JUSTICE IN THE VIEW OF THOMISTIC NATURAL LAW ETHICS

Aquinas explicitly argues that the human person is a social being.

Aquinas says that the human persons are by necessity social beings precisely
because they cannot survive on their own1. Since birth, a human person is at the
mercy of others like that person’s family, immediate community, and later on,
the society as a whole. It is evident that the human person is in no way self-
sufficient. Furthermore, Aquinas argues that man needs others in order to live
well. He says, “as regards the conveniences without which life cannot be lived
well, he is helped by the civil group, both for material benefit and for moral
advantage.”2

A human person certainly needs others in order to survive and to live well.
The human person is a social animal. But if the human person is a social animal,
there is always a need for him/her to enter into a kind of structure.3 The human
person has to structure his/her existence in order to peacefully live with others.
The human person has to enter into a state, a society, whereby that person’s
relationship with others is regulated. Aquinas says, “With many individuals each
seeking what suits himself, the mass would disintegrate were there not one
power within it caring for the common good. Any organism would disintegrate
were there no unifying force working for the common good of all the members.” 4
Arguing further, Aquinas says, “A ruling cause therefore is required, standing
apart from interests of private gain, to act for the common good of the many.”5

But, the need for the human person to come to an association with others
validates the need for the practice of justice. For Aquinas, justice assures that
man’s relationship with others is well-ordered. To reiterate, Aquinas defines
justice as the “perpetual will to render to others that which is their due.” 6 The
practice of justice is man’s participation to God’s ordering of the universe.

It is then worthwhile to examine Aquinas’ proposal for the practice of

justice in the world. The first thing to emphasize from the above definition of
justice is its emphasis on the other. Justice is not meant for oneself. Aquinas
himself says that there is no justice about the self. Justice always entails an
“other.” In this regard, justice always has a social value. This means then that
justice finds its fulfillment, not in the individual, but in one’s relationship with
1
Aquinas describes the human person in these words: “as regards necessities without which life cannot be
lived, he is supported by the domestic group. He depends on his parents for his birth, feeding, upbringing.”
(Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, lecture I – Henceforth, this work will be referred to as
CNEA, I). Further, Aquinas says, “one solitary man cannot discover everything for himself. He must combine in
a team, so that one may help another and different men be reasonably engaged in different jobs, one in
medicine, another in this, another in that.” (CNEA, I).
2
CNEA, I; see Thomas Aquinas, Philosophical Texts, trans. and ed. Thomas Gilby (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1950), 372.
3
Walter Farrel says, “because men are not tied down to one necessary path to the goal, it is possible for
man to crash into each other like stars gone wild. Men must have some order other than the merely physical, to
govern their mutual relations precisely because of the great potentialities inherent in their nature.” (Farrel, 166).
4
Aquinas, Philosophical Texts, 380.
5
Ibid.
6
ST II-II, q. 58, art.1, I answer that.

JOEL C. SAGUT 1
others. Hence, if there are principles that should regulate one’s relationship with
others, one of them should be the principle of justice.

Another aspect of the definition that is worth mentioning is the concept of

the “due.” Earlier, the notion of the due is discussed as the “right,” which earlier
is categorized into three types: the objective right, the subjective right, and the
right that proceeds from law. However, in addition to this distinction, there is one
important insight that we ought to get from the idea of right, that is, the concept
of the due or the right connotes “equality.” Aquinas would always say that the
notion of justice always promotes equality.7 Thus, even in the Thomistic
distinction of the distributive and commutative justice, the emphasis remains to
be the equality of men. Distributive justice, which refers to the distribution of
goods by the State to the people, is based on desert 8 and the intensity of the
need. This is called by Aquinas as geometric equality that is, equality that is
proportional. While commutative justice is the principle operating between
individuals, and this is called by Aquinas as arithmetic equality, which means
that it is quantified and measured. This type of justice assures that the status of
individuals prior to a transaction is maintained even after the transaction is
made.

