G.R. No.

L-2935 March 23, 1909

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GEORGE I. FRAN, defendant-appellant.
Judgment was rendered in the lower court on the 5th day of September, 1905. he
defendant appealed. !n the 1"th day of !ctober, 1905, the appellant filed his printed
bill of e#ceptions with the cler$ of the Supreme %ourt. !n the 5th day of &ecember,
1905, the appellant filed his brief with the cler$ of the Supreme %ourt. !n the 19th
day of January, 190', the (ttorney-)eneral filed his brief in said cause. *othing
further was done in said cause until on or about the +0th day of January, 1909, when
the respective parties were re,uested by this court to prosecute the appeal under the
penalty of having the same dismissed for failure so to do- whereupon the appellant,
by petition, had the caused placed upon the calendar and the same was heard on the
"d day of .ebruary, 1909.
he facts from the record appear to be as follows/
.irst. hat on or about the 10th day of (pril, 190+, in the city of %hicago, in the state
of 1llinois, in the 2nited States, the defendant, through a respective of the 1nsular
)overnment of the 3hilippine 1slands, entered into a contract for a period of two years
with the plaintiff, by which the defendant was to receive a salary of 1,"00 dollars per
year as a stenographer in the service of the said plaintiff, and in addition thereto was
to be paid in advance the e#penses incurred in traveling from the said city of %hicago
to 4anila, and one-half salary during said period of travel.
Second. Said contract contained a provision that in case of a violation of its terms on
the part of the defendant, he should become liable to the plaintiff for the amount
e#pended by the )overnment by way of e#penses incurred in traveling from %hicago
to 4anila and one-half salary paid during such period.
hird. he defendant entered upon the performance of his contract upon the +0th day
of (pril, 190+, and was paid half-salary from that date until June 5, 190+, the date of
his arrival in the 3hilippine 1slands.
.ourth. hat on the 11th day of .ebruary, 1905, the defendant left the service of the
plaintiff and refused to ma$e further compliance with the terms of the contract.
.ifth. !n the +d day of &ecember, 1905, the plaintiff commenced an action in the
%ourt of .irst 1nstance of the city of 4anila to recover from the defendant the sum of
"'9."+ dollars, which amount the plaintiff claimed had been paid to the defendant as
e#penses incurred in traveling from %hicago to 4anila, and as half salary for the
period consumed in travel.
Si#th. 1t was e#pressly agreed between the parties to said contract that 6aws *o. 70
and *o. ""5 should constitute a part of said contract.
o the complaint of the plaintiff the defendant filed a general denial and a special
defense, alleging in his special defense that the )overnment of the 3hilippine 1slands
had amended 6aws *o. 70 and *o. ""5 and had thereby materially altered the said
contract, and also that he was a minor at the time the contract was entered into and
was therefore not responsible under the law.
o the special defense of the defendant the plaintiff filed a demurrer, which demurrer
the court sustained.
2pon the issue thus presented, and after hearing the evidence adduced during the
trial of the cause, the lower court rendered a 8udgment against the defendant and in
favor of the plaintiff for the sum of "'5.90 dollars. he lower court found that at the
time the defendant ,uit the service of the plaintiff there was due him from the said
plaintiff the sum of +.++ dollars, leaving a balance due the plaintiff in the sum of
"'5.90 dollars. .rom this 8udgment the defendant appealed and made the following
assignments of error/
1. he court erred in sustaining plaintiff9s demurrer to defendant9s special defenses.
". he court erred in rendering 8udgment against the defendant on the facts.
:ith reference to the above assignments of error, it may be said that the mere fact
that the legislative department of the )overnment of the 3hilippine 1slands had
amended said (cts *o. 70 and *o. ""5 by the (cts *o. '5+ and *o. 1050 did not
have the effect of changing the terms of the contract made between the plaintiff and
the defendant. he legislative department of the )overnment is e#pressly prohibited
by section 5 of the (ct of %ongress of 190" from altering or changing the terms of the
contract. he right which the defendant had ac,uired by virtue of (cts *o. 70 and *o.
""5 had not been changed in any respect by the fact that said laws had been
amended. hese acts, constituting the terms of the contract, still constituted a part of
said contract and were enforceable in favor of the defendant.
he defendant alleged in his special defense that he was a minor and therefore the
contract could not be enforced against him. he record discloses that, at the time the
contract was entered into in the State of 1llinois, he was an adult under the laws of
that State and had full authority to contract. he plaintiff ;the defendant< claims that,
by reason of the fact that, under the laws of the 3hilippine 1slands at the time the
contract was made, male persons in said 1slands did not reach their ma8ority until they
had attained the age of "+ years, he was not liable under said contract, contending
that the laws of the 3hilippine 1slands governed. 1t is not disputed = upon the
contrary the fact is admitted = that at the time and place of the ma$ing of the contract
in ,uestion the defendant had full capacity to ma$e the same. *o rule is better settled
in law than that matters bearing upon the e#ecution, interpretation and validity of a
contract are determined by the law of the place where the contract is made. >Scudder
vs. 2nion *ational ?an$, 91 2. S., 50'.@ 4atters connected with its performance are
regulated by the law prevailing at the place of performance. 4atters respecting a
remedy, such as the bringing of suit, admissibility of evidence, and statutes of
limitations, depend upon the law of the place where the suit is brought. >Idem.@
he defendant9s claim that he was an adult when he left %hicago but was a minor
when he arrived at 4anila- that he was an adult at the time he made the contract but
was a minor at the time the plaintiff attempted to enforce the contract, more than a
year later, is not tenable.
!ur conclusions with reference to the first above assignment of error are, therefore/
.irst. hat the amendments to (cts *o. 70 and *o. ""5 in no way affected the terms
of the contract in ,uestion- and
Second. he plaintiff ;defendant< being fully ,ualified to enter into the contract at the
place and time the contract was made, he can not plead infancy as a defense at the
place where the contract is being enforced.
:e believe that the above conclusions also dispose of the second assignment of
error.
.or the reasons above stated, the 8udgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs.
G.R. No. 122191 Oc!o"#r $, 199$
SA%DI ARA&IAN AIRLINES, petitioner,
vs.
'O%RT OF APPEALS, MILAGROS P. MORADA a() HON. RODOLFO A. ORTI*,
+( h+, ca-ac+!. a, Pr#,+)+(/ 01)/# o2 &ra(ch $9, R#/+o(a3 Tr+a3 'o1r! o2 41#5o(
'+!., respondents.
his petition for certiorari pursuant to Aule 55 of the Aules of %ourt see$s to annul
and set aside the Aesolution
1
dated September "0, 1995 and the &ecision
2
dated
(pril 10, 199' of the %ourt of (ppeals
3
in %(-).A. S3 *o. +'5++,
6
and the !rders
5

dated (ugust "9, 1995
7
and .ebruary ", 1995
8
that were issued by the trial court in
%ivil %ase *o. B-9+-17+95.

he pertinent antecedent facts which gave rise to the instant petition, as stated in the
,uestioned &ecision
9
, are as follows/
!n January "1, 1977 defendant S(2&1( hired plaintiff as a .light (ttendant
for its airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi (rabia. . . .
!n (pril "0, 1990, while on a lay-over in Ja$arta, 1ndonesia, plaintiff went to
a disco dance with fellow crew members hamer (l-)aCCawi and (llah (l-
)aCCawi, both Saudi nationals. ?ecause it was almost morning when they
returned to their hotels, they agreed to have brea$fast together at the room
of hamer. :hen they were in te >sic@ room, (llah left on some prete#t.
Shortly after he did, hamer attempted to rape plaintiff. .ortunately, a
roomboy and several security personnel heard her cries for help and
rescued her. 6ater, the 1ndonesian police came and arrested hamer and
(llah (l-)aCCawi, the latter as an accomplice.
:hen plaintiff returned to Jeddah a few days later, several S(2&1( officials
interrogated her about the Ja$arta incident. hey then re,uested her to go
bac$ to Ja$arta to help arrange the release of hamer and (llah. 1n Ja$arta,
S(2&1( 6egal !fficer Sirah ($$ad and base manager ?aharini negotiated
with the police for the immediate release of the detained crew members but
did not succeed because plaintiff refused to cooperate. She was afraid that
she might be tric$ed into something she did not want because of her inability
to understand the local dialect. She also declined to sign a blan$ paper and
a document written in the local dialect. Dventually, S(2&1( allowed plaintiff
to return to Jeddah but barred her from the Ja$arta flights.
3laintiff learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi (rabian
government, the 1ndonesian authorities agreed to deport hamer and (llah
after two wee$s of detention. Dventually, they were again put in service by
defendant S(2&1 >sic@. 1n September 1990, defendant S(2&1( transferred
plaintiff to 4anila.
!n January 15, 199", 8ust when plaintiff thought that the Ja$arta incident
was already behind her, her superiors re,uested her to see 4r. (li 4eniewy,
%hief 6egal !fficer of S(2&1(, in Jeddah, Saudi (rabia. :hen she saw him,
he brought her to the police station where the police too$ her passport and
,uestioned her about the Ja$arta incident. 4iniewy simply stood by as the
police put pressure on her to ma$e a statement dropping the case against
hamer and (llah. *ot until she agreed to do so did the police return her
passport and allowed her to catch the afternoon flight out of Jeddah.
!ne year and a half later or on lune 1', 199+, in Aiyadh, Saudi (rabia, a few
minutes before the departure of her flight to 4anila, plaintiff was not allowed
to board the plane and instead ordered to ta$e a later flight to Jeddah to see
4r. 4iniewy, the %hief 6egal !fficer of S(2&1(. :hen she did, a certain
Ehalid of the S(2&1( office brought her to a Saudi court where she was
as$ed to sign a document written in (rabic. hey told her that this was
necessary to close the case against hamer and (llah. (s it turned out,
plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear before the court on June "0, 199+.
