IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

1. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FORENSIC )
COUNSELORS, INC., a Nevada Non-Profit )
Corporation; et al. )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Case No.: 6:14-CV-00187-RAW
)
1. NARCONON INTERNATIONAL, a California )
Non-Profit Corporation; et al. )
)
Defendants. )


MOTION TO DISMISS OF NARCONON INTERNATIONAL




JOHN H. TUCKER, OBA 9110
jtucker@rhodesokla.com
COLIN H. TUCKER, OBA 16325
chtucker@rhodesokla.com
KERRY R. LEWIS, OBA 16519
klewis@rhodesokla.com
DENELDA L. RICHARDSON, OBA 20103
drichardson@rhodesokla.com
RHODES HIERONYMUS JONES TUCKER & GABLE
P.O. Box 21100
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74121-1100
Phone: (918) 582-1173; Fax: (918) 592-3390

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT, Narconon International

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ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................................................. iv

INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................... 1

BACKGROUND ......................................................................................................................................... 1

LEGAL STANDARDS ............................................................................................................................... 3

A. FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(B)(2) ........................................................ 3

B. FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(B)(6) ........................................................ 5

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................... 6

I. THE COURT LACKS PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER INTERNATIONAL
(WHETHER PREMISED AS GENERAL OR SPECIFIC JURISDICTION) .......................................... 6

A. REQUIREMENTS FOR ASSERTING GENERAL JURISDICTION
OVER INTERNATIONAL ..................................................................................................... 6

B. REQUIREMENTS FOR ASSERTING SPECIFIC JURISDICTION
OVER INTERNATIONAL ..................................................................................................... 9

C. INTERNATIONAL LACKS THE MINIMUM CONTACTS TO
SUPPORT GENERAL OR SPECIFIC JURISDICTION OVER
INTERNATIONAL ............................................................................................................. 10

D. PLAINTIFFS WEBSITE ALLEGATIONS DO NOT ESTABLISH
PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER INTERNATIONAL ..................................................... 13

E. PLAINTIFFS CONSPIRACY ALLEGATIONS DO NOT SUPPORT
PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER INTERNATIONAL ..................................................... 17

II. EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION OVER INTERNATIONAL WOULD
VIOLATE DUE PROCESS .............................................................................................................. 21

A. THE BURDEN ON THE DEFENDANT OF LITIGATING IN THE
FORUM ............................................................................................................................. 21


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iii

B. THE FORUM STATES INTEREST IN ADJUDICATING THE
DISPUTE .......................................................................................................................... 21

C. PLAINTIFFS INTEREST IN CONVENIENT AND
EFFECTIVE RELIEF ......................................................................................................... 22

D. THE INTERSTATE JUDICIAL SYSTEMS INTEREST
IN OBTAINING EFFICIENT RESOLUTION ...................................................................... 22

E. STATE INTEREST IN FURTHERING FUNDAMENTAL
SUBSTANTIVE SOCIAL POLICIES ................................................................................... 23

III. ALTERNATIVELY, INTERNATIONAL ADOPTS THE ARGUMENTS MADE BY
CERTAIN DEFENDANTS IN THEIR MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON
PLAINTIFFS FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM [Dkt. 287] .......................................................... 24

CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................................... 25

























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iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:

Agape Flights, Inc. v. Covington Aircraft Engines, Inc.,
771 F.Supp. 2d 1278 (E.D. Okla. 2011) ........................................................................... 14

Am. Educ. Corp. v. Chase,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47788 (W.D. Okla. July 13, 2006) ............................................. 7

Am. Land Program, Inc. v. Bonaventura
Uitgevers Maatschappij, N.V.
710 F.2d 1449 (10th Cir. 1983) .......................................................................... 17, 18, 20

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009) ..................................................................................................... 5, 6, 18

AST Sports Science, Inc. v. CLF Dist. Ltd.,
514 F.3d 1054 (10th Cir. 2008) ............................................................................................ 9

Baldridge v. McPike, Inc.,
466 F.2d 65 (10th Cir. 1972) ....................................................................................... 17, 20

Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Natl, Inc.,
223 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) ........................................................................................... 16

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955,
167 L.Ed. 2d (2007) ....................................................................................... 5, 6, 18, 19, 20

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462 (1985) ............................................................................................................ 7, 9

Calder v. Jones,
464 U.S. 783 (1984) .............................................................................................................. 14

Capitol Federal Savings Bank v. Eastern Bank Corp.,
493 F.Supp. 2d 1150 (D. Kan. 2007) ................................................................................ 15

Casanova v. Ulibarri,
595 F.3d 1120 (10th Cir. 2010) ............................................................................................ 5

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v

Clark v. Tabin,
400 F.Supp. 2d 1290 (N.D. Okla. 2005) .......................................................... 17, 19, 20

Custom Cupboards, Inc. v. Cemp SRL,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44822 (D. Kan. May 7, 2010) ........................................... 14, 15

Daimler AG v. Bauman,
134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) ........................................................................................... 7, 8, 10, 13

Dennis Garberg & Assocs. v. Pack-Tech Intl Corp.,
115 F.3d 767 (10th Cir. 1997) .............................................................................................. 9

Doe v. Natl Med. Servs.,
974 F.2d 143 (10th Cir. 1992) ............................................................................................. 8

Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc.,
514 F.3d 1063 (10th Cir. 2008) ................................................................... 4, 7, 9, 10, 14

Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Oaklawn Apts.,
959 F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1992) .............................................................................................. 9

Firemans Fund Ins. Co. v. Thyssen
Mining Construction of Canada, Ltd.,
703 F.3d 488 (10th Cir. 2012) .............................................................................................. 8

Forest Guardians v. Forsgreen,
478 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 2007) ............................................................................................ 6

Good v. Fuji Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
271 Fed. Appx. 756 (10th Cir. 2008) ............................................................................... 10

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown,
131 S.Ct. 2846 (2011) ....................................................................................................... 8, 10

Grimes v. Cirrus Indus.,
712 F.Supp. 2d 1256 (W.D. Okla. 2010) ............................................................................ 9

Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall,
466 U.S. 408 (1984) ................................................................................................................. 8

Intercon, Inc. v. Bell Atl. Internet Solutions, Inc.,
205 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2000) ............................................................................................ 5
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Intl Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945) .............................................................................................. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9

Kohler Co. v. Kohler Intl, Ltd.,
196 F.Supp. 2d 690 (N.D. Ill. 2002) .................................................................................. 17

Melea, Ltd. v. Jawer SA,
511 F.3d 1060 (10th Cir. 2007) ............................................................................. 4, 17, 18

Near v. Crivello,
673 F.Supp. 2d 1265 (D. Kan. 2009) ......................................................................... 18, 19

OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Canada,
149 F.3d 1086 (10th Cir. 1998) ................................................................ 5, 9, 21, 22, 23

Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S. 265 (1986)................................................................................................................... 6

Peay v. Bellsouth Med Assn Plan,
205 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2000) ............................................................................................ 7

Peterson v. Grisham,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70206 (E.D. Okla. Sept. 17, 2008),
affd., 594 F.3d 723 (10th Cir. 2010) ............................................................................... 20

Quarles v. Fuqua Indus., Inc.,
504 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1974) ......................................................................................... 10

