The Ten Modes of Pyrrhonism

Pyrrhonism is more a mental attitude or therapy than a theory. It involves setting things in
opposition and owing to the equipollence of the objects and reasons, one suspends judgement.
"We oppose either appearances to appearances or objects of thought to objects of thought
or alternando."
[10]
The ten modes induce suspension of judgement and in turn a state of mental
suspense followed by ataraxia. If ever one is in a position in which they are unable to refute a
theory, Pyrrhonists reply "Just as, before the birth of the founder of the School to which you
belong, the theory it holds was not as yet apparent as a sound theory, although it was really in
existence, so likewise it is possible that the opposite theory to that which you now propound is
already really existent, though not yet apparent to us, so that we ought not as yet to yield assent
to this theory which at the moment seems to be valid."
[11]
These ten modes or tropes were
originally listed by Aenesidemus.
1. "The same impressions are not produced by the same objects owing to the differences
in animals."
[12]

2. The same impressions are not produced by the same objects owing to the differences
among human beings.
[13]

3. The same impressions are not produced by the same objects owing to the differences
among the senses.
[14]

4. Owing to the "circumstances, conditions or dispositions," the same objects appear
different. The same temperature, as established by instrument, feels very different after
an extended period of cold winter weather than after mild weather in the autumn. Honey
tastes sweet to most but bitter to someone with jaundice. Things appear different when
drunk as opposed to sober, sick as opposed to well, etc.
[15]

5. "Based on positions, distances, and locations; for owing to each of these the same
objects appear different." The same tower appears rectangular at close distance and
round from far away.
[16]

6. We deduce that since no object strikes us entirely by itself, but along with something
else, it may perhaps be possible to say what the mixture compounded out of the
external object and the thing perceived with it is like, but we would not be able to say
what the external object is like by itself."
[17]

7. "Based, as we said, on the quantity and constitution of the underlying objects, meaning
generally by "constitution" the manner of composition." So, for example, goat horn
appears black when intact and appears white when ground up.
[18]

8. "Since all things appear relative, we will suspend judgement about what things exist
absolutely and really existent.
[19]
"Do things which exist "differentially" or "have a distinct
existence of their own as opposed to a relative existence" differ from relative things or
not? If they do not differ, then they too are relative; but if they differ, then, since
everything which differs is relative to something..., things which exist differentially are
relative."
[20]

9. "Based on constancy or rarity of occurrence." The sun is more amazing than a comet,
but because we see the sun daily and the comet rarely, the latter commands our
attention.
[21]

10. "There is a Tenth Mode, which is mainly concerned with Ethics, being based on rules of
conduct, habits, laws, legendary beliefs, and dogmatic conceptions."
[22]

Superordinate to these ten modes stand three other modes:
I - that based on the subject who judges (modes 1, 2, 3 & 4).
II - that based on the object judged (modes 7 & 10).
III - that based on both subject who judges and object judged (modes 5, 6, 8 & 9)
Superordinate to these three modes is the mode of relation.
[23]


Philosophy
Sextus Empiricus raised concerns which applied to all types of knowledge. He doubted the validity
of induction
[2]
long before its best known critic David Hume, and raised the regress argument against all
forms of reasoning:
Those who claim for themselves to judge the truth are bound to possess a criterion of truth. This criterion,
then, either is without a judge's approval or has been approved. But if it is without approval, whence
comes it that it is truthworthy? For no matter of dispute is to be trusted without judging. And, if it has been
approved, that which approves it, in turn, either has been approved or has not been approved, and so
on ad infinitum.
[3]

Because of these and other barriers to acquiring true beliefs, Sextus Empiricus advises
[4]
that we should
suspend judgment about virtually all beliefs, that is, we should neither affirm any belief as true nor deny
any belief as false. This view is known as Pyrrhonian skepticism, as distinguished from Academic
skepticism, as practiced by Carneades, which, according to Sextus, denies knowledge altogether. Sextus
did not deny the possibility of knowledge. He criticizes the Academic skeptic's claim that nothing is
knowable as being an affirmative belief. Instead, Sextus advocates simply giving up belief: that is,
suspending judgment about whether or not anything is knowable.
[5]
Only by suspending judgment can we
attain a state of ataraxia (roughly, 'peace of mind'). Sextus did not think such a general suspension of
judgment to be impractical, since we may live without any beliefs, acting by habit.
Sextus allowed that we might affirm claims about our experience (e.g., reports about our feelings or
sensations). That is, for some claim X that I feel or perceive, it could be true to say "it seems to me now
that X." However, he pointed out that this does not imply any objective knowledge of external reality.
Though I might know that the honey I eat at a certain moment tastes sweet to me, this is merely a
subjective judgment, and as such may not tell me anything true about the honey itself.
Interpretations of Sextus's philosophy along the above lines have been advocated by scholars such
as Myles Burnyeat,
[6]
Jonathan Barnes,
[7]
and Benson Mates.
[8]