3laintiff then returned to 4anila.
Shortly afterwards, defendant S(2&1( summoned plaintiff to report to
Jeddah once again and see 4iniewy on June "0, 199+ for further
investigation. 3laintiff did so after receiving assurance from S(2&1(9s 4anila
manager, (slam Saleemi, that the investigation was routinary and that it
posed no danger to her.
1n Jeddah, a S(2&1( legal officer brought plaintiff to the same Saudi court
on June "0, 199+. *othing happened then but on June "7, 199+, a Saudi
8udge interrogated plaintiff through an interpreter about the Ja$arta incident.
(fter one hour of interrogation, they let her go. (t the airport, however, 8ust
as her plane was about to ta$e off, a S(2&1( officer told her that the airline
had forbidden her to ta$e flight. (t the 1nflight Service !ffice where she was
told to go, the secretary of 4r. Fahya Saddic$ too$ away her passport and
told her to remain in Jeddah, at the crew ,uarters, until further orders.
!n July +, 199+ a S(2&1( legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the same
court where the 8udge, to her astonishment and shoc$, rendered a decision,
translated to her in Dnglish, sentencing her to five months imprisonment and
to "7' lashes. !nly then did she realiCe that the Saudi court had tried her,
together with hamer and (llah, for what happened in Ja$arta. he court
found plaintiff guilty of >1@ adultery- >"@ going to a disco, dancing and
listening to the music in violation of 1slamic laws- and >+@ socialiCing with the
male crew, in contravention of 1slamic tradition.
10
.acing conviction, private respondent sought the help of her employer, petitioner
S(2&1(. 2nfortunately, she was denied any assistance. She then as$ed the
3hilippine Dmbassy in Jeddah to help her while her case is on appeal. 4eanwhile, to
pay for her up$eep, she wor$ed on the domestic flight of S(2&1(, while hamer and
(llah continued to serve in the international
flights.
11
?ecause she was wrongfully convicted, the 3rince of 4a$$ah dismissed the case
against her and allowed her to leave Saudi (rabia. Shortly before her return to
4anila,
12
she was terminated from the service by S(2&1(, without her being
informed of the cause.
!n *ovember "+, 199+, 4orada filed a %omplaint
13
for damages against S(2&1(,
and Ehaled (l-?alawi >G(l-?alawiG@, its country manager.
!n January 19, 1995, S(2&1( filed an !mnibus 4otion o &ismiss
16
which raised
the following grounds, to wit/ >1@ that the %omplaint states no cause of action against
Saudia- >"@ that defendant (l-?alawi is not a real party in interest- >+@ that the claim or
demand set forth in the %omplaint has been waived, abandoned or otherwise
e#tinguished- and >5@ that the trial court has no 8urisdiction to try the case.
!n .ebruary 10, 1995, 4orada filed her !pposition >o 4otion to &ismiss@
15
. Saudia
filed a reply
17
thereto on 4arch +, 1995.
!n June "+, 1995, 4orada filed an (mended %omplaint
18
wherein (l-?alawi was
dropped as party defendant. !n (ugust 11, 1995, Saudia filed its 4anifestation and
4otion to &ismiss (mended %omplaint
1$
.
he trial court issued an !rder
19
dated (ugust "9, 1995 denying the 4otion to
&ismiss (mended %omplaint filed by Saudia.
.rom the !rder of respondent Judge
20
denying the 4otion to &ismiss, S(2&1( filed
on September "0, 1995, its 4otion for Aeconsideration
21
of the !rder dated (ugust
"9, 1995. 1t alleged that the trial court has no 8urisdiction to hear and try the case on
the basis of (rticle "1 of the %ivil %ode, since the proper law applicable is the law of
the Eingdom of Saudi (rabia. !n !ctober 15, 1995, 4orada filed her !pposition
22

>o &efendant9s 4otion for Aeconsideration@.
1n the Aeply
23
filed with the trial court on !ctober "5, 1995, S(2&1( alleged that
since its 4otion for Aeconsideration raised lac$ of 8urisdiction as its cause of action,
the !mnibus 4otion Aule does not apply, even if that ground is raised for the first
time on appeal. (dditionally, S(2&1( alleged that the 3hilippines does not have any
substantial interest in the prosecution of the instant case, and hence, without
8urisdiction to ad8udicate the same.
Aespondent Judge subse,uently issued another !rder
26
dated .ebruary ", 1995,
denying S(2&1(9s 4otion for Aeconsideration. he pertinent portion of the assailed
!rder reads as follows/
(cting on the 4otion for Aeconsideration of defendant Saudi (rabian (irlines
filed, thru counsel, on September "0, 1995, and the !pposition thereto of the
plaintiff filed, thru counsel, on !ctober 15, 1995, as well as the Aeply
therewith of defendant Saudi (rabian (irlines filed, thru counsel, on !ctober
"5, 1995, considering that a perusal of the plaintiffs (mended %omplaint,
which is one for the recovery of actual, moral and e#emplary damages plus
attorney9s fees, upon the basis of the applicable 3hilippine law, (rticle "1 of
the *ew %ivil %ode of the 3hilippines, is, clearly, within the 8urisdiction of this
%ourt as regards the sub8ect matter, and there being nothing new of
substance which might cause the reversal or modification of the order
sought to be reconsidered, the motion for reconsideration of the defendant,
is &D*1D&.
S! !A&DAD&.
25
%onse,uently, on .ebruary "0, 1995, S(2&1( filed its 3etition for Certiorari and
3rohibition with 3rayer for 1ssuance of :rit of 3reliminary 1n8unction andHor emporary
Aestraining !rder
27
with the %ourt of (ppeals.
Aespondent %ourt of (ppeals promulgated a Aesolution with emporary Aestraining
!rder
28
dated .ebruary "+, 1995, prohibiting the respondent Judge from further
conducting any proceeding, unless otherwise directed, in the interim.
1n another Aesolution
2$
promulgated on September "0, 1995, now assailed, the
appellate court denied S(2&1(9s 3etition for the 1ssuance of a :rit of 3reliminary
1n8unction dated .ebruary 17, 1995, to wit/
he 3etition for the 1ssuance of a :rit of 3reliminary 1n8unction is hereby
&D*1D&, after considering the (nswer, with 3rayer to &eny :rit of
3reliminary 1n8unction >Rollo, p. 1+5@ the Aeply and Ae8oinder, it appearing
that herein petitioner is not clearly entitled thereto >Unciano Paramedical
College, et. Al., v. Court of Appeals, et. Al., 100335, April 7, 13, !econd
"ivision@.
S! !A&DAD&.
!n !ctober "0, 1995, S(2&1( filed with this Ionorable %ourt the instant 3etition
29

for Aeview with 3rayer for emporary Aestraining !rder dated !ctober 1+, 1995.
Iowever, during the pendency of the instant 3etition, respondent %ourt of (ppeals
rendered the &ecision
30
dated (pril 10, 199', now also assailed. 1t ruled that the
3hilippines is an appropriate forum considering that the (mended %omplaint9s basis
for recovery of damages is (rticle "1 of the %ivil %ode, and thus, clearly within the
8urisdiction of respondent %ourt. 1t further held that certiorari is not the proper remedy
in a denial of a 4otion to &ismiss, inasmuch as the petitioner should have proceeded
to trial, and in case of an adverse ruling, find recourse in an appeal.
!n 4ay 0, 199', S(2&1( filed its Supplemental 3etition for Aeview with 3rayer for
emporary Aestraining !rder
31
dated (pril +0, 199', given due course by this %ourt.
(fter both parties submitted their 4emoranda,
32
the instant case is now deemed
submitted for decision.
3etitioner S(2&1( raised the following issues/
1
he trial court has no 8urisdiction to hear and try %ivil %ase *o. B-9+-17+95
based on (rticle "1 of the *ew %ivil %ode since the proper law applicable is
the law of the Eingdom of Saudi (rabia inasmuch as this case involves what
is $nown in private international law as a Gconflicts problemG. !therwise, the
Aepublic of the 3hilippines will sit in 8udgment of the acts done by another
sovereign state which is abhorred.
11
6eave of court before filing a supplemental pleading is not a 8urisdictional
re,uirement. ?esides, the matter as to absence of leave of court is now
moot and academic when this Ionorable %ourt re,uired the respondents to
comment on petitioner9s (pril +0, 199' Supplemental 3etition .or Aeview
:ith 3rayer .or ( emporary Aestraining !rder :ithin en >10@ &ays .rom
*otice hereof. .urther, the Aevised Aules of %ourt should be construed
with liberality pursuant to Section ", Aule 1 thereof.
111
3etitioner received on (pril "", 199' the (pril 10, 199' decision in %(-).A.
S3 *!. +'5++ entitled GSaudi (rabian (irlines v. Ion. Aodolfo (. !rtiC, et
al.G and filed its (pril +0, 199' Supplemental 3etition .or Aeview :ith 3rayer
.or ( emporary Aestraining !rder on 4ay 0, 199' at 10/"9 a.m. or within
the 15-day reglementary period as provided for under Section 1, Aule 55 of
the Aevised Aules of %ourt. herefore, the decision in %(-).A. S3 *!.
+'5++ has not yet become final and e#ecutory and this Ionorable %ourt can
ta$e cogniCance of this case.
33
.rom the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents, the following issues emerge
for our resolution/
1.
