CrimPro Rule 116 Case Digests

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Purpose of Arraignment

BORJA v. MENDOZA

Facts: Respondent Judge Senining proceeded with the trial in
absentia and thereafter in a decision promulgated, found the
petitioner guilty of such offense and sentenced him to suffer
imprisonment for a period of twenty days of arresto menor.
Thereafter, an appeal was duly elevated to the Court of First
Instance of Cebu presided by respondent Judge Mendoza. It
was then alleged that without any notice to petitioner and
without requiring him to submit his memorandum, a decision
on the appealed case was rendered petitioner that the failure
to arraign him is violative of his constitutional right to
procedural due process.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was denied of his right
to be heard.

Held:
1. It requires that the accused be arraigned so that he
may be informed as to why he was indicted and what
penal offense he has to face.2. He must be fully
informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is
mobilized againsthim.3. Hearing being conducted in
the absence of petitioner, he was convicted. Verily the
records clearly show that petitioner was not
arraigned at all and was not represented by counsel
throughout the whole proceedings in the respondent
City Court.4. Only after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure
to appear is unjustified. Constitutional right that the
accused should be heard by himself and counsel.
The appeal itself is tantamount to
questioning defects. Petition granted.

Duties of a Judge: Capital Offense

People vs. Chua

Facts: Prior to this case the accused was confined
in a drug rehabilitation center for drug dependents.
He escaped from said facility. The trial court,
thereafter, issued an Order recommitting him to
the center but he again escaped.
The accused appellant was charged with the
murder of a 13 year old boy. The accused was 17 at
the time of commission.

The appellant, assisted by counsel, was duly
arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty.

After trial, the court rendered judgment convicting
the appellant of the crime charged. The court
declared that the appellant was a minor when the
crime was committed; hence, was entitled to the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority
under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered
judgment affirming the judgment of the trial court,
but applied Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code
and increased the penalty to reclusion perpetua.
The appellate court considered the minority of the
appellant merely as a generic mitigating
circumstance, and concluded that such minority
could not be considered a generic and a privileged
mitigating circumstance at the same time.

Issue: Whether the appellate court was correct in
appreciating the modifying circumstances.

Held: The Supreme Court modified the decision.
The trial court convicted the appellant of murder
without stating the qualifying circumstance
attendant to the crime. The trial court also
appreciated in favor of the appellant the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender and
considered such minority as a mere mitigating
circumstance.

The crime was qualified by treachery. The victim,
who was barely thirteen years old, was helpless
and unable to defend himself. His feet and hands
were tied while the appellant mauled and kicked
him, and hit him with a piece of wood. The
appellant was so depraved that he even
electrocuted the victim by placing a live wire on the
latters palms and burying him alive. By his
detestable acts, the appellant intended to
exacerbate the suffering of the victim. Hence,
cruelty was attendant to the commission of the
crime. However, cruelty is absorbed by treachery.

The trial court and appellate court also erred in
appreciating the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender in favor of the appellant. He
was arrested by the policemen not only for his
involvement in the killing of the victim but also
because of the warrant for his arrest for robbery,
and the recommitment order issued by the RTC for
escaping from the rehabilitation center.

The appellate court erred, likewise, in appreciating
the minority of the appellant merely as a generic
mitigating circumstance. While under Article 13,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, minority is
a mitigating circumstance, this provision must be
construed in relation to Article 68 thereof, which
provides that minority is a privileged mitigating
circumstance warranting the reduction of the
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imposable penalty by one or two degrees,
depending upon the age of the accused. The
minority of the accused is not merely a generic
mitigating circumstance but is a privileged
mitigating circumstance. Furthermore, in
determining the penalty to be meted on the
accused, the trial court must first consider any
modifying circumstance attendant to the crime.

In this case, the appellant was seventeen years old
when he committed the crime. Hence, the
imposable penalty must be reduced by one degree,
conformably to Article 68 of the Revised Penal
Code. The imposable penalty for murder is
reclusion perpetua to death under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659. One degree lower than reclusion
perpetua to death is reclusion temporal,
conformably to paragraph 2, Article 61, in relation
to Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code.

To determine the minimum of the indeterminate
penalty, reclusion temporal should be reduced by
one degree, prision mayor, which has a range of
from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years. There being no modifying circumstances
attendant to the crime, the maximum of the
indeterminate penalty should be imposed in its
medium period. The minimum of the
indeterminate penalty should be taken from the
full range of prision mayor.

Jurisprudential Rule

People v. Alicando

Facts: Accused was convicted with a crime of rape
with homicide of a 4 year old girl. He was arrested
and during the interrogation he made a confession
of the crime without the assistance of a counsel. By
virtue of his uncounseled confession the police
came to know where to find the evidences
consisting of the victims personal things like
clothes stained with blood which was admitted to
court as evidences. The victim pleaded guilty
during the arraignment and was convicted with the
death penalty. The case was forwarded to the SC
for automatic review.

Issue: Whether or not due process during the
custodial investigation was accorded to the
accused.