Michael Frede, however, defends a different interpretation,
[9]
according to which Sextus does allow
beliefs, so long as they are not derived by reason, philosophy or speculation; a skeptic may, for example,
accept common opinions in the skeptic's society. The important difference between the sceptic and the
dogmatist is that the sceptic does not hold his beliefs as a result of rigorous philosophical
investigation. In Against the Ethicists, Sextus in fact directly says that "the Skeptic does not conduct his
life according to philosophical theory (so far as regards this he is inactive), but as regards the non-
philosophical regulation of life he is capable of desiring some things and avoiding others." (XI, 165). Thus,
on this interpretation (and as per Sextus' own words), the skeptic may well entertain the belief that God
does or does not exist or that virtue is good. But he may not believe that such claims are true on the basis
of reasons.
It must also be remembered that by "dogma" Sextus means "assent to something non-evident [,
adlos]" (PH I, 16). And by "non-evident" he means things which lie beyond appearances (and thus
beyond proof or disproof), such as the existence and/or nature of causality, time, motion, or even proof
itself. Thus, the skeptic will, for example, believe the proposition that "Dion is in the room" if sense-data
and ordinary reasoning led to the emergence of such a belief. On the other hand, if she were to "strongly"
assert that Dion was "really" in the room, then she may be met with opposing arguments of equal
psychological force against the self-same proposition and experience mental disquietude as a result.
Thus, the Pyrrhonian does not assent to the proposition "Dion is in the room" in a dogmatic way as that
would purport to describe a non-evident reality which lies beyond the "appearance" [,
phainomenon] of Dion being in the room. The Skeptic simply goes along with the appearance just as "a
child is persuaded by...his teacher." (PH I, 229). It is for this reason then that Sextus says the Skeptic
lives undogmatically in accordance with appearances and also according to a "fourfold regimine of life"
which includes the guidance of nature, compulsion of pathe (feelings), laws and customs, and instruction
in arts and crafts. The Skeptic follows this course of life while suspending judgment concerning the
ultimate truth of the non-evident matters debated in philosophy and the sciences (PH I, 17). Thus, the
Pyrrhonian Skeptic is one who believes possibly many things, but yet does not dogmatize about those
beliefs since she finds no ultimate justification for them. Thus, Pyrrhonian achieves ataraxia not by finding
certain knowledge, but rather by suspending judgment on whether not finding certain knowledge is an
inherently bad thing in the first place (as was assumed previously).

Sextus Empiricuss Outlines of Pyrrhonism
Sextus Empiricus was a Greek philosopher who lived in Alexandria and in Athens
during the late second and early third century A.D. His best-known work, Outlines of
Pyrrhonism, described a school of thought which was named after the philosopher
Pyrrho of Elis (c. 365-275 B.C.). Pyrrhonism was a form of extreme skepticism which
held that judgment must be suspended about whether it is possible to know true
reality. Pyrrhonism asserted that suspension of judgment (epoch, a Greek term which
refers to a cessation) about the true nature of reality leads to serenity and equanimity
(ataraxia) about what constitutes truth or falsehood.
There are three basic approaches to epistemology, says Sextus Empiricus. The
"dogmatists" assert that truth is discoverable. The "academics" deny that truth is
discoverable. The "skeptics" suspend judgment and continue to search for conditions
under which truth may be discovered.
Skepticism is a state of suspension of judgment. The skeptic resolves contradiction by
suspending judgment. Skepticism does not affirm or deny that knowledge is possible.
However, it asserts that every proposition has a co-equal opposing proposition and
that every proposition is therefore susceptible to doubt.
Skepticism is different from nihilism. While nihilism asserts that nothing can be
known, skepticism says that it is possible that some things may be known. Skepticism
is also different from empiricism. While empiricism views experience as a source of
knowledge, skepticism suspends judgment about whether knowledge is possible or
impossible.
The aims of skepticism are also different from those of ethical hedonism. While the
hedonist aims to enjoy pleasure and to avoid pain, the skeptic aims to achieve the
tranquility of mind that is produced by being able to avoid errors of reasoning.
The skeptic questions whether the appearance of anything reflects an underlying
reality. He does not affirm or deny the claim that the world reflects an underlying
reality, but he questions it.
Skepticism applies the rule that things may always appear differently from the way
that they actually appear. The appearance of an object may change for a perceiving
subject if there is a change in the way in which the object is perceived by the subject
or if there is some other change in the relation between the object and the subject. The
appearance of an object may change over a period of time, or the object may become
less apparent to the subject, or it may be only occasionally apparent to the subject.
Sextus does not argue that the appearances of objects are unreal or that the objects of
our perceptions do not exist. Instead, he suggests that judgments concerning the true
nature of objects of perception should be suspended. Although objects of perception
may appear to be real, we may not be able to prove that they have a reality that is
independent of our perceptions of them.
If we are skeptical about something, then we neither affirm nor deny it. The skeptic
does not say that nothing can be known, but instead he asks whether there are
conditions under which things may be known. However, he does not make any
assertions about probability or improbability. Skepticism does not assert that any
proposition is more or less probable than any other proposition.
The skeptic suspends judgment about whether there is any criterion of truth, and he
says that any criterion of truth can only be judged by another criterion, which can only
be judged by another criterion, and so on ad infinitum. Thus, the attempt to
demonstrate any criterion of truth leads to a form of circular reasoning and cannot
arrive at any conclusion.
To suspend judgment about the truth or falsehood of a logical proposition may be to
suggest that there is some uncertainty about its truth or falsehood. Sextus does not say
that there must be a sufficient degree of uncertainty about the truth or falsehood of a
proposition in order to justify a suspension of judgment, but he says that no
proposition can be proved with complete certainty.
Skepticism does not make any assertions about reality or unreality. It does not affirm
or deny that objects of perception exist in reality or that they do not exist in reality.
The sceptic suspends judgment about the reality of physical laws, about the reality of
matter, and about the reality of time and space.
Skepticism also leads to a suspension of judgement about whether there are any causal
relations between events or phenomena. It neither affirms nor denies that any event is
the cause of another event, and it suspends judgment about the existence of causality
as an explanation for why things appear in the way in which they actually appear.
The skeptic questions whether anything can be proved, because any proof must be
proved by another proof, which must be proved by another proof, and so on ad
infinitum. Thus, for the skeptic, there is no self-evident proof of anything.
Ethical skepticism suspends judgment about how good and bad should be defined, and
it suspends judgment about whether anything is instrinsically good or evil. It asserts
that any moral criterion of what is right or wrong may be susceptible to doubt.
The skeptic also suspends judgment about the existence or non-existence of God. For
the skeptic, there is no self-evident proof of the existence of God. While an agnostic
may say that it is impossible for us to know whether or not God exists, the skeptic
says that we should suspend judgment about whether or not God exists.
Sextus Empiricus' skepticism attempts to avoid error by suspending judgment about
questions which cannot be resolved with certainty. This suspension of judgment
applies not only to metaphysical questions (such as the origin of the universe or the
nature of ultimate reality), but also to ethical, aesthetic, and logical questions.
Skepticism refuses to accept any metaphysical, ethical, aesthetic, or logical
propositions which have not been subjected to careful scrutiny.
This suspension of judgment is not, in any absolute sense, proposed as a formula for
finding truth. Skepticism is more a method of avoiding error than a method of finding
truth. The skeptic avoids belief or disbelief in anything, because belief or disbelief
may produce conflict instead of equanimity concerning the nature of truth or
falsehood.
A weakness of this viewpoint, however, is that this attitude of systematic doubt
inevitably leaves skepticism unable to prove its own conclusions. Skepticism must be
careful to avoid self-contradiction, because the rule that everything is susceptible to
doubt may itself be susceptible to doubt.


