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THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988

FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely,
GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL, SR., respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

CORTES, J.:

This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2) resolutions of the Special First Division of the
Court of Appeals in the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution
promulgated on 30 September 1987 denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration and
directed entry of judgment since the decision in said case had become final; and the second Resolution dated 27 October 1987
denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for having been filed out of time.

At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not being verified as required by Rule 65 section 1 of the
Rules of Court. However, even if the instant petition did not suffer from this defect, this Court, on procedural and substantive
grounds, would still resolve to deny it.

The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the
tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of
Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity
to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial
Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross
negligence and awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the
Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by petitioners on August 25,
1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of
time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the appellate court in the Resolution of September
30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of
October 27, 1987.

This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners' motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed entry of judgment and denied their motion for reconsideration.
It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461,
that the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. In its Resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration, promulgated on July 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated and
clarified the rule, to wit:

Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension
of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial
Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the
court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. (at p. 212)

Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 73146-53, August 26, 1986, 143
SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and went further to restate and clarify the modes and periods of appeal.

Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15, 1986,144 SCRA 161],stressed the prospective application of
said rule, and explained the operation of the grace period, to wit:

In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the promulgation on May 30, 1986 of the Court's Resolution in the
clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986, within which the rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new
trial or reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly enforceable.

Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February 27, 1986, it is still within the grace period, which expired
on June 30, 1986, and may still be allowed.

This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 73669, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA
306].]

In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time was filed on September 9, 1987, more than a year after
the expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within the coverage of the grace period. Considering
the length of time from the expiration of the grace period to the promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on August
25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion
for reconsideration within the reglementary period.

Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the
non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was


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promulgated. Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official
Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer
in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified,
consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as
the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.

This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court's
decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the proprietor of a building or
structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary
repairs.

Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had the "last clear chance" to avoid the
accident if only they heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring shop and , therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be
disregarded, since the doctrine of "last clear chance," which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this
case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the instant petition for lack of merit.

Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.


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G.R. No. 77656 August 31, 1987
ROBERTO ANTONIO, DIONISIO BENSION, CONRADA CHAN, MARINO CUMLAT, VICENTE DIMACUHA, PROCOPIO
ESPEJON, RODRIGO FORBES, MANITO FUENTES, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SPECIAL ELEVENTH DIVISION, HON. ANTONIA C. MACANDOG, in her capacity as
then presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch CXX and ALICIA BILAN, respondents.

GANCAYCO, J:
This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It seeks to annul the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals 1 promulgated on March 10, 1987 which denied the admission of the petitioners' Motion
for Reconsideration of the decision
2
earlier rendered. Also, it prays that a writ of preliminary injunction be immediately
issued to restrain the respondent Regional Trial Court in Caloocan City, Branch CXX, from implementing its Order dated March
6, 1987, which issued a writ of execution in accordance with the Court of Appeals decision on the case, thereby asking that said
court be directed to defer or stay the execution pending the resolution of this petition and an annulment case allegedly
appealed with the Court of Appeals.
The petitioners are lessees of an apartment building located in No. 121, 2nd Street, 9th Avenue, Caloocan City. This property
was foreclosed by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) after its original owner failed to pay back his loan.
After due notice to the petitioners and all others concerned, the property was sold to the private respondent at a public
bidding held on July 29, 1982. It appears, petitioners deliberately did not participate in the said bidding because they believed
that, as tenants therein, they have priority in law to acquire the property. Their thinking was that their participation would be
deemed a waiver of their right to question the act of the GSIS in selling the property and would adversely affect their offer to
buy the same.
The award or sale of the property to the private respondent was duly approved by the GSIS Board of Trustees in its Resolution
No. 772 adopted on August 20, 1982. It was then certified that the possession and administration of the property had been
transferred to the private respondent A conditional deed of sale was executed in favor of private respondent by the GSIS
stating that for all intents and purposes, the private respondent is the owner of the property.
The GSIS advised the petitioners that they should now pay their rent and arrearages to the private respondent. But despite
repeated written demands, the petitioners failed and refused to settle their accounts.
After a barangay conciliation proceeding proved futile, the private respondent filed a complaint for ejectment against the
petitioners with the Metropolitan Trial Court in that locality. Said court rendered judgment on January 8, 1985, ordering the
petitioners to vacate the premises occupied by them and to pay certain amounts as damages.
Not satisfied therewith, the petitioners appealed to the respondent Regional Trial Court which, on August 20, 1985, rendered a
decision affirming in toto the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court.
The petitioners then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the respondent Court of Appeals. This case was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 07828.
On December 5, 1986, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the petitioner for review. Later an
entry of judgment dated February 3, 1987, was duly certified thereupon by the Clerk of Court attesting to the fact that the
judgment became final and executory as of January 22, 1987. The records of the case were consequently, remanded to the
respondent Regional Trial Court on February 11, 1987.
On February 23, 1987, the petitioners, through their new counsel, filed an "Appearance And Motion For Leave To Admit
Motion For Reconsideration, together with the Motion For Reconsideration With Prayer For Issuance Of Temporary
Restraining Order," with the respondent Court of Appeals. They moved that the respondent Court of Appeals admit their
motion for reconsideration, which was obviously filed beyond the reglementary period for filing the same, alleging that their
counsel of record abandoned them and migrated to the United States without at least informing them that a decision was
rendered against them.
The petitioners' motion was denied by the respondent Court of Appeals in the Resolution dated March 10, 1987, now put in
issue. It is hereunder reproduced, thus:
Now before this Court is an Appearance and Motion for Leave to Admit Motion for Reconsideration' filed by
petitioners in the above-entitled case on February 23, 1987 on the ground that their former counsel Atty.
Funelas had abandoned the case and is now abroad, together with the corresponding Motion For
Reconsideration With Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order.
Considering that the decision sought to be reconsidered dated December 5, 1986 had become final, entry of
judgment having been issued on February 3, 1987 and the records remanded to the court a quo on February
11, 1987, for which reason the said decision has become final and this Court has become bereft of jurisdiction
to act thereupon, the abovementioned Motions are hereby noted. Parenthetically, and merely for purposes of
record, it is observed that counsel of record of petitioners is the law office Funelas, Perez and Associates and
not Atty. Funelas alone. Therefore, the fact that Atty. Funelas has abandoned the case and is now abroad is not
a valid ground for the late filing of the motion for reconsideration.
3

Earlier, on March 6, 1987, the respondent Regional Trial Court issued an order
4
for a writ of execution to be issued against the
petitioners for the enforcement of the decision in CA-G.R. No. 07828.
Henceforth, the petitioners, believing that they were deprived of their day in court when the respondent Court of Appeals
denied their motion for reconsideration, instituted this petition.
As their initial argument in this petition and as contained in their "Appearance And Motion For Leave To Admit Motion For
Reconsideration," the petitioners maintain that they were deprived of their day in court-equivalent to a denial of due process
of law-when their motion for reconsideration was refused due course by the respondent Court of Appeals. They alleged that
their counsel at that time, Atty. Pitty A. Funelas, virtually abandoned them by leaving abroad without at least notifying them.
So when the Court of Appeals decision was rendered and a copy was sent to Atty. Funelas, no notice thereof was ever received
by the petitioners. The petitioners only had knowledge of the judgment against them after it was eventually entered in the
Book of Entries Of Judgments for being final and executory.
A certain Romeo S. Obligar, representing himself as the former messenger of Atty. Funelas, executed an affidavit on February
19, 1987 stating among others that while getting the mails from the Post Office last January 6, 1987, for his new employer, he


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received the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 07828; that since the records of that case was with Atty. Funelas, he was not able to
contact the petitioners herein; and that he forgot all about said decision until a secretary informed him that the petitioners
were verifying the said case when they happened to visit the office of his new employer.
We agree with the Court of Appeals in denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. It is well-settled that after the lapse
of fifteen (1 5) days from notice of judgment, the same becomes final and the Court of Appeals loses, jurisdiction over the case.
And the subsequent filing of a motion for reconsideration cannot disturb the finality of the judgment nor restore jurisdiction
which had already been lost.
5
The court a quo cannot decide the case anew. decision rendered anew notwithstanding the
finality of the original one is null and void.
6

In this case, the messenger, Mr. Obligar, received a copy of the decision on January 6, 1987. This decision became final and
executory on January 22, 1987. Thus, the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners on February 23, 1987, could not
be acted upon on the merits and could only be noted by the respondent Court of Appeals. It was properly denied.
The negligence attributed by the petitioners to their then counsel, Atty. Funelas, is not excusable. Clear and as it can be seen
from the pleadings filed that the petitioners' counsel of record is the law office of Funelas Perez and Associates and not Atty.
Funelas alone. Atty. Funelas signed the documents in his capacity as the representative of the said law firm. The respondent
Court of Appeals made this same observation in its questioned resolution.
In an attempt to belie the preceding observation, the petitioners submitted to this Court another affidavit executed by Mr.
Obligar dated March 17, 1987. This affidavit stated that the law firm of Funelas, Perez and Associates was actually composed of
only Atty. Funelas; that Atty. Perez was only a partner in name, never handled any case of the law office, and did not actually
report in said office; that there were no associates of Atty. Funelas; and that said law firm was dissolved in August, 1986. This
affidavit has no evidentiary value. It was executed and submitted after the questioned resolution was already promulgated.
Hence, it could not have affected or influenced the adjudication of the said resolution.
It is safe to presume that a law firm which registered and represented itself as such, with at least two named partners, is
composed of at least two lawyers. And if it is true that this law office was earlier dissolved, the winding up process is
presumed to have been performed in a regular manner, with all the obligations properly accounted for. Very concrete
evidence must be presented in order that these presumptions may be rebutted.
At most, the affidavit must be classified as a mere afterthought and a futile attempt to contradict the findings of the respondent
Court of Appeals.
Recently, this Court laid down a ruling that is applicable to this case. It reads:
When a party appears by attorney in an action or proceeding all court, all notices required to be given therein
must be given to their attorney and not to the client. Hence, a notice given to the client and not to his attorney
is not a notice in law.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that the client is bound by the negligence or failings of counsel. It is the duty of
an attorney to himself and to his clients to invariably adopt a system whereby he can be sure of receiving
promptly all judicial notices during his absence from his address of record. The attorney must so arrange
matters that communications sent by mail addressed to his office or residence, may reach him promptly. ...
7

In the motion for reconsideration, the sole issue presented for reconsideration was a mere amplification of one argument
already passed upon by the respondent Court of Appeals in its decision.
On January 18, 1983 before the ejectment case was instituted, the petitioners filed a complaint in the then Court of First
Instance to annul the award in a public auction of the leased premises by the GSIS to the private respondent for they claimed
that as tenants therein, they have the priority in law over the same. The court, in a decision rendered on January 28, 1985,
dismissed the case for lack of a cause of action. Now, this case is allegedly pending appeal in the Court of Appeals.
The issue, thus, advanced in the motion for reconsideration is whether the pendency of an annulment case of an award in
public auction is prejudicial to an ejectment suit as to warrant the suspension of the latter proceeding.
We quote with approval the holding of the respondent Court of Appeals on this matter, thus:
The pendency of an action for title filed by the defendants (now petitioners) with the Regional Trial Court
does not have the effect of removing the ejectment case from the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court.
The rule is well- settled that an action for ownership or annulment of title is not a bar to an action for forcible
entry and detainer (Alviar, et al. vs. Pampolina, et al., 84 Phil. 45, at p. 47; Padilla vs. de Jesus, et al., 95 Phil.
688, at p. 691; Aguilar vs. Cabrera, et al., 74 Phil. 658, at p. 868.)
8

In an ejectment case, the issue is possession, while in an annulment case the issue is ownership.
9
Therefore, an ejectment case
can very well proceed independently of an annulment case. The only recognized exception to the preceding doctrine is the
situation wherein the question of possession is so intertwined with the question of ownership to the effect that the question of
possession cannot be resolved without resolving the question of ownership. This case at bar does not fall within the exception.
Accordingly, the petitioners' position that this ejectment proceeding should be suspended in deference to an annulment
proceeding presently pending in another forum must necessarily be rejected.
The order of the respondent Regional Trial Court for the issuance of a writ of execution was because the decision in the
ejectment case had already become final and executory. Its implementation cannot be stayed.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. With costs against petitioners. This is immediately executory.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa and Cruz, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., took no part.



