e is no cont rari et y bet ween Decl arat i on and pr obans
whi ch is gr ounded in it (= empl oyment of Decl arat i on) or
gener at ed by it. Ther ef or e t her e is no occasion of defeat
called ' Cont rary Declaration.*
One might object, "Even if t her e is no empl oyment of
Decl arat i on, t he cont rari et y bet ween Declaration and
pr obans coul d be i mpl i ed. For exampl e (t he i nference may
be stated as this;) "If any object apart from col our etc. is not
appr ehended, t hen t hat object is distinct from qualities; and
a subst ance is not appr ehended as an object apart from
col our etc.".
1
Even if t he ar gument is stated as this, t he
cont rari et y bet ween pr obandum and pr obans is definitely
under st ood, because how is it t hat t her e is non-
appr ehensi on of somet hi ng ot her t han that, and yet t her e
exists t he t hi ng ot her t han t hat ?"
[Answer] Tr ue. Thi s contrariety will be t her e if t he pr obans
proves t he opposi t e of t he pr obandum. Because,
if t he subst ance is known to be fulfilling t he
condi t i on of apprehensi bi l i t y and t her e is non-
appr ehensi on of t he self-appearance of such a
*. (V); fHrrentfuri - (R) and (D).
subst ance as distinct from t he appear ances of
col our etc., t hen t he pr obans will be contrary, as
we have already said. Because, this pr obans
proves t he opposi t e of t he i nt ended
( pr obandum, namely,) distinctness, (which is
expressed as-) ' It (= subst ance) exists as distinct
from it (= col our etc..)*. And it is definitely a
gr ound of defeat if t he cont rari et y of this ki nd
bet ween Decl arat i on and pr obans is i nt ended
2
(by you) .
But if t he fulfilment of t he condi t i on of
apprehensi bi l i t y by it (= t he subst ance) is lost,
t hen t her e is no cont rari et y bet ween Decl arat i on
and pr obans, because t hen t he di st i nct ness of it
(= subst ance) exists even if it is not a ppr e he nde d
because some distinct entities, which are r emot e
in some respect
3
, do exist distinctly ( t hough they
are not a ppr e he nde d) .
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f ^ f f : ^RT^, Wc^ H<M<Hl9F?:
TPT
Tt^ft ^ W-^k^ ^ cTcTT
REFUTATION OF THE NYYA-VIEVJ 79
49. On what you have said viz., "If Decl arat i on ut t er ed by
oneself is cont rary to it' s own ut t er ance, t hen it is a cont rary
Decl arat i on, " we say - That a Decl arat i on, which is a non-
const i t uent of proof, is empl oyed in the inferential
st at ement is itself a gr ound of defeat. Thi s is not a case of
contrariety, because t hat (= Decl arat i on) itself is t he
gr ound.
If t her e is cont rari et y (bet ween pr obans and pr obandum)
i ndependent l y of Decl arat i on t hen it is a gr ound of defeat.
But when Decl arat i on is t he gr ound of defeat, t he defeat is
due to empl oyment of t he Decl arat i on itself. And because it
[= Decl arat i on] itself results i nt o concl usi on of t he debat e,
it is futile to poi nt out contrariety. Because, a defeat ed or}
is not defeat ed again, like fire which has t ur ned i nt o ashes
(does not get ext i ngui shed agai n) /
We state many pr obans' for provi ng one ( and t he same)
pr oba ndum on some occasions of discussions, but they have
capasity to prove t he pr oba ndum alternatively (i.e.
i ndependent l y of each ot her ) . Ot herwi se (i.e. if t he second
pr obans is not capabl e of provi ng t he pr obandum
i ndependent l y of t he first,) t hen t he second pr obans will be
superfl uous.
If out of t he two pr obans' (proving t he same
pr oba ndum) , t he empl oyment of t he ot her pr obans cannot
be made wi t hout t he empl oyment of one, t hen (t he
pr oba ndum bei ng proved by t he first probans, ) t he second
one has got not hi ng to prove, because what is already
exper i enced is not to be established again.
Ther ef or e t her e is no occasion of defeat called
' Cont rari et y of Decl arat i on to its own utterance. *
Moreover, t her e is no ' cont rari et y of Decl arat i on' in t he
st at ement ' Self does not exist*. Because it is deni ed t hat t he
meani ng of t he expressi on ' Self does not exist' cor r esponds
to a real entity (= bhva) ( The expressi on does not deny t hat
t he wor d ' Sel f has s ome meani ng. ) If t he meani ng of t he
word is deni ed t hen t her e will be (self) contrariety.
Moreover, t he meani ng of a wor d is not t he same as t he self-
charact eri sed particular.
2
t t
^ ^fcfl HRf yf t i ^ i M^ i : , HTftf %cft:,
50. You have also talked of ' cont rari et y of pr obans (to
Decl arat i on) based on falsification of Decl arat i on' as in
' Everyt hi ng is discrete because t he t erm denot i ng a real is
appl i cabl e to an aggregat e' . ( Our view about this exampl e
is:) Her e t her e is no empl oyment of Decl arat i on nor t hat of
pr obans with which Decl arat i on will have cont rari et y. What
is t her e t hen? Thi s woul d be t he summi ng- up st at ement
whi ch pr esent s t he object (already) ar gued out . (This woul d
ha ppe n as follows:) One first establishes by empl oyi ng ot her
reasons t hat t he word (such as ' pot ' ) does not express a
single pecul i ar charact eri st i c but expresses a c ommon
charact eri st i c bel ongi ng to many objects. One t hen shows
REFUTATION OF THE NKKA-VIEW 81
t hat any meani ng of a word is not by nat ur e a single peculiar
characteristic of a t hi ng, as it is of t he form of plurality of
objects. Having shown this one may say, "Everything is
di scret e" with reference to t he meani ng of a word.
Thi s answers t he (accused) cont rari et y in this.
t t
1
new ft
, ^T f^ft^:
51. [Alternative expl anat i on: ] Moreover, t he st at ement
(viz. Everything is discrete because a t erm denot i ng a real is
appl i cabl e to an aggregat e only) coul d be taken as an
i ndi cat i on of t he i nst ance, j ust as ' Sound in i mper manent ,
because pr oduct s are i mper manent ' (is a st at ement
i ndi cat i ng t he i nst ance).
1
For exampl e when t here is di sput e
on some mat t er, t he di sput ant shows t hat a word is
admi t t edl y used for a common propert y covering many
objects and having ar gued for t he di sput ed poi nt , concl udes
in general , ' Everything is discrete*.
82 VDANYYA OF DHARMAK1RTI
[A possi bl e obj ect i on: ] "If it amount s to empl oyment of
i nst ance, why is t he i nst ance not empl oyed i n its st rai ght
mode of empl oyment ? And why is not t he obj ect of di sput e
i ndi cat ed in t hat way?"
[Answer] No, because it is shown in an abr i dged form. We
see t he uses (of ar gument ) in this form also.
Secondl y t he st at ement unde r consi derat i on is
not t he st at ement of pr oof ( but it only resembl es
t he proof).
2
For t he same reason t her e is no falsification of
pr obans by t he Decl arat i on her e. Her e one (i.e.
t he Buddhi st ) is not i nt endi ng to accept some
col l ect i on whi ch is composi t e in nat ur e and (yet)
is singular, when one says t hat t her e is not hi ng
such as a single object. If one accepts* it (= a
col l ect i on whi ch is composi t e and yet si ngul ar)
t hen t her e woul d be cont rari et y.
Even t he one who talks of t he particularity (=
bheda) of at om by saying, ' Since t her e is
conj unct i on (of at oms) with t he mu d at once*
etc.,
3
does not i nt end to prove a single object of
composi t e nat ur e. What t hen? He i nt ends to
prove t he absence of such an object because
manyness of one t hi ng is deni ed. Ther ef or e i n
t hat i nf er ence, t he object i nt ended to be proved
is not a col l ect i on and a wor d is not made
appl i cabl e to it. Ther ef or e t her e is no cont rari et y
(bet ween Decl arat i on and pr obans her e) .
t t
f t
52. Secondly, this case of contrariety
1
does not differ
from t he earlier cont rari et y, in which case (i.e. in case it
differs) it woul d be ment i oned separately.
[A possible Nyaya objection:] "There, (= in t he earlier
case) t her e was falsification of pr obans and Decl arat i on (by
some evidence) but her e t her e is falsification of pr obans by
t he Decl arat i on. So t her e is a difference."
[Answer:] Ther e will be t he rel at i on of falsified-and-falsifier
bet ween pr obans and Decl arat i on if they are
cont rary t o objects (= facts). Following t he
pri nci pl e, "If t her e is contrariety bet ween two
t hi ngs t hen t he two t hi ngs are cont rary to all
objects", if any t hi ng (= any pair) is mutually
falsifying, because if one object is accept ed, t he
ot her object becomes impossible, t hen t her e is
no substantial difference bet ween t he two
exampl es of cont rari et y - whet her it is collective
cont rari et y (of pr obans and Decl arat i on to some
evidences) or a separat e cont rari et y (of
Decl arat i on and pr obans to each ot her ) .
t i t
*. As an alternative reading accepted in V; ^ J ^ - (R) and (D).
Tt f ^
"ffcTI
53. Moreover, is it (= t he i nference, "Everything is
discrete because a t er m denot i ng a real is appl i cabl e to an
aggregat e only") a case of Cont rary pr obans or it is an
Unpr oved pr obans because it has a different subst rat um
(from t hat of pr oba ndum) ( and this is not i ced) as soon as
t her e is empl oyment of pr obans and hence Unpr oveness of
pr obans is t he occasi on of defeat here? Because, (i.e., latter
is t he case, because) this ki nd of ( Unpr oved) pr obans, as
soon as it is ut t er ed, is r ecogni sed as not bei ng t he pr oper t y
of t hat ( - t he bear er of t he pr oba ndum) and bri ngs about
t he defeat of t he speaker. When t he speaker is defeat ed, t he
concer n whet her t he object of it (= pr obans) is cont rary (to
Decl arat i on) has no significance.
Moreover, in every case this cont rari et y bet ween
Decl arat i on and pr obans, when it occurs, falls i nt o two types
of faults: Cont rari et y a nd Unpr ovedness.
Cont rari et y is not hi ng but t he absence of pr oba ndum -
propert y, when t he exi st ence of pr obans in t he propert y-
REFUTATION OF THE NY K4-VIEW 85
bear er (= locus) is proved, because existence of (such a)
pr obans is cont rary to Decl arat i on.
Unpr ovedness on t he ot her hand takes pl ace when t he
decl ared object (= pr obandum) is proved (by some ot her
means) in t he propert y-bearer (= locus) (and t he pr obans
bei ng cont rary to pr obandum is non-exi st ent in t he
propert y-bearer) because two cont rary nat ures cannot exist
in one pl ace; otherwise t her e is no contrariety.
1
[A possible Nyaya objection:] "Contrariety (of
Decl arat i on) is possible even when t he nat ur e of t he
( pr obans -) propert y is unpr oved because t her e would be
cont rari et y bet ween t he expressed pr obans and t he
decl ared object. "
[Answer] When t he evidence is not available to bot h
(di sput ant as well as opponent ) t her e arises
doubt about (t he existence of pr obans in) t he
propert y-bearer. In t hat case, when t her e is doubt
about t he existence of pr obans in t he propert y-
bear er , Unpr ovedness is t he only fault in
pr obans. Ther ef or e t her e is no cause of defeat
called ' Cont rari et y of Decl arat i on' apart from
( t he fallacies of pr obans called) Unpr oved and
Cont rary pr obans.
And Unpr oved and Cont rary pr obans are covered
by t he ment i on of ' fallacies of pr obans' (as one of
t he occasions of defeat ). Ther ef or e ' Cont rary
Declaration* shoul d not be stated separately (as
an occasion of defeat ).
t t
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54. [A possible objection:] "Since cont rari et y (always)
hol ds bet ween two objects, any one of t hem coul d be
ment i oned by t he speaker accor di ng to his i nt ent i on".
[Answer] That is possible. (You mi ght say:) The cont rari et y
of Decl arat i on and pr obans hol ds bet ween
Decl arat i on and pr obans. So it is de pe nde nt on
two relata. So it is called Cont r ar i et y of
Decl arat i on' , when t he cont rari et y of Decl arat i on
is i nt ended and it is called Cont r a r y pr obans '
when cont rari et y of pr obans to Decl arat i on is
i nt ended. Ther ef or e t her e is no fault in calling it
ei t her Cont r ar i et y of Decl arat i on' or
' Cont rari et y of pr obans. '
The exampl e of (cont rary) pr obans is - ' Sound is
pe r ma ne nt because it is subject to gener at i on' .
The exampl e of cont rari et y of Decl arat i on is-
' Ther e is no Sel f. The exampl e of mut ual
cont rari et y bet ween Decl arat i on a nd pr obans is
' Subst ance is di st i nct from quality etc. '
1
The
REFUTATION OF THE NY KA-VIEW 87
exampl e of cont rari et y of pr obans to Declaration
is, Th e r e is no single object
1
etc.
2
(Al t hough you mi ght say this, our comment her e
is twofold-) You cannot say so (i.e., you cannot
t reat t hem as different types of ' Cont rary
Decl arat i on' ) Because, as we said her e before, no
case of cont rari et y de pe nde nt on pr obans falls
out si de t he scope of t he fallacy of cont rary
pr obans.
And if it is i nt ended t hat t her e is contrariety in
t he Decl arat i on itself, in isolation, (i.e.,)
i ndependent l y (of pr obans) t hen empl oyment of
t he t erm ' pr obans ' in (t he definition of Cont rary
Decl arat i on as-) ' Cont rari et y bet ween
Decl arat i on and pr obans ' woul d be irrelevant.
Moreover, it is not pr oper to say that t her e is
Cont rari et y to pr obans ' (= hetuvirodhah) in
exampl e, "Sound is per manent because it is
subject to generat i on", because t her e will be
' cont rari et y to pr obans ' (properl y so called)
when t he Decl arat i on falsifies pr obans. But her e
t he pr obans falsifies t he Decl arat i on. It is
t herefore pr oper to call this exampl e as t hat of
' cont rari et y to Decl arat i on' .
Because, al t hough cont rari et y hol ds between two
objects, t hat to whi ch t her e is cont rari et y is
det er mi ned relative to what is falsified.
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55. You (= Udyot akara) have said by following t he
allegorical pri nci pl e viz., ' t he pi ct ur e drawn by a buffoon' ,
1
"By this (definition of cont rary Decl arat i on, ) t he cont rari et y
of Decl arat i on to i nst ance etc. shoul d also be said (to be
cover ed) " We say on this - Ther e will be cont rari et y of
i nst ance if t he i nst ance possesses t he absence of t he
provabl e property.
2
If t he exi st ence of pr obans is proved to
be t her e in such a cont rary i nst ance exclusively, t hen it is a
case of t he fallacy of pr obans, viz. Cont r ar y probans.
3
But if t he existence of pr obans is c ommon (to cont rary
i nst ances as well as ot her i nst ances), or if t he r ul e about its
exi st ence is unpr oved, t hen it is a case of t he fallacy of
pr obans called Inconclusive. Or if pr oban does not exist
( bot h in positive cont rary i nst ances as well as ot her
instances) t hen it is a case of t he fallacy of pr obans called
Unc ommon.
[A possible Nyaya objection:] "A pr obans does not exist
in t he cont rary i nst ance but exists in t he opposi t e instances,
4
*. (V); ^T IFimiTUT: - (R) and (D).
s. (R); tfWT - (V) and (D).
REFUTATION OF THE NYK-VIEW 89
t hen t her e is no fault in probans, but t he Declaration does
have cont rari et y to i nst ance. "
[Answer] No. Because, (in t he case cited by you) t he
pr obans does not exceed dubitability. Because,
t he cont rari et y of Decl arat i on to t he instance
5
is a
fault when it is with r egar d to positive instance,
not when it is with r egar d to negative instance,
because such a cont rari et y (i.e. t he one with
r egar d to negative i nst ance) is desirable.
When t he positive i nst ance possesses a propert y
cont rary (to pr oba ndum) , al t hough pr obans in
fact has invariable rel at i on with pr obandum, t he
invariable charact er of t he pr obans cannot be
demonst r at ed (because t he positive instance is
defective) and t here cannot be det er mi nat e
cogni t i on (of t he pr obandum) caused by t he
pr obans unless its rel at i on of invariable
concomi t ance (with t he pr obandum) is
demonst r at ed. Ther ef or e t he contrariety of
Decl arat i on to instance does not fall outside t he
fallacies of pr obans.
t t
. (V); "Sren^ H - (R) and (D).
rl ffcf
56. [ A Naiyayika mi ght say:] "Let t her e be fault in
bot h ways".
[Answer] No. Because, t he fault in pr obans has pr i or
occur r ence. And it is not expect ed to discover
anot her fault, once t he di sput ant is defeat ed
( due to t he fault in pr obans ) .
Thi s is t rue especially in t he case of one who
insists on t he rul e r egar di ng t he or der of t he
el ement s of proof.
1
The defi ni ng characteristic of
pr obans viz. ' similarity with (positive) i nst ance'
becomes i nappl i cabl e to t he pr obans if t he
(positive) i nst ance is cont rary. Hence t he defeat
of t he di sput ant takes pl ace due to t he fault in
pr obans which is empl oyed before (i nst ance).
Hence t he cont rari et y (of Decl arat i on) with
respect to i nst ance, whi ch is empl oyed later, does
not deserve our concer n.
If pr obans has cont rari et y to (positive) i nst ance
(i.e. it does not exist in t he positive i nst ance)
t hen t her e will be ( t he fallacy of pr obans called)
Unc ommon. Or if t he pr obans (t hat does not
exist in positive i nst ances) exists in t he negative
i nst ance t hen t her e will be (t he fallacy of pr obans
called) Cont rari et y.
On t he ot her ha nd when pr obans is cont rary to a
means of knowl edge, like in t he exampl e, "Fire
does not bur n because it is col d, " t her e is t he
fallacy called Unpr oved pr obans.
T h e cont rari et y of Decl arat i on to a means of
knowl edge' is expl ai ned (i.e. exami ned) t hr ough
(t he exami nat i on of) ' Cont rari et y to its own
ut t er ence. '
In this way all these cases are i ncl uded in t he
fallacies of pr obans when t her e is cont rari et y in
t he proof.
t t
I ^T f f
57. But your st at ement viz. "Accusing t he ot her ' s
ar gument of t he fallacy of Inconclusive pr obans, by
referri ng t o ôwness' ,
1
whi ch is proved in one' s own
discipline, amount s to cont rary reply," is qui t e irrelevant (to
t he occasi on of defeat called cont rary Decl arat i on).
Because, if t he oppone nt claims to prove t he variability of
rel at i on (bet ween pr obans and pr obandum) by referri ng to
cowness etc., whi ch is pr oved i n his own discipline, t hen t he
cont rari et y (of his reply) will be right, because t he cowness
et c. which is cont rary to t he di sput ant ' s own posi t i on is not
accept ed by hi m ( =di sput ant ) . Because, he (=t he opponent )
doubt s t he exi st ence of t he pr obans in cowness, whi ch is
accept ed by himself, and hence exhibits his own lack of
under st andi ng.
But whet her cowness exists or not , t he pr obans r emai ns
Inconclusive, when its capasity to prove (t he pr oba ndum) is
not established, because it causes doubt .
If on t he ot her ha nd its capasity (t o prove t he
pr oba ndum) is est abl i shed, t hen in t hat case it does not
exist in cowness and hence t her e is no doubt r egar di ng t he
pr obans at all, because it (= capasity of pr obans) is
est abl i shed by r emovi ng all sorts of doubt s.
2
Thi s also expl ai ns t he i nconcl usi veness of t he pr obans
whi ch is empl oyed i ndependent l y of one' s own posi t i on.
