Fixed Income Research

Fixed-Income Research
The ABCs of HELs

December 8, 2004 INTRODUCTION
The Home Equity Loan (HEL) sector has grown exponentially since 2002 to form
Primary Authors the largest component of the ABS market. These bonds have increasingly become
David Heike a core holding for ABS investors due to their high liquidity and attractive spread
Akhil Mago pickup over the benchmark auto and credit card sectors. However, HEL bonds
212-526-8312 demand careful analysis because of their inherent mix of credit, prepayment, and
structural risks.
This article provides a broad overview of the HEL market to help ABS investors get
Strategy acquainted with the opportunities and risks in the sector. We begin with a historical
David Heike overview of the market evolution over the past decade to provide some perspective
dheike@lehman.com on the lending industry. We examine typical loan characteristics, discuss underwriting
trends and highlight the drivers of collateral performance. From a bond perspective,
Akhil Mago we discuss typical structural features of HEL ABS transactions and outline the key
akmago@lehman.com risk factors for ABS bondholders.
Sihan Shu
sshu@lehman.com
Quantitative Research
Dick Kazarian
dick.kazarian@lehman.com
Stefano Risa
srisa@lehman.com
Namit Sinha
nsinha@lehman.com
PLEASE SEE IMPORTANT ANALYST CERTIFICATION AT THE END OF THIS REPORT.

Lehman Brothers | MBS & ABS Strategies The ABCs of HELs
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 3
Evolution of the HEL Market ........................................................................................ 4
Pre-1996 – Nascent ................................................................................................ 4
1996-1998 – Initial Growth ................................................................................... 5
1999-2001 – Consolidation ................................................................................... 6
2002 to 2004 – Expansion ...................................................................................... 6
Loan Characteristics ....................................................................................................... 8
Collateral Trends .......................................................................................................... 10
Collateral Performance ................................................................................................ 12
Voluntary Prepayments ....................................................................................... 12
Defaults and Delinquencies ................................................................................. 16
Severity Rates ........................................................................................................ 18
Originator/Servicer Effects .................................................................................. 19
Structural Features of HEL Securities ......................................................................... 20
Rating Agency Methodology ....................................................................................... 27
Risk Factors ................................................................................................................... 28
Interest Rate Risk ................................................................................................. 28
Housing Market Slowdown ................................................................................. 29
Predatory Lending/Servicing ............................................................................... 29
IO Credit Performance ........................................................................................ 30
Summary ....................................................................................................................... 31
Additional Reading ....................................................................................................... 32
Glossary ......................................................................................................................... 33
December 8, 2004 2
INTRODUCTION
We define HELs as subprime first-lien In this report, we define a home equity loan (HEL) as a subprime first-lien mortgage and
mortgages use these terms interchangeably. This is the most common convention among ABS
investors, who equate HELs with first-lien mortgages made to borrowers with imperfect
or limited credit history. This somewhat peculiar terminology grew from the original
usage of the term in the ABS market, when it generally referred to second-lien mortgages
taken out by lower credit borrowers for debt consolidation purposes.
Other smaller loan types are sometimes This classification is not universally accepted. Some market participants, including many
included in this definition mortgage lenders, apply the rubric of HELs to a broader universe of loans (Figure 1).
Borrower characteristics, underwriting and performance vary widely among these related
loan types. Most of these related sectors are relatively small; subprime first-lien mortgages
still comprise over 95% of loan originations in this broader set. While we do not discuss
these related loans types in this paper, we list them below for completeness:
• Closed-end second-liens: Second-lien mortgage used by the borrower to cash out
the equity in the house. This was the traditional definition of a home equity loan in
the early-1990s. Simultaneous closed-end second-liens issued at the time of pur-
chase (piggyback seconds) have recently gained in popularity.
• Home equity lines of credit (HELOCs): Revolving lines of credit backed by
borrower equity typically made to a prime quality borrower. These could either be
first- or second-liens.
• High loan-to-value loans (HLTV): Mortgages with LTVs in excess of 100%, often
up to 125%, taken to add/improve existing property. Home improvement loans
(HIL) often have high LTVs and are classified in this category.
• Specialty loans: These loans exit regular mortgage pools due to various reasons.
Non-performers/re-performers are bought out of existing pools due to early/first-
pay defaults or delinquencies. Scratch and dent loans do not qualify the guidelines
originally established for the pool (guideline exceptions).
Figure 1. Historical Loan Originations, ($bn)
600
Subprime First Lien Second Lien
HELOC HLTV
500
Specialty
400
300
200
100
0
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004E
Source: Lehman Brothers, Inside B&C Lending
December 8, 2004 3
Figure 2. Comparison versus Other Mortgage Products, 2H04
Average
Gross Loan Average Average DTI Full Doc Fixed
Loan Type WAC (%) Size ($) LTV FICO Cutoff (%) (%) Underwriting Comments
Prime Conforming 5.75 200,000 70 740 < 36 95 70 Most marketable properties, agency
underwriting
Prime Jumbo 5.95 450,000 71 740 < 38 90 20 Similar to Prime Conforming loans
except for loan size.
Alt-A Conforming 6.20 200,000 82 700 < 45 35 70 Higher LTV than prime conforming,
less docs, less primary occupied,
more multi-family, more cash out
FHA/VA 6.25 125,000 100 640 < 42 95 90 Government insured, low and
moderate income borrowers
Alt-A Jumbo 6.45 450,000 76 700 < 42 35 35 Similar to Alt-A Conforming except for
loan size
Home Equity Loans 7.25 170,000 82 630 < 50 65 30 Moderate income borrowers, limited
(Subprime Mortgages) credit history or credit issues
Manufactured Housing 7.50 90,000 80 600-720 <50 90 95 Low income borrowers, usually
(Land-home) located on private property
Second-Lien 9.60 40,000 95 685 <55 70 95 Same borrower leverage as HEL,
superior borrower credit, higher
documentation, more purchase
Manufactured Housing 9.75-12.00 45,000 90 600-720 <50 95 95 Low income borrowers, typically
(Chattel) located in MH parks
Source: Lehman Brothers
We compare HEL characteristics to other Subprime mortgage characteristics fall on a credit continuum between prime/Alt-A
mortgage products mortgages and manufactured housing loans (Figure 2). An average subprime borrower
pays a mortgage rate 150-200bp higher than the conventional prime mortgage rate due
to poorer credit characteristics. The average borrower has a Fair Issac & Co. (FICO)
credit score of 630, having either limited credit history or experienced credit problems
in fulfilling previous consumer or mortgage debt obligations. The average loan size is
around $170,000 with typical LTVs ranging between 80-85%.
EVOLUTION OF THE HEL MARKET

The market participants, borrower, loan The HEL sector has changed dramatically since its early days. The market participants
and structural characteristics have have changed over time. Borrower, loan and structural characteristics seem to change
changed dramatically over time on an annual basis. We describe the evolution of the HEL market by dividing it into four
broad phases (Figure 3):
• Pre-1996 – Nascent
• 1996-1998 – Initial growth
• 1999-2001 – Consolidation
• 2002 to 2004 – Expansion
Pre-1996 – Nascent
In the early 1990s, HELs consisted mostly Home equity loans in the early 1990s referred to second-lien loans made to credit-
of second liens ... impaired borrowers. The market was dominated by a limited number of specialized
lenders, because mainstream banks (which were the main source of mortgage financing)
did not actively participate in the subprime sector (Figure 4). Activity was limited to
portfolio lenders due to lack of secondary market liquidity through the capital markets.
December 8, 2004 4
... with conservative loan guidelines The absence of a proven credit grading system led to conservative loan programs that
focused more on the strength of the collateral than the borrower’s credit quality. Thus,
most loans made during this period carried small loan balances, low LTVs and short
amortization terms (less than 15 years). Lending was concentrated in the lower-tier
subprime market (referred to as “hard money” lending), with a high proportion of loans
made to seriously credit-impaired borrowers (foreclosure, bankruptcy bailouts, etc.).
1996-1998 – Initial Growth

The market expanded rapidly between The HEL market grew rapidly between 1996 and 1998, almost tripling in yearly issuance.
1996 and 1998 ... This was facilitated by three key factors:
• A number of mainstream lenders entered the subprime market to boost volumes
following the drop-off in the conventional mortgage market in the 1994-1995 rate
backup. In addition, the subprime market offered attractive margins over conventional
mortgages due to low competition among the limited number of existing players.
Figure 3. HEL Loan Originations, ($bn)
600
Early Days Initial Growth Consolidation Expansion
500
400
300
200
100
0
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004E
Source: Lehman Brothers, Inside B&C Lending
Figure 4. Major HEL Lenders across Various Market Phases
Pre-1996 1996-1998 1999-2001 2002 to 2004