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A.M. No. 1048 July 14, 1995
WELLINGTON REYES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR M. GAA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
This administrative complaint for disbarment charges respondent, a former Assistant City Fiscal of manila, with malpractice
and willful violation of his oath as an attorney.
I
On March 30, 1971, at around 9:00 A.M. complainant reported to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that he
had been the victim of extortion by respondent, an Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, who was investigating a complaint for estafa
filed by complainant's business rival. According to complainant, he had given respondent P500.00 on March 1, 1971 and a total
of P500.00 on three other occasions. He said that another "payoff" was scheduled at 11:00 A.M. that day in respondent's office
at the City Hall. An entrapment was set up by the NBI. Complainant furnished the NBI agents several peso bills totalling
P150.00 for marking. The paper bills were sent to the Forensic and Chemistry Division of the NBI and subsequently returned
to complainant for the use in the entrapment. When complainant went to respondent's office, he was told that the latter would
not return until around 2:30 P.M. So complainant and the NBI agents went back at around 2:30 P.M. As there were other
persons doing business with respondent, complainant had to wait for thirty minutes. When finally complainant was able to see
respondent, the latter greeted him in Tagalog "Ano ba ang sa iyo?" Complainant answered "Hindi tayo nagkita kaninang
umaga." To which respondent replied "Oo, kanina pa kita hinihintay." Complainant then handed to respondent the marked
money which he placed inside his right pocket. The NBI agents then apprehended respondent and brought him to the NBI
Forensic and Chemistry Division for examination. Respondent's hands were found positive of the yellow florescent powder
applied earlier to the marked money. Respondent was thereafter taken to the Office of the Anti-Organized Crime Division of
the NBI where he was photographed, fingerprinted and record checked. Respondent declined to give a sworn statement to
explain his side of the case, invoking his right against self-incrimination.
On the same date, the NBI recommended the prosecution of respondent for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019.
On April 13, 1971, the NBI recommended to the Secretary of Justice the filing of administrative charges and the institution of
disbarment proceedings against him. On April 21, 1971, President Marcos suspended respondent from office pending
investigation and disposition of his administrative case (Case No. 74). Aside from the criminal complaint and Administrative
Case No. 74, two other cases were earlier filed against respondent: namely, Administrative Case No. 10 for Grave Misconduct
filed by one Angel Alora on October 13, 1969, wherein respondent was found guilty as charged and was recommended for
suspension; and Administrative Case No. 10-A. for partiality filed by Fabiola Fajardo on April 26, 1970, which was pending
resolution. In his answer to the complaint for disbarment, respondent asserted that complainant surreptitiously planted the
marked money in his pocket without his knowledge and consent. He further said that the criminal case (IS No. 71-6558) filed
against him by the NBI at the instance of complainant was still pending preliminary investigation by the City Fiscal of Manila.
In connection with the incident of March 30, 1971, he said that he had filed a criminal complaint for incriminatory
machination, perjury and attempted corruption of a public official against complainant with the City Fiscal of Manila. In reply
to the answer, complainant denied that the several cases against respondent were motivated by revenge, malice or personal ill
will. He said that the investigating fiscal had recommended the dismissal of the charges filed by respondent against him.
In a resolution dated December 23, 1971, this Court resolved to refer the disbarment case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. However, upon the adoption of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court., the case
was transferred to the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and disposition.
On March 15, 1993, Commissioner Vicente Q. Roxas of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) recommended that respondent be disbarred. Said recommendation was approved by the IBP Board of
Governors in its resolution dated March 26, 1994.
II
We agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
In the case at bench, respondent was caught in flagrante delicto in the act of receiving the marked money from complainant
during the entrapment conducted by the NBI agents, which resulted in his arrest and the subsequent filing of administrative
and criminal cases against him. In his defense, respondent merely denied the charge of extortion and retorted that the marked
money was planted by complainant.
It is settled that affirmative testimony is given greater weight than negative testimony (Delos Reyes v. Aznar, 179 SCRA 653
[1989]). When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he
must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him (Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics 93 [1949]). He must show
proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him (Bayasen v. Court of
Appeals, 103 SCRA 197 [1981]; Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393 [1978]).
Where the misconduct of a lawyer as a government official is of such a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to
show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds (Gonzales-Austria v. Abaya, 176
SCRA 634 [1989]).
The extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as a public official, which also constitutes a violation of his
oath as a lawyer. The lawyer's oath (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 138, Section 18; People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968 [1958]),
imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and
its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action (Agpalo, Legal Ethics 66-67 [1983]).
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this
resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the personal records of
respondent.
SO ORDERED.



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A.C. No. 2033 May 9, 1990
E. CONRAD and VIRGINIA BEWLEY GEESLIN, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FELIPE C. NAVARRO, respondent.
A.C. No. 2148 May 9, 1990
ATTY. FRANCISCO ORTIGAS, JR. and ATTY. EULOGIO R. RODRIGUEZ, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FELIPE C. NAVARRO, respondent.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Pea & Marcos for complainants in AC No. 2033.
Felipe C. Navarro for and in his own behalf.

PER CURIAM:
We write this finale to the dispiriting charges filed by complainants Francisco Ortigas, Jr. and Eulogio R. Rodriguez in
Administrative Case No. 2148
1
and by spouses E. Conrad and Virginia Bewley Geeslin in Administrative Case No.
2033
2
seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty. Felipe C. Navarro for malpractice and gross misconduct.
In our resolution dated May 5, 1980, issued consequent to the Report and Recommendation of the Office of the Solicitor
General submitted to this Court on April 21, 1980, we ordered the suspension of respondent Navarro from the practice of law
during the pendency of these cases.
3

The investigative phase was conducted by said office pursuant to our resolutions of February 14, 1975 and September 13,
1976 in G.R. Nos.
L- 39386 and L-39620-29, entitled "Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et al." With commendable
thoroughness and attention to detail, two reports were submitted which, in order to vividly portray the scope and magnitude
of respondent's operations and how he was able to perpetrate the anomalous transactions complained of, we quote
extensively from said reports which are sustained by the evidence of record.
I. The antecedent facts on which Administrative Case No. 2148 is premised are reported by then Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza, as follows:
PREPATORY STATEMENT
This unnumbered administrative case against respondent Atty. Felipe C. Navarro (hereinafter called respondent NAVARRO, for
short) originally stemmed from the letter of a certain Angelito B. Cayanan to the Honorable Supreme Court dated January 25,
1975 which reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
I wish to respectfully inform your good office that I bought a few lots on installment basis from Atty. Felipe C. Navarro of Ruby
Hills Subdivision as evidenced by the attached OR Nos. 0512 and 0519 and a "Contract of Sale".
Atty. Navarro, some officials and representative of the said company claim that although there is a pending case No. L-39386
under Decree No. 1425 on the property being sold, the case is almost won in their favor and are just waiting for your final
decision within a couple of months or even less.
In this connection, I am respectfully writing you this letter in order to bring to your attention this transaction and to protect
my rights in the event that any unfavorable circumstances may arise in the future.
xxx xxx xxx
Acting on the aforesaid letter, the Supreme Court, per Resolution dated February 14, 1975, referred the copy of Mr. Cayanan's
letter to the Solicitor General for "investigation of the existence of sufficient ground to proceed with the prosecution of Atty.
Felipe C. Navarro (whose address of record is No. 66 Azucena, Roxas District, Quezon City) for suspension or removal from the
office of attorney and for appropriate action." The resolution reads as follows:
L-39386 and L-39620-29 (Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et al.) The court NOTED the letter dated
January 25, 1975 of Mr. Angelito B. Cayanan with its attachments (copy thereof has been furnished Atty. Felipe C. Navarro,
counsel for respondents) and RESOLVED to instruct the Clerk of Court to inform him of the status of the cases at bar.
It appearing from said letter that Atty. Felipe C. Navarro has been selling the lots in litigation herein on installment basis to the
public (among them, Mr. Cayanan) as "absolute owner by virtue of this contract of legal services in Civil Case No. 8321, etc. of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig" (see Ruby Hills Subdivision Contract of Sale), which lots are titled in the name of
herein petitioner and not in Atty. Navarro's name and that the unwarranted claim is made on his behalf that 'the case is almost
won in their favor' (see Mr. Cayanan's letter), the Court RESOLVED FURTHER to refer copy of Mr. Cayanan's said letter with its
attachments to the Solicitor General under Rule 139, Sections 1, 3, 4 and 5 for investigation of the existence of sufficient
ground to proceed with the prosecution of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro (whose address of record is No. 66 Azucena, Roxas District,
Quezon City) for suspension or removal from the office of attorney and for appropriate action.
Aside from Mr. Cayanan, the Solicitor General is directed to communicate in the premises with Atty. Eulogio R. Rodriguez of
the law firm of Ortigas & Ortigas (with address at 10th Floor, Ortigas Bldg. Ortigas Ave., Pasig, Rizal), who under letter of June
10, 1974 on file in Administrative Case No. 1154 has offered to make available documents in their possession showing other
sales made by Atty. Navarro of properties titled in the name of other persons, involving a total selling price of P75 million and
down payments of almost P 0.6 million.
On April 4, 1975, Assistant Solicitor General (now Justice of the Court of Appeals) Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. wrote Mr. Angelito B.
Cayanan asking him to submit his affidavit embodying the circumstances surrounding the matters contained in his letter dated
January 25, 1975, especially the second paragraph thereof. The letter was sent to Mr. Cayanan by registered mail but the same
was returned unserved for the reason that the addressee had moved to another address.
On the same date, April 4, 1975, Assistant Solicitor General Gutierrez, Jr. also wrote to Atty. Eulogio R. Rodriguez requesting
him for copies of the documents evidencing the sales made by respondent Navarro.
On February 13, 1976, this Honorable Court issued a Resolution in L-39386 and L-39620-29 (Florentina Nuguid Vda. de
Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et al.) referring the letter of Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr. dated January 13, 1976 "for investigation
of the existence of sufficient grounds for the prosecution of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro for suspension or removal from office and
for appropriate action" and directing "Mr. Ortigas, Jr., to furnish the Office of the Solicitor General for the purpose with a copy
of said letter and all its pertinent attachments."
The aforementioned letter of Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr. dated January 13, 1976 reads as follows:


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xxx xxx xxx
Dear Justice Teehankee,
This is to apprise your Office of the latest activities of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro who has previously been reported to the Supreme
Court as selling properties titled in the name of this Company.
We have just secured a new "subdivision plan" of Atty. Navarro showing that the lots he is now selling to the public include
those titled in the names of the heirs of the late Don Vicente Madrigal and this Company in Quezon City. Atty. Navarro has thus
expanded his activities despite recent detention by the Military. As could be seen from the attached "plan", Navarro claims to
be the owner of that huge property (actually titled in the name of the Madrigals and this Company) bounded by Ortigas
Avenue, E. delos Santos Avenue, White Plains Road and R. Rodriguez Avenue, comprising approximately of 260 hectares.
As reported in our previous letters to the Court, Navarro claims to be the owner of some 4,000 hectares of land in the Greater
Manila Area in virtue of his handling the case of some squatters on a 1.2-hectare lot in Mandaluyong, Rizal owned by Dona
Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer. He contends that whereas his squatters-clients occupy only about a hectare, he has
become, in virtue of his contract of legal services' with them, the owner of thousands of hectares of land as these are allegedly0
covered by void titles. Navarro thus started to openly sell these properties.
Navarro's Ruby Hills and Bluehills Subdivisions, for instance, cover properties already with buildings and other
improvements. He has nevertheless been quite successful in selling portions thereof, as when he sold lots within the De La
Salle College, Wack-Wack Golf & Country Club, ABM Sison Hospital, etc. His modus operandi is described in this Company's
letter complaint dated April 8, 1974 to Gen. Prospero Olivas, copy of which is attached hereto for ready reference.
Navarro continues to defy the authorities, for only after a brief lull he is now again openly selling titled properties of other
persons. We have provided more than sufficient documentary evidence to the Court and the Solicitor General and we hope
that formal administrative charges can now be filed against Navarro to prevent him from further perpetrating a large scale
fraud upon the public.
xxx xxx xxx
Thereafter, hearings were conducted on various dates.
COMPLAINANTS' EVIDENCE
The evidence for the complainants consist mainly of documents, most of which were presented in Criminal Cases Nos. 3158
and 3159 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and in the various civil cases before the said court involving Florentina Nuguid
Vda. de Haberer. Complainants' sole witness, Reynaldo Morallos, merely identified the various documentary exhibits
presented by the complainants.
From the evidence adduced by the complainants, it appears that a certain Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer (hereinafter
called HABERER, for short) filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal twenty-two (22) cases for recovery of possession of her
1.2 hectare property in Mandaluyong, Rizal titled in her name, and to eject the twenty-two (22) families squatting thereat.
Eleven (11) of these cases were raffled to Judge Emilio Salas, while the other eleven (11) cases were assigned to Judge Pedro
Navarro. All the twenty-two (22) defendants-squatters were represented by respondent NAVARRO. On behalf of his clients,
respondent NAVARRO interposed as principal defense, the alleged nullity of the HABERER'S title, claiming that the mother title
from which it emanated actually originated from Decree No. 1425 issued in G.L.R.O. Record No. 917, which he claims to be
non-existent.
The two sets of cases were decided differently. In the first set of eleven (11) cases, Judge Salas rendered a decision on August
31, 1970 sustaining the validity of the HABERER'S title and ordering the eviction of the defendants-squatters clients of
respondent NAVARRO (Exhibit W). In finding for the plaintiff, Judge Salas stated as follows:
After due consideration of the evidence adduced by both parties, this Court finds that most of the documentary evidence
submitted by defendants are irrelevant to the case since they pertain to defendants claim of ownership over 10,000 hectares
of land when the area of the property subject matter of the complaint is only 12,700 square meters. This Court also believes
that the above-mentioned claims of defendants are untenable.
Plaintiffs ownership over the property in question is evidenced by the issuance in her name, since 1929, of Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 15043. It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to
the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. After the expiration of the one-year period from the issuance
of the decree of registration upon which it is based, it becomes incontrovertible (see case of Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, 43
Phil. 558; Reyes & Nadres vs. Borbon & Director of Lands, 50 Phil. 791; Manuel Sy Juco, et al. vs. Luis Francisco, 53 O.G., p.
2186, April 15,1957; Brizuela et al. vs. Ciriaco Vda. de Vargas, 53 O.G., p. 2822, May 15, 1957).
Defendants' claim that they became owners of the land in question by adverse possession is without merit considering that
title to land becomes non-prescriptible Sec. 42 of Act No. 496 provides that no title to registered land in derogation to that of
the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession (Corporation de Pp. Agustines vs. Crisostomo, 42
Phil. 427). A title once registered cannot be defeated even by adverse, open and notorious possession. Registered title under
the Torrens System cannot be defeated by prescription. The title, once registered, is notice to the World. All persons must take
notice. No one can plead ignorance of registration (Legarda vs. Saleeby, 3 Phil. 590, 595).
Further, defendants recognized plaintiffs ownership over the property in question when they filed a petition with the People's
Homesite & Housing Corporation wherein they sought the latter's intervention for the acquisition of the property and for the
subdividing thereof into small lots to be sold to them at nominal cost. In said petition defendants not only named the plaintiff
as the owner of the property in question but they also indicated therein her title to the land as Transfer Certificate of Title No.
15043 of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal. We quote hereunder the pertinent facts and data concerning the property in
question in defendants' petition submitted to the General Manager of the People's Homesite & Housing Corporation, as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
1) Location of land: Barrio Burol, Mandaluyong, Rizal
2) Name of registered owner: Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer
3) Address of owner: 1288 Burgos St., Paco, Manila, or c/o Bausa, Ampil, & Suarez Law Offices, Madrigal Bldg., Manila
4) Certificate of Title No. (attach photostatic copy): 15043
5) Area of land, Lot & Block & Survey Nos. 12,700 square meters(Exh G).
As regards defendants' claim that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 issued since 1929 in the name of plaintiff is null and
void, this Court is of the opinion that defendants cannot assail the validity of said title in this proceeding, which is for recovery


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of possession. Any attack on the decree of registration of title must be direct and not by collateral proceeding. The title which
may be issued in pursuance of said decree cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged or diminished in a collateral
proceeding (Legarda, et al. vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590). In the case of Director of Land vs. Gan Tan, G.R. No. L-2664, May 30, 1951,
our Supreme Court, in reversing the decision of the trial court where the registered owner was considered disqualified to
acquire land under the Constitution and consequently was denied the right to constitute his title, said: "That the
disqualification raised by the Court is untenable in the light of the theory that a Torrens title cannot be collateraly attacked.
That issue can only be raised in an action instituted expressly for that purpose". (See also Ramon Chua Yu Sun vs. The Hon.
Ceferino de los Santos, et al., G.R. No. 4347, November 23,1951; James (sic) G.R. No. L-4013, Dec. 29,1951; Samonte, et al. vs.
Descallar et al., No. L-12964, Feb. 29,1960).
In view of the above-mentioned ruling of the Supreme Court, it is our opinion that there is no need to discuss the merits of the
reasons claimed by defendants why Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 in the name of plaintiff is null and void. (Exh. W)
Decision in Civil Cases Nos. 8322, 8323, 8327, 8370, 8375, 8374, 8382, 8691, 8693, 8696 & 8699, at pages 6-7; 9-10).
In the second set of eleven (11) cases, Judge Pedro Navarro decided in favor of the defendants-squatters clients of respondent
NAVARRO. In his decision dated May 26, 1971, dismissing the complaints, Judge Navarro stated as follows:
Plaintiff claims to be the registered owner of a parcel of land containing an area of 12,000 square meters situated at the corner
of A. Luna, Harapin Ang Bukas and J.C. Zuluete Streets, Mandaluyong, Rizal, which is covered by, and more particularly
described in, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal and indicated in the sketch plan attached
to the complaint as Annex A.
xxx xxx xxx
It likewise appears that ejectment proceedings have been filed in the Municipal Court of Pasig, Rizal, and in the City Court of
Quezon City against several persons occupying other parcels by Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership, where decisions
have been rendered in favor of said Partnership. In order to forestall executions of these decisions defendants in said
ejectment cases filed class suit before this Court by the occupants of the land which was heard and tried before Branch XV in
which the Director of Lands was impleaded as a party-defendant. The decision of Branch XV in said class suit is made part of
the evidence of these defendants in the herein eleven cases for whatever the same may be worth as aid in the determination of
the merits of the issues raised herein.
As may be gleaned from said decision of Branch XV plaintiff therein assailed the validity of Decree No. 1425 as null and void
and or fictitious and the proceedings in GLRO Rec. No. 917 upon which the decree was based as also null and void. The Court
sustained the herein plaintiffs claim and rendered judgment declaring (1) the proceedings in GLRO Rec. No. 917 null and void;
(2) the Decree No. 1425 null and void; (3) all original certificates of title issued by virtue of and pursuant to the judgment in
GLRO Rec. No. 917 and Decree No. 1425 utter nullities; (4) all transfer certificates of title derived from the original certificates
of title declared void under No. 3 above, particularly but not exclusively, Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 77652 and 77653 of
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and 126575 and its derivative Transfer Certificate of 'title No. 135879 of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal, null and void; (5) that the rightful owners of the litigated lands covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
77652, 77653, 126575 (or 135879) are the herein plaintiffs . . . and so forth.
The Court has read copy of this decision of our Branch XV and observed findings of facts too ponderous to be ignored.
That case before Branch XV directly assails the nullity of the proceedings leading to the proceedings in GLRO Record No. 917
and, as an inevitable corollary, the nullity of Decree No. 1425 issue by virtue of such void proceedings as well as the original
certificates of title issued as consequence thereof.
In said proceeding before Branch XV the Court, among other things, found that while the decision in GLRO 917 was supposedly
rendered on April 25, 1905, the survey of the property subject matter of therein application was not made until June 16 to
August 16, 1906, or some one year after the decision. It found no proof of initial hearing of the application for registration
being published as required by law without which the Land Registration Court could not have acquired jurisdiction over the
case. Said decision also made inference that since the survey of the property was not made until a year after the rendition of
the judgment the technical descriptions appearing in the original certificates of title issued under GLRO Rec. No. 917 Decree
No. 1425, could not have been those appearing in the notice of initial hearing, if any. Publication of accurate technical
description being an essential jurisdictional requirement which cannot be dispensed with and non-compliance with this
requirement renders the proceedings and the decision and decree and titles issued arising therefrom null and void.
The same decision of Branch XV also made its findings that James Ross who was said to have penned the decision in GLRO Rec.
No. 917, never was a judge of the Court of Land Registration at the time the decision was supposedly rendered because the
Gaceta Official for the year 1905 does not show that James Ross was listed as Judge of the Land Registration Court or that he
was ever appointed in that capacity. Furthermore, the Court found that while J.C. Welson was the Clerk of Court on April 26,
1905, one A.K. Jones issued the decree and he signed it as Clerk of Court. The Court even found the supposed decision in that
proceedings missing and made its conclusion that since the decree which was supposedly issued by a person who was not the
Clerk of Court at the time and which decree did not contain the description of the property ordered in the decision to be
rendered because the survey of the property was only made some one year later and that said decree cannot now even be
found, the decision rendered therein is void for lack of jurisdiction.
Now, as we have said, the foregoing findings of facts are too ponderous to be ignored. It is indeed a truism that a void original
certificate of title cannot be the source of a valid transfer certificate of title and a void judgment is, in the eyes of the law,
inexistent and cannot give source to any legal right.
The evidence now shows that the plaintiffs in said Civil Case No. 7-M(10339) before Branch XV of this Court are also the
defendants in the herein eleven cases in which their properties are also involved. Since the case before Branch XV directly
assails the nullity of the proceedings by virtue of which Decree No. 1425 and the alleged title of the plaintiff over the parcels of
land occupied by the herein eleven defendants is a derivative from such decree, it is the considered opinion of this Court that
until and unless the decision of Branch XV of this Court is reversed or set aside by final judgment, plaintiffs prayer to order the
herein eleven defendants in these eleven cases to vacate the parcels which they occupy and on which their respective houses
are built has become premature. It goes without saying that if said decision of Branch XV will be finally affirmed, or that the
same becomes final and executory, all the claims of rights to ownership and possession of properties embraced in the decision
in GLRO Rec. No. 917 and Decree No. 1425 shall become absolute nullities. Possessions by actual occupants of all these
properties had better be maintained until after final decision in Civil Case No. 7-M(10339) shall have been rendered. (Exh. R,
Decision in Civil Cases Nos. 8320, 8321, 8326, 8369, 8379, 8383, 8385, 8386, 8387 and 8700, at pp. 2, 5-9).


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On June 21, 1971, Judge Navarro, acting on the motion filed by respondent NAVARRO, issued an order cancelling HABERER's
title over her property in question and directing the issuance of a new title in lieu thereof in favor of respondent's clients Thus

