Schopenhauer and the Cartesian Tradition

Ted Humphrey
Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 19, Number 2, April 1981,
pp. 191-212 (Article)
Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press
DOI: 10.1353/hph.2008.0724
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Schopenhauer and the
Cartesian Tradition
TED HUMPHREY
IN THIS CENTURY, we have relegated Schopenhauer to a position outside the
mainstream of modern philosophy, primarily, I suspect, because his metaphysi-
cal views, some would say excesses, do not accord with our more analytical and
otherwise circumspect attitudes. Our neglect also derives from not knowing just
how he fits into the historical flow, for rather than comprising part of the flood of
idealism that swept Germany in the first half of the nineteenth century, he seems
to have been only an isolated spring that soon ran dry. This perception of him is
unfortunate. His thought was not unrelated to the dominant philosophical tradi-
tion, as his writings' profuse admiring and critical references to its major and
minor figures attest; nor did he fail to influence those who came after him,
Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, and Sartre, among others.
Our reason for finding it difficult to fit Schopenhauer' s thought into the
dominant tradition of philosophy extending from I)escartes to the present is that
we regard his views as wildly deviating from it, particularly in metaphysics and
epistemology. This is a mistake. Actually, his metaphisical and epistemological
views were deeply influenced by Kant ' s, and are importantly similar to
Hobbes' s and Hume' s, and this alone is sufficient to force admission that he is
part of the mainstream. But because Schopenhauer follows the tendency in
Hobbes and Hume to attribute predominance of the will and passions over
reason in human nature, he tends to offend the rather more Cartesian and Kan-
tian tendencies of our present age. Just how (1) Schopenhauer fits into the
Cartesian tradition and (2) his views extend crucial positions of one of that
tradition' s branches become clear only when we examine the relations among
being, reason, and will in the theories of its major figures. In this paper I will
restrict the discussion to Descartes, Hume, Kant, and Schopenhauer--and in
them to only the most central points--with the intent of showing that Schopen-
hauer is an important figure in our philosophical tradition and that his argu-
ments, correcting and extending as they do doctrines crucial to that tradition,
warrant our attention and respect.
Several persons read earlier versions of this paper and made numerous comments, for which I
am most grateful. I want particularly to mention Professors Michael J. White, John D. Stone,
Thomas Auxter and Jerrold Levinson, whose meticulous comments prevented several blunders. The
mistakes that remain are, of course, my own.
[191]
192 HI STORY OF PHI LOSOPHY
The analysis begins with a di scussi on of Descar t es' s vi ews, which I use t o
define the main i ssues at stake and to illuminate what I think is cl ose to t he
preferred vi ew in our tradition on t he relations among being, reason and will.
Descar t es is most exerci sed about t he relation of r eason to being, and quest i ons
about will arise for him onl y in a ver y ci rcumscri bed cont ext ; however , consid-
erat i ons about the will are crucial t o how, with r espect to their pr edecessor s,
Hume, Kant , and Schopenhauer concei ve and devel op their posi t i ons regarding
being and reason. In fact, among t hese four writers I find a continuing dialectic
over the relations among being, reason, and will---a dialectic that ext ends to t he
vi ews of ot her figures in the modern tradition. Payi ng attention to it, even in the
pr esent proscri bed cont ext , yields i mport ant clues about the strategies, devel op-
ment and goals of modern phi l osophy.
As t hey devel op their positions about the relations among reason, will and
being, I find that Kant ' s vi ews are importantly anal ogous t o Descar t es' s and
Schopenhauer ' s to Hume' s . Furt her, Schopenhauer expands Kant ' s criticisms
bot h of Humean skept i ci sm and Cart esi an rationalism. Her e one find Schopen-
hauer a thinker of consi derabl e compl exi t y, i nvent i veness and s ubt l et y- - but
t hen this is the manner in which Schopenhauer saw himself. The dialectic I
di scern shows that hi st ory repeat s itself. However , t he moral of this is not that if
we are ignorant of hi st ory we are bound to repeat it, but rat her that ff we are
sufficiently acquai nt ed with history, we can, with intelligence and ingenuity,
r epeat and ext end it t o our advantage.
I. THE FIRST PHASE
A. Descartes's Assertions. Descar t es' s first truth, Cogito ergo sum, is an
unequi vocal sign of his rationalism. It implicitly contains his predilection to the
vi ews that with r espect t o the relation bet ween reason and being, cognition is
pri me, and that in the economy of human nature, rationality has pr ecedence over
will. The cour se of t hought contained in the cogito and devel oped in the Medita-
tions runs as follows: I know I am because I think; hence, for me, knowi ng
pr ecedes being, even though in the or der of things being may pr ecede knowing.
My met aphysi cal nature must be that of a thinker/knower. This l at t er claim, it
t urns out , is not onl y met aphysi cal but existential as well, for t o fulfill my
nat ure, that is, to become most fully human, I must, in fact, know. Accordi ng to
Descar t es, who holds a cor r espondence t heory of truth, knowing entails becom-
ing acquai nt ed with t he propert i es of what there is. To speak met aphori cal l y,
knowi ng consi st s of molding the mind t o the shape of obj ect s t hemsel ves, strip-
ping our notion of t hem of all propert i es that might pertain to or deri ve from
oneself. Consequent l y, in sorting through the propert i es of the ball of wax,
Descar t es discards (1) the secondary qual i t i es- - t hey exist onl y because of inter-
act i on bet ween sel f and o b j e c t e d (2) the accidental but non-subject-influ-
enced propert i es, for exampl e, shape and weight, settling on that pr oper t y that
woul d be, even if the ball of wax wer e not, namely, ext ensi on. Just as thought is
the pri mary quality of t he self, ext ensi on is the primary quality of bodi es. By
now this is a familiar st ory.
SCHOPENHAUER 193
In telling it for the first time, Descartes never mentions either the tertiary
qualifies or the will.t Will does not enter into his consideration of the essential
nature of the self, and, perhaps more surprisingly, tertiary qualities do not enter
into his consideration of the nature of body. 2 The claims about thought and exten-
sion go hand-in-hand. As Descartes conceives them, they are what remains of
human nature and the material world when we have completely abstracted from
life.
Tertiary qualities are signs of life: "The nature here described ["those things
given by God to me as a being composed of mind and body"] truly teaches me to
flee from things which cause the sensation of pain, and seek after the things
which communicate to me the sentiment of pleasure and so forth" (AT, IX:65;
HR, I : 193). These qualities that we feel in the face of the world stimulate us to
act; they prevent us from responding to the effects of the world on our compos-
ite nature with the detachment of a "pilot of a vessel" to a rent in the hull of his
ship. Nevertheless, they "t each me nothing but what is most obscure and con-
fused. " Descartes cites two reasons why tertiary qualities cannot serve as a
source of knowledge: First, he believes that while they are properly taken as
signs of what is happening to us, they are signs only of affections of the body,
which is neither an intrinsic part of the self, so far as I can tell qua knower, nor a
thing necessary for knowing, because, "mi nd alone, and not mind and body in
conjunction . . . . is requisite to a knowledge of the t r ut h. . . " (AT, IX:65; HR,
I: 193). Second, body' s extended nature is the very basis for mistakennessabout
what occurs in the world, for stimuli must be transmitted and may on occasion
arise from deviant sources or from malfunctions in the mechanical system itself,
e.g., sickness. Consequently, "notwithstanding the supreme goodness of God,
the nature of man, inasmuch as it is composed of mind and body, cannot be
otherwise than sometimes a source of deception" (AT, IX: 70; HR, I: 198). And
" r e a s on. . . persuades me that I ought no less carefully to withhold my assent
from matters which are not entirely certain and indubitable than from those
which appear to me manifestly to be false" (AT, IX: 14; HR, I: 15). In other
words, the source of motivation in composite human nature is intrinsically sub-
ject to error and, therefore, untrustworthy. However, the tertiary qualities are
not the only source of motivation or error in human nature.
t But see: " Wha t is a thing whi ch t hi nks? It is a t hi ng whi ch doubt s, under st ands, [concei ves],
affirms, deni es, wills, refuses, whi ch al so i magi nes and f eel s" (AT, I X: 22; HR, I : 53) . The or der
here is i mpor t ant , placing willing aft er t he more st ri ct l y intellectual aspect s of t hi nki ng but before
t hose t hat i ncl ude t hought formally in t hei r concept , yet i nvol ve t he ot her aspect of human nat ur e,
body. The or der is i mpor t ant because it emphasi zes t he ambi guous position of willing in t he economy
of human nat ur e. All ci t at i ons t o Descar t es are t o Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. C. Adam and P.
Tanner y, 12 vols. (Paris: Li brai ri e Phi l osophi que J. Vrin, 1897-1910), ci t ed as AT foUowcd by
vol ume and page number . I use t he t ransl at i ons of El i zabet h S. Hal dane and G. R. T. Ross,
Philosophical Works of Descartes, 2 vols. (Cambri dge: Cambri dge Uni ver si t y Press, 1967), ci t ed as
HR followed by vol ume and page number s. Heraft cr ci t at i ons will be pl aced in par ent heses in t he
t ext and have this form: (AT, vol. : page; HR, vol. : page).
