G.R. No.

78517 February 27, 1989

GABINO ALITA, JESUS JULIAN, JR., JESUS JULIAN,
SR., PEDRO RICALDE, VICENTE RICALDE and
ROLANDO SALAMAR, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ENRIQUE M.
REYES, PAZ M. REYES and FE M. REYES, respondents
The Reyeses acquired two parcels of land in Zamboanga
del Sur through their predecessors-in-interest who were
originally granted homestead patents. They desired to
cultivate these lands personally, but Alita et.al. refused to
vacate, relying on the provisions of the agrarian reform law
back then, PD 27. Thus, the Reyeses filed a complaint
against the Minister of Agrarian Reform, the MAR Regional
Director, and Alita et. al. for the declaration of PD 27 and
appurtenant regulations as inapplicable to homestead
lands.
The CA declared that PD 27 is inapplicable to homestead;
that the Reyeses will cultivate their farmholding as owners
thereof; and ejectment of the so-called tenants Alita et. al.
ISSUE: Should agrarian reform under PD 27 be applicable
to homestead lands?
HELD: No. The contention that PD 27 decreeing the
emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and
transferring to them ownership of the land they till is a
sweeping social legislation CANNOT BE INVOKED to
defeat the very purpose of the Public Land Act (CA 141).
The Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and
protection of the poor. The law gives a needy citizen a
piece of land where he may build a modest house for
himself and family and plant what is necessary for
subsistence and for the satisfaction of life's other needs.
The right of the citizens to their homes and to the things
necessary for their subsistence is as vital as the right to life
itself. They have a right to live with a certain degree of
comfort as become human beings, and the State which
looks after the welfare of the people's happiness is under a
duty to safeguard the satisfaction of this vital right.
Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian
reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance
with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural
resources, including lands of public domain under lease or
concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights,
homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of
indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.
Nota Bene, Sec. 6 of CARL provides that original
homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who
still own the original homestead at the time of the approval
of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they
continue to cultivate said homestead.
[G.R. No. 103302. August 12, 1993.]
NATALIA REALTY, INC., and ESTATE DEVELOPERS
AND INVESTORS
CORP., petitioners,vs. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, SEC. BENJAMIN T. LEONG and DIR.
WILFREDO LEANO, DAR-REGION IV, respondents.
NATALIA owns three contiguous parcels of land in
Antipolo totaling 125 hectares. In 1979, PD 1637 set
aside lands in Antipolo, San Mateo and Montalban as
townsite areas to absorb the population overspill, known
as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite, and this included the
NATALIA properties, which eventually became Antipolo
Hills Subdivision.
In 1990, the DAR issued a Notice of Coverage on the
undeveloped portions of Antipolo Hills, which NATALIA
immediately objected to. In 1991, the Sammahan ng
Magsasaka sa Bundok (SAMBA) filed a complaint against
NATALIA and its developer EDIC before the DAR to
restrain them from developing the areas that the farmers
are cultivating.
It is later proved that NATALIA and EDIC did in fact
comply with the law on conversion of lands (Subdivision
and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree, PD 957).
ISSUE: Are lands already classified for residential,
commercial or industrial use, as approved by the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board and its precursor
agencies prior to 15 June 1988, covered by R.A. 6657,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988?
HELD: Yes. The NATALIA properties were already set
aside for the Lungsod Silangan Reservation pursuant to
PD 1637 for the purpose of providing additional housing
to the burgeoning population of Metro Manila. Thus, the
lands were validly converted to residential use.
Moreover, PD 1637 is a special law which must prevail
over a general law, PD 957.
The lands are also not subject to CARL, as agricultural
land means land devoted to agricultural activity as
defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land.
Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are
outside the coverage of CARL. These include lands
previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the
effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than
respondent DAR.
Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15 June
1988, respondent DAR is bound by such conversion. It was
therefore error to include the undeveloped portions of the
Antipolo Hills Subdivision within the coverage of CARL. The
Secretary of Justice, responding to a query by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, noted in an Opinion
19
that
lands covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 1637, inter
alia, of which the NATALIA lands are part, having been
reserved for townsite purposes "to be developed as human
settlements by the proper land and housing agency," are
"not deemed 'agricultural lands' within the meaning and
intent of Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 6657." Not being deemed
"agricultural lands," they are outside the coverage of CARL.