Rambo v. American S. Ins. Co.,
839 F.2d 1415 (10th Cir. 1988) ...................................................................................... 7, 9

Ridge at Red Hawk, LLC v. Schneider,
493 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 2007) ....................................................................................... 5, 6

Robbins v. Okla.,
519 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2008) ............................................................................................ 6

RTC v. Heiserman,
898 P.2d 1049 (Colo. 1995) ............................................................................................... 18


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Shrader v. Biddinger,
633 F.3d 1235 (10th Cir. 2011) ....................................................... 4, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17

Silver v. Brown,
382 F. Appx 723 (10th Cir. 2010) .............................................................................. 16, 17

Sleepy Lagoon, Ltd. v. Tower Grp., Inc.,
809 F.Supp.2d 1300 (N.D. Okla. 2011) ........................................................................... 22

Smalls v. Stermer,
2011 WL 1234781 (D.Kan. 2011),
Affd. 457 Fed. Appx 715 (10th Cir. Jan. 10, 2012) ...................................................... 4

Smith v. Basin Park Hosp., Inc.,
178 F.Supp. 2d 1225 (N.D. Okla. 2001) .......................................................................... 14

Smith v. United States,
561 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2009) ........................................................................................... 5

Soma Med. Intl. v. Standard Chartered Bank,
196 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 1999) .......................................................................... 13, 14, 15

Sunward Elecs., Inc. v. McDonald,
362 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2004) ..................................................................................................... 7

Taylor v. Phelan,
912 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1990) ...................................................................................... 4, 10

TH Agric. & Nutrition, LLC v. Ace European Group Ltd.,
488 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 2007) ............................................................................................ 4

Theunissen v. Matthews d/b/a Matthews Lumber Transfer,
935 F.2d 1454 (6th Cir. 1991) ........................................................................................... 10

Ticketmaster-New York, Inc. v. Alioto,
26 F.3d 201 (1st Cir. 1994) .................................................................................................... 9

Toytrackerz, LLC v. Am. Plastic Equip., Inc.,
615 F.Supp. 29 1242 (D. Kan. 2009) ............................................................................... 20

U.S. v. Botefuhr,
309 F.3d 1263 (10th Cir. 2002) ....................................................................................... 4, 5
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Watkins v. Kajima Intl,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85787,
2009 WL 3053856 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 18, 2009) ......................................................... 19

Woods v. Prestwick House, Inc.,
247 P.3d 1183 (Okl. 2011) .................................................................................................. 23

World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286 (1979) .............................................................................................................. 21

Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.,
952 F.Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997) .................................................................... 13, 14, 15




STATUTES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES:

U.S. Const., amend. XIV ......................................................................................................................... 7

15 U.S.C. 1114(1) ............................................................................................................................... 24

15 U.S.C. 1125(a) ............................................................................................................................... 24

15 U.S.C. 1125(a)(1)(A) ..................................................................................................................... 3

FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A) ................................................................................................................. 4, 7,

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2) ................................................................................................................ 1, 3, 25

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) ....................................................................................................... 1, 5, 24, 25

12 O.S. 1449 ................................................................................................................................... 3, 23

12 O.S. 2004(F) ..................................................................................................................................... 7

Internal Revenue Code, 501(C)(3) .............................................................................................. 11
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Defendant, Narconon International (International), moves the Court to dismiss
International from this action, pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2), for lack of personal
jurisdiction. Alternatively, International, specially appearing, moves to dismiss Plaintiffs
claims against it, pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim against
International.
INTRODUCTION
This lawsuit is brought by two Nevada corporations with their principal place of
business in Fort Wayne, Indiana. Neither of these corporations is registered with the
Oklahoma Secretary of State to conduct business in the State of Oklahoma. These Plaintiffs
represent that they offer certifications for substance abuse counseling, but neither of them
offer certifications recognized by the State of Oklahoma. Plaintiffs filed suit against
predominantly non-Oklahoma defendants -- including this Defendant, Narconon
International -- alleging trademark misuse in states other than Oklahoma. The clearest
connection Plaintiffs' lawsuit has to Oklahoma is the fact that Oklahoma is where Plaintiffs'
lawyers reside.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are two Nevada entities with principal places of business in Indiana.
[Complaint, Dkt. 3, 1-2.] NAFC and CCFC bring this action against 82 Defendants,
including International, a California not-for-profit corporation with its principal place of
business in California.
Plaintiff, National Association of Forensic Counselors (NAFC), and its subsidiary,
American Academy of Certified Forensic Counselors, Inc. (CCFC), claim they provide
nationally accredited certifications for professionals working with criminal offenders in
the fields of criminal justice, corrections, addictions and mental health. [Id. 88 (alleging
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six Certifications as relevant to the claims alleged).] Plaintiffs make no allegations that
any of the alleged Certifications are registered with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) as trademarks or certification marks.
Plaintiffs allege individuals must meet eligibility requirements to become certified
by Plaintiffs, and, that certified individuals must pay periodic fees to Plaintiffs to remain
certified. NAFC allows certified individuals to use a logo which contains NAFCs name, as
well as the initials and words that comprise NAFC's accreditations, as set out in 108 of
Plaintiffs Complaint (the NFAC Logo). [Id. at 106-108.] Plaintiffs also allege
ownership of one federally registered trademark: NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FORENSIC
COUNSELORS, Registration No. 3585933 (the NAFC Mark). [Id. at 109.] Plaintiffs claim
trademark rights in the unregistered NAFC Logo and the NAFC Mark, and appear to allege
rights in the unregistered Certifications, presumably as certification marks.
Plaintiffs allege four of the 82 Defendants used the NAFC Mark and NAFC Logo
without authorization of Plaintiffs, such as by displaying them on documents, websites, and
other marketing materials to promote themselves. [Id. at 130, 252 (Narconon Georgia);
131, 133, 135 (Narconon Vista Bay, California); 202 (Richard Hawk, Georgia); 225
(Steve Bruno, California).] The Complaint makes no allegations that International ever
used the NAFC Mark or the NAFC Logo.
Of the six allegedly relevant unregistered Certifications, Plaintiffs primarily
allege infringement of the designation Certified Chemical Dependency Counselor. There
is no allegation any Defendant used, let alone infringed, three of the alleged Certifications
Certified Criminal Justice Addictions Specialist, Certified Co-Occurring Disorder Specialist,
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and Certified Forensic Addictions Specialist.
1
Plaintiffs allege only two of the 82 Defendants
used Baccalaureate Addictions Counselor without authorization, [Id. at 134, 145]; and
only seven of 82 Defendants allegedly used Master Addictions Counselor without
authorization (but not International). [Id. at 134, 148, 162, 164, 169, 218, 220.] The
allegations against International are based on others use of the Certifications on
Internationals website. The Complaint makes no allegation Plaintiffs had exclusive use of
any of the alleged Certifications, or that any of the Certifications have acquired
distinctiveness or secondary meaning.
Plaintiffs allege five causes of action against all Defendants:
1. Federal Trademark Infringement under Section 32(1) of the Lanham Act, 15
U.S.C. 1114(1) (Registered marks) [id., at 260-270];