2 Descar t es' s vi ew t hat t ert i ary qualities do not provi de any t rue i nformat i on about real i t y is
broadl y hi nt ed at in Medi t at i on I, where he fails t o subj ect t hem to t he doubt i ng pr ocess to whi ch he
subj ect s all knowledge.
194 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
Will, because it is included in the concept of a thinking thing, is the source of
motivation uniquely proper to man, "t he power of choosing to do a thing or not
to do it" (AT, IX:46; HR, 1:475). Descartes does not maintain that will is
intrinsically prone to error; rather, error arises from a lack of proportion be-
tween will and understanding. In man, understanding is a finite capacity to
comprehend what there is, and will is an unlimited capacity to affirm, deny,
pursue or flee.
Whence then come my errors? They come from the sole fact that since the will is much
wider in its range and compass than the understanding, I do not restrain it within the
same bounds, but extend it also to things which I do not understand: and as the will is of
itself indifferent to these, it easily falls into error and sin, and chooses the evil for the
good, or the false for the true. (AT, IX: 46; HR, I: 175-76)
In the economy of human nature, reason is the guide to will, even to the extent
that men must rationally constrain the will not to motivate them precipitately,
i.e., on the basis of inadequate knowledge. 3 Failure to constrain the will inevita-
bly leads to error. Because will is the capacity to affirm, error ultimately rests
with it, even though the error lies in judgment, which is viewed by Descartes as
the unique product of rationality. Will's exigency but absolute incapacity is to
know.
Descartes holds that reason and will are quite distinct, although both are
contained in the concept of a thinking thing. Reason is only a faculty of
knowledge, otherwise inefficacious in itself, and will is an arbitrarily free capac-
ity for action, necessarily prone to error when exercised independently of rea-
son' s constraint. These views capture the essence of Descartes' s rationalism, his
refusal to accept any form of skepticism. Descartes' s affirmation of the primacy
of reason and knowledge in human nature raises this problem: One essential
action is affirming the truth or falsity of a proposition. Now will is a necessary
and sufficient condition for making affirmations, as it is for any act; however,
reason is the necessary condition for right affirmation or action, for these depend
on knowledge. Thus, for right action, reason must either constrain will within
the limits of knowledge or will must have a criterion of truth intrinsic to itself.
Applying constraint is an action, one that in the case presently under discussion
must originate in reason, but for which reason is only a necessary condition. On
the other hand, Descartes quite obviously cannot admit that will possesses its
own criterion of truth, for that would seem to render its freedom less than
absolute, as well as to make his entire search for a criterion of truth quite
unnecessary. Descartes' s rejection of skepticism rests equally on his affirma-
tions of reason' s primacy and will's absolute freedom, but the separation of the
Beginning with the foregoing quote the perspicuous reader will detect an unsettling vagueness
and ambiguity in the reference of the first person personal pronouns. Here their reference is inelucta-
bly caught between rationality and will. Rationality must instruct will to constrain itself to act in a
certain way but has not, of itself, the knowledge needed to effect the proper constraint. The separa-
tion of abilities is necessary to Descartes's rationalism, but untenable. This point is taken up by
Fichte (see note 14) and by Schopenhauer.
SCHOPENHAUER 195
t wo raises logical probl ems about the possibility of right act i on that could onl y
result in denying the view.
B. Hume' s Denials. Hume is a naturalistic skeptic. 4 The core of his par-
ticular naturalism is his t heory of the role that tertiary qualities and passi ons pl ay
in human life. The cutting edge of Hume' s attack on Descart es is the argument
that the tertiary qualities provi de the basis for our bel i ef in the cont i nued, and
hence i ndependent , exi st ence of things. This argument simply stands Descar t es' s
rationalism on its head. It pr esupposes that all our knowl edge begins with and
deri ves from experi ence and that the mind qua reason is properl y subj ect to the
passi ons' influences (T, 415). s
Hume begins the argument by asserting (1) that "bot h philOsophers and the
vul gar" assume pri mary qualities " t o have a distinct cont i nued exi st ence" (T,
192), (2) that the vulgar grant such exi st ence to secondary qualities, and (3) that
neither bel i eves tertiary qualities t o have it. But all t hese kinds of percept i ons
are essentially equi val ent qua percept i ons, inasmuch as we know t hem to exist
only when we percei ve them; t herefore, " we may concl ude, that as far as the
senses are j udges, all percept i ons are the same in the manner of their exi st ence"
(T, 193). Nor do reason and philosophical arguments provi de the basis for our
bel i ef that pri mary and secondar y qualities have i ndependent exi st ence, for
" ' tis obvi ous t hese argument s are known but to ver y few, and that ' tis not by
them, that children, peasant s, and the greatest part of mankind are i nduc' d to
attribute obj ect s to some i mpressi ons, and deny t hem to ot her s" (T, 193). Hume
cont ends that a versi on of the consi st ent dream hypot hesi s 6 account s for our
bel i ef that primary and secondar y qualities provi de information about indepen-
dent, cont i nued existence. Because t hey lack consi st ency, we do not bel i eve
tertiary qualities possess such exi st ence. However , the propert i es of primary
and secondary qualities that i nduce us to ascribe i ndependent exi st ence to t hem
are not intrinsic but extrinsic, t hat is, t hey have to do with relations among
ideas---the relations coherence and const ancy. Consequent l y, we cannot on the
4 Thi s poi nt is est abl i shed in Ri chard H. Popki n' s classic paper " Davi d Hume: Hi s Pyr r honi sm
and his Cri t i que of Pyr r honi s m, " i n Hume, ed. V. C. Chappell, ( Gar den City: Anchor Books, 1967),
pp. 53-98.
s All references t o Hume are t o t he Selby-Bigge editions: Davi d Hume, A Treatise of Human
Nature, ed. L. A. Seiby-Bigge (Oxford: The Cl ar endon Press, 1963). Ci t at i ons will be i n par ent heses
and will have t hi s form: (T, page) for r ef er ences t o t he Treatise and (EM, page) for r ef er ences t o t he
Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals.
6 I bor r ow t he t er m " cons i s t ent dr eam Hypot hes i s " from Lewi s Whi t e Beck, who in Early
German Philosophy argues t hat it is one of t wo argument s t hat t he Car t esi an t radi t i on used t o j ust i f y
bel i ef in an ext ernal worl d. The ot her is t he passi vi t y argument . Bot h are cont ai ned in t he Medi t a-
t i ons, t he l at t er in Medi t at i on III, t he f or mer at t he end of Medi t at i on VI. Hume ' s use of t he
consi st ent dream hypot hesi s is i nt erest i ng and i mpor t ant because it marks a di st i nct i on bet ween hi m
and ot her empi ri ci st s, who used t he passi vi t y argument as t hei r pr i mar y pr oof of an i ndependent l y
exi st i ng world. But Hume saw cl earl y t hat t hi s woul d not do, for, ' " t i s nei t her upon account of t he
i nvol unt ar i ness of cer t ai n i mpr essi ons, as is commonl y suppos' d, nor of t he super i or force and
vi ol ence t hat we at t r i but e t o t hem [pri mary and secondary qualities] cont i nu' d exi st ence . . . . For ' t i s
evi dent our pai ns and pl easures, our passi ons and affections, whi ch we ne ve r suppose t o have any
exi st ence beyond our per cept i on, oper at e wi t h gr eat er violence, and are equal l y i nvol unt ar y, as t he
i mpressi ons of figure and ext ensi on, col our and sound, whi ch we suppose t o be per manent bei ngs"
(T, 194).
196 HISTORY OF PHI LOSOPHY
basis of our ascription of i ndependence to t hem validly infer t hat , in fact, t hey
provide true information about what t here is. One cannot infer from t he intrinsic
properties of any percept that it provi des objective information about an ext er-
nal, i ndependent l y existing world.
This argument undermi nes Descart es' s cont ent i ons about pri mary qualities
and, ultimately, about r eason' s role in human action. For i f pri mary, secondar y
and t ert i ary qualities are essentially equivalent in providing knowl edge of objec-
tive exi st ence, and if we respond to our experi ence primarily on t he basis of
t ert i ary qualities, t hey assume pri mary i mport ance for our exi st ence in t he
world. Al t oget her i ndependent l y of whet her t hey provide objective knowledge of
things as t hey are in t hemsel ves, t ert i ary qualities constitute t he rel evant infor-
mation about t he effects of things on us, and, consequent l y, are t he basis for our
responses to t he world. However , to make this point we must exami ne Hume' s
t heory of t he relations among t he will, the passions and t he t ert i ary qualities.
The relation bet ween t he t ert i ary qualities and t he passions is immediate for
Hume, because t he "di r ect passi ons, " whi ch include "desi r e, aversion, grief,
j oy, hope, fear, despair and secur i t y, " arise "i mmedi at el y from good or evil,
from pain or pl easur e, " and the "i ndi r ect , " among whi ch he includes pride,
humility, love and hatred, "f r om t he same principles, but by t he conj unct i on of
ot her qualities" (T, 276-77). Hume furt her maintains that t he "caus es of pride
and humility [are] plainly nat ur al " (T, 281). The second reason is especially
important: Hume const ant l y argues that t he original and natural "wel l s and
spri ngs" of human nat ure are found to operat e similarly in all men at all times.
