Source: International Migration Review, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Spring, 1991), pp. 176-193 Published by: The Center for Migration Studies of New York, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2546239 Accessed: 24/10/2010 20:49 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cmigrations. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. The Center for Migration Studies of New York, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Migration Review. http://www.jstor.org CONFERENCE REPORT Labor Migration in Asia Philip L. Martin1 University of California, Davis International migration for employment is usually studied by examining countries that export labor to or that receive foreign workers in Western Europe, North America, and in the Middle East. Other labor migrations are usually considered special cases (migration into South Africa), a continua? tion of historical patterns (migration across African borders), or relatively small labor migrations (migration into Singapore). Among the three major economic regions that dominate world economic output and trade?the U.S.-led North American region, the German-led European region, and the Japanese-led Asian region?international migration for employment within Asia has been conspicuous by its absence from literature.2 A recent conference sponsored by the United Nations Center for Re? gional Development (UNCRD) in Nagoya, Japan examined the growing importance of labor migration for four major Asian labor importers (Japan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore) and five major labor exporters (Bangladesh, Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, and Thailand).3 Although reli? able data are unavailable, the four major importing countries include over one million foreign workers and persisting differences in wages, unemploy? ment, and economic growth rates, as well as events in the Middle East which have reduced the demand for foreign workers there, are expected to make international labor migration within Asia an increasingly important phe? nomenon.4 1 Professor of Agricultural Economics at the University of California, Davis. 2 There have been articles on labor migration into Singapore, and the effects of emigration on labor exporters such as the Philippines, but Asian labor migration is covered most extensively in the clipping service provided by Abella since 1986. 3 Taiwan is also debating whether to import foreign workers, but was not represented at the conference. Neither were Australia and New Zealand, which are not considered Asian countries. China has almost 100 companies that export workers, usually as project-tied workers to build a steel mill in Africa; for example, it too was not represented at the conference. Half of these foreign workers are illegal aliens in Malaysia. Japan has 81,000 legal foreign workers, 65,000 foreign students and trainees, and an estimated 100,000 to 200,000 illegal aliens. 176 IMR Volume xxv, No. 1 CONFERENCE REPORT 177 The conference concluded that international labor migration would increase within Asia because the tight labor markets and rising wages which have stimulated Japanese investment in other Asian nations, for example, have not been sufficient to eliminate migration push and pull forces (Abella, 1990). Japan has aggressively invested throughout Asia, taking capital and jobs to workers instead of improving workers, but Japan has not eliminated labor shortages within the country.5 Hong Kong was not as successful as Japan at restricting labor immigration, so its manufacturing industries have been slower to restructure. Singapore very effectively controls foreign workers, but has not yet decided exactly how quickly to force lower-wage industries to go abroad. Finally, booming Malaysia has very little control over immigration and a segmented labor market which complicates the job restructuring process. Labor shortages are occurring in Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia, and Korea as foreign worker employment in the Middle East is shrinking, so the Philippines, Thailand, Bangladesh, and Pakistan are looking with renewed interest to send workers to Asian labor markets such as Japan. There is an important background factor in all discussions of future labor migration within Asia: China has 1.2 billion people and several corporations which send Chinese workers abroad. If labor-short countries decide to recruit unskilled Asian workers, and Chinese workers are made available, China is expected to be able to supply all of the foreign workers required by Asian labor importers. LABOR IMPORTERS Japan Japan is Asia's economic locomotive. During the early 1970s, labor short? ages in manufacturing prompted a debate over the need for guestworkers, but cultural insularity prevented employers from winning approval for foreign workers before the 1973 oil price hikes brought about a recession and industrial restructuring to make foreign workers unnecessary. In the Hong Kong has about 75,000 legal foreign workers and perhaps 20,000 illegal aliens. Malaysia has 400,000 to 800,000 mostly illegal alien workers. Singapore has 150,000 legal foreign workers. There are about 15 million foreigners in Western European countries and about 15 million foreigners in North America. Between 1986 and 1989 Japan invested $11 billion in three fast-growing Asian economies with a combined population of 250 million?Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia. Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore (the 4 Tigers) invested another $11 billion in these countries, versus a U.S. investment of $3 billion. A recent article predicted the 600 million people in Western Pacific?Japan, the 4 Tigers, ASEAN, and coastal Chinese provinces Guangdong and Fujian? would surpass the EC and North America in economic activity within a generation (Tanzer, 1990). 178 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW early 1980s, Japan was considered the best example of an industrial country that enjoyed rapid economic growth without foreign workers (Reubens, 1982).6 However, since the mid-1980s, there have once again been com? plaints from employers of labor shortages; for example, in May 1990, the Japan Food Service Association urged the government to admit up to 600,000 unskilled workers on two to three-year contracts. Illegal immi? grants have begun to arrive while the government debates how to respond to labor shortage complaints. There were 2,000 illegal aliens apprehended in 1983, 14,000 in 1988, and 23,000 in 1989, and in 1990 there are an estimated 100,000 to 200,000 illegal alien workers in Japan.7 The men? from the Philippines, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and China?find unskilled jobs in construction and small factories while the women?from Thailand, Taiwan, and the Philippines?work as entertainers in bars and restaurants and as maids. Japan has an alien worker admissions system which requires employers to request the Immigration Bureau of the Ministry of Justice to certify that a particular alien worker is needed. The employer supplies supporting documentation, and the Immigration Bureau makes a decision on the employer's application without any formal consultation with the Ministry of Labor. If the Immigration Bureau approves the employer's request, it issues a certificate which permits the alien worker to secure the appropriate visa from a Japanese consulate before departing for Japan. Most temporary employment visas are for three years or less. This admissions system applies to all foreign workers, but requests to import unskilled alien workers are routinely denied.8 Instead of approving the admission of unskilled alien workers, labor-short Japanese employers have been advised by the government to recruit older and disadvantaged Reubens (1982:750) reviewed two explanations for Japan's "exceptional" nondependence on unskilled foreign workers: tight controls to keep them out despite push and pull factors, and factors within Japan which 1) nunimize the amount of low-level work; and 2) integrate low-level jobs into the labor market so that domestic workers would take them. The Ministry of Justice estimated that 100,000 aliens were in Japan longer than they should have been in mid-1989. Shimada (1990:3) estimates that, with the addition of persons legally in Japan as students, for example, but who violate the terms of their stay by working, there are "several hundred thousand" illegal alien workers. 8 There are limited exceptions. The foreign children or spouses of Japanese citizens can enter Japan fairly easily to work there, and there are an estimated 40,000 to 50,000 South Americans of Japanese descent employed in the Japanese auto parts and apparel industries. Another limited exception are foreign?usually Filipino?brides imported by Japanese farmers to be both wives and farmworkers. Several hundred have been imported, but success has been mixed, in part because husband and wife often have no common language. CONFERENCE REPORT 179 workers or to restructure jobs so that unskilled foreign workers are not needed. Japanese employers who cannot find unskilled Japanese workers have been turning to illegal foreign workers instead of restructuring. Filipino women have been imported legally as singers and entertainers for a decade, and the networks established by this immigration have been expanded to import illegal alien men for construction and manufacturing jobs, especially to small and medium-sized manufacturing firms such as foundries.9 In 1987, about 70 percent of the 11,300 illegal aliens who were apprehended while working in Japan were from the Philippines. Most illegal alien workers arrive on 90-day tourist visas and then go to work as unskilled and semi? skilled workers in small manufacturing plants. Most earn about 60 percent of what Japanese workers in comparable jobs earn, although one study reported that the illegal aliens earned more