ARTICLE 48 - 49

Sin vs. Sin

GR No. 137590, March 26, 2001

FACTS:

Florence, the petitioner, was married with Philipp, a Portuguese citizen in January 1987. Florence filed in
September 1994, a complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Trial ensued and the parties presented
their respective documentary and testimonial evidence. In June 1995, trial court dismissed Florences petition and
throughout its trial, the State did not participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal Jabson filed with the trial court a
manifestation dated November 1994 stating that he found no collusion between the parties, he did not actively
participated therein. Other than having appearance at certain hearings, nothing more was heard of him.

ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity may be declared even with the absence of the participation of the State in
the proceedings.

HELD:

Article 48 of the Family Code states that in all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the
Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the state to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. The trial court
should have ordered the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the state.
No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification briefly stating his reasons for
his agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition. The records are bereft of an evidence that the State
participated in the prosecution of the case thus, the case is remanded for proper trial.

Ocampo vs Florenciano
107 Phil 35

FACTS:

Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938. They begot several children who are not living
with plaintiff. In March 1951, latter discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by
maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas. Having found out, he sent the wife to Manila in June 1951 to study
beauty culture where she stayed for one year. Again plaintiff discovered that the wife was going out with several
other man other than Arcalas. In 1952, when the wife finished her studies, she left plaintiff and since then they had
lived separately. In June 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with Nelson Orzame.
He signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation to which defendant manifested conformity provided
she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, Ocampo filed a petition for legal separation in
1955.

ISSUE: Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the confession of judgment disallowed by the
Family Code.

HELD:

Florencianos admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery, in the existence of evidence of
adultery other than such confession, is not the confession of judgment disallowed by Article 48 of the Family Code.
What is prohibited is a confession of judgment, a confession done in court or through a pleading. Where there is
evidence of the adultery independent of the defendants statement agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of
separation should be granted since it would not be based on the confession but upon the evidence presented by the
plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively on defendants confession. The petition should be
granted based on the second adultery, which has not yet prescribed.


ARTICLE 55-56

Lapuz - Sy vs Eufemio
DOCTRINE:
An action for legal separation is purely personal. Being personal in character, the death of one party to the action
causes the death of the action itself. The right to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, the loss of right
by the offending spouse to any share of the profits earned by the partnership or community, or his disqualification to
inherit by intestacy from the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of testamentary provisions in favor of the
offending spouse made by the innocent one,
are all rights and disabilities that are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses and by their nature, such claims
and disabilities are not assignable or transmissible.

FACTS:
CARMEN O. LAPUZ SY filed a petition for legal separation against EUFEMIO. She alleged that they were
married civilly on 9/21/1934 and had lived together as husband and wife continuously until 1943when her husband
abandoned her. They had no child.
She prayed for the issuance of a decree, which would order defendant Eufemio to be deprived of his share of the
conjugal partnership profits.
EUFEMIO alleged affirmative and special defenses and counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity ab initio of
his marriage with Carmen because of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and
customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok.
During trial, petitioner Carmen died in a vehicular accident on May 1969.
Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on 2 grounds that the: (1) petition for legal separation
was filed beyond the 1-year period provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code; and (b)death of Carmen abated the
action for legal separation.
Counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. Counsel
for Eufemio opposed the motion.
The court dismissed the case and stated that the motion to dismiss and the motion for substitution had to be
resolved on the question of whether or not the plaintiff's cause of action has survived, which the court resolved in
the negative.
Petitioner filed a petitioner for review of the order of dismissal, but the order of dismissal wasaffirmed.

ISSUES:
Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate theaction?

RULING: YES
An action for legal separation involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses is purely
personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes in Article 100 allows only the innocent spouse (and no one
else) to claim legal separation and in Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or
abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it
follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself.
Changes in property relations between spouses shows that they are solely the effect of the decree of legal
separation. Hence, they cannot survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree.
An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is that
these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such
rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in
expectation.
Regarding Eufemios petition for a declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage to Carmen Lapuz, it is apparent
that such action became moot and academic upon the death of the latter, and there could be no further interest in
continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union.





Gandionco vs Penaranda
GR No. 72984, November 27, 1987

FACTS:

Private respondent, Teresita Gandionco, filed a complaint against herein petitioner, Froilan Gandionco for legal
separation on the ground of concubinage as a civil case. Teresita also filed a criminal complaint of concubinage
against her husband. She likewise filed an application for the provisional remedy of support pendent elite which
was approved and ordered by the respondent judge. Petitioner moved to suspend the action for legal separation and
the incidents consequent thereto such as the support for pendent elite, in view of the criminal case for concubinage
filed against him. He contends that the civil action for legal separation is inextricably tied with the criminal action
thus, all proceedings related to legal separation will have to be suspended and await the conviction or acquittal of the
criminal case.

