AGUILAR v.

CA- Co-ownership

Any of the Co-owners may demand the sale of the house and lot at any time and the other cannot object to such demand; thereafter the
proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally according to their respective interests.

FACTS:

Petitioner Vergilio and respondent Senen bought a house and lot in Paraaque where their father could spend and enjoy his remaining years in a
peaceful neighborhood. They initially agreed that Vergilio will get 2/3 and Senen will get 1/3; but later they agreed on equal shares. Senen was left
in the said lot to take care of their father since Vergilios family was in Cebu. After their fathers death petitioner demanded from private
respondent that the latter vacate the house and that the property be sold and proceeds thereof divided among them but the latter refused.
Petitioner then filed to compel the sale of the property. The chunk of the issue tackled by the courts was regarding the pre-trial. Respondent filed
a motion to cancel Pre-trial since the counsel had to accompany his wife in Dumaguete City where she would be a principal sponsor in a wedding.
CFI denied the motion; and the pre-trial proceeded on the scheduled date. The respondents did not appear thus they were declared in default.
The trial went on ex parte without the respondent and held that the property should be sold to a third party and that the proceeds be distributed
to the parties; in addition respondent was made to pay rent from the time the action was filed. Respondents appealed this and the decision was
reversed by the CA saying that the TC erred in declaring respondents in default; the case was then remanded to the trial court. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
A) W/N CA erred (1) in holding that the motion of respondent through counsel to cancel the pre-trial was dilatory in character and (2) in
remanding the case to the trial court for pre-trial and trial?
ISSUE RELEVANT TO PROPERTY:
B) W/N trial court was correct with regards to the sale and rent?

RULING:
A) YES, CA erred in granting the respondents motion and remanding the case. The law is clear that the appearance of parties at the pretrial is
mandatory. A party who fails to appear at a pre-trial conference may be non-suited or considered as in default. It is the discretion of the court to
grant the motion if it sees that the reason for the cancelation of the same would be reasonable. SC found that the reason for the cancelation of
the pre-trial was insufficient and that the trial court was not in grave abuse of discretion when they denied it.

B) YES, with a few modification. Petitioner and respondents are co-owners of subject house and lot in equal shares; either one of them may
demand the sale of the house and lot at any time and the other cannot object to such demand; thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be
divided equally according to their respective interests.

BASIS: Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and that each co-owner may
demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code states
that whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the
others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly distributed.

SC held that of the proceeds should go to the petitioner and the remainder to the respondent (1,200 each.) Also rent was awarded 1,200 pesos
per month with legal interest from the time the trial court ordered the respondent to vacate, for the use and enjoyment of the other half of the
property.

BASIS: When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and the trial court granted the petition and ordered the ejectment of
respondent, the co-ownership was deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the possession jointly also ceased.










