"

U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
(Northern Division)


WILLIAM JOHN JOSEPH HOGE )
)
Plaintiff, )
) Case Number 1:14-cv-01683 ELH
v. )
)
WILLIAM M. SCHMALFELDT )
)
Defendant. )
______________________________)


DEFENDANTS REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Now comes Defendant William M. Schmalfeldt with this
memorandum in reply to Plaintiff William John Joseph Hoge IIIs
Opposition to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF 45)
MATERIAL FACTS NOT IN DISPUTE
In his response, Plaintiff listed a few items he believes are material
facts that are still in dispute.
In Defendants First Amended Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint (ECF
39) Defendant denied that Plaintiff routinely screens comments to his
Hogewash.com blog for editorial suitability. (ECF 45 (a)) It is not clear to
the Defendant how this rises to the level of a material fact in a copyright
#
infringement lawsuit, since the Plaintiff brings it up the Defendant will
reply. Exhibit A shows several examples of Plaintiff allowing comments that
are either obscene or grossly off topic. Therefore, the issue is not in
dispute and therefore, this reason to deny Defendants request for Summary
Judgment evaporates.
Plaintiff presents Defendants lack of knowledge of whether or not the
Plaintiff actually purchased the pseudonymous Paul Krendlers copyright
for Krendlers The Thinking Mans Zombie blog post of April 10, 2014
as a material fact that is still in dispute. That might be true if the
Plaintiff had, in fact, submitted a copyright application with the U.S.
Copyright Office prior to filing the instant case. As previously established,
Plaintiff filed his copyright application for the work he purportedly
purchased from Krendler on June 7 11 days after filing the instant case
on May 27, 2014. This court has a copy of the Plaintiffs purported
copyright application receipt so no need to kill another tree to reprint it. As
this court made very clear in its Memorandum Opinion on Plaintiffs Motion
for Preliminary Injunction (ECF 31):

It is not entirely clear that the materials plaintiff introduced would
satisfy the requirement articulated in Caner. See 2014 WL 2002835, at
*13.

$
It is also apparent that uncertainty exists as to whether a plaintiffs
mere application for a copyright is sufficient, as a matter of law, to
meet the statutory registration requirement found in Section 411(a).
Although I need not resolve this issue in order to rule on plaintiffs
preliminary injunction Motion, the uncertainty is a consideration in
assessing plaintiffs ability to prevail on the merits in this case. (Id at
p. 20)

In Footnote #7 on Page 19, this court opined:

At the hearing, plaintiff claimed that he is entitled to pursue copyright
claims in connection with material that was posted on Hogewash! and
allegedly misused by defendant for a period of 90 days prior to
plaintiffs June 2014 copyright application. Plaintiff cited 17 U.S.C.
412 to support his position. For purposes of ruling on the Motion, I
need not reach the merits of plaintiffs contention that his copyright
application in June 2014 has retroactive force. (Id. at p. 19)

If Plaintiff had cited 17 USC 411(a), he would have been forced to
admit that he did not have standing to file a copyright infringement case on
May 27, 2014.

(a) Except for an action brought for a violation of the rights of the
author under section 106A (a), and subject to the provisions of
subsection (b), no civil action for infringement of the copyright in
any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or
registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance
with this title. In any case, however, where the deposit, application,
and fee required for registration have been delivered to the Copyright
Office in proper form and registration has been refused, the applicant
is entitled to institute a civil action for infringement if notice thereof,
with a copy of the complaint, is served on the Register of Copyrights.
The Register may, at his or her option, become a party to the action
with respect to the issue of registrability of the copyright claim by
entering an appearance within sixty days after such service, but the
Registers failure to become a party shall not deprive the court of
jurisdiction to determine that issue. (Emphasis added)
%

