Loyalists and Separatists: The Muslims in Southern Thailand
Author(s): Astri Suhrke
Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Mar., 1977), pp. 237-250 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643498 Accessed: 24/10/2010 20:42 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucal. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. 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What are the main dimensions of the problem, and how are these regarded by the local Muslims?1 The Muslim population in the South is concentrated in the four provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwas and Satul. The southern Mus- lims represent about 3% of the population of Thailand, or 700,000 people according to the 1960 census. In the four provinces, however, they constitute 70-80% of the local population and are clearly demar- cated as a distinct group. They speak a local dialect of Malay and only a small proportion (20-30%) also speak Thai except in Satul, where a substantial proportion of the Muslim population speaks Thai. They are Malay Muslims, maintain their traditional Malay dress and cus- toms, and rarely marry Thai Buddhists. The presence of this territorially concentrated group of Malays in a region bordering on Malaysia, where the Malays have a dominant political role, has meant persistent difficulties for both the Thai gov- ernment and the minority group. Everyone concerned recognizes that the problem is an old one, going back to the 13th century when the Sukothai kings claimed the southern Muslim sultanates as vassals. This relationship was decisively transformed by the administrative reorgani- 1 This is an abridged version of a paper presented at the Association for Asian Studies meeting, Toronto, 1976. It is primarily based on information collected dur- ing fieldwork in Thailand in 1970, 1971, and 1976. I would like to note the assistance of Charoenchit Na Songkhla, former director of the Co-ordination Center in Yala; the late Senator Leck V. Angkul, Dato Sin Daraman in Narathiwas, Professor Pattaya Saihoo at Chulalongkorn University, and representatives of the United Patani Freedom Movement. Connor Bailey of Cornell University made useful com- ments on the paper. 237 238 ASTRI SUHRKE zation of Thailand starting at the end of the 19th century, at which time the present manifestations of the problem first began to emerge. These can be divided into three main areas, relating to educational, administrative, and economic matters, each of which will be briefly discussed here. Education: The Thai government has continuously emphasized that the Muslims must learn the Thai language and receive secular education. Indeed, there is a tendency in Bangkok and among local government officials to regard education as a panacea for peaceful inte- gration of the Muslims. But the response of the Muslim community to secular education has been mixed. In lower primary school (P.S. 1-4) student enrollment corresponds to the ethnic proportions of the popu- lation in the border provinces: Muslims clearly predominate while the Buddhists are a small minority. However, the Muslim student body de- clines drastically from lower primary to upper primary school (P.S. 5- 7), and this trend continues in high school (M.S. 1-3, 4-5). The over- whelming majority of the student population at these levels is Bud- dhist, while the Muslims constitute a small minority. This anomaly is partly explained by the attitudes towards secular education among the Muslims. Some oppose it out of deference to tra- ditional values, which hold that religious education is more important than secular education. Another factor is the conviction among some that the Thai government is using secular education to assimilate the Muslims, to make them eventually deny their religion, historical herit- age, race and customs-in short their religious and ethnic identity. As the separatist United Patani Freedom Movement (UPFM) has claimed: "The Thai government is trying to teach the younger generation the Thai language and make them love the Thai government and respect the king so that in the future they will forget the Malay race and com- pletely accept Thai nationality."2 Militant Muslims have attacked gov- ernment schools and teachers, leading to the establishment of teacher vigilante groups and a temporary teacher boycott in Narathiwas in October 1975. These views, in turn, are strongly criticized by other Muslims who maintain that secular Thai education is desirable by enabling the Muslims better to protect their rights against local officials and eventually permitting upward socioeconomic mobility. There are some institutional vehicles for combining secular and religious education. The Islamic College in Bangkok takes some stu- dents from the border provinces, and it is interesting to note that among these almost all cite the prospect for upward mobility as the main reason for seeking higher education.3 For the majority of the southern Muslims religious education is provided by the local Islamic 2 United Patani Freedom Movement, "Declaration of Warning," August 1, 1971. (Original in Jawi and Malay). 