Hume' s naturalism lies in t he cont ent i ons that t he t ert i ary qualifies are the di rect
stimuli of t he passions and that t he passions are t he natural responses of original
principles in human nat ure to our experi ence. Thus, although we may regard the
primary and secondar y qualities as t he properties of continuing, i ndependent
exi st ences, we respond to t hem only because t hey have effects on us that give
rise to t ert i ary qualifies, whi ch in their t urn arouse t he passions. The capst one of
Hume' s argument against Descart es' s rationalism is this t heor y of t he relation
bet ween t he passions and t he will.
Hume' s stand against t he view that the will is liberium arbitrium is resolute.
The crux of t he di sagreement is his cont ent i on t hat t he actions of men exhibit the
same const ancy that we di scover among objects. The const ancy of conjunction
and contiguity that give rise to our notion of causat i on in material nat ure we find
also among t he motives, t empers, situations and actions of men: "necessi t y
makes an essential part of causation; and consequent l y liberty, by removi ng
necessi t y, removes also causes, and is the very same with change" (T, 407). The
will is free only in the sense that it spont aneousl y originates new courses of
events. Actions begin with it, but not from sheer indifference (T, 399). Ever y
action is mot i vat ed and t he motives are passionate responses, however calm and
disinterested, to pleasure and pain. This is so even in the case of moral actions,
that is, actions occasi oned by benevol ence, t hat "sent i ment , so universal and
compr ehens i ve as to ext end to all manki nd, and r e n d e r . . , act i ons and
c o n d u c t . . , t he object of applause or censur e" (EM, 272).
SCHOPENHAUER 197
When Hume writes, " Reas on is, and ought only t o be the slave of the
passi ons, and can never pret end to any ot her office than to serve and obey
t hem" (T, 415), he turns the t abl es on Descar t es' s position. Of course this
difference in vi ew st ems from Hume' s t heory that reason in and of i t sel f is
passive, that it can deal only with "rel at i ons, that are obj ect s of sci ence, " and
matters of fact, nei t her of whi ch is directly involved in moral i t y (T, 468). The
matters of fact that concern morality are feelings involving t he passions. The
only funct i ons of reason in human action are its di scovery of causal relations in
experi ence, wher eby it provi des knowl edge of possi bl e means to ends, and its
clarifying situations, wher eby it allows us to respond t o t hem in emotionally
appropriate ways:
reason and s e nt i me nt concur in almost all moral determinations and conclusions. The
f i nal s ent ence . . . whi ch pr onounc e s char act er s and act i ons ami abl e or odi ous, prai se-
wor t hy or bl ameabl e . . . de pe nds on s ome i nt ernal s ens e or f eel i ng, whi ch nat ure has
made uni versal in t he whol e speci es. But in order to pave the way for such a senti-
me n t . . , it is often ne c e s s a r y. . , that much reasoning should precede, that nice distinc-
tions be made, just conclusions be drawn, distant comparisons formed, complicated rela-
tions examined, and general facts fixed and ascertained. (EM, 172-73, emphasis mine)
Thus, Hume rej ect s Descar t es' s vi ew that reason can or shoul d constrain will
within the bounds of rational knowledge. Our passi ons, whose source is an
original quality of human nature, are and ought to be the guides to actions, for
ot herwi se man woul d "st and like the school man' s ass, i rresol ut e and undeter-
mined, bet ween equal mot i ves" (EM, 235).
Hume avoi ds the probl em regarding right action that we found in Descar t es'
theories of reason, will and the relationship bet ween them. Will, though not
arbitrarily free, is the necessary and sufficient condition for action, and t he
mot i ve to right action is one of its constituents. Reason is nei t her a necessary
nor sufficient condition for right action. Wher e action is concerned, reason
serves onl y to provi de and clarify information. I.t can be mot i vat ed t o do so by
will, and this is the sense in which Hume assert s that " r eas on is and ought t o be
the sl ave of the passi ons. " Naturalistic, as it may be, skeptical, as rationalists
may want t o call it, Hume' s position is a coherent t heory of man' s realtion to t he
world and of his ability to act.
The revol ut i on is here complete. In Descar t es' s t heory of the relation be-
t ween being and reason, the t wo converge in r eason' s apprehensi on of pri mary
qualities. The ot her qualities are denigrated, and the tertiary, because whol l y
subj ect i ve, have no genuine place in human life insofar as Descar t es bases it on
knowledge. Consequent l y, will cannot properl y be guided by such qualities and
the passi ons that might attend them. Reason is will' s sole pr oper source of
motivation. Hume, on the ot her hand, det aches all qualities from i ndependent
existence, freeing hi msel f from the contention that reason is capabl e of absol ut e,
obj ect i ve knowl edge, for no intrinsic propert i es of qualities signal their obj ect i ve
198 HI STORY OF PHI LOSOPHY
existence. Hence, his claim that our passi onat e responses mot i vat e human ac-
tion is not irrationalistic. 7 Rather., because the deepest root s of human nature
respond to those qualities and because the passions are human nat ure' s deepest
and most universal response to t hose qualities, t hey are the tie that binds us to
the worl d we experience. Hume, with his skepticism in knowl edge and his natu-
ralism in human action, inverts Descar t es' s t heory of the relation of being to
reason; his asertion of will' s pri macy in human nature is the antithesis of ration-
alism. We have now to consi der still anot her revolution.
II. THE SECOND PHASE
A. Ka n t ' s R e v i v a l o f R a t i o n a l i s m. Kant ' s realization t hat it was "necessar y
to deny k n o wl e d g e , in order to make r oom for fai t h" (B xxx), 8 mot i vat ed his
Coperni can revolution in the met hodol ogy of philosophical thought. Though he
was certainly concerned to secure synt het i c a priori status for the foundat i onal
proposi t i ons of human knowl edge, Kant ' s interest in the obj ect s of faith was every
bit as great as Descart es' s. God pl ays an i mport ant role in bot h of their syst ems,
guarant eei ng the veraci t y of the criterion of truth in Descar t es' s and serving as the
highest postulate of morality in Kant ' s. But bet ween God and reason lies will; and
what ever Kant ' s intentions regarding God may have been, he was most ass.uredly
interested to make a place for freedom, whi ch in man is a proxi mat e condi t i on or
morality. Kant ' s views on the proper relation of will to reason in the economy of
the moral life of finite rational beings are remarkabl y similar to Descar t es' s, even
though freedom is onl y an hypot hesi s for Kant. However, before we examine that
relation in more detail, we must consi der Kant ' s response to that "r emembr ance
of Hume. "
Kant reacted to the Cartesian rationalist and empi ri ci st tradition that we
normal l y regard as culminating with Hume by rejecting its concept i on of the
relation bet ween being and reason. When he wrot e that "r eas on has insight only
into that which it produces after a plan of its own" (B xiii), and that whereas
"hi t hert o it has been assumed that all our knowl edge must conf or m to obj ect s, "
The claim is not irrationalistic for two reasons: (1) The claim that primary qualities are objec-
tive cannot be defended; consequently, one cannot accuse Hume of attempting to base action on
some aspect of reality less real or reliable than some other. (2) Hume does have a theory of reason
and its role in action. That he should not give pride of place to this capacity and that he locates the
motivation to be rational in the passions and will does not make his view irrationalistic. It is, a theory
of rationality and its place in human life.
s In 1798 Kant wrote to Christian Garve: "It was not from the investigation of the existence of
God, of immortality, and so on, that I started but from the antinomy of pure reason, 'The world has a
beginning--; it has no beginning--;' and so on, up to the fourth [sic] antinomy: 'Man has freedom'--
against this: 'There is no freedom; everything belongs to natural necessity'. These were the first that
awoke me from the dogmatic slumbers..."(XII, 258). One finds this view also expressed in Kant's
final essay on metaphysics and epistemology, What Actual Progress has Metaphysics Made since
the Time of Leibniz and Wolff?.
All references to Kant are to Immanuel Kant, Kant's gesammelte Schriften, ed. Preussischen
Akademie der Wissenschaften, 28 vols. (Berlin and Leipzig: G. Reimer and Walter de Gruyter,
1901--). I will cite the Kritik der reinen Vernunft in the normal manner by A and B edition; citations
to other works will be by volume and page number, e.g., (If, page). All translations are my own.
SCHOPENHAUER 199
it is now necessary to "make trial whether we may not have more success in the
tasks of metaphysics, if we assume that objects must conform to our knowl-
edge" (B xvi), he expressed in a very self-conscious way the view that the
concept of truth does not entail that the mind conform itself to reality. This
realization allowed him to break away from both Cartesian rationalism and Hu-
mean skepticism, even though his newly articulated position was formulated on
the basis of insights gained from and critical reactions to both. Because his
statements on the development of his thought are so diverse and, often, inconsis-
tent, and because so little of a systematic nature is actually known about the
crucial period of the Seventies, the precise concatenation of stimuli that led him
to the critical position will likely remain a matter of speculation and controversy.
But we can identify the basic steps.