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaints in the above-entitled cases (Nos.
8320, 8321, 8326, 8329, 8376, 8379, 8383, 8386, 8685, 8687 and 8700) all with costs against the plaintiff and hereby ordering
the Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal issued in favor
of the plaintiff Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer and in view thereof issue new certificates of title in favor of the defendants
subject to the lien for attorney's fees in favor of Attorney Felipe Navarro in accordance with the terms of the "Kasunduan
Hinggil sa Serbisyo ng Abogado" which is quoted in hisex-parte motion for clarification and/or modification of the decision.
As so modified the decision stands in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
(Exhibit S, pp. 4-5).
On July 23, 1971, HABERER filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order, and on September 15, 1972, Judge
Navarro issued the following order:
In the order dated July 17, 1971, the Court had occasion to reiterate that its decision in this case was mainly predicated on the
decision of Branch XV of this Court that the certificate of title emanating from the proceedings in GLRO Record No. 917 were
null and void and plaintiffs title happened to be one of them. The Court opined that until said decision is reversed the actual
occupants had better be maintained in their possessions of the land.
Pursuant to the same order the motion for reconsideration and new trial was set only for reception of alleged newly
discovered evidence.
The Court now understands that the decision of Branch XV is now under review by order of our Appellate Court.
It has also come to the understanding of the Court that the order of June 21, 1971, sought to be reconsidered insofar as it
ordered the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 in favor of the plaintiff, also adversely affects the interests of
other persons and entities like the Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, which is not a party herein, because the certificate
of title of the plaintiff is also a derivative of GLRO 917 and Decree No. 1425 from which Ortigas and Company, Limited
Partnership, derives titles over wide tracts of land. Since Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, is not a party in this case
whatever orders or decisions are made in this case cannot be made to affect the said company. Decisions and orders can only
affect parties to the case.
The Court therefore arrives at the conclusion that the order dated June 21, 1971, must be reconsidered on two grounds (1)
because the decision of Branch XV is now being the subject of further proceedings and (2) because it has the effect of adversely
affecting the interest of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, which is not even a party herein.
WHEREFORE, as prayed, the order dated June 21, 1971, is set aside. However, the decision dated May 26, 1971, insofar as it
denies the ejectment of the present occupants of the land as stated in the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
(Exhibit T, at pp. 2-3).
HABERER appealed from the decision of Judge Navarro while the defendants-clients of respondent NAVARRO appealed from
the decision of Judge Salas. The Navarro order of June 21, 1971 was not appealed by respondent NAVARRO's clients.
After the rendition of the Navarro decision which made reference to the decision rendered by Judge Vivencio Ruiz of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, respondent NAVARRO published in the Manila Times on July 4, 1971 the following:
LEGAL NOTICE TO ALL THOSE INVOLVED:
PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF LAW AS INTERPRETED BY OUR SUPREME COURT RESPECTING A VAST TRACT OF LAND
LATIFUNDIO COVERING MANDALUYONG, SAN JUAN, PASIG, MARIKINA, AND QUEZON CITY, THE DECISION DATED MAY 26,
1971 REITERATING AND REPEATING THE DECLARATION AND ORDER THAT ALL ORIGINAL AND TRANSFER CERTIFICATES
OF TITLE DERIVED FROM DECREE NO. 1425 ARE NULL AND VOID AB INITIO RENDERED BY THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
OF RIZAL IN FAVOR OF THE MYRIAD CLIENTS OF THE UNDERSIGNED HAS AUTOMATICALLY BY MERE LAPSE OF THE
REGLEMENTARY PERIOD) BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
But to every possessor in good faith there comes a time when he is considered a possessor in bad faith. When the owner or
possessor with a better right comes along, when he becomes aware that what he had taken for granted is at least doubtful, and
when he learns the grounds in support of the adverse contention, good faith ceases. The possessor may still believe that his
right is more secure, because we resign ourselves with difficulty to the sight of our vanishing hopes, but when the final
judgment of the court deprives him of the possession, all illusion necessarily disappears. (Tacas vs. Robon, 53 Phil. 356, 361-
362 citing Manresa and Articles 528, 545, and 1123 of our present Civil Code).
He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to
indemnity (Art 449, Civil Code)
HOWEVER, IT IS NOT THE DESIRE OF THE UNDERSIGNED PREVAILING PARTY AND SUCCESSOR BY TITLE ACQUIRED AFTER
THE ACTIONS WERE BEGUN BY VIRTUE OF HIS CONTRACT OF LEGAL SERVICES TO DEMAND FOR THE DEMOLITION OR
REMOVAL OF THE IMPROVEMENTS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE POSSESSOR IN BAD FAITH FOR:
The Civil Code confirms certain time-honored principles of the law of property. One of those is the principle of accession
whereby the owner of property acquires not only that which it produces but that which it united to it either naturally or
artificially. Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of another, and the improvements or repairs made thereon, belong
to the owner of the land. Where however, the planter, builder or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises
between the owners and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the
owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating what Manresa calls a state of "forced co-ownership" (Vol. 3, 4th
ed., p. 213), the law has provided a just and equitable solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the
improvements after the payment of the proper indemnity or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower
to pay the proper rent. It is the owner of the land who is allowed to exercise the option because his right is older and because,
by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing." Bernardo vs. Bataclan, 66 Phil. 598, 602;
see also Filipinas Colleges, Inc. vs. Garcia Timbang, et al., 106 Phil. 247, 254).
So caveat emptor (buyers beware) of possesors in bad faith as we are ready to ask for the execution of the decision pursuant to
law and avoid a scire facias Ordinary prudence requires that those involved may please make some kind of arrangements with
the undersigned before execution by calling through the following telephones:


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xxx xxx xxx
BY THE WAY, YOU ARE ALL INVITED TO JOIN THEMOTORCADE OF OUR PEOPLE'S VICTORY WHICH WILL PASS THROUGH
THE PRINCIPAL STREETS OF MANDALUYONG, SAN JUAN, PASIG, MARIKINA, AND QUEZON CITY FROM 9 A.M. TO 12 NOON
TODAY, SUNDAY, JULY 4, 1971, THE MOTORCADE WILL BEGIN FROM NO. 61 AMADO T. REYES STREET, BARRIO BUROL,
MANDALUYONG, RIZAL RETURNING TO THE SAME PLACE AT NOON FOR LUNCH CELEBRATING TILL MIDNIGHT.
(Sgd.) FELIPE C. NAVARRO
Counsel for the Defense
60 Azucena, Roxas District, Quezon City
(Exhibit D, at pages 6-8).
Thereafter, respondent NAVARRO claimed ownership of properties originally covered by Decree 1425 including the parcels of
land owned by Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership (hereinafter called ORTIGAS, for short), and started selling them.
In view of the aforementioned publication, panic ensued among the lot buyers of ORTIGAS and among the property owners
whose titles were derived from Decree No. 1425. As a counter measure to allay the fears of the panicky lot buyers and owners,
ORTIGAS caused the publication in the Manila Times on July 19 and 17, 1971 the following:
WARNING
SO THE PUBLIC MAY KNOW
In reply to numerous inquiries received by Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership with reference to an advertisement
published in the Manila Times on July 4, 1971 supposedly affecting the validity of all original certificates of title and transfer
certificates of title derived from Decree No. 1425, Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership wishes to announce that it is not a
party to ANY case allegedly decided on May 26, 1971 by the Supreme Court or any other court and therefore ALL ITS TITLES
DERIVED FROM DECREE NO. 1425 ARE NOT IN ANY WAY AFFECTED BY SAID DECISION.
The public is hereby requested to be wary of any person selling lands and/or rights to lands belonging to and in the name of
Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership.
The public is also warned to be wary of MISLEADING adverstisements and/or persons basing their rights to lands of Ortigas &
Company, Limited Partnership on such "decision" of May 26, 1971 which is claimed to be "final and executory."
ORTIGAS & COMPANY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
(Exhibit D, at pages 4-5).
After the publication of the foregoing notices, respondent NAVARRO filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VIII,
two (2) complaints for libel against the officers of ORTIGAS and the officials of the defunct Manila 'times. Respondent
NAVARRO sought to recover in said cases damages allegedly sustained by him on account of his failure to consummate
thousands of sales by reason of the publication of the above notice. In support of his allegation, respondent NAVARRO
presented 169 deeds of sale over lots in his various subdivisions, the locations of which overlap the properties owned by
ORTIGAS (marked as Exhibit F, F-1 to F-168 in the instant proceedings).
On December 13, 1971, Judge Benjamin H. Aquino dismissed these two cases for libel for lack of merit (Exhibit D).
Apart from the documents pertaining to the HABERER cases and the libel cases, the complainants also presented documents
relating to Civil Case No. 7-M(10339), Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, entitled "Pedro del Rosario, et al. vs. Ortigas &
Company, Limited Partnership, et al." and Civil Case No. Q-16265, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVI,
entitled "Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership vs. Felipe C. Navarro."
In Civil Case No. 7-M (10339), the plaintiffs therein sought to enjoin ORTIGAS from ejecting them. Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz
decided in favor of the plaintiffs, arguing that (1) there was no publication for the Notice of Initial Hearing set in 1905; (2)
there was no survey of the property sought to be registered; (3) the judge presiding over the defunct Court of Land
Registration was fake; and (4) the Clerk of Court of the said Court was also fake. The dispositive portion of the Ruiz decision
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby declares and/or orders:
1. That the proceedings in G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 917 are null and void;
2. That Decree No. 1425 is null and void and/or fictitious;
3. That all the original certificates of title issued by virtue of and pursuant to the judgments in G.L.R.0 Rec. No. 917 and Decree
No. 1425 were utter nullities;
4. That all transfer certificates of title derived from the original certificates of title declared void under No. (3) above,
particularly but not exclusively, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 77652 and 77653 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
and 126575 and its derivative Transfer Certificate of Title No. 135879 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, were and are null and
void;
5. That the rightfully (sic) owners of the litigated lands covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 77652, 77653, 126575 (or
135879) are the herein plaintiffs, the portions owned by them being as indicated in Exhibit P;
6. That the defendant Partnership cease and desist from molesting the plaintiffs in the enjoyment and peaceful possession of
their respective landholdings;
7. That the Hon. Andres Siochi, as Presiding Judge, Municipal Court, Pasig, Rizal, and Hon. Ricardo Tensuan, as Presiding Judge,
Branch II, City Court of Quezon City, and the defendant Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership, their agents,
representatives and any and all persons acting in their behalves, refrain and desist absolute (sic) and perpetually from
proceeding with or taking any action on Civil Cases Nos. 1134, II 13865, II-13869, II-13877, II-13913, and II-13921 filed by the
herein defendant Partnership against some of the herein plaintiffs;
8. That the case be dismissed as against defendant Director of Lands;
9. That the defendant Partnership pay to the plaintiffs the sum of P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees;
10. That the defendant Partnership pay to the plaintiffs the costs of the suit; and
Defendant Partnership's counterclaim is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
(Exhibit EE at pages 5-6).
ORTIGAS appealed the Ruiz decision to the Court of Appeals. On November 21, 1971, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
setting aside the decision of Judge Ruiz and ordering a new trial to enable the petitioner to introduce newly discovered
evidence. The case was then remanded to the lower Court. On November 3, 1973, Judge Arsenio A. Alcantara, who took the


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place of Judge Ruiz who was separated from the service by the President of the Philippines, rendered a decision the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant, Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, as against the
plaintiffs:
1. Dismissing the amended complaint;
2. Confirming the validity of Decree No. 1425, issued in Expediente 917 and all titles emanating therefrom;
3. Directing each of the plaintiffs to individually pay the defendant Company:
(a) P30.00 per month as rental of the premises occupied by them from the time of the filing of the complaint on October 20,
1967, with legal rate of interest, until they surrender the possession thereof to defendant Company;
(b) P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.
(4) Ordering plaintiff and their successors-in-interest, agents or any person or persons acting in their behalf, who are found to
be in possession of defendant company's land to vacate the same and remove and demolish their improvements thereon at
plaintiffs expenses;
(5) Ordering Atty. Emilio D. Castellanes to return the attorney's fees in the amount of P 1,030.00 he prematurely collected
from defendant company, with interest; and
(6) To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
(Exhibit DD at pages 44-45).
The aforesaid decision was appealed. During the pendency of the approval of the record on appeal, ORTIGAS filed a motion for
immediate execution of judgment. After exchange of pleadings by the parties, the trial court presided by Judge Alcantara
granted the motion and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of Ortigas upon filing a bond in the amount of
P250,000.00. Del Rosario, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order. Despite opposition by Ortigas, Judge
Florellana Castro-Bartolome, who was appointed to Branch XV vice Judge Alcantara, granted the motion for reconsideration
and set aside the order of Judge Alcantara. Ortigas contested the order of Judge Bartolome through a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-04060.
On September 1, 1975, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision in the aforesaid case, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted. The order of the respondent Judge dated February 25, 1975, is hereby annulled
and set aside and the order of Judge Arsenio Alcantara, granting immediate execution, is hereby revived, with instructions to
the respondent judge to fully implement the latter order, including the approval of the petitioner's bond and the issuance of
the necessary writ or writs of execution. The restraining order issued at the inception of this action is hereby (sic) permanent.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
(Exhibit EE at pages 50-51).
This decision was the subject of a petition for review filed by respondents Del Rosario, et al., but the same was denied. So also
with the motion for reconsideration filed with the Supreme Court (Annex "A" of Exhibit FF)
In order to stop respondent NAVARRO from selling its titled properties, ORTIGAS also filed Civil Case No. Q-16265, Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch XVI, entitled "Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership vs. Felipe C. Navarro.
On December 16, 1972, Judge Sergio A.F. Apostol rendered a decision in favor of Ortigas as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
It having been found that defendant was guilty of bad faith and fraud in claiming and selling plaintiff's land, plaintiff is entitled
to attomey's fees. This court finds the amount of attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00 to be fair and reasonable considering
the extent and value of the property involved and the nature of the case.
Defendant, in his answer and motion to dismiss, alleged that as a result of the issuance of the restraining order, he suffered
damages in the amount of Pl,000,000.00 daily.
Firstly, the same was not raised as a counterclaim. Therefore, this court can only treat it as an affirmative defense.
Secondly, no evidence was submitted to prove this claim of damages. Under the same authorities cited in support of the denial
of plaintiffs claim for damages, therefore, he has failed to establish what damages he had suffered.
Lastly, the court has found that plaintiff is entitled to the injunction prayed for. It follows, therefore, that the issuance of the
restraining order was proper and, hence, can not be the basis for a claim for damages.
This court cannot help but end this decision with a note of admonition and hope. The people who will ultimately suffer the
most from defendant's acts in question are his buyers, who in all probability are middle class people who themselves wanted
to make money out of the apparent sad predicament that defendant had brought upon the plaintiff. It is the fervent hope of
this court, therefore, that with the advent of the NEW SOCIETY defendant will turn a new page and make a fresh start in life.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Upholding the validity and indefeasibility of plaintiffs Transfer Certificates of Title over the land in question;
2. As a consequence thereof, forever enjoining and barring the defendant, his successors-in-interest, assigns, agents or any
person or persons acting for or in his behalf, from selling and advertising, verbally, or in writing, the sale of the lands in
question and from asserting any claim or dominion or possession whatsoever on or over the said property, directly or
indirectly, adverse to the plaintiff; and
3. Ordering the defendant to pay attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00 plus cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.
(Exhibit II-I-a, at pages 409-411 of Exhibit II).
The afore-quoted decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. L-53125-R.
On December 13, 1978, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision in the aforesaid case affirming the decision of Judge
Apostol.
Respondent NAVARRO elevated the case to this Honorable Tribunal (G.R. No. L-50156). Again, his petition was denied for lack
of merit. His subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied. Consequently, the issue brought forth in the sala of Judge
Apostol has now been laid to rest.
EVIDENCE FOR THE RESPONDENT