Such an empl oyment of pr obans also amount s to appl yi ng
t he pr obans t hat exists in t he pe r ma ne nt ' cowness' accept ed
by oneself, for provi ng i mper manence. Hence such an
empl oyment of pr obans bei ng i ncapabl e (of provi ng
pr oba ndum) amount s to empl oyi ng dubi t abl e pr obans
only, as it is a non- const i t uent of proof.
You also said, "Ther e is (somet i mes) a claim of
i nconcl usi veness on t he basis of somet hi ng whi ch is
admi t t ed by bot h t he part i es". Her e also one shoul d talk of
inconclusiveness necessarily based on t he pr obans causi ng
doubt . Thi s factor ( namel y t he pr obans causi ng doubt ) is
c ommon to ot her cases (of inconclusiveness) also, hence
t her e is no di fference bet ween t he inconclusiveness in this
case wher e s omet hi ng is admi t t ed by bot h t he part i es, and
-the one in ot her cases.
REFUTATION OF THE NTYA-VIEW 93
%cft:?] 3TT?, cfF?
"fERTFTlft
58. You also said, "Because t he fallacies of instance arise
out of t he fallacies of pr obans, so t he former are covered by
t he ment i on of t he latter. Ther ef or e t he former are not
ment i oned separately in t he list of t he occasions of defeat."
This t oo cannot be hel d rightfully by t he advocates of
(i nst ance as) a distinct el ement in t he ar gument .
The ment i on of t he fallacies of pr obans cannot cover t he
ment i on of t he fallacies of i nst ance accor di ng to the one
who talks of i nst ance as an el ement distinct from pr obans.
Because, if it (= a fallacy of instance) is covered by t he
ment i on of t hem (= fallacies of pr obans) t hen it (=
i nst ance) will not be a distinct const i t uent of proof from
t hat (= pr obans ) .
\. (R); c^ - (V) and (D).
If t he fallacies of i nst ance are i ncl uded in t he fallacies of
pr obans, t hen it is desi rabl e also to i ncl ude i nst ance in t he
pr obans. In t hat case i nst ance will not be a separat e el ement
of proof, as it does not have separat e exi st ence.
The object whi ch is to be proved by t he i nst ance is
i ncl uded in t he (object to be proved by) pr obans. Ther ef or e
it is proved by pr obans only and hence t he i nst ance has no
power separately.
Moreover, any occasion of defeat of t he di sput ant (= t he
def ender of t he first posi t i on; pwapaksavdin) is not justly
so if it is not connect ed with a fallacy of pr obans. Hence all
t he cases (of occasions of defeat) rel at ed with it (= a fallacy
of pr obans) ar e covered by t he ment i on of ' fallacies of
pr obans ' (in t he list of t he occasi ons of defeat) and hence
they do not deserve a separat e ment i on.
Because, t he occasion of defeat such as ' Shifting to a
different poi nt ' is also possible only when t he pr obans is
i ncapabl e (of provi ng t he pr oba ndum) . Because, nobody
begi ns to shift to a different poi nt if t he pr obans (empl oyed
by hi m) is s ound and t he pr oba ndum is proved. Because,
only an i ncapabl e per son goes for false pract i ces.
t t
cTFT yfadUHIKfi ^TFT
59. (4) [Pratijnsaihnyasa: Renunci at i on of Decl arat i on]
' "Renunci at i on of Decl arat i on' means removi ng (i.e.
disowning) t he decl ared thesis when one' s position is
r epudi at ed (by t he oppone nt ) " (NS5.2.5.)
[Nyya explanation:] "The di sput ant first decl ares t he
thesis as ' Sound is i mper manent because it is knowabl e
t hr ough senses
1
and when it is r epudi at ed by showing t he
variability of rel at i on of t he pr obans (with t he pr obandum)
by referri ng to t he exi st ence of t he pr obans in universals, he
disowns t he thesis by saying, "Who said t hat t he sound is
i mper manent ?" It is an occasion of his defeat, called
' Renunci at i on of Decl arat i on
1
. "
[Dharmakirti's response:] If in this case t he di sput ant
does not disown his own posi t i on, t hen will he not be
defeated?
If you say, "( He will not be defeated) because her e t he
di sput ant expresses fallacious pr obans when he is not
defeat ed (i.e. not caught by t he opponent ) ,"* t hen we ask.-
What is t he poi nt in l ooki ng forward to t he later
r enunci at i on of Declaration? The earlier event (of one' s
ar gument bei ng r epudi at ed by t he opponent ) is itself t he
occasion of one' s (= di sput ant ' s) defeat. What is t he use of
i nt r oduci ng t he ot her i nnumer abl e acts of i mpot ent chat t er
(as t he varieties of occasion of defeat)? In this way t here will
be transgression (of r eason) . Becomi ng silent when one' s
posi t i on is r epudi at ed will be an occasion of defeat called
' Becomi ng silent
1
; if one r uns away (when one' s position is
r epudi at ed) , t hen it will be an occasion of defeat called
' Runni ng away
1
. The occasions of defeat such as these will
all have to be ment i oned (separately). Ther ef or e this
(occasion of defeat) is also irrelevant.
. ^ . V ^ . ]
60. (5) [Hetvantara: Anot her pr obans]
a <
Anot her pr obans ' occurs when one desires to pr esent
t he qualified pr obans when t he pr obans st at ed wi t hout
qualifications is r epudi at ed". (NS5.2.6.)
[Vtsyayana explains-] "For exampl e, "The manifest has
singular ori gi nal nat ur e (= prakrti) because it has a limited
size (= parimna). For i nst ance it is seen t hat t he t hi ngs like
( ear t hen) pl at e et c. whi ch are pr oduced from (a single
subst ance viz.) mud, have l i mi t ed size."
"This ar gument is r epudi at ed (by t he opponent ) by
poi nt i ng out t he variability (of t he rel at i on) in t he following
way - "The t hi ngs havi ng mani fol d ori gi nal nat ur e as also t he
t hi ngs having si ngul ar (i.e. common) ori gi nal nat ur e are
seen to have l i mi t ed size."
c. (V
v Supported by V.
REFUTATION OF THE NYYA-VlEVt 97
"When r epudi at ed in this way, t he di sput ant says: (We
state our pr obans as follows:) "Because ' limited size
1
is
observed in t he ki nds of objects co-ordi nat ed by a singular
original nat ur e
1
' and all t hese manifest objects which are co-
or di nat ed by pl easure, pai n and delusion, are known to
have limited size; ( hence) they have a singular original
nat ur e and t he lack of co-ordi nat i on with any ot her original
nat ur e. " In this way it becomes a case of Anot her pr obans
when someone r epudi at es t he unqual i fi ed pr obans.
"When anot her pr obans is pr esent ed t he earlier pr obans
proves to be i ncapabl e of provi ng (t he pr obandum) and
hence an occasion of defeat. "
[Dharmaklrti's response:] In this t oo, where is t he poi nt
in t hi nki ng about t he ot her pr obans, as t he di sput ant is
already defeated due to t he earlier st at ement of t he
Inconclusive probans? If t he pr oposer of t he first pr obans
expresses an Inconclusive pr obans and is given an
oppor t uni t y to r espond (t o t he objections) t hen he gets
defeat ed due to t he same (Inconclusive pr obans) . But if he
is not given an oppor t uni t y to r espond (to the objections)
t hen even if he pr esent s anot her pr obans, he is not worthy
of bei ng defeated, because t her e is no closure (of t he
debat e in t hat case).
t t
61. (6) [Arthntara: Different poi nt ]
"' Different poi nt ' means (speaki ng) somet hi ng, t he
cont ent of whi ch is i rrel evant to t he t opi c unde r
consi derat i on". (NS5.2.7.)
[Vtsyayana explains:] "When t he posi t i on and t he
count er-posi t i on ar e hel d in accor dance with t hei r
definitions (by di sput ant and oppone nt respectively) and
pr oof of t he pr oba ndum on t he basis of pr obans is due, one
(= t he di sput ant ) woul d say, "Sound is per manent . The hetu
(= pr obans) i s- ' because i nt angi bl e' . ' Het u' is a word endi ng
with krt- suffix when t he word tu is at t ached as suffix to t he
r oot 'hi (= 'hinoti). Words ar e of four ki nds - noun, verb,
prefix and part i cl e. " Havi ng i ni t i at ed (a different poi nt ) in
this way he expl ai ns noun et c. "
[Udyotkara explains:] "This is an occasi on of defeat
called ' Different poi nt ' , because her e t he di sput ant ' s
speech is irrelevant to t he pr oposed t opi c. "
[Dharmakirti's response:] Thi s occasi on of defeat is
legitimate one. It amount s to first leaving t he issue at hand
when t he fault (in one' s ar gument ) is poi nt ed out (by t he
ot her debat er ) and t hen ' stating a non- const i t uent of pr oof
or ' poi nt i ng out a non-fault' , on t he part s of di sput ant and
oppone nt respectively. Because, when t he pr oposer of t he
ar gument is r equi r ed to give justification of his pr oposed
ar gument , he states i nst ead of t hat s omet hi ng t hat is not
invariably connect ed with t he pr opos ed t opi c ei t her by
rel at i ng it to t he cont ext or not . And from t he side of t he
r es pondent (i.e. opponent ) it amount s to expressi ng
somet hi ng ot her t han discovery of t he fault (of t he
di sput ant ) .
REFUTATION OF THE ATKA-VIEW 99
^ . [VS.] ^
f ? ci
ffcTI
TJgTfcT
"Q^ % cTT fn^NfJi OTTE2TT
? ] I
62. (7) [Nirarthaka: Meani ngl ess ut t er ance]
"' Meani ngl ess ut t er ance' means an act like ut t er i ng a
series of letters. " (NS 5.2.8.)
\. In the light of NV52.Q; WHI^MKM^- (R) and (D).
100 ' VDANYYA OF DHARMAKIRTI
[Vtsyayana explains:] "For exampl e, "Sound
ern
dha.
r
[Vtsyayana explains:] "For exampl e, "Sound is
per manent because (it is) ja, ba, ga, da, like jha, bha, gha,
dha.
n
.
[Udyotakara explains:] "Here t he debat er is defeat ed
due to non- empl oyment of t he pr obans. "
[Dharmakirti responds:] Thi s is also irrelevant.
Because t her e is no meani ngl essness when simply it is
pr oved t hat t her e is an ut t er ance of a series of letters. If
somet hi ng is an ut t er ance of a non- const i t uent of proof,
only t hen it is meani ngl ess. Because, t he cont ent of t hat
ut t er ance is not conduci ve to t he pr oof of t he pr oba ndum
and also because it does not serve any pur pose. Accept ance
of it, (t herefore, ) as a special type (of t he occasion of
defeat) is not in or der .
[A possible objection:] "It is no fault, because t he word
vat (= ' like' ) is used (in t he defi ni t i on). "
[Answer] It may be so. (You mi ght say-) The t er m vat ( =
like) is used in t he expressi on 'varna-
kramanirdesavat' (= an act like ut t er i ng a series of
l et t ers). It i ndi cat es ot her di scor dant expressi ons
also. Ther ef or e t her e is no fault. But we do not
accept this. Because, in t hat case no ment i on of
' Different poi nt ' et c. will have to be made (as
distinct occasi ons of defeat ). And in t hat case all
t hose exampl es (of Different poi nt ) will have to
be called t he exampl es of Meani ngl essness only,
because they ar e covered by ( t he defi ni t i on of t he
occasion of defeat called) ' Meani ngl ess. '
[A possible objection:] "Meaningless ut t er ance' does not
mean t he one whi ch does not surve any pur pose in provi ng
t he pr oba ndum. By ' Meani ngl ess ut t er ance' we mean t he
one whi ch does not have any meani ng. "
REFUTATION OF THE NYYA-VLEY/ 101
[Answer] In t hat case, why is not any person, who is not a
di sput ant at all (i.e. who does not part i ci pat e in a
debat e at all), defeat ed when he makes
meani ngl ess ut t erances? Because, t he efficient
cause (= nimitta) is common (to t he two cases).
[A possi bl e objection:] " No. Such a case is not relevant
in this cont ext . "
[Answer] Her e you have to accept t hat the one who makes i
meani ngl ess ut t er ance is defeat ed by thai
ut t er ance only. Thi s is common to all t he person:
who state a non-const i t uent of proof. All thos(
who make meani ngl ess ut t erances are worthy o:
bei ng defeat ed by t he same occasion of defeat.
Moreover, ut t er ance of a series of letters is no
always meani ngl ess. In some cont ext even t hat i
meani ngful . So this (= your ment i oni ng series o
letters as meani ngl ess) is itself an occasion OJ
(your) defeat, because it is meani ngl ess her e (=
in this cont ext ) . Moreover, you are saying
somet hi ng different (from what is relevant) when
you say, ' Ut t er ance of a series of letters is an
occasion of defeat' , because in t hat case one
shoul d ment i on striking t he cheeks,
1
r ubbi ng t he
upper gar ment
2
etc.
t t
63. (8) [Avijntrtha: Meani ng -not- under st ood]
"' Meani ng- not - under st ood' occurs when t he st at ement
ut t er ed t hri ce (by t he di sput ant ) is not under st ood by t he
audi ence and by t he oppone nt " (NS 5.2.9)
[Vatsyayana explains:] "If t he st at ement ut t er ed t hri ce
(by t he di sput ant ) is not under s t ood by t he audi ence and
t he opponent , because it cont ai ns obscure words or
unfami l i ar usages or is ut t er ed t oo speedily or for some
ot her reason, t hen such a st at ement t he meani ng of whi ch is
not under s t ood and whi ch is used for hi di ng one' s capasity
(to justify one' s own posi t i on) is an occasion of defeat. "
[Dharmaklrti's response:] Thi s does not differ from
*Meaningless ut t er ance' . If t he di sput ant makes a st at ement
speedily, whi ch is intelligible and rel evant to t he t opi c
unde r consi derat i on, t hen he does not have incapability (to
justify his posi t i on). Nor do t he audi ence etc. fail to
c ompr e he nd his st at ement because he was insensible. (But
t he audi ence fails to c ompr e he nd because of speady
delivery.) Ther ef or e such a l ear ned di sput ant does not
deserve to be called defeat ed.
[A possible objection:] "The di sput ant does deserve to
be called defeat ed because t he audi ence has only to i magi ne
t hat his st at ement is capabl e.
1
(i.e. meani ngful , arha)".
[Answer] Why is not t he oppone nt (i nst ead of t he
di sput ant ) called defeat ed, who due to
. (V); ^roi^ldyPdm^WIH^f - (R) and (D).
insensitivity does not under st and t he st at ement
of t he di sput ant argui ng rationally? Or because
his (= di sput ant ' s) capability to argue out t he case
is not under st ood by t he audi ence and ot her s
due to their insensitivity, he (= di sput ant ) is
nei t her to be called t he wi nner nor defeat ed. And
in case t he di sput ant is maki ng irrelevant
st at ement s it is not hi ng but Meani ngl ess
ut t er ance' . Ther ef or e no separat e occasion of
defeat viz. ' Meani ng-not -underst ood' may be
pr oposed.
t t
64. (9) [Aprthaka: Non-sensical]
"' Non-sensical' means an ut t er ance whi ch has no
i nt egrat ed sense, because earlier and later words in it have
no connect i on. " (JVS5.2.10).
In the light of /V8h5.2.10; cR^rg^frMT^- (R) and (D).
(V); ^MUÎ^BWrosfaFTH- (R) and (D).
[Vtsyayana explains:] "Where many words or sent ences
are known to be unr el at ed in meani ng because t her e is no
connect i on bet ween earlier and later (words or sant ences),
t hen it is ' Non-sensi cal ' because it is bereft of i nt egrat ed
meani ng, like t he sent ence begi nni ng with T e n
pomegr anat es' . "
1
[Dharmakirti's response] Thi s, they say
2
, is ment i oned
separately from ' Meani ngl ess ut t er ance' which cont ai ns
unconnect ed letters, because in this (= ' Non-sensi cal ' ),
words ( and not letters) are unconnect ed.
But in t hat case ' unconnect ed sent ences' also will have to
be ment i oned separately. You cannot say t hat ' Non-sensical
1
as t he occasion of defeat is l egi t i mat e because it covers bot h
( unconnect ed words and sent ences) because in t hat case
(by t he same t oken) ' Meani ngl ess' woul d also be covered
(by Non-sensi cal ).
We have al ready said t hat it is a transgression (of reason)
to prat t l e for defi ni ng separat e occasions of defeat
accor di ng to such peculiarities. We do not find any fault in
referri ng to a collection (of cases by a single occasion of
defeat ). Nor do we find any special virtue in diversification.
So this (Nyya ar gument ) is insignificant.
t t
65. (1.0) [Aprptakla : Mistimed]
"' Mi st i med' means ut t er ance of t he el ement s (of
ar gument ) in perverse or der . " (NS5.2.11).
[Vtsyayana explains:] "The el ement s of ar gument
starting with Decl arat i on follow an or der due to t hei r
significance in accordance with their definitions. Hence
stating t he el ement s in perverse or der is an occasion of
defeat. "
[Udyotakara explains:] "If one says, "No, because t he
pr oof (of t he pr obandum) is possible in this way also", t hen
we say, - No, because it (= an ar gument in perverse or der ) is
like a word r emoved from t he (st andard) usage. For
i nst ance it is not correct to say t hat explication of t he
meani ngs of words is in vain because even t he word 'gonV
used in t he sense of 'go* (~ bullock) conveys an object
possessing hump on shoul ders et c. (i.e. a bul l ock). Her e
one appr ehends t he word 'go* t hr ough this word (= goni)
and t hen under st ands t he object possessing hump on
shoul ders etc. In t he same way one appr ehends t he
el ement s of ar gument such as Declaration et c. ar r anged in
t hei r pr oper or der t hr ough t he el ement s which are
pr esent ed in perverse or der and t hen knows t he meani ng
(of t he ar gument ) from t he el ement s in pr oper order. That
is why we find in this world t hat one first takes t he object of
act i on such as t he l ump of clay and t hen takes t he
i nst rument . "
1
t t
s. In the light of V; <T<T: "3OT ^Rn
u
siiVh cftfr - (R) and (D);
l NV,
cftfif Wt^, ^ TJcf f^T H ^H^lPd?
: Mal fa
66. [Dharmakirtrs response:] Your saying t hat it is like
a word r emoved from t he ( st andar d) usage, is like one mad
per son nar r at i ng anot her mad per son' s statement
1
! We do
not see any poi nt in ( Gr ammar i an' s) at t empt towards
expl i cat i on of (correct ) words, if t he appr ehens i on of t he
object possessing h u mp in shoul der s (i.e. a bul l ock) takes
place from t he word 'gonV.
[A possible objection:] "The expl i cat i on (of correct
words) is ma de in or der to expl i cat e t he meani ng-conveyi ng
REFUTATION OF THE NY YA-VIEYJ 107
words, because t he word 'gonV does not have capasity to
convey t he meani ng. "
[Answer] But we find in t he worl d that t here is
appr ehensi on (of meani ng) from t he word 'gonT
also!
[Objection:] "True. We do find. But we have said that it
(= t he appr ehensi on of meani ng) is not di rect . "
[Answer] "You have said that, but what you said is not
correct . Because women and Sudras do not have
appr ehensi on of bot h (= t he correct word as well
as t he i ncorrect word).
2
Because only he will
under s t and (t he meani ng from t he i ncorrect
wor d via t he correct word) who knows bot h, t he
(correct ) word and t he i ncorrect word. But how
will be the person who knows t he word 'nakka
1
or
^mukkcC b u t . does not know t he word 'nsa'
( meani ng nose) under st and t he correct word
from t he i ncorrect word and t hen under st and t he
meani ng? But we see in fact t hat t he per son not
knowi ng bot h t he words (but only t he i ncorrect
word) does appr ehended (t he meani ng) .
Thi s appr ehensi on does not t ake place t hr ough a
series of relations. Because if a word does not
have capasity to pr oduce t he appr ehensi on of t he
meani ng, t hen it cannot have the capasity to
pr oduce t he appr ehensi on of a word also.