Although there is controversy among the various Circuit Courts of
Appeal as to whether to follow the Application Approach or the Registration
Approach in determining eligibility to file a copyright infringement suit,
there is no controversy over having to file a copyright application before
filing a copyright infringement suit. If this Court applies the black letter law
in this case, then this case would be dismissed and this is no longer a
material fact in dispute.
The Plaintiff is playing fast and loose in (c) of his response to
Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment, although the Defendants
assertion of denial in his Amended Answer to Plaintiffs Amended
Complaint could have been more artful. Instead of merely stating denied
as his reply, Defendant should have admitted he published My Slow,
Journalistic Death on or about April 18, 2014, admitted that he reprinted
the entire single line of Plaintiffs Hogewash post of April 14, 2014 in
toto, that the e-book was offered for sale and copies were sold. What
Defendant meant to deny was the Plaintiffs assertion that the use infringed
on Plaintiffs copyright, as Plaintiffs extant terms of service allowed such
publication. Plaintiff objects to what he calls a lack of linkage back to
Hogewash.com in the e-book Chapter 13. Exhibit B demonstrates the falsity
of this assertion as each of the comments published in the e-book contained
&
a link back to hogewash.com. Whether or not the Plaintiff is aware that the
little yellow line under a series of words constitutes the presence of a
hyperlink is unknown, however, it boggles the imagination to think that a
NASA-employed engineer would not recognize a hyperlink when he sees
one, let alone more than a hundred in a series of pages. Since the use was
allowed under Plaintiffs extant terms of service, and since Plaintiff did not
file a copyright application before filing his copyright infringement suit, this
is not a material fact in dispute.
In his Declarations accompanying the Plaintiffs Response to
Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment, he includes a redacted e-mail
which he purports to be proof that he purchased the world book and e-book
rights to the portion of pseudonymous blogger Paul Krendlers April 10
blog post. This is mooted by the fact that Plaintiff filed the instant case on
May 27 but did not apply for copyright for the work until June 7. Plaintiff
seems to believe and cites cases to support his mistaken contention that
filing an amended complaint restarts a lawsuit. Of course, this is not the
case.
In MadStad Engineering, Inc. v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office,
No. 8:12-cv-01589-SDM-MAP (M.D. Fla), the court decided that a plaintiff
cannot manufacture standing in order to proceed with an infringement suit.
'