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Respondent NAVARRO presented both testimonial and documentary evidence. His testimonial evidence consist of his
testimony and those of Atty. Eulogio R. Rodriguez, one of the complainants; and Arsenio de Guzman, Chief of Section of the
Bureau of Lands. His documentary evidence consist of Exhibits 1 to 13, inclusive.
On direct examination, respondent NAVARRO testified that the present charges are the same as the charges in administrative
Case No. 1154, entitled, "In Re: Atty. Felipe C. Navarro, respondent", which was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General
for investigation. He further declared that this Honorable Court deferred action on the said administrative case until such time
that G.R. Nos. L-42699-42709, the heirs of the late Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et al. is terminated.
Respondent's direct testimony dwelt only on these two matters and on the identification of his Exhibits 1 to 9.
On cross-examination, respondent NAVARRO testified that he is the counsel for the defendants in the twenty-two (22) cases
before Judge Pedro Navarro and Judge Emilio Salas of the Court of First Instance of Rizal; that he became the owner of the
lands not occupied by his clients by virtue of his contract of legal services signed by them (pp. 76-78, t.s.n., July 7, 1977; pp. 7-
10, t.s.n., Sept. 9, 1977). Said contract for legal services, which appears on pages 224-232 of Exhibit "1", reads as follows:
KASUNDUAN HINGGIL SA SERBISYO NG ABOGADO SA MGA KINAUUKULAN NA ANG MGA BAGAY NA ITO AY MALAMAN AT
MAKARATING
Itong kasulatan na ito ay nagpapatibay at nagbibigay-bisa hinggil sa serbisyo ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro tungkol sa aming
karapatan sa lupaing nasasakop ng diumanoy Kautusan-Blg. 1425 (Decree No. 1425) sa diumanoy Usapin Blg. 699, 875, 917,
aip (Cases Nos. 699, 875, 917, etc.) sa dating Hukuman ng Pagpapatala ng Lupain defunct Court of Land Registration) na ang
nasabing diumano'y Kautusan Blg. 1425 na siyang pinagbatayan ng ipinapatalang gawagawang dalawanput anim (26) ng mga
Original Certificates of Title ng Register of Deeds ng Pasig at nagbunga ito ng maraming Transfer Certificates of Title na sa
kasalukuyan iginigiit ng mga mayhawak ngunit yan ay wala namang bisa at katuturan (Viz., City of Manila vs. Lack, 19 Phil.
324, 340) dahil sa kapaltosan ng nasabing diumano'y Kautusan Blg. 1425 na sa mula't sapul magpahanggang ngayon sa
kasalukuyan ay iginigiit sa mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito kasama na rin ang mga dati at ibang mga kliyente ni
Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na ngayon ay siyang nararapat maging kalahok sa animnapung usapin na sa kasalukuyang hawak ni
Atty. Felipe C. Navarro (Civil Cases Nos. 8322, etc. of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branches I, II, and VI contesting the
genuineness and due execution of Decree No. 1425 of the defunct Court of Land Registration) upang mabigyan ang mga
nakalagda sa ibaba ng mga kanikaniyang katibayan o kung sila man ay mayhawak ng titulo na sakup ng diumano'y Kautusan
Blg. 1425 ay babagohin iyan o mapapalitan ng maybisa galing sa Hukuman upang matahimik at mapayapa ang dahilan
paninirahan kanilang mula't sapul ay kanila nang pinamamayanan sa buong kaalaman ng sambayanan at walang paglilihim ng
kanilang mapayapang pagmamay-ari ng mga lupain na sa mula't sapul ay pinaninirahan ng mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng
kasunduang ito at ng kanilang ninuno o nagpamana (predecessors-in-interest) na siyang mga pangyayari ay sapat na upang
maigawad ang mabisang titulo sapagkat ang nasabing lupain kailanmay di naging pambayan kungdi pribado o di kaya'y
sariling pag-aari ng nakalagdang may-ari sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito, dahil sa mga nabanggit ng mga pangyayari na 'natamo sa
pamamagitan ng pagbibigay-bisa ng batas di lamang ng karapatan sa pag-aangkin ng lupain kungdi maging ang karapatang
ipinagkaloob sa kanila ng pamahalaan ay nagsasaad na ang aktuwal na pagkakaloob sa kanila ng pamahalaan ng titulo ay di na
kinakailangan upang ang nasabing karapatan ay di kilanlin o pagtibayin ng Hukuman (Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands, 48
Phil. 242; Director of Lands vs. Abaldonado CA-G.R. No. 177-R, Jan. 12, 1948, 45 Off. Gaz 2188). Ngunit sa dahilang mayroon
huwad na titulo ang mga nag-aangkin ng mga lupain at nararapat iharap sa Hukuman ang bagay na ito upang ang Hukuman
magpatibay at magbigay-bisa ng mga titulo sa mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito ayon sa Section 10 ng Rule 39 ng
Rules of Court. Sapagkat ang pamumusisyon sa isang bagay ang batayang di mapagtatalunan hinggil sa kalaunan ng
pagmamay-ari nito ng makalipas ang mahabang panahong takda ng batas, maging ito man ay walang karampatang titulo o
mabuting hangarin ay nagpapahina at sumisira sa saklaw-bisa at halaga ng pinakamahusay na titulo na maaring nasa bagay na
iyon na pinanghahawakan ng taong hindi nagmamay-ari. Bunga nito, ang pamumusisyon ng mahigit sa tatlumpung (30) taon
na tinatamasa ng isang tao bilang may-ari kahit na walang karampatang titulo o mabuting hangarin ay gumaganap ng sapat na
titulo upang makuha ang pag-aari ng lupaing tangan sapagkat ang lampas-bisa o ang panahong itinakda ng batas sa
pamamagitan ng pamumusisyon ng mahigit na tatlumpung (30) taon ay tiyakang hadlang na maging ang pinakamahusay na
titulo na kinikilala ng batas ay hindi makatitinag o makapangingibabaw (Kincaid vs. Cabututan, 35 Phil. 383).' Hindi maaring
sabihin o ipagmalakdan ng mga nangamkam na sa pamamagitan ng kanilang huwad na titulo ay naangkin na nila ang lupain o
di kayay gawing batayan ang kanilang huwad na titulo upang masabing sila ay nagmamay-ari ng lupa. Hindi ito maaring
maganap sapagkat ang krimen at panlilinlang ay hindi maaring maging batayan ng panimula ng ay isang tunay at mabisang
titulo kahit na ipinagbili at nabili sa isang mabuti ang hangarin ng bumili ng karampatang halaga ng lupain (Levin vs. Bass, 91
Phil. 419, 439). Dahil sa itinuring ng batas na sila ay 'constructive trustees, lamang kaya hindi maganap ang lampas-bisa
(Gayondato vs. Treasurer of the Philippine Islands, 49 Phil. 244-249). Subali't dahilan sa ilang katiwalian ng katotohanan na di
nabatid ng mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito na di-umano'y siyang naganap na pangyayari ngunit ang tunay na
katotohanan ay di naman ito naganap at naliligaw sa paniniwalang nararapat silang nagbayad ng rentas o alkila at ang ilan ay
binili ang lupain gayong ang katotohanan ay sila ang nararapat at tunay na may-ari sa di-umano'y Kautusan Blg. 1425 (Decree
No. 1425) ng defunct Court of Land Registration na nagbunga ng gawa-gawang titulo na sumasakop sa buong kalawakan ng
humigit kumulang ng 4,000 hectares na samakatuwid ay apatnapung (40) milyong metro kuwadrado ng lupaing ngayon ay
matatagpuan sa buong bayan ng Mandaluyong, ang buong bayan ng San Juan sapagkat sakop ito noon ng bayan San Felipe Neri
ayon sa Act No. 942, ang bahagi ng Punta sa Maynila sapagkat sakop ito noon ng Mandaluyong na ngayon, kalahati ng bayan ng
Pasig, kalahati ng bayang Mariquina, at kalahati ng Lungsod ng Quezon sapagka't pinilas lamang ito buhat sa bayan ng
Mariquina, Pasig, San Juan at Mandaluyong sa pamamagitan ng Commonwealth Act No. 502 na pinagtibay noong Oktubre 12,
1939 at sang-ayon sa mga paglalarawan ng di-umano'y pagsusukat o survey nagsimula sa Maytunas creek patungong ilog ng
San Juan patungong dakong ibaba ng agos ng ilog ng San Juan hanggang sa bahaging matatagpuan ang ilog ng Pasig sa Punta,
Maynila at lumilisya sa patungong itaas ng agos ng ilog Pasig na nababanggit ang sapa ng Buayang Bato sa Namayan,
Mandaluyong pagkatapos ay pabalik sa ilog Pasig sa dakong pataas ng agos ng ilog hanggang sa ilog ng Mariquina at pagsunod
sa dakong pataas ng agos ng ilog ng Mariquina hanggang sa sapa ng Pinagpatayang Buaya at lumalakdaw hanggang sa
pinagmulan ng sapa ng Diliman na umaagos ng pababa patungong ilog ng San Juan at pabalik sa sapa ng Maytunas na ang
nasabing baybay-sukat o survey sa abot makakaya ng sino mang may sapat ng kakayahang agrimensor (surveyor) ay di
makabuo ng ni isa man lamang maramihang-gilid na hugis o anyo (polygon).
Dahilan sa mga nabanggit na pangyayari, ang mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng Kasunduang ito ay sumasang-ayon na kasunduin ang
paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro ng No. 66 Azucena, Roxas District, Quezon City upang gumawa ng karampatang hakbang