2. Common Law Trademark Infringement [Id. at 271-277];
3. Federal Infringement pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 1125(a)(1)(A) [Id. at 278-283];
4. Violation of Right of Publicity under 12 O.S. 1449 [Id. at 284-291]; and
5. Civil Conspiracy [Id. at 292-296].
As to these causes of action, Plaintiffs purport to join all 82 separate Defendants (some
corporate entities, some individuals, and all but 13 outside of Oklahoma) for their alleged
roles in an alleged conspiracy to misuse Plaintiffs NAFC Mark, NAFC Logo, and
Certifications, primarily on various websites.
LEGAL STANDARDS

A. FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(B)(2).

On a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, the burden is with the plaintiff to establish personal

1
The Complaint alleges one Defendant (Thomas Garcia) used a different Certification, Certified
Forensic Addictions Examiner, but Plaintiffs admit they abandoned that Certification over two
years ago. [Dkt. 3, 90(c), 197.]
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jurisdiction, and the weight of this burden varies with the stage of proceeding. Dudnikov v.
Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1069 (10th Cir.2008); Smalls v. Stermer,
2011 WL 1234781, at *2 (D. Kan. 2011), aff'd, 457 Fed. Appx 715 (10th Cir. Jan. 10, 2012).
At this stage, the plaintiff must only make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction ...
by demonstrating, via affidavit or other written materials, facts that if true would support
jurisdiction over each of the moving defendants." Melea, Ltd. v. Jawer SA, 511 F.3d 1060,
1065 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting TH Agric. & Nutrition, LLC v. Ace European Group Ltd., 488
F.3d 1282, 1286 (10th Cir. 2007)).
The court takes as true "all well-pled (that is, plausible, non-conclusory, and
nonspeculative) facts alleged in plaintiff's complaint. Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d 1235,
1239 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Only the well-pled
facts of the complaint, affidavits, or other writings, as distinguished from conclusory
allegations, can establish jurisdiction. Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1070. The court should accept
as true only those factual allegations that are plausible, non-conclusory, and non-
speculative, see Id., 514 F.3d at 1070, and then only to the extent they are uncontroverted
by the defendant's affidavits. Taylor v. Phelan, 912 F.2d 429, 431 (10th Cir. 1990). The
court, however, does not accept as true those allegations in the complaint contradicted by
the defendant's affidavits, but it must resolve any factual disputes in the plaintiff's favor.
Melea, 511 F.3d at 1065.
Two requirements are necessary for a federal district court to assert personal
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. First, the defendant must be one who could
be subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state in which the
district court is located. U.S. v. Botefuhr, 309 F.3d 1263, 1271 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A)). Second, the exercise of personal jurisdiction must not offend the
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due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Where, as in Oklahoma, the state long arm statute supports personal jurisdiction to the full
extent constitutionally permitted, due process principles govern the inquiry. Intercon, Inc.
v. Bell Atl. Internet Solutions, Inc., 205 F.3d 1244, 1247 (10th Cir. 2000).
Under the Due Process clause, a defendant must have sufficient minimum contacts
with the forum state that subjecting him to its jurisdiction will not offend traditional
conceptions of fair play and substantial justice. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted). The minimum contacts standard may be
met by showing either general or specific jurisdiction over the defendant. OMI Holdings,
Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Canada, 149 F.3d 1086, 1091 (10th Cir. 1998).
B. FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(B)(6).
Under Rule 12(b)(6) a court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). In deciding a motion under Rule
12(b)(6), the court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations ... and view
these allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d
1120, 1124 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir.
2009)). However, a plaintiff may not rely on mere labels or conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed. 2d (2007).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). [T]he mere metaphysical possibility that some plaintiff could prove
some set of facts in support of the pleaded claims is insufficient; the complaint must give
the court reason to believe that this plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering
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factual support for these claims. Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174,
1177 (10th Cir. 2007) The burden is on the plaintiff to frame a complaint with enough
factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that he or she is entitled to relief. Robbins v. Okla.,
519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The ultimate
duty of the court is to determine whether the complaint sufficiently alleges facts
supporting all the elements necessary to establish an entitlement to relief under the legal
theory proposed. Forest Guardians v. Forsgren, 478 F.3d 1149, 1160 (10th Cir. 2007).
Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The complaint must provide
more than labels and conclusions or merely a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action, so that courts are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched
as a factual allegation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265,
286 (1986)). Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be
a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. [W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit
the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has made
an allegation, but it has not shown that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. (quotation
marks and citation omitted).
ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. THE COURT LACKS PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER INTERNATIONAL (WHETHER PREMISED AS
GENERAL OR SPECIFIC JURISDICTION).

A. REQUIREMENTS FOR ASSERTING GENERAL JURISDICTION OVER INTERNATIONAL.

A court cannot grant any form of relief against a defendant unless the defendant is
amenable to the courts personal jurisdiction. See Intl Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. at 316.
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Plaintiffs must establish personal jurisdiction over each defendant. Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at
1069; Peay v. Bellsouth Med. Assn Plan, 205 F.3d 1206, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000).
The Lanham Act, under which Plaintiffs assert a claim, does not provide for
nationwide service of process. See, e.g., Am. Educ. Corp. v. Chase, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
47788, n.4 (W.D. Okla. July 13, 2006) (citing Sunward Elecs., Inc. v. McDonald, 362 F.3d 17,
22 (2d Cir. 2004). Therefore, FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A) requires the Court to apply the law of
the forum state (Oklahoma). See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 753 (2014);
Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1070. Oklahoma permits personal jurisdiction to be exercised on
any basis consistent with the Constitution of this state and the Constitution of the United
States. 12 O.S. 2004(F). Accordingly, this Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over
International only if the due process requirements of the U.S. Constitution are met.
The Supreme Court has held that to exercise jurisdiction in harmony with due
process, defendants must have minimum contacts with the forum state, such that having
to defend a lawsuit there would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice. Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1070 (quoting Intl Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316). In assessing a
defendants contacts with the forum state, the Court may consider two types of personal
jurisdiction: general and specific. As summarized by the Tenth Circuit:
Jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out of or related to the
defendants contacts with the forum state is specific jurisdiction. In
contrast, where the suit does not arise from or relate to the defendants
contacts with the forum and jurisdiction is based on the defendants presence
or accumulated contacts with the forum, the court exercises general
jurisdiction.

Rambo v. American S. Ins. Co., 839 F.2d 1415, 1418 (10th Cir. 1988); see also Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 n. 15 (1985).
Consistent with constitutional due process, a court may exercise general personal
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jurisdiction over a defendant who has continuous or systematic contacts with the forum
state. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn. 8 & 9 (1984).
But, as Daimler warns, a corporations continuous activity of some sorts within a state is
not enough to support the demand that the corporation be amenable to suits unrelated to
that activity. Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 757 (quoting Intl Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318). The contacts
must be such that the defendant could reasonably anticipate being haled into court in that
forum. See Doe v. Natl Med. Servs., 974 F.2d 143, 146 (10th Cir. 1992). The paradigm
forum where a corporate defendant is subject to general personal jurisdiction is its place
of incorporation and/or its principal place of business. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 759. In
determining whether a corporation is subject to general personal jurisdiction in another
forum, the question is not whether a foreign corporations in-forum contacts can be said to
be in some sense continuous and systematic, it is whether the corporations affiliations
with the State are so continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home in the
forum State. Id. at 762 (emphasis added); see Firemans Fund Ins. Co. v. Thyssen Mining
Construction of Canada, Ltd., 703 F.3d 488, 493 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop
Tires Operations v. Brown, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011)) (same).
Indeed, the Daimler Court rejected the notion that a corporation could be subject to
general personal jurisdiction in numerous venues merely because it performs substantial
activities or engages in substantial business in each of those venues:
[T]he general jurisdiction inquiry does not focu[s] solely on the magnitude
of the defendants in-state contacts. General jurisdiction instead calls for an
appraisal of a corporations activities in their entirety, nationwide and
worldwide. A corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be
deemed at home in all of them. Otherwise, at home would be synonymous
with doing business tests framed before specific jurisdiction evolved in the
United States.