:IDIDA ADS3!*&D* (33D66(D %!2A DAAD& 1*
I!6&1*) I( ID AD)1!*(6 A1(6 %!2A !. B2DJ!*
%1F I(S J2A1S&1%1!* ! ID(A (*& AF %1K16 %(SD *!.
B-9+-17+95 D*16D& G416()A!S 3. 4!A(&( K. S(2&1
(A(?1(* (1A61*DSG.
11.
:IDIDA ADS3!*&D* (33D66(D %!2A DAAD& 1*
A261*) I( 1* I1S %(SD 3I161331*D 6(: SI!26&
)!KDA*.
3etitioner S(2&1( claims that before us is a conflict of laws that must be settled at
the outset. 1t maintains that private respondent9s claim for alleged abuse of rights
occurred in the Eingdom of Saudi (rabia. 1t alleges that the e#istence of a foreign
element ,ualifies the instant case for the application of the law of the Eingdom of
Saudi (rabia, by virtue of the le# loci delicti commissi rule.
36
!n the other hand, private respondent contends that since her (mended %omplaint is
based on (rticles 19
35
and "1
37
of the %ivil %ode, then the instant case is properly a
matter of domestic law.
38
2nder the factual antecedents obtaining in this case, there is no dispute that the
interplay of events occurred in two states, the 3hilippines and Saudi (rabia.
(s stated by private respondent in her (mended %omplaint
3$
dated June "+, 1995/
". &efendant S(2&1 (A(?1(* (1A61*DS or S(2&1( is a foreign airlines
corporation doing business in the 3hilippines. 1t may be served with
summons and other court processes at ravel :ide (ssociated Sales
>3hils.@. 1nc., +rd .loor, %ougar ?uilding, 115 Kalero St., Salcedo Killage,
4a$ati, 4etro 4anila.
### ### ###
'. 3laintiff learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi (rabian
government, the 1ndonesian authorities agreed to deport hamer and (llah
after two wee$s of detention. Dventually, they were again put in service by
defendant S(2&1(. In !eptem$er 10, defendant !AU"IA transferred
plaintiff to %anila.
0. &n 'anuar( 1), 1*, +ust ,-en plaintiff t-oug-t t-at t-e 'a.arta incident
,as alread( $e-ind -er, -er superiors reauested -er to see %R. Ali
%enie,(, C-ief /egal &fficer of !AU"IA in 'edda-, !audi Ara$ia. :hen she
saw him, he brought her to the police station where the police too$ her
passport and ,uestioned her about the Ja$arta incident. 4iniewy simply
stood by as the police put pressure on her to ma$e a statement dropping the
case against hamer and (llah. *ot until she agreed to do so did the police
return her passport and allowed her to catch the afternoon flight out of
Jeddah.
7. !ne year and a half later or on June 1', 199+, in Aiyadh, Saudi (rabia, a
few minutes before the departure of her flight to 4anila, plaintiff was not
allowed to board the plane and instead ordered to ta$e a later flight to
Jeddah to see 4r. 4eniewy, the %hief 6egal !fficer of S(2&1(. :hen she
did, a certain Ehalid of the S(2&1( office brought her to a Saudi court where
she was as$ed to sigh a document written in (rabic. hey told her that this
was necessary to close the case against hamer and (llah. (s it turned out,
plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear before the court on June "0, 199+.
Plaintiff t-en returned to %anila.
9. !-ortl( after,ards, defendant !AU"IA summoned plaintiff to report to
'edda- once again and see %inie,( on 'une *7, 13 for furt-er
investigation. Plaintiff did so after receiving assurance from !AU"IA0s
%anila manger, Aslam !aleemi, t-at t-e investigation ,as routinar( and t-at
it posed no danger to -er.
10. 1n Jeddah, a S(2&1( legal officer brought plaintiff to the same Saudi
court on June "0, 199+. *othing happened then but on June "7, 199+, a
Saudi 8udge interrogated plaintiff through an interpreter about the Ja$arta
incident. (fter one hour of interrogation, they let her go. (t the airport,
however, 8ust as her plane was about to ta$e off, a S(2&1( officer told her
that the airline had forbidden her to ta$e that flight. (t the 1nflight Service
!ffice where she was told to go, the secretary of 4r. Fahya Saddic$ too$
away her passport and told her to remain in Jeddah, at the crew ,uarters,
until further orders.
11. !n July +, 199+ a S(2&1( legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the
same court where the 8udge, to her astonishment and shoc$, rendered a
decision, translated to her in Dnglish, sentencing her to five months
imprisonment and to "7' lashes. !nly then did she realiCe that the Saudi
court had tried her, together with hamer and (llah, for what happened in
Ja$arta. he court found plaintiff guilty of >1@ adultery- >"@ going to a disco,
dancing, and listening to the music in violation of 1slamic laws- >+@ socialiCing
with the male crew, in contravention of 1slamic tradition.
1". 1ecause !AU"IA refused to lend -er a -and in t-e case, plaintiff soug-t
t-e -elp of t-e P-ilippines 2m$ass( in 'edda-. he latter helped her pursue
an appeal from the decision of the court. o pay for her up$eep, she wor$ed
on the domestic flights of defendant S(2&1( while, ironically, hamer and
(llah freely served the international flights.
39
:here the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the e#istence of a foreign
element, we agree with petitioner that the problem herein could present a GconflictsG
case.
( factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws
of two or more states is said to contain a Gforeign elementG. he presence of a foreign
element is inevitable since social and economic affairs of individuals and associations
are rarely confined to the geographic limits of their birth or conception.
60
he forms in which this foreign element may appear are many.
61
he foreign element
may simply consist in the fact that one of the parties to a contract is an alien or has a
foreign domicile, or that a contract between nationals of one State involves properties
situated in another State. 1n other cases, the foreign element may assume a comple#
form.
62
1n the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private respondent
4orada is a resident 3hilippine national, and that petitioner S(2&1( is a resident
foreign corporation. (lso, by virtue of the employment of 4orada with the petitioner
Saudia as a flight stewardess, events did transpire during her many occasions of
travel across national borders, particularly from 4anila, 3hilippines to Jeddah, Saudi
(rabia, and vice versa, that caused a GconflictsG situation to arise.
:e thus find private respondent9s assertion that the case is purely domestic,
imprecise. ( conflicts problem presents itself here, and the ,uestion of 8urisdiction
63

confronts the court a 3uo.
(fter a careful study of the private respondent9s (mended %omplaint,
66
and the
%omment thereon, we note that she aptly predicated her cause of action on (rticles
19 and "1 of the *ew %ivil %ode.
!n one hand, (rticle 19 of the *ew %ivil %ode provides/
(rt. 19. Dvery person must, in the e#ercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with 8ustice give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith.
!n the other hand, (rticle "1 of the *ew %ivil %ode provides/
(rt. "1. (ny person who willfully causes loss or in8ury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for damages.
hus, in P-ilippine 4ational 1an. 5P416 vs. Court of Appeals,
65
this %ourt held that/
he aforecited provisions on human relations were intended to e#pand the
concept of torts in this 8urisdiction by granting ade,uate legal remedy for the
untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
specifically provide in the statutes.
(lthough (rticle 19 merely declares a principle of law, (rticle "1 gives flesh to its
provisions. hus, we agree with private respondent9s assertion that violations of
(rticles 19 and "1 are actionable, with 8udicially enforceable remedies in the
municipal forum.
?ased on the allegations
67
in the (mended %omplaint, read in the light of the Aules
of %ourt on 8urisdiction
68
we find that the Aegional rial %ourt >A%@ of BueCon %ity
possesses 8urisdiction over the sub8ect matter of the suit.
6$
1ts authority to try and
hear the case is provided for under Section 1 of Aepublic (ct *o. 0'91, to wit/
Sec. 1. Section 19 of ?atas 3ambansa ?lg. 1"9, otherwise $nown as the
GJudiciary AeorganiCation (ct of 1970G, is hereby amended to read as
follows/
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in %ivil %ases. = Aegional rial %ourts shall e#ercise
e#clusive 8urisdiction/
### ### ###
>7@ 1n all other cases in which demand, e#clusive of interest,
damages of ,-atever .ind, attorney9s fees, litigation e#penses, and
cots or the value of the property in controversy e#ceeds !ne
hundred thousand pesos >3100,000.00@ or, in such other cases in
4etro 4anila, where the demand, e#clusive of the above-
mentioned items e#ceeds wo hundred housand pesos
>3"00,000.00@. >Dmphasis ours@
### ### ###
(nd following Section " >b@, Aule 5 of the Aevised Aules of %ourt = the venue,
BueCon %ity, is appropriate/
Sec. " Kenue in %ourts of .irst 1nstance. = ;*ow Aegional rial %ourt<
>a@ ### ### ###
>b@ 3ersonal actions. = (ll other actions may be commenced and tried
where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or
where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiff resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
3ragmatic considerations, including the convenience of the parties, also weigh
heavily in favor of the A% BueCon %ity assuming 8urisdiction. 3aramount is the
private interest of the litigant. Dnforceability of a 8udgment if one is obtained is ,uite
obvious. Aelative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial are e,ually important.
3laintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, Gve#G, GharassG, or GoppressG the
defendant, e.g. by inflicting upon him needless e#pense or disturbance. ?ut unless
the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should
rarely be disturbed.
69
:eighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a 3uo found it best to hear the
case in the 3hilippines. Iad it refused to ta$e cogniCance of the case, it would be
forcing plaintiff >private respondent now@ to see$ remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the
Eingdom of Saudi (rabia where she no longer maintains substantial connections.
hat would have caused a fundamental unfairness to her.