than comparable Japanese workers ($7.30 versus $5.40 hourly) because they had no job security (Koga, 1990). This case study of subcontractors with less than 30 employees who made parts for auto manufacturer Fuji found that 4,000 to 5,000 illegal Bangladeshi workers were up to half of these small firms' work forces, and their illegal presence was known and tolerated because, without them, these small firms could not survive (Koga, 1990). After the June 1990 employer sanctions law, these employers switched to Brazilian workers of Japanese ancestry, who are permitted to live and work in Japan without restriction. Most illegal aliens arrive in Japan as tourists and then work, but there are also 65,000 foreign students and trainees in Japan. In some cases, labor recruiters sign up Chinese or Korean 20 to 30 year-olds for Japanese language training and then put the students to work as soon as they arrive in Japan. These students want to work in Japan, and usually see the tuition payment as the price of getting into Japan to work. Immigration to Japan is regulated by the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act (ICRRA) of 1952.10ICRRA, which went into effect on June 1, 1990, included sanctions of 2 million yen (about $15,000) for every illegal alien hired by an employer. Despite the labor shortage debate, 9 Most of the 81,407 legal foreign workers granted visas to work in Japan in 1988 were entertainers (71,000). The next largest groups were business executives (6,100) and language teachers (2,000). There were only 30,000 legal foreign workers in 1980, including 20,000 entertainers. 10 Japan requires refugees to have documentary proof of political persecution and a Japanese guarantor. Immigration statistics show that Japan accepted an average 30 refugees yearly since 1982. Kono (1990) reports that 130,000 refugees arrived in Japan between 1975 and 1989, and that 63,000 have been resetded in third countries; 35,000 are awaiting resetde- ment in refugee camps; and 25,000 are setded in Japan. 180 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW the June 1990 amendments do not deal with unskilled guestworker migra? tion "because the issues needed to be discussed further" (Suwa, 1990:6). However, the June 1990 amendments are expected to make it easier for professional and skilled workers to work in Japan because they force the Immigration Bureau of the Ministry of Justice to publish its heretofore unpublished entry requirements and to act quickly on employer requests to admit and employ foreigners?administratively, the Bureau now has less discretionary authority to deny entry to lawyers and accountants who wish to work in Japan. Ten additional occupations are permitted to employ foreign workers, including lawyers and accountants, doctors and nurses, and research and education, bringing the total to 28. While making it easier for professionals to work in Japan, the June 1990 amendments toughened sanctions against employers and brokers of illegal aliens. Most unskilled illegal aliens are recruited by labor brokers, enter Japan as tourists and they are then taken to a Japanese employer who has arranged with the labor broker for their employment.11 The new 2 million yen fine and prison terms of up to three years apply to foreign and Japanese labor brokers and Japanese employers who knowingly hire illegal aliens. Illegal aliens working in Japan remain subject to fines of up to 300,000 yen (about $2,500) and up to three-year prison terms. The June 1990 amendments caused confusion and concern among work? ers and employers in the construction, shipping, and restaurant industries. Several newspapers reported falsely that all illegal alien workers would be imprisoned, although only illegal aliens entering after June 1, 1990 were threatened with imprisonment, and an estimated 20,000 left Japan after March 1990 (Suwa, 1990:7). The resulting labor shortage complaints from small and medium-sized businesses prompted a flurry of government activ? ities. A May 1990 government survey of 10,000 employers reported that 15 percent hired foreign workers within the past two years and that one-third would like to hire more foreign workers. About half of the foreign workers employed by these businesses were students. Foreign students are allowed to work twenty hours per week in Japan, but 70 percent in this survey were illegal aliens because they exceeded this limit. The number of foreign students and trainees jumped during the 1980s from less than 20,000 in 1983 to 65,000 in 1988.12 11 Japan had 2.4 million business and tourist arrivals in 1988, a doubling from 1.2 million in 1980. Over one third of these arrivals were from Korea and Taiwan. About 8.4 million Japanese traveled abroad in 1988. Of the 1.9 million new or first time arrivals in Japan in 1988, about half were tourists and one-third were business visitors. 