On appeal, MadStad argues that the district court incorrectly assumed
that it would not purchase additional security equipment because of
the AIA (LeahySmith America Invents Act). MadStad contends that
it has already suffered injury attributable to the AIA because it did
purchase and implement enhanced security measures after the passage
of the AIA. MadStad further insists that the district court incorrectly
assumed that computer hacking is an exotic scenario. MadStad
contends that it detects intrusions on its system every week and points
to a number of statistics that indicate computer hacking is prevalent in
the United States.
MadStad's arguments miss the mark. In order to establish standing,
the injury must be, inter alia, fairly traceable to the challenged
action. Monsanto, 561 U.S. at 149. The point of the district court's
analysis was not to downplay the risk of hackers, but to emphasize all
of the unlikely steps required for MadStad to suffer injury fairly
traceable to any alleged increased risk of hacking caused by the AIA.
See MadStad, 2013 WL 3155280, at *6. The mere fact that MadStad,
like all other people and companies, faces cyber threats does not
create standing. In fact, MadStad cites statistics that indicate hacking
was a growing threat well before the AIA was even enacted. (Id.)
-
The MadStad court cited the United States Supreme Court ruling in
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, U.S. , 133 S.Ct. 1138, 185
L.Ed.2d 264 (2013)
The Supreme Court held that Amnesty did not have standing to assert
a constitutional challenge to FISA because its argument rested on its
speculative, subjective fear that:
(1) the Government will decide to target the communications of non-
U.S. persons with whom they communicate; (2) in doing so, the
Government will choose to invoke its authority under 1881a rather
than utilizing another method of surveillance; (3) the Article III judges
who serve on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court will
conclude that the Government's proposed surveillance procedures
(
satisfy 1881a's many safeguards and are consistent with the Fourth
Amendment; (4) the Government will succeed in intercepting the
communications of [Amnesty's] contacts; and (5) [Amnesty] will be
[a] part[y] to the particular communications that the Government
intercepts.
Id. at 1148. Because it found each of these steps highly speculative
and contingent on specific choices by the Government, the FISA
Court, and Amnesty itself, the Supreme Court decline[d] to abandon
[its] usual reluctance to endorse standing theories that rest on
speculation about the decisions of independent actors. Id. at 1150.
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs purchase of Krendlers
blog entry is no longer a material fact in dispute.
Defendant understands that tone of voice does not translate well in
the printed word. As a writer, Defendant assumes the reader will be
intelligent enough to get the joke without having to be told its a joke.
When Defendant wrote in his book Intentional Infliction that he did not
believe that Krendler would sue him for using the material because he would
have to reveal his identity to do so, the Defendant meant it as a sarcastic
aside, not as expectation that Defendant would be sued as Plaintiff alleges.
This sort of scenario is a recurring theme in Defendants dealings with the
Plaintiff. The Plaintiff took Beware the Ides of March to be a death threat
aimed at him. Defendant has learned that in his communications with
Plaintiff, he has to be clear and careful in his choice of words, as if talking to
a child, as the Plaintiff is likely to either inadvertently or advertently
)
misunderstand or misrepresent what Defendant said or wrote in an effort to
twist the statement to Plaintiffs advantage.
In paragraph (i) of Plaintiffs response to Defendants Motion for
Preliminary Judgment, Plaintiff goes on about his various counts against the
Defendant. These counts as alleged by Plaintiff are all moot as a result of the
fact that he did not apply for copyright applications for the March, April and
May editions of Hogewash until June 5, after instigating the instant suit on
May 27. Therefore, because of 17 USC 411(a), these counts cannot be
considered a material fact in dispute.
In what Defendant fears is yet another effort to confuse the issue and
muddy the waters for the Court, in paragraph (j) of his Response, he alludes
to Defendants allegation that Plaintiff attempted to register copyrights for
works in the public domain. It is true that Plaintiff attempts to do so as he
does not exclude any of the 70 NASA photos included in his registration of
the March, April and May 2014 issues of Hogewash as prescribed by the
US Copyright Office. The Plaintiff denies he attempted to register these
items, but there is no indication that he sets these images aside as he
attempts to register three months worth of blog posts. However, the issue is
mooted again by the fact that the Plaintiff did not apply for a Copyright
*
until June 5, after filing the instant case on May 27. Therefore, this is not a
material fact in dispute.
In paragraph (k) Plaintiff complains that Defendant accuses him of
trying to register the Defendants work under his own copyright. Using the
same rationale as demonstrated by his failure to set aside the NASA
photographs from his blanket copyright applications, Plaintiff does not set
aside the portions of Defendants blog that were used on Plaintiffs blog.
Again, the issue is mooted by the fact that the Plaintiff did not apply for a
Copyright until June 5, after filing the instant case on May 27. Therefore,
this is not a material fact in dispute.
In paragraph (l), the Plaintiff complains about Defendants allegation
that he comes to the instant case with unclean hands. There are instances,
despite Plaintiffs denials, where he used substantial portions of Defendants
blog on his own blog. Yet, the issue is mooted again by the fact that the
Plaintiff did not apply for a Copyright until June 5, after filing the instant
case on May 27. Therefore, this is not a material fact in dispute.
In paragraph (m), Plaintiff alleges that Defendant asserts Plaintiffs
copyright applications are defective on multiple grounds. He fails to