The first step in Kant' s march toward criticism was taken in 1768, in the
essay, "Regions in Space," where, as against Leibniz' s received rationalist
view, Kant argues that space cannot be a function of the relations of existent
physical entities, because it possesses certain irreducible global relational char-
acteristics (II, 377-83). Within two years, he formulated, in his Inaugural Dis-
sertation, the theory of space and time that, with the exception of a single
element, 9 would constitute the "Transcendental Aesthetic" and serve as one of
the two fundamental supports of the critical epistemology. Roughly two years
after that, in his letter of February 1772 to Marcus Herz, he posed the central
epistemological question that would continue to bemuse him until he completed
the second edition of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, namely, "on what basis
rests the relation to the object of that which in ourselves we call representa-
t i on?" (X, 124). This, of course, is just the question about the relation of reason
to being. Asking it became inevitable once Kant had formulated the theory that
the space and time of which humans are aware originate in their cognitive capac-
ties, for the most obvious objects of human experience are spatiotemporal.
Kant ' s final developmental step before publishing the Kritik was to formulate the
concept and doctrine of synthetic a priori propositions, which occurred around
1774. Geometrical propositions are the first to which Kant is known to have
ascribed this status, but he must very soon have realized that it belonged to the
causal maxim, ex nihilo, nihilfit. Kant' s formulation of the doctrine of synthetic
a priori propositions and his realization that mathematical and fundamental me-
taphysical propositions, among others, enjoy this status, allowed him to recog-
nize and traverse the narrow ridge between Descartes' s rationalism and Hume' s
skepticism. 1~ This is the heart of the Kantian synthesis.
Kant ' s solution to the problem of the relation of representation to object and
to the problem of synthetic a priori truth, which turn out for him to be aspects of
9 In 1770 Kant di d not yet hol d t he vi ew definitive of t he first Kritik, namel y, t hat space and t i me
are necessar y a pri ori r epr esent at i ons. He adopt ed t hi s vi ew somet i me duri ng i 774-75, at l east i f our
dat i ng of his Nachlass can be t rust ed.
~0 Thi s is onl y t he bri efest sket ch of mat eri al di scussed in Ted B. Humphr ey, " Th e Hi st ori cal
and Concept ual Rel at i ons bet ween Kant ' s Met aphysi cs of Space and Ge ome t r y, " Journal o f the
History o f Philosophy 11 (Oct ober, 1973) : 483-512.
200 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
a single problem, requires two co-ordinate part s--a theory of intuition and a
theory of concepts. The essence of these is contained in his view that sensuous
awareness or intuition, which provides the content, and conceptualization,
which supplies the form, are equally necessary for knowledge. Kant expresses
this mutual limitation of reason and sensibility that is missing in both Descartes
and Hume, when he writes, "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions
without concepts are blind" (A 51/B 75). He arrives at this central point of his
epistemology only after formulating the views that space and time are "neces-
sary a priori representation[s], which underlie a l l . . , intuitions" (A 24/B 38; cp.
A 31/B 46). and that "understanding in us men is not itself a faculty of intu-
itions" (B 153). Here we find the doctrines that most basically distinguish the
Kritik from the Dissertation. In the latter, Kant, following the Leibnizian tradi-
tion, allowed for two different sources and orders of knowledge, sensibility and
reason. In the Kritik he argues for a single order of knowledge that involves both
sources essentially. The new doctrine about the role of space and time in human
cognition has dual significance: First it comprises a theory of primary qualities,
relativizing them, in spite of the Cartesian tradition, to the human subject. 11
Still, space and time retain their mathematically analyzable status and thereby
provide a basis for the kind of natural knowledge so important to the rationalists.
This theory allows Kant to avoid the controversy concerning the primacy of the
different kinds of qualities that was the focal point of Hume' s attack on Des-
cartes. No quality appears to men independently of the forms of intuition; conse-
quently, one cannot consistently argue that any of them more truly represent
being than any others.
This doctrine has two important consequences: First, it restricts our aware-
ness to the appearances to us of things-in-themselves. This is not a pernicious
result~ It means only that our perceptions are ordered in accord with conditions
of receptivity whose source is our own cognitive capacities. This is as true of our
introspective awareness of ourselves as of our awareness of independently exist-
ing objects. The conclusion that we apprehend only our empirical selveg our
spatiotemporally ordered bodies conjoined with our temporally ordered mi nds--
not ourselves as they may be in themselves, allows Kant to set aside both
Descartes' s and Hume' s claims about the essential nature of the self, claims
central to their controversy. We shall see that this limitation of self-knowledge is
one of the crucial bases of his effort to place the argument concerning the
relation of reason and will on a new level. Second, Kant uses the doctrine of
space and time to delimit the scope of concepts by reconceiving the nature of
concepts and their function in human knowledge.
Cartesianism' s use of the concept of causality--especially the Leibnizio-
Wolffian School' s use of the principle of sufficient reason--was crucial in stimu-
lating Kant to formulate a new theory of concepts. Kant ' s central contention
regarding that principle, along with every other proposition that is supposed to
express pure conceptual knowledge, is that in order to have a real use, and
iz Kant makes this point in w Note II of the Prolegomena. (See IV, 288-90.)
S CHOP E NHAUE R 201
he nc e t o be meani ngf ul , it mus t r ef er t o what can be i nt ui t ed. Becaus e all
i nt ui t i on is s ens uous , f or a pr opos i t i on t o have r eal meani ng it mus t r ef er t o
s pace or t i me, but pr i mar i l y t he l at t er . 12 Unl i ke Des car t es , who c onc e i ve d of
t hi nki ng as a uni que f or m of appr ehendi ng, Ka nt concei ves it as j udgi ng. Judg-
i ng is t he act of linking r epr es ent at i ons . The basi c ki nds of j udgment s t hat
humans can ma k e - - t h e basi c ki nds of l i nks t hey can est abl i sh among r epr es en-
t a t i ons - - a r e l i mi t ed in number . Ka nt cal l s t hese f or ms of l i nki ng pur e concept s
of under st andi ng.
To have r eal meani ng pur e c onc e pt s must r ef er t o an i nt ui t i ve cont ent , e ve n
if t hi s cont ent in t ur n is al t oget her pur e; ot her wi se, t hey r emai n e mpt y f or ms of
t hought . In t hei r i'eal use, pur e c onc e pt s co- or di nat e i nt ui t i on, t hat is, concept u-
al l y s ynt hes i ze it i nt o ar t i cul abl e par t s on t he basi s of t he t empor al char act er i s-
t i cs it di spl ays. Now j us t as c onc e pt s r equi r e i nt ui t i on f or t hei r real use, i nt ui t i on
needs t hought , f or " Th e I think mus t be able t o a c c ompa ny all my r epr esent a-
t i ons, becaus e ot her wi s e somet hi ng woul d be r epr es ent ed in me t hat coul d not
be t hought " (B 131-32). Toge t he r pur e i nt ui t i on and pur e c onc e pt s compr i s e t he
c ont e xt of possi bl e exper i ence, s pace and t i me pr ovi di ng t he onl y mat r i ces of
r ef er ence t hat we ar e abl e t o appr ehend and t he pur e concept s of under st andi ng
const i t ut i ng t he onl y possi bl e pur e c onc e pt of an obj ect in gener al t hat we can
have: "Object is t hat in whos e c onc e pt t he mani f ol d of a gi ven i nt ui t i on is
unified" (B 137).
The f or egoi ng s ent ence is one of t he mos t abst r use in Ka nt ' s wri t i ngs. I t
ans wer s t he ques t i on he pos ed in t he l et t er t o He r z t hat f or ced hi m t o make t he
cri t i cal t ur n. I n it he i nt ends t o expr es s t he vi ew t hat an object is f or us t he mer e
pr oduc t of our abi l i t y t o concept ual i ze what is gi ven in i nt ui t i on, an abi l i t y
cons t i t ut ed by t he pur e concept s of under st andi ng. We der i ve no sense of what
t he pr es ent at i onal or concept ual form of an obj ect ma y be f r om our encount er s
wi t h i ndependent l y exi st i ng t hi ngs. On t he cont r ar y, t hos e f or ms ar e i nher ent
(vorbereit) in us, and are ne c e s s a r y condi t i ons of our ve r y abi l i t y t o c ompr e he nd
as an obj ect what is gi ven as ma t t e r of sensat i on, t hat is, t o c ompr e he nd t hi s
mat t er as a spat i ot empor al l y and concept ual l y uni fi ed set of qual i t i es. Thus , t he
ve r y c onc e pt of what f or us an obj ect can be is t hor oughl y i deal i zed, dependent
on t he const i t ut i on of man' s abi l i t y t o i nt ui t and t hi nk. I f t hi s be so, r eas on and
bei ng have be e n compl et el y separ at ed. Ka nt has bl azed t he t rai l of fai t h.
In Ka nt ' s s ys t em f ai t h' s pr i mar y f ocus is f r eedom: " S o f ar as its r eal i t y is
pr ove n by an apodi ct i c l aw of pr act i cal r eas on, t he c onc e pt of f r e e dom is t he
~2 The schematization of the pure concepts of the understanding sets out the conditions for the
real meaningfulness of pure concepts. Empirical meaningfulness, of course, derves from a concept's
reference to actual experience. The concept of real meaningfulness is best developed by Lewis White
Beck in "Kant's Theory of Definition," in Studies in the Philosophy of Kant (Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1965), pp. 61-73. I think it important to note that Kant schematizes pure concepts solely in
terms of time, which allows him to give a univocal real sense to them. Schopenhauer argues that the
only pure concepts, for example, a priori ones, are the four forms of the principle of sufficient
reason. Since each of the four forms has the same fundamental conceptual content, they must be
differently schematized in order to distinguish among them. Thus, Schopenhauer schematizes them
in terms of different concatenations of space and time. This is a crucial move on Schopenhauer's
part.