There are various concerns as to how should justice be administered in

practice. There are issues as to whether justice should be taken as “absolute
equality for all” like the view of socialist communism, or as mainly based on
deserts, as in the case of capitalism, whereby the one with the biggest share
earns the most in a business undertaking. In his article, “Redefining Justice in
Philippine Situation,” Corpuz has cited a tension between distributive justice and
commutative justice. In that article he argues that in the Philippines, “the
distributive view should be taken as the criterion of justice.”9 But such valuation
of distributive justice is used as a critique to the other form, commutative
justice, when he says, “the freedom to get as implied by the liberal morality of
the commutative view cannot be just in a situation where it results to the
unequal distribution of basic benefits.”10 There seems to be an irony in this

7
Aquinas speaks of the relation of justice to the notion of equality among persons when he says, “Justice is
properly included among the other virtues in that it orders man in his relationship with others. It is concerned
with a certain equality, as its name indicates. Equality moreover is concerned with others, whereas other virtues
perfect man solely in those things which are appropriate to himself.” (ST II-II, q. 57, art.1) Cf. Robert Goodwin,
“Aquinas’ Justice: An Interpretation,” The New Scholasticism 63, no.3 (1989): 276.
8
There is a growing debate about the concept of desert or the merit that should be accorded to each person.
In understanding Aquinas’ concept about the “due,” it should always be taken into mind that the “right” should
not only be understood as a desert in the sense of merit whereby a person is granted a share only when such
merit was acquired by what one has done. Rawls is quoted in one work saying, “one cannot claim a greater part
of the pie merely on the ground that he has labored more or has more talent than the other.” [Manuel Corpuz,
“Redefining Justice in Philippine Situation,” Unitas 58, no.4 (1985): 420]. Instead, there are rights that are
inalienable to a person not because of any merit but simply because of the fact that one is a human person.
Piefer himself says, “it is through creation that the created being first comes to have his rights. By virtue of
creation first arises the possibility of saying: Something is my due.” (Piefer, 46). For a more detailed discussion
about the “due” vis-à-vis the concept of merit or desert, see the work of Julian Lamont, “The Concept of Desert
in Distributive Justice,” The Philosophical Quarterly 44, no. 174 (1994): 45-63.
9
Corpuz, p.420.
10
Corpuz, p.420.

JOEL C. SAGUT 2
claim, however. How can the administration of commutative justice become an
instance of injustice itself?

To resolve this perceived dilemma, it would be good to look once again at

our basic understanding of what justice is. Noting the two things that have been
highlighted earlier regarding the definition of justice namely, the realization of
the other and the notion of the due, there are inevitable realizations that need to
be recognized. One of these is the fact that justice is primarily about human
relationship. To speak of justice is basically to speak about proper human
relations. Injustice occurs if one’s relationship with another has become
improper.

It would then be helpful to view Aquinas’ teaching on justice via this bias
on right or proper human relationship. If this is the case, then the question of
“how can I be just?” maybe translated into the question, “how should I relate
with others?” How would Aquinas answer the question: how should I relate with
others? The question is hypothetical and Aquinas himself hardly speaks of the
“other” in the sense that the “other” is spoken of these days. But what is certain
is the fact that in the talk about justice, Aquinas explicitly speaks of the ”other” 11
as the true end of our just actions. The being who should benefit one’s just
action is the “other” and not the “self.” Furthermore, in recognizing the other,
Aquinas speaks of the “other” as having a “due.” Every person has a due, which
should be accorded to that person in the name of justice. Hence, the question
remains: how can I be just? And the nearest yet still theoretical answer that can
be given is: “I can be just if I relate with the other rightly 12 that is, if I relate with
the other as the “other.”13 In short, justice is simply respect. Justice is a right
relationship with the “other,” and such right relationship happens when one
respects the “otherness” of the “other.”

But then, ‘who is the other?’ In Aquinas, there are two things that are
worth keeping about his concept of the human person or the “other” to whom I
relate within a state or a community:

1. The other is an image and likeness of God

Respecting another person necessitates the recognition of that person’s

primordial dignity as the one creature of God who bears God’s image and

11
Fr. Fausto Gomez recognizes this in his lecture on “The Relevance of St. Thomas Aquinas’ Teaching on
Justice Today,” delivered during the national conference on “St Thomas Aquinas and Contemporary
Philosophy,” last January 19, 2007 at the Graduate School of the University of Santo Tomas. He says, “the three
main properties of justice that flow from its definition are otherness, indebtedness, and equality.” These three
properties are also emphasized in this article.
12
James Schall even says, “For Aquinas, justice is the virtue of making things right within and among all
beings, including human beings.” (James Schall, “The Uniqueness of the Political Philosophy of Thomas
Aquinas,” Perspectives on Political Science 26, no. 2 (1997): 87.
13
The tone about alterity in the talk of justice is commonly identified with Emannuel Levinas. But such
available labeling should not hinder us to look at Aquinas’ teaching on justice via the eyes of the “other.” A
known Thomist, Etienne Gilson, himself says “we are always just or unjust in regard to another. But as the
effect of this disposition is to assure that we act rightfully toward another according as reason would have us, it
renders its possessor better.” (Gilson, 307).