Anent the argument that there was failure to exhaust
administrative remedies in the instant petition, suffice it to
say that the issues raised in the case filed by SAMBA
members differ from those of petitioners. The former involve
possession; the latter, the propriety of including under the
operation of CARL lands already converted for residential
use prior to its effectivity.
DAR represented by Secretary Jose Mari Ponce vs.
Delia Sutton, et. al.
G.R. No. 162070 October 19, 2005
Sutton and her siblings inherited a parcel of land in
Masbate devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding.
Pursuant to the agrarian reform program at the time, they
made a voluntary offer to sell their holding to DAR to avail
of the incentives in 1987.
In 1988, a new law, CARL, took effect, which included
farms used for raising livestock under its coverage. In light
of the Luz Farms ruling, the Suttons filed a formal request
to withdraw their VOS as their land was outside the
coverage of CARL. The DAR ignored their request.
In 1993 the DAR issued AO 9-1993, which provides that
only lands used for raising livestock, poultry and swine are
outside the coverage of CARL. And in 1995, the DAR
ordered a part of the Suttons landholdings to be
segregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition.
ISSUE: Constitutionality of the assailed AO
HELD: Unconstitutional.
Administrative agencies are endowed with powers
legislative in nature, i.e.,the power to make rules and
regulations. They have been granted by Congress with the
authority to issue rules to regulate the implementation of a
law entrusted to them. Delegated rule-making has become
a practical necessity in modern governance due to the
increasing complexity and variety of public functions.
However, while administrative rules and regulations have
the force and effect of law, they are not immune from
judicial review They may be properly challenged before the
courts to ensure that they do not violate the Constitution
and no grave abuse of administrative discretion is
committed by the administrative body concerned.
To be valid, administrative rules and regulations must
be issued by authority of a law andmust not contravene
the provisions of the Constitution. Nor can it be used to
enlarge the power of the administrative agency beyond
the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory
provisions control with respect to what rules and
regulations may be promulgated by administrative
agencies and the scope of their regulations.
The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from
crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural,
activity. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise
is in the form of industrial fixed assets.
Lands devoted to raising of livestock, poultry and swine
have been classified as industrial, not agricultural, lands
and thus exempt from agrarian reform. Petitioner DAR
argues that, in issuing the impugned A.O., it was seeking to
address the reports it has received that some unscrupulous
landowners have been converting their agricultural lands to
livestock farms to avoid their coverage by the agrarian
reform. Again, we find neither merit nor logic in this
contention. The undesirable scenario which petitioner
seeks to prevent with the issuance of the A.O. clearly
does not apply in this case. Respondents family
acquired their landholdings as early as 1948. They have
long been in the business of breeding cattle in Masbate
which is popularly known as the cattle-breeding capital of
the Philippines. Petitioner DAR does not dispute this fact.
Indeed, there is no evidence on record that respondents
have just recently engaged in or converted to the business
of breeding cattle after the enactment of the CARL that may
lead one to suspect that respondents intended to evade its
coverage. It must be stressed that what the CARL prohibits
is the conversion of agricultural lands for non-
agricultural purposes after the effectivity of the
CARL. There has been no change of business interest
in the case of respondents.
Milestone Farms Inc. vs. Office of the President
G.R. No. 182332 February 23, 2011
Milestone Farms Inc. is engaged with the raising of cattle,
pigs and other livestock and is a corporation organized and
registered with the SEC as such in 1960. It owns 316 Ha
land in Baras, Rizal which it uses for livestock raising.
Pursuant to Luz Farms, it applied for the exclusion from
coverage from CARL.
The Southern Pinugay Farmers Multipurpose Cooperative
however contests such exclusion. They were sued with
Forcible Entry which the MCTC granted but the RTC
reversed. CA upheld MCTC, which became final and
executory.