4oreover, by hearing the case in the 3hilippines no unnecessary difficulties and
inconvenience have been shown by either of the parties. he choice of forum of the
plaintiff >now private respondent@ should be upheld.
Similarly, the trial court also possesses 8urisdiction over the persons of the parties
herein. ?y filing her %omplaint and (mended %omplaint with the trial court, private
respondent has voluntary submitted herself to the 8urisdiction of the court.
he records show that petitioner S(2&1( has filed several motions
50
praying for the
dismissal of 4orada9s (mended %omplaint. S(2&1( also filed an (nswer 1n 2#
A$undante Cautelam dated .ebruary "0, 1995. :hat is very patent and e#plicit from
the motions filed, is that S(2&1( prayed for other reliefs under the premises.
2ndeniably, petitioner S(2&1( has effectively submitted to the trial court9s 8urisdiction
by praying for the dismissal of the (mended %omplaint on grounds other than lac$ of
8urisdiction.
(s held by this %ourt in Repu$lic vs. 7er and Compan(, /td./
51
:e observe that the motion to dismiss filed on (pril 15, 19'", aside from
disputing the lower court9s 8urisdiction over defendant9s person, prayed for
dismissal of the complaint on the ground that plaintiff9s cause of action has
prescribed. ?y interposing such second ground in its motion to dismiss, Eer
and %o., 6td. availed of an affirmative defense on the basis of which it
prayed the court to resolve controversy in its favor. .or the court to validly
decide the said plea of defendant Eer L %o., 6td., it necessarily had to
ac,uire 8urisdiction upon the latter9s person, who, being the proponent of the
affirmative defense, should be deemed to have abandoned its special
appearance and voluntarily submitted itself to the 8urisdiction of the court.
Similarly, the case of "e %idgel( vs. 8erandos, held that-
:hen the appearance is by motion for the purpose of ob8ecting to the
8urisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate
purpose of ob8ecting to the 8urisdiction of the court. 1f his motion is for any
other purpose than to ob8ect to the 8urisdiction of the court over his person,
he thereby submits himself to the 8urisdiction of the court. ( special
appearance by motion made for the purpose of ob8ecting to the 8urisdiction of
the court over the person will be held to be a general appearance, if the
party in said motion should, for e#ample, as$ for a dismissal of the action
upon the further ground that the court had no 8urisdiction over the sub8ect
matter.
52
%learly, petitioner had submitted to the 8urisdiction of the Aegional rial %ourt of
BueCon %ity. hus, we find that the trial court has 8urisdiction over the case and that
its e#ercise thereof, 8ustified.
(s to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-law problems see$ to
answer two important ,uestions/ >1@ :hat legal system should control a given
situation where some of the significant facts occurred in two or more states- and >"@ to
what e#tent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation.
53
Several theories have been propounded in order to identify the legal system that
should ultimately control. (lthough ideally, all choice-of-law theories should
intrinsically advance both notions of 8ustice and predictability, they do not always do
so. he forum is then faced with the problem of deciding which of these two important
values should be stressed.
56
?efore a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what category
a certain set of facts or rules fall. his process is $nown as GcharacteriCationG, or the
Gdoctrine of ,ualificationG. 1t is the Gprocess of deciding whether or not the facts relate
to the $ind of ,uestion specified in a conflicts rule.G
55
he purpose of
GcharacteriCationG is to enable the forum to select the proper law.
57
!ur starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual situation, event,
or operative fact.
58
(n essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a GtestG or
Gconnecting factorG or Gpoint of contactG. %hoice-of-law rules invariably consist of a
factual relationship >such as property right, contract claim@ and a connecting factor or
point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of celebration, the place of
performance, or the place of wrongdoing.
5$
*ote that one or more circumstances may be present to serve as the possible test for
the determination of the applicable law.
59
hese Gtest factorsG or Gpoints of contactG or
Gconnecting factorsG could be any of the following/
>1@ he nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of
so8ourn, or his origin-
>"@ the seat of a legal or 8uridical person, such as a corporation-
>+@ the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be
situated. 1n particular, the le# situs is decisive when real rights are involved-
>5@ t-e place ,-ere an act -as $een done, t-e locus actus, suc- as t-e
place ,-ere a contract -as $een made, a marriage cele$rated, a ,ill signed
or a tort committed. 9-e le# loci actus is particularl( important in contracts
and torts:
>5@ the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of
performance of contractual duties, or the place where a power of attorney is
to be e#ercised-
>'@ the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern
their agreement, the le# loci intentionis-
>0@ the place where 8udicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or
done. he le# fori = the law of the forum = is particularly important
because, as we have seen earlier, matters of GprocedureG not going to the
substance of the claim involved are governed by it- and because the le# fori
applies whenever the content of the otherwise applicable foreign law is
e#cluded from application in a given case for the reason that it falls under
one of the e#ceptions to the applications of foreign law- and
>7@ the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal
relationships of the ship and of its master or owner as such. 1t also covers
contractual relationships particularly contracts of affreightment.
70
>Dmphasis
ours.@
(fter a careful study of the pleadings on record, including allegations in the (mended
%omplaint deemed admitted for purposes of the motion to dismiss, we are convinced
that there is reasonable basis for private respondent9s assertion that although she
was already wor$ing in 4anila, petitioner brought her to Jeddah on the pretense that
she would merely testify in an investigation of the charges she made against the two
S(2&1( crew members for the attac$ on her person while they were in Ja$arta. (s it
turned out, she was the one made to face trial for very serious charges, including
adultery and violation of 1slamic laws and tradition.
here is li$ewise logical basis on record for the claim that the Ghanding overG or
Gturning overG of the person of private respondent to Jeddah officials, petitioner may
have acted beyond its duties as employer. 3etitioner9s purported act contributed to
and amplified or even pro#imately caused additional humiliation, misery and suffering
of private respondent. 3etitioner thereby allegedly facilitated the arrest, detention and
prosecution of private respondent under the guise of petitioner9s authority as
employer, ta$ing advantage of the trust, confidence and faith she reposed upon it. (s
purportedly found by the 3rince of 4a$$ah, the alleged conviction and imprisonment
of private respondent was wrongful. ?ut these capped the in8ury or harm allegedly
inflicted upon her person and reputation, for which petitioner could be liable as
claimed, to provide compensation or redress for the wrongs done, once duly proven.
%onsidering that the complaint in the court a 3uo is one involving torts, the
Gconnecting factorG or Gpoint of contactG could be the place or places where the
tortious conduct or le# loci actus occurred. (nd applying the torts principle in a
conflicts case, we find that the 3hilippines could be said as a situs of the tort >the
place where the alleged tortious conduct too$ place@. his is because it is in the
3hilippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a .ilipina residing
and wor$ing here. (ccording to her, she had honestly believed that petitioner would,
in the e#ercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties, Gact with 8ustice, give
her due and observe honesty and good faith.G 1nstead, petitioner failed to protect her,
she claimed. hat certain acts or parts of the in8ury allegedly occurred in another
country is of no moment. .or in our view what is important here is the place where the
over-all harm or the totality of the alleged in8ury to the person, reputation, social
standing and human rights of complainant, had lodged, according to the plaintiff
below >herein private respondent@. (ll told, it is not without basis to identify the
3hilippines as the situs of the alleged tort.
4oreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of le# loci delicti
commissi, modern theories and rules on tort liability
71
have been advanced to offer
fresh 8udicial approaches to arrive at 8ust results. 1n $eeping abreast with the modern
theories on tort liability, we find here an occasion to apply the GState of the most
significant relationshipG rule, which in our view should be appropriate to apply now,
given the factual conte#t of this case.
1n applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant
relationship, the following contacts are to be ta$en into account and evaluated
according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue/ >a@ the place
where the in8ury occurred- >b@ the place where the conduct causing the in8ury
occurred- >c@ the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties, and >d@ the place where the relationship, if any, between the
parties is centered.
72
(s already discussed, there is basis for the claim that over-all in8ury occurred and
lodged in the 3hilippines. here is li$ewise no ,uestion that private respondent is a
resident .ilipina national, wor$ing with petitioner, a resident foreign corporation
engaged here in the business of international air carriage. hus, the GrelationshipG
between the parties was centered here, although it should be stressed that this suit is
not based on mere labor law violations. .rom the record, the claim that the
3hilippines has the most significant contact with the matter in this dispute,
73
raised by
private respondent as plaintiff below against defendant >herein petitioner@, in our view,
has been properly established.
3rescinding from this premise that the 3hilippines is the situs of the tort complained of
and the place Ghaving the most interest in the problemG, we find, by way of
recapitulation, that the 3hilippine law on tort liability should have paramount
application to and control in the resolution of the legal issues arising out of this case.
.urther, we hold that the respondent Aegional rial %ourt has 8urisdiction over the
parties and the sub8ect matter of the complaint- the appropriate venue is in BueCon
%ity, which could properly apply 3hilippine law. 4oreover, we find untenable
petitioner9s insistence that G;s<ince private respondent instituted this suit, she has the
burden of pleading and proving the applicable Saudi law on the matter.G
76
(s aptly
said by private respondent, she has Gno obligation to plead and prove the law of the
Eingdom of Saudi (rabia since her cause of action is based on (rticles 19 and "1G of
the %ivil %ode of the 3hilippines. 1n her (mended %omplaint and subse,uent
pleadings, she never alleged that Saudi law should govern this case.
75
(nd as
correctly held by the respondent appellate court, Gconsidering that it was the petitioner
who was invo$ing the applicability of the law of Saudi (rabia, then the burden was on
it ;petitioner< to plead and to establish what the law of Saudi (rabia isG.