134 S.Ct. at 762, n. 20 (quoting at 767 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment)).
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B. REQUIREMENTS FOR ASSERTING SPECIFIC JURISDICTION OVER INTERNATIONAL.
A court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant if the defendant
purposefully directed its activities at residents of the forum state and the plaintiffs
injuries arise out of defendants forum-related activities. Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1071
(quoting Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 472). Any assertion of specific jurisdiction must
always be consonant with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1071 (citing Intl Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316).
Although distinct, minimum contacts and purposeful availment interplay so that
"depending on the strength of the defendant's contacts with the forum state, the
reasonableness component of the constitutional test may have a greater or lesser effect on
the outcome of the due process inquiry." Rambo, 839 F.2d at 1419 n. 6. The weaker a
plaintiff's showing on the minimum contacts prong, the less a defendant need show in
terms of unreasonableness to defeat specific jurisdiction. OMI Holdings, 149 F.3d at 1092
(citing Ticketmaster-New York, Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 210 (1st Cir. 1994)).
The Court may decide whether personal jurisdiction exists upon review of the briefs
and evidentiary materials, or following an evidentiary hearing. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v.
Oaklawn Apts., 959 F.2d 170, 174 (10th Cir. 1992). If the Court holds a hearing, Plaintiffs
must prove personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Dennis Garberg &
Assocs. v. Pack-Tech Int'l Corp., 115 F.3d 767, 773 (10th Cir. 1997). If the Court does not
hold a hearing, Plaintiffs must make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction by
demonstrating, via affidavit or other written materials, facts that, if true, would support
jurisdiction over the defendant. Grimes v. Cirrus Indus., 712 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (W.D. Okla.
2010) (citing AST Sports Science, Inc. v. CLF Dist. Ltd., 514 F.3d 1054, 1057 (10th Cir. 2008)).
The Court should accept as true only factual allegations that are plausible, non-
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conclusory, and non-speculative, Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1070, and then only to the extent
they are uncontroverted by the defendant's affidavits. Taylor, 912 F.2d at 431 (quotations
omitted). In other words, in the face of a properly supported motion for dismissal, the
plaintiff may not stand on his pleadings but must, by affidavit or otherwise, set forth
specific facts showing that the court has jurisdiction. Theunissen v. Matthews d/b/a
Matthews Lumber Transfer, 935 F.2d 1454, 1458 (6th Cir. 1991).
C. INTERNATIONAL LACKS THE MINIMUM CONTACTS TO SUPPORT GENERAL OR SPECIFIC
JURISDICTION OVER INTERNATIONAL.

Plaintiffs fail to allege facts showing International has contacts with Oklahoma so
continuous and systematic as to render International at home in Oklahoma. The Court
may assert general jurisdiction over International to hear any and all claims against [it]
only when its affiliations with Oklahoma are so constant and pervasive as to render [it]
essentially at home in the forum State. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760; see also Goodyear, 131
S.Ct. at 2851.
Plaintiffs allegations that International resides within the district are incorrect.
[Dkt. 3, 3 and 86.] International is a California corporation with its principal place of
business in California. One of the counseling centers that International licenses, out of the
more than one hundred such centers, is within the boundaries of Oklahoma. Even if the
single licensee was a subsidiary of International (it is not), jurisdiction over a subsidiary is
insufficient to establish jurisdiction over the parent. For purposes of personal jurisdiction,
a holding or parent company has a separate corporate existence and is treated separately
from the subsidiary in the absence of circumstances justifying disregard of the corporate
entity. Good v. Fuji Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 271 Fed. Appx 756 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Quarles v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., 504 F.2d 1358, 1362 (10th Cir. 1974)). International, in
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contrast, is not Narconon Arrowheads holding company or parent.
Those facts of the Complaint that are well-pleaded, and the facts set out by
International, taken together, show that Plaintiffs cannot establish sufficient contacts by
International with Oklahoma necessary to support either general or specific personal
jurisdiction over International:
International is a non-profit corporation organized under the laws of California,
recognized as tax exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.
[See Clark Carr Declaration, 9, attached as Ex. 1.]

International's office and principal place of business are in California. [See Ex. 1,
10.]

Internationals service agent is located in California. International does not have a
service agent in Oklahoma. [See Ex. 1, 11.]

International licenses drug and alcohol rehabilitation centers throughout the United
States and the world, including centers in Italy, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, Russia,
Colombia, Australia, Taiwan, Nepal, Mexico, and South Africa to use the NARCONON
trademark in connection with delivery of drug and alcohol rehabilitation and drug
education services. International licenses a total of 42 licensee rehabilitation
centers, 12 of which are in the United States. [See Ex. 1, 12.]

International is not a parent corporation to any of the licensee entities. International
owns no capital stock in any corporation because it is a non-profit corporation that
owns no stock. International has no ownership of Narconon Arrowhead or any other
licensees of International's trademarks. [See Ex. 1, 13.]

International licenses ABLE's trademarks to Narconon of Oklahoma, Inc. dba
Narconon Arrowhead, an Oklahoma corporation with its principal place of business
in Oklahoma. Narconon Arrowhead is the only Oklahoma entity that holds a
trademarks license from International. [See Ex. 1, 14.]

International is not authorized to do business in Oklahoma. While it previously was
authorized to do business in Oklahoma, it voluntarily withdrew from Oklahoma in
2010. International does not direct business to or solicit business from residents of
Oklahoma nor does it advertise specifically in Oklahoma. [See Ex. 1, 15, 16.]

International does not own or lease any real property in Oklahoma. [See Ex. 1, 16.]

International does not have a bank account, other financial account or safe deposit
box in Oklahoma. It has not paid taxes in Oklahoma and has no telephone or fax
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listings in Oklahoma. [See Ex. 1, 17.]

International does not provide rehabilitation services. International has never
applied for or held any sort of a license or credential to provide rehabilitation
services in Oklahoma. [See Ex. 1, 18.]

International has the right under its trademarks license to disseminate certain
standards, specifications, and guidelines for the proper use and display of the
NARCONON trademark. International further has the right to monitor licensees'
operations with respect to their use of the marks. [See Ex. 1, 19, 20.]

International's License Agreement with Narconon Arrowhead specifically states that
International and Arrowhead are not agents of one another and have no authority to
act on behalf of the other. [See Ex. 1, 21.]

International and Narconon Arrowhead maintain their own finances; each hires its
own employees; and each runs its own daily operations. International only receives
money from Narconon Arrowhead pursuant to the contractual terms of the
trademarks license agreement. [See Ex. 1, 22.]

