Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 163753 January 15, 2014
DR. ENCARNACION C. LUMANTAS, M.D., Petitioner,
vs.
HANZ CALAPIZ, REPRESENTED BY HIS PARENTS, HILARIO CALAPIZ, JR. and HERLITA CALAPIZ,Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
BERSAMIN, J .:
The acquittal of the accused does not necessarily mean his absolution from civil liability.
The Case
In this appeal, an accused desires the reversal of the decision promulgated on February 20, 2003,
1
whereby the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgment rendered on August 6, 1999 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13, in
Oroquieta City ordering him to pay moral damages despite his acquittal of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
serious physical injuries charged against him.
2

Antecedents
On January 16, 1995, Spouses Hilario Calapiz, Jr. and Herlita Calapiz brought their 8-year-old son, Hanz Calapiz (Hanz),
to the Misamis Occidental Provincial Hospital, Oroquieta City, for an emergency appendectomy. Hanz was attended to by
the petitioner, who suggested to the parents that Hanz also undergo circumcision at no added cost to spare him the pain.
With the parents consent, the petitioner performed the coronal type of circumcision on Hanz after his appendectomy. On
the following day, Hanz complained of pain in his penis, which exhibited blisters. His testicles were swollen. The parents
noticed that the child urinated abnormally after the petitioner forcibly removed the catheter, but the petitioner dismissed
the abnormality as normal. On January 30, 1995, Hanz was discharged from the hospital over his parents protestations,
and was directed to continue taking antibiotics.
On February 8, 1995, Hanz was confined in a hospital because of the abscess formation between the base and the shaft
of his penis. Presuming that the ulceration was brought about by Hanzs appendicitis, the petitioner referred him to Dr.
Henry Go, an urologist, who diagnosed the boy to have a damaged urethra. Thus, Hanz underwent cystostomy, and
thereafter was operated on three times to repair his damaged urethra.
When his damaged urethra could not be fully repaired and reconstructed, Hanzs parents brought a criminal charge
against the petitioner for reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries. On April 17, 1997, the
information
3
was filed in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Oroquieta City (MTCC), to which the latter pleaded not guilty
on May 22, 1998.
4
Under the order of April 30, 1999, the case was transferred to the RTC pursuant to Supreme Court
Circular No. 11-99.
5

At the trial, the Prosecution presented several witnesses, including Dr. Rufino Agudera as an expert witness and as the
physician who had operated on Hanz twice to repair the damaged urethra. Dr. Agudera testified that Hanz had been
diagnosed to have urethral stricture and cavernosal injury left secondary to trauma that had necessitated the conduct of
two operations to strengthen and to lengthen the urethra. Although satisfactorily explaining that the injury to the urethra
had been caused by trauma, Dr. Agudera could not determine the kind of trauma that had caused the injury.
In his defense, the petitioner denied the charge. He contended that at the time of his examination of Hanz on January 16,
1995, he had found an accumulation of pus at the vicinity of the appendix two to three inches from the penis that had
required immediate surgical operation; that after performing the appendectomy, he had circumcised Hanz with his
parents consent by using a congo instrument, thereby debunking the parents claim that their child had been cauterized;
that he had then cleared Hanz on January 27, 1995 once his fever had subsided; that he had found no complications
when Hanz returned for his follow up check-up on February 2, 1995; and that the abscess formation between the base
and the shaft of the penis had been brought about by Hanzs burst appendicitis.
Ruling of the RTC
In its decision rendered on August 6, 1999,
6
the RTC acquitted the petitioner of the crime charged for insufficiency of the
evidence. It held that the Prosecutions evidence did not show the required standard of care to be observed by other
members of the medical profession under similar circumstances. Nonetheless, the RTC ruled that the petitioner was liable
for moral damages because there was a preponderance of evidence showing that Hanz had received the injurious trauma
from his circumcision by the petitioner. The decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, this court renders judgment acquitting the accused, Dr. Encarnacion
Lumantas, of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries, but ordering him to pay Hanz CalapizP50,000.00
as moral damages. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC,
7
sustaining the award of moral damages. It opined that even if the petitioner had
been acquitted of the crime charged, the acquittal did not necessarily mean that he had not incurred civil liability
considering that the Prosecution had preponderantly established the sufferings of Hanz as the result of the circumcision.
The petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion on April 28, 2004.
8

Hence, this appeal.
Issue
Whether the CA erred in affirming the petitioners civil liability despite his acquittal of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in serious physical injuries.
Ruling
The petition for review lacks merit.
It is axiomatic that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
9
Nevertheless, the acquittal of an accused
of the crime charged does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability. In Manantan v. Court of Appeals,
10
the Court
elucidates on the two kinds of acquittal recognized by our law as well as on the different effects of acquittal on the civil
liability of the accused, viz:
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused.1wphi1 First is an
acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes the
door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can
never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the
civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the
situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt
on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not
exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
The Rules of Court requires that in case of an acquittal, the judgment shall state "whether the evidence of the prosecution
absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either
case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist."
11

