Rodriguez vs Gella

Political Law Second Emergency Powers Cases

Rodriguez et al seek to invalidate Executive Orders 545 and 546 issued in 1952, the first
appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and the second setting
aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods,
droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities. These EOs were pursuant to
Commonwealth Act 671. Note that prior to Araneta vs Dinglasan, Congress passed House Bill 727
intending to revoke CA 671 but the same was vetoed by the President due to the Korean War and
his perception that war is still subsisting as a fact.

ISSUE: Whether or not the EOs are valid.

HELD: As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the EOs issued in pursuant to CA 671 shall be
rendered ineffective. The president did not invoke any actual emergencies or calamities emanating
from the last world war for which CA 671 has been intended. Without such invocation, the veto of the
president cannot be of merit for the emergency he feared cannot be attributed to the war
contemplated in CA 671. Even if the president vetoed the repealing bill the intent of Congress must
be given due weight. For it would be absurd to contend otherwise. For while Congress might
delegate its power by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by two-third vote.
In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is
not right and is not, and ought not to be the law. Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract
of agency, whereby the consent of the agent is necessary only in the sense that he cannot be
compelled to accept the trust, in the same way that the principal cannot be forced to keep the
relation in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the agency created
under the Act is coupled with interest.











Araneta v Dinglasan
G.R. No. L-2044 August 26, 1949
Tuason, J .:

Facts:
1. The petitions challenged the validity of executive orders issued by virtue of CA No. 671 or the Emergency
Powers Act. CA 671 declared a state of emergency as a result of war and authorized the President to
promulgate rules and regulations to meet such emergency. However, the Act did not fix the duration of its
effectivity.

2. EO 62 regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. The petitioner, Araneta, is under
prosecution in the CFI for violation of the provisions of this EO 62 and prays for the issuance of the writ of
prohibition.

3. EO 192, aims to control exports from the Philippines. Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to
compel the Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner of Customs to permit the
exportation of shoes. Both officials refuse to issue the required export license on the ground that the
exportation of shoes from the Philippines is forbidden by this EO.

4. EO 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the Government during the period from July 1,
1949 to June 30, 1950, and for other purposes was assailed by petitioner Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a
tax-payer, elector, and president of the Nacionalista Party. He applied for a writ of prohibition to restrain
the Treasurer of the Philippines from disbursing the funds by virtue of this EO.

5. Finally, EO 226, which appropriated P6M to defray the expenses in connection with the national
elections in 1949. was questioned by Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter. He asked the
Court to prevent "the respondents from disbursing, spending or otherwise disposing of that amount or any
part of it."

ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 ceased to have any force and effect

YES.
1. The Act fixed a definite limited period. The Court held that it became inoperative when
Congress met during the opening of the regular session on May 1946 and that EOs 62, 192, 225
and 226 were issued without authority of law . The session of the Congress is the point of
expiration of the Act and not the first special session after it.
2. Executive Orders No. 62 (dated June 21, 1947) regulating house and lot rentals, No. 192
(dated December 24, 1948) regulating exports, Nos. 225 and 226 (dated June 15,1949) the first
appropriation funds for the operation of the Government from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and
the second appropriating funds for election expenses in November 1949, were therefore declared
null and void for having been issued after Act No. 671 had lapsed and/or after the Congress had
enacted legislation on the same subjects. This is based on the language of Act 671 that the
National Assembly restricted the life of the emergency powers of the President to the time the
Legislature was prevented from holding sessions due to enemy action or other causes brought on
by the war.

G.R. No. L-34674 October 26, 1931
MAURICIO CRUZ, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
STANTON YOUNGBERG, Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, respondent-appellee.
Jose Yulo for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Reyes for appellee.