3
Because, ' t he capasity to connot e t he meani ng
1
(= arthe vcakatvam) (that subsists in a word) is
not qui t e a different t hi ng from ' capasity to
pr oduce t he appr ehensi on of it.'
And if t he i ncorrect word does pr oduce t he
appr ehensi on of t he correct word, t hen why does
it not pr oduce t he appr ehensi on of t he meani ng
itself? We do not see any ki nd of dissension of it
(= i ncorrect word) with t he meani ng due to
whi ch it woul d keep t he meani ng away.
Moreover t he (i ncorrect ) word cannot gener at e
t he appr ehens i on of t he correct word also, unl ess
such a convent i on is made.
Because, t he i ncorrect word does not pr oduce
t he appr ehensi on of t he correct word naturally,
because we do not see t hat . But it woul d pr oduce
( t he appr ehensi on) only if t her e is such a
convent i on. The word oper at es on account of
convent i on.
The exert i on of (post ul at i ng) a series of
appr ehens i ons is avoi ded in this way.
t t
c?t%
c^Mir^
"^TFT
(R); Ttefti - (D).
%S T
67. Moreover, (t he i ncorrect words need not convey the
meani ng indirectly and correct words directly) because we
find t hat converse is t he case. Those who do not under st and
t he meani ng from t he (correct) word are found acqui ri ng
knowl edge from cor r upt words. Hence t he ' Inst ruct i on
about words' (as given in Sanskrit Gr ammar ) is fruitless.
[A possible objection:] "It is not fruitless, because it is
meant for explication of Sanskrit (= cul t ured) words"
[Answer] What is *being cultured* in t he case of words? We
do not see any (sign of) cul t uredness such as
intellect or l earnedness (in t hem) .
Nor do these (Sanskrit) words have ext r eme
audibility. Nor do
;
they have any pr e- emi nence in
conveying t he meani ng.
Nor are they t he means to religious merit,
because demer i t is pr oduced even from t he
\$. In the light of V; S-qgiW:- (R) and (D).
c. (V); deWIHeTWlfcT: - (R); drtWK*uftH: - (D).
Sanskrit words motivating wrong at t i t udes.
Conversely ot her words (= non-Sanskrit words)
also pr oduce meri t . The gr ammar i an' s
a nnounc e me nt t hat j ust t he pr oper use of a word
gives one t he pl easure in Heaven, is merely an
ut t er ance. The expert s of r easoni ng do not
honour such ( unf ounded) scri pt ural st at ement s.
Nor is it t he case t hat one' s mout h becomes
t or t uous if one says, "If t her e is only a pr oper use
of t he word, but it does not give mot i vat i on for
acqui r i ng meri t t hr ough charity etc, t hen
(i nst ead of giving heavenly pl easure) it leads to
collapse of a mount ai n. "
1
Ther ef or e t her e is no
wor d whi ch is cul t ur ed.
[A possible objection:] "Cul t ur endness of a wor d means
its having been used by l ear ned persons. "
[The count er-quest i on: ] Who are l earned?
[Opponent's answer:] "Those who possess t he qualities
such as t he knowl edge of what one shoul d know. "
[Dharmaklrti's response:] What sort of a false convi ct i on
they (t he l e a r n e d per sons' ) are having t hen, whi ch does
not r equi r e any excel l ence in t hei r qualities? Because, they
use only t hese (= Sanskrit) words and not ot hers! Moreover,
t her e is no di rect witness to ( t he use of) t hese words, on t he
basis of whom we can ascertain t hat l ear ned per sons use
only these wor ds and not ot her s.
We do not appr ove of cul t ur edness of even a few words as
we do not see any excess of qualities (in t hem) . Pr ot ect i on
of Vedas is a non- pur pose accor di ng to t he one who is not a
follower of t hei r system. And even if t her e is s ome excess of
qualities (in t he Sanskrit wor ds) , no effort needs to be made
for t hei r explication.
2
Because t he part i cul ar nat ur e of t hose
words coul d be justified on some ot her basis also, like in t he
case of t he words in Prkrta, Apabhrama, Dravida, ndhra
and ot her l anguages. Ther e is no defining characteristic of
l anguages bel ongi ng to t he respective regi ons. Peopl e
under s t and ( meani ngs from words) in a definite way due to
t he sameness (i.e. continuity) of t radi t i on, as they also
under s t and deviation from t he st andar d usage. The
appr ehensi on of Sanskrit words also will take pl ace in t he
same way. Ther ef or e t endi ng to at t ri but e defining
characteristic
3
to words is an insensitive mode of
under st andi ng.
t t
TTof
R f ?
3T3
^. In the light of V; uuMWcflrd4" - (R) and (D).
\. (R); a^lWtr: - (D) (No support from V).
^. (R); ^Tî:-(D) (No support from V)
, rfifpT ^ W ^ T F ^ I : >K^d ^fcT ^ f^TR:
68. (Now comi ng to t he occasion of defeat pr oper : )
If in spite of t he perverse or der of t he el ement s (of an
ar gument ) t her e is t he appr ehensi on of t he mut al relation-
ship
1
of t he sent ences (in t he ar gument ) , t her e is nei t her false
appr ehensi on nor non- appr ehensi on, t hen it is because t he
ar gument (with t he el ement s in perverse or der ) has capasity
(to convey t he i nt ended meani ng) .
Nor is t her e any convent i on such as ' t he words (in t he
ar gument ) shoul d be used in this way alone* as t her e is no
difference in conveyance (of meani ng) .
[A possible objection:] "That is t he pr oper or der of
el ement s t hr ough whi ch t he appr ehensi on of t he meani ng
takes pl ace. Hence t her e is no appr ehens i on t hr ough t he
el ement s in perverse or der . The appr ehensi on of meani ng
t hr ough t hem takes pl ace via t he appr ehens i on of pr oper
sequent i al or der . "
[Answer] The pr oper sequent i al or der is not appr ehended
unl ess t he rel at i on amongst t he el ement s is
a ppr e he nde d. And if t he rel at i on amongst t he
words is a ppr e he nde d as Th i s is rel at ed her e' ,
t hen what woul d be t hei r or der of priority or
post eri ori t y on account of whi ch they woul d be
ar r anged? Because when t he rel at i on is
appr ehended, t hat itself is t hei r or der , viz. t he
rel at i onshi p whi ch is a ppr e he nde d amongst
t hem as they are. Ther e is no rul e governi ng t he
IFUTATION OF THE NYYA-V1EVJ 113
or der of words bel ongi ng to sent ences. For
exampl e 'puruso rjnafi (= Man of t he king) and
'rjnah purusati (= king' s man) (bot h are
grammatically correct).
2
Those many words constitute a sent ence t hr ough
which t her e is accompl i shment of meani ng. For
exampl e "Devadatta, gm naya krsnrri (=
Devadatta, br i ng the black cow.) ( The or der of
words = Devadatta, cow, bri ng, bl ack. )
3
Here t her e
is no difference in the appr ehensi on of meani ng
al t hough t he words are used freely. Hence t he
adher ence to order (of t he el ement s of
ar gument ) is insignificant (kasdt).
Moreover we have expl ai ned how t her e can be
appr ehensi on (of t he pr obandum) even wi t hout
t he st at ement of Declaration. If an i mpl i ed word
(or sent ence) has to be used (explicity), t hen it
woul d be a transgression (of r eason) . We have
said with r egar d to the r emai ni ng el ement s that
t her e is no rul e t hat one shoul d first i ndi cat e t he
rel at i on (of pervasion) and t hen the exi st ence (of
pr obans) in t he property-bearer, or t hat one
shoul d first indicate t he existence in t he
properl y-bearer and t hen t he rel at i on of
pervasion. Because, t he knowl edge of t he
pr oba ndum arises in bot h t he cases.
4
If (on t he ot her hand) (t he or der of t he words in
t he ar gument is so perverse that) no rel at i on is
a ppr e he nde d amongst t he words, t hen t he
pr oper sequent i al or der (amongst t he el ement s
of t he ar gument ) also will not be appr ehended.
Hence this case will not differ from t he (occasion
of defeat called) *Non sensical*. In t hat case it will
not be pr oper to ment i on ' Mi st i med' as a distinct
occasion of defeat.
69. (11) [Nyna: Insufficient]
"' Insufficient' means t hat (i nferent i al st at ement ) whi ch is
dest i t ut e of one of t he el ement s. " (NS 5.2.12.)
[Vtsyayana explains:] ' Th e (inferential) st at ement in
whi ch one of t he el ement s, such as Decl arat i on, is lacking, is
deficient. Because t he pr oba ndum is not proved in t he
absence of (compl et e) proof."
[Dharmakirti's response:] If it is dest i t ut e of, say,
Decl arat i on, t hen it is not deficient, because we have
expl ai ned t hat t he knowl edge of pr oba ndum takes pl ace
even in its absence.
Anot her one
1
says, "it is deficient, because even in t he case
of insufficiency ( due to t he absence of Decl ar at i on) , defeat
takes pl ace. "
Thi s is an unt hought f ul st at ement , because he will
deserve defeat, who uses a r e dunda nt sent ence (lit.
meani ngl ess sent ence) t he meani ng of whi ch is i mpl i ed (by
ot her el ement s of t he ar gument ) , but t he one who ut t ers a
meani ngf ul ( nQn- r edundant ) sent ences is not defeat ed.
(R); Supported by yfa^wui^wtfOTT^ - V; But the reading mentioned
in V - iWîi, and also (D).
Decl arat i on is not a const i t uent of pr oof for t he same
reason.
t t
70. (12) [Adhika: Addi t i onal ]
"' Addi t i onal ' means t hat (inferential st at ement ) whi ch
cont ai ns an addi t i onal pr obans or i nst ance. " (NS5. 2. 13).
[Vtsyayana explains:] "When t he inferential st at ement
is compl et e with one ( pr obans or instance) t he ot her one is
r edundant (Lit. meani ngl ess) . Thi s is to be under s t ood (as
an occasion of defeat) when such a rul e is accept ed (in t he
debat e) . "
[Dharmakirti's response:] When t he discussion is based
on (t he rul e of) usi ng an inferential st at ement cont ai ni ng
(only) one pr obans, st at i ng an addi t i onal pr obans in such a
discussion is r edundant . Hence it is an occasion of defeat
( t her e) .
In a diffuse discussion t her e is no fault (of this ki nd)
because t her e are no rul es in it.
t t
. In the light of Nh 5.2.13. The word used in NBh is ar^rcRFT; But
(R) and (D).
Ri ^rfcT ^fcf%3 ^f cT
7
! Reifet
71. (13) [Punarukta: Repet i t i on]
"' Repet i t i on
1
means i t erat i on ( made in t he course of
ar gument ) of words or meani ng except as a confi rmat ory
repetition. "
1
(A/55.2.14)
[Udyotakara explains:] "An exampl e of Repet i t i on of
words - "Sound is i mper manent , s ound is i mper manent . " An
exampl e of t he Repet i t i on of meani ng - "Sound is
i mper manent , sonori t y is subject to dest ruct i on. "
[Dharmakl rt i ' s r esponse: ] Her e ' Repetition* of words
need not be ment i oned separately. Because it is covered by
t he ment i on of ' Repet i t i on of meani ng' . Because, t her e is
no fault if t he meani ng is different even if t he words are t he
same. For i nst ance -
"The machi ne bought for a bit of money
2
is such t hat it
l aught s when t he mast er l aughs, cries loudly when cries,
r uns with a fast ened Waist-band and with sweat comi ng out
when runs, censur es a vi rt uous faultless per son when (t he
master) censures ( t he same) , dances when dances.'*
3
REFUTATION OF THE NYYA-VIEW 11V
Or ( anot her exampl e) - "That which happens when this
real t hi ng happens and does not happen when it does not
happen, is t he effect of this, and t he ot her t hi ng is t he
cause.
4
t t
Tic*
72. [Another type of Punarukta as stated in NS :]
"That ut t er ance is also called Repet i t i on which expresses
t he meani ng again which is i mpl i ed (by ot her ut t erances)
wl
[Dharmakirti's response:] Thi s (type of Repet i t i on)
occurs when t he use of words in an inferential st at ement is
rul e bound. Ut t erance of Decl arat i on is an exampl e of this.
Thi s (type of Repet i t i on) need not be ment i oned separately
because it is covered by Repet i t i on of meani ng.
Moreover this shoul d be called a fault in that debat e
wher e t he inferential st at ement s are rul e-bound, not in a
diffused discussion. Because, (in a diffused discussion) t he
speaker somet i mes says t he same t hi ng again and again by
raising t he doubt t hat witnesses and ot hers have not hear d
(t he st at ement ) properl y or under st ood properly. Hence
t her e is no decept i on (of t he opponent or t he audi ence)
her e.
[A possible objection:] "No (it is an occasion of defeat ),
because this (ki nd of debat e) is not t he pr oper pl ace (for
repetitive st at ement s). Her e (i.e. in diffuse debat e) t he
debat er is nei t her a t eacher nor a st udent ; so he need not be
addressed with efforts (i.e. elaborately) on account of whi ch
t he same t hi ng woul d be ut t er ed again and agai n. Hence
t he r epet i t i on does a mount to defeat."
2
[Answer] That is not so, because (in such a diffuse
discussion) t he witnesses are to be addr essed with
efferts, because if t hey are not addr essed with
efforts t hen this is r egar ded as a fault; (secondly)
because her e t he per son to whom t he
expl anat i on is addr essed is a st udent (in a br oad
sense, i.e., s omeone wort hy of bei ng t aught ) ;
(thirdly,) because (in a disffused discussion) t he
debat e i nt ended merely to gai n victory is
pr ohi bi t t ed; (fourthly) because * maki ng t he
st at ement t hri ce' has been ment i oned (by you) ;
"(fifthly) because (in a diffused discussion) t her e
is no convent i onal rul e r egar dmg r epet i t i on of an
ut t er ance.
t i t
sf t
^. CN/); HHM^^Bf - (R) and (D).
vs. (V); i$rt\[< - (R) and (D).
REFUTATION OF THE NYKA-VIEW 119
3Tf: "J^T: HfclMKHW f
73. Moreover this (= Repet i t i on) does not differ from
' Addi t i onal
1
, hence it shoul d not be ment i oned separately.
Because, t he fault of Additionality can occur in an
i nferent i al st at ement wher e t he use of words is rul e-bound.
So in t he case of Repet i t i on also t he word, meani ng of which
is al ready expressed (by, other words) is Addi t i on.
Plurality of pr obans' and Repeat ed ut t er ance is not a
fault
1
in a diffuse discussion. Th e diffuse discussion is such
t hat it is not specified in it t hat t he proof of a single object is
under t aken; but it is desi red to prove various objects in it or
it is desi red by t he audi ence t hat one employs vari ous
pr obans (for proving t he same obj ect ). It is a fault (in t he
debat e wher e t he use of words is rul e-bound. Because, in
such a debat e t her e is no (second) appr ehensi on (i.e. it is
not per mi t t ed to gener at e second appr ehensi on) of what is
appr ehended. So plurality of pr obans etc. and plurality of
expressi on (in such a debat e) is a fault of proof.
The fault in ' Addi t i onal ' and ' Repet i t i on' is equal .
Ther ef or e it is pr oper to express t hem i n uni on. Just as
t her e is no fault (in maki ng t hei r uni on) , t her e is no plus-
poi nt (in ment i oni ng t hem distinctly). We have said t hat
ment i oni ng varieties of this ki nd (distinctly) amount s t o
t ransgressi on (of reason).
2
(' Addi t i onal ' can be i ncl uded in ' Repet i t i on of words' . )
Because, t he second pr obans whi ch applies to t he object
ar gued out (by the first pr obans) is j ust like a synonym (of
t he first pr obans) . Because, t he object of ar gument is not
distinct (in bot h t he cases).
The (Repet i t i on of) meani ng
8
does not differ from
ar gui ng again (with addi t i onal pr obans or i nst ance) .
f i t
74. What has been said (by t he aut hor of NS, may be
consi der ed now) - "In t he case of confi rmat ory repet i t i on (=
anuvda), it is not a Repet i t i on (as such) because (t here)
some special pur pose is served by r epeat i ng words. " (NS
5.2.15)
[Vtsyayana explains:] "For exampl e concl usi on (=
nigamana) is (defi ned by t he aut hor of Aft in NS 1.1.39 as)
rest at i ng t he Decl arat i on on t he basis of pr obans. "
[Dharmakirti's response:] St at i ng t he Decl arat i on t he
meani ng of whi ch is i mpl i ed (by t he premi ses) is itself a
Repet i t i on, what to say about t he r est at ement of it! In this
way (stating t he) concl usi on is i nadequat e.
t t
[ V*. ]
t. (R); ^5Rf - (D).
\. (R); supported by V, H<yRi5tf - (D).
arfer
[ ?
^ ^
75. (14) [Ananubhasana: Non- r epr oduct i on]
"ôn- r epr oduct i on* means inability to ut t er t he
st at ement (of t he ot her debat er ) , t he meani ng of which is
under st ood by t he assembly and which is ut t er ed thrice (by
t he ot her debat er ) . " (JVS5.2.17)
[Vtsyayana explains:] "The non-re-ut t erance of t he
st at ement , t he meani ng of which is under st ood by t he
assembly and which is ut t er ed thrice (by t he ot her debat er)
is t he occasion of defeat called Non- r epr oduct i on, because
if a debat er does not (= cannot ) re-utter (t he ot her
debat er ' s st at ement ) , on what basis will be r epudi at e t he
opponent ' s posi t i on?"
[Udyotakara explains:] "If one says- "This is not an
occasion of defeat because a debat e is concl uded by an
answer (and not by t he re-ut t erance)I", t hen we say: One
may say so - "Whet her one (= t he r espondent ) is confused or
not is known from t he answer; what is t he significance of
ut t er i ng (t he di sput ant ' s st at ement ) t hen? Because some
per sons are capabl e of answeri ng but not of re-ut t erance.
He (= t he r espondent ) need not deserve defeat j ust for
t hat . " If one says this t hen we say: No. Because, (inability to
r epr oduce implies) t he absence of compr ehensi on of t he
%. lnthelightof/SA/5.2.17.
subject of answer. If he does not reut t er, t hen t he answer
will be i mpl i ed to be wi t hout subject. If he gives an answer,
why does he not ut t er ( t he subject of answer)? So you are
saying this cont radi ct ory t hi ng - ' Does not ut t er ( t he
st at ement ) but answers i t / ( One mi ght say) "This is not so
(i.e. Non- r epr oduct i on is not an occasion of defeat) because
t her e is no decl arat i on (t o t hat effect). It is not decl ared (in
t he debat e) t hat a debat er shoul d first ut t er everyt hi ng
( ut t er ed by t he ot her debat er ) and t he answer shoul d be
st at ed afterwards." (we say:) The answer shoul d be st at ed
somehow. But answer wi t hout basis is i mpr oper . Ther ef or e
it is pr oper to r egar d ' not re-uttering* as an occasion of
defeat. "
t t
F*TT
:
f
^fa
76. [Dharmakirti's response:] Suppose t hat t he
di sput ant incidentally announces same ot her topic unde r
. (V); jjiuei - (R) and (D).
t he pr et ext of expl i cat i ng t he object of one' s own ar gument ,
states all t he objects of i nqui ry on whi ch t her e is di sput e, in
t he course of Decl arat i on etc. and t hen el aborat es t he
discussion by i nt r oduci ng ot her topics in a special series of
topics and suppose t hat t he oppone nt cannot r epr oduce all
t hat . The n what ki nd of failure in t he opponent ' s capasity is
t her e, in case he states only t he answer to t he subject on
whi ch t her e is dispute? Because, you call t he Non-
r epr oduct i on of di sput ant ' s st at ement an occasion of
defeat! Ther ef or e it is not t he case t hat t he one who does
not r epr oduce t he whol e speach of t he di sput ant is
(necessarily) unabl e to give answer.
