Professional Documents
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BEIRUT
BRUSSELS
MOSCOW
WA S H I N G T O N
EXPLORING UZBEKISTANS
POTENTIAL POLITICAL
TRANSITION
Alexey Malashenko
Carnegie.ru
J U LY 2 0 1 4
EXPLORING UZBEKISTANS
POTENTIAL POLITICAL
TRANSITION
Alexey Malashenko
Contents
About theAuthor
Summary 1
The President
10
13
Transition andIslam
15
External Actors
15
Conclusions 16
Notes 19
Carnegie Moscow Center
21
Summary
Islam Karimov has essentially been inpower inUzbekistan since 1989. Rumors
abound that Karimov will not take part in the countrys next presidential election in2015, but it seems likely that he will participate. If he does, he is guaranteed towin. Though it is still too early totalk about thechances specific candidates
have ofreplacing Karimov, it is important tolook closely atthecurrent ruling elite
andthepresidents possible successors tosee where thecountry might be heading.
Possible Successors
The presidents eldest daughter, Gulnara Karimova, andtheNational Security
Service chief, Rustam Inoyatov, are seen as the main actors in the struggle
to gain the presidency after Karimovs departure, though there are a number of other potential candidates from both Uzbekistans powerful clans
andthegovernment.
The presidents daughter is one ofthe richest people inthecountry. She has
conducted local andforeign business transactions inviolation ofboth national
and European laws, expecting her fathers protection. This undermined
Uzbekistans image, drawing father anddaughter into conflict.
Inoyatov is Uzbekistans second most influential figure. He dismantled
Gulnaras business empire and placed her under house arrest at the presidents behest. Some experts believe that he is staking aclaim toKarimovs seat
andconsiders thepresidents daughter his main rival.
Two other potential candidates are the current prime minister, Shavkat
Mirziyoyev, and the deputy prime minister and finance minister, Rustam
Azimov.
Conclusions
Karimov will decide when and to whom to transfer power. The president
recently proposed constitutional changes that would give some presidential
powers to the legislative and executive branches. This may signify his gradual exit from power, but thechanges could also provide Karimov with legal
grounds for running for president again.
1
Inoyatov is likely to remain one of the key players during the power transition. Gulnara Karimova has little public support andis unlikely tosucceed as
anopposition figure or tobe thesuccessor.
External actors are likely tohave limited influence onthetransition.
Regardless ofwho emerges as thenext president, regional clans andtheir political representatives will have asignificant influence onthebalance ofpower
inthecountry.
The eventual power transition is most likely tobe peaceful, with interest groups
andclans coming toan agreement toavoid instability. Yet, if aclan is dissatisfied with thenew arrangement, it may appeal for public support andprovoke
social protests with anIslamist core.
The President
Islam Karimov has been in power in Uzbekistan since 1989, when he became
thefirst secretary ofUzbekistans Communist Party. Subsequently, he has been
elected president three timesin 1991, 2000, and 2007. In 2014, Karimov
proposed constitutional changes that would transfer some presidential powers
tothelegislative andexecutive branches.
Opinions about themove are divided. Some believe that Karimovs proposal
marks thestart ofhis gradual exit from power andinterpret it as asign suggesting that he will not take part inthe2015 presidential election. Others see it as
a tactical move, which seeks to legitimate the continuation of Karimovs rule,
since theconstitutional changes that limit anindividual totwo terms inoffice
would allow him torun for president again.1 It seems more probable that this is
atactical move.
But even if Karimov actually intends to relinquish some of his powers
to the government and parliament, and even if he plans to retire, he will still
remain an indisputable leader, albeit unofficially this time. Thus, the question
of a successor remains open, and this person will be effectively appointed by
Karimov himself.
The prospects andtime ofthe power transition largely depend onKarimovs
physical condition. His health is the subject ofsome controversy. For instance,
the renowned Uzbek opposition activist Muhammad Salih believes it is far
from perfect, claiming that thepresident suffered several heart-related episodes
andamassive heart attack in2013. Many ofthose who met Karimov inthesecond half of2013 remarked onhis sickly appearance. For his part, Karimov never
hinted athis poor health, andhis daughter Lola wished her fathers health toevery
seventy-five-year-old ina recent BBC interview.2
In recent years, Uzbekistans potential power transition has been generating serious analytical discourse, numerous rumors, and much speculation.