Meanwhile, DAR Secretary Garilao issued an order
exempting only 240 Ha of the land from CARP. The
remaining 72 Ha are not. Applying the animal-land ratio (1
hectare for grazing for every head of cattle/carabao/horse)
and the infrastructure-animal ratio (1.7815 hectares for 21
heads of cattle/carabao/horse, and 0.5126 hectare for 21
heads of hogs) under DAR A.O. No. 9, Secretary Garilao
exempted 240.9776 hectares.
The OP held that, when it comes to proof of ownership, the
reference is the Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle.
Certificates of cattle ownership, which are readily available
being issued by the appropriate government office
ought to match the number of heads of cattle counted as
existing during the actual headcount. The presence of
large cattle on the land, without sufficient proof of
ownership thereof, only proves such presence.
Taking note of Secretary Garilaos observations, the OP
also held that, before an ocular investigation is conducted
on the property, the landowners are notified in advance;
hence, mere reliance on the physical headcount is
dangerous because there is a possibility that the
landowners would increase the number of their cattle for
headcount purposes only. The OP observed that there was
a big variance between the actual headcount of 448 heads
of cattle and only 86 certificates of ownership of large cattle.
Consequently, petitioner sought recourse from the CA.
However, the CA found out that part of the land was
converted to non-agricultural uses (golf course and
residential) and the subject of the controversy is only 162
Ha. The farmers groups prayed that the remaining area be
brought under the CARP.
Relying on the Sutton decision, Milestone prayed that it be
exempted from coverage.
HELD: Petition denied. Reliance on Sutton ruling is
unavailing.
Milestones bad faith is apparent in its surreptitious
conversion of part of its land, now known as Palo Alto.
Moreover, only 153 Ha was converted, and not the entire
property. 43 cows were also found grazing outside the
property.
It is the DAR Secretary who is vested with such jurisdiction
and authority to exempt and/or exclude a property from
CARP coverage based on the factual circumstances of
each case and in accordance with law and applicable
jurisprudence. In addition, albeit parenthetically, Secretary
Villa had already granted the conversion into residential and
golf courses use of nearly one-half of the entire area
originally claimed as exempt from CARP coverage because
it was allegedly devoted to livestock production.
Central Mindanao State University vs. DARAB, et. al.
G.R. No. 100091 October 22, 1992
Bukidnon Free Farmers Agricultural Laborers Organization
led by Obrique and Hermoso claim that they are landless
peasants.
CMU is an agricultural university that tries to answer the
need to develop the agricultural potential of Mindanao. It
was granted 3,080 Ha. It had a program, Kilusang Sariling
SIkap Program, where part of its property was leased to its
teachers and employees for cultivation. This program was
conceived as a multidisciplinary applied research extension
and productivity program to utilize the land, train people in
modern agricultural technology, and give the faculty and
staff opportunities to augment their salaries. Among the
participants are the BUFFALO members.
Under the terms of a 3-party Memorandum of
Agreement
2
among the CMU, the CMU-Integrated
Development Foundation (CMU-IDF) and groups or
"seldas" of 5 CMU employees, the CMU would provide the
use of 4 to 5 hectares of land to a selda for one (1) calendar
year. The CMU-IDF would provide researchers and
specialists to assist in the preparation of project proposals
and to monitor and analyze project implementation. The
selda in turn would pay to the CMU P100 as service fee
and P1,000 per hectare as participant's land rental fee. In
addition, 400 kilograms of the produce per year would be
turned over or donated to the CMU-IDF. The participants
agreed not to allow their hired laborers or member of their
family to establish any house or live within vicinity of the
project area and not to use the allocated lot as collateral for
a loan. It was expressly provided that no tenant-landlord
relationship would exist as a result of the Agreement.
The non-renewal of the contracts, the discontinuance of the
rice, corn and sugar cane project, the loss of jobs due to
termination or separation from the service and the alleged
harassment by school authorities, all contributed to, and
precipitated the filing of the complaint.