LOGIC
[1] Sextus is noteworthy for the claim that the syllogism is a circular argument
form [see Pyrrhonism, 1] [a]. A major premise which is universal ('All S is P', for example) can
be proved only by complete enumeration. The conclusion ('x is P') must therefore already be
included in the premiss.

METHODOLOGY/ ETHICS
[2] The greater part of Sextus's work [Pyrrhonism, 2 and 3] consists of a comprehensive
account of Greek scepticism. But he added glosses of his own [see also Against the
Dogmatists]. Scepticism, he said, involves the rejection of all dogmatism be it in metaphysics
(of whatever variety) or epistemological 'probabilism' (associated with the Sceptics of the
Academy); in other words, of all positive claims to knowledge [a]. He distinguished three stages
of the dialectic process or method of doubt [b]. (1) The philosopher presents claims about some
phenomenon, principle, or moral law, which appear to be mutually contradictory. Different
Sceptics identified ways of arguing (tropoi), the number varying from thinker to thinker. (2) The
second stage is the epoch or suspension of judgement on the tropoi [c]. Sextus seems to
confine theepoch to claims which go beyond appearances or everyday behaviour. He here
makes an important distinction between (a) certain kinds of words which are indicative signs of
supposed entities such as substances, which we cannot experience; and (b) words which
'commemorate', that is, remind us of other experiences we have had, for example, bodily
functions, sense experiences, even the conventional rules and customs of our society. We need
all these, Sextus says, if we are to cope with the demands of everyday life, but he emphasizes
that we must keep an open mind as to their validity. (3) The third stage is the attainment of
tranquillity or imperturbability (ataraxia) [d] this being the ultimate motivating force (arche)
underlying scepticism and which leads to well-being (eudaimonia) [e].

CRITICAL SUMMARY
Sextus's comprehensive bringing together of the various strands of the Sceptic tradition the
search for ataraxia, the use of dialectic, for example, and his confining of the epoch to what
others supposed to underlie phenomena, combined with a provisional acceptance of sensory
and conventional cultural data (as opposed to 'probabilism') all this made for a full-bodied
and yet more open-minded and influential philosophy. Herein lies the importance of anti-
dogmatic scepticism as an 'attitude' an attitude which was to provide the foundation for the
modern scepticism which emerged in the sixteenth century particularly in the essays of
Montaigne. But clearly it is not a system in itself; if it were it would be self-refuting.