Thequestion ofwho will take thereins is ofparticular interest. Thepresidents
eldest daughter, Gulnara, andthesixty-nine-year-old National Security Service
(NSS) chief, Rustam Inoyatov, are seen as themain actors inthestruggle togain
the presidency after Karimovs departure, though there are a number of other
potential candidates from both Uzbekistans powerful clans andthegovernment.
3
Who will actually come out on top remains unclear. The true inner workings ofthe Uzbek ruling elite are aclosely guarded secret. Although theparties
tothefuture transition prepare for it totheextent possible, they do not know how
it will happen andwhere it will lead. Experts attheMoscow-based International
Institute for Political Expertise conclude that no special arrangements for asuccessor have been developed inUzbekistan as oftoday.3 However, various political
factions are vying for power away from theimmediate ranks ofthe ruling circle.
Though it is still too early totalk about thechances specific candidates have
of gaining Karimovs seat, it is important to look closely at the countrys current ruling elite andthepresidents possible successors because leadership change
in Uzbekistan could have a substantial effect on the situation in the Central
Asian region. Thenext leader could also significantly impact Uzbekistans relations with external playersChina, Russia, and the United States. Changes
atthetop may bring Uzbekistan closer totheummahthe global community
ofIslamic peoplesin addition totheTurkic-speaking community that includes
inhabitants of Turkey and Central Asian countries as well as some minorities
(including Tatars) living intheRussian Federation andAfghanistan.
Alexey Malashenko|5
failed topay $500 million intaxes onits export revenues. Zeromax went bankrupt in2010.
Karimova is actively working in the jewelry business and owns the Guli
designer clothing line. She also tried her hand inshow business, starring inamusic
video featuring thecontroversial French actor Gerard Depardieu. She founded
Uzbekistans Forum for Arts andCulture, which sought toattract creative youth.
In Moscow, Gulnara Karimova hosted receptions and banquets frequented by
influential Russian politicians, including those close totheKremlin.
Karimova controlled theinformation andcommunication business, allowing
certain companies tooperate inUzbekistan while banishing others. In 2012, she
ordered that Uzundrobita, aleading player onthelocal media market anda subsidiary ofMTS, theRussian telecommunications giant, be stripped ofits license
andexpelled from thecountry. Its general director, Radik Dautov, acitizen ofthe
Russian Federation, was arrested. Dautovs wife, Tamara, wrote to Vladimir
Putin asking him to investigate this incident. MTSs losses totaled $1 billion.
Uzbek businessmen know how dangerous competing against Karimova is. While
inbusiness, she pursued her own interests, sometimes resorting toillegal means
tobankrupt several media companies.
Gulnara Karimovas ambitions also extended to foreign policy. A Harvard
graduate anda PhD inpolitical science, she had adiplomatic career. Beginning
in2010 she was theambassador toSpain, andshe was also adeputy foreign minister for international cooperation in cultural and humanitarian affairs. Until
the middle of 2013, she also served as Uzbekistans permanent representative
totheUnited Nations andother international organizations.
Being thepresidents daughter, she considered herself invincible. In fact, family members andchildren ofpolitical leaders frequently become very influential
political figures in the post-Soviet space. Heydar Alievs son Ilham inherited
Azerbaijans presidency; Nursultan Nazarbayevs daughter Dariga was atthetop
inKazakhstan for along period oftime; andKyrgyz business was controlled by
President Kurmanbek Bakiyevs son Maksim. While thefate ofthese presidential
offspring is now quite clearsome ofthem are inpower, while others are charged
with crimesGulnara Karimovas future looks less certain.
Completely unaccountable (she did not even report to her own father),
Gulnara has started toaggravate theUzbek elite, the middle class, andespecially
the business community. She is especially disliked by theforce structures, which
seek toestablish total control over society andare responsible for thecountrys
security. Occasional rumors ofher designs onthepresidential seat fueled thediscontent. Therumors often came from abroad andwere not well substantiated.