International does not control or have the right to control the day to day treatment
of Narconon Arrowhead students. International does not supervise the staff of
Narconon Arrowhead and does not control its daily affairs. [See Ex. 1, 23.]

International occasionally travels to Oklahoma in its oversight of the license held by
Narconon Arrowhead. Internationals sporadic visits to Oklahoma have nothing to
do with the use, publication or advertisement of Plaintiffs' marks, logos and
certifications. [See Ex. 1, 24.]

International has not and does not use its website to conduct any commercial
transactions with residents of Oklahoma. [See Ex. 1, 25.]

The websites cited in Plaintiffs Complaint generally offer assistance by drug
rehabilitation counselors or information on rehabilitation programs. The
counselors and other entities related to the rehabilitation services are separate legal
entities from International. International does not offer any type of treatment itself.
[See Ex. 1, 26.]

International has not used the NAFC Logo or the NAFC Mark or "Certifications" since
March 2013. [See Ex. 1, 27.]

International never communicated to any other defendant about the use or
potential use of Plaintiffs marks, logos or certifications (until after the filing of the
lawsuit). [See Ex. 1, 28.]

International is a licensing organization that licenses drug treatment centers around the
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world so that they may use the counseling and other materials owned and trademarked by
ABLE. Its activities in Oklahoma are not continuous and systematic and do not support
general jurisdiction in Oklahoma. International's licensing of trademarks to Narconon
Arrowhead does not render International subject to specific personal jurisdiction in
Oklahoma. Nothing about Narconon Arrowheads trademark license is at issue in the
Complaint. Plaintiffs' assertions that Internationals activities in Oklahoma render it
subject to jurisdiction in this District are unsupported by the record.
D. PLAINTIFFS WEBSITE ALLEGATIONS DO NOT ESTABLISH PERSONAL JURISDICTION
OVER INTERNATIONAL.

When communications on the internet form a significant part of the asserted basis
for jurisdiction, special issues can arise. The Complaint alleges [p]ersonal jurisdiction
exists over all Defendants because they purposefully directed their continuous and
systematic activities at the forum state through the maintenance and operation of active
websites to engage individuals in the forum state, which constitutes the requisite minimum
contacts. [Dkt. 3, 86 (emphasis added).]
Although International has a website, this fact is insufficient in itself to subject
International to general personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma under the standards set forth in
Daimler. See, 134 S. Ct. at 761-62; see also Soma Med. Intl v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196
F.3d 1292, 1296 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp.
1119, 1123-24 (W.D. Pa. 1997)).
Even prior to Daimlers recent recognition of the limitations of general jurisdiction,
the Tenth Circuit held that [a] web site will subject a defendant to general personal
jurisdiction only when the defendant has actually and deliberately used its website to
conduct commercial transactions on a sustained basis with a substantial number of
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residents of the forum. Shrader, 633 F.3d at 1243 (quoting Smith v. Basin Park Hosp., Inc.,
178 F.Supp. 2d 1225, 1235 (N.D. Okla. 2001)). The focus is on the numerosity of
commercial transactions with a large enough number of forum residents over a long
enough period of time. It is not a matter of whether a website exists on the internet and
that can be viewed by residents in the forum. "In this internet age, the existence of an
interactive website which allows for the exchange of information and for sales transactions
over a virtually unlimited geographical area cannot, by itself, equate with the existence of
general personal jurisdiction." Agape Flights, Inc. v. Covington Aircraft Engines, Inc., 771
F.Supp. 2d 1278, 1287-1288 (E.D. Okla. 2011) (referencing with approval Soma, Zippo and
Baskin Park Hosp. and granting motion to dismiss).
[C]ourts [should] look to indications that a defendant deliberately directed its
message at an audience in the forum state and intended harm to the plaintiff occurring
primarily or particularly in the forum state. Shrader, 633 F.3d at 1241. The Tenth Circuit
takes a restrictive view of the concept of purposeful direction toward the forum state, and
requires that the forum state must be the focal point of the tort. Id. at 1244 (quoting
Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1074 n. 9 and citing Calder v. Jones, 464 U.S. 783 (1984)). Plaintiffs
have not, and cannot, allege such conduct here.
Interactivity must be a significant part of a website to allow it to serve as the basis
for personal jurisdiction. A website was deemed not interactive where it was alleged
"Kansas customers can generate product codes, search products, email [defendant's]
management, file online requests for information, sign a guestbook, download manuals and
technical specifications, and search for authorized distributors and repair facilities."
Custom Cupboards, Inc. v. Cemp SRL, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44822 *8 (D. Kan. May 7, 2010).
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Applying Zippo,
2
the Custom Cupboards district court found the website not only was
primarily passive, but also "there is nothing on the website to suggest that defendant
specifically intended commercial interaction with Kansas residents over the website," a
factor consistent with Shrader's requirement of targeting in particular forum residents with
a website. Id. at *9.
Here, there is no allegation and no evidence that International intended harm to the
plaintiff occurring primarily or particularly in the forum state as a result of its lone
reference to CCDC accreditation of a California drug counselor. See Shrader, 633 F.3d at
1241. Plaintiffs were not authorized to issue CCDC certifications to California drug
counselors by operation of the California Code of Regulations. [See Request for Judicial
Notice, Exhibit 2.] Plaintiffs are citizens of Indiana. Plaintiffs do not allege they have
offices, personnel, or staff in the State of Oklahoma or that they primarily or particularly
receive income or lost income from the State of Oklahoma as a consequence of the alleged
"advertising" of three or four individuals as being CCDC on the International website. [See
Dkt. 3 at 137, 175, 190, 226.]
Plaintiffs allegations are akin to Soma, where the plaintiff alleged the defendant
maintains an internet website offering information concerning [defendants] services and
soliciting business from all over the planet, which allows access from anywhere, including
[the forum state]. Soma, 196 F.3d at 1297. The Tenth Circuit held it ha[s] no difficulty
concluding that it is the type of website which does not subject its creator [defendant] to
personal jurisdiction in [the forum state], under any standard promulgated by any court.
Id.

