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Decryption(SK
1
, SK
2
;CT, CT
, that
he wishes to be challenged upon. Then he commits to the
challenge key policy A
1
.
Setup: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gives
PK to A.
Phase 1: A makes the queries as follows.
Extract(S
1
): A submits an attribute list S
1
for a
KeyGen query where S
1
A
1
, the challenger gives the
adversary the secret key SK
S
1
.
TKExtract(SK
S
1
, A
1
): A submits SK
S
1
and access
structure A
1
for a TK query, the challenger gives the
adversary the transform key TK
S
1
.
Challenge: A submits two equal-length messages M
0
,
M
1
to the challenger. The challenger ips a random coin
b, then Encrypt(PK,M
b
, S
1
) and compute ReEnc(TK,CT),
gives the 1st level ciphertext to the adversary.
Phase 2: Phase 1 is repeated.
Guess: A outputs a guess b
of b.
The advantage of A in this game is dened as
Adv
A
= |Pr[b
= b] 1/2|.
2) Selective Secret Key Security Model:
Init: The adversary declares the set of attributes S
that
he wishes to be challenged upon. Then he commits to the
challenge ciphertext policy A
1
.
Setup: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gives
PK to A.
Phase 1: A makes the queries as follows.
Extract(S
1
): A submits an attribute list S
1
for a
KeyGen query where S
1
= S
1
.
TKExtract(S
1
, A
1
): A submits S
1
and access structure
A
1
for a TK query, the challenger gives the adversary the
transform key TK
S
1
.
Output: A outputs SK
S
for the attribute list S
, then
A succeeds.
The advantage of A in this game is dened as Adv
A
=
Pr[Asucceeds].
C. The Proposed Scheme
The rst three algorithms is the same as in [11]:
Setup(,U). The setup algorithm takes as input a universe
description U and the security parameter. Let U = {0, 1}
.
It then chooses a group G of prime order p, a generator g
and a hash function F that maps {0, 1}
to G. Furthermore,
it randomly chooses values Z
p
and g
1
, h G. The
authority sets as the master secret key. MSK=. The public
key is published as
PK = g; g
1
; g
; h; F
Encrypt(PK;M;S
1
). The encryption algorithm takes as
input the public parameters PK, a message M, and a set of
attributes S
1
. It chooses a random s
1
Z
p
. The 2nd-level
2
ciphertext is published as CT = (S
1
;C
0
) where
CT
0
= M e(g, h)
s1
; C
1
= g
s1
; C
1
= g
s1
1
; {C
x
=
F(x)
s1
}
xS1
KeyGen(MSK;(M
1
;
1
)). The KeyGen algorithm takes as
input MSK and security parameter. Furthermore, it takes as
input an LSSS access structure (M
1
;
1
). The function
1
associates rows of M
1
to attributes. Let M
1
be an l
1
n
1
ma-
trix. It rst chooses a random vector
v
1
= (, y
2
, , y
n
)
Z
n
p
, which are used to share the encryption exponent . For
i = 1 to l, it calculates
1,i
=
v
1
M
1,i
, where M
1,i
is the
vector corresponding to the ith row of M. In addition, the
algorithm chooses random r
11
, , r
1l
Z
p
. The SK
1
is
published as :
(D
11
= h
11
F(
1
(1))
r11
, R
11
= g
r11
), , (D
1l
=
h
1l
F(
1
(l))
r
1l
, R
1l
= g
r
1l
)
along with a description of (M
1
;
1
).