12 Trainees in Japan are not permitted to be paid wages even if they receive on-the-job training. The number of trainees doubled to 23,000 between 1983 and 1988. CONFERENCE REPORT 181 Japan is in the midst of a vigorous debate over foreign workers. On the one side are mosdy small employers who face increased international competition, a reduced number of entry-level Japanese workers for un? skilled jobs, and the knowledge that there are millions of Filipino, Bangladeshi, and Chinese workers who are eager to fill unskilled jobs in Japan. On the other side are the Japanese who note that Japan has done a poor job of integrating the 700,000 second and third generation descen? dants of Koreans imported before and during World War II, and they note the failure of European countries to get their guestworkers to leave and doubt that Japan can prevent unskilled workers from setding.13* 14 The government has established a ten-member Commission to study a consensus solution to labor shortage complaints. The Japanese Labor Min? istry opposes guestworkers?it projects a shortage of 500,000 workers during the 1990s, but then notes that economic reforms could help to eliminate labor shortages without immigration. For example, reducing agricultural protections for Japan's 4 million farmers could provide addi? tional workers for labor-short industry and services.15 Similarly, restructur? ing the distribution and retail sector from small family-operated businesses into U.S.-style superstores would free up many of the family workers. Japan's ruling Liberal-Democratic Party is reluctant to encourage labor-dis? placing structural changes in agriculture and retailing, two of its pillars of support. The Japanese government has so far resisted pleas for easy employer access to unskilled foreign workers. Instead, a government booklet for small 13 Japan occupied Korea from 1910 to the end of World War II. Most of the 700,000 Koreans in Japan have refused to give up their Korean nationality, and they retain their Korean names. As foreigners in Japan, they must be fingerprinted and carry alien registration cards. Third- generation Koreans?there were four in May 1990?will no longer have to be fingerprinted {New York Times, May 2, 1990, p. A5). Some internationaUy-minded Japanese believe that guestworkers might begin to change Japanese prejudices against outsiders. However, other Japanese believe that racial homogeneity is a key to Japan's economic success, and that racial and ethnic diversity hurt America's ability to compete. Former Prime Minister Nakasone in 1986 said that "Blacks, Puerto Ricans, and Mexicans" keep average U.S. educational levels low, and Justice Minister Kajiyama in 1990 justified rounding-up illegal alien Thai prostitutes by drawing a parallel to Blacks, arguing that when "Blacks move in, whites are forced out." The United States imposed a land reform on Japan after World War II which has given Japan about 4.5 million farms owned by their operators. These farms average about 1 hectare or 2.5 acres each. Almost 90 percent of these farmers are part-time operators whose nonfarm income exceeds their farm income; in densely-populated Japan, farmers can commute to urban jobs and farm on weekends. Many full-time farmers are workers who retired from urban jobs in their 50s; their average age is 56. However, half of the farm work force is women in their 40s. 182 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW and medium-sized employers offering "3k" jobs?dangerous (Kiken), dirty (Kitani), and demanding or hard (Kitsui)?told the employers that they should correct "labor market mismatches" with new technology and by making better use of women and older Japanese workers and not depend on foreign workers. However, many academicians and journalists discuss "the inevitability of foreign labor" and "foreign workers: neighbors of tomorrow" (Shimada, 1990:17-18). Academic working papers assert that "as long as Japan has a demand for labor, a large scale inflow of migrant workers from Asia is inevitable" (Morita, 1990:11) and then they outline work-and-learn or other guestworker programs that admit foreign workers but minimize their negative effects, including their settlement in Japan. The sense that foreign workers are inevitable is widespread: there seems to be a belief that an international and open economy should include foreign workers. The government, unions, and the population at large seem to be opposed to the call for guestworkers made by business and some academi? cians, but a research institute funded by the Japanese Labor Union Confed? eration, which opposes the admission of unskilled foreign workers, recommended in October 1990 the admission of unskilled foreign work? ers.16 Japan has the world's lowest fertility rate and longest life expectancy, guaranteeing labor shortage complaints for the foreseeable future if eco? nomic growth remains high (Martin, 1989). Unemployment has been at 2 to 3 percent during the 1980s, and is not threatening to rise despite the energy price hikes occurring in the fall of 1990. If Japan were to import