2
The Custom Cupboards court states that Zippo is the seminal case on this issue and notes that
Tenth Circuit courts cited this case in Capitol Federal Savings Bank v. Eastern Bank Corp., 493
F.Supp. 2d 1150, 1159-62 (D. Kan. 2007) and Soma, 196 F.3d at 1296.
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Plaintiffs bare allegations related to International's website do not establish
personal jurisdiction. Contacts directed at the forum state must be of a sort that
approximate physical presence in the stateand engaging in commerce with residents of
the forum state is not in and of itself the kind of activity that approximates physical
presence within the states borders. Shrader, 633 F.3d at 1243 (quoting Bancroft &
Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Natl, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000)). Whether a website
selling products to residents of a state could create general jurisdiction depends on the
degree of activity, but[t]he case law sets the bar quite high, ... denying general jurisdiction
absent substantial sales. Shrader, 633 F.3d at 1243 (listing cases). In this case,
International is a corporation that works with treatment centers to license them to use
certain trademarked counseling materials. It does not use its website to conduct any
commercial transactions with any residents of Oklahoma, nor to direct any International
activity into Oklahoma with the intent of engaging in any commercial interaction with
Oklahoma or any residents of Oklahoma. [See Ex. 1, 16, 25.]
The Complaint's allegation that Internationals website presence might engage
individuals in the forum state does not constitute well-pleaded facts showing
Internationals website is intended to reach Oklahoma in order to commit a tort or other
unlawful act within Oklahoma. This distinction was made by the Tenth Circuit in Shrader,
in its discussion of the types of contacts that together are sufficient to establish jurisdiction.
The Shrader defendant created a web blog for the specific purpose of harming the plaintiff,
used the plaintiff's name in the internet address on the attack blog, and the defendant's
conduct "uniquely targeted" the plaintiff within the forum state and was directed at an
audience that "would have inherently included a substantial number of forum state
residents and businesses." Shrader, 633 F.3d at 1245 (citing Silver v. Brown, 382 F. App'x
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723 (10th Cir. 2010)).
The Complaint fails to allege facts remotely as compelling as those in Shrader. The
websites cited in the Complaint generally only offer information about drug rehabilitation
counselors or information on rehabilitation programs. [See Ex. 1, 26.] The counselors
and other entities related to rehabilitation are separate legal entities from International;
International does not offer any type of treatment itself. Id. The allegations of the
Complaint do not show any degree of activity (commercial activity or otherwise) in
Oklahoma by International through websites. Plaintiffs fail to allege the kind of sustained
activity or transactions with a substantial number of Oklahoma residents by International
to support jurisdiction.
E. PLAINTIFFS CONSPIRACY ALLEGATIONS DO NOT SUPPORT PERSONAL JURISDICTION
OVER INTERNATIONAL.

The Complaint alleges personal jurisdiction exists over all Defendants due to
Defendants participation in a civil conspiracy with its [sic] co-Defendants located in this
forum. [Dkt. 3, 86.] To establish personal jurisdiction based on a conspiracy theory, a
plaintiff must offer more than bare allegations that a conspiracy existed, and must allege
facts that would support a prima facie showing of a conspiracy. Shrader, 633 F.3d at 1242
(quoting Melea, 511 F.3d at 1069 (internal quotation omitted)). Indeed, [f]or jurisdiction
based on the conspiracy theory of jurisdiction to exist in Oklahoma, an overt act of the
conspiracy must have taken place in Oklahoma. Clark v. Tabin, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1297
(N.D. Okla. 2005) (citing Kohler Co. v. Kohler Intl, Ltd., 196 F. Supp. 2d 690, 697 (N.D. Ill.
2002)). Moreover, [t]he overt act must not just be alleged, but must be shown by affidavit
that it likely took place. Mere allegations of conspiracy are insufficient. Clark, 400 F. Supp.
2d at 1297 (citing Baldridge v. McPike, Inc., 466 F.2d 65, 68 (10th Cir. 1972)); see also Am.
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Land Program, Inc. v. Bonaventura Uitgevers Maatschappij, N.V., 710 F.2d 1449, 1454 (10th
Cir. 1983) (finding that the plaintiff failed to establish personal jurisdiction based on
conspiracy because the defendants [] countered [plaintiffs allegations] by sworn affidavits
that no conspiracy ... existed, and the plaintiff failed to controvert defendants affidavits
other than by conclusory allegations in its complaint and briefs).
Due process also requires Plaintiffs to show jurisdiction over each defendant
individually. [T]o hold that one co-conspirator's presence in the forum creates jurisdiction
over other co-conspirators threatens to confuse the standards applicable to personal
jurisdiction and those applicable to liability. Melea, 511 F.3d at 1070. Even when a prima
facie case of conspiracy might exist, this does not translate to a finding of jurisdiction over a
defendant:
Assuming that Melea could make a prima facie showing of a conspiracy,
Heiserman might warrant holding either Engel or Jawer liable for the other's
acts under [the forums] law. However, it does not necessarily establish that
jurisdiction over Engel automatically translates into jurisdiction over Jawer.
Due process requires that Jawer itself have minimum contacts with [the
forum].

Id. (distinguishing RTC v. Heiserman, 898 P.2d 1049 (Colo. 1995). Whether Plaintiffs can
establish personal jurisdiction over any other defendant is immaterial to the threshold
question of whether Plaintiffs can establish jurisdiction over International.
With regard to its analysis of personal jurisdiction, the Court should require from
Plaintiffs the same pleading standard set forth in Twombly with regard to the jurisdictional
allegations against each of the Defendants:
In addition, the Supreme Court recently confirmed that merely conclusory
allegations are not entitled to the presumption of truth at the pleading stage
and are not sufficient to state a claim for relief; rather, the plaintiff must
plead facts in sufficient detail to establish a plausible right to relief. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (citing
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L.
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Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). Applying these standards in the context of an antitrust
claim, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff may not merely allege the
existence of a conspiracy, but must plead sufficient factual matter to suggest
that an agreement was actually made. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57. There
is no reason to believe that these same standards should not also govern a
plaintiff's allegations in support of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Watkins v. Kajima
Int'l, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85787, 2009 WL 3053856, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. Sept.
18, 2009) (pleading deficient under Twombly did not provide minimum
contacts necessary to support the assertion of personal jurisdiction).

Near v. Crivello, 673 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (D. Kan. 2009). Plaintiffs general allegation of civil
conspiracy is not a basis for subjecting International to personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma.
As Clark explained:
In this case, Plaintiff alleges as a "fourth cause of action" a civil conspiracy.
Plaintiff makes only general allegations, and none of the allegations include
the commission of an overt act in Oklahoma in furtherance of the conspiracy.

Id., 400 F.Supp. 2d at 1296. Plaintiffs conspiracy allegations consist entirely of the
following conclusory assertions, unsupported by any alleged facts:
1. Additionally, personal jurisdiction exists over all Defendants due to
Defendants participation in a civil conspiracy with its co-Defendants located
in this forum. [Dkt. 3, 86.]
2. International and the other Defendants operate a common scheme ... to
promote the Narconon Network through the misuse of NAFC logos,
trademarks, and certifications [Id. 253 (emphasis added).]
3. Defendants intentionally engaged in common plan to utilize NAFCs
Certification, Mark and Logo to attract customers to Defendants drug
treatment facilities. [Id. 293 (emphasis added).]
4. Defendants were aware of the common plan and the common purpose: to
receive acclaim in the industry and consequently profit and to attract new
members to the Church of Scientology, based on the use of the NAFC
Certifications, Mark and Logo. [Id. 294 (emphasis added).]
5. Defendants acted in concert, agreed and cooperated to achieve such misuse
and took affirmative steps to encourage the achievement of their plan. [Id.
295 (emphasis added).]
None of the allegations states commission of an overt act in Oklahoma in furtherance of
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the conspiracy, but that is what is required to rely on conspiracy as the basis for assertion
of jurisdiction. Clark, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 1297. "The overt act must not be just alleged, but
must be shown by affidavit that it likely took place." Id.
When an allegation of conspiracy is controverted by affidavits that deny the
allegations, dismissal is the correct result:
As the mere allegation of conspiracy was controverted by the affidavits
presented by the alleged co-conspirators in support of their denial of the
conspiracy, the trial court correctly found that it had personal jurisdiction
only of Niles & Moser, and dismissed the action as to the other appellees.