Money Store Associates First Capital Household Ameriquest
Beneficial Household CitiFinancial New Century
Household ContiMortgage Bank of America CitiFinancial
Guardian Savings and Loan IMC Washington Mutual Household
LongBeach Savings Money Store Option One Option One
Green Tree GMAC-RFC First Franklin
Advanta Countrywide Washington Mutual
GMAC-RFC First Franklin Countrywide
New Century GMAC-RFC
Ameriquest Wells Fargo
Source: Lehman Brothers, Inside Mortgage Finance
December 8, 2004 5
• The increasing use of securitization provided non-bank lenders an alternate source

of funding, enabling them to enter the subprime sector.
• The evolution of credit scores helped lenders to better understand and price
borrower credit risk. This common benchmark provided lenders and investors with
the ability to analyze and compare credit performance across borrowers, which
increased liquidity and facilitated the introduction of new loan types.
... leading to new loan types and The entry of a number of new lenders had the following effect on the HEL market:
underwriting standards • A number of new loan types with longer amortization terms up to 30 years were
introduced (for example, hybrid adjustable rate mortgages). As a result, the propor-
tion of purchase borrowers increased and the market shifted from second-liens
towards subprime first-liens. The proportion of seriously credit-impaired borrowers
declined, as more mainstream subprime borrowers were extended credit.
• Strong competitive pressures led to the loosening of underwriting standards and the
introduction of higher LTV programs by new lenders to capture market share.
1999-2001 – Consolidation
A majority of lenders faced financial There was a major shakeup among subprime lenders between 1999 and 2001. Three-
difficulties from 1999 to 2001 ... fourths of the active lenders either exited due to financial problems or merged with larger
players. Some of the notable issuers to exit during this period were ContiMortgage, First
Plus, Bank of America and Superior Bank. Other lenders were acquired by larger players,
such as The Money Store (by First Union), Green Tree (by Conseco) and Advanta
(by JPMorgan).
... driven by lax underwriting and The financial problems among lenders were caused by a combination of lax underwriting
aggressive accounting standards, aggressive gain-on-sale income accounting, and unfavorable market conditions
after the liquidity crisis in 1998. Most of the new non-bank lenders that entered the
market after 1996 were thinly capitalized. These lenders used gain-on-sale accounting
with aggressive assumptions around residual valuations to gain favorable access to
funding. However, poor collateral performance due to lax underwriting caused them to
take large non-cash writedowns against their residual asset valuations. These financial
problems were magnified during the 1998 liquidity crisis, when market execution
became unfavorable due to a widening in spreads. This led lenders to turn to whole loan
sales (to bank portfolios), which in turn lowered whole loan prices. HEL issuance growth
stalled during this period (Figure 3). Most lenders used mortgage warehousing lines of
credit for inventory financing. Financing was reduced following the liquidity crisis as
these warehouse facilities were either curtailed or eliminated.
2002 to 2004 – Expansion

Issuance has grown exponentially The HEL market has grown exponentially from 2002 to 2004. This surge in issuance is
since 2002 ... based on several factors:
• Historically low mortgage rates have driven the purchase markets to record highs.
The strength of the purchase market is evidenced by the growth in homeownership
trends (Figure 5a). However, homeownership trends understate purchase demand
in subprime, where overall market penetration has increased markedly more than
the overall mortgage market.
• Refinancing volume remains high even in a environment of rising interest rates, due
to tighter margins. The increase in competition among a number of large lenders
December 8, 2004 6
has compressed subprime margins over the last year (Figure 5b). Subprime loan
rates have been declining while conventional mortgage rates have risen modestly.
• Strong home price appreciation (HPA) has supported cash-out refinancing
volumes (Figure 5c). Please refer to the section on collateral performance for the
link between HPA and prepayments.
• The use of securitization as a funding mechanism has increased; approximately
80% of new loan originations are being securitized (Figure 5d). This has reduced
capital constraints and enabled the entry of smaller lenders.
• The subprime market has expanded to include borrowers that were traditionally
covered by Alt-A lenders. This is evidenced by collateral trends in the 2002-2004
vintages (Figure 10). Average loan size has increased by around 30%, while limited
documentation loans have increased from 27% to 38% from 2001 to 2004.
... driving servicing portfolio growth Servicing portfolio growth has mirrored the recent increase in issuance. Servicing
portfolios have grown sharply for large originators that typically retain servicing of their
originations (Ameriquest, Countrywide etc.). Figure 6 lists the top issuers and servicers
of subprime mortgages for 1H04.
The growth of NIMs prompted dealer The securitized market got a major technological boost in 2001 when issuers began to
conduits to enter after 2001 monetize the senior component of the residual cashflow in the form of a NIM security.
This enables ABS issuers to maximize deal issuance proceeds and reduce or eliminate
Figure 5. Issuance Growth Drivers
a. U.S. Homeownership Rate (%) b. Spread of Subprime Mortgage Rates to Conventional Prime (%)
70 4 Fixed
68 Hybrid
3
66
2
64
62 1
60 0
1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 1998
1/98 2000
1/00 2002
1/02 2004
1/04
c. U.S. Annual HPA (%) d. HEL Securitized Issuance vs. Loan Originations, ($bn)
%
16 600 Unsecuritzed 100%
Securitized
500 80%
%
12 Securitized % (RHS)
400
60%
8
% 300
40%
200
4
%
100 20%
0
% 0 0%
1998 2000 2002 2004 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004E
Source: Lehman Brothers, Inside B&C Lending, Freddie Mac, Federal Reserve, Loan Performance
December 8, 2004 7
Figure 6. Top Lenders and Servicers in 1H04
Market Origination Volume Market Servicing Portfolio

1H04 Subprime Share ($bn) Primary Share ($bn)
Rank Lenders 1H04 2003 1H04 Servicers 1H04 2003 1H04
1 Ameriquest 15.1% 39.0 38.2 Ameriquest 8.7% 49.0 71.8
2 New Century 8.2% 27.4 20.7 CountryWide 7.1% 39.3 58.0
3 CountryWide 6.5% 19.8 16.4 Household 6.8% 51.4 56.2
4 Household 6.5% 20.3 16.3 Citifinancial 6.6% 50.4 54.0
5 First Franklin 5.7% 20.1 14.4 Option One 5.9% 41.4 48.3
6 Washington Mutual 5.5% 19.9 13.9 Homecomings 5.9% 44.2 48.2
7 Option One 4.7% 20.1 11.9 Chase 4.4% 27.9 36.4
8 Wells Fargo 4.5% 16.5 11.4 Ocwen 4.2% 37.5 34.8
9 CitiFinancial 4.4% 21.4 11.1 HomeEq 4.1% 24.0 33.9
10 Fremont 4.3% 13.0 11.0 Wells Fargo 3.2% 12.7 26.1
11 GMAC RFC 4.3% 14.0 10.9 Washington Mutual 2.9% 19.3 23.7
12 WMC 2.9% 8.2 7.3 National City 2.7% 18.4 22.2
13 Accredited 2.3% 8.0 5.7 Select Portfolio 2.6% 28.6 21.0
14 Aegis 2.2% 8.2 5.6 New Century 2.5% 11.6 20.9
15 BNC 2.0% 7.0 5.0 Litton Loan 2.2% 12.3 17.9
Source: Inside B&C Lending
their residual risk position. The rapid growth of NIM securitizations prompted a
number of Wall Street dealer conduits to enter the securitized HEL market after 2001.
Dealer presence has been increasing and accounts for around 30% of the HEL market in
2004. These dealer shelves aggregate collateral from originators through secondary
market whole loan purchases. This improved liquidity and efficiency in the secondary
whole loan market has led to product standardization across issuers and greater third-
party due diligence.
The REIT structure has been gaining A growing number of mortgage originators have recently organized themselves as
popularity among lenders Mortgage REITs. There are two key factors that have recently emerged to make REIT
conversion a more compelling option:
• Lenders are seeking to reduce gain-on-sale earnings volatility accounting to boost
equity market valuations. Lenders who retain mortgages on balance sheet effec-
tively convert one-time gain-on-sale income to spread income that is recognized
over the life of the mortgage. As a lender increases the on-balance-sheet portfolio,
the tax-advantaged status for the REIT-eligible spread income starts to look more
attractive.
• The reception of the equity market to REIT IPOs has been extremely positive, as
REIT stocks offer dividend yields of around 10-12%.
LOAN CHARACTERISTICS
HEL borrowers can choose between different combinations of interest payment options,
amortization types and loan terms. We describe these in detail below.
Interest Payment Types

Borrowers can choose between fixed and Borrowers can choose to pay a traditional fixed interest rate over the life of the mortgage,
hybrid interest rates ... which is typically 30 years. They can also choose a fixed rate payment for an initial period,
and reset into a floating rate over the remaining life of the mortgage.
December 8, 2004 8
• Hybrid adjustable rate mortgages (Hybrid ARMs, 70% by issuance): These mort-
gages have a fixed coupon for an initial period and a floating-rate coupon after a
specified reset date (typically indexed to 6-Mo LIBOR and reset every 6 months).
Most common is the 2/28 hybrid (60% by issuance), which has a 2-year fixed-rate
period and a 28-year floating-rate period. There are less popular variants where the
length of the initial fixed rate period is zero (pure ARM), three (3/27 hybrid), and
five years (5/25 hybrid). Hybrids are the dominant loan type for subprime mort-
gages. Borrowers typically have a short time horizon, hoping to refinance into a
lower-rate prime mortgage due to improvement in their credit file.
• Fixed-rate (30% by issuance): These are fixed coupon, level pay mortgages with
typical loan terms of 30 years. These formed a large proportion of the market of the
market before 1996 (Figure 7).
Amortization Type
... level pay and IO mortgages Borrowers can choose between two amortization schedules:
• Level Pay: These are fully-amortizing mortgages where the length of the amortiza-
tion period is same as the term of the mortgage. Most fixed-rate and around 90%
of hybrids are level-pay mortgages.
• Interest-only (IO) loans: The borrower pays interest only for an initial period
(typically ranging from 2-10 years) with the amortization of principal over the
remaining 20-28 years of the mortgage. For example, for a 5-year IO loan, the
borrower only makes interest payments for the first five years with no principal
amortization. At the end of five years, the borrower faces an increase in monthly
payments since principal begins to amortize based on a 25-year schedule. Since
almost all recent IO loans are also hybrids, the borrower faces two payment resets
over the life of the loan – the rate reset (interest payments) and the amortization
reset (principal payments). IO products were traditionally used in the prime market
as a means of tax-advantage to borrowers and have gained popularity in the
subprime market since 2004 (15-20% of issuance). Please refer to the section on IO
loans for more details.
Figure 7. Historical Loan Originations by Interest Payment Type, ($bn)

600
Pure ARM
5/25
500 3/27
2/28
400 FRM
300
200
100
0
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Source: Lehman Brothers, Loan Performance, Inside B&C Lending
December 8, 2004 9
Figure 8. Overall Prepayment Penalty Distribution

100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
12 Mo. 24 Mo. 36 Mo. 60 Mo.