3 Author's survey of student attitudes (1971). MUSLIMS IN THAILAND 239 schools (Pondok), which until recently taught no standard Thai cur- riculum. In the traditional Pondok the students entered at age 8 and lived with the teacher on the premises for several years (often 7-9), hence the Pondok constituted an effective competitor to the govern- ment schools. The government responded in the late 1960s by using monetary incentives to gradually convert the Pondoks into private schools that would also teach Thai language and some standard cur- riculum. A majority of the Pondok headmasters (to-kru in Thai) reg- istered their schools in this program, which may, if successful, mediate the conflict between religious and secular education. Much will depend upon the manner of implementation as the Pondok is a powerful symbol of religious and ethnic identity to southern Muslims of all per- suasions. Separatist spokesmen predictably denounced the program as an attempt to undermine the Pondok schools, and even those Muslims who favored secular education cautioned that the government must not close down Pondok schools that do not convert, or convert too slowly. Administration: There are no statistics available on the number of Muslims in the local administration, but it is widely assumed that the Muslims are in a distinct minority, and a Muslim District Officer or Deputy District Officer is a rarity. This is primarily due to the low level of education among the Muslims, although one frequently en- counters the suspicion that even if a Muslim would qualify, the govern- ment would post him anywhere but the border provinces for fear that he may not be "reliable." Moreover, one segment of the Muslim com- munity, the separatists, denounces all forms of cooperation with the Thai government and calls on the people not to seek administrative positions. The predominance of Thai Buddhist government officials in the South, most of whom do not speak Malay, is a crucial factor in creating an adversary relationship between the local people and the administra- tion. This ranges from complaints by the Muslims of petty harrassment and corruption to more serious accusations of persecution and im- prisonment of Muslims based on tenuous allegations of banditry or subversion. Muslim leaders have drawn different conclusions from this situa- tion. Some, such as the famous Haji Sulong, who was killed in 1954 (evidently by Thai police), argue that a majority of the government officials in the Muslim provinces must be Muslim, although there is disagreement on whether this should be a gradual process correspond- ing to the growth of higher education among the Muslims, or be im- plemented regardless of existing educational requirements under a general autonomy scheme.4 Others maintain that the Muslims should 4 Information cited in Stuara Siswa (Kuala Lumpur), December 1970, claims that Haji Sulong was killed by Thai police agents. This was confirmed by a less partisan source, a British former officer of the Malay police, in an interview with this author. 240 ASTRI SUHRKE rather rely upon present opportunities to act as a "cushion" between the administration and the people in the capacity of village and hamlet headmen (kamnan and puyaiban), and as elected representatives to the townships (tambon) and in the National Assembly (when functioning). This strategy has at least two limitations, however. One is that Thai- land remains what is aptly called a "bureaucratic polity" where effec- tive political power-to protect and promote individual or group in- terests-resides in the centralized administration, leaving little scope of activity for the elected representatives or local leaders. Second, the more successful this strategy is, the more it tends to polarize attitudes within the Muslim community since the militants see it as traitorous cooptation by local leaders. The UPFM, for instance, has accused the kamnan and puyaiban of being "intelligence officers" for the govern- ment and warned that these are "very dangerous" people.5 One may expect a similar reaction from militant Muslims if the present Thai government proceeds to implement the Bill on Local Government passed by the National Assembly in November 1975, designed to strengthen the power of township councils by direct allocation of re- sources to these units (500,000 baht per tambon). Maintenance of a modicum of law and order has become one of the most pressing problems in the border provinces, which have been under martial law since the Sarit Administration. The government sev- eral times has moved in troops to quell "disturbances"-whether caused by communists, bandits, separatists, or combinations thereof. Invari- ably, the presence of regular armed forces leads to an escalation of vio- lence and embitters existing divisions between the Buddhists and the Muslims, as well as among the Muslims. The so-called Pattani massacre in December 1975 seems to be a typical example. Five Muslim youths were allegedly murdered by Thai soldiers, leading to large demonstra- tions by Muslims where more people were killed. But there was also evidence of disagreement among the Muslims on the propriety of the demands presented to the government on that occasion (that the gov- ernment immediately withdraw troops, pay compensation to the vic- tims' families, and send Prime Minister Kukrit to the South for wide- ranging discussions with Muslim leaders). Some felt the demands went too far, others that they did not go far enough. The government's re- sponse also received a mixed reaction, especially the decision to appoint a Muslim from Satul, Termsakdi Samantarath, to replace the incum- bent Thai Buddhist Governor of Pattani.6 To the militants it was an- 5 United Patani Freedom Movement, "Declaration of Warning." 