The st at ement s with which t he pr oof of the enqui r ed
object is invariably connect ed - such as t hat of existence (of
pr obans) in t he thesis-subject and t he justification of
pervasi on - whi ch are made wi t hout i nt r oduci ng some ot her
topics in t hat , are (i.e. have to be) definitely i ndi cat ed (by
t he oppone nt ) . Because, a const i t uent of ar gument is t he
object of refut at i on. But even t her e it is not obligatory to
ut t er everything first in t he same or der and t hen to refute it.
Because in t hat case t her e will be t he undesi rabl e
occur r ence of doubl e ut t er ance. If t he opponent
r epr oduces ( t he rel evant st at ement of t he di sput ant ) in
or der to i ndi cat e t he object of refutation, t hen
a nnounc e me nt of t he di sput ant ' s st at ement s in t he same
or der is of no use and hence shoul d not be made by t he
opponent . Cor r espondi ng to each i ndi cat i on of fault, t he
object (havi ng t he fault) is ment i oned, because t her e is an
invariable rel at i on of t he form ' this has this fault' .
t t
cT^TT
77. Moreover, it is not possible t o i ndi cat e all t he objects
and t hen state t he fault (in all of t hem) at once. Because,
faults differ from object to object. Ther ef or e t he object of
refutation whi ch one is r epudi at i ng (at a part i cul ar time)
shoul d be i ndi cat ed at t hat t i me, not any ot her . Because at
t he t i me of refut i ng one object i ndi cat i on of anot her object
is impossible. After it is refut ed, anot her object whi ch is t he
object of anot her fault can be i ndi cat ed. Thi s is t he pr oper
way of r epr oduct i on and refut at i on.
If everyt hi ng (t hat t he di sput ant says) is r epr oduced at
once, t hen t he object (of refut at i on) will have to be
i ndi cat ed agai n at t he t i me of stating faults in it, because a
fault cannot be st at ed wi t hout i ndi cat i ng its object. Thi s will
a mount to maki ng r epr oduct i on twice. Out of t hem (= two
*. (R); -zn - (V) and (D).
*. In view of the parallel discussion of srqfcrc in Sec. 61.
s. (V) and a parallel statement in sec. 33; TO*r - (R) and (D).
r epr oduct i ons) t he first r epr oduct i on of everything in t he
same order, is wi t hout any purpose; (on t he contrary) when
t he opponent has to state t he fault, stating somet hi ng which
is not per t i nent to it, amount s to ' Not poi nt i ng out t he
fault' (= Adosodhvana). It also amount s to dupl i cat i on.
Ther ef or e r epr oduci ng everything at once shoul d be called
a gr ound of defeat.
[The opponent might say:] "Let it be so"
[Answer] You mi ght say "We have said t hat ' Different
poi nt
1
is an occasion of defeat. While provi ng his
own ar gument if t he di sput ant states some poi nt
whi ch is not invariably connect ed (with t he mai n
poi nt ) by bri ngi ng in some cont ext or t he ot her
t hen it amount s to shifting to a Different poi nt ,
and hence he deserves defeat for t hat . Not hi ng
r emai ns i nappl i cabl e if t he cont ext is created!
However, such a st at ement of hi m (= di sput ant )
is not to be r epr oduced. We are also not
admi t t i ng t hat first everything is to be st at ed (by
t he opponent ) once and t hen faults in t hat are to
be stated. But (we admi t on the cont rary t hat ) t he
obj ect (of refutation) shoul d be i ndi cat ed by t he
oppone nt (in due t i me), otherwise t he refutation
will not st and!"
t t
"3rR R ^ $ t ^
126 VADAATKAÔFDHARMAKIRTI
78. ( On this we say:) In t hat case Non- r epr oduct i on
shoul d not be ment i oned as a distinct occasi on of defeat
because it is covered by Non-i magi nat i on. Non-i magi nat i on
means non- appr ehensi on of t he answer (to be gi ven). The
one who does not i ndi cat e t he object of answer is not
capabl e of appr ehendi ng t he answer. It is not t he case t hat
Non- r epr oduct i on does not imply ' Non- appr ehensi on of
t he answer' . Ther ef or e since Non-i magi nat i on pervades (=
covers) Non- r epr oduct i on, t he occasion-of-defeat-hood t hat
subsists in Non- i magi nat i on, subsists in Non- r epr oduct i on
( t oo) . For i nst ance t he pr oper t y of possessing dewlaps etc.
which subsists i ndi scri mi nat el y in all bul l ocks subsists (by
implication) in Bhuleya (= t he bul l ock na me d as Bhuleya)
also. Ther ef or e only Non-i magi nat i on shoul d be called an
occasion of defeat and not Non- r epr oduct i on.
Moreover, whi ch convent i onal rul e is this viz. "Non-
r epr oduct i on of t he st at ement st at ed t hri ce (is an occasion
of defeat)
1
? If this pract i ce (of ut t er i ng t he st at ement
thrice) is for t he opponent ' s under s t andi ng of t he
st at ement , why shoul d it be st at ed (exactly) thrice? He (=
(R) and (V); ftlf*mtfm - (D).
(V); Mvfa (R) and (D).
t he opponent ) shoul d be communi cat ed in such a way t hat
he under st ands it. If (on t he contrary) this pract i ce is for
t roubl i ng t he opponent , t hen too why is t he st at ement
st at ed thrice? Inst ead of t hat he (= t he di sput ant ) shoul d
first tell t he st at ement in t he ears of t he witnesses and t hen
attack t he oppone nt by maki ng t he st at ement cumber some,
i ncompr ehensi bl e, speedy and abri dged so t hat opponent is
confused in appr ehendi ng t he answer and becomes silent.
Because t her e is no rat i onal rul e r egar di ng t he way of
t roubl i ng t he oppone nt on account of whi ch t he
cumber some and i ncompr ehensi bl e expressi ons ut t er ed
speedily are pr event ed and t hri ce ut t er ance is prescri bed. It
shoul d be said her e t hat good persons do not t end to
t r oubl e t he opponent s nor are sciences cr eat ed for that.
Ther ef or e t he di sput ant shoul d speak unt i l t he opponent
grasps, not necessarily t hr ee times.
If t he oppone nt does not have capasity to under st and
t hen t he di sput ant who has limited capasity shoul d avoid
hi m bef or ehand, by maki ng (t he witnesses) alert (to t he fact
t hat t he oppone nt cannot appr ehend t he meani ng of
st at ement s) .
t i t
^ 34I HM:
[ ? rf
^Ri cRTt: ^^^^S^rf cI ^FTT: eft fspspq
79. (15) [Ajiina: Non- under st andi ng]
"' Non- under st andi ng' occurs when (a st at ement made by
t he di sput ant is) not under s t ood" (MS5. 2. 17).
[Vtsyayana expl ai ns: ] "When a st at ement under s t ood by
t he assembly is not under s t ood by t he oppone nt t hen it is an
occasion of defeat called Non- under st andi ng. Because if t he
meani ng (of t he ar gument ) is not under s t ood, he cannot
make its r epudi at i on. "
[DharmaklrtPs response:] Thi s (occasion of defeat) also
is covered by it (i.e. by Non-i magi nat i on) and hence like
Non- r epr oduct i on it shoul d not be ment i oned (separately)..
1
J us t like Non- r epr oduct i on, it is an occasi on of defeat via
' non- appr ehens i on of answer' (i.e. Non- i magi nat i on) ,
because t her e (i.e. in t he case of Non- r epr oduct i on) t he
appr ehens i on of answer is i mpossi bl e since t he object (of
refut at i on) is not i ndi cat ed; t hat is because r epr oduct i on
will be of no use wi t hout t he cont ext of i ndi cat i ng t he
subject of answer; in t he same way, in t he case of Non-
under s t andi ng also, it is an occasion of defeat, via non-
appr ehens i on of answer (i.e. Non- i magi nat i on) .
Because, hQw can t he one, who does not under st and,
speak out t he answer and t he subject of answer? Ther ef or e
not under s t andi ng t he subject and not under s t andi ng t he
answer is t he occasi on of defeat. If t hat is not so (i.e. if they
are not covered by Non-i magi nat i on) t hen in t hat case Non-
i magi nat i on will be wi t hout any subject mat t er.
2
REFUTATION OF THE NY YA-VIEW 129
Because, t he one who has not under s t ood t he meani ng
does not r epr oduce; t he one who does not (= cannot )
r epr oduce will not be able to i ndi cat e t he subject and
appr ehend t he answer, and hence he will not appr ehend
t he answer. Because t he one who knows t he answer and its
subject cannot fail to appr ehend t he answer, as bot h these
(= (1) Not under st andi ng t he subject (2) Not
under st andi ng t he answer) const i t ut e t he cause of t he non-
appr ehensi on of t he answer.
The appr ehensi on (of answer) does take pl ace in t he
absence of these (=' non- appr ehensi on of subject and non-
appr ehensi on of answer). So you shoul d tell me, what is t he
subject mat t er of Non-i magi nat i on, if t hese two (non-
appr ehensi ons) are ment i oned separately (as t he two ki nds
of Non- under st andi ng) ! Non-i magi nat i on (in t hat case)
shoul d not be ment i oned at all, because it has no (distinct)
subject-matter.
t t
f f
cfff
crff
[ ?
fsb^cl",
i ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
80. [Naiyayikasmaysay:]
a
Non- under s t andi ng does not
mean not under s t andi ng t he answer, but it means not
under s t andi ng t he subject-matter. Even when t he subject-
mat t er is under st ood, t he answer may not be a ppr e he nde d
because it is not known. Hence Non- i magi nat i on has a
(distinct) subject-matter. "
[Answer] The n in t hat case Non- r epr oduct i on will be
wi t hout subject-matter, because it is i mpl i ed by
Non- under st andi ng. The one who appr ehends
t he subject-matter correctly will not fail to
r epr oduce it. Hence Non- r epr oduct i on shoul d
not be ment i oned separately.
(Similarly Non-i magi nat i on t oo shoul d not be
ment i oned separately.) Because, not
under s t andi ng t he answer is also i mpl i ed. ' Not
under s t andi ng t he answer* is i mpl i ed by ' not
under s t andi ng t he subj ect -mat t er/ The per son
who does not under s t and t he subject-matter,
does not under s t and t he answer also. Ther ef or e
t her e is no (distinct) subj ect -mat t er of Non-
i magi nat i on.
[Naiyayikas may say:] The subj ect -mat t er of Non-
i magi nat i on is ' not knowi ng t he answer even if t he subject-
mat t er is known. '
[Answer] The n in t hat case, ot her
1
(i nt ermedi at e?)
occasi on of defeat will have to be ment i oned by
REFUTATION OF THE YYA-WESN 131
classifying ' Non- under st andi ng of subject-matter
and answer' furt her. As you are account i ng for a
different occasion of defeat, by classifying Non-
under s t andi ng i nt o ' Not under st andi ng subject-
matter* and ' Not under st andi ng t he answer' even
t hough t her e is no addi t i onal poi nt (guntisaya)
(in doi ng so), in t he same way (we ask,) why are
ot her occasions of defeat not bei ng ment i oned
by classifying ' Non- under st andi ng' i nt o ' Not
under st andi ng t he whol e answer'
2
etc.r Nor is
t her e any fault ki ment i oni ng t he two-fold Non-
under st andi ng unitedly; on t he cont rary t her e
will be a plus-point namel y ' economy' (lit.
l i ght ness). Ther ef or e ment i oni ng t hem uni t edl y
is justified. Hence no separat e ment i on of Non-
r epr oduct i on and Non- under st andi ng is justified
because t hei r subject-matter is t he subject-matter
of Non-i magi nat i on.
Moreover, any ot her occasions of t he defeat of
pr oposer or r espondent , apart from Fallacies of
pr obans and Non-i magi nat i on, are not justified,
because everything becomes ment i oned by
ment i oni ng t he two. The el aborat e classification
is futile, because it is a t ransgressi on (of reason)
to under t ake to ment i on t he subdivisions i mpl i ed
by t he two (= Fallacies of pr obans and Non-
i magi nat i on) (separately) wi t hout t her e bei ng
any addi t i onal poi nt .
t t
ffcT
81. (16) [Apratibh: Non-imagination]
ai
Non-imagination' means non-apprehension of answer,"
(A/S5.2.18)
[Vtsyayana explains:] "When the other debater's
position is to be repudiated by one, but the one does not
apprehend the answer (to be given) to his (= other
debater's) argument, the one is to be called defeated."
[Dharmakirti's response:] After the argument has been
stated (by the disputant) and when the topic-wise answer is
to be given (by the respondent), if he (= the respondent)
spends time in vain, by announci ng (the disputant's
statements) in the same order, reciting verses etc., out of
ignorance about the answer, then he (= the respondent)
deserves defeat because he does not know what he has to do.
Therefore this occasion of defeat is justified.
t t
- \ . \ .
"^TR
(R) and (D).
82. (17) (Viksepa: Di spensat i on)
" di s pens at i on' means breaki ng the discussion due to
engagement with some work" (NS 5.2.20)
[Nyaya-explanation:]
1
On e breaks t he discussion by
referri ng to engagement with some duty or t he ot her - "This
work which ought to be done by me is get t i ng lost; I will
cont i nue (lit. do) when t hat work is compl et ed"; "The stroke
of cold is damagi ng my t hr oad. " One breaks t he discussion
by t he st at ement like this. Thi s is t he occasion of defeat
called di s pens at i on' ; one oneself bri ngs t he discussion to
an end when t he end of t he discussion shoul d be r eached by
t he defeat of one of t he two (debat ers). "
[Dharmakirti's response:] Thi s t oo is an occasion of
defeat if t he pr oposer of t he first position commi t s it only
t hr ough a pr et ent i ous allusion, not if t her e exists a genui ne
( ur gent ) work which obst ruct s the. discussion of that kind.
Ther e will be Di spensat i on (in t he former case) because t he
lack of power of t he di sput ant ' s own ar gument is identified.
In t hat case this occasion will be i ncl uded in shifting to a
Different poi nt . Or it will be i ncl uded in t he Fallacy of
pr obans, because it is (a case of) stating an uns ound (lit.
i ncapabl e) reason. Moreover, it does not differ from (t he
occasions of defeat called) ' Meani ngl ess' and ' Non-sensical'
because it amount s to one' s appr ehensi on irrelevant to t he
pr oposed ar gument . And we have already stated t he
%. (R); wsflRR^(V) and (D).
t rangressi on (of reason) involved in account i ng for separat e
occasions of defeat cor r espondi ng to varieties of
appr ehensi ons i rrel evant to t he i nferent i al st at ement
( under consi der at i on) .
If on t he ot her ha nd t he r es pondent commi t s
Di spensat i on, because he does not a ppr e he nd t he answer,
while he has to a ppr e he nd t he answer i mmedi at el y after t he
or gument (is made by t he di sput ant ) , t hen t hat
Di spensat i on (lit. appr ehens i on of Di spensat i on) get s
i ncl uded under Non- i magi nat i on or Different poi nt .
t i t
83. [The Opponent says:] "But not everyone necessarily
appr ehends t hr ough pr oof and refut at i on, so t hat every
i mpr oper appr ehensi on, whi ch ei t her t he di sput ant or t he
opponent has, is i ncl uded ei t her in Fallacies of pr obans or
3. I suggest "^Fi^fen ^rf^yfcTc(Tf^%^^^
*. (R); f3Tcn^jvjTcn^(V) and (D). This reading seems equally tenable.
* . (V); ^C JITUM^MÎU^ (R) and (D).
REFUTATION OF THE NYYA-VIEW
135
Different poi nt or Non-i magi nat i on. Because debat e is
possible by way of unr egul at ed diffuse discussion also (i.e.
wi t hout mut ual opposi t i on or wi t hout any definite
posi t i on) . "
[Answer] No. Because t hat is impossible. Ther e can be a
debat e bet ween t he two debat er s hol di ng
cont rary hypot heses on t he same issue, because
t her e is absence of opposi t i on bet ween t he two
per sons hol di ng non-cont rary hypot heses or
t hose hol di ng no hypot heses. Ther e (= in t he
debat e bet ween t he two debat er s hol di ng
cont rary hypot heses), one of t he debat ers
necessarily makes t he first begi nni ng of speech.
Because any (two) per sons with sound mi nd are
not i ncl i ned to make t he begi nni ng at once
because such a pract i ce will be unsuccessful,
because t hen under s t andi ng and graspi ng each
ot her ' s st at ement s and answeri ng t hem will be
impossible. The debat er (with sound mi nd)
shoul d surely state t he pr oof after pr esent i ng his
own hypothesis. Ot herwi se ot her s will not
appr ehend. The oppone nt t oo shoul d state t he
fault connect ed with it (= pr oof ) . Ther e will be
t he occur r ence of Fallacies of pr obans and Non-
i magi nat i on (respectively) if t he two debat er s
(di sput ant and oppone nt respectively) have
i mpr oper appr ehensi on. Ther ef or e any
pr esent at i on of ei t her first posi t i on or second
(contrary) position, if it is based on logic, does
not fall beyond (t he j uri sdi ct i on of) t he two faults
(: t he Fallacies of pr obans and Non-
i magi nat i on).
1
Negative debat e (vitand)
%
is rul ed out by t he
same ar gument . Because t her e is no debat e in t he
absence of hypotehsis.
, cT^T
84. [An objection:] "But if a debat er after stating t he
hypothesis in a debat e does not say anyt hi ng or chat t ers
somet hi ng different (i.e. i rrel evant ) because of frustration,
how is this case i ncl uded in Fallacies of probans?
wl
[Answer] We have said so (i.e. t hat it will be i ncl uded in
Fallacies of pr obans) with reference to stating
pr obans whi ch is not justified. But we have also
said t hat defeat (of t he di sput ant ) does occur i n
t he cases of not st at i ng (t he proof). Because t hey
are t he cases of *not stating a const i t uent of
pr oof (= asdhanngavacana)
2
after st at i ng t he
hypot hesi s in debat e.
Thi s expl ai ns in what way ' Addi t i onal ' ,
' Repet i t i on' and also
3
' t he st at ement of
Decl arat i on et c. ' are occasions of defeat (lit. t he
occasion-of-defeat-hood of . . . . ). That is because
t he power of ar gument is said to consist in not
stating somet hi ng whi ch is already st at ed. That is
because it pr oduces an appr ehensi on of what is
not a ppr e he nde d. It is not because t he (Nyya-)
defi ni t i on of a r gume nt is like that. It (= stating
Decl arat i on etc.) is an occasion of defeat because
it is a st at ement of a non- const i t uent of pr oof
(asdhanngavacana).
REFUTATION OF THE NYYA-VIEV/ 137
85. (18) [Mat anuj n: Permi t t i ng ( opponent ' s) view]
"' Permi t t i ng ( opponent ' s) view' means implicating a
fault in t he opponent ' s posi t i on while accept i ng t he fault in
one' s own posi t i on. " (JVS5.2.11)
1
[Nyaya-explanation:
2
] "The one who says, "This fault is
commi t t ed by you t oo" wi t hout rul i ng out ( one' s own) fault
i ndi cat ed by his opponent , per mi t s t he opponent ' s view,
because he implicates t he fault in t he opponent ' s position
by accept i ng it in his own posi t i on. For exampl e, when one
(= t he opponent ) says, "You are a thief, because you are a
man, " t he di sput ant woul d say to hi m "You too". This is an
occasion of defeat called ' Permi t t i ng t he ( opponent ' s)
s. (V); *ram fofag: - (R) and (D).
s. (V); ^TKiyPdMtfl ^ - (R) and (D).
[Dharmakirti's response:] In this exampl e also, if t he
di sput ant means, "You t oo will be a thief, because you are a
man. But you do not accept yourself to be so. Ther ef or e this
(= ' because a man*) is not a s ound pr obans", t hen t her e is
no fault. Because it amount ' s to refutation of t he
di sapproved pr esent at i on of pr obans ( made by t he
oppone nt ) , by at t ri but i ng t hi ef-hood to his (= opponent ' s )
self.