Source: Lehman Brothers, Loan Performance
Prepayment Penalties
Most loans are originated with Most subprime mortgages (80% of Hybrids, 65% of FRMs) are originated with prepayment
prepayment penalties penalties during the first few years, which limit borrower prepayments and protect the
lender’s interests. The lender compensates the borrower by charging a lower rate
(typically 50-75bp lower). Fixed-rate mortgages typically have a penalty period for the
first three years (around 65% of FRM penalty loans) while the length of the hybrid
penalty period usually coincides with the initial fixed-rate period (Figure 8). The amount
of the penalty is usually 6 months of interest payments on 80% of the prepaid balance
(2.5 to 3 points).
Interest Rate Caps/Floor

Hybrid borrowers are protected from large To protect hybrid borrowers from large increases in interest-rates during the floating-
rate increases due to embedded caps rate period, hybrid loans are embedded with various interest rate caps. Hybrid loans
typically specify three interest-rate caps - initial caps, periodic caps and lifetime caps.
• Initial caps limit the increase in coupon at the first-reset date over the initial fixed-
rate (typically 1.5%-3%).
• Periodic caps limit the change in rate from the last period’s coupon to a specified
amount (typically 1%).
• Lifetime caps limit the absolute level of interest rates to a specified maximum over
the life of the loan (typically 6% over the initial fixed rate).
Hybrid loans are also typically embedded with an interest rate floor which bounds the
minimum mortgage rate to the initial fixed rate.
Property Type and Loan Purpose

HEL collateral can be further segmented by loan purpose and property type (Figure 9).
The composition of single-family and rate-refinance mortgages has remained largely
constant across time.
COLLATERAL TRENDS
Currently, the average subprime The subprime market has shifted to higher credit quality loans as evidenced by recent
homeowner has superior credit quality... trends in collateral characteristics (Figure 10). Since credit bottomed out in 2000-2001,
December 8, 2004 10
Figure 9. 2004 Issuance by Property Type and Loan Purpose
Property Type Loan Purpose
5% 1% 14% 1%
8%
9%
55%
30%
77%
Single-Family Planned Unit Development

2-4 Unit Condo Rate Refi Purchase Cash-Out Refi Other
Other
Figure 10. Average Historical FICO Scores and Loan Size
FICO Loan Size ($K)

660 ARM 200 ARM
FRM FRM
160
620
120
80
580
40
540 0
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
FICO scores especially for fixed-rate product have risen by around 30 points1. Over the
past three years, overall loan sizes have increased from $120K to $150K. This shift away
from the lower-tier subprime borrowers has been prompted by two factors. First, due to
the fixed cost of liquidation (legal fees, refurbishing etc.), low-balance loans are associated
with higher loss severities. Second, lenders have avoided the lower-tier subprime market
due to growing predatory lending concerns around high-cost loans to weak credit
quality borrowers.
... but higher borrower leverage The recent improvement in borrower quality has been accompanied by an increase in
borrower leverage (Figure 11). This is evidenced by higher LTVs, falling loan-
documentation levels and largely constant DTIs (even in a declining interest rate
environment). Thus, subprime homeowner characteristics have evolved towards a
stronger credit quality, but a more levered borrower.
1 While the overall FICO population has drifted upwards, the improvement in HEL borrower characteristics has
dominated this larger trend.
December 8, 2004 11
Figure 11. Historical LTV and Documentation Trends
LTV (%) Full Doc Loan (%)
84 ARM 90 ARM
FRM FRM
82
80
80
70
78
76 60
74 50
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
COLLATERAL PERFORMANCE
We examine historical performance of The blend of prepayment and credit characteristics positions HEL as a unique cross-over
HEL collateral and highlight the key sector between mortgage and asset backed securities. In this section we examine
performance drivers historical performance of HEL collateral and highlight the key performance drivers. The
analysis of HEL securities is dependent on assumptions around four key performance
variables - voluntary prepayments, involuntary prepayments (defaults), delinquencies
and severity rates.
Voluntary Prepayments
Voluntary prepayments are driven Voluntary prepayments can result from rate refinancing, cashout refinancing, credit
by rate and cashout refinancing, curing and housing turnover. These components have different drivers:
curing and turnover ... • Rate refinancing: Caused by borrower prepayments due to a decline in prevailing
HEL loan rates.
• Cashout refinancing: Prepayments where borrowers tap the built up equity in the
house by taking a larger loan.
• Credit curing: An improvement in borrower credit can enable homeowners to
refinance in to a lower mortgage rate even as market rates remain constant.
• Turnover: Caused by borrowers shifting residence and prepaying the mortgage on
the existing home.
... and are greatly dependent on loan type The shape of the voluntary prepayment curve is largely dependent on loan type.
Prepayments for fixed-rate HEL have historically increased over the first two years to
25-35CPR before stabilizing at those levels. Hybrid prepayments follow a typical pattern
which is closely related to the length of the initial fixed-rate and the prepayment penalty
period (Figure 12). Hybrid voluntary prepayments are faster than fixed-rate due to a
self-selection bias; many borrowers with a shorter time horizon choose a hybrid over a
30-year fixed-rate product.
December 8, 2004 12
Figure 12. Voluntary Prepayments by Deal Age
FRM ARM
60% 1998 1999 2000 80% 1998 1999 2000 2001

2001 2002 2003 2002 2003 2004
2004
45% 60%
30% 40%
15% 20%
0% 0%
01 13
12 25
24 37
36 49
48 61
60 73
72 01 13
12 25
24 37
36 49
48 61
60 73
72
Voluntary prepayments are driven by the following factors:
Better credit borrowers have higher Borrower Characteristics: Rate-refinancing sensitivity is smaller for lower-credit borrowers
rate-refinancing sensitivity than it is for better-credit borrowers due to fewer financing alternatives and lower
sophistication. The different dimensions of borrower credit quality (FICO, LTV, DTI etc.)
can be largely captured by a single variable: the spread at origination (SATO). SATO
measures the difference in the mortgage rate between the specified loan and a constant
quality subprime mortgage rate. Assuming that lenders price borrower risk efficiently, a
higher SATO implies a worse credit borrower2. The refinancing sensitivity across a high
and low quality borrower pool distinguished by SATO is shown in Figure 13.
2 SATO provides a reasonable measure of borrower quality; however, more precise prepayment and credit analysis
can be performed through borrower FICO, LTV, DTI data.
Figure 13. Rate Sensitivity by Borrower Credit Quality

50
Low SATO
40 High SATO
30
20
10
0
-2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2
Rate Incentive (%)
FRM: 3-year penalty penalty, 15-30 WALA

December 8, 2004 13
Prepayment penalties provide a Prepayment Penalty: Loans with prepayment penalties prepay more slowly since the
significant disincentive to prepay 2.5-3.0 point penalty provides a significant disincentive during the penalty period.
Moreover, borrowers with a low propensity to prepay self-select themselves into these
loans. Borrowers with penalty loans who postpone their prepayments typically prepay
immediately after the end of the penalty period, thereby causing a transitory spike in
prepayments. Hybrid prepayments display a sharp spike after the prepayment penalty
period (which usually coincides with the initial fixed-rate period) and CPRs typically
reach as high as 70-80 CPR for a few months. Fixed rate prepayments also demonstrate
a prepayment spike after 36 months of loan age, which is the typical penalty period
(Figure 12).
Loan Size: Since the dollar refinancing incentive increases with higher loan sizes,
prepayments sensitivity to interest rates is higher for larger loan sizes (Figure 14).
Figure 14. Prepayment Sensitivity by Loan Size
50 Small Size
Large Size
40
30
20
10
0
-1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5
Rate Incentive (%)
FRM: 3-year penalty penalty, 15-30 WALA