Baldridge, 466 F.2d at 68; see also Toytrackerz, LLC v. Am. Plastic Equip., Inc., 615 F. Supp. 29
1242 (D. Kan. 2009). International has submitted a sworn affidavit[] that no conspiracy ...
existed, Am. Land Program, 710 F.2d at 1454, including that International never
communicated to any other defendant about the use or potential use of Plaintiffs marks or
logos. [See Ex. 1, 28.] The allegations of the Complaint are precisely the type of naked
conclusions that cannot support personal jurisdiction under a conspiracy theory. Repeated
incantations of common plan, common scheme, or conspiracy, are no substitute for
specific facts. Instead, the pleading of civil conspiracy is that certain Defendants infringed
Plaintiffs' marks, and the alleged multiple infringements are evidence of an agreement to
conspire. As a matter of law, however, "[a]llegations 'must be placed in a context that raises
a suggestion of preceding agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as well be
independent action.'" Peterson v. Grisham, 2008 U.S. Dist LEXIS 70206 *28 (E.D. Okla. Sept.
17, 2008) (quoting Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1966), aff'd., 594 F.3d 723 (10th Cir. 2010).
The Complaint offers only conclusory allegations related to an alleged conspiracy.
There are no well-pleaded facts that could support a finding of conspiracy involving
International. International directly controverts the conclusory allegations by affidavit. A
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finding of personal jurisdiction over International based on mere pleading of civil
conspiracy would be improper.
II. EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION OVER INTERNATIONAL WOULD VIOLATE DUE PROCESS.

Even if Plaintiffs could make a prima facie showing of Internationals minimum
contacts with Oklahoma, exercise of personal jurisdiction over International would be
unreasonable, unfair, and in violation of due process. The Tenth Circuit identified factors to
be considered in determining the reasonableness of exercise of personal jurisdiction:
In determining whether exercise of jurisdiction is so unreasonable as to
violate fair play and substantial justice, we consider: (1) the burden on the
defendant, (2) the forum states interest in resolving the dispute, (3) the
plaintiffs interest in receiving convenient and effective relief, (4) the
interstate judicial systems interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution
of controversies, and (5) the shared interest of the several states in
furthering fundamental substantive social policies.
OMI Holdings, 149 F.3d at 1095-96. Applied to International, these factors demonstrate
that exercise of jurisdiction over International in Oklahoma would be unreasonable and
unfair.
A. THE BURDEN ON THE DEFENDANT OF LITIGATING IN THE FORUM.
While not dispositive, the burden on the defendant of litigating the case in a foreign
forum is of primary concern in determining the reasonableness of personal jurisdiction.
World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1979). The burden on
International in this case is significant. International is a California corporation with its
principal place of business in California. It has no offices, assets, or employees in
Oklahoma. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of International.
B. THE FORUM STATES INTEREST IN ADJUDICATING THE DISPUTE.
Plaintiffs are not Oklahoma residents. They are Nevada corporations with their
principal places of business in Fort Wayne, Indiana. They brought claims against 82
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Defendants 13 residing in Oklahoma and the others residing in at least 14 states, Canada,
and the United Kingdom. Those claims are based on conduct not centered in Oklahoma, but
alleged to have occurred in the various places where the Defendants reside. Thus,
Oklahoma has no greater interest in adjudicating the dispute than any of these other
jurisdictions. Compare, Sleepy Lagoon, Ltd. v. Tower Grp., Inc., 809 F.Supp. 2d 1300, 1310
(N.D. Okla. 2011) (forum state has an interest in exercising personal jurisdiction over a
defendant where one or more of the plaintiffs is a resident of the forum state).
C. PLAINTIFFS INTEREST IN CONVENIENT AND EFFECTIVE RELIEF.
This element hinges on whether Plaintiffs may obtain convenient and effective relief
in another forum. This factor may weigh heavily in cases where a plaintiffs chances of
recovery will be greatly diminished by forcing it to litigate in another forum because of that
forums laws or because the burden may be so overwhelming as to practically foreclose
pursuit of the lawsuit. OMI Holdings, 149 F.3d at 1097. No such danger exists here. As
noted above, Plaintiffs are Nevada corporations based in Indiana. There is no reason to
believe Oklahoma is a more convenient forum than the courts in or closer to their home
states. Nor do they suggest that a peculiarity of Oklahoma law greatly enhances their
chances of recovery here. This factor does not support this Courts assertion of jurisdiction
over International.
D. THE INTERSTATE JUDICIAL SYSTEMS INTEREST IN OBTAINING EFFICIENT RESOLUTION.

This factor examines whether the forum state is the most efficient place to litigate
the dispute. Id., at 1097. Key parts of this inquiry are location of the wrong underlying the
lawsuit and what states substantive law governs. Id.
This case involves Nevada-incorporated Plaintiffs with their principal place of
business in Indiana. Of the 82 Defendants, only 13 are residents of Oklahoma. Oklahoma is
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23

not the epicenter of this dispute it is one of many places in which the alleged wrongful
conduct has occurred. The majority of the claims asserted are based on federal statutes or
common law. The single Oklahoma statutory claim involves a right-of-publicity statute, 12
O.S. 1449 -- a statute hardly unique to Oklahoma and one that defies relief to Plaintiffs in
Oklahoma as a matter of law. See, Woods v. Prestwick House, Inc., 247 P.3d 1183, 1187 (Okl.
2011) (section 1449 protects individuals from unauthorized use of the persons name,
voice, signature, photograph or likeness, indicating the statute only may be invoked by
individuals, not corporate entities such as Plaintiffs (emphasis added)). Thus, Oklahoma is
not the most efficient place in which to litigate this dispute.
E. STATE INTEREST IN FURTHERING FUNDAMENTAL SUBSTANTIVE SOCIAL POLICIES.
The final factor is the interests of the several states, in addition to the forum state, in
advancing fundamental substantive social policies. OMI Holdings, 149 F.3d at 1098. This
factor asks whether exercise of jurisdiction by the forum state affects the substantive social
policy interests of other states. This factor does not appear to apply here.
Summarizing the role of due process in the determination of whether jurisdiction
should be exercised over a party, the Tenth Circuit stated:
Personal jurisdiction analysis requires that [the court] draw a line in the
sand. At some point, the facts supporting jurisdiction in a given forum are so
lacking that the notions of fundamental fairness inherent in the Due Process
Clause preclude a district court from exercising jurisdiction over a defendant.

Id. Even taking the Complaints conclusory allegations against International as true,
Internationals contact with Oklahoma would be so slight that compelling International to
defend this suit in Oklahoma would be unreasonable and inconsistent with notions of fair
play and substantial justice which form the bedrock of the due process inquiry. Id.

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III. ALTERNATIVELY, INTERNATIONAL ADOPTS THE ARGUMENTS MADE BY CERTAIN DEFENDANTS
IN THEIR MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON PLAINTIFFS FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM. [DKT.
#287.]