TransformKey(SK
1
,(M
1
,
1
)). The Transform key algo-
rithm calls the KeyGen algorithm, then chooses random d
Z
p
, and compute g
1,id
1
, g
d
. Then encrypt g
d
with the pub-
lic key (attributes) of User2 using the Encrypt(PK;g
d
; S
2
)
algorithm. It output CT
1
= En
S2
(g
d
) and the TK as:
(D
11
= h
11
F(
1
(1))
r
11
g
11d
1
, R
11
= g
r
11
), ,
(D
1l
= h
1l
F(
1
(l))
r
1l
g
1l
d
1
, R
1l
= g
r
1l
)
ReEnc(TK,CT). The ReEnc algorithm takes as input
the CT, public parameters PK. The Re-encryption algorithm
then takes as input S
1
. Suppose that S
1
satises the access
structure (M
1
;
1
) and let I
1
{1, 2, , l
1
} be dened as
I
1
= {i :
1
(i) S
1
}. Then, let {
i
Z
p
}
iI1
be a set of
constants such that if
1i
are valid shares of any secret
according to M
1
, then
iI1
1i
= . It calculate CT
2
as follow:
CT
2
=
e(C
1
,
iI1
D
i
1i
)
iI1
e(R
1i
, C
i
1(i)
)
=
e(g
s1
,
iI1
(h
1ii
F(
1
(i))
r
1i
i
g
1idi
1
))
(
iI1
e(g
r
1i
, F(
1
(i))
s1i
))
= e(g, h)
s1
e(g, g
1
)
s1d
The 1st-level CT
:
CT
0
= M e(g, h)
s1
; CT
1
= En
S2
(g
d
); C
1
= g
s1
;
C
1
= g
s1
1
;CT
2
Decryption(SK
1
, SK
2
;CT,CT). U
1
can decrypt the ci-
phertext if the attributes associated with the ciphertext satisfy
2
In our proxy re-encrypt KP-ABE CT scheme, a 2nd-level ciphertext
is an original ABE ciphertext and a 1st-level ciphertext is a transformed
ciphertext.
48
his keys access structure, and if the attributes satisfy U
2
iI1
D
i
1i
)
iI1
e(R
1i
, C
i
1(i)
)
= e(g, h)
s1
then get M = CT
0
/ct
2
Dec
1
(SK
2
, CT
). User2 decrypts CT
1
using his secret
key sk
j
to get g
d
. Next, calculate CT
3
= e(g
d
, g
s1
1
) =
e(g, g
1
)
s1d
. Finally, it calculate CT
0
CT
3
/CT
2
= M.
D. Security Analysis
Theory 1. If there is an adversary who breaks our scheme
in selective the transform key security model to get User1s
SK
S1
, then he can solve discrete logarithm problem.
Proof. In the security model, the simulator B runs A.
The adversary A commits to a challenge attribute list S
.
To provide a public key PK to A, B generate PK =
g; g
; F
1
, , F
S
; h. A makes queries.
Extract(S
1
): A submits an attribute list S
1
for a
KeyGen query where S
1
= S
, B randomly choose
11
, ,
1l
,r
11
, , r
1l
, computes the secret key SK
S
1
:
(D
11
= h
11
F(
1
(1))
r11
, R
1
= g
r11
), , (D
1l
= h
1l
F(
1
(l))
r
1l
, R
1l
= g
r
1l
)
TKExtract(S
1
,A
1
): A submits an attribute list S
1
for
a transform key query, B runs the TransformKey algorithm.
TK : (D
11
= h
11
F(
1
(1))
r
11
g
11
d
1
, R
1
= g
r
11
), ,
(D
1l
= h
1l
F(
1
(l))
r
1l
g
1l
d
1
, R
1
= g
r
1l
)
If the proxy collude with the User2, he can get g
from
User2. If he want to get SK
S
1
, he must rstly compute
g
11
d
1
, , g
1l
d
1
, it equal to solve discrete logarithm
problem, and he knows nothing about the random parameter
r
11
, , r
1l
.
Theory 2. Our KP-ABPRE scheme is a selectively CPA-
secure construction, as the GPSW KP-ABE scheme [7] is
selectively CPA-secure.
Proof.
3
If there exists a polynomial-time adversary A,
that can break our scheme in the Selective-Policy model
with advantage , it can can play the Decisional BDH game
with advantage /2.
Init: Given a DBDH tuple [g, g
a
, g
b
, g
c
, Z]. The simulator
B runs A. A gives the key policy A
1
to B.