Karimovas business practices also drew complaints from her Western partners. She has been accused ofmoney laundering andties totransnational organized crime. In late 2013, her domestic partner, Rustam Madumarovthe registered owner of Karimovas propertywas implicated in a number of criminal cases in France, Latvia, Sweden, and Switzerland. Switzerland froze bank
Alexey Malashenko|7
accounts associated with Karimovas business. Thecase ofTeliaSonera, aSwedishFinnish mobile telephone service provider, generated the strongest negative
reaction. Thecompany paid Karimova $300 million toenter Uzbekistans telecommunications market. Themoney was transferred toa small Gibraltar company in the name of Gayane Avakyan, Karimovas associate. The investigation
of the TeliaSonera affair commenced in 2012. In 2013, the Organized Crime
and Corruption Reporting Project added Gulnara Karimova to its Person
of the Year list. The corrupt and even criminal nature of business dealings
conducted by the presidents daughter sullied Uzbekistans business reputation
abroad.
Uzbek force structures had been carefully collecting information related toGulnaras business andthen furnished it
Karimova cannot succeed as an opposition
toher father. NSS chief Rustam Inoyatov was acting as both
figure since she has little popular support.
theprotector ofstate security andthedefender ofthe presidents reputation andpopularity. He had been increasingly
shielding thepresident from Gulnara. It is unlikely that he
feared her potential presidency, but she certainly posed athreat tohis authority
and, by extension, tohis influence onthetransition ofpower.
Karimova had a few chances to defeat Inoyatov. In her struggle against
the NSS chief, she started portraying herself as a champion of social justice
andeven anadvocate for human rights (she was proceeding cautiously andhad
no direct contacts with human rights activists). It is notable that she refused
to be interviewed by the Fergana.ru Information Agency, which frequently
publishes critical analyses ofthe situation inthecountry by experts andopposition activists.
Gulnaras writings appeared on the Proza.ru website, which is blocked
in Uzbekistan, under the pseudonym of Marcus Aurelius. She fiercely criticized theruling elite, particularly Inoyatov andPrime Minister Mirziyoyev. She
accused thelatter ofinviting prostitutes andpromiscuous government employees
into his royal chambers.9 Another subject ofGulnaras criticism is her mother,
Tatiana Akbarovna Karimova; their relations have been long and irreparably
damaged. Gulnara denies her authorship ofthe texts, but many inUzbekistan
strongly believe her tobe theauthor.
In themiddle of2013, Karimova repeatedly criticized thecourse ofthe Uzbek
government, which is essentially her fathers course. She assailed his migration
policy, saying that migrants are unfortunate people who are forced toleave their
homeland tohelp their families survive. She questioned theofficial employment
statistics for theperiod 20052011: 5 million new jobs were reportedly created,
60 percent ofthem insmall andmidsize businesses. Karimova also mentioned
thepoor health ofUzbekistans citizens, which supposedly made them shorter.
Describing her trip to the historic city of Kokand in her Twitter account, she
remarked that she did not see asingle public restroom during her travels (I took
thesame trip once andcan confirm theaccuracy ofher observation).
Alexey Malashenko|9
In thecourse ofthe search, they acted crudely and, by some accounts, even used
physical force. As aresult, Karimova andher daughter Iman (a U.S. citizen) found
themselves held under house arrest. No one can predict how Islam andGulnara
Karimovs relations will develop inthefuture.
Alexey Malashenko|11
officials visited the members of the group on the eve of their meeting, warning them about thepossible consequences ofsupporting Rustamov. As aresult,
themeeting never took place. Rustamov was intimidated as well. It is still unclear
how he is planning toparticipate inthenext presidential campaign in2015.
A U.S. migr, Bakhodir Choriyev, who heads theBirdamlik Movement, may
become another presidential candidate. He stresses that he advocates anonviolent course ofaction, which is ina way reminiscent ofthe protests carried out
by theSoviet dissident movement. For instance, his associates organized public
gatherings incity squares, where they took group photos infront ofgovernment
buildings with theConstitution ofUzbekistan intheir hands.