guestworkers, and if it added 10 percent of foreign workers to its work force (as many European countries did in the early 1970s) Japan would have 6 million foreign workers. Singapore The city-state of Singapore has doubled its foreign work force from 72,000 in 1970 to 150,000 in 1990, and reduced its dependence on Malays, who are now half of Singapore's foreign workers (Fong, 1990). Most of Singapore's foreign workers are unskilled; perhaps 25,000 are skilled and professional workers. Singapore has one of the most interventionist guestworker policies in the world: it has separate systems for professional and unskilled foreign workers, and its micro management of unskilled foreign workers includes sectoral limitations (they can work only in hotels, manufacturing, construc? tion, and as domestic maids), per worker levies or taxes to equalize the cost of foreign and domestic workers (S$300 in August 1990), and a ceiling of 16 Wall Street Journal, October 16, 1990, p. A27. CONFERENCE REPORT 183 70 percent foreign workers in any firm (but no quota on the total number of foreign workers in the country).17 Singapore enforces foreign worker rotation, increasing the training, transportation, and tax costs of employers, but rotation maintains foreign workers as a flexible buffer work force that can be sent home when they are no longer needed. Unskilled foreign workers are not permitted to settle or to bring their families to Singapore, and even marriage to a Singaporean does not confer an automatic right of residence in Singapore. As the number of unskilled foreign workers rose during the 1970s, Singapore in 1981 announced a plan to stop recruiting unskilled foreign workers by 1991. Employers protested and, instead of shrinking, the num? ber of foreign workers jumped to 160,000 or 11 percent of the work force in 1984. The 1986 recession sent 50,000 foreign workers home, but by 1989 their number was back up to 161,000. Illegal immigration became a problem in the 1980s. In March 1989, Singapore announced that illegal aliens would receive a mandatory three- month jail term and three strokes of the cane.18 An amnesty before the law came into effect produced 11,800 illegal aliens, about half Thais, more than expected. However, when a Thai illegal alien worker was sentenced in June 1989 to three months in jail and three-cane strokes, the Thai government protested the corporal punishment and pointed out that Singaporean em? ployers were not subject to cane strokes for knowingly hiring illegal aliens. In July-August 1989, Singapore had a second amnesty, which produced another 500 illegal aliens, and Singapore announced that henceforth em? ployers who knowingly hire five or more illegal alien workers would be caned. In contrast to its tightly regulated unskilled foreign worker program, Singapore has a liberal policy toward skilled and professional foreign workers. In August 1989, Singapore announced that college-educated per? sons earning at least S$ 1,500 per month could apply for permanent resi? dence. This policy was designed to attract educated Hong Kong residents, where it has been received enthusiastically, and may send 25,000 immigrant families or 100,000 people to Singapore in the 1990s. Skilled Hong Kong residents may receive the right to immigrate immediately, but they do not 17 $1.00 U.S. equaled S$1.70 in November 1990. 18 Cane strokes are applied with a wood stick soaked in water, so that the flesh is removed, leaving a permanent scar. Caning often leads to hospitalization. It is believed that the Singaporean government has located and caned several illegal alien workers since the summer 1989 dispute with Thailand, but canings are no longer publicized because they are not a deterrent to some Indian and Thai workers, for example. No employer has yet been caned, so it is not yet resolved exactly who an employer is; for example, who in a corporation is to be caned if five or more illegal aliens are found employed? 184 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW have to move to Singapore for five years. There is some concern that such an influx of Chinese immigrants may upset Singapore's ethnic balance, which is currendy three-quarters Chinese. Singapore has a two-tiered foreign worker policy, encouraging the entry and setdement of skilled immigrants and permitting the entry of unskilled workers but discouraging their settlement. Few other governments have Singapore's confidence that foreign workers can be regulated exacdy as anticipated. However, in an apparent concession to setdement pressures, Singapore is encouraging unskilled foreign workers to upgrade their skills and then settle in Singa? pore. The major problems in Singapore are the foreign worker levy and the foreign policy consequences of Singapore's illegal alien policies. Singapore has no minimum wage, so when the government raised the foreign worker levy to discourage the recruitment of unskilled workers, employers simply cut wages to recoup the levy from the