Property Relationship In A Void Marriage
Lupo Atienza v. Yolanda de Castro, G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006
Lupo, a married man cohabited with Yolanda as husband and wife. During their coverture, they allegedly acquired a real property and
registered it under the name of Yolanda. Their cohabitation turned sour, hence, they parted. He filed an action for partition contending
that they owned it in common under the concept of limited co-ownership. Yolanda contended that she alone was the owner as she
acquired it thru her own savings as a businesswoman. The RTC declared the property subject of co-ownership, but the CA reversed it
as he failed to prove material contribution in the acquisition of the same. On appeal, he contended that he was not burdened to prove
that he contributed in the acquisition of the property because with or without contribution he was deemed a co-owner adding that
under Article 484, NCC, for as long as they acquired the property during their extramarital union, such property would be legally owned
by them in common and governed by the rule on co-ownership. Is the contention correct? Explain.
Held: No. It is not disputed that the parties herein were not capacitated to marry each other because Lupo Atienza was validly
married to another woman at the time of his cohabitation with Yolanda. Their property regime, therefore, is governed by Article 148 of
the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationship, relationships in a state of concubinage, relat ionships
where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this regi me, only
the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. (Cario v. Cario, 351 SCRA 127 (2001)). Proof of actual contribution
is required. (Agapay v. Palang, 342 Phil. 302).
As it is, the regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry
each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in
proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money,
property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.
(Adriano v. CA, 385 Phil. 474 (2000); Tumlos v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 137650, April 12, 2000, 330 SCRA 718; Atienza v. Yolanda de
Castro, G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006).
Here, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1983, or way before the effectivity of the Family Code
on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the
Civil Code. (Saguid v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 678). Before Article 148 of the Family Code was
enacted, there was no provision governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the
cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. (Tumlos v. Fernandez;
Article 256, F.C.).
The applicable law being settled the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of
the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength
of the partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponents defense. The petitioner as plaintiff below is not
automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the defendant some measure of protection as the plaintiff must still prove
the allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court is convinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff
warrant such relief. Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.
It is the petitioners posture that the respondent, having no financial capacity to acquire the property in question, merely
manipulated the dollar bank accounts of his two (2) corporations to raise the amount needed therefor. Unfortunately for petitioner, his
submissions are burdened by the fact that his claim to the property contradicts duly written instruments, i.e., the Contract to Sell dated
March 24, 1987, the Deed of Assignment of Redemption dated March 27, 1987 and the Deed of Transfer dated April 27, 1987, all
entered into by and between the respondent and the vendor of said property, to the exclusion of the petitioner.
The claim of co-ownership in the disputed property is without basis because not only did he fail to substantiate his alleged
contribution in the purchase thereof but likewise the very trail of documents pertaining to its purchase as evidentiary proof redounds to
the benefit of the respondent. In contrast, aside from his mere say so and voluminous records of bank accounts, which sadly f ind no
relevance in this case, the petitioner failed to overcome his burden of proof. Allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence. Simply
stated, he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it; mere allegation is not evidence.
True, the mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real
property covered thereby may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a
trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. However, as already
stated, petitioners evidence in support of his claim is either insufficient or immaterial to warrant the trial courts findi ng that the
disputed property falls under the purview of Article 148 of the Family Code. In contrast to petitioners dismal failure to prove his cause,
herein respondent was able to present preponderant evidence of her sole ownership. There can clearly be no co-ownership when, as
here, the respondent sufficiently established that she derived the funds used to purchase the property from earnings, not onl y as an
accountant but also as a businesswoman engaged in foreign currency trading, money lending and jewelry retain. She presented her
clientele and the promissory notes evincing substantial dealings with her clients. She also presented her bank account statements and
bank transactions, which reflect that she had the financial capacity to pay the purchase price of the subject property.
SUNSET VIEW CONDOMINIUM
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HON. JOSE
C. CAMPOS, JR. OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE, BRANCH XXX, PASAY CITY and
AGUILAR-BERNARES REALTY, respondents.
(G.R. No. L-52361 April 27, 1981)
Jul25

Facts:
The petitioner, Sunset View Condominium Corporationis a condominium corporation within the meaning
of Republic Act No. 4726 in relation to a duly registered Amended Master Deed with Declaration of
Restrictions of the Sunset View Condominium Project located at 2230 Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City of
which said petitioner is the Management Body holding title to all the common and limited common areas.
The private respondent, Aguilar-Bernares Realty, a sole proprietorship owned and operated by the
spouses Emmanuel G. Aguilar and Zenaida B. Aguilar, is the assignee of a unit, Solana, in the Sunset
View Condominium Project with La Perla Commercial, Incorporated, as assignor. The La Perla
Commercial, Incorporated bought the Solana unit on installment from the Tower Builders, Inc. The
petitioner, Sunset View Condominium Corporation, filed for the collection of assessments levied on the
unit against Aguilar-Bernares Realty.
The private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the grounds (1) that the complaint
does not state a cause of action: (2) that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject or nature other
action; and (3) that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause. The
petitioner filed its opposition.
The motion to dismiss was granted by the respondent Judge, pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act No.
4726, a holder of a separate interest and consequently, a shareholder of the plaintiff condominium
corporation; and that the case should be properly filed with the Securities & Exchange Commission
which has exclusive original jurisdiction on controversies arising between shareholders of the
corporation. the motion for reconsideration thereof having been denied, the petitioner, alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge, filed the instant petition for certiorari praying that
the said orders be set aside.
ISSUE: Whether the CFI or the City Courts have jurisdiction over the claims filed by Sunset View, the
condominium corporation.

Held: Not every purchaser of a condominium unit is a shareholder in the corporation. The
Mater Deed determines when ownership of the unit and participation in the corporation vests
in the purchaser.
The City Court and the CFI have jurisdiction.
The share of stock appurtenant to the unit win be transferred accordingly to the purchaser of the unit
only upon full payment of the purchase price at which time he will also become the owner of the unit.
Consequently, even under the contract, it is only the owner of a unit who is a shareholder of the
Condominium Corporation. Inasmuch as owners is conveyed only upon full payment of the purchase
price, it necessarily follows that a purchaser of a unit who has not paid the full purchase price thereof is
not The owner of the unit and consequently is not a shareholder of the Condominium Corporation.
In this case, the Master Deed provides that ownership is transferred only upon full payment of the
purchase price.
Private respondents have not yet fully paid the purchase price, hence they are not shareholders and the
SEC has no jurisdiction over the claims.
*now, special courts handle intra-corporate disputes