77
6astly, no error could be imputed to the respondent appellate court in upholding the
trial court9s denial of defendant9s >herein petitioner9s@ motion to dismiss the case. *ot
only was 8urisdiction in order and venue properly laid, but appeal after trial was
obviously available, and e#peditious trial itself indicated by the nature of the case at
hand. 1ndubitably, the 3hilippines is the state intimately concerned with the ultimate
outcome of the case below, not 8ust for the benefit of all the litigants, but also for the
vindication of the country9s system of law and 8ustice in a transnational setting. :ith
these guidelines in mind, the trial court must proceed to try and ad8udge the case in
the light of relevant 3hilippine law, with due consideration of the foreign element or
elements involved. *othing said herein, of course, should be construed as pre8udging
the results of the case in any manner whatsoever.
:IDAD.!AD, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby &1S41SSD&. %ivil %ase *o.
B-9+-17+95 entitled G4ilagros 3. 4orada vs. Saudi (rabia (irlinesG is hereby
AD4(*&D& to Aegional rial %ourt of BueCon %ity, ?ranch 79 for further
proceedings.
S! !A&DAD&.
9G.R. No. 119761. Ma. 18, 1997:
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, IN'., -#!+!+o(#r, ;,. 'O%RT OF APPEALS, DR.
0OSEFINO MIRANDA a() L%ISA MIRANDA, r#,-o()#(!,.
SF66(?2S
1. %1K16 6(:- !?61)(1!*S (*& %!*A(%S- %!*A(% !. (1A
%(AA1()D- ( AD6(1!* (D*&D& :1I 32?61% &2F- &1S%!2AD!2S
%!*&2% !:(A&S ( 3(SSD*)DA )1KDS A1SD .!A (* (%1!* .!A
&(4()DS. - he %ourt has time and again ruled, and it cannot be over-emphasiCed,
that a contract of air carriage generates a relation attended with a public duty and any
discourteous conduct on the part of a carrierMs employee toward a passenger gives
the latter an action for damages and, more so, where there is bad faith. :hile it may
be true that there was no direct evidence on record of blatant rudeness on the part of
3(6 employees towards the 4irandas, the fact that private respondents were
practically compelled to haggle for accommodations, a situation unbefitting persons of
their stature, is rather demeaning and it parta$es of discourtesy magnified by 3(6Ms
condescending attitude. 4oreover, it cannot be denied that the 3(6 employees herein
concerned were definitely less than candid, to put it mildly, when they withheld
information from private respondents that they could actually be accommodated in a
hotel of their choice.
". AD4D&1(6 6(:- DK1&D*%D- .1*&1*)S !. ID A1(6 (*& (33D66(D
%!2A !* ID DN1SD*%D !. ?(& .(1I !* ID 3(A !. ID %(AA1DA,
)D*DA(66F *! &1S2A?D& !* (33D(6. - 1t is settled that bad faith must be
duly proved and not merely presumed. he e#istence of bad faith, being a factual
,uestion, and the Supreme %ourt not being a trier of facts, the findings thereon of the
trial court as well as of the %ourt of (ppeals shall not be disturbed on appeal and are
entitled to great weight and respect. Said findings are final and conclusive upon the
Supreme %ourt e#cept, inter alia, where the findings of the %ourt of (ppeals and the
trial court are contrary to each other.
+. 1&.- 1&.- 1&.- %(SD ( ?(A. - 1t is evident that the issues raised in this petition are
the correctness of the factual findings of the %ourt of (ppeals of bad faith on the part
of petitioner and the award of damages against it. his %ourt has consistently held
that the findings of the %ourt of (ppeals and the other lower courts are as a rule
binding upon it, sub8ect to certain e#ceptions created by case law. (s nothing in the
record indicates any of such e#ceptions, the factual conclusions of the appellate court
must be affirmed.
5. %1K16 6(:- &(4()DS- 4!A(6 &(4()DS- AD%!KDA(?6D 1* ( ?AD(%I !.
%!*A(% (D*&D& :1I .A(2& !A ?(& .(1I- 1*(D*1!* ! (*&
6(%E !. %(AD .!A 1*DADSS !. 3(SSD*)DAS (4!2*S ! ?(& .(1I. -
1t is now firmly settled that moral damages are recoverable in suits predicated on
breach of a contract of carriage where it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud
or bad faith. 1nattention to and lac$ of care for the interests of its passengers who are
entitled to its utmost consideration, particularly as to their convenience, amount to
bad faith which entitles the passenger to an award of moral damages. :hat the law
considers as bad faith which may furnish the ground for an award of moral damages
would be bad faith in securing the contract and in the e#ecution thereof, as well as in
the enforcement of its terms, or any other $ind of deceit. Such unprofessional and
prescribed conduct is attributable to petitioner airline in the case at bar and the
adverse doctrinal rule is accordingly applicable to it.
5. 1&.- 1&.- 1&.- (:(A&D& ! %!43D*S(D 36(1*1..MS 1*J2A1DS. - 1t must, of
course, be borne in mind that moral damages are not awarded to penaliCe the
defendant but to compensate the plaintiff for the in8uries he may have suffered.
'. 1&.- 1&.- DND436(AF &(4()DS- (:(A&D& :IDAD &D.D*&(* (%D& 1*
:(*!*, .A(2&26D* (*& !33ADSS1KD 4(**DA. - 1n a contractual or ,uasi-
contractual relationship, e#emplary damages, on the other hand, may be awarded
only if the defendant had acted in a wanton, fraudulent, rec$less, oppressive or
malevolent manner.
0. 1&.- 1&.- (!A*DFMS .DDS- (:(A&D& :IDAD IDAD 1S ( .1*&1*) !. ?(&
.(1I- %(SD ( ?(A. - (ttorneyMs fees in the concept of damages may be awarded
where there is a finding of bad faith. he evidence on record amply sustains, and we
correspondingly find, that the awards assessed against petitioner on the aforestated
items of damages are 8ustified and reasonable.
7. 1&.- !?61)(1!*S (*& %!*A(%S- %!*A(% !. (1A %(AA1()D-
61(?161F !. %(AA1DA *! 6141D& ?F ID 3A!K1S1!*S !. :(AS(:
%!*KD*1!*. - (lthough the :arsaw %onvention has the force and effect of law in
this country, being a treaty commitment assumed by the 3hilippine government, said
convention does not operate as an e#clusive enumeration of the instances for
declaring a carrier liable for breach of contract of carriage or as an absolute limit of
the e#tent of that liability. he :arsaw %onvention declares the carrier liable in the
enumerated cases and under certain limitations. Iowever, it must not be construed to
preclude the operation of the %ivil %ode and pertinent laws. 1t does not regulate,
much less e#empt, the carrier from liability for damages for violating the rights of its
passengers under the contract of carriage, especially if willful misconduct on the part
of the carrierMs employees is found or established. >%athay 3acific (irways, 6td. vs.
%ourt of (ppeals, et al., ).A. *o. '0501, 4arch 5, 199+@
D E ' I S I O N
1n this appeal by certiorari, petitioner 3hilippine (irlines, 1nc. >3(6@ assails the
decision of respondent %ourt of (ppeals in %(-).A. %K *o.
"9150
1
which affirmed the 8udgment of the trial court finding herein petitioner liable as
follows/
:herefore, premises considered, 8udgment is hereby rendered ordering the
defendant, 3hilippine (irlines or 3(6, to pay to the plaintiffs, &r. Josefino
4iranda and 6uisa 4iranda, the sum of 3100,000.00 as moral damages-
3+0,000.00 as e#emplary or corrective damages- 310,000.00 as attorney9s
fees- and the costs.

he factual antecedents of the present petition reveal that sometime in 4ay, 1977, &r.
Josefino 4iranda and his wife, 6uisa, who were residents of Surigao %ity, went to the
2nited States of (merica on a regular flight of 3hilippine (irlines, 1nc. >3(6@. !n June
19, 1977, after a stay of over a month there, they obtained confirmed boo$ings from
3(69s San .rancisco !ffice for 3(6 .light 3A 101 from San .rancisco to 4anila via
Ionolulu on June "1, 1977- 3(6 flight 3A 751 from 4anila to %ebu on June "5, 1977-
and 3(6 .light 3A 905 from %ebu to Surigao also on June "5, 1977.
(ccordingly, on June "1, 1977, private respondents boarded 3(6 .light 3A 101 in
San .rancisco with five >5@ pieces of baggage. (fter a stopover at Ionolulu, and upon
arrival in 4anila on June "+, 1977, they were told by the 3(6 personnel that their
baggage consisting of two $ali.$a(an bo#es, two pieces of luggage and one fishing
rod case were off-loaded at Ionolulu, Iawaii due to weight limitations. %onse,uently,
private respondents missed their connecting flight from 4anila to %ebu %ity, as
originally scheduled, since they had to wait for their baggage which arrived the
following day, June "5, 1977, after their pre-scheduled connecting flight had left. hey
conse,uently also missed their other scheduled connecting flight from %ebu %ity to
Surigao %ity.
!n June "5, 1977, they departed for %ebu %ity and therefrom private respondents
had to transfer to 3(6 .light 501 for Surigao %ity. !n the way to Surigao %ity, the pilot
announced that they had to return to 4actan (irport due to some mechanical
problem. :hile at 4actan (irport, the passengers were provided by 3(6 with lunch
and were boo$ed for the afternoon flight to Surigao %ity. Iowever, said flight was also
canceled.
Since there were no more lights for Surigao %ity that day, private respondents as$ed
to be billeted at the %ebu 3laCa Iotel where they usually stay whenever they happen
to be in %ebu %ity. hey were, however, told by the 3(6 employees that they could
not be accommodated at said hotel supposedly because it was fully boo$ed.