Conformably with the foregoing, therefore, the acquittal of an accused does not prevent a judgment from still being
rendered against him on the civil aspect of the criminal case unless the court finds and declares that the fact from which
the civil liability might arise did not exist.
Although it found the Prosecutions evidence insufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction against the petitioner for the
crime charged, the RTC did not err in determining and adjudging his civil liability for the same act complained of based on
mere preponderance of evidence.
12
In this connection, the Court reminds that the acquittal for insufficiency of the
evidence did not require that the complainants recovery of civil liability should be through the institution of a separate civil
action for that purpose.
13

The petitioners contention that he could not be held civilly liable because there was no proof of his negligence deserves
scant consideration. The failure of the Prosecution to prove his criminal negligence with moral certainty did not forbid a
finding against him that there was preponderant evidence of his negligence to hold him civilly liable.
14
With the RTC and
the CA both finding that Hanz had sustained the injurious trauma from the hands of the petitioner on the occasion of or
incidental to the circumcision, and that the trauma could have been avoided, the Court must concur with their uniform
findings. In that regard, the Court need not analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the proceedings a quo.
The Court, by virtue of its not being a trier of facts, should now accord the highest respect to the factual findings of the trial
court as affirmed by the CA in the absence of a clear showing by the petitioner that such findings were tainted with
arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.
Every person is entitled to the physical integrity of his body.1wphi1 Although we have long advocated the view that any
physical injury, like the loss or diminution of the use of any part of ones body, is not equatable to a pecuniary loss, and is
not susceptible of exact monetary estimation, civil damages should be assessed once that integrity has been violated.
The assessment is but an imperfect estimation of the true value of ones body. The usual practice is to award moral
damages for the physical injuries sustained.
15
In Hanzs case, the undesirable outcome of the circumcision performed by
the petitioner forced the young child to endure several other procedures on his penis in order to repair his damaged
urethra. Surely, his physical and moral sufferings properly warranted the amount ofP50,000.00 awarded as moral
damages.
Many years have gone by since Hanz suffered the injury. Interest of 6% per annum should then be imposed on the award
as a sincere means of adjusting the value of the award to a level that is not only reasonable but just and commensurate.
Unless we make the adjustment in the permissible manner by prescribing legal interest on the award, his sufferings would
be unduly compounded. For that purpose, the reckoning of interest should be from the filing of the criminal information on
April 17, 1997, the making of the judicial demand for the liability of the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on February 20, 2003, with the modification that legal
interest of 6% per annum to start from April 17, 1997 is imposed on the award of:P50,000.00 as moral damages; and
ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.












Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 145391 August 26, 2002
AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO, petitioners,
vs.
MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA, respondent.
CARPIO, J .:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the Resolution
1
dated December 28, 1999 dismissing the petition for
certiorari and the Resolution
2
dated August 24, 2000 denying the motion for reconsideration, both issued by the Regional
Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, in Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99).
The Facts
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Laroya ("Laroya" for brevity) and the other owned by petitioner
Roberto Capitulo ("Capitulo" for brevity) and driven by petitioner Avelino Casupanan ("Casupanan" for brevity), figured in
an accident. As a result, two cases were filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court ("MCTC" for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac.
Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 002-99. On the other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict,
docketed as Civil Case No. 2089.
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the
civil case, filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of forum-shopping considering the pendency of the
criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion in the Order of March 26, 1999 and dismissed the civil case.
On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a separate civil action which can
proceed independently of the criminal case. The MCTC denied the motion for reconsideration in the Order of May 7, 1999.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court ("Capas RTC" for
brevity) of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66,
3
assailing the MCTCs Order of dismissal.
The Trial Courts Ruling
The Capas RTC rendered judgment on December 28, 1999 dismissing the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. The
Capas RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final order which disposes of the case and therefore
the proper remedy should have been an appeal. The Capas RTC further held that a special civil action for certiorari is not
a substitute for a lost appeal. Finally, the Capas RTC declared that even on the premise that the MCTC erred in
dismissing the civil case, such error is a pure error of judgment and not an abuse of discretion.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Capas RTC denied the same in the Resolution of
August 24, 2000.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
The petition premises the legal issue in this wise:
"In a certain vehicular accident involving two parties, each one of them may think and believe that the accident
was caused by the fault of the other. x x x [T]he first party, believing himself to be the aggrieved party, opted to file
a criminal case for reckless imprudence against the second party. On the other hand, the second party, together
with his operator, believing themselves to be the real aggrieved parties, opted in turn to file a civil case for quasi-
delict against the first party who is the very private complainant in the criminal case."
4