Held: Due process was not observed in the conduct
of custodial investigation for the accused. He was
not informed of his right to a counsel upon making
his extrajudicial confession and the information
against him was written in a language he could not
understand and was not explained to him. This is in
violation of section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule
implementing the constitutional right of the
appellant to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him. The lower court also
violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the
plea of guilt of the appellant without conducting a
search inquiry on the voluntariness and full
understanding of the accused of the consequences
of his plea. Moreover the evidences admitted by
the court that warranted his convicted were
inadmissible because they were due to an invalid
custodial investigation that did not provide the
accused with due process of the law. Thus the SC
annulled the decision of the imposition of the
death penalty and remanded the case back to the
lower for further proceeding.

Non-suspension of criminal Action

PEZA v. Alikpala

Facts: Petitioner argues that the issuance of the
TVR is proof that there was no reason for the
confiscation of the drivers license and that Amars
license has not expired but has been renewed.
Judge denied plaintiff request for time to present
additional rebuttal evidence in proof of the same
propositions. Hence this case seeking certiorari.

Issue: WON Empire is liable?

Held: NO.

Ratio: Plaintiffs proof irrelevant
Whether the LTC agent was correct or not in his
opinion that driver Amar had violated some traffic
regulation warranting confiscation of his license
and issuance of a TVR in lieu thereof, this would
not alter the undisputed fact that Amar's license
had indeed been confiscated and a TVR issued
to him, and the TVR had already expired at the
time that the vehicle being operated by him killed
two children by accident. Neither would proof of
the renewal of Amar's license change the fact that
it had really been earlier confiscated by the LTC
agent. No Grave Abuse of Discretion Even positing
error in the Judge's analysis of the evidence
attempted to be introduced and his rejection
thereof, it is clear that it was at most an error of
judgment, not such an error as may be branded a
grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners failed to
perfect appeal. The mere pendency of a special
civil action for certiorari, commenced in relation
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to a case pending before a lower Court, does not
interrupt the course of the latter when there is no
writ of injunction restraining it.

In their eagerness to prove the respondent Judge
wrong in sustaining objections to their proffered
proofs, and to have him punished for contempt for
rendering judgment on the merits adversely to
them despite his being a respondent in their
certiorari suit before this Court, the plaintiff failed
to perfect an appeal from that
Guingona v. City Fiscal Flaminiano

Facts:
David invested several deposits with the Nation
Savings and Loan Association [NSLA]. He said that
he was induced into making said investments by an
Australian national who was a close associate of
the petitioners [NSLA officials]. On March
1981, NSLA was placed under receivership by the
Central Bank, so David filed claims for his and his
sisters investments.
On June 1981, Guingona and Martin, upon
Davids request, assumed the banks obligation to
David by executing a joint promissory note. On
July 1981, David received a report that only a
portion of his investments was entered in the
NSLA records.
On December 1981, David filed I.S. No. 81-
31938 in the Office of the City Fiscal, which case
was assigned to Asst. City Fiscal Lota for
preliminary investigation. David charged
petitioners with estafa and violation of Central
Bank Circular No. 364 and related regulations on
foreign exchange transactions.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the charges
against them for lack of jurisdiction because
David's claims allegedly comprised a purely civil
obligation, but the motion was denied. After the
presentation of David's principal
witness, petitioners filed this petition for
prohibition and injunction because:
a. The production of various documents showed that
the transactions between David and NSLA were
simple loans (civil obligations which were novated
when Guingona and Martin assumed them)
b. David's principal witness testified that
the duplicate originals of the instruments of
indebtedness were all on file with NSLA.
A TRO was issued ordering the respondents
to refrain from proceeding with the preliminary
investigation in I.S. No. 81-31938.

Petitioners liability is civil in nature, so
respondents have no jurisdiction over the estafa
charge. TRO CORRECTLY ISSUED.

GENERAL RULE: Criminal prosecution may not be
blocked by court prohibition or injunction.

EXCEPTIONS
1. For the orderly administration of justice
2. To prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in
an oppressive and vindictive manner
3. To avoid multiplicity of actions
4. To afford adequate protection to constitutional
rights
5. In proper cases, because the statute relied upon
is unconstitutional or was held invalid

When David invested his money on time and
savings deposits with NSLA, the contract that was
perfected was a contract of simple loan
or mutuum and not a contract of deposit. The
relationship between David and NSLA is that
of creditor and debtor. While the Bank has the
obligation to return the amount deposited, it
has no obligation to return or deliver the same
money that was deposited. NSLAs failure to
return the amount deposited will not constitute
estafa through misappropriation, but it will only
give rise to civil liability over which the public
respondents have no jurisdiction.
Considering that petitioners liability is
purely civil in nature and that there is no clear
showing that they engaged in foreign exchange
transactions, public respondents acted without
jurisdiction when they investigated the charges
against the petitioners. Public respondents should
be restrained from further proceeding with the
criminal case for to allow the case to continue
would work great injustice to petitioners and
would render meaningless the proper
administration of justice.
Even granting that NSLAs failure to pay the
time and savings deposits would constitute a
violation of RPC 315, paragraph 1(b), any incipient
criminal liability was deemed avoided. When NSLA
was placed under receivership, Guingona and
Martin assumed the obligation to David, thereby
resulting in the novation of the original
contractual obligation. The original trust
relationbetween NSLA and David
was converted into an ordinary debtor-creditor
relation between the petitioners and David. While
it is true that novation does not extinguish criminal
liability, it may prevent the rise of criminal liability
as long as it occurs prior to the filing of the criminal
information in court.