On the basis of the above facts, the DARAB found that the
private respondents were not tenants and cannot therefore
be beneficiaries under the CARP. At the same time, the
DARAB ordered the segregation of 400 hectares of
suitable, compact and contiguous portions of the CMU land
and their inclusion in the CARP for distribution to qualified
beneficiaries.
HELD: DARAB correct.
The evidence on record establish without doubt that the
complainants were originally authorized or given permission
to occupy certain areas of the CMU property for a definite
purpose to carry out certain university projects as part of
the CMU's program of activities pursuant to its avowed
purpose of giving training and instruction in agricultural and
other related technologies, using the land and other
resources of the institution as a laboratory for these
projects. Their entry into the land of the CMU was with the
permission and written consent of the owner, the CMU, for
a limited period and for a specific purpose. After the
expiration of their privilege to occupy and cultivate the land
of the CMU, their continued stay was unauthorized and
their settlement on the CMU's land was without legal
authority. A person entering upon lands of another, not
claiming in good faith the right to do so by virtue of any title
of his own, or by virtue of some agreement with the owner
or with one whom he believes holds title to the land, is a
squatter. Squatters cannot enter the land of another
surreptitiously or by stealth, and under the umbrella of the
CARP, claim rights to said property as landless peasants.
Under Section 73 of R.A. 6657, persons guilty of committing
prohibited acts of forcible entry or illegal detainer do not
qualify as beneficiaries and may not avail themselves of the
rights and benefits of agrarian reform. Any such person who
knowingly and wilfully violates the above provision of the
Act shall be punished with imprisonment or fine at the
discretion of the Court.
the jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited only to matters
involving the implementation of the CARP. More
specifically, it is restricted to agrarian cases and
controversies involving lands falling within the coverage of
the aforementioned program. It does not include those
which are actually, directly and exclusively used and found
to be necessary for, among such purposes, school sites
and campuses for setting up experimental farm stations,
research and pilot production centers, etc.
Consequently, the DARAB has no power to try, hear and
adjudicate the case pending before it involving a portion of
the CMU's titled school site, as the portion of the CMU land
reservation ordered segregated is actually, directly and
exclusively used and found by the school to be necessary
for its purposes. The CMU has constantly raised the issue
of the DARAB's lack of jurisdiction and has questioned the
respondent's authority to hear, try and adjudicate the case
at bar. Despite the law and the evidence on record tending
to establish that the fact that the DARAB had no jurisdiction,
it made the adjudication now subject of review.
The education of the youth and agrarian reform are
admittedly among the highest priorities in the government
socio-economic programs. In this case, neither need give
way to the other. Certainly, there must still be vast tracts of
agricultural land in Mindanao outside the CMU land
reservation which can be made available to landless
peasants, assuming the claimants here, or some of them,
can qualify as CARP beneficiaries. To our mind, the taking
of the CMU land which had been segregated for
educational purposes for distribution to yet uncertain
beneficiaries is a gross misinterpretation of the authority
and jurisdiction granted by law to the DARAB.
[G.R. No. 158228. March 23, 2004]
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, as
represented by its Secretary, ROBERTO M.
PAGDANGANAN, petitioner, vs. DEPARTMENT
OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS
(DECS), respondent.
The lands in question are located at Hacienda Fe in Negros
Occidental donated by the late Esteban Jalandoni to the
DECS, and have an aggregate size of 189 Ha.
The DECS leased the lands to Anglo Agricultural
Corporation for 10 agricultural crop years (from 1984-85 to
2004-05).
From the time of the donation to the time of the lease, the
lands were agricultural devoted to the planting of
sugarcane.
In 1993 however, Alpar and several others claiming to be
regular farmworkers of the lands filed a petition for
compulsory agrarian reform coverage with the MARO. The
MARO found after investigatin that the lands should be
covered by CARP, so it invited representatives of DECS
and the farmers for a conference.
DECS appealed to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, which
affirmed the MARO and the DAR Regional Director.
DECS sought exemption from CARL on the ground that the
income derived from the lease with Anglo Agricultural were
actually, directly and exclusively used for educational
purposes, e.g., repairs of schools in their locality.