6 Governor Termsakdi comes from a distinguished family of public servants in Satul and served previously in Narathiwas and Satul. 1-is views on conditions in the border provinces are presented at length in a thesis he wrote for the National Defense College, Kawbanyasarob satangan si changwad paahtai (An Account of Conditions in the Four Southern Provinces) (mimeographed), Bangkok, 1970. MUSLIMS IN THAILAND 241 other cooptation move; to others it demonstrated government efforts to meet local demands and promised better understanding and com- munication between the local population and the Governor's office. Economic Aspects: Buddhists and Muslims agree that disturbances in the Muslim provinces are closely related to economic problems that have some unique, local dimensions. The economic structure is domi- nated by Thai Buddhist government officials and Thai Chinese capital- ists (merchants and rubber plantation owners). Although it can be demonstrated that on a nationwide scale there are Thai Buddhists who are as poor as the southern Muslims, the focus of the latter is more narrow, usually confined to the border provinces. In this universe, the Muslim is generally a rubber tapper (heavily dependent on fluctuating world market prices for natural rubber), a fisherman, or a vendor, while the Thai Chinese and the Thai Buddhists occupy the higher socio- economic strata. Moreover, the relatively low educational attainment of the southern Muslims makes economic advancement correspond- ingly difficult. Ethnic divisions thus tend to coincide with economic cleavages. Some Muslim leaders conclude that autonomy or secession is nec- essary for the Muslims to obtain a "just" share of the income generated in the area. This claim is based on the assumption that the four border provinces are rich in rubber and tin but this wealth is siphoned off by Thai Buddhists and Thai Chinese. Others, however, point to the fact that the budgets of the four provinces are heavily subsidized by the cen- tral government, and argue that pressure must be exerted within ex- isting institutions to increase this share.7 Simultaneously, they say, the Muslims themselves must take a more "positive" attitude towards edu- cation as a means of economic advancement. One especially sensitive point is the government's policy of estab- lishing land settlements (nikom sang kong eng) whereby land is allo- cated to Buddhists from other provinces. There is no evidence that such settlements are concentrated in the Muslim provinces as compared to other provinces in the country, but this is a moot point to those Mus- lims who fear that eventually the program may seriously affect their own land tenure.8 Separatist spokesmen naturally emphasize the nikom program in their anti-government propaganda. 7 Narathiwas province, which is not atypical, collected local revenues totalling 25 million baht in 1970, while budget expenditures were slightly over 117 million baht. This does not include capital investment effected directly under central ad- ministration offices. Changwat Narathiwas, Hua kawbanyasarob kong changwat narathiwas, 2513. (Narathiwas Provincial Yearbook, 1970). 8 According to the Ministry of the Interior, Self-help Land Settlement in Thai- land (Bangkok, 1971), there were 49 nikom in the country, of which six were in the Muslim provinces. 242 ASTRI SUHRKE Loyalists and Separatists Within the southern Muslim community, then, one can distinguish two schools of thought with respect to the nature of the problem and the means of solving it. One view, which may be labelled "loyalist," holds that the Muslims must accept Thai rule as legitimate, and that they must work with Thai officials to solve problems of economic de- velopment, education and administration in the South. Autonomy or separatism are seen as impossible and for that reason undesirable. The loyalists argue that the Thai government permits a great deal of toler- ance in religious and educational affairs. In some respects they blame the government more for sins of omission than commission (e.g., failing to provide adequate social and economic infrastructure), although they also fear government misuse of power against the Muslims as indi- viduals or as a group. A completely contrary view-"the separatist"-maintains that the Muslims will never be able to protect and maintain themselves as a distinct community under Thai rule, and that opportunities for eco- nomic self-advancement are stifled. Those who are concerned with the latter (and not all Muslim leaders are), also argue that the debate be- tween "orthodox" and "modern" Muslims in the South is perverted by the presence of a Thai administration since to become "modern" means to become Thai. Only by obtaining autonomy or independence can those Muslims who wish to become "modern" do so while still re- maining a Malay Muslim. Similarly, those whose primary concern is to protect religious and communal values can only do so under conditions of self-rule. This view has in the past been held by advocates of both autonomy and secession. However, the attractiveness of autonomy as an alternative has declined as the Thai government proved equally op- posed to this as to separatism. Its leading advocates in the past were either killed (Haji Sulong) or went into exile (Abdul Na Saiburi and Tengku Abdul Yala).9 Although autonomy may appear as a possible