[A possible question by a Naiyayika:] "Why is t he
variability of ( pr obans- pr obandum- ) rel at i on not poi nt ed
out (= na vyabhicritah) in his (= opponent ' s ) ar gument in a
st rai ght forward manner i nst ead of accusi ng hi m (in a
cr ooked way)?"
[Answer] Thi s (quest i on) is insignificant. Because such
(crooked or i ndi rect ) linguistic practices are also
(well-accepted) in peopl e.
[Objection:]"But suppose he (= t he di sput ant ) is
(actually) accept i ng his (= opponent ' s ) infliction ( and not
poi nt i ng out t he variability of rel at i on) -"
[Answer] In t hat case t oo t he di sput ant deserves defeat,
because he does not a ppr e he nd t he answer to be
given to his (= opponent ' s ) ar gument , not
because he (= t he di sput ant ) inflicts his own fault
upon t he ot her debat er . Because if his (=
opponent ' s ) a r gume nt is faultless, t hen
accept i ng it is not hi ng but not appr ehendi ng an
answer (to i t ). Ther ef or e since t he defeat has
fallen upon hi m bef or ehand due to this r eason
only, ' inflicting a fault on t he ot her debat er ' is
not to be r equi r ed (for decl ari ng hi m def eat ed) .
t t
REFUTATION OF THE NYYA-VIEY/ 139
86. (19) [Paryanuyojyopeksana: Negl ect i ng t he
obj ect i onabl e]
"' Negl ect i ng t he obj ect i onabl e' means not claiming t he
defeat of t he one (= t he ot her debat er ) , who has r eached
t he defeat." (A/55.2.22).
[Vtsyayana explains:] "The word paryanujojya (=
obj ect i onabl e) means t he one who shoul d be objected by
confi rmi ng his defeat. Upeksana of hi m (= Negl ect i ng hi m)
means not raising t he obj ect i on when t he defeat has been
r eached. Thi s (occasion of defeat) shoul d be spoken out
(i.e. decl ared) by t he counci l when it is asked, "Who is
defeat ed. ?" Because, t he one who has r eached defeat will
not expose his own wrong. "
[Dharmaklrti's response:] In this case also if t he
r es pondent does not object to t he pr oposer of proof, who
has r eached defeat, t hen it is not hi ng but t he case of Non-
i magi nat i on, because t her e is non- appr ehensi on of answer
on his (= r espondent ' s) part . Ther ef or e ' Negl ect i ng t he
obj ect i onabl e' is not a separat e occasion of defeat. If,
however, t he logic (of debat e) is concer ned, t hen t her e is
nei t her victory nor defeat of ei t her of t he debat ers here,
(V); ^TtRmm-HwfaHK-ii^ - (D); ^^^^^rfsfc^m-i i ^- (R).
because ( (1) t he pr oposer has not won because) due to t he
fallacy of pr oof t her e is no ( pr oper ) ar gument and because
( (2) t he pr oposer has not been defeat ed because) (his) real
faults have not been poi nt ed out (by t he r es pondent ) .
t a t
, TRTt c^t -Hl ^l oMl RRi ^ \ ^ "RT ^fcf
î i H^HÎ(' i i fî i ^î ^
87. [A possi bl e obj ect i on: ] "Suppose t he r es pondent
discovers some fault but does not discover some ot her. . . . "
[Answer] In t hat case he does not deserve defeat because
he appr ehends an answer.
[Obj ect i on: ]
u
He does deserve defeat, because he fails to
discover some real fault."
c. (V); <ifa$M ti^mgiH, - (R) and (D).
\. (R); Wit: - (D).
[Answer] It is not t he case t hat all t he faults must be spoken
out j ust because they are real . Nor is one defeated
j ust because t her e is non-st at ement (of some
faul t ). Because even a single (real) fault vitiates
t he proof like t he st at ement of a single probans.
1
That is as follows (= yath). When t her e exist
many pr obans for one (provable) object, all t he
pr obans are not empl oyed since t he object is
proved by a single pr obans. Therefore t he one
who poi nt s out (only) one fault does not deserve
defeat for not poi nt i ng out some ot her fault; as
(we have ar gued) before.
Now if t he pr oposer does not claim t he defeat of
t he r es pondent who has reached t he defeat,
t her e is nei t her victory nor defeat of ei t her of t he
debat ers as in t he earlier case. It is not t he victory
of t he di sput ant (= pr oposer ) who does not set
aside t he r es pondent from his ar gument when he
(= t he r espondent ) ut t ers a fallacious refutation,
because it amount s to non-justification of ( one' s
own) ar gument on t he par t of t he di sput ant . That
is because he (= t he di sput ant ) does not justify
t he const i t uent s of his ar gument by
demonst r at i ng t he impossibility of all faults. Nor
is it t he victory of t he r espondent , because he
does not poi nt out any ( genui ne) fault.
2
Ther ef or e, Negl ect i ng t he objectionable is not a
gr ound of defeat in this way also.
t t
66.
ff?T
88. (20) [Niranuyojnuyoga: Obj ect i ng agai nst t he non-
obj ect i onabl e]
" Obj ect i ng agai nst t he non- obj ect i onabl e' means
obj ect i ng t o a non-occasi on of defeat as an occasion of
defeat" (JVS5.2.22)
[Vtsyyana explains:] "The debat er who because of his
wr ong under s t andi ng of t he definition of occasion of
defeat, says to t he ot her debat er, "You are defeat ed", even if
it is not an occasi on of (t he latter' s) defeat, shoul d be called
' defeat ed' , due to ' Obj ect i ng against t he non-
obj ect i onabl e. ' "
[Dharmakirti's response:] Her e t oo if t he r es pondent
charges t he pr oposer of t he ar gument , with t he faults whi ch
are not t her e, t hen he does not become like t hat (i.e.
def eat ed) , t hough he at t ri but es, t hat is, poi nt s out t he
occasion of defeat in t he case of a non-occasi on, t hat is, in a
faultless ar gument . But he becomes defeat ed due to Non-
i magi nat i on when t he fallacious nat ur e of his answer is
br ought out by t he ot her debat er, because he (=
r es pondent ) does not a ppr e he nd t he answer, which is
defi ned as ' poi nt i ng out a real fault' . Ther ef or e it (=
%. (V); faqî'-flî^cq? - (R);
REFUTATION OF THE Nltf KA-VIEW 143
Obj ect i ng against t he non-obj ect i onabl e) is not a different
occasion of defeat from t hat (= Non-i rnagi nat i on).
If on t he ot her hand t he ot her debat er (= pr oposer )
charges t he r es pondent who poi nt s out some fault in t he
( pr oposer ' s) ar gument , with stating a pseudo-fault, t hen he
(= t he pr oposer ) is defeat ed for stating a fallacious
ar gument when t he genui ne charact er of t he fault is
br ought out (by t he r es pondent ) .
In this way also it does not differ from t he fallacies of
pr obans. One has to ment i on inevitably t he fallacies of
pr obans as an occasion of defeat in or der to take ot her cases
i nt o account .
1
Once they are ment i oned, ment i oni ng t he
ot her types (such as ' Obj ect i ng against t he non-
obj ect i onabl e' ) is r edundant .
t t
i fcl l " ^ 5 ^
(V); 3JoqcwrcihKlu|lH,- (R) and (D).
89. (21) [ApasiddMnta: Devi ant thesis]
"' Deviant thesis' means first t aki ng up a thesis (of one' s
own discipline for pr oof ) , and t hen maki ng a poi nt in
debat e wi t hout (following one' s) di sci pl i ne" (JVS5.2.24).
[Vtsyayana explains:] "' Deviant thesis' may be known
to be commi t t ed by one who after decl ari ng some object as
having such and such nat ur e, makes a poi nt in debat e,
goi ng cont rary to t he decl ar ed thesis. For exampl e a
debat er, accept i ng t he thesis t hat "Ther e is no dest ruct i on
of t he existent; nor does t he non-exi st ent came i nt o
exi st ence" decl ares t he thesis, "The ori gi nal Nat ur e (=
Prakrti) of t he Manifest (objects) is one (Lit. si ngl e-ended).
Because, t he modi fi cat i ons of t he Non-mani fest are seen to
be i nt er - connect ed with a single or i gi n) . For exampl e it is
seen t hat plates et c. made from mud have a single original
nat ur e (namel y mu d ) . I n t he same way t he various
mani fest at i ons are known to be i nt er - connect ed with
pl easure, pai n and del usi on. Ther ef or e they have t he single
( common) nat ur e called pl e a s ur e et c. ' (i.e. Prakrt i ). "
He, having said this, is asked (by t he opponent ) , "How
shoul d one defi ne ' ori gi nal nat ur e' and ' modi f i cat i on?"
( The di sput ant answers-) "When one (lit. anot her )
pr oper t y ceases and anot her pr oper t y occurs, t hat whi ch is
const ant ( t hr ough- out this t ransformat i on) is t he original
nat ur e. And t he ot her t hi ng (lit. propert y) (which ceases or
occurs) is modi fi cat i on. "
Her e he (= t he di sput ant ) is maki ng a poi nt in debat e by
goi ng cont rary to t he pr opos ed thesis, wi t hout (following
his own) discipline. Because, he has decl ar ed -
"The non-exi st ent does not appear and t he exi st ent does
not di sappear. "
t t
REFUTATION OF THE NYYA-VIEY1 145
am " ^ ,
90. When it is obj ect ed to (by t he opponent ) as - ' Th e r e
is no ' cessation of occurrence* of t he existent except
di sappearance and t her e is no occur r ence of t he non-
existent except appear ance", at t hat time if he (= t he
Siikhya di sput ant ) accept s t hat t he existent loses itself and
t he non-exi st ent gains itself, t hen it is a case of Deviant
thesis. If he does not accept, t hen his position is not
proved. "
[Dharmakirti's response:] Her e (i.e. in the above
exampl e) t oo t her e is no poi nt bei ng made in debat e
wi t hout (following one' s own) discipline. For justifying what
he (= t he Siikhya di sput ant ) has submi t t ed viz. ' Non-
existent does not come into existent and existent is not
dest royed' , he says this viz. T h e original nat ur e of t he
Manifest is one, because t he i nt er-connect i on is seen.
1
(This
can be expl ai ned as follows.) I n. t hi s ar gument t he single
original nat ur e means (t he t hr ee strands-) pl easure, pai n
and del usi on. The Manifest has its origin in these undi vi ded
( t hr ee st ands). Because it (= t he Manifest) is seen to be
i nt er-connect ed with it (= t he original Nat ur e) . The
Manifest is of t hat nat ur e because it (= t he Manifest) is
observed to be non-different (from t he Nat ur e) . Hence it is
proved: Because it is not accepted that pleasure etc. come
into existence or that they are destroyed, everything which is
of that nature, neither comes into existence nor is
destroyed.
t t
TFf
a ffcTI
i 1 WT:, ^T cft^fT: "^T^TSrf^nf^m^l TftcPTg
91. In this debate, he (= the Naiyyika) himself who, not
pointing out a fault in the probans stated by him (= the
Snkhya disputant), asks for the definitions of
modifications and original nature, conti nues the debate
without relation with the proposed topic and without
following the discipline.
v (V); ^WT ^c^T - (R); TO ^ r ^ - (D).
. (V); ^TTîq)<*î MciKq^- (R) and (D).
v (R); tcfkf^^RT^ - (D).
REFUTATION OF THE NYYA-YLEW 147
Her e it may be objected: ' "Manifest* means t hat whi ch is
subject to occur r ence and cessation. Pl easure etc. are not
like t hat . If t he Manifest is i nt er connect ed with pl easure
etc., t hen it has t he same nat ur e as t he pl easure et c. Hence
its definition as somet hi ng subject to occur r ence and
cessation becomes vitiated. Now t he nat ur e (of t he
Manifest) cannot be t he same as t hat of pl easure etc. whi ch
are bereft of t hat pr oper t y (viz. t hat of bei ng subject to
occur r ence and cessation) because t hen t he definition of
t he Manifest becomes cont radi cat ed. Ther ef or e t he pr obans
viz. ' because t he Manifest is seen to be i nt er connect ed with
pl easure etc.
1
is unpr oved.
In this way his (= Snkhya di sput ant ' s) thesis is refut ed by
poi nt i ng out a fault in his ar gument . "
[Answer] Her e he (= t he Naiyyika opponent ) i nst ead of
demonst r at i ng t he story of t he fault in t he
ar gument (directly), deceivers (t he di sput ant )
1
and projects his own fault on t he ot her debat er
(i.e. t he di sput ant ) .
[A possible objection:] "The same fault (viz.
Unpr ovedness) is bei ng st at ed (by t he opponent ) in this
way."
[Answer] Thi s is t he provi nce of t he pr ophet i c persons (lit.
ast rol ogers); (because, common) peopl e are not
capabl e of appr ehendi ng t he meani ng which is
not expressed by words. The same allegorical
pri nci pl e of ' t he pi ct ure drawn by a buffoon
1
(which we referred to before)
2
appl i es her e also.
Her e t he (di sput ant ' s) defeat takes pl ace in t he
way st at ed (by us) because of t he st at ement of a
non-const i t ut ent of proof viz. t he Unpr oved
pr obans, which is empl oyed before, and not
because a poi nt is made in t he debat e wi t hout
following discipline. Hence this (occasion of
defeat) shoul d not be ment i oned separately
because it is i ncl uded in Fallacies of pr obans.
t t
3TTW
92. (22) [Hetvbhsa: Fallacies of pr obans]
"Fallacies of pr obans as expressed before (are t he
occasi ons of defeat ). "
[Vtsyayana explains:] "Fallacies of pr obans are t he
occasi ons of defeat. ( Her e t he quest i on may arise-) Do t he
fallacies of pr obans assume t he title of occasi ons of defeat
due to some ot her defi ni ng feat ure as means of knowl edge
assume t he title ' objects of knowl edge' ( on account of some
ot her feat ure and not by vi rt ure of t hei r bei ng means of
knowl edge)?
1
Hence (Aksapda) says- "The title ' occasi on of
defeat ' is due to t he same defi ni ng feat ure of Fallacies of
pr obans s expressed bef or e. "
[DharmaktPs response] Her e t oo it is a mat t er of
concer n because (they say:) "As expressed before. " Are t he
fallacies of pr obans to be const r ued as occasi ons of defeat in
t he same way as they are classified (in Nyyastra), or in
some ot her way? The issue, if discussed her e will take us t oo
far and hence we do not st ret ch it.
Thi s much is accept abl e her e - The fallacies of probans, in
so far as they are reasonably so, are occasions of defeat.
t i t
RtP-K^Rt ct
"^TR Moh<
u
i
93. Thi s logic of debat e, whi ch tears t he curt ai n of t he
darkness of i gnor ance covering t he phi l osophi cal vision of
peopl e, has been const ruct ed by good persons engaged with
t he well-being of ot her s. But these (ot her) mi sgui ded
intellectuals (= durvidagdha) are convert i ng this light of
phi l osophi cal vision i nt o darkness. I have made this effort,
t herefore, to br i ght en it (= t he light) (agai n).
The treatise called T h e Logic of Debat e' is compl et e.
[Thi s is t he work of t he honour abl e crya Dhar makl r t i ] .
t i t
N o t e s
[ The not es are number ed accordi ng to t he section
numbe r occur r i ng first and t hen t he not e- number within
t he respective section of t he Transl at i on. ]
(1.1) 'Nigrahd literally means ' arrest ' , and nigrahasthna
t he place of arrest i ng or t he poi nt of arrest. In this cont ext
'nigraha' means defeat and 'nigrahasthna' means poi nt of
defeat or occasion of defeat.
(1. 2). By ' i mpr oper methods* t he aut hor means t he ways
such as chala
y
jti and i mpr oper poi nt s of defeat. (See. V).
(1.3) I have used t he words asdhanngavacana and
adosodbhvana in t he t ransl at i on wi t hout translating t hem
because Dhar makl r t i himself i nt erpret s these words in
various ways. For exampl e asdhanngavacana means (i)
Non-justification of a const i t uent of proof or (ii) Non-
st at ement of a const i t uent of pr oof or (iii) St at ement of
what is r edundant as a par t of pr oof or (iv) St at ement of
what is a non-const i t uent of pr oof i.e. a fallacious
const i t uent of proof or .(v) st at ement of somet hi ng
i rrel evant to what is sought to be proved, (i) and (ii) can be
cl ubbed t oget her as insufficient proof (iii), (iv) and (v) can
be cl ubbed t oget her as t he t hr ee ki nds of st at ement s of non-
const i t uent s of proof.* Adosodbhvana means (i) Not
poi nt i ng out t he fault of t he di sput ant or (ii) Poi nt i ng out
non-fault as fault.
(1.4) Artha literally means object or mat t er (to be
conveyed) but in t he cont ext of i nference it r at her means a
state of affairs or a proposi t i on to be proved.
(1.5) Accordi ng to Dhar makl r t i , st at ement of t he
inferential sign (linga, pr obans) with its t hr ee characteristics
(riipas) const i t ut es t he ar gument or proof (sdhana). The
ar gument shoul d be furt her justified {samarthana) by
poi nt i ng out t hat t he pr obans does possess t he t hr ee
characteristics. Asdhanngavacana her e means ei t her non-
statement of a const i t uent of pr oof or non-justification of a
const i t uent of proof.
(3.1) A proof cont ai ns two st at ement s accor di ng to
Dhar makl r t i (i) The st at ement of paksadharmat (which
states t hat t he pr obans exists in t he thesis-subject) and (ii)
The st at ement of vypti (= pervasi on, whi ch states t hat
whatever has pr obans, has pr oba ndum) . Her e Dharmakl rt i
is saying t hat whet her one states vypti as t he first premi se
and paksadharmat as t he second or t he ot her way about is
i mmat eri al as to t he est abl i shment of t he thesis.
(4.1) I have t ransl at ed pramna as Evi dence' or ' means
to knowl edge' dependi ng upon t he cont ext .
(4.2) Sntarksita expl ai ns - * ?<m4<\ IIWTFT s? al 4^HM^ Wi:
^fcTfa:!' Meani ng- I n t he absence = In t he absence of\sadhya
( pr obandum) in spite of t he exi st ence of pr obans.
(4.3) Literally - The entity whi ch has as its defi ni ng
feat ure, ' t he absence of t he descri pt i on t hat it has some
capasity' , is i ndescri babl e.
(5.1) The i dea is this. Suppose, we want to justify t he
thesis, ' Sound is moment ar y
1
on t he basis of t he pr obans
' bei ng r eal ' . For t hat we have to justify t he st at ement of
vypti viz. ' What ever is real is moment ar y' . For doi ng this we
have to be sure about t he evi dence (pramna) whi ch falsifies
t he negat i on of vypti. The negat i on of vypti coul d be
NOTES 153
stated as ' somet hi ng is real, yet not momentary*. We want to
show t he absence of such a ' non- moment ar y real obj ea' . It
does not suffice to say t hat non- moment ar y real object does
not exist because we have not seen any such t hi ng so far.
Because every ki nd of non- appr ehensi on does not prove
non-exi st ence. So we have to pr oduce some addi t i onal
pr oof whi ch may be given as follows - The ' real ' by definition
has capasity to funct i on. So we have to show t he absence of a
' non- moment ar y t hi ng having capasity to funct i on' . Non-
appr ehensi on (anupalabdhi) of a pervadi ng characteristic
(Vypak) can be an evidence for t he absence of t he
pervaded characteristic (Vypya). ' Succession or lack of
succession' is t he pervadi ng characteristic and 'capasity to
funct i on' is t he per vaded characteristic. That is, t here is t he
pervasion of t he form, wherever t her e is capasity, t here is
ei t her succession or lack of succession. So t he non-
appr ehensi on of ' ei t her succession or no succession' in a
non- moment ar y t hi ng proves t he non-exi st ence of ' capasity'
in it and non-exi st ence of capasity implies unreality.
(5.2) The infinite regress woul d occur if one vypti is
proved on t he basis of anot her and t hat on t he basis of t he
t hi rd and so on and so forth.