OSTRAND, J .:
This is a petition brought originally before the Court of First Instance of Manila for the issuance of a
writ of mandatory injunction against the respondent, Stanton Youngberg, as Director of the Bureau
of Animal Industry, requiring him to issue a permit for the landing of ten large cattle imported by the
petitioner and for the slaughter thereof. The petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155,
which at present prohibits the importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands.
Among other things in the allegation of the petition, it is asserted that "Act No. 3155 of the Philippine
Legislature was enacted for the sole purpose of preventing the introduction of cattle diseases into
the Philippine Islands from foreign countries, as shown by an explanatory note and text of Senate
Bill No. 328 as introduced in the Philippine Legislature, ... ." The Act in question reads as follows:
SECTION 1. After March thirty-first, nineteen hundred and twenty-five existing contracts for
the importation of cattle into this country to the contrary notwithstanding, it shall be strictly
prohibited to import, bring or introduce into the Philippine Islands any cattle from foreign
countries: Provided, however, That at any time after said date, the Governor-General, with
the concurrence of the presiding officers of both Houses, may raise such prohibition entirely
or in part if the conditions of the country make this advisable or if decease among foreign
cattle has ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and live stock of the lands.
SEC. 2. All acts or parts of acts inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect on its approval.
Approved, March 8, 1924.
The respondent demurred to the petition on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was based on two reasons, namely, (1) that if Act No.
3155 were declared unconstitutional and void, the petitioner would not be entitled to the relief
demanded because Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective and would prohibit the
respondent from giving the permit prayed for; and (2) that Act No. 3155 was constitutional and,
therefore, valid.
The court sustained the demurrer and the complaint was dismissed by reason of the failure of the
petitioner to file another complaint. From that order of dismissal, the petitioner appealed to this court.
The appellee contends that even if Act No. 3155 be declared unconstitutional by the fact alleged by
the petitioner in his complaint, still the petitioner can not be allowed to import cattle from Australia for
the reason that, while Act No. 3155 were declared unconstitutional, Act No. 3052 would
automatically become effective. Act No. 3052 reads as follows:
SECTION 1. Section seventeen hundred and sixty-two of Act Numbered Twenty-seven
hundred and eleven, known as the Administrative Code, is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"SEC. 1762. Bringing of animals imported from foreign countries into the Philippine
Islands. It shall be unlawful for any person or corporation to import, bring or
introduce live cattle into the Philippine Islands from any foreign country. The Director
of Agriculture may, with the approval of the head of the department first had,
authorize the importation, bringing or introduction of various classes of thoroughbred
cattle from foreign countries for breeding the same to the native cattle of these
Islands, and such as may be necessary for the improvement of the breed, not to
exceed five hundred head per annum: Provided, however, That the Director of
Agriculture shall in all cases permit the importation, bringing or introduction of draft
cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum:Provided, further, That all live
cattle from foreign countries the importation, bringing or introduction of which into the
Islands is authorized by this Act, shall be submitted to regulations issued by the
Director of Agriculture, with the approval of the head of the department, prior to
authorizing its transfer to other provinces.
"At the time of the approval of this Act, the Governor-General shall issue regulations
and others to provide against a raising of the price of both fresh and refrigerated
meat. The Governor-General also may, by executive order, suspend, this prohibition
for a fixed period in case local conditions require it."
SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect six months after approval.
Approved, March 14, 1922.
The petitioner does not present any allegations in regard to Act No. 3052 to show its nullity or
unconstitutionality though it appears clearly that in the absence of Act No. 3155 the former act would
make it impossible for the Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry to grant the petitioner a permit
for the importation of the cattle without the approval of the head of the corresponding department.
An unconstitutional statute can have no effect to repeal former laws or parts of laws by
implication, since, being void, it is not inconsistent with such former laws. (I Lewis
Sutherland, Statutory Construction 2nd ed., p. 458, citing McAllister vs. Hamlin, 83 Cal., 361;
23 Pac., 357; Orange Country vs. Harris, 97 Cal., 600; 32 Pac., 594; Carr vs. State, 127 Ind.,
204; 11 L.R.A., 370, etc.)
This court has several times declared that it will not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes unless
it is necessary to do so (McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu, 30 Phil., 563, 568; Walter E. Olsen &
Co. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad, 43 Phil., 259) but in this case it is not necessary to pass upon the
validity of the statute attacked by the petitioner because even if it were declared unconstitutional, the
petitioner would not be entitled to relief inasmuch as Act No. 3052 is not in issue.
But aside from the provisions of Act No. 3052, we are of the opinion that Act No. 3155 is entirely
valid. As shown in paragraph 8 of the amended petition, the Legislature passed Act No. 3155 to
protect the cattle industry of the country and to prevent the introduction of cattle diseases through
importation of foreign cattle. It is now generally recognized that the promotion of industries affecting
the public welfare and the development of the resources of the country are objects within the scope
of the police power (12 C.J., 927; 6 R.C.L., 203-206 and decisions cited therein; Reid vs. Colorado,
187 U.S., 137, 147, 152; Yeazel vs. Alexander, 58 Ill., 254). In this connection it is said in the case of
Punzalan vs. Ferriols and Provincial Board of Batangas (19 Phil., 214), that the provisions of the Act
of Congress of July 1, 1902, did not have the effect of denying to the Government of the Philippine
Islands the right to the exercise of the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare
and the public interest. The facts recited in paragraph 8 of the amended petition shows that at the
time the Act No. 3155 was promulgated there was reasonable necessity therefor and it cannot be
said that the Legislature exceeded its power in passing the Act. That being so, it is not for this court
to avoid or vacate the Act upon constitutional grounds nor will it assume to determine whether the
measures are wise or the best that might have been adopted. (6 R.C.L., 243 and decisions cited
therein.)1awphil.net
In his third assignment of error the petitioner claims that "The lower court erred in not holding that
the power given by Act No. 3155 to the Governor-General to suspend or not, at his discretion, the
prohibition provided in the act constitutes an unlawful delegation of the legislative powers." We do
not think that such is the case; as Judge Ranney of the Ohio Supreme Court in Cincinnati,
Wilmington and Zanesville Railroad Co. vs. Commissioners of Clinton County (1 Ohio St., 77, 88)
said in such case:
The true distinction, therefore, is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.
Under his fourth assignment of error the appellant argues that Act No. 3155 amends section 3 of the
Tariff Law, but it will be noted that Act No. 3155 is not an absolute prohibition of the importation of
cattle and it does not add any provision to section 3 of the Tariff Law. As stated in the brief of the
Attorney-General: "It is a complete statute in itself. It does not make any reference to the Tariff Law.
It does not permit the importation of articles, whose importation is prohibited by the Tariff Law. It is
not a tariff measure but a quarantine measure, a statute adopted under the police power of the
Philippine Government. It is at most a `supplement' or an `addition' to the Tariff Law. (See
MacLeary vs. Babcock, 82 N.E., 453, 455; 169 Ind., 228 for distinction between `supplemental' and
`amendatory' and O'Pry vs. U.S., 249 U.S., 323; 63 Law. ed., 626, for distinction between `addition'
and `amendment.')"
The decision appealed from is affirmed with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.