%ontrarily, when &r. 4iranda called the hotel, he was informed that he and his wife
could be accommodated there. (lthough reluctant at first, 3(6 eventually agreed to
private respondents9 overnight stay at said hotel. !scar JereCa, 3(6 duty manager,
approved the corresponding hotel authority with standard meals. 1t was only after
private respondents9 insistence that their meals be ordered a la carte that they were
allowed to do so by 3(6 provided that they sign for their orders.
1nasmuch as the shuttle bus had already left by the time private respondents were
ready to go to the hotel, 3(6 offered them 3150.00 to include the fare for the return
trip to the airport. &r. 4iranda as$ed for 3150.00 more as he and his wife, along with
all of their baggage, could not be accommodated in 8ust one ta#i, aside from the need
for tipping money for hotel boys. 2pon refusal of this simple re,uest, &r. 4iranda then
declared that he would forego the amenities offered by 3(6. hus, the voucher for
3150.00 and the authority for the hotel accommodations prepared by 3(6 were
voided due to private respondents9 decision not to avail themselves thereof.
o aggravate the muddled situation, when private respondents tried to retrieve their
baggage, they were told this time that the same were loaded on another earlier 3(6
flight to Surigao %ity. hus, private respondents proceeded to the hotel sans their
baggage and of which they were deprived for the remainder of their trip. 3rivate
respondents were finally able to leave on board the first 3(6 flight to Surigao %ity only
on June "', 1977. hereafter, they instituted an action for damages which, after trial
as well as on appeal, was decided in their favor.
3etitioner 3(6 has come to us via the instant petition for review on certiorari, wherein
it challenges the affirmatory decision of respondent %ourt of (ppeals
3
>1@ for applying
(rticles """0, ""+" and ""07 of the %ivil %ode when it sustained the award of the
court a 3uo for moral and e#emplary damages and attorney9s fees despite absence of
bad faith on its part- and >"@ for not applying the e#press provisions of the contract of
carriage and pertinent provisions of the :arsaw %onvention limiting its liability to
2SO"0.00 per $ilo of baggage.
1. (nent the first issue, petitioner argues that there was no bad faith on its part for
while there was admittedly a delay in fulfilling its obligation under the contract of
carriage with respect to the transport of passengers and the delivery of their baggage,
such delay was 8ustified by the paramount consideration of ensuring the safety of its
passengers. 1t li$ewise maintains that its employees treated private respondents fairly
and with courtesy to the e#tent of acceding to most of their demands in order to
mitigate the inconvenience occasioned by the measures underta$en by the airline to
ensure passenger safety.
6
1t reiterated its position that the off-loading of private respondents9 baggage was due
to Gweight limitations,G as lengthily e#plained by petitioner from an aeronautically
technical viewpoint,
5
ta$ing into consideration such variable factors as flight distance,
weather, air resistance, runway condition and fuel re,uirement. )iven the variable
weather conditions, it claimed that the weight limitation for each flight can only be
ascertained shortly before ta$e-off. :hile admittedly there would be a resulting
inconvenience in the accommodations of the passengers and the handling of their
cargo, the same is outweighed by the paramount concern for the safety of the flight.
3etitioner moreover impugns the %ourt of (ppeal9s allegedly improper reliance on the
inaccurate interpretation of the testimony of 3(69s baggage service representative,
Ddgar 4onde8ar, < that private respondents9 baggage were off-loaded to give
preference to baggage andHor cargo originating from Ionolulu. 3(6 argues that
4onde8ar9s $nowledge of what transpired in Ionolulu was merely based on the tele#
report forwarded to 3(69s 4anila station stating that the off-loading was due to weight
limitations.
7
3etitioner enumerates the following incidents as indicative of its good faith in dealing
with private respondents/ >1@ he cancellation of the flight to Surigao %ity due to
mechanicalHengine trouble was to ensure the safety of passengers and cargo- >"@ 3(6
offered to shoulder private respondents9 preferred accommodations, meals and
transportation while in %ebu %ity with more than the usual amenities given in cases of
flight disruption, and gave them priority in the following day9s flight to Surigao %ity- >+@
3(6 employees did not act rudely towards private respondents and its managerial
personnel even gave them special attention- >5@ 1t was reasonable for 3(6 to limit the
transportation e#pense to 3150.00, considering that the fare between the airport and
the hotel was only 305.00, and they would be pic$ed up by the shuttle bus from the
hotel to the airport, while the re,uest for money for tips could not be 8ustified- and >5@
he inadvertent loading of private respondents9 baggage on the replacement flight to
Surigao %ity was at most simple and e#cusable negligence due to the numerous flight
disruptions and large number of baggage on that day.
3etitioner strenuously, and understandably, insists that its employees did not lie to
private respondents regarding the want of accommodations at the latter9s hotel of
preference. he only reason why %ebu 3laCa Iotel was not initially offered to them by
3(6 was because of the earlier advice of the hotel personnel that not all the stranded
3(6 passengers could be accommodated therein. 1t claimed that it was in accordance
with the airline9s policy of housing all affected passengers in one location for easy
communication and transportation, which accommodations in this instance could be
provided by 4agellan Iotel. Iowever, upon insistence of the 4irandas on their
preference for %ebu 3laCa Iotel, Jeremias umula$, 3(69s passenger relations
officer, told them that they could use the office phone and that if they could arrange
for such accommodation 3(6 would shoulder the e#penses. his concession, so
petitioner avers, negates any malicious intent on its part.
%rucial to the determination of the propriety of the award of damages in this case is
the lower court9s findings on the matter of bad faith, which deserves to be ,uoted at
length/
hese claims were reasonable and appeared to be supported by the
evidence. hus it cannot be denied that plaintiffs had to undergo some
personal inconveniences in 4anila for lac$ of their baggage. 1t is also highly
probable that plaintiffs9 scheduled return to Surigao %ity was upset because
of their having to wait for one day for their missing things. %onse,uently, it
was ,uite evident that the off-loading of plaintiffs9 baggage in Ionolulu was
the pro#imate cause of plaintiffs subse,uent inconveniences for which they
claimed to have suffered social humiliation, wounded feelings, frustration
and mental anguish.
### ### ###
1n the present case there was a breach of contract committed in bad faith by
the defendant airlines. (s previously noted, plaintiffs had a confirmed
boo$ing on 3(6 .light 3A 101 from San .rancisco to 4anila. herefore
plaintiffs were entitled to an assured passage not only for themselves but for
their baggage as well. hey had a legal right to rely on this.
he evidence showed that plaintiffs9 baggage were properly loaded and
stowed in the plane when it left San .rancisco for Ionolulu. he off-loading
or bumping off by defendant airlines of plaintiffs9 baggage to give way to
other passengers or cargo was an arbitrary and oppressive act which clearly
amounted to a breach of contract committed in bad faith and with malice. 1n
the aforecited case, the Supreme %ourt defined bad faith as a breach of a
$nown duty through some motive of interest or ill will. Self-enrichment or
fraternal interest, and not personal ill will, may have been the motive, but it is
malice nevertheless >infra@.
(s correctly pointed out in the 4emorandum for 3laintiffs dated June 17,
1990 >pp. 5-5@, the following e#cerpt from the testimony of Ddgar 4onde8ar
clearly demonstrated the act of discrimination perpetrated by defendant on
the herein plaintiffs >S*, Ddgar 4onde8ar, .eb. "7, 1990, pp. "'-"7@, thus/
B ?efore a plane departs, your office will see to it the plane loads
the e#act weight limitation insofar as the cargoes >sic@ and
passengers are concerned, is that correctP
( Fes.
B (nd so with the 3A 101 flight starting mainland 2S(, it complied
with the weight limitation, passengers and baggages >sic@ limitation,
is that correctP
( Fes.
B 1n other words the trip from the mainland 2S( started in Iawaii
to off-load cargoes >sic@, you complied with the weight limitation and
so onP
( Fes.
B ?ut you are saying upon arriving in Ionolulu certain containers
were off-loadedP
( Fes.
B hat would be therefore some containers were off-loaded to give
way to some other containers starting from Ionolulu towards
4anilaP
( Fes.
B 1n other words 4r. 4onde8ar, preference was given to cargoes
>sic@ newly loaded at Ionolulu instead of the cargoes >sic@ already
from mainland 2S(, is that correctP
( Fes.
he aforesaid testimony constituted a clear admission in defendant9s
evidence of facts amounting to a breach of contract in bad faith. his being
so, defendant must be held liable in damages for the conse,uences of its
action.
8
>%orrections indicated in original te#t.@
he trial court further found that the situation was aggravated by the following
incidents/ the poor treatment of the 4irandas by the 3(6 employees during the
stopover at 4actan (irport in %ebu- the cavalier and dubious response of petitioner9s
personnel to the 4iranda spouses9 re,uest to be billeted at the %ebu 3laCa Iotel by
denying the same allegedly because it was fully boo$ed, which claim was belied by
the fact that &r. 4iranda was easily able to arrange for accommodations thereat- and,
the 3(6 employees9 negligent, almost malicious, act of sending off the baggage of
private respondents to Surigao %ity, while they were still in %ebu, without any
e#planation for this gross oversight.
$
he %ourt of (ppeals affirmed these findings of the trial court by stating that =
:hile we recogniCe an airline9s prerogative to off-load baggag>e@ to conform
with weight limitations for the purpose of ensuring the safety of passengers,
:e, however, cannot sanction the motion >sic@ and manner it was carried out
in this case.