Thus, the issue raised is whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file,
simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal
case.
The Courts Ruling
Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Case No. 2089, which the MCTC dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping,
constitutes a counterclaim in the criminal case. Casupanan and Capitulo argue that if the accused in a criminal case has a
counterclaim against the private complainant, he may file the counterclaim in a separate civil action at the proper time.
They contend that an action on quasi-delict is different from an action resulting from the crime of reckless imprudence,
and an accused in a criminal case can be an aggrieved party in a civil case arising from the same incident. They maintain
that under Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil case can proceed independently of the criminal action. Finally,
they point out that Casupanan was not the only one who filed the independent civil action based on quasi-delict but also
Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle, who was not a party in the criminal case.
In his Comment, Laroya claims that the petition is fatally defective as it does not state the real antecedents. Laroya further
alleges that Casupanan and Capitulo forfeited their right to question the order of dismissal when they failed to avail of the
proper remedy of appeal. Laroya argues that there is no question of law to be resolved as the order of dismissal is already
final and a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed appeal.
In their Reply, Casupanan and Capitulo contend that the petition raises the legal question of whether there is forum-
shopping since they filed only one action - the independent civil action for quasi-delict against Laroya.
Nature of the Order of Dismissal
The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the ground of forum-shopping under Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did not state in its order of dismissal
5
that the dismissal was with prejudice.
Under the Administrative Circular, the order of dismissal is without prejudice to refiling the complaint, unless the order of
dismissal expressly states it is with prejudice.
6
Absent a declaration that the dismissal is with prejudice, the same is
deemed without prejudice. Thus, the MCTCs dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a dismissal without prejudice.
Section 1 of Rule 41
7
provides that an order dismissing an action without prejudice is not appealable. The remedy of the
aggrieved party is to file a special civil action under Rule 65. Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly states that "where the
judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65."
Clearly, the Capas RTCs order dismissing the petition for certiorari, on the ground that the proper remedy is an ordinary
appeal, is erroneous.
Forum-Shopping
The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment.
8
Forum-shopping is present when in the two or more
cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights of action and reliefs sought.
9
However, there is no forum-shopping in the
instant case because the law and the rules expressly allow the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed
independently of the criminal action.
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property based on the Revised Penal Code
while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these
two actions arose from the same act or omission, they have different causes of action. The criminal case is based on
culpa criminal punishable under the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under
Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. These articles on culpa aquiliana read:
"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from
the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for
the same act or omission of the defendant."
Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves, by preponderance of evidence, that he has suffered
damage because of the fault or negligence of another. Either the private complainant or the accused can file a separate
civil action under these articles. There is nothing in the law or rules that state only the private complainant in a criminal
case may invoke these articles.
Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure ("2000 Rules" for brevity) expressly
requires the accused to litigate his counterclaim in a separate civil action, to wit:
"SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) x x x.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any
cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action." (Emphasis
supplied)
Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his counterclaim in a separate civil action, there
can be no forum-shopping if the accused files such separate civil action.
Filing of a separate civil action
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure ("1985 Rules" for brevity), as amended in 1988, allowed the
filing of a separate civil action independently of the criminal action provided the offended party reserved the right to file
such civil action. Unless the offended party reserved the civil action before the presentation of the evidence for the
prosecution, all civil actions arising from the same act or omission were deemed "impliedly instituted" in the criminal case.
These civil actions referred to the recovery of civil liability ex-delicto, the recovery of damages for quasi-delict, and the
recovery of damages for violation of Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code on Human Relations.
Thus, to file a separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict under the 1985 Rules, the offended party had to
reserve in the criminal action the right to bring such action. Otherwise, such civil action was deemed "impliedly instituted"
in the criminal action. Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules provided as follows:
"Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the action,
reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of
the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation of the right to file,
any of said civil actions separately waives the others.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to
present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such
reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused.
x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules was amended on December 1, 2000 and now provides as follows:
"SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action
for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the
criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts
presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make
such reservation.
x x x
(b) x x x
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated
with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial
of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this rule governing consolidation of the civil and
criminal actions." (Emphasis supplied)
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is "deemed instituted" with the criminal action is only the action to recover
civil liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code are no longer "deemed instituted," and may be filed separately and prosecuted independently even without any
reservation in the criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file
a separate and independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code. The prescriptive period on the civil
actions based on these articles of the Civil Code continues to run even with the filing of the criminal action. Verily, the civil
actions based on these articles of the Civil Code are separate, distinct and independent of the civil action "deemed
instituted" in the criminal action.
10

Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still given the option to file a separate civil action to recover civil liability
ex-delicto by reserving such right in the criminal action before the prosecution presents its evidence. Also, the offended
party is deemed to make such reservation if he files a separate civil action before filing the criminal action. If the civil
action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is filed separately but its trial has not yet commenced, the civil action may be
consolidated with the criminal action. The consolidation under this Rule does not apply to separate civil actions arising
from the same act or omission filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.
11