Setup: B randomly choose
r
Z
p
, g, h G set A =
g
1
): A submits an attribute list S
1
for a
KeyGen query where S
1
A
1
. B choose
11
, ,
1l
3
The security of the 2nd level ciphertext and CT
1
have been proved
security [11]. We only need to prove the security of 1st level ciphertext.
satisfy that
i
, i I
1
,
iI1
1i
i
=
. The secret
key SK
1
is:
(D
11
= h
11
F(
1
(1))
r
11
, R
11
= g
r
11
), ,(D
1l
= h
1l
F(
1
(l))
r
1l
, R
1l
= g
r
1l
)
TKExtract(SK
S
1
, A
1
): A submits SK
S
1
and access
structure A
1
for a TK query. It randomly choose d
Z
P
.
Finally B gives the adversary C = g
d
11
= h
11
F(
1
(1))
r
11
g
11
d
1
, R
11
= g
r
11
), ,
(D
1l
= h
1l
F(
1
(l))
r
1l
g
1l
d
1
, R
1l
= g
r
1l
)
Challenge: A submits two challenge messages M
0
and
M
1
. Then B ips a random coin b {0, 1} and returns A
the ciphertext as CT
0
= M
b
e(g; h)
s1
; B = C
1
= g
s1
1
;
CT
2
= Z e(g; h)
s1
Phase 2: Phase 1 is repeated.
Guess: A outputs a guess b
= b] 1/2| =
1
2
IV. DISCUSSIONS
A. Multi-Use
To realize the Multi-Use property, the form of the CT
1
is
CT
1
= g
d
1
e(g; h)
s2
; C
2
= g
s2
; C
x
= F(x)
s2
xS2
. The
User2s secret key is :(D
21
= h
21
F(
2
(1))
r21
, R
21
=
g
r21
), , (D
2l
= h
2l
F(
2
(l))
r
2l
, R
2l
= g
r
2l
) along
with a description of (M
2
;
2
).
B. Re-encryption Control
Note that if the encryptor does not provide g
s1
1
in cipher-
text, the original decryption is not affected but the decryption
of re-encrypted ciphertext cannot go on. Thats because g
s1
1
is only used in decrypting re-encrypted step, so he can
control whether the ciphertext can be re-encrypted.
C. Construction of CCA-Secure KP-AB-PRE
Peikert and Waters [20] rst put forward Lossy trapdoor
functions (LTFs), in particular as a means to construct
chosen-ciphertext (CCA) secure public-key encryption (P-
KE) schemes. After that, it drawn extensive attention by a
lot of cryptography scholars. We may construct the CCA-
Secure KP-AB-PRE scheme with the help of it. We can also
reference the work of Zhao, Feng [17]. But it is not an easy
work, we need more time to research.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We present a key policy attribute-based proxy re-
encryption(KP-AB-PRE)scheme, in which the proxy can
be the cloud server. In our scheme, we use matrix access
structure to realize the key policy. The secret key size,
encryption, and decryption time scales linearly with the
complexity of the access formula. Our work result can also
inherit some properties of PRE. In addition, our scheme
49
has secret key security property, the cloud proxy cannot
obtain the secret key information even collude with the
User. Cloud computing is a promising computing paradigm
which has drawn extensive attention from both academia
and commerce. A lot of security work need to do.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We would like to thank Xiaofeng Chen for the sug-
gestions to improve this paper. Also, we are grateful to
the anonymous referees for their invaluable suggestion-
s. This work is supported by the Fundamental Research
Funds for the Central Universities (K50511010001 and
JY10000901034), the National Natural Science Foundation
of China (No.61070249) and the Graduate Student Innova-
tion Fund of Xidian University (No.K50513100015).
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Keying Li, master of Faculty of science, Xidian University,
Xian, China. His research interests cover the attributes
based encryption, cloud computing, lossy trapdoor function,
lossy encryption, e-cash payment.
Yinghui Zhang, received his B.S. (2007) and M.S.
(2010) from Nanchang Hangkong University and Xidian
University, both in Mathematics. Currently, He is working
toward the Ph.D. degree in Cryptography, Xidian University.
His research interests are in the areas of cloud computing
security and cryptography.
Hua Ma, professor of Faculty of science, Xidian University,
Xian, China. Her research directions including The Theory
and technology in e-commerce security, Design and analysis
of fast public key cryptography, Theory and technology of
the network security.
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