Shosalimov, Tojiboy-ugli, Rustamov, and Choriyev do not directly participate inUzbekistans political life. They can be more aptly described as civic leaders. However, given thegrowing tensions andconflicts within theruling class,
theprimary cast ofpolitical characters will have totake these individuals into
account tosome degree. It is worth noting that Gulnara Karimova has already
tried to look for supporters among those discontented with the presidents
authoritarian methods.
Potential Outcomes
Currently, there is no official discussion ofpresidential succession. Both Shavkat
Mirziyoyev and Rustam Azimov are potential presidential hopefuls in theory
only. Neither ofthem will dare even drop ahint oftheir possible interest ingreater
political prospects. Thesame is true ofRustam Inoyatov andto aneven greater
extent of Gulnara Karimova. Moreover, the most likely candidate for the top
position intheeyes oflocal andforeign analysts could be easily sidelined andeven
disciplined for his real or imaginary political ambitions.
An unscientific poll conducted by theindependent Uzbek sociologist Khayet
Khan Nasreddinov sheds some light onthepotential outcomes ofan election.
His acquaintances answered thepoll questions for his article as afavor tohim.
Nasreddinov asked the people about the possible results of the 2015 presidential elections if theelections were free. According tothedata he obtained, Islam
Karimov would get 27.18 percent ofthe vote, Gulnara Karimova11.41 percent,
aforce structure representative (in this case, Inoyatov A.M.)13.63 percent,
Shavkat Mirziyoyev10.82 percent, Rustam Azimov5.71 percent. Opposition
leaders come next onNasreddinovs list: Bakhodir Choriyev would finish with
4.41 percent; Sanjar Umarov would get 2.61 percent, andMuhammad Salih
24.24 percent. Nasreddinov admits that his poll is hypothetical, and people
would vote differently during theactual elections.19
This informal, essentially unscientific poll can be viewed as areflection ofpublic sentiments. Although Uzbek citizens may not voice them in public, these
sentiments can nevertheless affect thesituation inthecountry. A case inpoint
is theSoviet intelligentsia, especially its dissident segment, whose protest views
appeared marginal andabsolutely irrelevant during Soviet times. Nevertheless, it
Alexey Malashenko|13
was thenonconformists that were thedriving force behind perestroika, which led
totheSoviet collapse.
Alexey Malashenko|15
Transition andIslam
As has frequently been the case in the past, public discontent may manifest
itself inreligious, Islamic form, which is typical ofany Muslim country. While
the main Islamic opposition force in Uzbekistan, Hizb-ut Tahrir al-Islami
(theIslamic Liberation Party) is weaker today, andits activists are forced tolive
inneighboring countries andRussia, where there are possibly hundreds ofthem,
theorganization may spring back tolife andtake charge ofthe protest inthetime
ofcrisis, especially intheFerghana Valley. Paradoxically, theforce structures may
take advantage of the growing activism on the part of the Islamic opposition;
they may initially allow protest inits extreme form only tosuppress it later, thus
again demonstrating their ability torestore order.
The situation may escalate if thefactions engaged inthetransition ofpower
prove unable toreach aquick settlement. In this case, one ofthe parties (especially theone that senses its own defeat) may resort toreligious protest rhetoric
inits appeal for public support.
External Actors
External actorsChina, Russia, and the United States in particularare
unlikely toplay asignificant role inUzbekistans power transition.
The pro-Russian lobby did not emerge inUzbekistan. Actually, Moscow did
not launch anorganized effort tocreate it. TheKremlin hopes that Islam Karimov
himself will ensure the continuation of Russian-Uzbek relations, but Karimov
has initiated andconsistently implemented amulti-vector foreign policy. While
maintaining bilateral economic relations with Russia, Karimov strongly opposes
Uzbekistans participation intheRussian integration projects: theCustoms Union
andtheEurasian Union. He refrained from joining theCollective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO). In 2009, Tashkent failed tosign theagreement onthecreation ofa rapid reaction force within theCSTO framework.