People vs Vera
Political Law Delegation of Powers
Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was
elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting
new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of.
Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied
the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be
set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng
under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of
Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted
person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only
indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is
unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said
law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of
power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to
provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power.

HELD: The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact it is limited and is in a way an
imposition of penalty. There is undue delegation of power because there is no set standard provided
by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial
boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non
delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The
challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only
in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a
probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said
probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the
direction of the Probation Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide
appropriation for a probation officer may have a system of probation within their locality. This would
mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of their
right to probation.








Pelaez vs Auditor general
Political Law Sufficient Standard Test and Completeness Test
From Sept 04 to Oct 29, 1964, the President (Marcos) issued executive orders creating 33
municipalities this is purportedly in pursuant to Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which
provides that the President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or
boundaries, of any province, sub-province, municipality, [township] municipal district or other political
subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into
one or more subprovincesThe VP Emmanuel Pelaez and a taxpayer filed a special civil action to
prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities.
Pelaez claims that the EOs are unconstitutional. He said that Sec 68 of the RAC has been impliedly
repealed by Sec 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may not be created or their boundaries
altered nor their names changed except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial
board upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected and the recommendation of the
council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated. Pelaez argues,
accordingly: If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a
municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities? The
Auditor General countered that only barrios are barred from being created by the President.
Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that t a municipality can be created without creating
barrios. Existing barrios can just be placed into the new municipality. This theory overlooks,
however, the main import of Pelaez argument, which is that the statutory denial of the presidential
authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each
of which consists of several barrios.

ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by
virtue of Sec 68 of the RAC.

HELD: Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in
the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a
violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set
forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a
standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate
must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy,
the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and,
without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable
certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
In the case at bar, the power to create municipalities is eminently legislative in character not
administrative.