JOEL C. SAGUT 3
likeness.14 Acts of injustice, or improper human relations, are basically a
forgetting of this fundamental fact of man’s dignity. The injustice against which
the women have cried out since the entrance of the feminist movements is
premised on this failure to recognize them as bearers of God’s image and
likeness. In the same way, the injustices against the poor are founded on the
rejection of the poor man’s dignity as an image of God. Withholding from others
that which is their due as an image of God is tantamount to the destruction of
the structure of the state.15

Firstly then, the recognition of the other as bearer of the image of God,
who is ultimately the distributor of all the good things of this earth, is the source
of the other’s claim for his inalienable rights. Piefer claims, “man has inalienable
rights because he is created a person by the act of God, that is, an act beyond
all human discussion. In the ultimate analysis then, something is inalienably due
to man because he is creatura.”16 By reason of his being a creature of God, a
human person poses that moral demand17 to others around him. Every person is
crying out, ‘I am a person and therefore I should be treated with the dignity of
an image of God and be accorded with my right.’18 Piefer speaks of the
obligation to recognize the right of the other by describing right as something
which the person “can plead against everyone else, a right which imposes upon
every one of his partners the obligation at least not to violate it.”19 Any
disregard of these inalienable rights is a clear instance of injustice.

Secondly, the recognition of the human person’s fundamental status

highlights the issue of equality. To justly relate with others, one must start with
the realization that the other is my equal.20 Social justice is largely based on this
claim for equality.21 Our right for private properties should not compromise our

14
See ST I, q.93, a.2 and ST I, q.93, a. 4. Care must be exercised so as to distinguish the concept of the
person as the bearer of Divine image, and the person that is understood as an individual accorded with particular
honors. Aquinas advocates proportional distribution that admits the notion of the “desert” as the basis, but he
calls it as the “cause” for distribution. For Aquinas, proportional distribution should be based on the cause, and
not on ‘respect for particular person.’ He says, “respect of person is contrary to distributive justice.” (ST II-II,
q.63, a.1) Then he describes one case of ‘respect of person’ as: “in conferring something on someone, you
consider in him not the fact that what you give him is proportionate or due to him, but the fact that he is this
particular man, then there is respect for person…since you give him something simply because he is this
person.” (ST II-II, q.63, a.1)
15
Piefer even claims that when one withholds from the other the latter’s rights, the former even destroys
himself/herself in the process. He says, “the man who does not give a person what belongs to him, withholds it
or deprives him of it, is really doing harm to himself; he is the one who actually loses something – indeed in the
most extreme case, he even destroys himself.” (Four Cardinal Virtues, 47).
16
Piefer, Four Cardinal Virtues, 51.
17
“Whatever is due to a person is something that one man may demand of another as owing to him.” (Ibid.,
47)
18
For the inalienable rights, Piefer also says this: “everyone is aware however that there are rights which do
not arise out of one’s work; in other words, that man has a right to some things as his due, which has no basis in
any action of his. No one for example doubts that a man has a right to his own life.” (Ibid.)
19
Ibid, 50.
20
Equality in this sense should not however be wrongly construed as uniformity. To be equal does not
necessarily mean that everyone has to be the same. Aquinas himself admits that even in the state of innocence, a
sort of inequality occurs. Aquinas has a negative reply on the question: “whether men were equal in the state of
innocence?” (ST I, q. 96, a.3).

JOEL C. SAGUT 4
fundamental equality with others.22 Denying this fundamental equality among all
human beings will eventually lead to gross offenses against the principles of
justice.23

2. The other is a person: incommunicable and autonomous.

In addition to the truth that every human person, every “other” in this
case, is created in God’s image, one must also realize that the other, as a
person, is incommunicable and autonomous. The other is incommunicable,
which means that the human person is subsistent and absolutely distinct. The
incommunicability of the human person is reminiscent once again of the modern
concept of “alterity.” Piefer says, “to be just means to recognize the other as
other; it means to give acknowledgment even where one cannot love.” 24
Therefore, to realize the incommunicability of the human person, the best
approach for justice should be respect. To be just would require that we let the
other be the other.25 There shall be no impositions for to impose over another is
an offense against the other’s incommunicability and is thereby grossly unjust.