DAR said that the lands are not exempt as they are not
actually, directly and exclusively used as school sites or
campuses, and they are in fact leased to Anglo. To be
exempt from the coverage, DAR insists, the land per se
must be used and not the income derived therefrom.
HELD: Court rules for DAR.
c) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and
found to be necessary for national defense,school sites and
campuses, including experimental farm stations operated
by public or private schools for educational purposes, ,
shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act.
Clearly, a reading of the paragraph shows that, in order to
be exempt from the coverage: 1) the land must be actually,
directly, and exclusively used and found to be
necessary; and 2) the purpose is for school sites and
campuses, including experimental farm stations operated
by public or private schools for educational purposes.
The importance of the phrase actually, directly, and
exclusively used and found to be necessary cannot be
understated, as what respondent DECS would want us to
do by not taking the words in their literal and technical
definitions. The words of the law are clear and
unambiguous. Thus, the plain meaning rule or verba
legis in statutory construction is applicable in this
case. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation.
[14]

We are not unaware of our ruling in the case of Central
Mindanao University v. Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board,
[15]
wherein we declared the land subject
thereof exempt from CARP coverage. DECS reliance
thereon is misplaced because the factual
circumstances are different in the case at bar.
Firstly, in the CMU case, the land involved was not
alienable and disposable land of the public domain because
it was reserved by the late President Carlos P. Garcia
under Proclamation No. 476 for the use
of Mindanao Agricultural College (now CMU). In this
case, however, the lands fall under the category of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
suitable for agriculture.
Secondly, in the CMU case, the land was actually,
directly and exclusively used and found to be
necessary for school sites and campuses. Although a
portion of it was being used by the Philippine Packing
Corporation (now Del Monte Phils., Inc.) under a
Management and Development Agreement, the
undertaking was that the land shall be used by the
Philippine Packing Corporation as part of the CMU research
program, with direct participation of faculty and
students. Moreover, the land was part of the land utilization
program developed by the CMU for its Kilusang Sariling
Sikap Project (CMU-KSSP), a multi-disciplinary applied
research extension and productivity program.

Hence, the
retention of the land was found to be necessary for the
present and future educational needs of the CMU. On the
other hand, the lands in this case were not
actually and exclusively utilized as school sites and
campuses, as they were leased to Anglo Agricultural
Corporation, not for educational purposes but for the
furtherance of its business. Also, as conceded by
respondent DECS, it was the income from the contract
of lease and not the subject lands that was directly
used for the repairs and renovations of the schools in
the locality.
Anent the issue of whether the farmers are qualified
beneficiaries of CARP, we disagree with the Court of
Appeals finding that they were not.
The BARC certified that herein farmers were potential
CARP beneficiaries of the subject properties.

Further,
on November 23, 1994, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
through the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO)
issued a Notice of Coverage placing the subject properties
under CARP. Since the identification and selection of
CARP beneficiaries are matters involving strictly the
administrative implementation of the CARP,
[19]
it behooves
the courts to exercise great caution in substituting its own
determination of the issue, unless there is grave abuse of
discretion committed by the administrative agency. In this
case, there was none.
Province of Camarines Sur represented by Gov.
Villlafuerte and Judge Panga of RTC vs. CA, San Juan
and San Joaquin
G.R. No. 103125. May 17, 1993.
On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
the Province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129,
Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to
purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the
provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for
non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a
housing project for provincial government employees.
Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur,
through its Governor, Hon. Luis R. Villafuerte, filed two
separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San
Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin before the RTC presided
by Judge Panga.
The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the
ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their
property. he trial court denied the motion to dismiss and
authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take
possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk
of Court of the amount of P5,714.00, the amount
provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages
that private respondents may suffer in the event that the
expropriation cases do not prosper. The trial court issued a
writ of possession in an order dated January 18, 1990.
Province of Camarines Sur claimed that it has the authority
to initiate the expropriation proceedings under Sections 4
and 7 of Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and that
the expropriations are for a public purpose.
Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the
petition, the Solicitor General stated that under Section 9 of
the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no
need for the approval by the Office of the President of the
exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of
eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed
the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first
secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform
of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as
a housing project.