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sa Hukuman ng Unang Dulungan ng Rizal pati Quezon City hanggang sa Corte Suprema kung kinakailangan at gawin ang
anumang paraang isinasaisip niyang tumpak at nararapat gawin sang-ayon sa batas upang matamo ng mga makalagda sa
ibaba ng kasunduang ito ang kani-kaniyang titulo ayon sa paraang minamarapat ng batas at kaming mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng
kasunduang ito ay nagkakaloob ng buong kapangyarihan kay Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na ilagay sa kanyang pangalan at kung sa
kanino man niya naising ipagkaloob ang ibang bahagi ng lupain na aming minana o pinagsundan (predecessors-in-interest)
nguni't ipinaubaya na namin kay Atty. Felipe C. Navarro bilang bahagi ng buong kabayaran ng kanyang serbisyo at karapatang
maangkin niya sangayon sa mga inilalahad ng kasunduang ito maliban na lamang doon sa bahagi ng lupaing nais naming
mapatituluhan sa ilalim ng aming kani-kaniyang pangalan at sumasangayon kami sa pagbabayad ng karampatang halaga sa
paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro nang naayon sa isinasaad ng kasunduang ito. Na sa bawa't kilos na magaganap sa
pagpapatitulo ng aming mga ariarian ang mamamahala sa mga gastos o kabayaran ay si Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na ang ibig
sabihin na mula sa pagpapasukat (survey) ng mga ari-arian hanggang sa pagbibigay ng mga plano ng mga sukat upang
mapagtibay ito ng Kagawaran ng Lupain (Bureau of Lands), paghahanda at pagnonotaryo ng mga affidavit' ng pagmay-ari,
pagkuha ng mga katibayan ng pagkamayari, bayad sa pagpasok sa husgado (filing fees), pagpapatala (registration), paggawa
ng mga kasulatan (documentation), pagsalin ng mga rekord (transcripts), pagpapatunay (certifications) at iba pang mga
kinakailangang bayaran at pagkagastuhan ay nasa kalayaan na ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na pagpasiyahan ng naaayon sa
kaniyang sariling kagustuhan na ang nilalayon sa bandang huli at ang tunay na hangarin ay ang mapatituluhan ng ayon sa
batas ang aming kani-kaniyang mga lupain sa aming kani-kaniyang pangalan na sa pamamagitan ng mga tungkuling iniatang
namin kay Atty. Felipe C. Navarro sa pamamagitan ng kasunduang ito, sumasang-ayon kami at natatalian o nabibigkisan ng
kasunduang ito na magbayad ng halagang Dalawampu't Limang Piso (P25.00) sa bawat metro kuwadrado ng lupaing
matitituluhan sa aming pangalan bilang kabayaran sa serbisyo o paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro; ang halagang Sampung
Piso (P10.00) sa bawat metro kuwadrado ay aming magiging paunang-bayad upang ang proyektong ito ay mapanimulan
kaagad sa lalong madaling panahon at ang matitirang dapat bayarang halaga na Labing-limang Piso (P15.00) bawa't metro
kuwadrado ay aming babayaran kapag naipagkaloob na ang titulo ng lupa sa amin sa kasunduang kapag buhat sa isang taon
mula sa petsang ipinagkaloob ang titulo ng lupa ay hindi kami nakababayad ng buo sa halagang natitira o balanse na Labing-
limang Piso (P15.00) sa bawat metro kuwadrado, ang titulo ng lupain ay mapupunta sa pangalan ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro
nguni't ang kasunduang ito na isang taong pagbibigay-palugit ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro upang siya ay mabigyan ng kabuuang
kabayaran sa kanyang mga paglilingkod sa usaping ito at sumasang-ayon si Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na kami ay pahintulutang
isangla ang aming mga ari-ariang may karampatang titulo na di huwad at pinagtibay ng batas sa alinmang bangko upang ito
ang magsilbing bayad sa mga paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro sa usaping ito at iyon lamang ang natatanging sandali o
panahong kami ay mawawalan na ng obligasyon o tungkuling bayaran ang Dalawampu't Limang Piso (P25.00) sa bawat metro
kuwadrado ng lupaing ikinasundo namin ang serbisyo ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro upang matituluhan nang naayon sa batas.
Sumasang-ayon din si Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na ang sinuman sa aming nakalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito na hindi kayang
magbayad ng paunang-halaga na Sampung Piso (P10.00) sa bawa't metro kuwadrado ay bibigyan ng karampatang magbayad
ng makahalintulad na halaga sa bawa't buwan sa loob ng sampu (10) o dalawampung (20) taon sang-ayon sa mga hinihingi ng
pangyayari, ang titulo ng lupain ay ipagkakaloob lamang sa nagnanais umangkin nito kung mababayaran na ang kabuuan ng
paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro kasama na ang "legal interest" at ang amortization nito ngunit kinakailangan magbigay
sila ng paunang bayad na Limangpung Piso (P50.00) upang panimulan ang pagbabayad buwan-buwan (monthly installment
condition) at magiging mabisa lamang ito kung matutupad ng buong katapatan ang pagbabayad ng hulugang buwan-buwan
(monthly installment) na maaring magbuhat sa halagang Limang Piso (P5.00) hanggang Limangpung Piso (P50.00) sa bawat
buwan nang naayon sa laki o kalawakan ng lupaing nararapat na mapasa-amin ayon sa batas. Sa dahilang ang buhay ng tao ay
walang katiyakang magtatagal na habang panahon ay isinasalin namin ang aming mga karapatan at tungkulin sa aming
tagapagmana lamang at gayon din si Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na maaring manahin ang kanyang karapatan sa kasunduang ito sa
mga tagapagmana lamang niya upang itaguyod nila ang paglilingkod sa anumang paraan ayon sa batas.
SA KATUNAYAN AT KATIBAYAN NG LAHAT NG NABANGGIT NA KASUNDUANG ITO
ay lumalagda kami sa kasunduang ito na aming tutuparin ang lahat ng isinasaad sa kasunduang ito na sinasang-ayunan din ni
Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na kanyang tuparin ang kanyang tungkulin bilang manananggol na tutulong sa amin upang kami ay
mapagkalooban ng Hukuman ng titulo sa aming kani-kaniyang lupain ng naayon sa batas at siyang isinasaad din ng
kasunduang ito at kasama ng paglagda ng aming mga pangalan na siyang nais naming pangalang lumitaw sa titulo, ang aming
kani-kaniyang tirahan, kalawakan ng lupain, paraang pagbabayad at petsa na kami'y lumagda sa kasunduang ito bilang
pagpapatunay sa aming taos-pusong pagsang-ayon at hangarin tumupad sa lahat ng napapaloob sa KASULATANG ITO.
In the course of the proceedings, respondent NAVARRO admitted that he has sold, and is still selling, properties covered by
Torrens titles in the names of ORTIGAS & CO., Madrigal, and others, but he claims that the titles of said parties are null and
void because they emanated from Decree No. 1425; that he has no title over the properties sold by him except the contract of
legal services which his clients allegedly signed; that he has no approved plans for the various subdivisions allegedly owned by
him; that he has not obtained any certificate of registration or license to sell from the National Housing Authority; that he has
not declared for taxation purposes the thousands of hectares of prime lands in Mandaluyong, San Juan, Pasig, Quezon City and
Marikina, allegedly owned by him; and that he has not filed any case directly attacking the title of ORTIGAS and others (pp. 7-
33, t.s.n., Sept. 9, 1977; Exhibit J).
Respondent NAVARRO also admits that he is the defendant in the "25-Billion-peso-case" before Judge Sergio Apostol, docketed
as Civil Case No. Q-16265, entitled "Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership vs. Felipe C. Navarro's Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch XVI, Quezon City"; that said case covers lands in Mandaluyong, San Juan, Pasig, Marikina and Quezon City
including those involved in the present case (pp. 8-21, t.s.n., July 7, 1977; Exhibits F, F-I to F-168).
Despite the decision of Judge Apostol upholding the validity of the Ortigas Transfer Certificate of Title and enjoining
respondent NAVARRO from selling lots covered by said title, NAVARRO still continued selling properties covered by the
injunction claiming that the said decision is ineffectual because the same has been appealed. (pp. 33-34, t.s.n., Sept. 9, 1977).
4

On the basis of the foregoing report, the Solicitor General filed a complaint with Francisco Ortigas, Jr. as complainant, praying
that respondent Navarro be disbarred, that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys, and that his certificate of admission
to the bar be recalled.
On May 23, 1980, respondent Navarro filed his answer with prayer to lift the order of suspension.
5
Complainant Ortigas, Jr.
filed an opposition to said motion to lift suspension .
6
Respondent Navarro reiterated his plea in his manifestation dated
August 8, 1980.
7
In a resolution dated September 2, 1980, this Court denied the motion to lift the order of suspension.
8



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14
On October 29, 1980, respondent Navarro filed an urgent ex parte motion praying for the lifting of the order of
suspension
9
which was denied by this Court on November 13, 1980.
10
He reiterated his prayer in another motion filed on
January 5, 1981
11
but the same was likewise denied in our resolution of January 22, 1981.
12

II. Administrative Case No. 2033 arose from a letter-complaint, dated March 13, 1979, filed by the spouses E. Conrad and
Virginia Geeslin with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, charging respondent Navarro with deceit, malpractice and gross
misconduct in office, and blatant violation of the Attorney's Oath. Said letter was thereafter referred to this Court by Integrated
Bar of the Philippines President (now Chief Justice) Marcelo B. Fernan for appropriate action.
13

Pursuant to our resolution of June 4, 1979,
14
respondent Navarro filed his answer with motion to dismiss on June 29,
1979.
15
The corresponding
reply
16
and rejoinder
17
were subsequently filed. In a resolution of this Court dated October 1, 1985, the case was referred to
the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
18

On August 28, 1989, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its report, with the following findings and recommendation:
CHARGES
In their Complaint dated March 13, 1979, complainants charged respondent with deceit, malpractice and gross conduct in
office, and blatant violation of the Attorney's Oath, for having deliberately misrepresented the facts and the law while acting as
counsel for the defendants in the following civil cases:
a. His insistence that our clients are no longer owners of the land subject of the cases mentioned above; he falsely alleged that
to his personal knowledge the title to the land is in the name of one Leopoldo Cojuangco. This false allegation was made
despite the final decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVII, in Civil Case No. Q-18221 entitled "E Conrad and
Virginia B. Geeslin vs. Leopoldo Cojuangco, et al." (1) declaring the transfer of the lot to Leopoldo Cojuangco was fraudulent
and had been effected thru falsification; and, (2) ordering the cancellation of the title issued to Cojuangco and the reversion of
the title to our clients. Copies of the Complaint and the Decision in said case are hereto attached as Annexes "B" and "C",
respectively.
b. Mr. Navarro persisted and still persists in representing that our clients' title was rendered null and void by virtue of the
expiration of the Parity Amendment and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Quasha vs. Republic, 46 SCRA 160.
Our clients' title to the aforesaid property was acquired by hereditary succession from the late Dr. Luther Bewley who
acquired said land in 1925. The ownership therefore of our clients is protected both under the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions.
Any lawyer, even a law student, knows that the Parity Amendment and the decision in the Quasha case,supra, covers cases
where property was acquired by virtue of the Parity Amendment. Mr. Navarro is either guilty of abysmal ignorance of the law
or of complete and unabashed contempt for facts, the law of the land and for the Courts.
c. Mr. Navarro persists in misrepresenting to the Court that the title covering the land subject of the above cases had been
declared null and void in the "final and executory" decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II. He deliberately
omits to give the title of the case and its docket number for the obvious and malicious reason that the case he relies upon
(Heirs of Nuguid vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 42699-42709) is still pending resolution before the Supreme Court and hence
cannot be "final and executory."
d. He misrepresents to the Court that the land subject of the cases heretofore enumerated is not within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Quezon City Court and hence the court has no jurisdiction. Further, that title thereto having described the
land to be part of the Municipality of San Juan del Monte, is void. He cannot disclaim knowledge however of the fact that the
area in the vicinity of Santolan Road in Quezon City was originally part of the Municipality of San Juan del Monte territory of
Quezon City when the latter was created on 14 June 1950. In the light of this fact, Mr. Navarro's representation is false and
malicious.
e. Mr. Navarro has shown a complete and total disregard for basic norms of honesty and decency in that having prejudiced the
interest of his clients because of his gross neglect to appeal in a timely manner from the decision of the court and having
adopted the wrong remedy, in complete ignorance of the law, he had influenced his clients into commencing a case before the
Tanod Bayan against the Presiding Judge of the City Court of Quezon City, Branch 1, and Hon. Minerva Genovea The case is
obviously calculated to harrass and coerce the Honorable Presiding Judge. Mr. Navarro's conduct speaks ill of his respect for
the law and the courts.
f. The penchant of Mr. Navarro to misrepresent and deceive did not stop before the City Court of Quezon City. He continues to
do so in the petition he filed before the Honorable Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. S.P. 08928 entitled "Adolfo Corpus,
et al. 'vs. Hon. Minerva Genovea et al." Copies of the Petition and the undersigned attorney's Comments thereto are hereto
attached as Annexes "D" and "E", respectively. (pp. 2-4, Record)
RESPONDENTS ANSWER
In his Answer dated June 29, 1979, respondent averred:
1. From the face of the Resolution itself showing that the undersigned respondent was never furnished with a copy of the
complaint, it can be gathered therefrom that the complaint is clearly intended to prevent the undersigned respondent to
proceed in defending his clients' cause in CA-G.R. No. SP-08928 (Adolfo M. Corpuz, et al. vs. Hon. Minerva C. Genovea, the
Spouses Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia Bewley Geeslin, et al.) still pending at this writing before the Court of Appeals. To allow
complainants to harass respondent while the case (is) still pending in our courts of justice is an act in contempt of court for
which complainants and their counsel is (sic) liable.
2. Undersigned respondent as counsel for the defendants Adolfo Corpuz, et al. gave his entire devotion to the interest of his
clients, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of their rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end
that nothing be taken or be withheld from his clients, save by the rules of law, legally applied; for his clients are entitled to the
benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by law as was done by the undersigned respondent in the
ejectment case filed by the complainants Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia B. Geeslin against the several clients of the
undersigned. (pp. 42-43, Record)
After complainants filed a Reply dated July 17, 1979 pointing out that respondent's Answer does not deny any of the six (6)
counts of charges specified in the Complaint, respondent filed a Rejoinder dated September 7, 1979, wherein he averred:
1. The complainants alien spouses Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia B. Geeslin who are citizens of the United States of America
held TCT No. 153657 which was cancelled on December 31, 1970 by TCT No. 180231 issued in the name of Leopoldo A.
Cojuangco both of which TCTs are described to be located at Santolan Road, Municipality of San Juan, Province of Rizal, (now
part of Metro-Manila) filed ejectment proceedings before the City Court of Quezon City against my clients Victorino Manaois