Furthermore, this leads us to another realization that the person is an

autonomous being. The human person is the master of his/her own actions.

21
Eleonore Stump claims that Aquinas opposes usury precisely because such practice promotes inequality,
which is against justice. “one of his reasons for opposing usury is commonly cited, namely, that the use of
money is not the kind of thing which should be sold. But he also has another reason, which shows his attitude
towards economic exchanges: it is manifest that this leads to inequality, which is contrary to justice.” (Stump,
319) Etienne Gilson also speaks of the relation between inequality and injustice, “injustice, properly so called,
consists in falsifying the equality in our relations with other persons.”(Gilson, 309)
22
This thought has started the controversy regarding to one economic measure termed as “redistributive
taxation,” which, for several thinkers, is an address to the issue about the widening gap between the rich and the
poor. The concept of “redistributive taxation” however is plagued with several ethical questions. Nevertheless,
it suggests that several people are scandalized by the undeniably wide gap between the rich and the poor. For a
good discussion about the case of redistributive taxation, see David Gordon, “Justice and Redistributive
Taxation: James Buchanan versus Ludwig von Mises,” The Review of Austrian Economics, vol. 8, no.1 (1994),
117-131.Moreover, St. Thomas himself has boldly spoken about the distribution of wealth: “goods that are held
in super abundance by some people should be used for the maintenance of the poor.” (ST II-II, q. 66, a.7). In
fact, this leads to a controversial position that “in the case of necessity everything is in common. Therefore a
person who takes somebody else’s property which necessity has made common again so far as he is concerned
does not commit sin.” (ST II-II, q.66, a.7) Eleanore Stump explains that the “the type of distribution Aquinas
recommends is designed to promote equality among people.” (Ibid.) Further, she describes Aquinas’
distribution as consisted of a “prohibition against retaining more of one’s possession than is needed.”(Ibid.)
Such prohibition “is clearly designed to keep the inequalities among persons small.” (Ibid.)
23
The wider the gap between the rich and the poor is, the more probable that injustices are happening
within the community. The wider the gap among people in terms of political opportunities and other benefits,
the more people are there who are marginalized, and in a sense, enslaved, which according to St. Thomas, is not
justifiable in the state of innocence. (ST I, q. 96, a.4)
24
Piefer, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 54.
25
Piefer claims, “a just man is just, therefore, because he sanctions another person in his very separateness
and helps him to receive his due.” (Ibid., 55) It would be worthwhile to note here that the demand of justice is
the minimum. It does not even require us to embrace the other into our life. It simply asks us to let the others be
not even as part of us but as somebody separate. This is perhaps the reason why moralists like Annette Baier
are dissatisfied with the ‘ethics of justice’ and proposed the ‘ethics of care’ instead. (see Stump, 2003) Justice is
simply a basic requirement for community living. It simply allows each individual to have a room for
expression and self-actualization.

JOEL C. SAGUT 5
Aquinas calls man as “a special case of being moved by an intrinsic principle.”26
He chooses his own paths. Man’s autonomy at the same time demands respect
from others. Any act of hindering the other to pursue his/her individualized ends
is an act of injustice. To be just, one should see to it that he has not placed any
hindrance on others’ path.

Lastly, to regulate the individualized pursuit for their respective ends,

there is a practical need for the society to pursue the common good. Any act of
one individual affecting another, when it is veering away from the common
good,27 becomes unjust. There is a subordination of one’s pursuit for individual
private happiness to that of the common good. Hence, for Aquinas, when human
persons gather together under one leadership, the ultimate gauge for the
actions of both the citizens and the leader is the pursuit of the common good.
Aquinas distinguishes the common good of the sate and the singular good of the
person: “the common good of the state and the singular good of the person do
not differ merely as many and one, for there is a formal difference.”28