There are no clearly Russia-oriented politicians among thepotential presidential candidates. After theannexation ofCrimea andtheconflict between Russia
andtheWest that followed, closer ties with Moscow may hinder thedevelopment
ofrelations with theUnited States andEurope. Uzbekistan has already indirectly
expressed its negative stance ontheKremlins Ukraine policy by abstaining during theUN vote onits resolution ontheCrimean annexation. Uzbekistan also
outbid Russia onNATO cargo transit. Russia requested 50,000 euros per container, while Uzbekistan offered just 30,000 euros.24 Respect for Russias decisive
moves along its Western borders is accompanied by fears ofits growing ambitions
along theentire perimeter ofthe post-Soviet space. Tashkent is even more unsettled by the quasi-Soviet rhetoric used by Moscow politicians and the red flags
onRussian city squares. If this trend continues, Uzbekistan will continue drifting
farther away from Russia under thenext president.
Even today, Moscows influence on Uzbekistans internal politics is insignificant, andany attempts toinfluence thecountrys power transition can only
trigger anegative reaction from theUzbek ruling class. Thus, Russia is reduced
toanobservers role inUzbekistans internal matters.
The United States exerts more influence onUzbekistans power transition, but
its role also appears limited. There are Western-oriented politicians inTashkent.
Among them are Rustam Azimov and former foreign minister Sodiq Safoyev.
Theyounger American- andEuropean-educated high-ranking officials can also
be considered part ofthe pro-American lobby. Their influence is growing; they
are replacing their older Russian-speaking counterparts, thus creating a proWestern atmosphere. While not forcing change, Washington is cautiously facilitating theevolution ofthe political landscape inaccordance with its interests.
Tashkent was promised that it would receive some ofthe American military
equipment after thecoalition troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. Uzbekistan
will become part ofthe main route for thecargo shipped from Afghanistan,
according to the 2012 Northern Distribution Network agreement. The US
views thecountrys territory as most attractive for creating large regionally-significant transportation hubs andmilitary installations (bases) that do not have
tofunction ona permanent basis.25 After theevents inUkraine, theinterest
indeveloping U.S.-Uzbek relations will be increasing, andthecountrys next
president will do everything inhis power toimprove them.
For its part, China does not pay much attention tothequestion ofwho will
become Uzbekistans new leader. Beijing is certain that thenew Uzbek leader
will treat China as his countrys stable, economically advantageous partner.
Cooperation with China also insulates Uzbekistan from excessive pressure
onthepart ofRussia andtheUnited States. In this respect, Uzbekistan is no
different from other countries intheregion, which also treat theChinese presence inthearea as aninevitability. Besides, Beijing is likely totake amore active
position mediating regional conflicts, which include theessential issue ofthe
distribution ofwater resources, which Russia did not succeed inresolving.
Conclusions
It is impossible toformulate any substantiated predictions onthepower transition
inUzbekistan. In therun-up tothe2015 elections, Islam Karimov announced
that he is ready torelinquish some ofhis powers totheparliament andgovernment, which is inno way indicative ofhis weakness as anational leader. Should he
decide toparticipate inanother election, his victory is guaranteed.
The succession question is not yet ontheagenda. An interim dark horse may
emerge, allowing Karimov to retain the position of indisputable leader during
thetransition period andalso making for asofter transition. None ofthe politicians mentioned inthis article are guaranteed thepresidential seat. Each ofthem
rejects any mention ofsuch apossibility.
Alexey Malashenko|17
Notes
V. Panfilova, Karimov predlozhil peredel vlasti [Islam Karimov Curtails His Own
Powers], Nezavisimaya gazeta, March 18, 2014, www.ng.ru/cis/2014-03-18/6_karimov.html.
A. Muminov, Kto byet i derzhit pod arestom Gulnaru Karimovu? [Who Is Holding
Under Arrest andBeating Up Gulnara Karimova?], Kursiv.kz, March 4, 2014, www.
kursiv.kz/news/details/obshestvo/Kto-bet-i-derzhit-pod-arestom-Gulnaru-Karimovu/.
21
BEIJING
BEIRUT
BRUSSELS
MOSCOW
WA S H I N G T O N
EXPLORING UZBEKISTANS
POTENTIAL POLITICAL
TRANSITION
Alexey Malashenko
Carnegie.ru
J U LY 2 0 1 4