Suspension of the Separate Civil Action
Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985 Rules, a separate civil action, if reserved in the criminal action, could not
be filed until after final judgment was rendered in the criminal action. If the separate civil action was filed before the
commencement of the criminal action, the civil action, if still pending, was suspended upon the filing of the criminal action
until final judgment was rendered in the criminal action. This rule applied only to the separate civil action filed to recover
liability ex-delicto. The rule did not apply to independent civil actions based on Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code, which could proceed independently regardless of the filing of the criminal action.
The amended provision of Section 2, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules continues this procedure, to wit:
"SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate
civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the latter shall be
suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last
until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is
rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal
action in the court trying the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil
action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right of the
prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the
parties to present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided
jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of the civil action which
cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled.
x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change the rule that the separate civil action, filed to recover
damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon the filing of the criminal action. Section 2 of the present Rule 111 also prohibits
the filing, after commencement of the criminal action, of a separate civil action to recover damagesex-delicto.
When civil action may proceed independently
The crucial question now is whether Casupanan and Capitulo, who are not the offended parties in the criminal case, can
file a separate civil action against the offended party in the criminal case. Section 3, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules provides
as follows:
"SEC 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offendedparty. It shall
proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal
action." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the amended 1985 Rules, expressly allows the "offended party"
to bring an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. As stated in Section 3 of the
present Rule 111, this civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the "offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission charged in the criminal action."
There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can file an independent civil action for quasi-delict
against the accused. Section 3 of the present Rule 111 expressly states that the "offended party" may bring such an
action but the "offended party" may not recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal
action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the offended party in the criminal action, not to the accused.
Casupanan and Capitulo, however, invoke the ruling in Cabaero vs. Cantos
12
where the Court held that the accused
therein could validly institute a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case.
In Cabaero, the accused in the criminal case filed his Answer with Counterclaim for malicious prosecution. At that time
the Court noted the "absence of clear-cut rules governing the prosecution on impliedly instituted civil actions and
the necessary consequences and implications thereof." Thus, the Court ruled that the trial court should confine itself
to the criminal aspect of the case and disregard any counterclaim for civil liability. The Court further ruled that the accused
may file a separate civil case against the offended party "after the criminal case is terminated and/or in accordance with
the new Rules which may be promulgated." The Court explained that a cross-claim, counterclaim or third-party complaint
on the civil aspect will only unnecessarily complicate the proceedings and delay the resolution of the criminal case.
Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 was incorporated in the 2000 Rules precisely to address
thelacuna mentioned in Cabaero. Under this provision, the accused is barred from filing a counterclaim, cross-claim or
third-party complaint in the criminal case. However, the same provision states that "any cause of action which could have
been the subject (of the counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint) may be litigated in a separate civil action." The
present Rule 111 mandates the accused to file his counterclaim in a separate civil actiosn which shall proceed
independently of the criminal action, even as the civil action of the offended party is litigated in the criminal action.
Conclusion
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is
not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation.
The commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil acti on under these
articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from
the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminal case where the civil
action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict - without violating
the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. The
commencement or prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is
that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. In most cases, the
offended party will have no reason to file a second civil action since he cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the accused. In some instances, the accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case
against his employer or guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in the criminal
case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the
accused "may be litigated in a separate civil action." This is only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited
from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is therefore
forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused does not file a separate civil acti on
for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is
filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that
the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing
a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due
process of law, access to the courts, and equal protection of the law.
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is proper. The order of dismissal
by the MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on the ground of forum-shopping is erroneous.
We make this ruling aware of the possibility that the decision of the trial court in the criminal case may vary with the
decision of the trial court in the independent civil action. This possibility has always been recognized ever since the Civil
Code introduced in 1950 the concept of an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Code. But
the law itself, in Article 31 of the Code, expressly provides that the independent civil action "may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter." In Azucena vs. Potenciano,
13
the Court declared:
"x x x. There can indeed be no other logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated
in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution whether it be conviction or acquittal would render
meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31 that this action 'may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."
More than half a century has passed since the Civil Code introduced the concept of a civil action separate and
independent from the criminal action although arising from the same act or omission. The Court, however, has yet to
encounter a case of conflicting and irreconcilable decisions of trial courts, one hearing the criminal case and the other the
civil action for quasi-delict. The fear of conflicting and irreconcilable decisions may be more apparent than real. In any
event, there are sufficient remedies under the Rules of Court to deal with such remote possibilities.
One final point. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000 while the MCTC issued the
order of dismissal on December 28, 1999 or before the amendment of the rules. The Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure must be given retroactive effect considering the well-settled rule that -
"x x x statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent."
14

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions dated December 28, 1999 and
August 24, 2000 in Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99) are ANNULLED and Civil Case No. 2089 isREINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.