202 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
capstone of the whole structure of pure, even speculative reason" (V, 3). We
first come to the concept of freedom through theoretical reason, which Kant
calls "t he faculty of inferring" (A 330/B 386) from conditioned to condition:
"Reason does not really produce any concepts; at best, it can free a concept of
the understanding from the inevitable limitations of possible experience, and
endeavor to extend it beyond the bounds of, yet in connection with, the empiri-
cal " (A 408/B 435-A 409/B 436). In Kant ' s schema of rational capacities, theo-
retical reason is the ability and drive to apprehend the "unconditioned totality"
of the phenomenal world, which entails transcending possible experience. Rea-
son operates with the empty conceptual form of the pure concepts of under-
standing and, independently of the conditions of possible experience contained
in their schematization, goes beyond experience--which it takes as conditioned,
since all experience is subject to space, time and causality--to conceivable pos-
sible conditions. One of the possible conditions of experience, according to the
Third Antinomy, is freedom. Freedom may be conceived as one source of what
we experience as a sequence of causally related events. It is neither immanent in
experience nor strictly verifiable, but merely inferred as one possible condition
of what we experience. Nonetheless, Kant does argue that we have good rea-
sons for believing that we are actually free.
Kant ' s contention pivots on his assertion that the same object can be viewed
in two ways: first, as object of experience, phenomenon, subject to all the forms
imposed by our cognitive capacities on the matter of sensation, and second, as
thing-in-itself. This pertains particularly to man, who experiences himself as
empirical self but who is also virtually compelled to regard himself as free agent:
Man, who otherwise knows all of nature only through the senses, knows himself also
through mere apperception in acts and inner determinations that cannot be attributed to
the senses. Certainly to himself he is, on the one hand, phenomenon, and, on the other, in
respect of certain faculties, whose acts cannot be ascribed to sensibility's receptivity, a
mere intelligible object. We call these faculties understanding and reason. The latter in
particular we distinguish in a wholly unique and special way from all empirically condi-
honed powers; for it considers its objects merely through ideas and then determines the
understanding accordingly. (A 546/B 574-A 547/B 575)
Theoretical reason leads us to the possibility of freedom through its search for
totality. Its spontaneous acts of synthesis, which we cannot ascribe to receptiv-
ity, are our source of a sense of freedom' s actual existence. Reason provides
even more evidence for this in its practical function.
Breaking with the Aristotelian tradition, Kant characterizes practical reason
as the source of moral imperatives, that is, conceiving and commanding goals,
rather than merely determining means. We regard reason in this role as indicat-
ing free causality, because "t he ought expresses a kind of necessity and connec-
tion with grounds that is not met with anywhere else in the whole of nat ure, "
and because "this ought expresses a possible action the ground of which is
nothing other than a concept" (A 547/B 575). The sense of causality we have in
SCHOPENHAUER 203
these situations differs from natural causality because the evidence we have for
it, our peculiar awareness of it, is not subject to the schema of natural causality:
its basis is wholly conceptual. Nonetheless, we feel that the imperatives we
impose on ourselves command absolutely and that we can conform to them.
Thus, Kant maintains that "t he moral law is the condition under which we can
first become conscious of freedom, " and consequently that while "freedom is
the ratio essendi of the moral law, the moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of
freedom" (V, 4). Ought implies can.
Human will (Willkiir) is arbitrium sensitivum liberum--free will that can be
affected by sensuous motives (A 534/B 562). ~3 Like Descartes, Kant conceives
the will as requiring guidance from reason. Our belief that man has a will,
according to them, means that we understand man to have a capacity for initiat-
ing acts independently of the chain of natural causality. But for Kant, will is not
its own source of motivation. "As at a crossroads, the will (Wille) stands be-
tween its a priori principle and its a posteriori incentive, which is material" (IV
400). Consequently, men are faced with this situation: Will is the foundation of
morality. A will's moral value is a function of the motives of its willing. The only
possible motives by virtue of which will can be regarded as morally good come
from reason in its practical function. Hence, will needs reason, for "reason has
been alloted to us [to serve] as a practical faculty, for example, as one that ought
to influence the will (Willen)" (IV, 396).
Kant' s views on reason and will resemble Descartes' s insofar as both main-
tain that while the will's free indifference, spontaneity, is a necessary condition
for morality, it must submit to reason' s control if its acts are to be morally good.
Their views regarding the respective roles of reason and will in the economy of
the self are similar as well. Just as Descartes grants primacy to the cognitive
subject through the cogito argument, Kant grants it the same pride of place in his
appeal to the transcendental unity of apperception, the "I think, " when he
argues that men have a sense of themselves as existing in two worlds. Thus, acts
of reason--which cannot be attributed to the senses--and most particularly rea-
son' s formulation of the moral imperative, may well be the ratio cognoscendi of
the will. But they are more: They are for Kant the very locus of the self, and the
will assumes a role wholly subsidiary to it. In this, Kant ' s view is no less
rationalistic than Descartes' s.
~3 Two t er ms in Kant ' s l exi con are t r ansl at ed by " wi l l " i n Engl i sh, Willkiir and Wille. The t er ms
are not equi val ent , t he first denot i ng spont anei t y, t he ability t o choose and t her eby initiate cour ses of
act i on, t he second connot i ng l aw giving and pract i cal r eason as such, t hat is, , aut onomy. The
di st i nct i on bet ween t hese t wo concept s of will is not consi st ent l y mai nt ai ned by Kant , partially
because his vocabul ar y evol ves f r om t he Critique of Pure Reason, wher e he t ends t o use Willkiir.
t hr ough t he Critique of Practical Reason. where Wille predomi nat es. In any case, when Kant uses
Wille he t ends pri mari l y t o mean t hat capaci t y we have, for exampl e, pr act i cal r eason, t o di rect t he
choi ce of our act i ons by reason. Thi s is t he view advocat ed by Lewi s Whi t e Beck, A Commentary on
Kant's Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago: The Uni ver si t y of Chi cago Press, 1960), pp. 176-81;
H. J. Pat on, The Categorical Imperative (Chicago: The Uni ver si t y of Chi cago Press, 1948), pp. 207-
16; and Jeffrie G. Murphy, " Mor al Deat h: A Kant i an Essay on Ps ychopat hy, " Ethics 82, no. 4 (Jul y,
1972): 285.
204 HI S T OR Y OF P HI L OS OP HY
Ka n t a v o i d s Hu me ' s c r i t i c i s m o f De s c a r t e s o n l y b y c o mp l e t e l y d i v o r c i n g t he
ordo essendi f r o m t he ordo cognoscendi a n d b y ma k i n g t he e x i s t e n c e o f wi l l a n
h y p o t h e s i s . Ho we v e r , t he s e p a r a t i o n is n o t as c o mp l e t e as Ka n t mi ght wa n t :
Wh e n he a s s e r t s t ha t o n t he bas i s o f t he f el t s p o n t a n e i t y o f r e a s o n me n f eel
t h e ms e l v e s f r e e he r e n d s t h e c o g n i t i v e s c r e e n he ha s s o me t i c u l o u s l y f a s h -
i one d. TM Th e q u e s t i o n s , wh a t is t he s o u r c e o f t he s p o n t a n e i t y a nd wh a t is t he
n a t u r e o f my a wa r e n e s s o f i t , lie i mpl i ci t i n t he i ni t i al a s s e r t i o n . Th r o u g h t he
t ear , s o n e c e s s a r y t o t he a r c h i t e c t o n i c s t r u c t u r e o f t he cr i t i cal s y s t e m, Ka n t ' s
s u c c e s s o r s ma d e t hei r wa y b a c k t o t he t hi ng- i n- i t s el f .
B. Schopenhauer ' s Revol ut i on in t he Revol ut i on. S c h o p e n h a u e r ' s i nt e n-
t i on t o e f f e c t a r e v o l u t i o n i n Ka n t ' s Co p e r n i c a n r e v o l u t i o n is r e v e a l e d mo s t
s ubt l y a n d s u c c i n c t l y i n t hi s r e p h r a s i n g o f t he s t r a t e g y o f Ka n t ' s " n e w me t h o d o f
t h o u g h t " : " We mu s t l e a r n t o u n d e r s t a n d n a t u r e f r o m o u r s e l v e s , n o t o u r s e l v e s
f r o m na t ur e . ' ' 15 Th e d e e p i r o n y i n S c h o p e n h a u e r ' s r e vi s i on o f Ka n t i a n d o c t r i n e
is hi s r e t u r n t o t h e Le i b n i z i o - Wo i f f i a n s c h o o l o f p h i l o s o p h y a n d t o Hu me f o r t he
f o u n d a t i o n s o f hi s t h e o r i e s o f t he pr i nc i pl e o f s uf f i ci ent r e a s o n a n d mo t i v a t i o n ,
r e s p e c t i v e l y .