Voluntary prepayments increase Loan Age/Seasoning: Voluntary prepayments increase with loan age for the following
with loan age ... three reasons. First, cash out refinancing activity increases over time as borrowers build
up equity due to accumulated home price appreciation. Second, credit curing becomes
viable after the borrower establishes a history of good credit for 2-3 years. Third,
turnover increases with loan age as most homeowners do not shift within the first few
years of taking a new mortgage.
... falling interest rates ... Interest Rates: Prepayments of premium mortgages are a function of the amount of rate
incentive, defined as the difference between the origination and the current market rate.
Subprime prepayments are less sensitive to a change in interest rates than conventional
prime mortgages. This is largely explained by the lower loan balances (limits dollar
incentive to refinance), higher fixed cost of refinancing (cost of origination) and lower
sophistication of these borrowers. The typical relationship between voluntary
prepayments and rate incentive is as shown below (Figure 15).
December 8, 2004 14
Figure 15. Total Prepayments (CPR) by Rate Incentive (%)
50
FRM
ARM
40
30
20
10
0
-2.25 -1.50 -0.75 0.00 0.75 1.50
Rate Incentive (%)
FRM: 15-30 month weighted average loan age (WALA), ARM: 15-20 WALA, prepayment penalty loans
... and home price appreciation Home Price Appreciation: Cashout refinancings increase during periods of strong home
price appreciation, as borrowers tap the built up equity in the house to retire more
expensive debt or meet big ticket expenses. In addition, strong home price appreciation
allows borrowers to reduce their mortgage rate even with unchanged market rates by
lowering the LTV (Figure 16a). The impact of HPA varies with the interest rate environment
since borrowers are more likely to be able to afford a larger mortgage and cash out if rates
have declined. Thus, the impact of HPA on prepayments is more pronounced for in-the-
money mortgages and relatively muted out-of-the-money (Figure 16b).
Other Economic Variables: Other economic variables such as unemployment and

income growth also impact voluntary prepayments. An improving credit environment
with low unemployment and strong income growth would boost turnover due to higher
economic activity and the increased ability to trade up to bigger houses.
Figure 16. Total Prepayments (CPR) by HPA
a. CPR by Deal Age b. CPR by Rate Incentive (%)*

50% 50 Normal HPA
40% 40 Fast HPA
30% 30
20% 20
5% HPA
10% 10
8% HPA
0% 0
0 12 24 36 48 60 72 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Deal Age Rate Incentive (%)
* FRM 3-year prepayment penalty, 15-30 WALA

December 8, 2004 15
Defaults and Delinquencies

Defaults and delinquencies are important Forecasting involuntary prepayments (defaults) is critical for the credit analysis of
variables for credit analysis subordinate and mezzanine HEL securities. Delinquency levels are particularly important
in HELs, since delinquency triggers are a key determinant of the deal principal paydown
(please refer to the section on structural features of HEL securities). Historical default
and delinquency performance by vintage is displayed below (Figure 17 and 18).
Defining Defaults
We define defaults as loan terminations The two most commonly-used definitions of defaults are (i) loan terminations with
from the 60+ delinquency bucket ... losses, or (ii) loans terminating from the 60+ delinquency bucket. The definition of
defaults is not standardized across issuers/servicers and varies by trust. In addition, a
number of trusts do not report defaults and severities individually, but instead state final
loss rates. It is important to specify a standard definition for defaults to compare
performance across different trusts and loan characteristics. Since accurate loss
information is often not available at the loan level, we define defaults as loan terminations
from the 60+ delinquency bucket. This definition includes loan terminations which get
resolved with no losses (due to adequate home equity or mortgage insurance), and thus
results in smaller effective severities.
Figure 17. Defaults (CDR) by Deal Age
FRM ARM
18% 1998 1999 2000 2001 25% 1998 1999 2000 2001
15% 2002 2003 2004 2002 2003 2004
20%
12%
15%
9%
10%
6%
3% 5%
0% 0%
0 12 24 36 48 60 72 0 12 24 36 48 60 72
Deal Age Deal Age
Figure 18. 60+ Delinquencies (% Cur Bal) by Deal Age, Incl. BK, FCL and REO
FRM ARM
30% 1998 1999 2000 2001 40% 1998 1999 2000 2001
2002 2003 2004 2002 2003 2004
30%
20%
20%
10%
10%
0% 0%
0 12 24 36 48 60 72 0 12 24 36 48 60 72
Deal Age Deal Age
December 8, 2004 16
Defaults and delinquencies are driven by the following factors:
... and use SATO as a summary variable Borrower Characteristics: Indicators of borrower credit quality such as length of
for borrower quality employment, credit history, debt-to-income ratio etc. provide an indication of
expected default rates. Borrowers who have previously experienced major derogatories
on their credit reports (i.e., at least one 90-day delinquency) are more likely to default.
First-time homeowners also default at higher rates than those who previously own a
residence. These dimensions of borrower credit quality can also be largely captured by
SATO. Defaults and delinquencies for a high and low quality borrower pool
(distinguished by SATO) are shown in Figure 19. The assumption that lenders price
borrower risk efficiently is reasonable, since SATO adequately differentiates the credit
quality between loans.
Figure 19. Defaults and Delinquencies by Borrower Credit Quality
Defaults 60+ Delinquency (% Current Balance)
15 Low SATO 25 Low SATO
12 High SATO 20 High SATO
9 15
6 10
3 5
0 0
0 12 24 36 48 60 0 12 24 36 48 60
Deal Age Deal Age
FRM, 2000 vintage, no prepayment penalty

Defaults and delinquencies rise Loan Age/Seasoning: Defaults are relatively rare during the first year of a loan due to the
with deal age recency of underwriting and long liquidation timelines. Total delinquencies rise over time
and stabilize around three years of deal age, with 60+ delinquencies settling in at 25-30%
(% current balance) for the overall deal. This high percentage is explained by a gradual shift
in the pool towards terminally delinquent borrowers. The borrowers who remain in the
pool are typically of average credit quality, since the good quality borrowers usually prepay
and the bad quality borrowers typically default as the deal seasons.
Higher HPA lowers the borrower Home Price Appreciation: Home price appreciation is an important driver of defaults and
incentive to default delinquencies since it determines the current loan-to-value ratio. At higher current LTVs,
borrowers have less equity in the home, and the incentive to default becomes greater. On
average, using a cross-sectional MSA study, a decrease in HPA by 3% (difference of around
10% in a loan’s current LTV at deal age 36) leads to an increase in default rates by around 20%.
Economic Conditions: Economic variables such as employment growth have a significant

impact on credit performance. A 2% decrease in local employment growth is estimated
to increase defaults and delinquencies by 3-4% (Figure 20).
December 8, 2004 17
Figure 20. Defaults and Deliquencies by Employment Growth Buckets (%), HPA Adjusted
Defaults 60+ Delinquency (% Current Balance)
18 0% 25 0%
2%
15 2% 20
12
15
9
10
6
5
3
0 0
0 12 24 36 48 60 0 12 24 36 48 60
Deal Age Deal Age
Severity Rates
Loss severities are determined by Loss severity rates, which measure the percentage loss on liquidations are driven by three
liquidation expenses, P&I advancing and key components (i) Liquidation expenses (legal fees, foreclosure fees etc.) (ii) Delinquent
market value declines principal and interest (P&I) advanced by the servicer, and (iii) Property market value
decline (if any). The length of the foreclosure process affects liquidation expenses and the
P&I advanced, while accumulated home price appreciation determines the equity
cushion available to cover market value declines. The historical severity rates by loan type
are shown below (Figure 21).
Figure 21. Severity (Pre-MI ) by Deal Age
FRM ARM
75% 1998 1999 2000 2001 60% 1998 1999 2000 2001
2002 2003 2004 2002 2003 2004
45%
50%
30%
25%
15%
0% 0%
0 12 24 36 48 60 72 0 12 24 36 48 60 72
Deal Age Deal Age
Severity rates are driven by the following factors:
Loan Size: Due to fixed costs such as legal fees, refurbishing etc. while liquidating units,
severities are higher on smaller loan sizes on a percentage basis.
December 8, 2004 18
Amortization Type: Loans with an initial IO period have a higher average principal
outstanding at the time of default. This amortization gap can result in severities being
higher by 2-3% for IO loans.
Mortgage Insurance: Certain HEL deals utilize mortgage insurance policies to protect
the trust from a limited amount of loss (specified by the policy) in an event of default.
The presence of mortgage insurance results in lower effective severity rates due to
insurance reimbursements by the mortgage insurer (please refer to the section on
structural features of HEL securities for more details).
Loan Age/Seasoning: Severity rates tend to increase with loan age and stabilize around
30% by 30 months. This is explained by a higher proportion of long foreclosure timeline
loans among defaulting loans later in the life of the deal. Longer liquidation timelines
entail higher P&I advancing, liquidation fees, and a possible lack of upkeep by the
defaulting borrower.
Accumulated HPA: Accumulated HPA reduces severity rates by providing an equity

cushion to cover liquidation expenses and P&I advancing. In addition, loans with strong
HPA typically have shorter liquidation timelines, since short sales are often used as the
liquidation mechanism. This further reduces the liquidation cost.
Originator/Servicer Effects
Collateral performance is strongly The variation in underwriting and verification practices across originators is an important
influenced by originator practices ... determinant of collateral performance which is often not evident from a loan tape.
Subprime lenders use a variety of business practices to determine the accuracy and
completeness of information while making a loan. The two key processes during
underwriting are property appraisal and income verification. These are gaining increasing
importance due to the prevalence of limited/stated documentation and high LTV loans
(Figure 10). The effectiveness of underwriting exceptions for fringe borrowers is another
key determinant of credit performance.
... and servicing capablities The relatively high delinquencies and defaults of subprime loans underscores the
importance of strong servicing capabilities for loss mitigation and recovery (Figure 22).
The main goal of a servicer working on a delinquent loan is to maximize the present value
of the loan’s future cash flows to the trust. This is typically achieved through two parallel
strategies. On the one hand, the servicer tries to get the borrower back on track. This
could require some help in the form of a forbearance plan or a loan modification.
However, if the borrower cannot cure the delinquency, so the servicer must follow the
necessary legal steps to liquidate the collateral to satisfy the borrower’s obligations. A
balanced execution of both these strategies is critical to maximize trust cashflow. These
originator/servicer effects can lead to significant differences in performance across loans
that appear similar on paper based on stated characteristics.
December 8, 2004 19
Figure 22. Subprime Servicing Entitites
The HEL sector has three types of servicing entities with different responsibilities:
• Primary servicer: Responsible for the different aspects of loan administration –
payment collection, loss mitigation, foreclosure, liquidation etc. The primary servicer
is also responsible for submitting monthly remittance reports and advancing principal
and interest to the trust. Most transactions have more than one primary servicer.
• Special servicer: Performs the specialized function of handling seriously delinquent
loans. Thus, the special servicer focuses on loss mitigation, managing defaults and
REO (real estate owned) properties.
• Master servicer: Responsible for overseeing the different sub-servicers (primary and
special) present on the transaction. Thus, the master servicer monitors the monthly
remittance reporting and aggregation, tracks the movement of funds between the
different accounts. In addition, the master servicer handles the event of a sub-servicer
bankruptcy/inability to service by handling servicing for an interim period before
assigning a new sub-servicer.
STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF HEL SECURITIES