compromise in the future if the situation in the South markedly de- teriorates, it is not likely to find many supporters at the present time. Moreover, it should be recalled that the central government has tra- ditionally responded to challenges to its authority by trying to tighten central control rather than to decentralize. While the movements favoring autonomy appear to have declined 9 Some autonomy may be openly advocated by Thai Buddhists, however. In January 1976, for instance, two smaller opposition parties in the National Assem- bly, the New Force (Palang Mai) and the Socialist Party of Thailand, formed a united front and included an item in their program that read: "Equal rights and some autonomy must be provided to minority groups." Bangkok Post, January 6, 1976. Some Muslims in the Bangkok area (who are not Malay) have tried to mediate between the government and southern Muslims who advocate autonomy, arguing that the latter "is not treason." See statement by The Siam Muslim Group in Bangkok Post, June 27, 1974. MUSL[MSX IN THAILAND 243 in recent years, the separatists remain. Their strength and constituency, however, are extremely hard to assess. They do not seem to draw sup- port from any one educational or occupational stratum within the community. So far they have not demonstrated any ability to mobilize popular support on a sustained and massive basis. Violent conflict in- volving separatists has been limited in scope and distinguished by its festering nature. The separatists are divided among themselves, al- though it is difficult for outsiders to determine if the various organiza- tions are competing, overlapping, or duplicating entities.'0 None of them claims to receive significant external support. Still, the separatists maintain that their strength lies "with the people," and that the strug- gle will and must continue regardless of the poor prospects for success in the near future. A closer view of the attitudes and characteristics of the separatists can be attained from the interviews below. They are contrasted with similar interviews and descriptions of representatives of "loyalist" Muslims." Mr. X is a young Muslim born in one of the four southern border provinces.12 He speaks Thai, English, and Arabic, in addition to his native Malay. He has a university degree from abroad, has close con- tacts with radical student groups in Malaysia, is on intimate terms with leaders of the clandestine separatist movement, the United Patani Free- dom Movement, and earns his living by working for the Thai govern- ment in a professional capacity. His views on the separatist movement, its chances of success, and of the alternative of accepting the Thai gov- ernment's integrationist policies are ambivalent. He is hedging his bets and keeps his options and contacts open to both sides. He summarizes his attitude as follows: I am a Malay Muslim. I must stay with my people. The Thai govern- ment does not respect us. The villagers are treated with contempt and the educated Muslims are regarded with suspicion. We have a right to self-determination, to remain Malay Muslim. On the other hand, it is a long and difficult struggle. Maybe it is better to stay with Thailand and take as much advantage of the educational and economic oppor- tunities as we can-at least until the Movement becomes stronger. The United Patani Freedom Movement:13 The meeting with a represen- 10 Various names have appeared in recent years, including The Patani Islamic Revolution, The National Revolutionary Front, The National Liberation Front of Patani, and The United Patani Freedom Movement. liThe interviews took place in 1971. They were conducted in Thai and Eng- lish and with the assistance of a Malay interpreter. 12 Further details have been omitted to prevent identification of the informant. 13 For a more recent interview with separatist spokesmen, see Norman Peagan, "Boiling Point in the Troubled South," Far Eastern Economnic Review, May 1976, pp. 10-11. Mr. Peagan does not identify which organization these separatists repre- sented. 244 ASTRI SUHRKE tative of the UPFM military section took place in Pattani under con- ditions of considerable preoccupation with security and cautionary measures by the intermediaries who arranged the meeting. The military man is quite young. He speaks some Thai, but much prefers his native Malay. He obtained his military training by staying with the Thai Army for two years, and says that some of his fellow guerrillas also have been in the Thai Army or police forces previously. I have been in the jungle for eight years now. My whole family joined the Movement, partly because we were afraid of the police, partly because we want to help. When we joined, the Movement was a pretty small group around Poh Yeh. Now there are about 1,000 of us, although it is difficult to give exact figures. Some are not quite loyal, but are merely bandits who have escaped the Thai police. They are not true to the Movement at heart, and we give them the bad weapons. We now have one top-secret permanent camp in the jungle, the rest of us move around. We do not want to keep too many men in the jungle but, rather, send in people to contact the villagers to educate them about the Movement and to teach them how to handle weapons. This way we have an infrastructure which we can call upon when the day comes. Now we are building up our strength and we only attack to get food and