S c h o p e n h a u e r ' s abi l i t y t o r e vi s e t h o s e d o c t r i n e s wi t h o u t o b v i o u s l y b e g g i n g
a n y i mp o r t a n t q u e s t i o n s a ga i ns t Ka n t is t e s t i mo n y t o hi s i nge nui t y. A s ubs t a nt i a l
p o r t i o n o f Ka n t ' s t h e o r y o f c a u s a l i t y wa s f o r mu l a t e d as d i r e c t c r i t i c i s m o f t he
Le i b n l z i o - Wo l f f i a n d o c t r i n e o f t he pr i nc i pl e o f s uf f i ci ent r e a s o n , a nd hi s e t hi c s is
a r e but t a l o f t h e t h e o r y o f mo t i v a t i o n p r e s e n t i n Hu me ' s d o c t r i n e o f t he mo r a l
s e ns e . S c h o p e n h a u e r wa s abl e t o r e s u s c i t a t e t he s e d o c t r i n e s i n t he f a c e o f
Ka n t ' s c r i t i c i s ms b y ge ne r a l i z i ng a n d i nt e gr a t i ng t h e m i nt o a c o mp l e t e s y s t e m o f
bei ng, k n o wi n g a n d wi l l i ng. Th e v i e ws c e nt r a l t o t hi s s y s t e m ar e (1) t ha t t he
~4 Fichte, who Kant first recognized and later rejected as a true proponent of the critical philoso-
phy, was the first to expose the hole Kant had torn in the screen. He did so in 1797 in the Second
Introduction to his Science of Knowledge. Fichte writes, "The intuiting of himself that is required of
the philosopher in performing the act whereby the I comes to exist I call intellectual intuition. It is
the unmediated consciousness that I act and of what I do: it is that through which I know something
because I do it . . . . Everyone who attributes an activity to himself appeals to thus intuition . . . . The
concept of action, which is possible only through this intuition of the self-active is the only one that
unifies both worlds that there are for us, the sensible and the intelligible." Fichte challenges Kant on
his own grounds, calling the doctrine that all intuition is sensuous into question by appealing to the
very experience that comprises the crucial transition in and professed capstone of the critical system.
One can see that Fichte' s move in these passages revives Hume' s attack on Descartes. But this is
only the first step in an attack that Schopenhauer continues and deepens, as we shall see.
The quotation is from Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Erste und Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaft-
slehre, ed. Fritz Medicus (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1967), pp. 49-50, 53. Translation mine.
,5 Arthur Schopenhauer, Sdmtliche Werke. 2rid ed., ed. Arthur H0bscher, 7 vols. (Wiesbaden:
Eberhard Brockhans Veflag, 1948), III, 219. Volume I contains Ueber die vierfache Wurzel des
Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde, and volume II and III, volumes I and II respectively of Die Welt
als WiUe und VorsteUung. Citations to the Fourfold Root will be to the German edition only, and will
have this form: (I, page) Citations to The World as Will and Representation, trans. E. F. J. Payne, 2
vols. (Indian Hills: The Falcon' s Wing Press, 1958), will have the following form (II, page; I, page).
The first number refers to the German, the second to the English edition. All translations are my
own. In the analysis that follows I have freely mixed passages from the Fourfold Root with passages
from the World, because in their final form, for example, the one in which they appear in Hi~bscher's
edition, they were integrated by Schopenhaner. In their final form, none of Scbopenhauer's works is
actually earlier than another.
SCHOPENHAUER 205
principle of sufficient reason has four forms, each of which charact eri zes a
distinct realm of knowl edge, (2) that sel f-consci ousness reveal s the will-like es-
sence of the sel f and the rest of reality, (3) that knowl edge is the instrument of
will, but (4) that through one sort of experi ence reason t ransforms the sufficient
condition for will' s motivation. Their concat enat i on yields the most compl ex and
interesting t heory of the relation among being, reason and will t hat we shall
examine.
The logical starting point of Schopenhauer ' s thought is " an ant i nomy in our
facul t y of knowl edge" (II, 36; I, 30). It cont rast s idealism and materealism, the
t wo generally accept ed sufficient explanations for knowl edge. Schopenhauer re-
j ect s bot h because t hey pr esuppose that knowl edge depends essentially on onl y
a single factor, either only the subj ect or only the obj ect , and that either only t he
subj ect or only the obj ect has genuine integrity of existence. Li ke Kant , Scho-
penhauer rej ect s met aphysi cal reduct i oni sm because he bel i eves it underlies
bot h idealism and empiricism. Consequent l y, he begins "nei t her from the obj ect
nor the subj ect , but from the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , which contains and pr esupposes
bot h; decomposi t i on into obj ect and subj ect is its first, most universal and essen-
tial f o r m. . , the ot her forms that are subordi nat e to it, space, time and causal-
ity, pertain onl y to the obj ect " (II, 30; I, 25). Because space, time, and causality
are essential forms of obj ect s as such, t hose forms "can be known a pri ori " ( l oc.
c i t . ) . The four forms of the principle of sufficient reason pertain to obj ect s
because obj ect s are ordered in accord with the a priori forms of space, time and
causality, either singly or in combination; hence, the principle of sufficient rea-
son in each of its versions is an a priori form of knowl edge also.
This order of present at i on, by which we arrive at the foundat i on of Schopen-
hauer' s epi st emol ogy and met aphysi cs, the fourfol d root of sufficient reason, is,
in the Kantian sense, analytic. Schol penhauer does not at t empt to reduce experi-
ence t o some single fundamental principle. Instead, he begins with t he experien-
tial situation as given, that is, with represent at i on, and regresses to its constitu-
ents, subj ect a n d obj ect , and the then regresses to the conditions of the experi-
ential situation, the a priori forms of represent t at i on (cf. I, 141-42). Then Scho-
penhauer' s thought follows this course: Experi ence, if we t ake that term in the
Kantian sense (as entailing cognitive significance or rational structure), is so
ordered that within it one can provi de r e a s o n s for what one says one knows (for
exampl e, maintains with any epistemic attitude) or does. Dependi ng on cont ext ,
the reasons one offers and accept s as rel evant differ in kind. Reasons may be
causal, logical, mathematical, or motivational. All are equally reasons, but each
kind provi des a unique t ype of explanation and is wholly sat i sfact ory only in a
single kind of cont ext .
The principle of sufficient reason itself is a generalization from the four
distinct forms of sufficient reason, and assert s that for each thing t here must be a
sufficient reason why it is or is not. When he defends the general validity of t he
principle, Schopenhauer returns in part t o the School Phi l osophy. While he
rej ect s Kant ' s vi ew that the principle has onl y one real use, the causal one, he
also adopt s one essential feature of Kant ' s view: Although it has four forms, t he
206 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
principle can be applied only in terms of specific a priori features of experience.
Its application requires, in Kant ' s terminology, schematization. Disagreeing with
Kant' s view concerning the essential univocality of the principle of sufficient
reason' s real use, Schopenhauer also denies the School Philosophy view that it
can be used independently of the conditions of experience.
(1) The dominant form of the PSR, the causal form, belongs to and defines
understanding. It governs, "intuitive, complete, empirical representations" (I,
28). These are all objects of perception, including the body, and incorporate both
sensuous form, spatiotemporality, and matter, by virtue of which we attribute
causality to such objects, both in their relations to ourselves and among one
another; for "cause and effect i s . . . the entire essence of matter; its being is its
action" (II, I0; I, 8). Causality is schematized as the concatenation of space and
time that constitutes materiality. In this, Schopenhauer' s theory differs com-
pletely from Kant' s. ~6 (2) The second form of the PSR pertains to knowing. It
governs concepts. All concepts are abstractions from perception, and abstrac-
tion entails eliminating reference to specific spatiotemporal features of objects,
that is, eliminating the principium individuationis from perceptual awareness.
This form of the principle, belonging to and defining reason, is twofold. It asserts
that all concepts (a) must have some ultimate relation to perception or (b) if the
relation to perception is indirect, must be related to one another by the laws of
logic. Concepts that fail to meet at least one of these conditions have no real use.
Schopenhauer eliminates the notion of pure concepts of understanding; all con-
cepts are abstractions from experience. The ultimate sufficient reason for the
existence of a concept is its derivation from perception, even if it is logically
deduced from some other concepts. (3) The mathematical form of the PSR, the
PSR of being, belongs to and defines sensibility; it applies to objects only insofar
as they are in either space or time, but not both. It governs the pure forms of
sensibility independently of their relation to understanding, and comprises
mathematics, which for Schopenhauer, as for Kant, derives its significance
solely from its reference to the pure sensuous manifolds of space and time. (4)
Finally, the motivational form of the PSR, the PSR of acting, belongs to and
defines self-consciousness; it governs the willing of each individual. Will constit-
utes the sufficient reason for each person' s acts, and a person' s motives always
provide a completely sufficient reason for his choices. As the originating source
of courses of action, will is free, but choices are not arbitrary. They can always
be adequately explained in terms of specific motivation.
In all its forms the principle of sufficient reason is an epistemological princi-
ple. Schopeahauer' s theory of the PSR is an important revision of Kant ' s episte-
mology. It abides by the spirit of the latter doctrine because Schopenhauer
,6 This particular criticism of Kant's doctrine of schematization, an attack on the view that the
pure concepts are schematizable solely in terms of time, is one of the most fascinating doctrines in
Schopenhauer. Essentially he holds that the concepts of materiality and efficient causality are com-
plementary. This view, as well as Schopenhauer's more general doctrine of schematization, has
much to recommend it. Although further analysis of them is relevant to the issues at hand, space
does not permit it.