describe these grounds. However, the issue is mooted again by the fact
"+
that the Plaintiff did not apply for a Copyright until June 5, after filing the
instant case on May 27. Therefore, this is not a material fact in dispute.
Since none of the so-called Material Facts alleged by Plaintiff as
still being in dispute are, in fact, in dispute, this Court should grant
Defendants motion for Summary Judgment at the earliest possible time.
Plaintiff alleges the motion is premature as he should be allowed
sufficient time to conduct discover as to fully develop a cross motion and
supporting memorandum and to allow for the possibility of settlement via
ADR, the Defendant is at a loss for a legally acceptable word for
balderdash. For one thing, there will be no settlement of this copyright
case in ADR as the Plaintiff does not have a valid complaint, again, having
filed his copyright applications a week and more after filing the instant case.
There may be a settlement of the incipient counterclaim. Time will tell.
But as far as Plaintiffs assertion that Defendant misapplied the law to
some of the undisputed facts? Again, we reach into the lectionary of
terminology in search for a word that is similar to balderdash that wont
offend the Courts sensibilities.
Hoge argues that his filing of an Amended Complaint means the
original complaint is null and void. While that may be true, filing an
amended complaint, as explained earlier, does not restart a copyright
""
infringement suit and, as elucidated in MadStad v. UPSTO, one cannot
manufacture standing as a case progresses.
Hoge goes into a long treatise about the effect of amending a
complaint and so on and so on, but none of it deals with the very real fact
that once a lawsuit is filed, the lawsuit is filed. And 17 USC 411(a) must be
applied.
The Plaintiff makes the point about my admitting that the copyright
applications were filed as if that somehow proves his case. Of course they
were filed. Defendant and the Court saw what the Plaintiff purports is the
application. Hoge says, this amounts to a judicial admission of the filings.
OK.
Despite this Courts lesson in the meaning of the decision in Collins v.
Does 1-22, 11-cv-01772-AW, Hoge resurrects it and tries to reanimate it as
an argument for the validity of his registration. In the memorandum opinion
for the Plaintiffs Preliminary Injunction, as stated earlier in this brief, the
Court addressed the fallacy of that contention.
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant misunderstands copyright abuse.
One of Plaintiffs failings is his assumption that he is the only one who
understands the legal issues in these matters, as demonstrated by his multiple
"#
attempts to instruct this Court on the finer points of copyright law in the
Preliminary Injunction hearing.
Copyright misuse has nothing to do with Defendants argument for
invalidating Plaintiffs copyright registration. The applications are invalid
because they are invalid. He attempted to file three months worth of
Hogewash blogs as a daily newsletter when the blog does not fit the
requirements as described in Circular 62a definitions of a daily newsletter.
Hogewash is not a work for hire. It is a hobby blog. It is not news intended
for a special interest group, like a church, club, association, school, etc. In
fact (Exhibit C), Mr. Hoge explains that he writes what interests him and if
anyone else reads it, that means they are interested in it as well.
Despite the very nice story about the Morton Salt Shaker, that has
nothing to do with my allegations of copyright misuse which are part of the
counterclaim, not the copyright infringement case.
Hoge again argues (in case the Court missed it several pages earlier)
that he did not try to register copyright for works that do not belong to him.
However, as Defendant demonstrates earlier in this brief, Hoge makes no
exception in his applications for the public domain NASA photos, or the
portions of the Defendants blog all of which are grouped and included in
his improper registration of the blog as a Daily Newsletter.
"$
Whether or not charges are brought against Mr. Hoge for violation of
17 USC 506(c) or (e) is a matter for this court or law enforcement. It has no
bearing on the copyright infringement case.
In as much as the Plaintiff, fresh off the glory of his single victory
against this Defendant in the granting of a Peace Order, Hoge warned
Defendant not to contact him unless it was about a settlement offer. By
settlement offer, Hoge means a decision about how much I intend to pay
him. So, Defendant is forced to wonder just how in the world he was
supposed to coordinate with Hoge over whether or not the Plaintiff intended
to file a cross motion. In fact, on July 29, 2014, Plaintiff attempted to file a
Peace Order against Defendant for the crime of contacting him via e-mail for
something that did not relate directly to a settlement offer. The Peace Order
was denied by the District Court. Hoge has appealed to the Carroll County
Circuit Court. (Exhibit D)
Given that contacting Hoge for any reason is like trying to pet a
rattlesnake, Defendant is loath to discuss anything with Plaintiff.
As stated earlier, Defendant sees no reason to enter into a settlement
discussion with the Plaintiff as there is nothing to discuss. This Defendant is
certainly not going to give into Plaintiffs monetary demands or any other
demand related to the alleged infringement. Defendant will attend the
"%
hearing on August 14 as ordered, but other than the terms of settlement of
Defendants counterclaim, Defendant has absolutely nothing to discuss with
the Plaintiff as regards to the copyright infringement case, and this Court can
render the whole point moot by granting Defendants motion for a summary
judgment, or by dismissing Plaintiffs infringement case sua sponte.
WHEREFORE, Mr. Schmalfeldt asks the Court to rein in Mr. Hoges
vexatious, vindictive use of the court system, to deny any and all motions
filed by Plaintiff in the copyright infringement case, GRANT summary
judgment or DISMISS the case sua sponte or however else this Court can
bring this bad law school examination of a case against this Defendant to a
halt and allow the Defendant to proceed with his counterclaim.