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15
and Adolfo Corpuz and twenty others in Civil Case Nos. I-29872 to I-29931 which later were elevated to the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. No. SP-08928 entitled Adolfo M. Corpuz, et al. vs. Hon. Minerva C.Genovea the Spouses Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia
Bewley Geeslin, et al.
2. Undersigned respondent being retained as counsel for the defendants Victorino Manaois and Adolfo Corpuz and the twenty
(20) other defendants did his bounden duty in defense of their rights and exerted his utmost learning and ability within what
the law allows that at this stage, the controversy is still under litigation before the courts as stated above.
3. Under the foregoing circumstances, the administrative action must have been resorted to by the complainants at the
instigation of their counsel who failed in wanting to defeat the defendants of their God-given rights to the land in litigation that
there can be no other conclusion left but that the administrative complaint against the respondent is 'pure' harassment. (pp.
53-54, Record)
FINDINGS
When the case was set for hearing by the Office of the Solicitor General, the parties agreed that there is no dispute as to the fact
of the case. Hence, they were granted a period of thirty (30) days within which to file their respective memoranda, if they so
desire, after which the case will be considered submitted for resolution.
Since respondent did not deny the allegations of the Complaint, and in fact admitted during the hearing of the case set by the
Office of the Solicitor General that there is no dispute as to the facts of this case, it follows that the specifications of the charges
against him, which are duly supported by documents, are deemed sufficiently proven.
The only justification invoked by respondent is that he "gave his entire devotion to the interest of his clients" and that he "did
his bounden duty in defense of their rights and exerted his utmost learning and ability.
Consequently, respondent is deemed to have committed the misrepresentations specified by complainants, as quoted above.
RECOMMENDATION
Respondent was also charged in Administrative Case No. 2148 entitled Ortigas vs. Navarro and has been suspended from the
practice of law since May 5, 1980. His suspension is still in effect.
The acts complained of in the present case also warrant the suspension of respondent from the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty. Felipe C. Navarro be likewise suspended from the practice
of law.
Makati, for Manila, August 17, 1989.
19

No justiciable issue was raised in Administrative Case No. 2033 as respondent Navarro failed to deny the material allegations
in the complaint of the spouses E. Conrad and Virginia B. Geeslin.
The two main issues raised by the Solicitor General in Administrative Case No. 2148 are:
1. Whether or not respondent Navarro sold properties titled in the names of other persons without the consent of the latter;
and
2. If in the affirmative, whether or not such acts constitute sufficient grounds for suspension or disbarment.
Respondent reiterated in his answer that the transfer certificates of title of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership and
Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer were declared null and void in the decision dated March 31, 1970 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, in Civil Case No. 7-M (10339) entitled "Pedro del Rosario, et al. vs. Ortigas & Co., Ltd. Partnership,
et al.," and in the order dated June 21, 1971 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, in Civil Cases Nos. 8320, 8321,
8326, 8369, 8376, 8379, 8383, 8685, 8686 and 8700 entitled "Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Federico Martinez, et al."
Respondent likewise reiterated his claim of ownership over all parcels of land (including those of Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership and Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer) covered by Decree No. 1425, G.L.R.O. Record No. 917, which was declared
null and void in the decision dated March 31, 1970 of Branch XV of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
20
Furthermore, he
asserts ownership over the subject properties as payment for his legal services rendered in the ejectment cases filed against
his clients in Branches I and II of the former Court of First Instance of Rizal.
1. To clarify, Civil Case No. 7-M(10339)filed before Branch XV of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal directly assailed the
nullity of the proceedings in G.L.R.O. Record No. 917 by virtue of which Decree No. 1425 was issued, as well as the original
certificates of title issued as a consequence thereof. These original certificates of title include the properties belonging to
Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership and Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer. On March 31, 1970, Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz
then presiding over said Branch XV rendered a decision declaring Decree No. 1425, as well as the original certificates of title
issued pursuant thereto, null and void. Ortigas appealed the Ruiz decision to the Court of Appeals which set the same aside and
remanded the case to Branch XV for new trial. On November 3, 1973, Judge Arsenio A. Alcantara, who replaced Judge Ruiz,
rendered a decision confirming the validity of Decree No. 1425 and all titles emanating therefrom. The said decision was
pending appeal with the Court of Appeals when the investigation of respondent by the Solicitor General was conducted.
We take judicial notice of the fact that on December 29, 1983, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirmingin toto the
November 3, 1973 decision of Judge Alcantara, which became final and executory on May 25, 1984 insofar as plaintiffs-
appellants Pascual Santos, et al. are concerned. The plaintiffs-appellants Pedro del Rosario, et al. appealed to the Supreme
Court in a petition for review on certiorari which was, however, denied on February 18, 1985. The denial became final and
executory on April 10, 1985. Thereafter, the records of the case were remanded to Branch XV of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal for execution.
The records further show that the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch XV in Civil Case No. 7-M (10339) became the basis of the
decision rendered by Judge Pedro Navarro of Branch II on May 21, 1971 which dismissed the complaint for ejectment filed by
Haberer against the clients of respondent Navarro. However, Judge Navarro in his decision categorically stated that "it is the
considered opinion of this court that until and unless the decision of Branch XV of this court is reversed or set aside by final
judgment, plaintiffs prayer to order the herein eleven defendants in these eleven cases to vacate the parcels which they occupy
and on which their respective houses are built has become premature." This condition was reiterated in Judge Navarro's order
of September 15, 1972 wherein he stated that:
In the order dated July 17, 1971, the Court had occasion to reiterate that its decision in this case was mainly predicated on the
decision of Branch XV of this Court that the certificate of title emanating from the proceedings in GLRO Record No. 917 were
null and void and plaintiffs title happened to be one of them. The Court opined that until said decision is reversed the actual
occupants had better be maintained in their possessions of the land.
21

However, to repeat, the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch XV was set aside by the Court of Appeals which remanded the case
for new trial and another one was rendered, this time by a different judge on November 3, 1973 upholding the validity of


Page |
16
Decree No. 1425 and all titles issued as a consequence thereof. Respondent cannot feign ignorance of the November 3, 1973
decision, which superseded the March 31, 1970 decision, for the simple reason that it was his clients who appealed the former
decision to the Court of Appeals. In spite thereof and indicative of his bad faith, he stubbornly continues to invoke the decision
of March 31, 1970 as the source of his alleged ownership rights over the Ortigas properties.
2. In the order of June 21, 1971, Judge Pedro Navarro of Branch II ordered the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
15043 issued in the name of Haberer and the issuance of new titles in the name of the defendants, subject to the lien for
attorney's fees in favor of respondent pursuant to the terms of the contract for his legal services. However, the same judge
issued an amendatory order dated September 15, 1972, which provides in part that:
It has also come to the understanding of the Court that the order of June 21, 1971, sought to be reconsidered insofar as it
ordered the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 in favor of the plaintiff, also adversely affects the interests of
other persons and entities like the Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership, which is not a party herein, because the
certificate of title of the plaintiff is also a derivative of GLRO 917 and Decree No. 1425 from which Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership, derives titles over wide tracts of land. Since Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, is not a party in this case
whatever orders of decisions are made in this case cannot be made to affect the said company. Decisions and orders can only
affect parties to the case.
The Court therefore arrives at the conclusion that the order dated June 21, 1971, must be reconsidered on two grounds (1)
because the decision of Branch XV is now being the subject of further proceedings and (2) because it has the effect of adversely
affecting the interest of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, which is not even a party herein.
WHEREFORE, as prayed, the order dated June 21, 1971, is set aside. However, the decision dated May 26, 1971, insofar as it
denies the ejectment of the present occupants of the land as stated in the decision stands. (Emphasis supplied)
22

It is apparent, therefore, that since the order of June 21, 1971, was set aside, the inescapable conclusion is that Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 15043 stands and remains in the name of Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer. Consequently, the
defendants therein never acquired title to the property covered by the title of Haberer. And, since respondent Navarro merely
derives his supposed title to the properties as a mere transferee, with more reason can he not validly become the owner of the
above properties.
3. Respondent intransigently relies on his contract for legal services executed with his clients, the defendants in the Haberer
case, as another basis of his claim of ownership over the entire property covered by Decree No. 1425. It must be noted that the
said contract was executed pursuant to the ejectment cases filed against respondent Navarro's clients which involve only the
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 containing an aggregate area of 12,700 square meters, more or
less. It appears that the defendants assigned rights to respondent Navarro over properties which they did not actually occupy
and which virtually extended to all the properties covered by titles issued under Decree No. 1425. As correctly observed by the
Solicitor General, said defendants have not presented any document evidencing their ownership of the parcels of land they
assigned to their lawyer.
From the foregoing considerations, it is incontrovertible that respondent's pretended ownership rights over the parcels of
land covered by Decree No. 1425 have no bases whatsoever, either in fact or in law, and it is an assault on credulity to assume
that he was not aware of the vacuity of his pretensions and misrepresentations.
In resolving this disbarment case, we must perforce initially focus on the degree of integrity and respectability required and
expected of the law profession. There is no denying that membership in the legal profession is achieved only after a long and
laborious study. By years of patience, zeal and ability the attorney acquires a fixed means of support for himself and his family.
This is not to say, however, that the emphasis is on the pecuniary value of this profession but rather on the social prestige and
intellectual standing necessarily arising from and attached to the same by reason of the fact that everyone is deemed an officer
of the court.
23

The importance of the dual aspects of the legal profession has been judiciously stated by Chief Justice Marshall of the United
States Supreme Court in this wise:
On one hand, the profession of an Atty. is of great importance to an individual and the prosperity of his life may depend on its
exercise. The right to exercise it ought not to be lightly or capriciously taken from him. On the other hand, it is extremely
desirable that the respectability of the Bar should be maintained and that its harmony with the bench should be preserved. For
these objects, some controlling power, some discretion, ought to be exercised with great moderation and judgment, but it must
be exercised.
24

In a number of cases, we have repeatedly explained and stressed that the purpose of disbarment is not meant as a punishment
to deprive an attorney of a means of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the courts and the public from the misconduct
of the officers of the court and to ensure the proper administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this
important function shall be competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may repose
confidence.
25
Its objectives are to compel the lawyer to deal fairly and honestly with his client and to remove from the
profession a person whose misconduct has proven him unfit for the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an
attorney.
26

As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges until the contrary is proved, and that, as
an officer of the court, he has performed his duty in accordance with his oath.
27
Therefore, in disbarment proceedings, the
burden of proof rests upon the complainant
28
, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the
respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.
29

We have painstakingly scrutinized and evaluated the records of these two administrative cases and we cannot but find that
strong and unassailable evidence exist to render it our irremissible duty to impose the ultimate sanction of disbarment on
respondent.
Respondent's defense is anchored primarily on the contract for legal services, executed by his clients whom he represented in
the twenty-two ejectment cases filed before Branches I and II of the former Court of First Instance of Rizal, and quoted in full
in the earlier part of this discussion.
It is extremely relevant to note that both of the aforesaid two branches of the trial court made no finding as to the validity of
the claim of ownership favorable to the defendants therein. On the contrary, Judge Salas of Branch I found for the plaintiff and
ordered the defendants, clients of respondent, to vacate the premises.