HEL securities are the most structurally complex of the core ABS sectors. The interaction
of prepayments, defaults and delinquencies with the structure creates unique paydown
mechanics for HEL securities. We discuss the major elements of deal structures below.
HEL transactions are shifting towards Prior to 1997, most HEL ABS transactions used bond insurance from AAA-rated
senior/subordinate structures ... monoline insurers as a form of credit enhancement. The growing liquidity in the ABS
market after 1997 led to a gradual shift towards senior/subordinate structures. The 1998
liquidity crisis temporarily halted this shift, but senior-subordinated structures grew in
popularity following the restructuring among lenders from 1999-2001. This recent shift
towards senior-subordinate structures has been fuelled in part by strong demand from
GSEs, foreign investors and structured finance CDOs. The securitized market has also
graduated from the use of mostly passthrough tranches at AAA level, to time-tranching
the senior AAA-rated sequential securities. The typical capital structure of a new issue
HEL deal is shown in Figure 23.
... utilizing different forms of credit Most current home equity deals (around 90%) issue floating-rate securities (indexed to
enhancement 1MoLIB) backed by a combination of fixed and hybrid collateral. Deals use senior/
subordinate structures, over-collateralization, excess spread, performance triggers,
Figure 23. Capital Structure by Issue Year, (%)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

AAA 92.3 93.8 91.8 91.2 89.0 85.5 83.5
AA+ 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 1.3
AA 3.0 2.3 3.1 3.2 4.0 5.2 4.2
AA- 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.8
A+ 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.7
A 2.4 1.7 2.5 2.5 3.1 4.0 2.8
A- 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.8 1.7
BBB+ 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 1.0 1.5
BBB 1.0 1.0 1.4 1.6 2.5 2.2 1.9
BBB- 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.2
BB+ 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
BB 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
BB- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Source: Lehman Brothers, Intex
December 8, 2004 20
mortgage insurance (MI) and external insurance (monoline wraps, letters of credit) as
different forms of credit enhancement. We describe each of these in detail in the sections
below.The collateral backing the deal is usually divided into different groups with senior
bonds linked to the cashflow from a particular group. Subordinates are paid the
remaining cashflow from all groups. The allocation of cashflow to securities is done
through three different allocation waterfalls: interest, principal and excess cashflow. We
describe these payment mechanics for a typical HEL deal structure below (Figure 24).
Figure 24. Deal Waterfall Payment Mechanics
HEL
Collateral
Collateral Interest Cashflow Collateral Principal Cashflow
Gross interest + Scheduled and prepaid principal +
delinquent advancing + delinquent advancing +
liquidation recovery liquidation recovery
Servicing + MI
premium + bond
insurance fee
INTEREST PRINCIPAL
WATERFALL AAA WATERFALL
Bonds are Bonds are paid
paid interest to principal in order
stated coupon Bond Coupon of credit priority
(1MoLIB+DM Payments
up to net WAC)
AA
A
BBB
Excess interest flows into

excess cashflow waterfall
EXCESS Turbo principal to

CASHFLOW attain target OC
WATERFALL Embedded Hedges Hedge cashflow is
Excess cashflow is Cover basis risk (Interest rate available for basis risk
used to cover losses, shortfalls corridors/swaps) shortfalls and bond
meet basis risk losses not covered by
shortfalls and recoup Cover Bond excess interest
bond losses Losses
Hedge cashflow not used for basis

Residual cashflow risk shortfalls and bond losses
flows to the residual holder/NIM
Residual
Holder/NIM
December 8, 2004 21
Interest Waterfall
Senior fees and premiums are deducted Available proceeds in the interest waterfall include the gross weighted average coupon
from gross interest ... (gross WAC) collected from the loans plus servicing advances for delinquent interest,
and interest recovery from liquidations. Servicing fees, servicer interest advances, MI
insurance premiums (if any) and other fees (bond insurer etc.) are paid at the top of the
waterfall. The servicing fee is typically set at 50bp/year. Most servicers provide liquidity
to the trust by advancing principal and interest (P&I) for delinquent loans as long as the
advanced amount is considered recoverable. The servicer recovers this P&I advancing
either through the monthly collections account when a loan becomes current, or from
the liquidation proceeds following a default.
... to pay bond coupon ... The amount remaining after meeting these payments (net WAC), flows into the interest
waterfall. Interest is typically paid to the bonds sequentially in order of priority up to the
stated bond coupon. Floating-rate bonds are typically promised a coupon (1MoLIB+DM)
which is limited to the net WAC of the collateral. This discount margin typically steps
up after the cleanup call distribution date if the option holder does not call the deal. The
limit of the bond coupon to the net WAC of the collateral is also called the available funds
cap (AFC) feature on these deals (we provide more detail on this in a later section).
... any excess spread flows into the excess The net interest collected from the collateral typically exceeds the coupon payment to the
spread waterfall bonds early in the life of the deal. For example, if the collateral net WAC is 6.5% and the
weighted average DM of the bonds is 50bp, the excess spread at origination (assuming 2.5%
1MoLIB) is 3.5% (6.5% - (2.5%+0.5%)). The difference between the collateral net WAC
and the interest paid to the bonds (excess spread) flows into the excess spread waterfall.
Principal Waterfall
Principal payment mechanism varies The scheduled principal, prepaid principal and principal recovery from liquidations
across the life of the deal flows into the principal waterfall. The principal payment mechanism varies across the
life of the deal. During the first 36 months of the deal (lockout period), senior bonds are
paid principal sequentially in the order of credit priority with the mezzanine and
subordinate bonds being locked out. After the stepdown date, conditional on the deal
passing performance triggers (explained below), principal is allocated to maintain a
target current credit enhancement for the senior and subordinate bonds (typically twice
the initial credit enhancement). If the deal fails triggers in any month, the deal switches
back to paying sequentially. Bonds start to take losses from the bottom of the capital
structure upwards in reverse credit priority when the collateral balance is reduced below
the total outstanding bond balance.
Over-collateralization serves as a form of The collateral balance backing the deal is typically higher than the total principal balance
credit enhancement ... of bonds outstanding. This over-collateralization (OC) serves as a form of credit
enhancement as it provides a first cushion to absorb collateral losses. The OC might
either be funded initially, or it may build up over time by applying excess spread to the
payment of bond principal (referred to as the “turbo” feature). Any collateral principal
remaining after paying down all the securities (ending OC) is paid to the residual holder.
... and is maintained at a target level The deal paydown attempts to maintain the OC at a specified over-collateralization
target percentage. The OC target is typically specified as a percentage of the original
collateral balance before the stepdown date. After the stepdown date, conditional on
triggers passing, the OC target is specified as a percentage of the current collateral
December 8, 2004 22
balance. If the target OC after the stepdown date is lower than the initial target OC, the
OC steps down to the new target, causing a release of principal to the residual/NIM
holder (Figure 25). In addition, deals typically specify a minimum OC floor at 0.5% of
the original balance.
Figure 25. OC Buildup Mechanics
OC builds OC at target OC steps down at the stepdown OC at floor and

to target (% of original date to new OC target (% of growing as a
balance) current balance) percentage of
current balance.
} Principal released to
residual holder/NIM
0 12 24 36 48 60 72 84 96
Deal Age
Excess Cashflow Waterfall