(6.1) The opponent seems to ar gue t hat t he non-
appr ehensi on would be useful accordi ng to you, because
non- appr ehensi on of t he pervader woul d prove the non-
exi st ence of t he pervaded. But this non- appr ehensi on
woul d not be useful if t he pervasion itself is not proved.
(6.2) Arvk-darsana may mean ei t her someone having
down-word vision or having pr oxi mat e vision.
(7.1) While el aborat i ng t he poi nt Dharmakl rt i is
r epeat i ng t he poi nt which he had made earlier.
Sntaraksita, rightly poi nt s this out . But he gives an
alternative i nt er pr et at i on of t he passage in or der to avoid
t he char ge of repet i t i on. He i nt erpret s this as response to
t he opponent ' s objection viz. " How is a pr obans not faulty if
it is s uppor t ed by a falsifying evi dence. " I am, however, not
following Sntaraksita' s i nt er pr et at i on her e. As a mat t er of
fact Dhar makl r t i is repetitive in his el aborat i on of
svabhvnumna.
(7.2) Her e t he word mtra cannot be t aken to mean
*only.\ Because t hen 'TfT^FT^^fT^P^T: " ^^T^PT' woul d imply
" Onl y t hat which has pr obans has pr oba ndum. " But this is
not pervasion pr oper but t he converse of it. Sntaraksita is
aware of this when he says -
i ^ ff
But mtra can be t ransl at ed as ' al l ' or ' whol e' as I have
done.
(8.1) Sntaraksita explains: 'Samarthesu tadhetusiT refers
to ot her causal condi t i ons (but not ' t he cause' ) For exampl e
air, fuel et c. are causal condi t i ons of t he smoke, but fire is
t he cause.
(8.2) The i dea may be expl ai ned with reference to
smoke-fire exampl e ,as follows. For est abl i shi ng negative
concomi t ance bet ween smoke and fire, it does, not suffice to
demonst r at e t hat when fire (= t he cause) i s not t her e smoke
(= t he effect) is also not t her e. Because, one may doubt t hat
smoke may not be t her e, because, say, fuel was not t her e. So
one has t o show t hat ot her condi t i ons (such as fuel, air)
bei ng pr esent , smoke is not t her e when fire is not t her e.
(9.1) ' upalabdhilaksariaprpta' literally means t hat whi ch
has arri ved at t he condi t i on of appr ehens i on. By i mpl i cat i on
it means ' appr ehensi bl e' , i.e. whi ch fulfils t he condi t i on of
apprehensi bi l i t y.
(9.2) Sntaraksita i nt er pr et s pratipattuh as prativdinah (=
of t he oppone nt ) . He suggests t hat t he object, t he absence
of whi ch is pr oved by t he di sput ant on t he basis of non-
appr ehens i on shoul d be appr ehensi bl e by t he opponent .
NOTES 155
That is, it does not suffice if it is appr ehensi bl e by t he
di sput ant himself but not appr ehensi bl e by t he opponent . I
have however t ransl at ed 'pratipattf as *knower\
(9.3) The ' pract i ce of non-exi st ence
1
means ei t her t he
linguistic pract i ce in t erms of non-exi st ence or any pract i ce
whi ch is concer ned with non-exi st ence of a certain object. It
may also i ndi cat e t he cogni t i on of non-exi st ence.
(9.4) The t hr ee fold r emot eness of t he object is (i)
r emot eness in space (ii) r emot eness in t i me and (iii)
r emot eness by self-nature of t he object. As Sntaraksita
expl ai ns - "ffsfa fqyohûi oq^sJT^T ^lîci^^rfolcT^r^T ...I
(12.1) Dharmaki rt i has said ".... Because, if t he object of
this ki nd exists and t he ot her condi t i ons of appr ehensi on
are present , t hen t her e will not be non- appr ehensi on" (See
Sec. 10) so t he appr ehensi on of t he object which is possible
because t he object fulfils t he condi t i ons of apprehensi bi l i t y
and because ot her condi t i ons are also present , gives rise to
t he pract i ce of existence.
(13.1) These exampl es are given by Dharmaki rt i to show
t hat many a t i me cogni t i on or descri pt i on of an object may
not mat ch with t he t r ue nat ur e of t he object. Somet i mes an
object is descri bed as real, but in fact ifis unr eal because it is
no mor e. (For exampl e, ' King Mahsammat a' ) . Somet i mes
t he object is unr eal because it is an event whi ch is yet to
happen (For exampl e, ' Saiikha elevating sacrificial post
1
).
Somet i mes t he object is a non-ent i t y (e.g. t he hor n of a
har e) . Somet i mes t he object is one but it is descri bed in t oo
many words because it has mul t i pl e funct i ons. (For i nst ance
col our whi ch is per cept ual and is restrictive because it
prohi bi t s t he exi st ence of ot her objects in its own l ocat i on).
Somet i mes t he object is in fact compl ex but it is descri bed
by a single t er m. (For exampl e 'pot* which is a cluster
(sanghta) of many objects is called by a singular t erm
because its funct i on (to carry water etc.) is singular. )
(14.1) I have suggest ed ' 3^<*><H^P*H^ in pl ace of *
in t he light of V. *^^<H^P^F^ seems to refer to t he
rel at i on of samavya which relates itself with many relata.
Especially in t he case of avayava-avayavi - rel at i on samavya
relates one composi t e object (avdyavin) with all its part s
(avayavas).
(14.2) An endl ess series (infinite regress) woul d occur, if
samavya is accept ed for expl ai ni ng one-many rel at i on.
Because, t hen samavya (which is one) will have to be
rel at ed with many relata, by anot her samavya and so on ad
i nfi ni t um.
(14.3) Vaisesikas t hi nk that al t hough pot is an out come
of a col l ect i on of many el ement s it is a different object from
t he collection of t hose el ement s. (It is avayavin and not
mer e samghta). The pot is rel at ed with its el ement s by t he
rel at i on called samavya. If pot were not a different object,
we woul d not have used a different wor d for it. Her e
Dhar makl r t i ar gues t hat use of a different wor d does not
imply t he exi st ence of a different entity. The same entity can
assume different descri pt i ons or nomencl at ur es in
accor dance with different funct i ons. Similarly many t hi ngs
having a c ommon collective funct i on may assume a singular
name.
(16.1) Vaisesikas hol d t hat subst ance (dravya) is t he
subst rat um of many qualities out of whi ch rpa (col our)
coul d be one. If one and t he same subst ance can be rel at ed
as t he subst r at um with many qualities, why cannot one and
t he same word, say, ' pot
1
be rel at ed as t he name with many
objects whi ch are t he const i t uent s of t he pot?
(16.2) Ther e is a pun on t he word
4
3TO^JcT It means (1)
false and also (2) t he ghost of fal sehood. The wor d srfaPi^Ri
(= i nvol vement , adher ence, bei ng possessed) appl i es to
bot h.
NOTES 157
(16.3) Her e t he opponent i nt ends to say t hat rpa as
rpa may be common to many objects, al t hough t he
function of rpa in one object is different from t hat in
anot her object. Her e we still use t he same word riipa for
different occur r ences of rpa, al t hough every occurrence
cor r esponds to a different pragmat i c funct i on.
(16.4) That is to say, if a part i cul ar col our is common to
many objects of t he same type, it will not have different (i.e.
exclusive) function differing from object to object, but it
will be one and t he same in t he case of all objects and
consequent l y t he col our occurri ng in various objects can be
ment i oned by a single word.
(16.5) The poi nt is: We do have per cept ual knowledge of
distinct col our-apprearances in spite of t he i ncl i nat i on of
our opponent s to claim t hat t he col our is common to all
collections having t hat col our.
(17.1) Literally: Cover, Shell. :
(17.2) Dhar makl r t i i nt ends to say: If accordi ng to you
(i.e. t he Vaisesika) t he pot exists as a distinct entity apart
from its const i t uent s such as col our, t hen t he pot shoul d be
percept i bl e i ndependent l y of any col our. But we never
perceive a pot bereft of all colours. So t he Vaisesika view that
pot is distinct from its col our, must be false.
(17.3) Dharmaki rt i is giving these exampl es for
suppor t i ng his own ar gument t hat if pot exists distinctly
apart from its const i t uent s, t hen it shoul d appear as distinct,
bereft of its col our et c. Odour and taste of t he same eatable
ar e distinct al t hough they are located in t he same eatable,
and they also appear distinctly. Similarly t he t ouch of wind
and t he t ouch of sun' s heat also appear distinctly and they
are distinct, al t hough they are objects of t he same sense-
organ. Similarly pot and its colour shoul d appear
i ndependent l y of each ot her if they are distinct entities.
(17.4) ' ^ ^ q - i a ^ i ' A per son who tries to pur chase
things wi t hout payi ng t hei r pri ce. Her e ' pot ' as concei ved by
Vaisesikas is compar ed with such a person. Pot as concei ved
by Vaisesikas tries to obt ai n distinct per cept i bl e exi st ence
wi t hout paying its pri ce, t hat is, wi t hout exhi bi t i ng its own
distinct nat ur e.
(18.1) Thi s compl et es one uni t of discussion whi ch
begi ns from section 13. The claim t hat was ma de in section
13, was t hat all cogni t i ons, ver bal usages or di st i nct i ons and
i dent i t i es among t he same do not prove t he existence of t he
cor r espondi ng objects or di st i nct i ons or i dent i t i es among
t he objects (respectively). Dhar makl r t i est abl i shed t he claim
with special reference to t he exi st ence of pot as an entity
distinct from its col our et c. He est abl i shed t hat al t hough a
different word ' pot
1
is used for t he collection of col our etc.,
it does not establish t he di st i nct ness of t he entity called pot .
He is her e concl udi ng t he discussion by general i si ng t he
claim with reference to all cogni t i ons, verbal usages et c.
(18.2) Her e t he Vaisesikas seem to be ar gui ng t hat in
fact t he composi t e object such as pot is per cept ual (so t her e
is no need to infer its exi st ence), but we ar e provi di ng
ar gument s for its pr oof because somet i mes it is not clearly
percei ved when its per cept i on is domi nat ed by some ot her
object (say, col our ) . Dhar makl r t i is saying t hat it is not
pr oper to ar gue in this way. Because at least somet i mes t he
per cept i on of a composi t e object shoul d not be domi nat ed
and when it is not domi nat ed, t he col our et c. shoul d be
identified as distinct from t he composi t e object. But in fact
it is never identified' distinctly. So your at t empt to provi de
i nferences for pr ovi ng- composi t e object (= Avayavi) is not
satisfactory.
(18.3) In section 12 Dhar makl r t i r ef er r ed to t hr ee
reasons on t he basis of whi ch exi st ence may be est abl i shed -
cogni t i on, verbal usage and pr agmat i c funct i on. Her e he
arrives at a concl usi on with r egar d to cogni t i on and verbal
NOTES 159
usage. He claims t hat they cannot always (uncondi t i onal l y)
establish t he exi st ence. In t he next section he is consi deri ng
t he quest i on with reference to pragmat i c funct i on.
(19.1) Her e Dharmakl rt i is cl ai mi ng t hat al t hough t he
col l ect i on of t hr eads which is called cloth is different from
t he col l ect i on of t hr eads which is simply called a collection
of t hr eads and not a cloth, because their causal condi t i ons
(pratyayas) are different, al t hough bot h of t hem bel ong to
t he same series of modifications (santati of sarhskras). The
col l ect i on of t hr eads which is called cloth is not hi ng over
and above collection of t hreads. It has a different function,
because it is a pr oduct of different causal condi t i ons. The
difference in funct i on does not establish t he distinct
exi st ence of a composi t e whole (avayvi) over and above its
part s.
(19.2) That is to say, accordi ng to Dharmakl rt i , just as
t he sameness or distinctness of pragmat i c funct i ons cannot
establish same or distinct existences of an object, similarly
sameness or distinctness of cogni t i on or appel l at i on t oo
does not establish sameness or di st i nct ness of t he
existences. In fact Dharmakl rt i has given an i ndependent
ar gument for t he latter par t of his posi t i on in sections 13 to
17.
(20.1) The earlier st at ement about non- appr ehensi on
was made in t he section 9.
(20.2) Her e Dharmakl rt i is suggesting t hat j ust as non-
exi st ence of pot can be proved on t he basis of its qualified
non- appr ehensi on (i.e. non- appr ehensi on qualified by
fulfillment of t he condi t i on of apprehensi bi l i t y), similarly
many ot her Vaisesika padrihas such as composi t e objects
(avayavi)
y
universals (smnya), I nher ence (sarnavya) etc.
coul d be proved to be non-exi st ent on t he basis of qualified
non- appr ehensi on.
160 VDANY YA OF DHARMAKIRT1
(20.3) Thi s concl udes one major ar gument regardi ng
t he nat ur e of non- appr ehensi on as t he reason for provi ng
non-exi st ence. Thi s ar gument st art ed from sect i on 9. In this
Dharmaki rt i was mainly combat i ng Vaisesikas. In t he next
section he is st art i ng his ar gument with Srikhyas.
(21.1) Thi s oppone nt is a Srikhya phi l osopher
accordi ng to Sntaraksita. Thi s whol e section (21) is
devot ed to t he discussion of t he obj ect i on of Shkhyas
accordi ng to whi ch everything is exi st ent ei t her in manifest
or non-mani fest form, so t hat t he quest i on of non-
appr ehensi on as t he reason for provi ng non-exi st ence do<es
not arise.
(21.2) Th e i dea is this: Accordi ng to t he Snkhya
opponent t he linguistic pract i ce of non-exi st nece is
unt enabl e. But this posi t i on may cause di sor der in his
systematisation. The Snkhya opponent want s to r emove t he
di sorder by t aki ng r ecour se to "di sappearance and
appear ance of t he states of a t hi ng". For i nst ance he woul d
say: The cur d was not npn-exi st ent in t he milk; only it was
non-manifest. Now Dhar kaml r t i argues; Even t he i dea of
' Not bei ng manifest
1
is unt enabl e if t he pract i ce of ' Non-
exi st ence' is not accept ed. Because, t he di st i nct i on bet ween
manifest and non-mani fest state is not hi ng but t he
distinction bet ween exi st ence and non-exi st ence of
mani fest at i on.
(21.3) By ' positive evi dence' (vidhi) Sntaraksita
under st ands t he varieties of cont rary appr ehens i ons such as
'SvabhvaviruddhopalambhcL (For exampl e: - "This t hi ng
cannot be wet with water because it is full of fire") and by
' negative evi dence' (pratisedha) he under s t ands t he varieties
of non- appr ehensi ons such as Vypaknupalabdhi (For
exampl e - "Her e t her e is no smoke because no fire is seen.")
(22.1) 'Vyabhicra! denot es a case wher e pr obans exists
wi t hout pr oba ndum. Her e ' Non-availability of i nf er ence' is
NOTES 161
t he pr obans and ' t he absence of t he object' is t he
pr obandum. Her e Dhar makl r t i poi nt s out t hat somet i mes
an object may be present but no i nference for provi ng it
may be present . Hence t her e is Vyabhicra.
(22.2) 4virq%iPi<jfTi: - (Lit-) t he cessation of per cept i ons
by all bei ngs. Her e Dhar makl r t i is poi nt i ng out t hat t hat an
object is not percei ved by any bei ng {sarvapratyaksanivrthih)
cannot be proved (asiddha). Thi s is a response to t he
opponent ' s ar gument whi ch may be expressed as follows,
"The object is absent because no one perceives it" Dharmakl rt i
claims t hat this pr obans cannot be proved.
(22.3) Her e Dhar makl r t i is stating t he general rule
r egar di ng t he knowl edge of non-existence (rat her,
r egar di ng t he correct pract i ce of non-exi st ence). Suppose
t hat t here is a pramna P which necessarily proves E (=
existence an object of specific nat ur e) . The specific nat ur e
of t he object is such t hat if t he object exists t hen it must be
known t hr ough P. If t he object has this specific nat ur e t hen
t he non-availability of P can l ead to t he knowl edge of Non -
E (Non-existence of t he obj ect ). That is, if E implies
availability of P t hen Non-availability of P implies Non-E.
(22.4) A Sankhya phi l osopher , for i nst ance, may claim
t hat t he cur d whi ch is l at ent in milk fulfils t he condi t i on of
apprehensi bi l i t y. Yet it is not percei ved in t he milk, but it is
i nferred to be t her e. So * non- appr ehensi on' shoul d i ncl ude
non-availability of i nference also. Dharmi ki rt i is denyi ng
this position because for hi m if curd is appr ehensi bl e, but
not appr ehended percept ual l y in t he milk, t hen it is non-
existent t her e.
(23.1) Sntaraksita i nt er pr et s it as ' cessation of one
excess and gener at i on of anot her excess' and expl ai ns this
Sankhya ar gument as follows: When we say that milk has
become curd now, we are saying t hat curd was in non-
manifest state, now t he non-mani fest state has ceased to
exist and t he manifest state has come i nt o exi st ence. He
seems to accept t he r eadi ng ' "^rfcRRrf^W' in place of
i'; But he himself refers t o t he ot her r eadi ng
also
<X
R: W i uf cwq: ffcTl' If we synthesize bot h t he readi ngs,
we coul d possibly recpnst ruct it as follows
4
*iiifa*H:l
J The t ransl at i on follows this r econst r uct ed
r eadi ng.
(23.2) I have t ransl at ed 'anvayd as cont i nuous capasity
or cont i nui t y, Thi s cont i nui t y is t he cont i nuous capasity to
get dest royed and to be gener at ed.
(23.3) We call somet hi ng as milk ( and not as curd) and
somet hi ng as cur d ( and not as mi l k). If t her e is cont i nui t y
(anvaya) wi t hout any change, t hen t her e will be no
significant di st i nct i on bet ween t he two pract i ces.
(24.1) Two ' modal i t i es' cor r espond with two view poi nt s
from whi ch a change can be descri bed. ' St at e' is one
modal i t y and ' capasity' is anot her . States get gener at ed and
dest royed. They are many in number and are percept i bl e.
But t he capasity is cont i nuous, wi t hout gener at i on or
dest r uct i on. It is one and i mper cept i bl e. So a t hi ng is
subject to gener at i on etc.; it is many a nd per cept i bl e from
' st at e' poi nt of view. But it is cont i nuous, one and
i mper cept i bl e from ' capasity' poi nt of view. Thi s appear s to
be t he Snkhya view. The l anguages of 'paryayai
(modal i t i es), however, suits mor e to t he J ai na appr oach
t han to Snkhya appr oach. (I have not followed
Snt araksi t a' s i nt er pr et at i on, accor di ng to which, t he
oneness of state and capasity is one modal i t y but t hei r
di st i nct i on is t he absol ut e t rut h (Wn*f?TC<J ^ V$).
(24.2) Accor di ng to Snkhya system pl easur e, pai n and
del usi on (= sukha, duhkha and moha) are t he different
st rands t hat const i t ut e Prakrti. They are i rreduci bl e to each
ot her . The difference bet ween t hem can be est abl i shed on
NOTES 163
t he basis of t hei r distinct cogni t i ons or appear ances.
Similarly Purusas (conscious beings) are many and distinct
from each ot her . Thei r difference can be established on t he
basis of our exper i ence to t he effect t hat cogni t i ons and
awareness t hat one per son has are different from those
anot her per son has.
(24.3) Sntaraksita comment s t hat accordi ng to
Dharmakl rt i Sakti (capasity, power) of a t hi ng cannot arise
from a t hi ng because it is always pr esent in the t hi ng.
Ot herwi se sakti will be i ndi st i ngui shabl e from a ' st at e' . A
state of a t hi ng can be said to arise from a t hi ng. Sakti,
however is not identical with t he t hi ng whi ch is t he locus of
sakti.
(25.1) Accordi ng to Buddhi st s ' pr oper t i es' and
' subst ances' are not distinct reals. Still one and t he same
t hi ng can be said to have different pr oper t i es relative to
different poi nt s of view. ( The different poi nt s of view
correl at e with t he different ki nds of t hi ngs from which t he
given t hi ng needs to be excl uded or differentiated. For
exampl e when a pot is charact eri sed as i mper manent , the
pot and its characteristic namel y i mper manence are not two
distinct reals. The pot may also be charact eri sed as black.