foreign workers they continued to import; in construction, for example, wages fell from S$23 daily to S$16 daily. A tax levy designed to change employer behavior away from reliance on unskilled foreign workers fails if employers simply take the levy from the workers, so the Singapore levy has become, in most cases, simply a way to reduce the wages earned by foreign workers without discouraging em? ployers from hiring them. Second, Singapore did not anticipate the vigorous 1989 Thai protests to caning illegal aliens. Singapore learned that its domestic management of foreign workers had foreign policy consequences. Hong Kong Like Singapore, Hong Kong has had a tight labor market since the 1970s?a two-tiered foreign worker policy with easy entry of skilled and professional workers, and the emigration to the United States, Canada, and Australia of some of its professionals (Yeh, 1990). However, most of Hong Kong's immigrants come from China, and Hong Kong will become a Special Administrative Region of China on July 1, 1997. Until October 1980, Hong Kong had a "touch base" policy toward Chinese nationals?illegal aliens that got into Hong Kong could remain as legal immigrants. However, when 170,000 Chinese arrived in 1979, the squatter population jumped from 300,000 in 1978 to 750,000 in 1980 and Hong Kong toughened its policies toward Chinese nationals. Hong Kong employers wishing to hire skilled and professional workers can get an approval or certification from the Director of Immigration for the alien they wish to hire, and the alien then gets an employment visa.19 Until 1990, the only unskilled workers admitted to Hong Kong were 39 United Kingdom passport holders can enter and work in Hong Kong without restriction. CONFERENCE REPORT 185 "domestic helpers" or maids. Originally begun as a program to get English- speaking maids for English-speaking families, the number of newly admit? ted legal maids jumped from 2,000 in 1976 to 44,000 in 1989, bringing the total to 58,000, mostly Filipinos. Employers must provide housing and pay a minimum wage of HK$3,000 per month, and the government has a dispute resolution service to deal with complaints from maids.20 Filipino maids in Singapore and Hong Kong also have a union to represent them. In May 1989, the Hong Kong government announced a program to import up to 3,000 skilled workers in a transitional program while compa? nies complaining of labor shortages developed labor-saving or training alternatives. However, employers immediately applied for 8,500 workers, and in May 1990 the government responded with an enlarged program to admit up to 14,700 skilled and semiskilled workers?2,700 skilled workers, 10,000 semiskilled (machine operators with at least one year's experience), and 2,000 airport construction workers. These foreign workers must be housed by the employer for free or at a cost regulated by the government and be paid wages at least equal to the median wage published by the government for that occupation. After six months, Hong Kong employers applied for 57,000 foreign workers, or four times the annual quota, launch? ing a debate over whether more foreign workers should be admitted. Hong Kong and Singapore are small economies (Hong Kong has a labor force of almost 3 million, Singapore has 1.5 million) that are successful manufacturing export platforms; that is, materials and components are brought to both countries, assembled, and then exported. In both areas, there have been persisting labor shortages that were usually satisfied by importing workers from a neighboring country?China to Hong Kong, and Malaysia to Singapore. Both countries adopted new policies in 1989-90; Singapore enacted the foreign worker tax or levy and introduced new measures against illegal aliens, while Hong Kong cautiously expanded its foreign worker program from maids to skilled and semiskilled workers. Filipinos loom large in the ever more diversified foreign work force of both areas. Conference participants felt that Hong Kong's minimum wage system better protected foreign workers than Singapore's foreign worker levy. Indeed, the difference between these areas' control mechanisms illustrates the different goals of foreign worker policies: Singapore is primarily inter? ested in its own economy and believes that it can regulate foreign worker entry and settlement with precision, while Hong Kong's policy was subject to more debate before being implemented and includes quotas and wage protections sought by Hong Kong unions. 20 $1.00 U.S. is equal to HK$7.8, so HK$3,000 is equal to $385. 