DATED: AUGUST 4, 2014 Respectfully submitted,

________________________________________
William M. Schmalfeldt
6636 Washington Blvd. Lot 71
Elkridge, MD 21075
410-206-9637
bschmalfeldt@comcast.net


Verification

"&
I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct
to the best of my knowledge and belief and all copies are true and correct
representations of the original documents.


William M. Schmalfeldt



Certificate of Service

I certify that on the 14
h
day of August, 2014, I served a copy of the
foregoing Reply to Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction and
Memorandum in Support of Defendants Motion to Dismiss by First Class
Mail to W.J.J.Hoge, 20 Ridge Road, Westminster, MD 21157, Certified,
Return Receipt Requested.



William M. Schmalfeldt
"







EXHIBIT A

A SELECTION OF COMMENTS
FROM HOGEWASH SHOWING
HOGES UNWILLINGNESS TO
REDACT COMMENTS THAT
ARE EITHER OFF TOPIC OF
OBSCENE
"
From a Blog post from Hogewash, http://hogewash.com/2014/08/02/team-
kimberlin-post-of-the-day-339 -- the subject is a receipt in the Brett
Kimberlin case. Somehow, it becomes a thread about Schmalfeldt.


#

$
This is from a Hogewash post, http://hogewash.com/2014/08/01/breaking-
kimberlin-ordered-to-pay-sanction, the subject being Brett Kimberlin
Forced to Pay Sanctions. As usual

%
&


'

(



)


*


"+


""

"#

"$








"%


Some various, miscellaneous attack comments of the sort Hoge encourages.
Family members are not excluded, such as this shot at my wife.



The Court will no doubt recall that my wife was a key player in the filth that
Hoge claims to have purchased from the pseudonymous Paul Krendler.

"&


Leroy Oddswatch, who has changed his handle to Leroy Schmalfeldt, is no
cousin of mine. He claims to have known me as a child. I didnt have all that
many cousins, but I knew them all.

"'


"(

I found this one interesting as I figured all along the only reason Hoge
pushed so hard for his peace order was so that he and Walker (his right hand
man, makes every court appearance with him) would have the right to call
me an Adjudicated Harasser.


")

"*

#+


The topic of this next post was one of Hoges delightful Are You Pondering
What Im Pondering bits of whimsy.

#"



##


#$


#%

#&



"

EXHIBIT B

A SEGMENT OF AN EXHIBIT
HOGE OFFERED IN HIS
RESPONSE AND
DECLARATION, INDICATING
THE PRESENCE OF LINES
INDICATED THE PRESENCE OF
HYPERLINKS, FOLLOWED BY
SEVERAL INSTANCES OF MY
ORIGINAL PDF VERSION OF
MY SLOW, JOURNALISTIC
DEATH SHOWING WHERE
THOSE LINKS LEAD.




#


$

%

&

"





EXHIBIT C

A BLOG POST FROM
HOGEWASH PROVING THAT
THE BLOG DOES NOT MEET
THE SPECIFICATIONS FOR A
DAILY NEWSLETTER AS
ELUCIDATED IN CIRCULAR 62a
OF THE US COPYRIGHT
OFFICE, FOLLOWED BY PAGE
TWO OF CIRCULAR 62a
"

#

"



EXHIBIT D

DOCUMENTS SHOWING THAT
PLAINTIFF HOGE, DURING
THE PROGRESS OF THIS CASE,
IS TRYING YET AGAIN TO GET
A PEACE ORDER AGAINST ME
FOR CONTACTING HIM IN
WAYS THAT HE DOES NOT
APPROVE, A CLEAR ABUSE OF
THE COURTS AND PROOF OF
HIS VEXATIOUS NATURE.

