Professional Documents
Culture Documents
In 1947 the Nationalist Chinese government put forward claims to the South China
Sea in a map containing eleven dotted lines. This map was adopted by the Chinese
Communists when their took power. Later Premier Chou En‐lai deleted two lines in
the Gulf of Tonkin. Unofficial maps containing the nine dotted lines have in
circulation for a number of year. Regional officials have been unable to get China to
indicate how the lines would be connected and what exactly it is that China is
claiming.
In 2009 a UN Commission set 13th May as the deadline for submission of claims for
extended continental shelves. Vietnam and Malaysia submitted a joint claim to areas
in the south, while Vietnam lodged a separate claims for an extended continental
shelf in the north. China lodged a protest and tabled a map with nine dotted lines to
indicate the area it said were Chinese territory. This appears to have been the first
time the Chinese government has tabled this map.
China is deliberately pursuing a policy of calculated ambiguity in this matter. It is
putting off any settlement of conflicting maritime sovereignty claims until the
moment suits Beijing. In the meantime, China seeks to divide regional states and
strike bilateral deals.
China has recently told the ten member Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN) that they should get their act together first before approaching China for
discussions on the South China Sea. Some ASEAN states point out that getting
consensus among the ASEAN ten states would be difficult and that a unified bloc
would only create friction in dealing with China. They prefer to see all eleven states
work towards consensus.
The Vietnamese hosts for the international workshop hope to organize at informal
network of scholars to stay in touch on South China Sea developments and to
convene a second workshop in Hanoi in around July 2010.
2) Will the results of the Vietnam meeting impact the Military Maritime Consultative
Agreement session in any meaningful way? What are China's objectives in this round
of the MMCA dialogue?
ANSWER: The Hanoi workshop will have no impact on the Military Maritime
Consultative Agreement (MMCA) discussions between the United States and China.
In fact, the US Embassy in Hanoi took the decision not to send diplomatic observers
to the workshop, thus distancing the United States from sovereignty and territorial
disputes in the South China Sea.
China and the United States established the Military Maritime Consultative
Agreement (MMCA) in 1998 to deal with incidents between their two armed forces.
Two working groups were formed, one on aviation safety and the other on maritime
safety. US attempts to use the MMCA mechanism in 2001 to deal with the EP‐3
incident failed when China refused to participate. MMCA talks have been suspended
until now.
The July US‐China Strategic and Economic Dialogue held in July in Washington
revived the MMCA mechanism. Subsequently China and the United States have
stepped up military to military relations. In October General Xu Caihou, vice
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chairman of China’s Central Military Commission visited Washington for talks with
Defense Secretary Robert Gates. They agreed on seven areas of cooperation:
Promoting high‐level visits; enhancing cooperation in the area of humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief; deepening military medical cooperation; expanding
exchanges between armies of the two nations; enhancing the program of mid‐
grade and junior officer exchanges; promoting cultural and sports exchanges
between the two militaries; invigorating the existing diplomatic and consultative
mechanisms to improve maritime operational safety.
Military to military relations featured in the U.S.‐China Joint Statement issued after
President Barack Obama’s November visit to Beijing. It was noted that the Chief of
Staff of China’s People’s Liberation Army will Visit Washington, and Secretary Gates
and Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will visit Beijing.
The next session of the MMCA may dampen maritime confrontation such as the
incident involving the USNS Impeccable. But negotiated Incident at Sea Agreement is
likely to take a year or more before it is signed. As General Xu made clear during his
visit there are four obstacles to military relations with the United States . According
to a summary by Xinhua:
The first and foremost obstacle is the U.S.‐Taiwan military relationship… The
Taiwan issue is related to the core interests of China and is a core issue that
prevents the development of the U.S.‐China military relationship. If the U.S. side
can’t handle this issue very well, a healthy and stable China‐US. Military
relationship will not be possible.
Second, U.S.‐military aircraft and ships’ intrusions into China’s maritime exclusive
economic zone should be terminated. China hopes the U.S. military can observe
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and Chinese maritime legislation, and stop
such acts which would threaten China’s security and interests.
Third, there is some U.S. legislation which restricts the development of the
China‐U.S. military relationship. Most notably is the 2000 Defense Authorization
Act passed in 1999.
Another obstacle is the United States lacking strategic trust in China.
China’s main objective to get the United States to scale down if not cease its
surveillance activities off China’s coast and the naval base on Hainan island
particularly.