The ambiguity of justice really demands that each context is weighed in lieu of
the principles enveloping the “other,” who is the concern of justice.29 But in
discerning which ways are just, Aquinas has at least given us good parameters
for consideration. Primarily, in the talk about justice, one thing ought not to be
forgotten, that is, the talk of the other. The other has inalienable right by virtue
of his being created in the image and likeness of God. Hence, the other has a
moral demand on every individual. The alterity of the other does not just
separate him/her from my grasp and manipulation, but more importantly, it
demands something from me. The notion of the “right” reminds one that he/she
has to be mindful of that moral demand that the other has imposed on him/her. 30
Secondly, Aquinas maintains that the practice of justice has to promote the
equality of men. Inequality is a fact in so far as this has been a reality even in
the state of innocence. But to attain a harmonious life within the state, the ones
in charge must look for means so as to avoid insurmountable gaps between
26
ST I-II, q.6, a.1. Aquinas also says, “forasmuch as man is rational it is necessary that man has free-will.”
(ST I, q.83, a.1).
27
Stump says, “no one ought to injure another unjustly in order to promote the common good.” (Stump,
318) This only means that injustice and the pursuit of the common good could not go together.
28
ST II-II, q.58, a.7; cf. Gilby ed., 389.
29
This is the reason why many writers have claimed that justice had to be reinforced by prudence. It is the
virtue of prudence that allows the person to cognize which of the various courses of actions is just in a given
complicated situation.
30
It is important to take note of this emphasis on one’s indebtedness to the other. The thought that the other
has imposed a moral demand on me to respond to his/her search for the “due” can serve as a measure to soften
the strong shouts of every contemporary person regarding his/her rights. Social policies may be engineered to
make people realize that the more fundamental ingredient for justice is not the demand for “my right” but in the
realization that the “other” has rights. It is the mutual recognition of rights that can perhaps mold us into equally
virtuous people. In his article in the U.S. Catholic magazine, Patrick McCormick criticizes the idea of
retributive justice that has been taught anywhere nowadays. We feel good at movies whose protagonists have
finally overcome and made even with their persecutors. But McCormick says that this type of justice
contributes even to the perpetuation of the cycle of violence in our communities. This has inspired kids, bullied
at school, to think of ways of getting even with their oppressors, thereby exercising violence over the latter in
the end. “Retribution is the thinnest part of justice,” McCormick says. But retribution is mainly premised by the
idea that ‘my rights have been offended’ and so I have to cry foul. It this has been found less effective, it might
be good to reverse the whole process.

JOEL C. SAGUT 6
people. Thirdly, Aquinas brings the talk of justice to the talk of the common
good. The ultimate criterion of a just act is its faithfulness to the common good.
Lastly, Aquinas implicitly argues that justice is the minimum requirement for
community living. Justice has to prepare the members for the higher ideal of
community living. Justice is a mere step so that the community may experience
the state of friendship, love and communion.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Corpuz, Manuel. “Redefining Justice in Philippine Situation,” Unitas 58, no.4
(1985).

de Mesa , Jose. In Solidarity with Culture: Studies in Theological Re-rooting.

Manila: Maryhill School of Theology, 1991.

Farrell, Walter. A Companion to the Summa: The Fullness of Life Vol. 3. New
York: Sheed and Ward, 1940.

Gilby, Thomas Gilby ed. Philosophical Texts. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1950.

Gilson , Etienne. The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. Indiana:

University of Notre Dame Press, 1994.

Gomez, Fausto. Promoting Justice, Love, Life. Manila: UST Publishing House,
1998.

____________. “The Relevance of St. Thomas Aquinas’ Teaching on Justice Today,”

delivered during the national conference on St Thomas Aquinas and
Contemporary Philosophy, last January 19, 2007 at the Graduate School of
the University of Santo Tomas, Philippines.

Goodwin, Robert . “Aquinas’ Justice: An Interpretation,” The New Scholasticism,

no.3 (1989).

Gordon, David. “Justice and Redistributive Taxation: James Buchanan versus

Ludwig von Mises,” The Review of Austrian Economics, vol. 8, no.1 (1994).

Lamont, Julian. “The Concept of Desert in Distributive Justice,” The Philosophical

Quarterly 44, no. 174 (1994).

McCormick, Patrick. “J is for Justice,” U.S. Catholic, Vol. 66 (July 2001).

Pieper , Josef. The Four Cardinal Virtues. Indiana: University of Notre Dame,
1975.

Stump, Eleonore. Aquinas. London: Routledge, 2005.

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