#
.?
Carroll County
DISTRICT COURT OF MARYLAND FOR
Work:
City/Lounty
t ocated at
l0l N. Court St., Westminster, MD 21157
caseNo. 3P 5X5*Jot4
Court Address
William M. Schmalfeldt
Respondent
Trailer 7 l, 6636Washington Blvd.
o*\ffdbli?rinster,
MD 2 I I 57
Ho*",
4-!
street nooress'fl1pil?ge,
lv{o ua75
vs.
Ciry, State, zip Code
HoBE: ..-.--**
Work:
.-._--
Teledpne Numbe(s)
Telephone Numbe(s) City, State, Zip Code
PETITION FOR PEACE ORDER
(NOTE: Fill in the
Jollowine,.Checkins
the sppropfiate. Qoxe-;..lJyoy
nee.Q qdlitional paper, ask the clerk.)
The Respondent committed the folrowing acts against
KesPondeffwilliam
John Joseph Hoge
---_ffi
wirhin the pasr 30 days on the dates stated below. (check all that apply) ft ficHng I punching fl choking il slapping
I
shooting
f]
*p" or other sexual offense (or attempt) EI
tritting with object fl
stabbing fl
shovingfl threats of violence
Et harass.ent f] stalking D detaining against will fl t
"rpr,
I mdicious destruction of property E other
lT f.,tla.alllfiBhtffi)pts:,t
ndaP!srfz*t*ta ##r#,#;,{:ilffW#ilxksittrf frf{i8f"v{ff*,Entwr*:"ffi,1f'
can.):
___-___:'
not provide to a business relationship with a third parfy.
William John Joseph Hoge
20 Ridge Road
Copyright Act a he ieaulaing in disruption of a commercial website. Threats to file criminal charges
2. I know of the following court cases involving the Respondent and me:
u.s. DiES#6[ courr
".rr#dHf
PJrfifff*nt ,[iXr
niteo Resu[s or Status fil vou know)
Pendrn g setuement conrerence
Circuit Court peace order 2013 Ordor granted.6 month extension granted.
Respondent was subject to a peace order
3.Describeallotherharmthe\e1Pondenthascausedy9qqldgiv.e^date(s),ifknown
issued by Judge Stansfield of tlie Circuit Court on 14 June,2013. Because of continued harassment, the order was
extended for 6 months on 9 Dec,20l3. Order and extension were appealed. Court of Appeals denied cert on both appeals.
4. I want the Respondent to be ordered:
I
NOf to commir or threaten to commit any of the acts listed in paragraph I against
William John Joseph Hoge
William John Joseph Hoge
m
EI
tr
NOT to contact, attempt to
,
NOT to go to the residence(s) at
NOT to go to the sehool(s) at
E NOf to go to the work place(s) at
f] ro go to counseling. fl ro go ro mediation, I fo pay the filing fees and' court costs.
f] otner specific relief:
I solemnly affirm under the penalties of perjury that the contents of this Petition are true to the best of my knowledge,
information, and belief .
l7luly,20l4
NOTICE TO TETITIONER
Any individual who knowingly provides false information in a Petition for Peace Order is guilty of a misdemeanor
and on conviction is subject to a fine not exceeding $l ,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 90 days or both.
DC/PO 1(Rev.2l2W3)

$
iltilililtfl ilillilllililililtiltililililililililril||fi fl|il||illl!fifl llil
DISTRICT COURT OF MARYLAND FOR CARROLL COUNTY
101 NORTH COURT ST, WESTMINSTER, MD 21157-5111
Case No. 1002SP005252014
Date: 07 117 12414 10:17 a.m.
WILLIAM JOHN JOSEPH HOGE vs WILLIAM M SCHMALFELDT
ORDER OF DENIAL OF PETITION FOR PEACE ORDER
After the appearance of the PETITIONER, and
The petition is denied because: NO STATUTORY BASIS FOR
Date:0711712014
;:1i $
il':r"''
* ,,'
*l'-
.*
*
*
cc-Dc/Po 15(4/2008)
Page 1

%
DrsrRrcr couRT oF MARyLAND FoR
--
-.-c-qg9ll-c-gry-
CitYlCounry
CIVIL APPEAL/REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT
(APPL) (rRSc)
N. Court Str-eet, Westminster, MD 21157
'"
1:j::note an appeal in the case rererenced above. Appeilant is rhe |#O.Uof-.----.---
in
the said case.
_,/
E|/District Court cost of S10 enclosed. (Not applicable to Domestic Violence Appeals.)
{Ad* n".Circuit Court filing fee and surcharge enclosed:
,r"
E Domestic Violence Case $0 fl Appiication for Expungement of Police Records $55 Zl Other $135
(Checks madc pa,vabie io Ctcuit Coifl)
E Appellant, as an indi-eent, seeks a waiver of costs.
tr Vty claim amount exceeds 55,000 and I am enclosing a deposit of S75 for the required transcript"
NOTE: On appeal, a transcript of the District Court proceeding is required rvhen the claim amount exceeds
55,000 excluii,re of interest, costs, and attomey's fees. The cost is 53 per page for an original transcript and one
cop.v. A deposit of S75 is required r,r,,hen the transcript is requested. You rvi1l be billed for the balance. The
appeal wilinot be fonvarded until ali costs, including the cost of the transcript, have been paid in fui1'
Signcis E*ril Addrcss. if anY'
CERTTFICATE OF SERVICE
I certifv that I sen'ed a Notice of Appeal upon the follorving par-v or parties by mailing first-class mail. postage
DCiCV i7 iRer,. 7,'201i l
&