SCHOPENHAUER 207
maintains that experi ence pr esupposes the four forms of the PSR and that the
PSR has no use independently of experi ence. However , it t ouches the thing-in-
itself through serf-consciousness, wher eby we are aware of oursel ves not merel y
as obj ect s but as subjects.
Schopenhauer ' s doctrine of sel f-consci ousness, the second fundamental sup-
port of his syst em, is not j ust a revision of Kantian doct ri ne, but a compl et e
br eak with it. Kant argues that because we can be aware of oursel ves only in
time, our self-knowledge is necessari l y subj ect to the conditions of sensibility,
and, consequent l y, we can know oursel ves only empirically. When we intro-
spect , we are aware onl y of serially ordered states of mind. That, at least, is the
canonical dogma. This vi ew is rat her Humean; Kant avoi ds its consequences
onl y by appeal to the doctrine of appercept i on. But the passage about our aware-
ness of the sel f that I quot ed from the Dialectic and di scussed above may be read
as an admission of the defeat and i mpoveri shment of Cart esi ani sm' s fundamental
epistemological and met aphysi cal assumpt i ons, an admission as poignant as the
one cont ai ned in Hume' s Appendix.
Kant asserts that all knowl edge logically pr esupposes "original appercep-
t i on" (B 132), Schopenhauer that "Al l knowl edge necessari l y presupposes sub-
j ect and obj ect " (I, 140). These assumpt i ons simply mark an essential difference
bet ween the two: Kant pr esupposes (1) that science is the pre-eminent form of
cognitive knowl edge, and (2) that t he peculiar kind of cert ai nt y demanded by
sci ence, apodictic certainty, entails the subj ect as its essential condition. Scho-
penhauer ' s basic point of view is less rest ri ct ed and his met hod, t herefore, more
phenomenol ogi cal . He grants equal weight to both subj ect and obj ect , j ust be-
cause t hey are the essential const i t uent s of every knowing situation, no mat t er
what kind of knowl edge is sought in it.
In Section 41 of the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason,
Schopenhauer tackles the probl em of self-knowledge that plagued Kant. He
simply denies the Kantian vi ew t hat the obj ect of sel f-consci ousness, which
Schopenhauer somet i mes calls inner sense, is the subj ect qua knower. Kant ' s
doct ri ne makes the knower qua knower its own obj ect , which Schopenhauer
bel i eves to involve an illicit, because thoroughly redundant , ramification of the
knowi ng situation: " Your knowl edge (Wissen) of your knowl edge (Erkennen) is
distinguished from your knowl edge (Erkennen) only by expressi on. ' I know
(weiss) that I know (erkenne)' expr esses nothing more than ' I know (erkenne)',
and this, lacking further cont ent (Bestimmung), expresses nothing more than
T " (I, 141). The point here is that knowing requires bot h subj ect and obj ect .
The expressi on " I know" al ways t akes a direct obj ect as its grammatical
compl ement , ff one cont ends that t he direct obj ect of t he expressi on " I know"
is t he subj ect of knowl edge itself, t hen one illicitly transforms the intrinsic sub-
j ect into an obj ect . This mi sconst rues the subj ect ' s role in knowing. If the sub-
j ect is knowabl e it must reveal i t sel f as a genuine obj ect , for exampl e, as pos-
sessing a unique character.
The central claim in Schopenhauer ' s thought is that the I reveals itself as
willing subject: "t he known in us as such is not the knowing but the willing
208 HI STORY OF PHI LOSOPHY
subject, t he subject of willing, the will. Beginning from [the standpoint of] know-
ing, one can say that ' I know (erkenne)' is an analytic proposition, as opposed to
' I will' , whi ch is a synt het i c and, i ndeed, a posteriori one, one given through
i nner (that is, in time only) exper i ence" (I, 143). On Schopenhauer ' s account ,
appercept i on, t he " I t hi nk" or " I know, " is analytically cont ai ned in ever y
cognitive situation; so far he agrees with Kant. But unlike t he latter, he does not
concei ve appercept i on to include pure concept s that are conditions of our appre-
hending a sensuous cont ent as an object. The i nference that t he I qua knower is
present in ever y cognitive episode does not provide a concr et e, distinguishing
intuition of t he self, but onl y t he thought that t here is an evanescent , cont ent l ess
one. But because this I of appercept i on is devoid of Kant ' s implicit concept ual
cont ent , accordi ng to Schopenhauer, he can assert that the self is unmedi at el y
apprehended in its acts of willing. This willing provides a distinguishing cont ent ,
object, for apprehensi on, t he subject, and, t herefore, a concr et e sense of t he
self. Kant ' s doct ri ne t hat all intuition is sensuous and t herefore recept i ve is not
the fundament al basis for his assertion that we cannot know t he subject-in-itself.
Rather, t he fundament al basis for this latter doct ri ne is that all our spontaneity
manifests i t sel f as thinking, which only links t oget her what is ot herwi se unrelat-
edly given. The given cannot be the source of its own relationality, because Kant
holds, relations cannot affect sensibility, a doct ri ne t horoughl y in accord with
Leibnizian met aphysi cs and most probably deri ved ~rom it. 17 Schopenhauer
maintains t hat we apprehend the i mmedi at el y given subject in specific, individ-
ual acts of willing, and, because t hey can be given at a moment , t hey are not
organizationally affect ed by temporality. Temporal i t y is a condition of t he sub-
j ect ' s apprehensi on, not of objects' givenness. Acts of willing are compl et el y
given in t he moment of t hei r apprehension. Moment s are t he subtle interstices,
the very limits, of time.IS
Schopenhauer meet s Kant on his own ground, granting t he recept i vi t y of all
human intuition---thus evading t he disaster of the Cartesian rationalists' and
German idealists' doct ri nes of intellectual intuition. However , he concret el y
apprehends t he subject as wilier, as agent, rat her t han knower. While he con-
ceives of t hought as involving perception essentially, he does not regard thought
as the pri mary original and irreducible propert y of t he subject. Nonet hel ess, he
admits t hat " t he identity of t he willing with the knowing subject, by virtue of
which (and i ndeed necessari l y so) t he word ' I' includes t he designates both, is
the [Gordian] knot of t he world and, t herefore, inexplicable" (I, 143).
Schopenhaner agrees with Kant that while we know everyt hi ng else only in a
t~ See " Th e Hi st ori cal and Concept ual Rel at i ons, " p. 498.
as I cannot her e exami ne i n det ai l Schopenhauer ' s doct ri ne of our knowl edge of t he thing-in-it-
self, whi ch is consi der abl y mor e subt l e t han it appear s on t he surface. Essent i al l y he cl ai ms t hat
what we know as will is onl y t he most proxi mat e aspect of t he t hi ng-i n-i t sel f and t hat what we know
t hr ough i nt r ospect i on is t he t hi ng-i n-i t sel f as i t is-in-itself. But he draws back f r om a st rai ght forward
identification of will wi t h thing-in-itself, pri mari l y because t he connot at i ons of " wi l l " may mi sl ead
us. Fur t her , he mai nt ai ns t hat our knowl edge of t he t hi ng-i n-i t sel f is i nadequat e i n our appr ehensi on
of act s of will because t hese act s ar e moment ar y mani fest at i ons of a char act er , t hat is, a hol i st i c
pri nci pl e of willing. Nonet hel ess, i nadequat e t hough it be, i t is appr ehensi on of t he thing-in-itself.
SCHOPENHAUER 209
single way, as sensible obj ect in the spatio-temporal world, we know oursel ves
under t wo guises. But Schopenhauer alters the t erms involved in self-knowledge.
Kant maintained t hat we know oursel ves also as intelligible beings, as thinkers
who give oursel ves commands, from which we infer our ability to will in accord-
ance with them. Schopenhauer argues that we sensuousl y intuit oursel ves as
wilting subjects. Because this is an unmediated, though recept i ve intuition, it
provi des direct awareness of the thing-in-itself. Our recept i vi t y to the will' s
affection of inner sense, which yields sel f-consci ousness, guarant ees its truth
through correspondence. Schopenhauer has reest abl i shed a direct link bet ween
reason and being in the face of Kant ' s criticism. This is a genuine revolution in
the revolution.
The revol ut i on is sust ai ned by Schopenhauer' s t heory of the relation of will
and reason. Our experiental relation to oursel ves and the rest of exi st ence is
threefold, through percept i on, unmedi at ed affections and reason. When we relate
percept ual l y to what there is, we do so as individual to individual, intrinsically
distinct from all else. This is an attitude of const ant struggle and strife, of the
eternal at t empt to satisfy personal needs and desires at t he expense of ot her
individuals. As individuals we al so relate to the world through unmedi at ed affec-
tions: "One is altogether i ncorrect when one calls pain and pleasure represent a-
tions; t hey are by no means t hat , but rat her unrnediated affections of the appear-
a nt e of the will, the body. They are compul si ve, i nst ant aneous willings or not-
willings of the impression that it suffers" (II, 120; I, 101). Unmedi at ed affections
are consequences of struggle and strife that are direct signs of one' s success or
failure. Because t hese affections involve the body, t hey pertain to the individual
as such. They cannot by t hemsel ves be a source of reform in our percept ual l y
individuated point of view. But t hey are not strictly spat i ot emporal either. They
do not represent obj ect s, but the relationship bet ween sel f and other. We appre-
hend t hem in the same interstices of time in which we apprehend our acts of
willing. The knowl edge t hey provi de concerns the subj ect mor e as will t han as
body and is more true than mer e percept ual awareness. This t heor y of the tertiary
qualities strongly resembl es Hume' s. For bot h Hume and Schopenhauer, the
tertiary qualities put us as knower s into direct cont act with oursel ves as willers.