The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court,
allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession
of private respondents' lands and the order denying the
admission of the amended motion to dismiss. It also
ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation
proceedings until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall
have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of
Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the property
of the private respondents from agricultural to non-
agricultural land.
Hence this petition.
It must be noted that in the Court of Appeals, the San
Joaquins asked for: (i) the dismissal of the complaints for
expropriation on the ground of the inadequacy of the
compensation offered for the property and (ii) the
nullification of Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988 of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines
Sur.
The Court of Appeals did not rule on the validity of the
questioned resolution; neither did it dismiss the complaints.
However, when the Court of Appeals ordered the
suspension of the proceedings until the Province of
Camarines Sur shall have obtained the authority of the
Department of Agrarian Reform to change the
classification of the lands sought to be expropriated
from agricultural to non-agricultural use, it assumed
that the resolution is valid and that the expropriation is
for a public purpose or public use.
Modernly, there has been a shift from the literal to a
broader interpretation of "public purpose" or "public use" for
which the power of eminent domain may be exercised. The
old concept was that the condemned property must actually
be used by the general public (e.g. roads, bridges, public
plazas, etc.) before the taking thereof could satisfy the
constitutional requirement of "public use". Under the new
concept, "public use" means public advantage,
convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to
the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole
community, like a resort complex for tourists or
housing project (Heirs of Juancho Ardano v. Reyes, 125
SCRA 220 [1983]; Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461
[1987]).
The expropriation of the property authorized by
the questioned resolution is for a public purpose. The
establishment of a pilot development center would
inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people
of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational, the
center would make available to the community invaluable
information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the
cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers,
fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing
project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of the
Constitution. As held in Sumulong v.Guerrero, 154 SCRA
461, "Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing
is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly
affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum
the general welfare."
It is the submission of the Province of Camarines
Sur that its exercise of the power of eminent domain
cannot be restricted by the provisions of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657),
particularly Section 65 thereof, which requires the
approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform before
a parcel of land can be reclassified from an agricultural
to a non-agricultural land.
The Court of Appeals, following the recommendation
of the Solicitor General, held that the Province of
Camarines Sur must comply with the provision of Section
65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and must
first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian
Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of the San
Joaquins.
In Heirs of Juancho Ardana v.Reyes, 125 SCRA 220,
petitioners raised the issue of whether the Philippine
Tourism Authority can expropriate lands covered by the
"Operation Land Transfer" for use of a tourist resort
complex. There was a finding that of the 282 hectares
sought to be expropriated, only an area of 8,970 square
meters or less than one hectare was affected by the land
reform program and covered by emancipation patents
issued by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. While the Court
said that there was "no need under the facts of this petition
to rule on whether the public purpose is superior or inferior
to another purpose or engage in a balancing of competing
public interest," it upheld the expropriation after noting that
petitioners had failed to overcome the showing that the
taking of 8,970 square meters formed part of the resort
complex. A fair and reasonable reading of the decision is
that this Court viewed the power of expropriation as
superior to the power to distribute lands under the land
reform program.
The Solicitor General denigrated the power to
expropriate by the Province of Camarines Sur by stressing
the fact that local government units exercise such power
only by delegation. (Comment, pp. 14-15; Rollo, pp. 128-
129).
It is true that local government units have no
inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it
only when expressly authorized by the legislature (City
of Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 US 439, 74 L.ed. 950, 50 S Ct.
360). It is also true that in delegating the power to
expropriate, the legislature may retain certain control or
impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof by the
local governments (Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 US
668 67 L. ed. 1167, 43 S Ct. 684). While such delegated
power may be a limited authority, it is complete within its
limits. Moreover, the limitations on the exercise of the
delegated power must be clearly expressed, either in the
law conferring the power or in other legislations.
Resolution No. 219, Series of 1988, was promulgated
pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local
Government Code, which provides:
"A local government unit may, through its head and acting
pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian exercise the right
of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings
for public use or purpose."