Again ' t he pot ' and ' black' are not two distinct reals. Still
' i mper manence' and ' bl ackness' do not mean t he same
t hi ng. Because t he pot is descri bed as i mper manent subject
to t he i nqui ry about t he pot whet her it is per manent or not ,
And it is descri bed as black subject to t he i nqui ry about its
col our.
But this alternative view-point is not available to a
Srikhya phi l osopher .
(25.2) Siikhyas say that t he consci ous subst ance
(Purusa) does not under go any t ransformat i on whereas
Prakrit does. But if cessation and arisal of one t hi ng can
amount to t ransformat i on of anot her t hi ng t hen t he former
in Prakrti can amount to t he latter in Purusa.
(25.3) A Buddhi st may approve of t he linguistic usage
' Mud has been t r ansf or med i nt o a pot ' . But he woul d
i nt er pr et it in such a way t hat t he distinction bet ween mud
and pot is expl ai ned in t erms of a cause-effect series.{hetu-
phala-santn). Thi s way is not open to t he Srikhya t hi nker.
The^ t ransformat i on accor di ng to hi m i mpl i es oneness
bet ween cause and effect.
(25.4)
4
*3*TOn ^T HR
U
HH: ' Thi s r eadi ng is not satisfactory.
Per haps 'cTFTRJWllfa ^ HRÎIH:
1
is t he correct r eadi ng her e
because Sntaraksita says - ' aî j ^f ^nf R ^T HR
U
IIH:
( That is, Dhar makl r t i sums up by saying - Ther ef or e t her e is
no t ransformat i on in bot h t he cases).
(26.1) Her e Viveka (= differentiation) probabl y means
' qual i fi cat i on' whi ch differentiates one t hi ng from its
t ransformat i on. Nirviveka- unqual i fi ed.
(26.2) Siikhya t hi nker s hol d t hat a subt l e (or non-
manifest) object is not directly a ppr e he nde d t hough it
exists. (Sauksmyt tadanupalabdhih- Snkhyakrik, verse 8.) A
fist is non-manifestly exi st ent i n t he fingers; hence it is not
appr ehended.
(26.3) The r eadi ng ' *<*^q Pi t ct *^ arawT
1
is not clear
enough. My t ransl at i on follows Snt araksi t a' s inter-
pr et at i on. " c f ^ F W* * ^ ^
(27.1) Accordi ng to Shkhya every effect is made up of
t hr ee gunas (strands) - Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. So every
effect ( pr oduct , mani fest at i on) is pre-exi st ent in t he form of
t hr ee gunas accor di ng to t hem. And t he cause al ready
consists of t hr ee gunas. So t he Siikhya t hi nker, who accept s
pre-exi st ence of all effects in t hei r causes in t he from of
t hr ee gunas will have to accept t hat anyt hi ng can be
pr oduced from anyt hi ng.
NOTES 165
(27.2) Santaraksita her e refers to an ar gument - '^Hcft
qf:
1
( The source is unknown) 'If
gener at i on of an existing t hi ng is accept ed, t hen a bor n
t hi ng can be bor n (again, i.e. wi t hout get t i ng dest royed).
The r eadi ng ' f t f Sî c i i q^Ni f W suggests t hat Dharmaki rt i
mi ght be following Mdhyamikas her e. But Santaraksita
refers to I^M^FJTCT^ as t he readi ng, which removes this
feeling.
(29.1) We can say t hat by i nt r oduci ng t he not i on of
Svabhvnupalabdhi Dharmaki rt i is r educi ng difference to
*mutual non-existence* (Anyonybhva in Nyya
t ermi nol ogy), a ki nd of absence. He woul d say t hat ' pl easure
is different from pai n' means ' pl easure is non-existent in
t he form of pai n' . And we can talk of this ki nd of absence
because we can say, "If pl easure woul d have existed as pain,
t hen it woul d have been appr ehended in t he form of pai n.
But it is not so appr ehended. So pl easure does not exist as
pai n. That is, it is different from pai n. "
(29.2)
i
HcÎ^Htf Iîi?îi^H*H WHNI ^SQI *^' Thi s part of
t he st at ement seems to be corrupt . Per haps this was a part of
some comment ar y, but proj ect ed i nt o t he text by some
copy-writer. Any way, this st at ement -part has not been
c omme nt e d upon by Santaraksita.
(31.1) 'W^ MRISIKHI^-IIW
1
does not make a good sense. I
have accept ed
i
^ ^ "^fcT^T WHi q^q:
1
. The same readi ng
seems to have been accept ed by Santaraksita when he says -
etc. in his comment ar y.
(31.2) Her e t he available r eadi ng of Dharmaki rt i ' s
ar gument does not seem to be clear and satisfactory.
(33.1) Her e t he readi ng seems to be corrupt and
i ncompl et e. The t ransl at i on is tentative.
(33.2) Literally - of t he savants approved by good
per sons.
(34.1) That is, he can give anot her per f or mance whi ch
cannot be r epeat ed by t he di sput ant and hence t he
di sput ant gets defeat ed.
(34.2) That is to say, br i ngi ng i rrel evant topics in t he
course of debat e is as i rrel evant and i mpr oper as offering
gifts and beat i ng with a r od for provi ng one' s poi nt .
(35.1) Accor di ng to t he doct r i ne of Pratityasamutpda all
pr oduct s (sarhskras) are de pe nde nt on many condi t i ons
{pratyayas). Pratyayas are of four ki nds: Hetu, lambana,
Anantara and Adhipati. Out of t hem Hetu is t he cause
(Nirvartaka: t he sufficient condi t i on) (See Madhyamakasstra
1.4. with Prasannapad) Every composi t e object or a pr oduct
is de pe nde nt on t he cause and ot her condi t i ons. Thi s
dependent or condi t i oned charact er of everything is
necessarily l i nked up with its unpl easant charact er and also
with its i mper manence.
(35.2)
4
yfaqifciifaiqiifaci^' can be r ead as
i.e. * yRiîlVl: ^fasiifVicnV as I have
done. If we accept 'f^rrf^TcFP?' as t he r eadi ng, t hen t he
st at ement woul d imply t hat stating what is enqui r ed by t he
oppone nt t oo is an occasi on of defeat. But this would be
i nconsi st ent with anot her st at ement by Dhar makl r t i -
:
1
(= If t her e is an enqui r y t hen t her e is no
fault.) (See section 33) . The poi nt is, even if a charact eri st i c
is relevant, it shoul d not be expressed separately if it
necessarily follows from t he ar gument , except when t her e is
an enqui ry about t hat charact eri st i c from t he side of t he
opponent .
(35.3) If t he di sput ant ' s ar gument is faulty, but t he
oppone nt does not poi nt out t he fault t hen nei t her does t he
di sput ant win (because his ar gument is faulty) nor does t he
NOTES 167
oppone nt win (because he fails to discover t he fault). Thi s is
pr i ma facie i nconsi st ent with adosodbhvana (rat her its first
ki nd which will be expl ai ned in section 36) as an occasion of
t he opponent ' s defeat. For a discussion of this pr obl em see
t he I nt r oduct i on.
(36.1) S nt a r a ks i t a i nt e r pr e t s . ' ^ f r ' a s
( That is, t he object t hat is enqui r ed) . That is to say, t he non-
discovery of fault in t he s t at ement / ar gument r egar di ng un-
enqui r ed object is not an occasion of defeat.
(36.2) I prefer tat to tatah whi ch was accept ed by Rahul
Sankritryayana and makes bet t er sense. Her e tat refers to t he
occur r ence of adosodbhvana.
(37.1) The words WT and fWT are found in R. In
Moni er Monier-William' s Sanskrit-English Dictionary t he
word ^TSH is given al ong with t he comment t hat it is probabl y
a wr ong r eadi ng for "rR. The meani ng of
<T
rreR
f
is given as
defiling, vitiating, disgracing, spoiling. The word f^TPFR is
not given in t he Dictionary but it probabl y means t he same
(37.2) Sntaraksita adds - ^t f di f cf a: frbet ?f?F
He i mpl i es t hat t he debat e bet ween t he two debat er s
desi rous of victory involves t he use of qui bbl i ng etc.,
accor di ng to Naiyyikas. Such a debat e is not legitimate (=
yogavihita, nyyya) accordi ng to Dharmakl rt i . Santaraksita' s
i nt er pr et at i on also implies t hat Dharmakl rt i was not critical
about any debat e bet ween debat er s desi rous of victory but
only if it involved qui bbl i ng and ot her pract i ces of cheat i ng.
In fact Dharmakl rt i seems to be revising t he Nyya concept s
of victory and defeat to make t hem mor e conduci ve to
academi c spirit i nst ead of get t i ng ri d of t hem completely.
(37.3) The poi nt is this - The di sput ant shoul d follow
t he nor ms of logic while argui ng his posi t i on. The i nt ent i on
behi nd it shoul d be to enl i ght en t he oppone nt or to
pervade hi m rationally and not to mislead or confuse hi m. If
t he oppone nt follows t he ar gument advanced by t he
di sput ant , well and good. But if he does not follow it, t he
di sput ant shoul d not try to confuse hi m or t he audi ence by
way of qui bbl i ng and ot her cheat i ng pract i ces. The pur pose
behi nd part i ci pat i on in debat e shoul d not be to cause non-
appr ehens i on or mi sappr ehensi on (i.e. apratipatti or
vipratipatti) but to r emor e t hem and avoid t hei r arisal.
(38.1) Jtis are pseudo-refut at i ons whi ch are generally
count er - ar gument s based on analogy. Sdharmyasama is a
count er - ar gument based on positive analogy,
Vaidharmyasama is t he one based on negative analogy. A list
of twenty four such jtis is given in NS for my discussion of
whi ch see my Inference and Fallacies discussed in Ancient India
Logic ( publ i shed by Indi an Books Cent r e) , Chapt er VII, Part
II.
(38.2) ' . . . arcnyoqiHii^ 3i<^\*TTqFT ^' - The available
r eadi ng is not satisfactory. The t ransl at i on is tentative.
(39.1) Dharmaki rt i , from this section onwards, critically
discusses t he 22 Nyya-ni grahast hnas as t hey are defi ned
and expl ai ned by Gaut ama, Vatsyayana a nd Udyot akara.
Whi l e r es pondi ng to each Nyya-ni grahast hna he first
quot es t he Nyya-aphorism, t hen some sel ect ed por t i ons
from t he comment ar i es by Vatsyayana a nd Udyot akara
(Nyyabhsya and Nyyavrtika respectively) and t hen gives
his r esponse. But while quot i ng Nyya posi t i on he does not
always make it clear as to whi ch comment ar y he is quot i ng.
It may also be not ed t hat Dhar maki r t i does not always quot e
t he comment ar i es very accurately but he seems to cite an
abr i dged and even r ephr ased version of t hem. Somet i mes
he makes a free combi nat i on of Nyyabhsya and
Nyyavrtika a nd states it as t he Piiruapaksa.
NOTES 169
(41.1) Her e I have accept ed t he available readi ng '
But I suspect t hat the original r eadi ng shoul d
have been * ^116*11^ yRiHaipH %^' which is mor e consistent
with t he answer given by Dharmakl rt i .
(42.1) Thi s 'Nyya expl anat i on' is a free combi nat i on of
Nyyabhsya 5.2.3. and Nyya-vrtika 5.2.3.
(43.1) Her e Dharmakl rt i is referri ng to t he Nyya
definition of hetu viz. ^ I g Wi l ! * ^ ^ T O T S R %<J:l '(NS
1.1.34).
(47.1) Her e Dharmakl rt i is referring to Udyot akara' s
st at ement . But t he st at ement in Nyyavrtika is different
from t he one referred to by Dharmakl rt i . The original
st at ement r uns -
4
WTSrftT^T ' i ^fci i S^chi foch^Mi ^ f^Rfa: "3:
WT^Hrlî ^r qi Ri l ozrf^fR^rfcT cf^ f ^R^^R qRaoqijj
1
Her e
Udyot akara is referri ng to t hree different cases and
i ncl udi ng t hem in Pratijnvirodha.
(i) fci<>*M, " 3 ^ 1 - (Cont rary Reply) Exampl e -
Suppose a Vaisesika is t he di sput ant . He mi ght ar gue -
" Sound is i mper manent because it is percept i bl e t hr ough
sense-organs'
1
. And suppose a Buddhi st is t he opponent . He
poi nt s out - "Your pr obans is inconclusive. Because,
' Universal
1
which is accept ed by you, is percept i bl e but not
i mper manent accordi ng to you." Her e t he opponent
(Buddhi st ) is accusing t he di sput ant (Vaisesika) of
Inconclusiveness (Anaikntikadesan) and poi nt i ng out a
count er-i nst ance whi ch t he di sput ant will have to accept but
t he oppone nt himself does not accept. (Because Buddhi st s
do not believe in t he existence of universals i . e . ^ w)
(ii) ^ o R^ M^ ^ r f ^ 5 : l Thi s case is similar to t he
case (i ). Her e Vaisesika di sput ant makes t he same ar gument
irrespective of his own posi t i on. In this exampl e t her e is no
ment i on of t he opponent .
(iii) "5^RîîH<fci4^: 3T^#cf^7:l In t he above two
cases t he count er i nst ance was accept abl e to one party but
not to t he ot her . But if t he count er-i nst ance is accept ed by
bot h t he parties, t hen t he pr obans will be inconclusive.
Dhar maki r t i under st ands t he first case in a different way.
In his pr esent at i on pr obabl y Buddhi st is t he di sput ant and
Vaisesika is t he opponent . The Buddhi st argues t hat sound
is i mper manent because knowabl e t hr ough senses and
Vaisesika pr oduces ' Uni versal s' as t he count er i nst ance.
In this discussion Udyot akara has used t he t er m viruddha
in a br oad sense and not in t he strict sense of t he viruddha -
hetvbhsa.
(48.1) In this ar gument t he wor d ' WT* shoul d be
suppl i ed. So t he ar gument will be -
(48.2) In Nyyabindu, Dhar maki r t i discusses t he fallacy
called istavightakrt in t he case of whi ch t he pr obans proves
t he opposi t e of t he intended pr oba ndum. Thi s fallacy was
acknowl edged by Di hnga as a special type of Viruddha, But
Dhar maki r t i i ncl udes it in Viruddhain gener al .
(48.3) ' "gKTf^foyc^rî i ^ - Remot e in some respect (or -
r emot e for some r eason) . For exampl e Dhar maki r t i himself
talks of r emot eness of t hr ee ki nds in Sec. 9.
(49.1) Thi s is an answer to a possible obj ect i on t hat a
Naiyyika coul d raise. The Nyaiyyika' s possible objection is
- Buddhi st s also use many pr obans for provi ng one and t he
same pr oba ndum. Similarly t her e is not hi ng wr ong in
poi nt i ng out many faults in one and t he same ar gument .
(49.2) Dharmaki rt i di st i ngui shes bet ween svalaksana (a
self-characterised part i cul ar) and smnyalaksana
(uni versal ). The meani ng ( connot at i on) of a word is
NOTES 171
universal in nat ur e. A universal is not ontologically real.
Svalaksana is ontologically real, but it is not t he meani ng of a
word. The st at ement ' Self does not exist
1
does not mean to
deny t he meani ng of t he word ' self, but it means to deny
t he existence of any ontologically real entity called 'self.'
(51.1) Thi s exampl e is given for showing t hat an
i nst ance need not be given always in t he form ' like so and
so
1
, but it coul d be given even in t he ablative form (pancami)
meani ng ' because so and s o /
(51.2) Sntaraksita comment s
(51.3) Staraksita refers to a verse of Yogcra
Buddhi st s -
Meaning: Since at oms of ear t h get conj oi ned with t he
mud (= A tryanuka of ear t h composed of six atoms?) at once,
t herefore since t he at om has no di mensi ons, it will be
uni t ed with all t he at oms in t he same poi nt of space and
hence t he cluster of at oms will be of t he size of an at om
only.
(52.1) Thi s case of cont rari et y is called ' cont rari et y of
pr obans (to t he Decl arat i on) based on falsification of
Decl arat i on' by Dhar makl r t i in section 50. The earlier type
of contrarity was ' cont rari et y of Decl arat i on and pr obans to
t he means of knowl edge' as referred to by Dharmakl rt i in
section 47.
(53.1) The i dea is this: The cont rari et y bet ween pr obans
and Decl arat i on may take form of two fallacies - Cont rary
pr obans and Unpr oved pr obans. It pr obans exists in t he
locus, t hen pr oba ndum does not exist t her e due to
contrarity. If on t he ot her hand pr obans does not exist i n
t he locus, t hen it is a clear case of Unpr oved pr obans. In t he
exampl e "Everything is di scret e because t erms denot i ng
reals st and for col l ect i ons" t he ' Unpr oved pr obans ' is
appar ent i mmedi at el y, whi ch is t he cause of t he occasion of
defeat. Cont rari et y may be discovered later when it has no
significance.
(54.1) See Sect i on 46.
(54.2) Presumabl y it is t he same ar gument as ' Everything
is di scret e because t he t er m ' real
1
is appl i cabl e to an
aggregat e only' . See section 46.
(55.1) ' V S I ^ O H ^ I ^ V In Sanskrit l i t erat ure we find t he
use of many popul ar maxi ms {laukika-nyya) Nyya in this
sense is a maxi m or pri nci pl e expressed in t he form of an
allegory. I have called it ' allegorical pri nci pl e' in t he
t ransl at i on. Bhandlekhya-nyya is not ment i oned in any
st andar d Glossary of nyyas. But it coul d be expl ai ned in t he
light of Snt araksi t a' s i nt er pr et at i on as follows. A buffoon
(Bhanda) draws amusi ng suggestive sket ches (lekhya) and
t hereby i ndi cat es different realistic pi ct ures by playing a
gimic. He may use t he same sket ch for i ndi cat i ng different
pi ct ures at different t i mes. Udyot akara is playing a similar
gimic accor di ng to Dhar maki r t . Though t he definition of
' Cont rary Decl arat i on' (Pratijnvirodha) primarily appl i es to
cont rari et y bet ween Decl arat i on and pr obans, Udyot akara
ext ends t he scope of this nigrahasthna to ot her ki nds of
contrariety, for exampl e, t he cont rari et y bet ween
Decl arat i on and Inst ance. In doi ng this he plays t he same
gimic as is suggest ed by t he t erm 'Bhandlekhyanyya
1
accordi ng to Dhar makl r t i .
(55.2) Her e Dhar makl r t i means pr oba ndum by
'Paksikrtadharma? and pr obans by 'paksadharma.'
(55.3) The i dea is this. A cont rary i nst ance is t hat wher e
t her e is absence of pr oba ndum. If pr obans exists in t he
cont rary i nst ances exclusively, t hat is, only in cont rary
NOTES 173
i nst ances and not in any ot her instances, t hat is, in non-
probandum-possessi ng i nst ances only and not in
probandum-possessi ng i nst ances t hen we coul d say, "Here
pr obans is pervaded by t he absence of pr obandum. " That
makes it a case of cont rary pr obans.
(55.4) The exampl e is, (following Sntaraksita) - " Sound
is i mper manent , because it differs from exper i ence to
exper i ence, like space, unl i ke pot . " Her e space is given as a
positive i nst ance but actually it is a ' cont rary instance*
(viruddha-drstnta) in t he sense t hat it does not possess
pr oba ndum ( i mper manence) . Her e t he pr obans does not
exist in this ' cont rary positive i nst ance' , but it exists in t he
opposi t e (i.e. non-cont rary) i nst ance. The non-cont rary
i nst ance is t hat which possesses pr obandum. Her e pot is t he
non-cont rary i nst ance and pr obans (i.e. t he quality of
differing from exper i ence to experi ence) exists in it. In fact
her e t he major part of t he ar gument is not fallacious but
i nst ances are fallacious because what shoul d have been
given as positive i nst ance is given as negative i nst ance and
vice versa.