weapons, and also to show the people our strength. Sometimes it is necessary to kidnap or kill Muslims in order to show the people that they must work with us. The poor people give us their manpower, but the rich are less willing to give. Do we get more support from the uneducated than the educated Muslims? In one sense, education helps us because it is easier to teach the educated Muslims about our cause. They understand the principles. On the other hand, the educated Muslims are sometimes afraid to cooperate because they fear the Thai government. The Movement, he says, draws on a variety of sources in its edu- cational program. There are political teachers at the camp who discuss guerrilla tactics developed in the Vietnam and Algerian wars; there are seminars on Castro and Che Guevara. Educational material reaches the Movement in various ways. One English-language book about Che Guevara, for instance, was translated into Malay by a Malaysian who had studied at Oxford and supported the Movement because his grand- father had originally escaped from Thailand. Chinese sources are translated into Malay by Malaysian Chinese (for appropriate remuner- ation), and Vietnamese sources are sometimes translated into Thai by persons who have lived in the Eastern border regions where there are sizable Vietnamese communities. As for any further cooperation between the Movement and other groups, he comments: The communists [Thai communists in the mid-South, the Malay- sian, mainly Chinese communists who use the border provinces as a MUSLIMS IN THAILAND 245 sanctuary] use the same tactics as us, but our aims are different. We can work together for tactical and diplomatic purposes, but not be- yond that. We do want international recognition, so that when we are ready, we will have foreign support. For instance, we have discussed if we should kidnap British or Americans who come to the South so that we can get international publicity. With respect to the current military situation (1971) and the joint Thai-Malaysian border patrols, he says: Sometimes we have a mock fight with the Thai Border Patrol Police, and the police units surrender their weapons. Now things are a bit difficult because the Thai Army is brought in, and we are also worried that the Malaysian security forces will go after us more heavily in the future. We have told the Malaysian forces not to attack their Muslim brothers and said that we, in return, will not attack joint patrols. If we attack, more Malaysian forces may come in. In the long run, you can interpret our tactic as a means to weaken the Thai economy by making the government spend more on the mili- tary. When the soldiers come down here we withdraw or hide, or only surface to ambush them. It is then difficult for the government to de- fend their expenditures to the National Assembly. Also, if the govern- ment has to spend more money on the military there will be less to spend on economic development, and this will turn the people against the government. The meeting with representatives of the political arm of the Move- ment took place in a village in a quite different atmosphere. Here we were clearly on "home ground." Except for the fact that the meeting took place at night, there were no security precautions or nervousness. One of the representatives was a to-kru, the other was an imam (leader of prayers). The imam was an old man, the to-kru rather younger. None of them spoke Thai. The aim of our organization is full independence-not autonomy or federation with Thailand. Neither do we want to be part of Malay- sia-even if that were possible. Only independence will serve our people. In order to obtain this, the most important thing is to work with the people and to teach them. They must be taught Islam first, and when they are strong in Islam we teach the history of our region and the needs for the future. Our struggle is an old one. In recent times, the most promising periods for our movement were probably during the war [World War II], and after the war when Hadji Sulong was the leader. But then came difficult years, and things are also difficult now-partly because there are parliamentarians. The parliamentarians [from the South] are not doing the right thing. Their way of doing things will not help our people, but some people might still listen to them and follow 246 ASTRI SUHRKE them. We are also in a difficult period now because the government is trying to change the Pondok schools. This we must prevent. If neces- sary, we will stop all the schools in the villages because no teachers will dare to come here and teach. The people here are not interested in learning Thai. But the government is trying to lure the people over to their side through education. Some to-kru have followed the govern- ment policy because they are afraid, but we can always win back the to-kru. The policy of the Thai government to appoint some Muslims from the region to administrative positions is a bad policy. These Mus- lims cannot really help their people because in their heart they become like the government." On the question of outside aid, the religious leaders were skeptical about the merits of establishing a working relationship with Thai and Chinese communists in the area. It was noted that they were not Mtalay Muslims; they were outsiders. Ideological differences were also men- tioned. They were only slightly more optimistic about the possibility for assistance from