You are on page 1of 8

uatchalian v.

Belim
Facts:

0n }uly 11, 197S, petitionei Reynalua uatchalian boaiueu as paying passengei a
minibus owneu by iesponuents. While the bus was iunning along the highway, a
"snapping sounu" was heaiu, anu aftei a shoit while, the bus bumpeu a cement
flowei pot, tuineu tuitle anu fell into a uitch. The passengeis weie confineu in the
hospital, anu theii bills weie paiu by iesponuent's spouse on }uly 14. Befoie Nis.
Belim left, she hau the injuieu passengeis sign an alieauy piepaieu affiuavit waiving
theii claims against iesponuents. Petitionei was among those who signeu.
Notwithstanuing the saiu uocument, petitionei fileu a claim to iecovei actual anu
moial uamages foi loss of employment oppoitunities, mental suffeiing anu
infeiioiity complex causeu by the scai on hei foieheau. Responuents iaiseu in
uefense foice majeuie anu the waivei signeu by petitionei. The tiial couit uphelu
the valiuity of the waivei anu uismisseu the complaint. The appellate couit iuleu
that the waivei was invaliu, but also that the petitionei is not entitleu to uamages.

Issues:

(1) Whethei theie was a valiu waivei
(2) Whethei the iesponuent was negligent
(S) Whethei the petitionei is entitleu to actual anu moial uamages

Belu:

(1) We agiee with the majoiity of the Couit of Appeals who helu that no valiu
waivei of hei cause of action hau been maue by petitionei. A waivei, to be valiu anu
effective, must in the fiist place be coucheu in cleai anu unequivocal teims which
leave no uoubt as to the intention of a peison to give up a iight oi benefit which
legally peitains to him. A waivei may not casually be attiibuteu to a peison when
the teims theieof uo not explicitly anu cleaily eviuence an intent to abanuon a iight
vesteu in such peison.

The ciicumstances unuei which the }oint Affiuavit was signeu by petitionei
uatchalian neeu to be consiueieu. Petitionei testifieu that she was still ieeling fiom
the effects of the vehiculai acciuent when the puipoiteu waivei in the foim of the
}oint Affiuavit was piesenteu to hei foi signing; that while ieauing the same, she
expeiienceu uizziness but that, seeing the othei passengeis who hau also suffeieu
injuiies sign the uocument, she too signeu without botheiing to ieau the }oint
Affiuavit in its entiiety. Consiueiing these ciicumstances, theie appeais substantial
uoubt whethei petitionei unueistoou fully the impoit of the }oint Affiuavit
(piepaieu by oi at the instance of piivate iesponuent) she signeu anu whethei she
actually intenueu theieby to waive any iight of action against piivate iesponuent.
Finally, because what is involveu heie is the liability of a common caiiiei foi injuiies
sustaineu by passengeis in iespect of whose safety a common caiiiei must exeicise
extiaoiuinaiy uiligence, we must constiue any such puipoiteu waivei most stiictly
against the common caiiiei. To upholu a supposeu waivei of any iight to claim
uamages by an injuieu passengei, unuei ciicumstances like those exhibiteu in this
case, woulu be to uilute anu weaken the stanuaiu of extiaoiuinaiy uiligence exacteu
by the law fiom common caiiieis anu hence to ienuei that stanuaiu unenfoiceable.
We believe such a puipoiteu waivei is offensive to public policy.

(2) In case of ueath oi injuiies to passengeis, a statutoiy piesumption aiises that
the common caiiiei was at fault oi hau acteu negligently "unless it pioves that it
|hauj obseiveu extiaoiuinaiy uiligence as piesciibeu in Aiticles 17SS anu 17SS." To
oveicome this piesumption, the common caiiiei must show to the couit that it hau
exeiciseu extiaoiuinaiy uiligence to piesent the injuiies. The stanuaiu of
extiaoiuinaiy uiligence imposeu upon common caiiieis is consiueiably moie
uemanuing than the stanuaiu of oiuinaiy uiligence. A common caiiiei is bounu to
caiiy its passengeis safely "as fai as human caie anu foiesight can pioviue, using
the utmost uiligence of a veiy cautious peison, with uue iegaiu to all the
ciicumstances".

The iecoius befoie the Couit aie beieft of any eviuence showing that iesponuent
hau exeiciseu the extiaoiuinaiy uiligence iequiieu by law. The obvious continueu
failuie of iesponuent to look aftei the ioauwoithiness anu safety of the bus, coupleu
with the uiivei's iefusal oi neglect to stop the mini-bus aftei he hau heaiu once
again the "snapping sounu" anu the ciy of alaim fiom one of the passengeis,
constituteu wanton uisiegaiu of the physical safety of the passengeis, anu hence
gioss negligence on the pait of iesponuent anu his uiivei.

(S) At the time of the acciuent, she was no longei employeu in a public school. Bei
employment as a substitute teachei was occasional anu episouic, contingent upon
the availability of vacancies foi substitute teacheis. She coulu not be saiu to have in
fact lost any employment aftei anu by ieason of the acciuent. She may not be
awaiueu uamages on the basis of speculation oi conjectuie.