Excess spread is available to cover The net collateral interest (net WAC) in excess of the amount required to pay bond interest
collateral losses ... flows into the excess spread waterfall. This excess spread is available to build over-
collateralization, cover basis risk shortfalls and bond losses before paying the residual
holder. In the event of the current OC being lower than the OC target (due to collateral
losses or initial OC ramp-up), any excess cashflow goes to pay principal to the bonds to
attain the target OC (turbo principal). Thus, excess spread is available to meet any collateral
losses before the deal experiences an erosion in OC. There is some limited cross-
collateralization among groups since the excess cashflow from one group can offset losses
of another group to maintain the overall over-collateralization target of the deal.
... basis risk shortfalls and bond losses In the event of an interest shortfall due the bond coupon being limited to the net WAC
of the collateral (basis risk shortfalls), the excess spread is available to meet this shortfall.
The excess spread also covers any unpaid basis risk shortfalls accruing from previous
payment months. Excess spread is also available to pay back any bond principal losses
experienced in previous months. The excess spread remaining after meeting these
payments goes to pay the residual/NIM holder.
Trigger Mechanics
Deals contain performance triggers ... HEL deals contain provisions to release principal to the subordinate tranches after an
initial lockout period if the pool meets certain performance tests or “triggers”. Triggers
provide additional credit protection to the senior bonds by directing a larger proportion
of the available cash flow to senior bonds if performance deteriorates. This enhances
senior credit support as the subordinate classes increase as a percentage of the total
collateral.
December 8, 2004 23
... based on cumulative losses and current Transactions typically specify these performance tests based on both cumulative losses
delinquencies (“cumulative loss trigger event”) and current delinquencies (“delinquency trigger event”).
• The cumulative loss trigger fails if the cumulative losses exceed a specified threshold. The
threshold is generally specified as a percentage of the original balance of the deal and follows
a schedule typically stepping up from month 36 to month 72-84. The threshold of the
cumulative loss trigger is static and does not change with the performance of the deal.
• The delinquency trigger threshold is typically specified as a percentage of the current
senior enhancement of the deal. For example, the delinquency trigger might be
specifed to fail if the 60+ delinquencies are greater than 50% of the current senior
credit enhancement. Thus, the 60+ delinquency trigger threshold changes dynami-
cally based on the current senior enhancement.
The delinquency trigger typically toggles The dynamic nature of the delinquency threshold causes this trigger to typically toggle
between passing and failing intermittently between passing and failing over the life of the deal. This can be explained by
looking at the following example. In a payment month when the 60+ delinquency trigger
fails, the deal pays principal sequentially. This leads to an increase in senior credit enhancement,
which in turn increases the delinquency trigger threshold (specified as a percentage of the
senior enhancement). This delinquency threshold rises over the next few distribution dates
to a level where the trigger passes. The reverse mechanism then takes effect as passing triggers
causes the senior credit enhancement to fall. The threshold falls to a level where the trigger
fails for a subsequent payment date. At this point the cycle repeats again.
NIMs
NIM represents the resecuritization of the Issuance of a net interest margin security (NIM) allows the issuer to monetize a portion
more senior tranche of the residual ... of the residual position while still maintaining economic exposure to the securitization
through a smaller secondary residual position. Thus, a NIM represents the resecuritization
of the more senior tranche of the residual (Figure 26). The growth in popularity of NIM
structures has led to recent transactions further tranching the NIM into a front-back
structure with a AA/A rated front-sequential and a high leverage back-sequential.
Figure 26. NIM Securitization Structure
AAA AAA
Collateral Balance
AA AA
A A
BBB BBB
OC OC
NIM
Residual
Residual
December 8, 2004 24
... and recieves cashflow from excess In a typical HEL structure, the NIM may receive cash flow from the following sources:
spread, hedges, OC release and • Excess spread: The residual holder is entitled to receive the remainder of monthly
prepayment penalties excess spread once the target overcollateralization level has been reached, and basis
risk shortfalls and bond losses have been covered.
• Interest rate hedges: HEL transactions contain hedge instruments to partly offset
interest rate risk (please refer to section on risk factors for more details). Payments
under these interest rate cap/swap hedge agreements (after application to cover
basis risk shortfalls and bond losses) are applied to NIMs.
• Over-collateralization release: This OC stepdown releases principal cash flow to
the residual holder (Figure 25).
• Prepayment penalties: The residual holder sometime holds the Class P security, which
consists of prepayment penalty cash flow. While this security is completely separate from
the residual and generally not subordinated, it is often included in a NIM securitization.
The risk of excess spread compression is The risk for the NIM holder arises from a compression of excess spread. This can be due
mitigated by several features to faster prepayments, higher losses, and increase in LIBOR. Higher prepayment speeds
decrease NIM cashflow due to a lower dollar amount of excess spread. However, this risk
is partly mitigated by the offsetting impact of prepayment penalty cash flow which flows
to the NIM. The NIMs are also partly protected from losses since the principal payment
windows on the NIMs are typically structured to end by month 24. Losses in HEL deals do
not become prominent early in the life of the deal (refer to section on collateral performance
drivers). Thus, the NIM is only exposed to the front end of the loss curve. The risk from
rising interest rates is also mitigated by additional cashflow from the hedge instrument.
Mortgage Insurance
MI provides credit enhancement by Some HEL deals utilize mortgage insurance (MI) as an additional form of credit
lowering trust severities enhancement. Mortgage insurance policies protect the trust against a limited amount of
loss (specified by the policy) in an event of default by the homeowner (Figure 27). MI
policies lower effective trust severities and thus reduce the level of subordination and
overcollateralization required. However, this is compensated by the lower excess
interest available in the structure due to payment of the insurance premium from the
interest cashflow (senior in the interest waterfall). Recent HEL transactions include
mortgage insurance on high LTV loans (usually >80 LTV) which are associated with
higher default frequencies and loss severity rates.
HEL deals typically use There are two levels of MI policies used by HEL transactions:
lender-paid MI policies • Bulk / Lender-paid: This is the more common form of MI used in HEL transactions.
The trust purchases mortgage insurance to lower severity rates on defaults. In this
case, the borrower is not aware of the existence of a mortgage insurance policy on
the loan. Since these are purchased by the trust, the mortgage insurance premium
is paid from the cashflow received by the trust (typically senior in the waterfall).
Bulk policies are also referred to as “lender-paid” policies since the insurance
premiums are paid by the holder of the loans (trust) instead of the borrower.
• Borrower-paid: At the time of making the loan, the lender sometimes requires a
mortgage insurance policy before extending credit to the homeowner. While
origination level policies are commonly used by prime mortgage originators, they
are not very common among subprime lenders. These are typically referred to as
“borrower-paid” MI policies since the borrower explicitly agrees to pay the insur-
ance premium to the insurance provider.
December 8, 2004 25
Figure 27. MI Claim Calculation
To calculate the payment against the MI claim, loans are specified to the covered down to
a target LTV. For example, for a loan with an initial LTV of 90%, the target LTV might be
specified as 60%. The MI coverage percentage is calculated as the (Original LTV-Target
LTV)/Original LTV. Thus, the coverage percentage for the above example is 33.3%
((90-60)/90). In the event of default, the lender submits a claim to the MI provider. The
claim amount is sum of the unpaid principal balance, P&I advanced and expenses (legal
fees, real estate taxes, property maintenance expense etc.). The MI provider has the
following options:
• Pay the full claim amount and obtain title to the property.
• Pay the coverage% of the claim amount.
The MI provider makes an economic decision in choosing between the two options, based
on the expected sale price of the property. This can be demonstrated by the following
example.
Original Loan Term

Original Property Appraisal 100,000
Original Loan Value 90,000
Original LTV 90%
MI Policy
Target LTV 60%
Coverage % 33.3%
MI Claim Calculation
Unpaid principal balance on default 80,000
P&I advanced 10,000
Other expenses (legal, property tax etc.) 20,000
Total Claim Amount 110,000
Property sale value (current) 85,000

MI Provider Options
Option1: Pay total claim and obtain title to property
Amount Paid 110,000
Amount recovered through property sale 85,000
Net Cost 25,000
Option2: Pay coverage% of the claim amount
Net Cost (110,000 * 33.3%) 36,667
Breakeven property sale value 73,333
The MI provider would choose to obtain title to the property since the net cost ($25,000)
is lower than the payment under the second option ($36,667).
If the sale price of the property is more than (100%-Coverage%)*Claim Amount ($73,333),
then the MI provider would choose to obtain title to the property and pay the full claim
amount. The trust thus incurs no loss on the default as long as the property sale price is
higher than this amount. If the property value falls lower than this value, the MI provider
will choose Option2. The payment against the MI policy is then capped out at $36,667,
and the trust incurs the loss in excess of this MI payment.
The credit risk of the MI provider It is important to have a strong originator and servicer since claims on covered loans can
is minimal be rejected (rescissions) or adjusted in case of fraud, bankruptcy, incomplete loan files
or servicer errors. The credit risk of the MI provider is not a significant risk factor since
the major MI providers (MGIC, Radian, PMI) are AA-rated. In addition, the trust holds
cancellation rights in the event of a MI provider rating downgrade.
December 8, 2004 26
RATING AGENCY METHODOLOGY

Rating agencies size subordination by Rating agencies estimate two key variables before rating a transaction. First, they review
estimating collateral losses and excess loan level data to calculate base case losses for a pool. Losses will depend primarily on
spread credit collateral characteristics, but other factors, such as an originator’s past performance, will
also affect base case loss estimates. The expected cumulative net loss estimate serves as
the foundation for the amount of credit support needed for a given rating category. The
rating level assigned represents a multiple of cumulative credit losses expected over the
life of the deal. Second, rating agencies determine the amount of excess spread available
to build credit enhancement or cover losses.
In addition to losses, the other important assumptions when calculating excess spread credit
are interest rates, loss timing, prepayments, collateral WAC deterioration, and triggers.
Interest Rates
Excess spread is determined by LIBOR, LIBOR stresses are used to assess the basis risk present in HEL transactions (please refer to
loss timing, prepayment, triggers and section on risk factors for more details). Current HEL transactions typically have 20%-35%
WAC deterioration assumptions fixed-rate loans backing mostly floating-rate bonds. When rates rise, a transaction will have
less excess spread if it does not have adequate hedge protection. Therefore, steeper LIBOR
curves will impose a higher level of stress. In response to growing concerns around the basis
risk, all three rating agencies introduced more stressful interest rate vectors in 2004, which
are significantly steeper than the forward curve3 (Figure 28). This has resulted in an
increase in OC levels and subordination for transactions rated using the new methodology.
Figure 28. AAA Interest Rate Stresses, 1 MoLIB
10% New Moodys New S&P S&P Equivalent