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the
least that local government units must first secure the
approval of the Department of Land Reform for the
conversion of lands from agricultural to non-
agricultural use, before they can institute the necessary
expropriation proceedings.
Likewise, there is no provision in the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly
subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by local
government units to the control of the Department of
Agrarian Reform. The closest provision of law that the Court
of Appeals could cite to justify the intervention of the
Department of Agrarian Reform in expropriation matters is
Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law,
which reads:
"SECTION 65. Conversion of Lands. After the lapse
of five (5) years from its award, when the land ceases to be
economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes,
or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have
a greater economic value for residential, commercial or
industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application of the
beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to the affected
parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize the
reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition:
Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully paid his
obligation."
The opening, adverbial phrase of the provision sends
signals that it applies to lands previously placed under the
agrarian reform program as it speaks of "the lapse of five
(5) years from its award."
The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in
Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of Executive Order No. 129 - A,
Series of 1987, cannot be the source of the authority of the
Department of Agrarian Reform to determine the suitability
of a parcel of agricultural land for the purpose to which it
would be devoted by the expropriating authority. While
those rules vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the
exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversions of
agricultural lands for residential, commercial or industrial
uses, such authority is limited to the applications for
reclassification submitted by the land owners or tenant
beneficiaries.
Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to
political subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by
implication (Schulman v. People, 10 N.Y. 2d. 249, 176 N.E.
2d. 817, 219 NYS 2d. 241).
To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that
the local government units can no longer expropriate
agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads,
bridges, schools, hospitals, etc., without first applying
for conversion of the use of the lands with the
Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these
projects would naturally involve a change in the land
use. In effect, it would then be the Department of
Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the
expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.
Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local
government unit that shall determine whether the use of the
property sought to be expropriated shall be public, the
same being an expression of legislative policy. The courts
defer to such legislative determination and will intervene
only when a particular undertaking has no real or
substantial relation to the public use.
There is also an ancient rule that restrictive statutes,
no matter how broad their terms are, do not embrace the
sovereign unless the sovereign is specially mentioned as
subject thereto (Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister
of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 1 [1983]). The
Republic of the Philippine, as sovereign, or its political
subdivisions, as holders of delegated sovereign powers,
cannot be bound by provisions of law couched in general
terms.
The fears of private respondents that they will be paid
on the basis of the valuation declared in the tax
declarations of their property, are unfounded. This Court
has declared as unconstitutional the Presidential Decrees
fixing the just compensation in expropriation cases to be the
value given to the condemned property either by the
owners or the assessor, whichever was lower ([Export
Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 [1987]).
As held inMunicipality of Talisay Ramirez, 183 SCRA 528
[1990]7 the rules for determining just compensation are
those laid down in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which
allow private respondents to submit evidence on what they
consider shall be the just compensation for their property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the
questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside
insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing the
Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private
respondents' property; (b) orders the trial court to suspend
the expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the
Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the
Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify
private respondents' property from agricultural to non-
agricultural use.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED
insofar as it sets aside the order of the trial court, denying
the amended motion to dismiss of the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Roxas & Company, Inc. vs. DAMBA-NFSW and DAR
G.R. Nos. 149548, 167505, December 4, 2009
Seven consolidated petitions for the application of Roxas &
Co. for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural use
of its three Nasugbu haciendas with an aggregate size of
almost 3,000 Ha.
In the 1999 case of Roxas & Co. vs. CA, it was alleged that
Hacienda Caylaway was reclassified to non-agricultural by
the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu. Moreover, PP 1520 of
Marcos in 1975 declared certain areas in Nasugbu, inter
alia, as tourist zone.
Its pending application notwithstanding, the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOAs) to the farmer-beneficiaries in
the three haciendas includingCLOA No. 6654 which was
issued on October 15, 1993 covering 513.983 hectares, the
subject of G.R. No. 167505.
The application for conversion of Roxas & Co. was the
subject of the above-stated Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals which the Court remanded to the DAR for the
observance of proper acquisition proceedings.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. Whether PP 1520 reclassified in 1975 all lands in
the Maragondon-Ternate-Nasugbu tourism zone to non-
agricultural use to exempt Roxas & Co.s
three haciendas in Nasugbu from CARP coverage.