Just as the subj ect qua knower unmedi at edl y apprehends the subj ect qua
wilier, the subj ect qua bodi l y percei ver apprehends itself as will in the unmedi-
at ed affections of pain and pl easure, unl i ke Descar t es' s pure knowing subject,
which is only extrinsically rel at ed to the body and which occupi es it as a mere
pilot in a vessel , Schopenhauer ' s willing subj ect is not a mere occupant of the
body, but , in its manifestation of itself as body, is actually in the world. " As the
body' s inherent being-in-itself, as that which this body i s . . . the will first makes
itself known in this body' s act ual movement s, insofar as t hese are nothing ot her
than the visibility of the individual acts of the will" (II, 126; I, 106). This
realization, that the subj ect as will is not a mere day-t ravel er in the world but is
inextricably in the world, is the source of still another, more fundamental in-
sight, one that can lead to an entirely new vi ew of the relationship bet ween the
person and the rest of exi st ence: What persons see as individual and essentially
210 HI STORY OF PHI LOSOPHY
di f f er ent in all t he act i ons of ani mat e nat ure and t he forces of i nani mat e nat ur e,
t he y are abl e upon refl ect i on t o
recognize as the same, as what is known unmediatedly--so intimately and better than all
else--and as what, where it manifests itself most clearly, is called will. Only this use of
reflection allows us to transcend appearance and transports us to the thing-in-itself . . . . It
is the innermost being, the kernel, of every individual and of the whole; it appears in
every blindly working natural force; it also appears in the reflective acts of man. (II, 131;
I, 110)
Thi s is a r emar kabl e passage. Whi l e Schopenhauer has car ef ul l y laid t he
gr ound for it, it is not so much t he concl usi on of an ar gument as a real i zat i on, an
act of fai t h, and t he expr essi on of a gest al t of our sel ves and of t he worl d. As
rat i onal i st s s omet i mes argue t hat we infer t he i nt el l i gence of ot her s f r om t hei r
behavi or , Schopenhauer ar gues t hat we can i nfer t he pr esence of will in all ot her
exi st ent s f r om t hei r act i on and f r om our sense of t he i mmedi at e rel at i on bet ween
will and our own act i ons, bodi l y and ot her wi se.
The nat ur e of t he real i zat i on is i mpor t ant t oo. It comes t hr ough refl ect i on,
t hat is, r eason, t he sour ce of concept ual appr ehensi on. Cons equent l y, t he real-
i zat i on is not l i mi t ed by t he principium individuationis. Because of it, we come
t o r egar d our sel ves as essent i al l y like all ot her bei ngs, even if, as member s of t he
per cept ual ( phenomenal ) r eal m we are opposed t o t hem. It can be t he source of
moral t r ans f or mat i on because r eason can pr ovi de t he mot i ve t o qui et t he self-
wi l l edness t hat gover ns our lives in t he per cept ual ( phenomenal ) real m.
Gi ven Schopenhauer ' s vi ew, we exi st in t wo f or mal l y di f f er ent but essen-
t i al l y i dent i cal r eal ms, bet ween whi ch the rel at i on of knowi ng t o willing di ffers in
mor al l y i mpor t ant ways. In t he real m of per cept ual ( phenomenal ) i ndi vi duat i on,
" t h e will of t he i ndi vi dual act i vat es t he machi ner y [of t he associ at i on of ideas]
by i mpel l i ng t he i nt el l ect , in accor dance wi t h t he i nt erst s, t hat is, t he i ndi vi dual
goal s of t he per son, t o bring fort h t hose r epr esent at i ons t hat are l ogi cal l y, or
anal ogi cal l y, or spat i al l y or t empor al l y rel at ed t o pr esent o n e s " (I, 146). These
associ at i ons, no less t han our bodi l y act s, have t hei r suffi ci ent r eason in t he
wi l l ' s mot i ves, for " a c t s of will al ways have a gr ound out si de t hemsel ves, in
mot i ve s " (II, 121; I, 106). In t he r eal m of the principium individuationis our act s
can be mot i vat ed onl y by t he wi l l ' s at t achment t o our i ndi vi dual i t y, t hat is, by
sel f-i nt erest . Thus , our mot i ve s - - our negat i ng t he pr esent by proj ect i ng it i nt o
t he fut ure as changed so as t o meet our needs and desi res mor e agr eebl y- -
necessar i l y bi nd us t o t he phenomenal worl d. The will uses knowl edge in t hi s
real m t o seek its i ndi vi duat ed goals, goals.
When we real i ze t hr ough r eason t hat we are essent i al l y i dent i cal wi t h t he
rest of exi st ence, we can transform wi l l ' s mot i vat i on. Thus, whi l e r eason ser ves
will, r eason can be t he source of confl i ct wi t hi n t he will. No l onger can t he
per sonal phenomenal l y opposed will regard i t sel f as in essent i al confl i ct wi t h
ot her phenomenal beings. Phenomenal mot i ves cannot be its own. In one' s
appr ehensi on of sufferi ng, pai n, t hat unmedi at ed affect i on of t he will, one rat i on-
SCHOPENHAUER 211
ally comprehends bot h the sel f and others, since bot h are mere phenomenal
manifestations of t he same will. Thus, one has by r eason' s grace, a mot i ve to
quiet the phenomenal l y individuated and mot i vat ed will. "Onl y insofar as suffer-
ing assumes the form of mere pure knowl edge, and this knowl edge, as quieter of
the will, brings forth true resignation, is it the pat h t o del i verance [from individ-
ual self-willedness] and thus wor t hy of r ever ence" (II, 469; I, 397).
Schopenhauer' s vi ew is compl ex and subtle. Knowl edge serves the will' s
ends; it is mot i vat ed by will. But through reason, that ability to see the general-
ity, the essence, of what t here is, knowl edge provi des will with the mot i ve of
morality, the mot i ve to extinguish suffering. Of the four whom we have exam-
.ined, Schopenhauer const ruct s the best-integrated t heory of the relationship of
being, knowing and willing. Each aspect of his t heory cont ri but es to an integral
whole. Although will is met aphysi cal l y prime, it does not assume absol ut e pre-
eminence over reason. For while will mot i vat es knowl edge, reason provi des t he
mot i ve for wi l l ' s moral destiny, and will in turn is the ability to seek that destiny.
In concluding I want to ret urn to the quot at i on from Schopenhauer with
which I began sect i on II. B: " We must learn to underst and nature from our-
selves, not oursel ves from nat ur e. " This sublimely subtle st at ement is a fitting
end to the dialectics of being, knowi ng and willing in the Cartesian tradition, of
which I think Schopenhauer was the last who pl aced met aphysi cs at the cent er
of his philosophy. As we have seen, the st at ement implicitly contains Schopen-
hauer' s intention t o side with Hume against Descart es on the crucial issue of
reason and will in the economy of human nature. Int rospect i on reveal s us t o
oursel ves as willers. On the ot her hand, Schopenhauer' s commi t ment to the
pri macy of will is met aphysi cal and in that sense his vi ew is more like Des-
car t es' s than Hume' s. Further, his cont ent i on that we know the thing-in-itself as
it is in itself when we apprehend the will is a return to a form of the dogmat i sm
that Kant found in his predecessors. Kant believed it necessary to rej ect dogma-
tism in order to found certainty within reason, t hereby toto caelo separating the
latter from being, a move his pr edecessor s either could, or did not cont empl at e.
Using what of val ue he found in Hume, Schopenhauer re-unites the t wo orders
in the face of t he Kant i an criticism.
Schopenhauer performs one further act of synthesis. Perhaps the most strik-
ing feature of Schopenhauer ' s syst em is the resolution bet ween reason and being
that he effects by means of the will. In Kant ' s and Descart es' theories, the will
must be kept under the strict rule of reason. For t hem, t he will has no intrinsic
relation to being and must be t reat ed as a compul si vel y errant child. Thus, by
the time we get to Kant , the t hree orders are almost totally discrete and relations
among t hem are extrinsic and forced. This gives Kant ' s ethical t heory the ap-
pearance of excessi ve rationalistic formalism. Schopenhauer surmount s this
negative feat ure of Kant ' s thought while retaining at least one of its fundament al
insights. When " we underst and nature from our sel ves, " we will actions that
alleviate universal suffering. A rational comprehensi on of nature t ransforms us.
Through it we have a Humean sympat hy with nature as a whole, including man,
212 HI STORY OF PHI LOSOPHY
and this mot i vat es our actions. Thus, Schopenhauer de-ant hropomorphi zes
Hume ' s moral sense t heory, and recogni zes, like Kant , that reason does have a
role in morality, t hough not that of constraining will, and t hat the morality of an
act i on rest s on universality. An act for Schopenhauer is moral j ust to the ext ent
t hat it at t empt s t o over come what illy affect s all that there is. This is a genuine
synt hesi s of Hume' s and Kant ' s fundament al moral insights. In it we find a unity
of being, reason, and will.
Arizona State University