Petitionei's claim foi the cost of plastic suigeiy foi iemoval of the scai on hei
foieheau, is anothei mattei. A peison is entitleu to the physical integiity of his oi
hei bouy; if that integiity is violateu oi uiminisheu, actual injuiy is suffeieu foi
which actual oi compensatoiy uamages aie uue anu assessable. Petitionei
uatchalian is entitleu to be placeu as neaily as possible in the conuition that she was
befoie the mishap. A scai, especially one on the face of the woman, iesulting fiom
the infliction of injuiy upon hei, is a violation of bouily integiity, giving iaise to a
legitimate claim foi iestoiation to hei conuitio ante.

Noial uamages may be awaiueu wheie gioss negligence on the pait of the common
caiiiei is shown. Consiueiing the extent of pain anu anxiety which petitionei must
have suffeieu as a iesult of hei physical injuiies incluuing the peimanent scai on
hei foieheau, we believe that the amount of PSu,uuu.uu woulu be a ieasonable
awaiu. Petitionei's claim foi P1,uuu.uu as attoiney's fees is in fact even moie
mouest.
uR No. L-Suu61 (Febiuaiy 27, 1974)
People vs. }abinal

FACTS:
}abinal was founu guilty of the ciime of Illegal Possession of Fiieaim anu
Ammunition.

The accuseu aumitteu that on Septembei S, 1964, he was in possession of the
ievolvei anu the ammunition uesciibeu in the complaint, without the iequisite
license oi peimit. Be, howevei, claimeu to be entitleu to exoneiation because,
although he hau no license oi peimit, he hau an appointment as Seciet Agent fiom
the Piovincial uoveinoi of Batangas anu an appointment as Confiuential Agent fiom
the PC Piovincial Commanuei, anu the saiu appointments expiessly caiiieu with
them the authoiity to possess anu caiiy the fiieaim in question.

The accuseu contenueu befoie the couit a quo that in view of his above-mentioneu
appointments as Seciet Agent anu Confiuential Agent, with authoiity to possess the
fiieaim subject mattei of the piosecution, he was entitleu to acquittal on the basis of
the Supieme Couit's uecision in People vs. Nacaianuang(19S9) anu People vs.
Luceio(19S8) anu not on the basis of the latest ieveisal anu abanuonment in People
vs. Napa (1967).

ISS0E:
Whethei oi not appellant shoulu be acquitteu on the basis of the couit's iulings in
Nacaianuang anu Luceio, oi shoulu his conviction stanu in view of the complete
ieveisal of the Nacaianuang anu Luceio uoctiine in Napa.

R0LINu:
Becisions of this Couit, unuei Aiticle 8 of the New Civil Coue states that "}uuicial
uecisions applying oi inteipieting the laws oi the Constitution shall foim a pait of
the legal system . ." The settleu iule suppoiteu by numeious authoiities is a
iestatement of legal maxim "legis inteipietatio legis vim obtinet" the
inteipietation placeu upon the wiitten law by a competent couit has the foice of
law.

Appellant was appointeu as Seciet Agent anu Confiuential Agent anu authoiizeu to
possess a fiieaim puisuant to the pievailing uoctiine enunciateu in Nacaianuang
anu Luceio unuei which no ciiminal liability woulu attach to his possession of saiu
fiieaim in spite of the absence of a license anu peimit theiefoi, appellant must be
absolveu. Ceitainly, appellant may not be punisheu foi an act which at the time it
was uone was helu not to be punishable.
The appellant was acquitteu.




People vs. Jabinal

Facts
Respondent appealed from the judgment of the MTC Batangas finding him guilty
of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition he contested the
validity of his conviction based on a retroactive application of the ruling in People
v. Mapa.
Respondent was appointed as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of
Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial
Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the
authority to possess and carry the firearm in question.
Respondent alleged that at the time of his appointments the prevailing doctrines
are Macarandang and Lucero doctrine.
In Macarandang it was held that"peace officers" are exempted from the
requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms.
While Lucero doctrine provides that the granting of the temporary use of the
firearm to the accused was a necessary means to carry out the lawful purpose of
the battalion commander and must be deemed incident to or necessarily included
in the duty and power of said military commander to effect the capture of a Huk
leader.
Respondent and OSG alleged that the decision held in Mapa Case is of no
applicability in this case

Issue
W/N the appellant should be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings in
Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete
reversal of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa case?

Ruling

The SC held that the decision in People v. Mapa reversing the Macarandang and
Lucero doctrines came only in 1967, it has no proper application in this case.
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form
a part of the legal system in the Philippines.
The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the
jurisprudence, hence, of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found by
possession of the firearm in question and when he was arraigned by the trial
court.
It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a
doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new
doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who
had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
Petitioner incurred no criminal liability at the time of the commission of the
crime since the prevailing doctrine then were the doctrines of Macarandang and
Lucero

You might also like