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17
In the case before Judge Navarro of Branch II, the complaint was dismissed merely on the ground that "since the evidence is
uncontroverted that the defendants in all these eleven cases have been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of their
respective parcels dating back since their predecessors in interest, their possession must be maintained and respected.
30

Thereafter, on June 21, 1971, the aforesaid judgment of dismissal dated May 26, 1971 was modified, and the Register of Deeds
was thereafter ordered to cancel the transfer certificate of title issued in favor of plaintiff and to issue new titles in the name of
defendants subject to the lien for attorney's fees in favor of herein respondent in accordance with the contract for legal
services hereinbefore discussed.
Eventually, however, this subsequent order was reconsidered and set aside in the order of September 15, 1972, "because it has
the effect of adversely affecting the interest of Ortigas & Co., Ltd. Partnership, which is not even a party herein," but it
reinstated the decision of May 26, 1971 insofar as it denied the ejectment of the present occupants.
As earlier noted, there is nothing in the records to show that the defendants in the ejectment cases were declared the true
owners of the land subject of said cases. Only the fact of possession was ruled upon, and what the courts recognized was
merely the defendants' right of possession. They, therefore, never become the owners of the subject lots in any sense of the
word in the absence of any declaration to that effect, by reason of which they could not have legally transmitted any ownership
rights or interests to herein respondent. Furthermore, we have seen that any further claim of ownership on their part was
finally settled by the order of September 15, 1972, setting aside the order of June 21, 1971, wherein the trial court correctly
held that the earlier order unjustifiedly affected adversely the rights of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership. In addition,
said court specifically excluded the title of said partnership from the effects of its decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of the contract of legal services, the defendants-clients agreed to convey to respondent whatever
properties may be adjudicated in their favor in the event of their failure to pay the attorney's fees agreed upon. As
hereinbefore stated, there was nothing awarded to the said defendants except the right to possess for the nonce the lots they
were occupying, nothing more. That respondent acquired no better right than the defendants from whom he supposedly
derived his claim is further confirmed in the order of Judge Navarro, dated June 21, 1971, denying the issuance of new
certificates of title to herein respondent who, to further stress the obvious, was not even a party but only a lawyer of the
defendants therein. It follows that his act of selling the Ortigas properties is patently and indisputably illegal.
Respondent admits that he has no Torrens title but insists on the puerile theory that his title is his contract of legal
services.
31
Considering that the effectivity of the provisions of that contract is squarely premised on the award of said
properties to the therein defendants, and since there was no such adjudication, respondent's pretense is unmasked as an
unmitigated deception. Furthermore, it will be recalled that the land involved in the two ejectment cases consists of only 1. 2
hectares whereas respondent is claiming ownership over thousands of hectares of land, the sheer absurdity of which he could
not be unaware.
Respondent further admits that he has been and is continuously selling, up to the present, the entirety of the land covered by
Decree No. 1425
32
pursuant to the decision of Branch XV of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, dated March 31, 1970,
declaring the said decree null and void as well as the titles derived therefrom.
It must nonetheless be remembered that the decision of Judge Navarro recognizing the defendants' right of possession is
subject to the final outcome of the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch XV which nullified Decree No. 1425. The latter decision,
at the time the decision of Judge Navarro was rendered, was pending appeal. This is precisely the reason why Judge Navarro
had to amend his decision a third time by setting aside the order of registration of the land in the name of the defendants. He
could not properly rule on the ownership rights of defendants therein pending a final determination of the validity of said
decree, which thus prompted him to find merely on the fact of possession. Besides, a mere declaration of nullity cannot, per
se justify the performance of any act of ownership over lands titled in the name of other persons pursuant to said decree. To
cap it all, as earlier discussed, that decision dated March 31, 1970 has been reversed and set aside, and a new one entered
confirming the validity of Decree No. 1425, which latter decision has long become final and executory.
In Civil Case No. Q-16265, entitled "Ortigas and Co., Ltd. Partnership vs. Navarro," herein respondent was enjoined from
selling, offering for sale and advertising properties of the plaintiff therein. We have seen that a decision was subsequently
rendered therein on December 16, 1972 by Branch XVI of the Court of First Instance of Rizal upholding the validity of the
transfer certificates of title issued in the name of Ortigas and Co., Limited Partnership which became final and executory after
respondent's petition for review was denied by this Court. However, respondent continued to sell properties belonging to
Ortigas in blatant disregard of said decision. This was categorically admitted by respondent himself during the investigation
conducted by the Solicitor
General.
33

Respondent avers that the said decision cannot be enforced during the pendency of the appeal therefrom. Even if this were
true, the fact that respondent was enjoined by the court from selling portions of the Ortigas properties is compelling reason
enough for him to desist from continuing with his illegal transactions.
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General:
Respondent Navarro knew that the decision of Judge Vivencio Ruiz declaring as null and void certificates of titles emanating
from Decree No. 1425 was reversed and set aside. He knew that Judge Pedro Navarro of the Rizal Court of First Instance
exempted Ortigas & Company from the effects of his decision. He also knew that Judge Sergio Apostol of the Rizal Court of First
Instance in Quezon City had upheld the validity of the certificates of title of Ortigas & Company. Despite all these
pronouncements and his awareness thereof, respondent NAVARRO still continued to sell properties titled in the name of
Ortigas & Company and the Madrigals.
34

Lastly, the motion to dismiss filed by respondent should be, as it is hereby, denied for lack of merit. Respondent inexplicably
posits that the charges against him should be dismissed on the ground that his suspension was automatically lifted by virtue of
our resolution, dated June 30, 1980, which merely reads:
The manifestation of counsel for respondent stating among other things that the complaint against respondent could not
prosper if respondent's manifestation dated March 3, 1980 in G.R. No. L-42699-42709 and his request for certification by the
Chief Justice to the effect that the petition in G.R. Nos. L-42699-42709 is deemed dismissed pursuant to Sec. 11(2) of Art. X of
the Constitution are granted, are NOTED.
There is absolutely nothing in the resolution to support respondent's typical distortion of facts. On the contrary, our
resolutions dated September 2, 1980, November 8, 1980, and January 22, 1981 repeatedly denied respondent's motions for
the lifting of his suspension.


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18
It further bears mention at this juncture that despite the suspension of respondent Navarro from the practice of law, he
continues to do so in clear violation and open defiance of the original resolution of suspension and the aforestated resolutions
reiterating and maintaining the same. Thus, the records of this Court disclose that in G.R. No. L-78103, entitled "Jose de Leon,
et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," a Second Division case filed on April 25, 1987, counsel for private respondents therein
questioned herein respondent Navarro's personality to intervene in the case since he was under suspension, to which
respondent Navarro rejoined by insisting that his suspension had allegedly been lifted already. In G.R. No. 85973, entitled
"Hilario Abalos vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," the petition wherein was filed on December 2, 1988 and assigned to the First
Division, respondent Navarro also appeared as counsel for therein petitioner. Said petition was denied since the same was
prepared, signed and verified by respondent Navarro, a suspended member of the Philippine Bar. Over his expostulation that
his suspension had already been lifted, the Court directed the Bar Confidant to take appropriate action to enforce the same.
Again, in G.R. No. 90873, entitled "Matilde Cabugwang et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," the Second Division, in a resolution
dated January 31, 1990, imposed a fine of P1,000.00 upon said respondent for appearing therein as counsel for petitioner
which fine he paid on February 5, 1990.
In at least three (3) other cases in the Second Division, respondent Navarro appeared before the Court as counsel for
petitioners therein, viz: (1) G.R. No. L-74792 (Lorenzo Valdez, et al., vs Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.), filed on June 11,
1986 and decided on December 7, 1986; (2) G.R. No.
L-76589 (Atty. Felipe C. Navarro, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.), filed on November 28, 1986 and decided on May 4,1987;
and (3) G.R. No. 81482 (Ricardo Rasalan vs. Flaviano Pascua, et al.), filed on January 30, 1988 and decided on February 15,
1988. The rollos in said cases show that he also appeared as counsel for the petitioners in the Court of Appeals, but since the
lower courts' original records were not forwarded to this Court, said rollos do not reflect whether he also appeared before the
different courts a quo.
Such acts of respondent are evidential of flouting resistance to lawful orders of constituted authority and illustrate his
incorrigible despiciency for an attorney's duty to society. Verily, respondent has proven himself unworthy of the trust and
confidence reposed in him by law and by this Court, through his deliberate rejection of his oath as an officer of the court.
WHEREFORE, respondent Felipe C. Navarro is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys. Let a copy of this resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread
on the personal records of respondent. This resolution is immediately executory.



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19
A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant
vs.
ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989, respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar, asks this
Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 October
1988 in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093.
On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry, with a total stated value
of P36,000.00, for sale on a commission basis, with the condition that the respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and
return the unsold items to Ms. Marquez on or before 14 February 1984. Sometime in February 1984, respondent, instead of
returning the unsold pieces of jewelry which then amounted to approximately P26,250.00, issued three checks: (a) a check
dated 16 February 1984 for the amount of P5,400.00; (b) a check dated 23 February 1984 also for the amount of P5,400.00;
and (c) a check dated 25 February 1984 for the amount of P15,450.00. Upon presentment for payment within ninety (90) days
after their issuance, all three (3) checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds.
Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor, respondent made no arrangements with the bank concerning the honoring
of checks which had bounced and made no effort to settle her obligations to Ms. Marquez.
Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against respondent with the Regional Trial Court of Manila: (a) one for estafa,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 85-38358; and (b) three (3) for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed respectively as Criminal Cases
Nos. 85-38359, 85-38360 and 85-38361. In due time, after trial, the trial court rendered a decision dated 25 August 1987
which:
(a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and
(b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in all three (3) cases, and sentenced respondent to pay a fine of P6,000.00,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00 in Criminal
Case No. 8538359;
to pay a fine of P 6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the
amount of P5,400.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38360; and
to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to indemnify the complainant in the
amount of P15,450.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38361, and to pay the costs in all three (3) cases.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093 affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court but, in addition,
suspended respondent Tuanda from the practice of law. The pertinent portion of the decision read as follows:
For reasons above stated and finding the evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction, the judgment is hereby AFFIRMED
subject to this modification.
It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda is a member of the Bar, and the offense for (sic) which she is found
guilty involved moral turpitude, she is hereby ordered suspended from the practice of law and shall not practice her profession
until further action from the Supreme Court, in accordance with Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. A copy of this
decision must be forwarded to the Supreme Court as required by Section 29 of the same Rule.
SO ORDERED.
1

On 16 December 1988, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution
dated 9 January 1989, noted respondent's Notice of Appeal and advised her "to address her Notice of Appeal to the Honorable
Supreme Court, the proper forum." On 1 February 1989, respondent filed with this Court a Notice of Appeal.
In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989, the Supreme Court noted without action respondent's Notice of Appeal and declared that
the Court of Appeals' decision of 17 October 1988 had become final and executory upon expiration of the period for filing a
petition for review on certiorari on 16 December 1988. In that Resolution, the Court found that respondent had lost her right
to appeal by certiorari when she posted with this Court a Notice of Appeal instead of filing a petition for review
on certiorari under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court within the reglementary period.
In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent states:
that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not painful penalty aggravating the lower court's penalty of
fine considering that accused-appellant's action on the case during the trial on the merits at the lower court has always been
motivated purely by sincere belief that she is innocent of the offense charged nor of the intention to cause damage to the
herein plaintiff-appellee.
We read the above statement as a claim by the respondent that, she had not violated her oath as a member of the Philippine
Bar upon the ground that when she issued the checks which bounced, she did not intend to cause damage to complainant Ms.
Marquez.
The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals upon respondent Tuanda. The
Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude." We should add that
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order. In Lozano v.
Martinez,
2
the Court explained the nature of the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in the following terms:
xxx xxx xxx
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is
dishonored upon its presentation for payment. . . . The thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions, the making
of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is
prescribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against public order.
xxx xxx xxx
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the
transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or
holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a
thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the
welfare of society and the public interest.
3
(Italics supplied)


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Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had been convicted of crimes involving moral
turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows:
Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
(Italics supplied)
Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. The Court of Appeals or a Court of First
Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such
suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises. (Italics
supplied)
We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the
profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such
offense. In Melendrez v. Decena,
4
this Court stressed that:
the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is
not only a condition precedent to an admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the
practice of law.
5

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent shall remain suspended from
the practice of law until further orders from this Court. A copy of this Resolution shall be forwarded to the Bar Confidant and
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the record of respondent.