PP 1520 merely recognized the potential tourism value of
certain areas within the general area declared as tourism
zones. It did not reclassify the areas to non-agricultural use.
Perambulatory clauses of PP 1520 identified only certain
areas which have potential tourism value and mandated the
conduct of necessary studies and segregation of specific
geographic areas to achieve its purpose. If all the lands in
those tourism zones were to be wholly converted to
non-agricultural use, there would have been no need
for the PP to direct the PTA to identify what those
specific geographic areas are.
In the above-cited case of Roxas & Co. v. CA,

the Court
made it clear that the power to determine
whether Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are
non-agricultural, hence, exempt from the coverage of the
[Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law] lies with the
[Department of Agrarian Reform], not with this Court. The
DAR, an administrative body of special competence,
denied, by Order of October 22, 2001, the application for
CARP exemption of Roxas & Co., it finding that PP 1520
did not automatically reclassify all the lands in the affected
municipalities from their original uses. It appears that the
PTA had not yet, at that time, identified the specific
geographic areas for tourism development and had no
pending tourism development projects in the areas.
A proclamation that merely recognizes the potential tourism
value of certain areas within the general area declared as
tourist zone clearly does not allocate, reserve, or intend the
entirety of the land area of the zone for non-agricultural
purposes. Neither does said proclamation direct that
otherwise CARPable lands within the zone shall already be
used for purposes other than agricultural.
2. Whether Nasugbu MSO No. 4, Series of 1982
exempted certain lots in Hacienda Palico from CARP
coverage.
No. True, a local government unit has the power to classify
and convert land from agricultural to non-agricultural prior to
the effectivity of the CARL. But Court finds in order the
observation of DAMBA-NFSW that Roxas & Co. should
have submitted the comprehensive land use plan and
pointed therein the exact locations of the properties to
prove that indeed they are within the area of coverage
of Nasugbu MZO No. 4. Read further below.
3. Whether the partial and complete cancellations by
the DAR of CLOA No. 6654 subject of G.R. No. 167505
is valid.
Yes. 1999 ruling, the FWBs hold the property in trust for the
rightful owner of the land.
In the nine parcels of land, the Municipal Planning and
Development Coordinator (MPDC) and Zoning
Administrator of Nasugbu, Batangas certified that the
subject parcels of land are within the Urban Core Zone
as specified in Zone A. VII of Municipal Zoning
Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1982, approved by the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC), now the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), under
Resolution No. 123, Series of 1983, dated 4 May 1983.
Thus, the CLOAs in nine parcels of land Hacienda Palico
should be cancelled.
As for the rest of the CLOAs, they should be respected
since Roxas & Co., as shown in the discussion in G.R.
Nos. 167540, 167543 and 167505, failed to prove that
the other lots in Hacienda Palico and the other
two haciendas, aside from the above-mentioned nine
lots, are CARP-exempt.
Be that as it may, the DAR Secretary made the following
conditions before exempting the nine parcels of land:
1. The farmer-occupants within subject parcels of land
shall be maintained in their peaceful possession and
cultivation of their respective areas of tillage until a
final determination has been made on the amount of
disturbance compensation due and entitlement of such
farmer-occupants thereto by the PARAD of Batangas
2. No development shall be undertaken within the subject
parcels of land until the appropriate disturbance
compensation has been paid to the farmer-occupants
who are determined by the PARAD to be entitled
thereto. Proof of payment of disturbance
compensation shall be submitted to this Office within
ten (10) days from such payment; and
3. The cancellation of the CLOA issued to the farmer-
beneficiaries shall be subject of a separate proceeding
before the PARAD of Batangas.

Roxas & Co. is thus mandated to first satisfy the
disturbance compensation of affected farmer-beneficiaries
in the areas covered by the nine parcels of lands in DAR
AO No. A-9999-008-98 before the CLOAs covering them
can be cancelled. And it is enjoined to strictly follow the
instructions of R.A. No. 3844.