Should the Court find that its exercise of jurisdiction over Narconon International is
proper, International hereby moves for dismissal of Plaintiffs Complaint for failure to state
a claim pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), as further set out in the Motion to Dismiss filed
by Defendants Michael George, Dena G. Goad, Kathy Gosselin, Michael J. Gosselin, Derry
Hallmark, Michael Otto, Pita Group, Inc., Gary W. Smith, Vicki Smith, Michael St. Amand,
Janet Watkins, Tom Widman. [Dkt. 287], and their accompanying brief in support. [Dkt.
288].
Specifically, Plaintiffs allegations that International infringed the federally
registered NAFC Mark under 15 U.S.C. 1114(1) (Count I), fail to state a claim because there
is no allegation that International ever used, let alone infringed, that registered mark. The
allegations of common law trademark infringement (Count II), and the parallel claim of
federal trademark infringement under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
1125(a) (Count III), of Plaintiffs unregistered NAFC Logo and its alleged unregistered
Certifications fail because: 1) there is no allegation that International used the NAFC Logo
or certain of the alleged certification marks; 2) the alleged unregistered Certification(s)
that International allegedly used, as well as the other Certifications, are unprotected
because they are descriptive as a matter of law, with no allegation that they have acquired
secondary meaning; and 3) unregistered certification marks are not protectable under the
common law or the Lanham Act.
Finally, to the extent Count III is construed to constitute a claim for false advertising,
it fails to allege the necessary proximate cause between the alleged false advertising and
alleged damage to Plaintiffs. As to these claims, International adopts the arguments and
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25

authorities presented by certain Defendants in their Motion to Dismiss. [Dkt. 287.]
Further, although Plaintiffs refer to false advertising in their Complaint, they fail to
plead a statutory cause of action for false advertising under the Lanham Act. To the
extent their statutory pleading failure is excused, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for false
advertising because they fail to allege the requisite proximate cause between any false
advertising by Defendants and any cognizable damage or injury to Plaintiffs. International
again adopts the arguments and authorities presented by certain Defendants in their
Motion to Dismiss. [Dkt. 287.]
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs fail to establish general or personal jurisdiction of the State of Oklahoma
over Narconon International. Dismissal of this Oklahoma lawsuit is appropriate as to
International as a matter of law. Alternatively, Plaintiffs claims against International
should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Narconon International moves the Court for
dismissal of all of Plaintiffs claims against it under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2) as this Court
lacks personal jurisdiction over International. Alternatively, the Court should dismiss
Plaintiffs causes of action for failure to state a claim under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
Respectfully Submitted,


By: ___/s/ John H. Tucker______________________________
JOHN H. TUCKER, OBA 9110
jtucker@rhodesokla.com
COLIN H. TUCKER, OBA 16325
chtucker@rhodesokla.com
KERRY R. LEWIS, OBA 16519
klewis@rhodesokla.com
DENELDA L. RICHARDSON, OBA 20103
drichardson@rhodesokla.com
RHODES HIERONYMUS JONES TUCKER & GABLE
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P.O. Box 21100
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74121-1100
Phone: (918) 582-1173; Fax: (918) 592-3390

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT,
NARCONON INTERNATIONAL



CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on the 1
st
day of August, 2014, I electronically transmitted the attached
document to the Clerk of Court using the ECF System for filing and transmittal of a Notice of
Electronic Filing to the following ECF registrants:


Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

David R. Keesling david@klgattorneys.com
Heidi L. Shadid Heidi@klgattorneys.com
Sloane Ryan Lile Sloane@klgattorneys.com
Keesling Law Group, PLLC
401 S. Boston Ave.
Tulsa, OK 74103


Attorneys for Defendant, Religious Technology Center:

David L. Bryant dbryant@gablelaw.com
David E. Keglovits dkeglovits@gablelaw.com
Amelia A. Fogleman afogleman@gablelaw.com
Gable Gotwals
1100 ONEOK Plaza
100 W. Fifth Street
Tulsa, OK 74103-4217


Attorneys for Defendants, Narconon of Oklahoma, Inc.,
Michael George, Derry Hallmark, Janet Watkins, Tom
Widman, Vicki Smith, Michael Otto, Michael Gosselin
Kathy Gosselin, Kent McGregor, Michael St. Amand,
Pita Group, Gary Smith, and Dena Goad:

M. David Riggs driggs@riggsabney.com
Donald M. Bingham don_bingham@riggsabney.com
Wm. Gregory James gjames@riggsabney.com
Riggs Abney Neal Turpen Orbison & Lewis
6:14-cv-00187-RAW Document 295 Filed in ED/OK on 08/01/14 Page 34 of 36

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502 W. 6
th
Street
Tulsa, OK 74119


Attorneys for Defendants: Best Drug Rehabilitation, Joseph
Guernaccini, Anthony Bylsma, Friends of Narconon International,
Glen Petcavage, A Life Worth Living, Thomas Garcia, Golden
Millennium Productions, Inc., David S. Lee, III Richard Hawk,
Narconon South Texas, Inc., Narconon Eastern United States,
Inc., Great Circle Studios, LLC, Luria Dion, James Woodworth,
Jonathan Moretti, International Academy of Detoxification,
Royalmark, Premazon, Narconon Spring Hill, Narconon Freedom
Center, Inc., Michael DiPalma, Daphna Hernandez, Robert J.
Hernandez, Mary Rieser, Carl Smith, Nicholas Thief,
Narconon of Georgia, Inc., Rebecca Pool, and Jonathan Beazley:

Charles D. Neal, Jr. cdn@steidley-neal.com
Rachel D. Parrilli rdp@steidley-neal.com
Stacie L. Hixon slh@steidley-neal.com
Steadley Neal
CityPlex Towers, 53
rd
Floor
2448 E. 81
st
Street
Tulsa, OK 74137


Attorneys for Defendant, David S. Lee:

Richard P. Hix Richard.hix@mcafeetaft.com
Alison A. Verret Alison.verret@mcafeetaft.com
McAfee & Taft, P.C.
1717 S. Boulder Ave., Suite 900
Tulsa, OK 74119


Attorney for Defendant, Church of Scientology:

John J. Carwile jcarwile@mmmsk.com
Mary E. Kindelt mkindelt@mmmsk.com
McDonald McCann Metcalf & Carwile
First Place Tower
15 East Fifth Street, Suite 1400
Tulsa, OK 74103


Attorneys for Defendants, Narconon Freedom
Center, Inc., and Nicholas Thiel:

6:14-cv-00187-RAW Document 295 Filed in ED/OK on 08/01/14 Page 35 of 36

28

Robert D. Nelon bnelon@hallestill.com
Nathaniel T. Haskins nhaskins@hallestill.com
Hall Estill Hardwick Gable Golden & Nelson
Chase Tower
100 N. Broadway, Suite 2900
Oklahoma City, OK 73102-8865


Attorney for Defendants, Jonathan Beazley,
Michael DiPalma, and Joseph Guernaccini:

Todd Nelson tnelson@fellerssnider.com
Fellers Snider Blankenship Bailey & Tippens
The Kennedy Building
321 S. Boston, Suite 800
Tulsa, OK 74103-3318


Attorneys for Defendant Philip R. Kelly, II:

Richard P. Hix Richard.hix@mcafeetaft.com
Alison A. Verret Alison.verret@mcafeetaft.com
McAfee & Taft
1717 S. Boulder Ave., Suite 900
Tulsa, OK 74119




__/s/ John H. Tucker__________________________

6:14-cv-00187-RAW Document 295 Filed in ED/OK on 08/01/14 Page 36 of 36