Muslim countries and groups, although this was clearly a more desirable option. We hope for help from other Muslim countries, but this is dif- ficult. We cannot accept much help from Malaysia either. We appre- ciate demonstrations in Malaysia on behalf of the rights of Muslims in Thailand, this gives our people moral support, but we cannot rely on getting much more assistance. When the day of uprising comes, we will have diplomatic and international connections, but first we must work with the people and strengthen ourselves. The people are with us, and our organization, which has existed for 20 years, is now much better organized than before. We have a centralized structure with a small committee of leaders on the top, the lower levels do not know the persons higher up, and so on. This makes us much more effective in the struggle. It has been a long struggle. If we do not succeed in our lifetime, the next generation will carry on to victory. Abdul Bhuminarong, at 40 years old, has twice been elected to the National Assembly as representative from Yala. During the 1957 elec- tion, he ran on a Saha Phoumi ticket; in the 1969 elections he ran as an independent but joined the government party (Saha Pracha Thai) shortly after being elected. He comes from an old and respected Muslim family; his father, in particular, was well known in the area. Mr. Bhuminarong studied in Kelantan-although he has no close family there he says it was "quite usual" to study in Kelantan at that time. Later he spent 14 years in Bangkok, working for a Japanese firm and serving as a parliamentarian after the 1957 (December) elections. He returned to Yala to campaign in the 1969 elections, and won a small margin (37 votes) over his two opponents (a Thai-Chinese municipal MUSLIMS IN THAILAND 247 councillor and a Thai Buddhist rubber plantation owner). He explains the slender margin by referring to his long absence from the province, and the fact that he won at all he attributes to his family's prestige and standing in the area. He lives in a Thai-style house in the provincial capital, owns a small business, and is married to a Thai-Chinese woman from Yala. His wife was previously a radio announcer and now teaches high school. She helped her husband in the election campaign (1969) and says that the villagers did not react negatively to the quite unusual fact of a Thai-Chinese being married to a Muslim, although she took care to respect the customs of the villagers so as to avoid giving offense. Bhuminarong commented on what he saw as marked changes in government policy towards the Muslims in the last decade. He is par- ticularly appreciative of the educational policy. Primary education must be expanded on a broad basis so that the Muslims learn to speak Thai. If they only complete the lower primary school level they soon forget Thai. But if they complete higher primary school as well they do not forget Thai. Now, the Thai govern- ment officials think that the Muslims are stupid. If the Muslims can speak Thai they can protect their rights. He notes that education does provide the Muslim with an increased range of professional and economic options, and stresses the encourage- ment given by the government in providing high school and university education for Thai-Muslims. Several Muslims who manage to go this far do not want to return to the South, however, but it is important that they do return and set an example to others in demonstrating what benefits education can bring, he says. Moreover, if these educated Muslims become government officials they will be able to help their people because they know the local customs and the language. On the other hand, it would not be good if Muslims aspired to high govern- ment positions in the South because the government might then be afraid of separatism. We have to find a balance. It is better to have educated Thais as government officials than to have uneducated Muslims as officials, and still better to have both Thais and Muslims working in the administra- tion so that the government would not worry about separatism. The separatist movement is an old story. It is a hopeless cause. The separatists do not know how to organize and fight, and the young Mus- lims are not interested in the movement. The younger generation is interested in getting an education and moving on-within the Thai nation. He does not see any incompatibility between being a good Mus- lim, on the one hand, and having a secular education and speaking Thai, on the other. Only the older generation feels this, "the conserva- 248 ASTRI SUHRKE tive and stubborn old people." In this connection, he recommends that the to-kru be presented with progressive views more forcefully than is the case at present. The to-kru constitute a highly respected and ex- tremely important leadership segment in the community and they should be educated in disciplines other than religion so that they could teach in these areas as well. "At present, the government only brings groups of to-kru to Bangkok for sight-seeing." There should be a much more comprehensive program. Even though he emphasized the need for secular education, he warned against the professed government policy of closing down all Pondok schools by the end of 1971 unless they start converting to private schools and introduce Thai language and secular topics in the curriculum. The conversion process is difficult and must be gradual. Religious