New Fitch Forward
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Deal Age
Timing of Losses
The timing of losses can have a dramatic effect on the credit protection of a subordinate
bond. Since excess spread is highest in the first few years of a transaction, a flat CDR or
front-loaded loss curve will boost the cumulative losses that a transaction can absorb.
Back-loaded loss curves are more stressful for credit (except for NIM bonds). The loss
curve assumptions may vary to maintain realistic default rates depending on the total
level of prepayments.
3 We convert the S&P curve to an equivalent upward-sloping vector to facilitate comparison.
December 8, 2004 27
Prepayments
The key for more conservative prepayment assumptions is to create basis risk by using
a faster prepayment curve for ARMs and slower speeds for FRMs. Fitch and Moody’s are
more conservative and achieve a greater basis risk stress by assuming faster hybrid
prepayments. S&P’s base case voluntary prepayment curve (CRR) is based on the
specific deal prospectus pricing curve and the involuntary component (CDR) of
prepayments is dependent on total cumulative losses.
WAC Deterioration
The collateral WAC will tend to decrease over time as borrowers with higher interest
rates prepay (voluntarily or involuntarily) faster than the average subprime borrower.
The WAC may also deteriorate as the mix of fixed- and floating-rate collateral changes
over time.
Triggers
There are practically no differences among rating agency approaches regarding triggers,
which are assumed to fail in most cases. They can have a significant effect on cash flows
and credit enhancement levels. In some transactions, overcollateralization levels are
allowed to step down when triggers pass after the lockout period ends. While some
subordinate securities may receive principal at this time, enhancement levels drop and
subsequent losses may actually be more stressful for the remaining tranches.
RISK FACTORS
HEL securities carry risks arising from structural features, macroeconomic conditions,
regulatory provisions and credit performance. The degree of these risks varies across
different vintages and transactions.
Interest Rate Risk

HEL investors are exposed to rising interest HEL investors are exposed to rising interest rates due to the basis risk between floating-
rates due to basis risk ... rate bonds and a combination of fixed-rate and hybrid collateral. HEL transactions are
at risk on two fronts. First, the floating-rate bond coupon is capped at the net weighted
average coupon (net WAC) on the collateral. Thus, HEL floaters contain embedded
short interest rate caps with the strike dependent on the net WAC of the collateral. This
is also known as available funds cap (AFC) risk. Second, the excess spread available to
cover losses/basis risk shortfalls falls as the collateral coupon rises less than the coupon
on the floating-rate bonds with rising interest rate environment.
... which is partly offset by Certain structural features partly offset the interest rate risk inherent in deals:
structural features • The risk of being capped out at the net WAC is partly mitigated by the presence of
a carryforward feature. The carryforward feature allows the basis risk shortfall to be
paid from any excess spread available in the deal in the current month or any later
month. This raises the effective AFC strike of the short caps embedded in these
floaters, since bonds can still receive full coupon (1MoLIB + DM) if excess spread
exists in the deal.
• Deals contain embedded interest rate hedges to offset the interest rate exposure.
Deals commonly use interest rate corridors/swaps which provide cashflow to the
trust as LIBOR increases. The hedge cashflow is available to cover basis risk
shortfalls (if any).
December 8, 2004 28
Excess spread compression and AFC The basis risk inherent in the structure typically increases with deal age.
issues are more prominent late in • During the first two years, there is typically enough excess spread to cover most AFC
the life of the deal issues since losses are low and the AFC cap is out of the money (carryforward feature
is valuable for subordinates).
• Excess spread compression and AFC issues are more prominent later in the life of the
deal due to three factors. First, the fixed rate collateral percentage increases over time
since hybrid loans typically prepay much faster than fixed-rate loans over the life of
the deal. Second, losses typically start ramping-up after the first year and reach 3-5CLR
around month 36. Third, most interest rate hedges are typically not outstanding after
the first 24 months and do not offset basis risk late in the life of the deal.
Housing Market Slowdown

The strength of the housing market will HEL collateral performance is highly levered to the strength of the housing market
impact HEL performance ... (please refer to the section on collateral performance). Strong home price appreciation
since 2003 has had a strong impact on prepayments and credit performance (defaults,
delinquencies and severities). Prepayments have been fast on the 2003 and 2004 vintages
partly due to strong cashout refinancings driven by robust HPA. Credit performance has
improved since borrowers have been bailed out by the built up equity in the home in the
event of credit problems.
... both on the prepayment and credit front In an event of a slowdown in the housing market, prepayments are expected to slow
down and losses/delinquencies will likely increase. We estimate that the effect of a 3%
slowdown in the appreciation rate would increase defaults by 30% and slowdown
prepayments by 5% on 2004 vintages. The combined effect would be an increase in total
cumulative losses by 35-40% in a HPA slowdown scenario. However, bonds are partly
protected since the excess spread available to offset losses increases due to slower
prepayments.
Predatory Lending/Servicing
The subprime market has been put under The subprime business has been put under increasing scrutiny for issues around various
increasing scrutiny for predatory practices predatory practices. The common predatory lending practices that have been questioned
are charging high interest or fees, including excessive prepayment penalties, extending
loans beyond the borrower’s financial ability to repay, refinancing a loan despite the lack
of benefit to the borrower (flipping) etc. In addition, predatory servicing issues have led
to probes into the practices at major subprime servicers such as Fairbanks and Ocwen.
The second largest servicer, Fairbanks, was downgraded three full grades to “Below
Average” and paid $40 million in settlement claims to its regulator (OTS) relating to
questionable servicing practices.
The risk for HEL transactions HEL transactions are at risk due to assignee liability provisions attached to certain
has been increasing due to assignee predatory lending statutes. Assignee liability permits a borrower to hold the purchaser
liability provisions or assignee liable for the same penalty as the original lender. The magnitude of the
problem has been increasing since certain state laws contain unlimited assignee liability
provisions (uncapped penalties). Lenders have been adjusting to a patchwork of
evolving local, state and federal regulations enacted to address the issue. The problem has
been compounded by the lack of clarity around statutory violations in several jurisdictions.
Certain jurisdictions have subjective standards to determine whether a loan is predatory
(for example, net tangible benefit or repayment ability tests) while others are vague
around the categories of loans covered by the statute.
December 8, 2004 29
These concerns have impacted rating Rating agencies have also been amending their criteria to protect transactions against
agency criteria ... predatory lending liabilities. Transactions containing loans with assignee liability require
additional credit enhancement due to the risk of potential liabilities (Figure 29). Loans
from jurisdictions that carry unlimited potential liability or with vague statutory
violation clauses are typically not included in transactions. Agencies also rate the ability
of lenders to implement compliance procedures to minimize violations. Lenders are
usually required to make representations regarding the compliance of the securitized
loans and warranty repurchasing loans that violate statutory provisions.
Figure 29. Factors to Assess Potential Liability from Predatory Statutes
• Scope of the statute: The loans covered by the statute should be identified. The
statute should clearly distinguish between those loans that are covered and those
that are not.
• Assignee liability test: For any type of loan under its scope, the statute should be
examined to see if it imposes assignee liability. If the statute does not carry assignee
liability, then the cashflow of the trust is not available to meet any potential liabilities
due to predatory abuses.
• Maximum penalty assessment: For loans carrying assignee liability (exposed loans)
that are covered by the statute, the maximum amount of penalties should be
established. It should be determined if monetary damages are limited to a dollar amount
or if they are uncapped (unlimited assignee liability). Rating agencies only allow loans
to be included in transactions when they carry either no assignee liability or the risk
associated with violating an anti-predatory lending law is quantifiable (limited liability).
• Safe harbors: The availability of certain provisions (for example, due diligence
procedures) that a purchaser or assignee can implement to avoid liability (“safe
harbors”) or limit the number of violations should be examined.
... and lending practices As an aside, the increasing focus on predatory lending has impacted the availability of
credit in different jurisdictions. Lenders might reduce or completely eliminate lending
in states to protect themselves against vague statutory lending statutes or if the market
for the sale of loans originated in that state is curtailed. Lending practices have adjusted
based on changing market appetite for loan types. For example, the Federal Home Loan
Banks and GSEs have ceased purchasing securities backed by loans with prepayment
penalty terms in excess of three years.
IO Credit Performance
Leverage has been increasing in the The HEL market has witnessed limited credit performance in an environment of rising
HEL market ... rates. With consumer leverage being high and consolidation of traditional forms of
consumer debt (credit cards, auto loans) into mostly floating-rate mortgages, investors
are concerned around credit performance as rates adjust higher. This risk has been
further accentuated in the HEL market due to the shift towards credit levered products
such as interest-only (IO) loans and piggyback seconds.
... with the proliferation of IO loans Interest only (IO) mortgages have exploded in popularity over the past couple of years
and account for around 15-20% of 2004 originations. There has been concern around
IO performance due to the potential for a double payment shock (rate reset and
amortization reset). This is accentuated for loans where the IO period coincides with the
initial fixed-rate period, leading to a simultaneous double shock for the borrower. The
trends in IO issuance characteristics also point to an increase in risk:
December 8, 2004 30
• IO terms have been shortening, and increasing percentages have the IO period
coinciding with the initial fixed-rate period.
• Initial IO originations had significantly superior credit characteristics (higher
FICO, loan documentation, loan size) than hybrids However, these differences in
borrower quality have been reducing in recent originations.
• While the IO product in prime jumbos has been used mostly for tax motivations,
there is evidence to suggest that affordability constraints drive subprime borrowers
toward IOs.
The risk is mostly from higher The additional risk of IO loans has been partly factored in by the rating agencies, with
foreclosure frequencies and limited Moodys demanding additional 15-20% credit enhancement for IO loans. We believe
on the severity front that the risk is more pronounced when the IO period coincides with the initial fixed-rate
period leading to a double payment shock for borrowers. The risk is mostly from higher
foreclosure frequencies and limited on the severity front.
SUMMARY
The HEL market has grown rapidly over the last three years to form the largest segment
of the ABS market. The analysis of HEL securities involves a careful analysis of the
interaction between collateral performance (credit and prepayment) and structural
features. The wider spreads in the sector are explained by this combination of prepayment
and credit features which positions it as a unique cross-over sector between the mortgage
and asset backed sectors. The next few years will test the maturity and depth of the HEL
market due to potential structural and credit risks from rising interest rates, leverage to
the housing market and an evolving regulatory environment.
December 8, 2004 31
ADDITIONAL READING
ABS Weekly Outlook
Impact of Slower Home Prices (10/6/03)
HEL Model Prepayments (3/22/04)
Comparing Rating Agency Criteria in HEL (5/10/04)
Projected HEL Issuance (7/26/04)
Revised S&P Interest Rate Vectors (8/16/04)
Fitch Revision to Interest Rate Stresses (8/23/04)
HEL Liquidation Timelines (09/13/04)
Structural Features of HEL Subordinates (10/18/04)
Shelf Publications
Subprime IO Mortgages: Characteristics, Mechanics, and Performance
A First Look at Second Liens
Net Interest Margin Securitizations in the HEL Market
Home Equity Lines of Credit: Stable Performance and Solid Structure
Surveillance
New Surveillance Tools on LehmanLive
SAIL/ARC Tracker
December 8, 2004 32
GLOSSARY
Assignee Liability: A liability that attaches to a purchaser or assignee of a loan (including
a securitization trust) by virtue of holding a predatory loan. Typically, statutes with
assignee liability permit a borrower to hold the purchaser or assignee liable for the same
penalty as the original lender. The potential assignee liability may sometimes exceed the
original principal balance of the loan.
Buy-Down Points: Feature by which borrowers can reduce their interest rates as well as
their monthly payments by paying an additional amount upfront. From the lender’s
point of view, it gives them cash up-front during securitization.
Cleanup Call: Most deals have a provision of providing the residual holder with an
optional clean-up provision to call the bonds when the bond principal balance reaches
a certain percentage of the initial collateral balance (typically 10%).
Closed-end Loan: The loan type where the borrowed amount is fixed and determined
at origination. This is contrasted with revolving lines of credit which enable the
borrower to vary the amount borrowed over time upto a maximum limit.
Excess Spread: The cash flow that remains after deducting the monthly bond interest,
servicing fees and any credit enhancement premiums (e.g., lender paid mortgage
insurance, LOC or surety bond fees) from the monthly collateral coupon.
Lien: The lien position determines the priority of the lender’s claim to the home in the
event of default by the borrower. A second-lien receives any residual proceeds from the
sale of the house after the first-lien holder is paid in full.
Loan extension/Loan modification: Renegotiating the contract terms to enable borrowers