(55.5) ' The Cont rari et y of Decl arat i on to t he i nst ance'
her e means non-exi st ence of t he Decl ared propert y, t hat is
t he pr obandum, in t he i nst ance. Such a non-exi st ence
woul d be fallacious if it is in t he positive instance, not if it is
in t he negative i nst ance.
(56.1) Accordi ng to Naiyyikas (i) Pratijn (ii) Hetu (iii)
Drstnta (iv) Upanaya and (v) Ni gamana is t he correct or der
of t he el ement s in an ar gument , t hat is, an i nference for
ot hers. So if pr obans and i nst ance bot h are faulty, t he fault
in t he pr obans will count first, and since t he debat er is
defeat ed by t he first fault, t he fault in t he i nst ance, whi ch
count s later, will be superfl uous.
(57.1) Her e t he ar gument under consi derat i on i s - "The
sound is per manent because knowabl e t hr ough senses" (See
t he not e 47.1) A Buddhi st proposes this ar gument and a
Vaisesika or Mlmrhsaka opposes it by poi nt i ng out t hat
Universals like ' cowness' are knowabl e t hr ough senses, but
per manent . So t he knowability t hr ough senses has a variable
rel at i on with i mper manence.
(57.2) The i dea is this. If t he di sput ant ' s ar gument is
well established, t hen cowness cannot succeeded as
count er i nst ance, whet her ' cowness
1
exists or not and if t he
ar gument is Inconclusive, t hen it is Inconclusive whet her
cowness exists or not . So this ki nd of Pratijnvirodha, if it is
an occasion of defeat, is covered by t he fallacy of pr obans
viz. Inconclusiveness.
(59.1) I have suggest ed srftpjfta TJT (i.e. ^Pi\i$!cl T^ ) in
pl ace of ^Pi ' j s cf "Q^ whi ch does not make any consi st ent
sense. However t he meani ng of t he st at ement is not still very
clear.
(60.1) Sntaraksita expl ai ns t he qualified pr obans as
. (The r eadi ng
4
nf
seems to be cor r upt . It shoul d be
4
nf<Hi
u
i<;*fii^) The
t ransl at i on follows this expl anat i on.
(62.1) Kapolavdita seems to mean Kapola-tdita or
Kapolatdana. Monier-Williams gives t he meani ng of t he
l at t er expressi on: Striking t he cheeks (as a t oken of
confession of faul t ).
(62.2) Kaksya means upper gar ment . I have accept ed this
as t he correct r eadi ng in pl ace of Kanksya. The word Kanksya
as used in t he available t ext is not f ound in Moni er William' s
Dictionary.
(63.1) * H^cyl a^msRohcrî i ^î i ^ Thi s r eadi ng seems to
be corrupt , as Snt araksi t a quot es it differently as,
NOTES 175
(64.1) The sent ence
; WQ cFRT: faclTSyfcwiVi:!
1
(Free
t ransl at i on - Ten pomegr anat es, six cakes, bowl, skin of a
goat, a l ump of gr ound sesamurn, now this is Yajus of t he
Ruruka-school, prot ect i on of a girl child, her father is not
frozen).
(64.2) The word Kila (= ' t hey say*) per haps refers to
Udyot akara' s expl anat i on -
4
?T? tl" cfufar^ I f cj
(Nyyavrtika 5.2.10).
(65.1)
<T
Jff cbMf
Udyot akara seems t o mean by this st at ement t hat t he or der
of words is adj ust ed in accor dance with meani ng. The
' meani ng' is t he karma (= object) of action (viz., knowi ng).
It is t aken i nt o account first. Then t he words are
a ppr e he nde d in t hei r pr oper or der . Appr ehensi on of words
is t he Karana ( i nst r ument ) of t he knowl edge of t he
sent ence- meani ng. [As Visvantha put s it in his Krikvati-
f ... IB1II]
(66.1) That an i ncorrect word conveys t he meani ng via
t he correct word, is originally t he view referred to by
Gr ammar i ans. (Bhart rhari , for i nst ance, refers to this view
in Vkyapadiya, Brahmaknda, verses 147-155). The
gr ammar i an who hol ds this view is speaki ng non-sense
accor di ng to Dharmakl rt i . And Naiyyika is anot her mad
per son (accordi ng to Dharmakl rt i ) who is narrat i ng and
usi ng t he faulty perspective of t he gr ammar i an. It is to be
not ed, however, t hat gr ammar i an' s posi t i on on t he issue of
cor r upt words (apabhramsas) is r at her compl ex. In
Vkyapadiya 1.152 Bhart rhari says t hat in cert ai n cases t he
cor r upt word conveys its meani ng via t he correct word. But
in 1.53 he says t hat when cor r upt words become cust omary
among t he speakers of lower starta (women, sdras et c. ),
t he cor r upt words are directly meani ngful , whereas t he
correct words fail to convey t hei r meani ng. Of course
gr ammar i ans give some sanctity to ' cor r ect ' (sdhu) words.
They at t ach some religious meri t to t hem. Dharmakl rt i
rightly criticises this view.
(66.2) Since a very l ong time women and sdras were
not allowed to use t he ' cul t ur ed' l anguage (Sanskrit) of t he
Brahmi ns. Majority of t hem were qui t e i gnor ant about most
of t he so-called correct words. The words well-formed
accor di ng to Pani ni an Gr ammar were supposed to be t he
correct words or t he st andar d words (sdhu-sabda). Ot her
words were non- st andar d words (asdhu-sabd). Non-
st andar d words di d not strictly bel ong to Sanskrit l anguage.
They coul d bel ong to t he so-called Prakri t (= nat ural ,
vulgar?) l anguage or Apabhrarhsa ( cor r upt ) l anguage.
(67.1) The r eadi ng
4
*I<IHKI*J,' is likely to be cor r upt . The
meani ng is not clear.
(67.2) The i dea is this. Gr ammar i ans and Naiyyikas
following t hem at t ri but e some special sanctity t o Sanskrit
words in virtue of t hei r well-defined (i.e. grammat i cal l y well-
formed) charact er (= sdhutva). Thi s is t he same as
correct ness or cul t ur edness (Sanskritness) of t hese words,
whi ch is supposed to owe its status t o t he r ul es of Sanskrit
gr ammar . Thi s view is not accept abl e to Dhar makl r t i .
Accordi ng to hi m we j udge ' cor r ect ness' or ' i ncor r ect ness'
of t hem, not due to any well-defined or essential charact er
of words but due to some ot her r eason. The ot her reason is
t he t radi t i on of word-usage at t he hands of exper i enced
per sons. Snt araksi t a calls it <2&HCII<;HK*H4. And this cause of
correct ness is c ommon to Sanskrit and non-Sanskri t
l anguage alike. So t her e is no special sanctity of Sanskrit
l anguage.
(67.3) The t endency to at t ri but e a well-defined charact er
to words is t he t endency to at t ri but e a fixed char act er to
t hem i nde pe nde nt of usage or convent i on.
NOTES 177
(67.4) In
4
W^y<i l f d- l , ^ t wf e : ' one ' ^ ' is addi t i onal and
may be omi t t ed for t he sake of consi st ent meani ng.
(68.2) In fact t he word to word translation of ' " 3 ^ W: '
woul d be ' Man king' s
1
(when t he actual meani ng is ' King' s
ma n' ) . Thi s t ransl at i on is not per mi t t ed in English. But in
Sanskrit such a reversal of words is allowed and makes a
good sense wi t hout any oddity.
(68.3) In Sanskrit t he or der of words is generally
uni mpor t ant . The semant i cal position of words is fixed by
t he suffixes at t ached to t hem and not by t hei r syntactical
or der . In English t he or der of words generally plays a
discisive rol e in fixation of meani ng. For instance ' Cow
br i ng t he black' will ei t her make no sense or at least will not
make t he same sense as ' Bri ng t he black cow*. But 'TTF^STFF?
^ W* ^ , ' cpqi TUJ^ 3TFFT\
4
3TFF? cp&li W{^ all make t he same
sense in Sanskrit.
(68.4) Accordi ng to Dharmakl rt i t he ar gument (i.e. t he
i nference for ot hers) consists of two steps: one i ndi cat es
pervasi on bet ween pr obans and pr obandum and t he ot her
i ndi cat es exi st ence of pr obans in t he propert y-bearer
(dhartrii). The propert y-bearer is to be proved to be
possessing pr oba ndum as its anot her propert y. These two
st eps coul d be pr esent ed i n any or der . Decl arat i on or
concl usi on is not necessary as a step in t he ar gument
because they are ent ai l ed by t he two steps ment i oned above.
(69.1) Thi s is a reference to Udyotakara accordi ng to
Sntaraksita.
(71.1) In t he five-membered inferential st at ement of
Nyya, Concl usi on (= t he last el ement ) is t he repet i t i on of
Decl arat i on (= t he first el ement ) . But this repet i t i on is
per mi t t ed by t he aut hor of NS, because it is Anuvdda (= a
r epet i t i on which expl ai ns or confirms t he earlier
178 VDANYYA OF DHARMKIRTI
statement). The repetitions which are not confirmatory like
this are not permitted.
(71.2) Here probably the metaphor of a machi ne is used
for denoting a slave.
(71.3) Here the word hasati (= (1) laughs (2) when
laughs), dhvati/pradhvati (= (1) runs (2) when runs),
nindati/pranindati (= (1) censures (2) when censures),
nrtyati/pranrtyati (= (1) dances (2) when dances) are used
twice but in two different senses.
(7L4) Here the word bhavati is used twice in two
different senses ((1) happens (2) when (it) happens).
(72.1) This is a restatement of the Nyya aphorism
1
(7VS5.2.15).
(72.2) According to Naiyyikas an elaborate discussion
which is not regulated by the rules of victory and defeat is
permitted if it is between a teacher and disciple or between
two co-disciples (See NS 4.2.48) but not between others. The
debate between others should be regulated by the
constraints of nigrahasthnas. It should not be diffuse and
repetitive.
(73.1) The original reading is corrupt and confusing. I
am following V in the translation. Sntaraksita too takes this
statement as elliptical and adds -
(73.2) Dharmaklrti has said this in sections 62 and 64.
(73.3) Here my translation follows Sntaraksita's
commentary. He takes
4
$r*f: "5^: yfti Hi qi i ^ f^TOcT to mean
(79.1) I suggest ' ST
1
^^^' in place of 'rfcT crtcj' the
latter being not sufficiently clear. But I have translated
following the available reading somehow.
NOTES 179
(79.2) That is, ei t her Ajnna is an occasion of defeat via
Apratibh or Ajnna is not an ( i ndependent ) occasion of
defeat at all because its scope is per vaded by Apratibh. Her e
I have suggest ed 'srefirerarT in place of ' ar af i wn' as an
alternative readi ng, t he former bei ng consi st ent with later
discussion. (See t he last sent ence of t he same section)
(80.1) ' Pin$<^MKKifti cnî fi
f
will be grammatically mor e
correct and semantically consistent, t han
. But t he word ' 3 MI ^ ' mi ght be t her e
in t he original text whi ch mi ght refer to I nt er medi at e*
occasions of defeat. By i ncor por at i ng it an alternative
r eadi ng may be suggest ed-
4
(80.2) The ot her such sub-divisions woul d be ' not
under s t andi ng t he half of t he answer' , ' not under st andi ng
one t hi rd of t he answer' , similarly, ' not under st andi ng t he
whol e subject-matter' , ' not under st andi ng t he half of t he
subject-matter' etc.
(82.1) Thi s Nyya-explanation as quot ed by Dharmakfrti
her e is a free combi nat i on of Nyyabhsya and Nyyavriika
oni VS5. 2. 20.
(83.1) In ot her words, whet her it is an ar gument
pr esent ed by t he di sput ant or t he response given by t he
opponent , it is r egul at ed by t he two-fold negative check:
Fallacies of pr obans and Non-i magi nat i on.
(83.2) Vitand means t he ki nd of debat e where t he
debat er s pr esent no posi t i on of t hei r own, but they only try
to refute t he ot her - debat er ' s posi t i on.
(84.1) Naiyyika' s obj ect i on is this: You have said t hat all
t he occasi ons of defeat commi t t ed by t he di sput ant coul d be
i ncl uded in Hetvbhsa and all t he occasions of defeat
commi t t ed by t he oppone nt coul d be i ncl uded in Apratibh.
But we are now citing a case which is an occasion of defeat
commi tted by the disputant but which is not i ncl uded in
Hetvbhsa.
(84.2) Here
4
sraT^Hiîcmi
f
is to be taken in broad sense.
'Not stating a constituent of argument' covers both
*3Hfa*IR' (Not stating) and 'SRufasfH' (stating something
else)
(84.3) The word *^' i n
4
yRi î ^^- i ^ ^
f
is interpreted as
4
^ ' (= 'like ') by Sntaraksita.
(85.1) I am interpreting this to be an occasion of defeat
of the disputant who indirectly permits the opponent' s
(refutative) argument. Here the word
iT
R
f
could be
interpreted as ' opponent' . But the roles of disputant and
opponent are transferable.
(85.2) This 'Nyya-explanation' is a free combination of
Nyyabhsya and Nyyavrtika on NS5.2.11.
(87.1) The idea is this: Just as a single sound probans is
sufficient for proving the probandum is spite of there being
many such probans', poi nti ng out a single mistake is
sufficient for vitiating the proof in spite of there being many
such mistakes in the proof.
(87.2) Here the word "3*FT does not make any clear
sense. It coul d be a misreading.
(88.1) This translation corresponds to the reading
f \ The reading accepted by Dvarikadas Shastri
is 'fPWRTO^sf' which would be translated as 'in order to
concl ude the topic (of' occasi ons of defeat')'.
(91.1) Here the textual reading
4
3T3TOTjcSf
' seems to be read by Sntaraksita as some what like
this: '3FJTO?r2T umi<{lq*^ 3TO^KT ... H 4 ^ ^ ÎT TfclFFF^. ,1
have, however, tried to translate in accordance with the
textual reading.
NOTES 181
(91.2) See section 55.
(92.1) Sntaraksita explains: The pramnas are defined
as means of t rue cogni t i on. The same pramnas are prameyas
(objects of knowl edge) also. But they are not so by virtue of
t he same definition, but by virture of their feature t hat they
are ' objects' {karma) of t he cognitive act. Similar quest i on
can arise with regard to hetvbhsas. They are defined (by
Vtsyyana) as
<
3^%cT^t tl^T^TH^HT:' (Non-probans
appear i ng as probans) and classified by Aksapda i nt o five
ki nds. Is this well-defined charact er of hetvbhsas to be set
aside in favour of an alternative- definition a n d / o r
classification when we const rue t hem as ' occasions of
def eat ? Nyya answer is in t he negative.
G l o s s a r y
of technical terms used in Vdanyya
( - fHUtSWR) - Non- under st andi ng
- transgression (of reason)
- excess
- (1) Not poi nt i ng out a fault (2) Poi nt i ng out a
non-fault as fault.
- Addi t i onal
( - f^rnrWR) - Non- r epr oduct i on
(-<jitii*FTCT) - Positive i nst ance wi t hout positive
concomi t ance
- Occur r ence of (vicious) infinite regress.
- non- appr ehensi on
- non- appr ehensi on
- confirmatory repet i t i on
( - %M^ T) - Inconclusive pr obans
^ i i . accusat i on of Inconclusive pr obans
- (1) positive concomi t ance (2) continuity, cont i nuous
capasity
184 . VDANY YA OF DhARMAKIRTI
- i ncor r ect word, cor r upt word
( - f%r?WT) - Deviant thesis
- Non-sensical
3T5rf?Rf% - non- appr ehensi on, non- under st andi ng
^^^TPT) - Non-i magi nat i on
( - ^TRTPTRl) - Positive i nst ance wi t hout t he
i ndi cat i on of positive concomi t ance
( - fa^WH) - Mi st i med
- funct i on, pr agmat i c funct i on
- Repet i t i on of meani ng
( - ftlfifWH) - Different poi nt
- Shifting to a Different poi nt
- el ement (of ar gument ) , st ep (in ar gument )
- t he one who claims t hat i nst ance is a
different el ement of pr oof from pr obans
- composi t e whol e
- state
- t he linguistic pract i ce of non-exi st ence, t he
pract i ce of non-exi st ence
- (1) non- st at ement or non-justification of a
const i t uent of pr oof (2) st at ement of a non-
const i t uent of proof.
( - tc^NTH) - Unpr oved pr obans
- unpr ovedness
-Appl i cat i on (of i nst ance to t he thesis-case)
- appr ehensi bl e, (t he object) fulfilling t he
condi t i on of apprehensi bi l i t y.
GLOSSARY 185
- effect as reason
- (1) qui bbl i ng (2) cheat i ng
- pr obans with triple charact er ( 1. existence in
thesis-case, 2. existence in similar cases, 3. non-
existence in dissimilar cases)
- (1) refutation, (2) fault
- fallacy of i nst ance
- propert y-bearer
- invariable relation
f ?TO -Conclusion
- occasion of defeat
( - Piy^^TH) - Obj ect i ng against t he non-
obj ect i onabl e
^TPT) - Meaningless ut t er ance
- (1) logic (2) rationality (3) an allegorical pri nci pl e
- Insufficient, Deficient
- Deficiency
TJ
(^- (1) subject of t he thesis, propert y-bearer, (2) position
^^^rfoTcR - t he st at ement t hat t he pr obans characterises t he
thesis-subject.
HR
U
IH - t ransformat i on
( - Pii4fjtlH) - Negl ect i ng t he obj ect i onabl e
- audi ence, assembly, counci l
( - Pis**lFO - Repet i t i on
- pr oposer of t he first position
- Nat ur e, original nat ur e
- Declaration
( - Pui$t*JH) -AnotherDecl arati on
l^ ( - f%ITWFT) - Contrary Declaration, (Lit.-)
Contrariety of / t o Declaration.
( - Pit4$**IFT) - Renunciation of Declaration
( - Piu$t*IPT) -Declaration-abandonment
- opponent, respondent
- diffuse discussion
- evidence, means to knowledge
- object of knowledge
- (1) occasion, context, (2) undesirable consequence
- the allegorical principle viz. (one plays a
gimic)like the picture drawn by a buffoon
( - Pii4^^H) -Permitting opponent' s view.
- economy, (Lit.-) lightness
7
- inferential sign, probans, reason
- debate (Dharmaklrti), discussion between teacher and
disciple or co-disciples for knowing truth (Nyya)
- disputant, proposer (of the first position)
Pii4$^TH) -Dispensation
iq - debate between persons desiring victory (even by
cheating practices)
- negative debate (debate in which the other's
position is confuted without establishing one's own)
- non-apprehension, non-understanding
- contrary, contradictory
( - %T^T
<
*Tnr) - Contrary probans
GLOSSARY 187
- contrariety, cont radi ct i on
- subject-matter, object
- diffuse discussion
TPtPT - ar gument cont ai ni ng dissimilarity (i.e.
negative concomi t ance)
t he Manifest (Snkhya)
- negative concomi t ance, absence
- variable rel at i on
. pervader
per vaded
- pervasion
- per vaded
- capasity
- Repet i t i on of words
- t he pract i ce/ l i ngui st i c practice of existence
- convent i on
-justification
- (1) ar gument , proof (2) pr obans
- inferential st at ement , ar gument
- fallacy of a r gume nt / pr oba ns
- el ement of ar gument , step in ar gument
TPfl
7
? - ar gument cont ai ni ng (t he st at ement of)
similarity (i.e. positive concomi t ance)
- pr obandum, provable
( - ÊRn^ra) - Positive i nst ance lacking
pr oba ndum
- self-nature
- self-nature as pr obans
- t he self-characterised part i cul ar
(yfciîNi:) - Decl arat i on cont rary to its own
ut t er ance
- pr obans, r eason
( - f%?WFr) - Anot her pr obans

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