ISSUE: Whether or not a civil case for legal separation can proceed pending the resolution of the criminal case for
concubinage.

HELD:

Supreme Court ruled that the contentions of the petitioner were incorrect. A civil action for legal separation on the
ground of concubinage may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because
said civil action is not one to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense, even if both the civil and criminal
actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live
separately, with the legal consequences thereof including the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains,
custody of the children, support and disqualifications from inheriting from the innocent spouse. Decree of legal
separation may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence, where no criminal proceeding or conviction is
necessary.

Furthermore, the support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal separation, and granted
at the discretion of the judge. If in case, the petitioner finds the amount of support pendente lite ordered as too
onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or reduce the same.

Bugayong vs Ginez
GR No. 10033, December 28, 1956

FACTS:

Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the US Navy was married with Leonila Ginez on August 1949 at Pangasinan
while on furlough leave. Immediately after the marriage, they lived with the sisters of Bugayong in said
municipality before he went back to duty. The couple came to an agreement that Ginez would stay with his sisters
who later moved in Manila. On or about July 1951, she left the dwelling of the sisters-in-law and informed her
husband by letter that she had gone to Pangasinan to reside with her mother and later on moved to Dagupan to study
in a local college.

Petitioner then began receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco, (plaintiffs sister-in-law) and some from
anonymous writers, which were not produced at the hearing, informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife.
He admitted that his wife informed him by letter that a certain Eliong kissed her. All these communications,
prompted him in October 1951 to seek the advice of the Navy Chaplain who asked him to consult with the navy
legal department.

In August 1952, Bugayong went to Pangasinan and looked for his wife. They met in the house of the defendants
godmother. They proceeded to the house of Pedro, cousin of the plaintiff where they stayed for 1 day and 1 night as
husband and wife. The next day, they slept together in their own house. He tried to verify with Leonila the truth on
the information he received but instead of answering, she merely packed up and left which he took as a confirmation
of the acts of infidelity. He then filed a complaint for legal separation.

ISSUE: Whether there was condonation between Bugayong and Ginez that may serve as a ground for dismissal of
the action.

HELD:

Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation. A single voluntary
act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute condonation and where the parties
live in the same house, it is presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation.

Furthermore, Art. 100 of the Civil Code states that the legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse,
provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage.

ARTICLE 58

Pacete vs Cariaga
231 SCRA 321

FACTS:

Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between her
erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation between her and
Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She averred in her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April
1938 and they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la
Concepcion and that she learned of such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between her and Pacete was
impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.

The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to file an answer, which the
court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in communication, the defendants failed to file
an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default,
which the court forthwith granted. The court received plaintiffs evidence during the hearings held on February 15,
20, 21, and 22, 1980. After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17,1980.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners motion for extension of time to
file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its decision on March 17, 1980 which decreed
the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and held to be null and void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita.

HELD:

The Civil Code provides that no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney
to inquire whether or not collusion between parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall
intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.

The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for
legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere
contract.

Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal
separation must in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition, obviously
in order to provide the parties a cooling-off period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the
parties to reconcile.

The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by the inclusion of a
provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or
for legal separation. Therefore, if the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails
to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties
exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not
fabricated.

ARTICLE 63

Macadandang vs CA
GR No. 38287, October 23, 1981

FACTS:

Respondent Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang and petitioner Antonio Macadangdang were married in 1946 after
having lived together for two years and had 6 children. They started a buy and sell business and sari-sari store in
Davao City. Through hard work and good fortune, their business grew and expanded into merchandising, trucking,
transportation, rice and corn mill business, abaca stripping, real estate etc. Their relationship became complicated
and both indulged in extramarital relations. Married life became intolerable so they separated in 1965 when private
respondent left for Cebu for good. When she returned in Davao in 1971, she learned of the illicit affairs of her
estranged husband. She then decided to take the initial action. In April 1971, she instituted a complaint for legal
separation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has effect on the legal
separation.

HELD:

The death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has no effect on the legal separation. When the decree
itself is issued, the finality of the separation is complete after the lapse of the period to appeal the decision to a
higher court even if the effects, such as the liquidation of the property, have not yet been commenced nor
terminated.

The law clearly spells out the effect of a final decree of legal separation on the conjugal property. Therefore, upon
the liquidation and distribution conformably with the effects of such final decree, the law on intestate succession
should take over the disposition of whatever remaining properties have been allocated to the deceased spouse.

Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the final decree. Article 106 of the Civil Code, now
Article 63 of the Family Code provides the effects of the decree of legal separation. These legal effects ipso facto or
automatically follows, as an inevitable incident of the judgment decreeing legal separation, for the purpose of
determining the share of each spouse in the conjugal assets.