to make regular payments. In extensions, the loan period is extended by adding the
missed payments to the end of the loan period. Loan modifications involve changing the
coupon in an interim period etc to enable the borrower to come back to schedule.
Loss Mitigation: Used by servicers to reduce/delay the losses on a portfolio through

techniques such as loan extensions, modifications, loan assumptions etc. This enables
a delinquent loan to renew payments and return to current status.
Monoline Gaurantee: A financial guarantee issued by a AAA-rated corporation covering

the timely payment of principal and interest on a security.
Over-collateralization: The difference between the collateral balance backing the deal
and the total principal balance of bonds outstanding. This serves as a form of credit
enhancement as it provides a first cushion to absorb collateral losses.
Short sale: The servicer agrees to settle the debt with the proceeds of the property sale
by the delinquent borrower, even if it implies a small loss for the trust. The servicer
choice is based on a NPV analysis comparing the cost of the foreclosure, REO disposition
and future missed payments against the immediate loss. The trust is usually better off
with this exit strategy as the liquidation of the delinquent loan is fast and cheap.
December 8, 2004 33
Triggers: Conditional tests that determine the priority and order of payments to the
various tranches in the event of deterioration of collateral performance. These trigger
events are typically based on credit performance parameters such as rolling three-month
60-day delinquencies and cumulative losses. A deal is said to be failing triggers if any of
the specified triggers fail due to poor credit performance.
December 8, 2004 34
The views expressed in this report accurately reflect the personal views of David Heike the primary analyst(s) responsible for this report,
about the subject securities or issuers referred to herein, and no part of such analyst(s)’ compensation was, is or will be directly or
indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views expressed herein.
Any reports referenced herein published after 14 April 2003 have been certified in accordance with Regulation AC. To obtain copies
of these reports and their certifications, please contact Larry Pindyck (lpindyck@lehman.com; 212-526-6268) or Valerie Monchi
(vmonchi@lehman.com; 44-(0)207-102-8035).
Lehman Brothers Inc. and any affiliate may have a position in the instruments or the companies discussed in this report. The firm’s
interests may conflict with the interests of an investor in those instruments.
The research analysts responsible for preparing this report receive compensation based upon various factors, including, among other
things, the quality of their work, firm revenues, including trading, competitive factors and client feedback.
Lehman Brothers usually makes a market in the securities mentioned in this report. These companies are current investment banking
clients of Lehman Brothers or companies for which Lehman Brothers would like to perform investment banking services.
Publications-L. Pindyck, B. Davenport, W. Lee, D. Kramer, R. Madison, A. Acevedo, T. Wan, M. Graham, V. Monchi, K. Banham, G. Garnham, Z. Talbot
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The ABCs of HELs

PLEASE SEE IMPORTANT ANALYST CERTIFICATION AT THE END OF THIS REPORT.

Figure 1. Historical Loan Originations, ($bn)

Source: Lehman Brothers, Inside B&C Lending

Figure 2. Comparison versus Other Mortgage Products, 2H04

Source: Lehman Brothers

EVOLUTION OF THE HEL MARKET

1996-1998 – Initial Growth

Figure 3. HEL Loan Originations, ($bn)

Source: Lehman Brothers, Inside B&C Lending

Figure 4. Major HEL Lenders across Various Market Phases

Pre-1996 1996-1998 1999-2001 2002 to 2004

Source: Lehman Brothers, Inside Mortgage Finance

• The increasing use of securitization provided non-bank lenders an alternate source

2002 to 2004 – Expansion

Figure 5. Issuance Growth Drivers

Figure 6. Top Lenders and Servicers in 1H04

Market Origination Volume Market Servicing Portfolio

Source: Inside B&C Lending

Interest Payment Types

Figure 7. Historical Loan Originations by Interest Payment Type, ($bn)

Source: Lehman Brothers, Loan Performance, Inside B&C Lending

Figure 8. Overall Prepayment Penalty Distribution

12 Mo. 24 Mo. 36 Mo. 60 Mo.

Interest Rate Caps/Floor

Property Type and Loan Purpose

Figure 9. 2004 Issuance by Property Type and Loan Purpose

Property Type Loan Purpose

Single-Family Planned Unit Development

Source: Lehman Brothers, Loan Performance

Figure 10. Average Historical FICO Scores and Loan Size

FICO Loan Size ($K)

Source: Lehman Brothers, Loan Performance

Figure 11. Historical LTV and Documentation Trends

LTV (%) Full Doc Loan (%)

Figure 12. Voluntary Prepayments by Deal Age

60% 1998 1999 2000 80% 1998 1999 2000 2001

Source: Lehman Brothers, Loan Performance

Voluntary prepayments are driven by the following factors:

Figure 13. Rate Sensitivity by Borrower Credit Quality

Rate Incentive (%)

FRM: 3-year penalty penalty, 15-30 WALA

Figure 14. Prepayment Sensitivity by Loan Size

Rate Incentive (%)

FRM: 3-year penalty penalty, 15-30 WALA

Figure 15. Total Prepayments (CPR) by Rate Incentive (%)

Rate Incentive (%)

Other Economic Variables: Other economic variables such as unemployment and

Figure 16. Total Prepayments (CPR) by HPA

a. CPR by Deal Age b. CPR by Rate Incentive (%)*

40% 40 Fast HPA

Deal Age Rate Incentive (%)

* FRM 3-year prepayment penalty, 15-30 WALA

Defaults and Delinquencies

Figure 17. Defaults (CDR) by Deal Age

Source: Lehman Brothers, Loan Performance

Deal Age Deal Age

Source: Lehman Brothers, Loan Performance

Defaults and delinquencies are driven by the following factors:

Figure 19. Defaults and Delinquencies by Borrower Credit Quality

Defaults 60+ Delinquency (% Current Balance)

15 Low SATO 25 Low SATO