education is better than no education which may be the al- ternative in some areas if the Pondok are closed. Most importantly, the Pondok have symbolic importance to the Muslims and there will cer- tainly be troubles if they are closed, he warns. Khun Pisan is a young Muslim living in Yala where he teaches school. He will shortly be promoted to local school inspector. He sug- gests that he may not be representative of many Muslims since he is too Thai in many respects-including his practice of speaking Thai at home with his wife and children (although lie speaks Malay with his parents) and having a Thai name. My father, who is a merchant, was very strict with our religious upbringing when we were small, but he encouraged me to go to school. I went first to a Pondok school in Pattani, then to a govern- ment school, followed by pre-university studies at an American-sup- ported Christian school in Bangkok. Many of the Muslims who, like me, go to Bangkok, do not want to return to the South because they feel that people here are too orthodox and concerned with religion alone. But things are changing here. It is only the old people who are mainly concerned about religion and the after-life; the young people are interested in education and material welfare, in social and economic mobility. They are reversing the priorities of the old genera- tion. The villagers are changing. They come into the town to sell their rubber and go to the stores; they change into town-style clothes when they are here and change back to traditional dress when they return to the villages. When they are in town they even go to the movie-which is not quite as sinful as it used to be. Some to-kru are also changing. The to-kru sometimes say that it is good to teach the Thai language because then the people can talk to the government officials and protect their rights, and, secondly, have a better material life. In 10-20 years I think the Pondok schools will change to become full private schools that teach only a few hours of Islam. MUSLIMS IN THAILAND 249 The old people are right when they say it is impossible to be both a traditionalist in religious questions and a modern man. When you go to the city and you get an education you cannot be so traditional and strict in many ways. But you can still combine the essence of Islam with modem life. Concerning the student demonstrations in Malaysia in June 1971 protesting Thai government policy in the Muslim provinces, Khun Pisan feels that the news did not have much impact on the local people: "they only want to be left in peace, they don't want trouble. Perhaps some bandits in the jungle are interested in the news." He also thinks that the old, traditional Muslims in the area look askance at the Muslims in Malaysia for being too "modern"-"there are no Pondok in Malaysia and the Muslims there even drink beer." In discussing the parliamentarians elected from the Muslim provinces during the 1969 elections, Khun Pisan emphasizes that: when people elect their representatives, they first look at his religion, but secondly they see what sort of man he is. Remember that two Bud- dhist candidates from Yala got many votes. But a Muslim candidate- if he is a good man-may have more of an impact since the government will know that he speaks for the people. The reason that many mem- bers of parliament from the South have been rather quiet in the past is not that they are afraid of speaking up or afraid that the government will distrust them of being separatists, but just that they are bad M.P.'s. Still, the government tends to misunderstand the situation here by suspecting that many Muslims are politically bad. In fact, the separatists probably make up a very small group. The government also misunderstands the people here by believing that all Muslims are reli- gious traditionalists. In fact, as I have said, things are changing. The Muslims in southern Thailand present a classic case of the dilemmas of a small minority group faced with a majority-directed integration policy. The leadership of the minority is split between the loyalists who accept the legitimacy of majority rule and hope for gradual changes within the existing system, and, on the other hand, the separatists who proclaim the necessity of self-rule. Each group at- tempts to mobilize popular support, but neither has been markedly successful to date. One of the most significant factors determining the outcome of this competition in the future may well be the govern- ment's education policy and the extent to which it succeeds in mediat- ing the conflict between "traditional" and "modern" values. If this dichotomy is cast in a communal-religious mold whereby "moderniza- tion" is seen as equivalent to "Thai-ification," the loyalists (and the government) will undoubtedly meet considerable local resistance. For the separatists the question is, rather, to what extent the movement(s) 250 ASTRI SUHRKE can expand by denying secular education and thus alienating younger Muslims who receive such education. Another question relates to the role of young Muslims who have studied abroad in Muslim countries. Very little is known about this group, even its size, yet it might con- ceivably emerge to compete with local religious leaders who have been instrumental in shaping separatist movement(s) in the past. ASTRI SUI-IRKE is an Assistant Professor in the School of International Service, American University, Washington, D.C.