1t is uncontroverted that appellees9 baggag>e@ were properly weighed and
loaded in the plane when it left San .rancisco for Ionolulu. :hen they
reached Ionolulu, they were not informed that their baggag>e@ would be off-
loaded. 1ronically, if the purpose of the off-loading was to conform with the
weight limitations, why were other containers loaded in IonoluluP he real
reason was revealed by Ddgar 4onte8ar, baggage service representative of
the appellant. . . .
9
### ### ###
(s earlier noted, the off-loading of appellees9 baggag>e@ was done in bad
faith because it was not really for the purpose of complying with weight
limitations but to give undue preference to newly-loaded baggag>e@ in
Ionolulu. his was followed by another mishandling of said baggag>e@ in the
twice-cancelled connecting flight from %ebu to Surigao. (ppellees9 sad
e#perience was further aggravated by the misconduct of appellant9s
personnel in %ebu, who lied to appellees in denying their re,uest to be
billeted at %ebu 3laCa Iotel.
10
he %ourt has time and again ruled, and it cannot be over-emphasiCed, that a
contract of air carriage generates a relation attended with a public duty and any
discourteous conduct on the part of a carrier9s employee toward a passenger gives
the latter an action for damages and, more so, where there is bad faith.
11
1t is settled that bad faith must be duly proved and not merely presumed. he
e#istence of bad faith, being a factual ,uestion, and the Supreme %ourt not being a
trier of facts, the findings thereon of the trial court as well as of the %ourt of (ppeals
shall not be disturbed on appeal and are entitled to great weight and respect.
12
Said
findings are final and conclusive upon the Supreme %ourt e#cept, inter alia, where the
findings of the %ourt of (ppeals and the trial court are contrary to each other.
13
1t is evident that the issues raised in this petition are the correctness of the factual
findings of the %ourt of (ppeals of bad faith on the part of petitioner and the award of
damages against it. his %ourt has consistently held that the findings of the %ourt of
(ppeals and the other lower courts are as a rule binding upon it, sub8ect to certain
e#ceptions created by case law. (s nothing in the record indicates any of such
e#ceptions, the factual conclusions of the appellate court must be affirmed.
16
1t is now firmly settled that moral damages are recoverable in suits predicated on
breach of a contract of carriage where it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud
or bad faith.
15
1nattention to and lac$ of care for the interests of its passengers who
are entitled to its utmost consideration, particularly as to their convenience, amount to
bad faith which entitles the passenger to an award of moral damages. :hat the law
considers as bad faith which may furnish the ground for an award of moral damages
would be bad faith in securing the contract and in the e#ecution thereof, as well as in
the enforcement of its terms, or any other $ind of deceit.
17
Such unprofessional and
proscribed conduct is attributable to petitioner airline in the case at bar and the
adverse doctrinal rule is accordingly applicable to it.
1n Cat-a( Pacific Air,a(s, /td. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
1
8 a case which is virtually
on all fours with the present controversy, we stated/
1n the case at bar, both the trial court and the appellate court found that
%(I(F was grossly negligent and rec$less when it failed to deliver the
luggage of petitioner at the appointed place and time. :e agree. . . . :hile
the mere failure of %(I(F to deliver respondent9s luggage at the agreed
place and time did not ipso facto amount to willful misconduct since the
luggage was eventually delivered to private respondent, albeit belatedly, :e
are persuaded that the employees of %(I(F acted in bad faith, . . .
. . ., if the defendant airline is shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad
faith, the award of moral and e#emplary damages is proper.
1t must, of course, be borne in mind that moral damages are not awarded to penaliCe
the defendant but to compensate the plaintiff for the in8uries he may have suffered.
1$

in a contractual or ,uasi-contractual relationship, e#emplary damages, on the other
hand, may be awarded only if the defendant had acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
rec$less, oppressive or malevolent manner.
19
(ttorney9s fees in the concept of
damages may be awarded where there is a finding of bad faith.
20
he evidence on
record amply sustains, and we correspondingly find, that the awards assessed
against petitioner on the aforestated items of damages are 8ustified and reasonable.
(t this 8uncture, it may also be pointed out that it is 3(69s duty to provide assistance
to private respondents and, for that matter, any other passenger similarly
inconvenienced due to delay in the completion of the transport and the receipt of their
baggage. herefore, its unilateral and voluntary act of providing cash assistance is
deemed part of its obligation as an air carrier, and is hardly anything to rave about.
6i$ewise, arrangements for and verification of re,uested hotel accommodations for
private respondents could and should have been done by 3(6 employees
themselves, and not by &r. 4iranda. 1t was rather patroniCing of 3(6 to ma$e much of
the fact that they allowed &r. 4iranda to use its office telephone in order to get a hotel
room.
:hile it may be true that there was no direct evidence on record of blatant rudeness
on the part of 3(6 employees towards the 4irandas, the fact that private respondents
were practically compelled to haggle for accommodations, a situation unbefitting
persons of their stature, is rather demeaning and it parta$es of discourtesy magnified
by 3(69s condescending attitude. 4oreover, it cannot be denied that the 3(6
employees herein concerned were definitely less than candid, to put it mildly, when
they withheld information from private respondents that they could actually be
accommodated in a hotel of their choice.
1ndeed, the flamboyant testimony of !scar JereCa, < as 3(69s duty manager, merely
pays lip-service to, without putting into reality, the avowed company policy of
invariably ma$ing available and always granting the re,uests for the $ind and
standard of accommodations demanded by and appropriate for its passengers.
21

%ertainly, a more efficient service, and not a lac$adaisical and disorganiCed system, is
e#pected of the nation9s flag carrier, especially on an international flight.
.or, on the picayune matter of transportation e#penses, 3(6 was obviously and
unduly scrimping even on the small amount to be given to the 4irandas. 3(6 failed to
consider that they were ma$ing arrangements for two paying round-trip passengers,
not penny-ante freeloaders, who had been inconvenienced by the numerous delays in
flight services and careless handling of their belongings by 3(6. he niggardly
attitude of its personnel in this unfortunate incident, as well as their hair-splitting
attempts at 8ustification, is a disservice to the image which our national airline see$s
to pro8ect in its costly advertisements.
:e agree with the findings of the lower court that the re,uest of private respondents
for monetary assistance of 3+00.00 for ta#i fare was indeed 8ustified, considering that
there were two of them and they had several pieces of luggage which had to be
ferried between the airport and the hotel. (lso, the re,uest for a small additional sum
for tips is e,ually reasonable since tipping, especially in a first-rate hotel, is an
accepted practice, of which the %ourt can ta$e 8udicial notice. his is aside from the
fact that private respondents, having 8ust arrived from an e#tended trip abroad, had
already run out of 3hilippine currency, which predicament was e#acerbated by their
additional stay in 4anila due to the off-loading of their baggage. (ll these
inconveniences should have warranted a commonsensical and more understanding
treatment from 3(6, considering that private respondents found themselves in. this
unpleasant situation through no fault of theirs.
". !n its second issue, petitioner avers that the e#press provisions on private
respondents9 tic$ets stipulating that liability for delay in delivery of baggage shall be
limited to 2SO"0.00 per $ilo of baggage delayed, unless the passenger declares a
higher valuation, constitutes the contract of carriage between 3(6 and private
respondents.
1t further contends that these e#press provisions are in compliance with the provisions
of the :arsaw %onvention for the 2nification of Aules Aelating to 1nternational %arrier
by (ir, to which the 3hilippines is a signatory. hereunder, it is asserted that 3(6 flight
3A 101 from San .rancisco, 2.S.(., to 4anila, 3hilippines is an Ginternational
transportationG well within the coverage of the :arsaw %onvention.
3etitioner obstinately insists on the applicability of the provisions of the :arsaw
%onvention regarding the carrier9s limited liability since the off-loading was
supposedly 8ustified and not attended by bad faith. *either was there any claim for
loss of baggage as in fact private respondents9 baggage were, albeit delayed,
received by them in good condition.
22
he court a 3uo debun$ed petitioner9s arguments by this holding/
he defense raised by defendant airlines that it can be held liable only under
the terms of the :arsaw %onvention >(nswer, Special and (ffirmative
&efenses, dated !ctober "', 1977@ is of no moment. .or it has also been
held that (rticles 10, 17 and 19 of the :arsaw %onvention of 19"9 merely
declare the air carriers liable for damages in the cases enumerated therein,
if the conditions specified are present. *either the provisions of said articles
nor others regulate or e#clude liability for other breaches of contract by air
carriers >*orthwest (irlines, 1nc. vs. *icolas %uenca, et al., 15 S%A( 10'+@.

23
his ruling of the trial court was affirmed by respondent %ourt of (ppeals, thus/
:e are not persuaded. (ppellees do not see$ payment for loss of any
baggage. hey are claiming damages arising from the discriminatory off-
loading of their baggag>e@. hat cannot be limited by the printed conditions in
the tic$ets and baggage chec$s. *either can the :arsaw %onvention
e#clude nor regulate the liability for other breaches of contract by air carriers.
( recognition of the :arsaw %onvention does not preclude the operation of
our %ivil %ode and related laws in determining the e#tent of liability of
common carriers in breach of contract of carriage, particularly for willful
misconduct of their employees.
26
he congruent finding of both the trial court and respondent court that there was
discriminatory off-loading being a factual ,uestion is, as stated earlier, binding upon
and can no longer be passed upon by this %ourt, especially in view of and in
deference to the affirmance of the same by respondent appellate court.
here was no error on the part of the %ourt of (ppeals when it refused to apply the
provisions of the :arsaw %onvention, for in the words of this %ourt in the afore,uoted
Cat-a( Pacific case/
. . . although the :arsaw %onvention has the force and effect of law in this
country, being a treaty commitment assumed by the 3hilippine government,
said convention does not operate as an e#clusive enumeration of the
instances for declaring a carrier liable for breach of contract of carriage or as
an absolute limit of the e#tent of that liability. he :arsaw %onvention
declares the carrier liable in the enumerated cases and under certain
limitations. Iowever, it must not be construed to preclude the operation of
the %ivil %ode and pertinent laws. 1t does not regulate, much less e#empt,
the carrier from liability for damages for violating the rights of its passengers
under the contract of carriage, especially if willful misconduct on the part of
the carrier9s employees is found or established, which is the case before
2s. . . .
(%%!A&1*)6F, finding no reversible error, the challenged 8udgment of respondent
%ourt of (ppeals is hereby (..1A4D& in toto.
S! !A&DAD&.
G.R. No. 96168 01(# $, 1996
REP%&LI' OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORA&LE RODOLFO TOLEDANO, +( h+, ca-ac+!. a, Pr#,+)+(/ 01)/# o2 !h#
R#/+o(a3 Tr+a3 'o1r!, Th+r) 01)+c+a3 R#/+o(, &ra(ch 79, I"a, *a="a3#, a()
SPO%SES ALVIN A. 'LO%SE a() EVEL>N A. 'LO%SE, respondents.
?efore us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision
1
of the Aegional rial
%ourt of 1ba, Jambales, ?ranch '9, in Special 3roceeding *o. A%-150-1, entitled, G1n
the 4atter of the (doption of the 4inor named Solomon Joseph (lcalaG, raising a
pure ,uestion of law.
he sole issue for determination concerns the right of private respondents spouses
(lvin (. %louse and Dvelyn (. %louse who are aliens to adopt under 3hilippine 6aw.
here is no controversy as to the facts.
!n .ebruary "1, 1990, in a verified petition filed before the Aegional rial %ourt of
1ba, Jambales, private respondents spouses %louse sought to adopt the minor,
Solomon Joseph (lcala, the younger brother of private respondent Dvelyn (. %louse.
1n an !rder issued on 4arch 1", 1990, the petition was set for hearing on (pril 17,
1990. he said !rder was published in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province of Jambales and %ity of !longapo for three >+@ consecutive wee$s.
he principal evidence disclose that private respondent (lvin (. %louse is a natural
born citiCen of the 2nited States of (merica. Ie married Dvelyn, a .ilipino on June 5,
1971 at !longapo %ity. !n (ugust 19, 1977, Dvelyn became a naturaliCed citiCen of
the 2nited States of (merica in )uam. hey are physically, mentally, morally, and
financially capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve >1"@ year old minor.
Since 1971 to 1975, then from *ovember ", 1979 up to the present, Solomon Joseph
(lcala was and has been under the care and custody of private respondents.
Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. Iis mother, *ery (lcala, a widow, li$ewise
consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability to support and educate her
son.
4rs. *ila %oraCon 3ronda, the social wor$er assigned to conduct the Iome and %hild
Study, favorably recommended the granting of the petition for adoption.
.inding that private respondents have all the ,ualifications and none of the
dis,ualifications provided by law and that the adoption will redound to the best
interest and welfare of the minor, respondent 8udge rendered a decision on June "0,
1990, disposing as follows/
:IDAD.!AD, the %ourt grants the petition for adoption filed by Spouses
(lvin (. %louse and Dvelyn (. %louse and decrees that the said minor be
considered as their child by adoption. o this effect, the %ourt gives the
minor the rights and duties as the legitimate child of the petitioners.
Ienceforth, he shall be $nown as S!6!4!* (6%(6( %6!2SD.
he %ourt dissolves parental authority bestowed upon his natural parents
and vests parental authority to the herein petitioners and ma$es him their
legal heir. 3ursuant to (rticle +' of 3.&. '0+ as amended, the decree of
adoption shall be effective as of the date when the petition was filed. 1n
accordance with (rticle 5+ of the same decree, let this decree of adoption be
recorded in the corresponding government agency, particularly the !ffice of
the 6ocal %ivil Aegistrar of 4erida, 6eyte where the minor was born. he
said office of the 6ocal %ivil Aegistrar is hereby directed to issue an
amended certificate of live birth to the minor adopted by the petitioners.
6et copies of this decision be furnished >sic@ the petitioners, &S:&,
Jambales ?ranch, !ffice of the Solicitor )eneral and the !ffice of the 6ocal
%ivil Aegistrar of 4erida, 6eyte.
S! !A&DAD&.
2
3etitioner, through the !ffice of the Solicitor )eneral appealed to us for relief,
contending/
ID 6!:DA %!2A DAAD& 1* )A(*1*) ID 3D11!* .!A
(&!31!* !. (6K1* (*& DKD6F* %6!2SD, ?D%(2SD IDF (AD *!
B2(61.1D& ! (&!3 2*&DA 3I161331*D 6(:.
:e rule for petitioner.
2nder (rticles 175 and 175 of D#ecutive !rder >D.!.@ *o. "09, otherwise $nown as
Ghe .amily %ode of the 3hilippinesG, private respondents spouses %louse are clearly
barred from adopting Solomon Joseph (lcala.
(rticle 175, paragraph >+@ of D#ecutive !rder *o. "09 e#pressly enumerates the
persons who are not ,ualified to adopt, vi;./
>+@ (n alien, e#cept/
>a@ ( former .ilipino citiCen who see$s to adopt a relative by
consanguinity-
>b@ !ne who see$s to adopt the legitimate child of his or her .ilipino
spouse- or
>c@ !ne who is married to a .ilipino citiCen and see$s to adopt
8ointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the
latter.
(liens not included in the foregoing e#ceptions may adopt .ilipino
children in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as
may be provided by law.
here can be no ,uestion that private respondent (lvin (. %louse is not ,ualified to
adopt Solomon Joseph (lcala under any of the e#ceptional cases in the afore,uoted
provision. 1n the first place, he is not a former .ilipino citiCen but a natural born citiCen
of the 2nited States of (merica. 1n the second place, Solomon Joseph (lcala is
neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. 1n the third
place, when private respondents spouses %louse 8ointly filed the petition to adopt
Solomon Joseph (lcala on .ebruary "1, 1990, private respondent Dvelyn (. %louse
was no longer a .ilipino citiCen. She lost her .ilipino citiCenship when she was
naturaliCed as a citiCen of the 2nited States in 1977.
3rivate respondent Dvelyn (. %louse, on the other hand, may appear to ,ualify
pursuant to paragraph +>a@ of (rticle 175 of D.!. "09. She was a former .ilipino
citiCen. She sought to adopt her younger brother. 2nfortunately, the petition for
adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating (rticle 175 which
mandates a 8oint adoption by the husband and wife. 1t reads/
(rticle 175. Iusband and wife must 8ointly adopt, e#cept in the following
cases/
>1@ :hen one spouse see$s to adopt his own illegitimate child- or
>"@ :hen one spouse see$s to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
(rticle 175 re,uires a 8oint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be
read along together with (rticle 175.
3
he historical evolution of this provision is clear. 3residential &ecree '0+ >he %hild
and Fouth :elfare %ode@, provides that husband and wife GmayG 8ointly adopt.
6

D#ecutive !rder *o. 91 issued on &ecember 10, 197' amended said provision of
3.&. '0+. 1t demands that both husband and wife GshallG 8ointly adopt if one of them is
an alien.
5
1t was so crafted to protect .ilipino children who are put up for adoption.
he .amily %ode reiterated the rule by re,uiring that husband and wife GmustG 8ointly
adopt, e#cept in the cases mentioned before. 2nder the said new law, 8oint adoption
by husband and wife is mandatory.
7
his is in consonance with the concept of 8oint
parental authority over the child, which is the ideal situation.
8
(s the child to be
adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to re,uire the
spouses to adopt 8ointly. he rule also insures harmony between the spouses.
$
1n a distinctly similar case, we held/
(s amended by D#ecutive !rder 91, 3residential &ecree *o. '0+, had thus
made it mandatory for both the spouses to 8ointly adopt when one of them
was an alien. he law was silent when both spouses were of the same
nationality.
he .amily %ode has resolved any possible uncertainty. (rticle 175 thereof
e#presses the necessity for a 8oint adoption by the spouses e#cept in only
two instances =
>1@ :hen one spouse see$s to adopt his own illegitimate child- or
>"@ :hen one spouse see$s to adopt the legitimate child of the
other.
1t is in the foregoing cases when (rticle 17' of the %ode, on the parental
authority, can aptly find governance.
(rticle 17'. 1n case husband and wife 8ointly adopt or one spouse adopts the
legitimate child of the other, 8ointly parental authority shall be e#ercised by
the spouses in accordance with this %ode.
9
(rticle 175 is all too clear and categorical and there is no room for its interpretation.
here is only room for application.
10
:e are not unaware that the modern trend is to encourage adoption and every
reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote that ob8ective.
11
(doption is
geared more towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and enhancement of
his opportunities for a useful and happy life.
12
1t is not the bureaucratic technicalities
but the interest of the child that should be the principal criterion in adoption cases.
13

D#ecutive !rder "09 li$ewise upholds that the interest and welfare of the child to be
adopted should be the paramount consideration. hese considerations
notwithstanding, the records of the case do not evince any fact as would 8ustify us in
allowing the adoption of the minor, Solomon Joseph (lcala, by private respondents
who are aliens.
:IDAD.!AD, the petition is )A(*D&. he decision of the lower court is
ADKDASD& and SD (S1&D. *o costs.
S! !A&DAD&.