186 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW Malaysia Malaysia has about half of Asia's foreign workers, but their status and effects are not well documented. Malaysia is a resource-rich country of 17 million. About 80 percent of the population lives on the Malay peninsula or West Malaysia, which is separated from East Malaysia in North Borneo by 900 miles of the South China Sea. The Malaysian population is 56 percent Malay, 33 percent Chinese, and 10 percent Indian and other. The Malays tend to engage in peasant agriculture, the Chinese have urban businesses, and the Indians often do farm work on estates. Before independence in 1957, the British imported Chinese, Indian, and Japanese workers to work on rubber plantations and estates. Malaysia adopted a New Economic Policy in 1971, and rural Malays began migrating to urban areas for factory jobs. The semigovernmental agencies which operate the rubber plantations now face labor shortages, since the children of peasants and estate farmworkers prefer steady monthly jobs and salaries in urban factories to uncertain and daily farm wages. The plantations have once again begun to import Filipino and Indonesian workers, so that today three quarters of Malaysia's farmworkers are foreign workers. The number of foreign-born persons in Malaysia declined between 1970 and 1980 according to the Census of Population, but this apparent decline simply reflects the undercount of illegal foreign workers (Abella, 1990:12). A 1968 Employment Restriction Act requires resident foreigners who are salaried workers to have work permits, and there were 18,000 such workers in 1987. But resident workers with manual jobs in agriculture and construc? tion do not need such permits. Temporary workers need to have only passes, and about 70,000 foreigners have such passes. These data suggest that there are fewer than 100,000 legal foreign workers in Malaysia, but the estimated number of illegal migrants in Malaysia ranges from 200,000 to 1 million (Abella, 1990:12, calls 400,000 conservative). By one estimate, there are perhaps 350,000 illegal In? donesians, 100,000 Filipinos, and several hundred thousand Thais. Malaysia's ethnic politics have made these estimates a political issue. Chinese politicians generally overestimate the number because most of the immigrants are Indonesian and Filipino Muslims, and the Chinese argue that because the immigrants are fellow Muslims the Malay-dominated government does not take vigorous action to reduce the illegal immigration which may add 1 percent to the Malaysian population each year. Malaysia had amnesties for illegal aliens in 1986 and 1990, but the high cost of legalization under these programs meant that most aliens remained in an illegal status. Malaysia has an employer sanctions law, but it is apparently CONFERENCE REPORT 187 not enforced. Malaysia's long coastline and the historical affinity between Malays and Indonesians, make it hard to promote a vigorous anti-illegal immigration policy. Malaysia also exports workers. Over 80,000 Malaysians are employed in Singapore at wages that are about twice Malaysian levels. Another several thousand Malays are employed in Middle Eastern countries, and there may be 1,000 illegal alien Malaysians in Japan. Malaysians of Chinese origin appear most likely to emigrate. LABOR EXPORTERS There are three types of Asian labor exporters: countries which both export and import labor, but are net importers (Malaysia); countries which both export and import labor, but are on balance exporters (Thailand, and soon Korea); and classic labor exporters such as the Philippines, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. Malaysia exports professional workers to the United States and other industrial countries as well as skilled and semiskilled labor to Singa? pore, but imports more unskilled Indonesian, Thai, and Filipino workers than it exports. Thailand is a net labor exporter, but rapid economic growth has led to labor shortages and an influx of workers from Burma and Cambodia. These immigrant workers, as well as landless Thais, work on the northeastern farms that are owned by land-owning migrants who are in the Middle East. Thailand, with a population of 56 million and a work force of 29 million (83 percent in rural areas), sent 125,000 migrant workers abroad in 1989. Half went to Saudi Arabia; only 20 percent went to Asian destina? tions such as Singapore, Brunei and Hong Kong (Tingsabath, 1990.A7). Korea first sent 240 migrant workers to West Germany in 1963 and, since then, about 1.7 million Korean migrants have remitted $16 billion to Korea (Park, 1990). Korea sends primarily project-tied migrants, especially to the Middle Eastern countries which took two thirds of the Korean emigrants. Most of these men had two or three-year contracts to build a factory, hotel or road, for example. The Korean government required all migrants to have contracts that established minimum wages and maximum hours (eleven hours daily), but these standards were violated routinely, especially in the Middle East. However, when Korean workers protested these contract violations, as in Jubeil in 1978, labor importers threatened to bar the importation of Korean workers unless these labor disputes stopped, which they did after the Korean government intervened, usually against the protesting migrants. In 1989, Korean employment reached 17.5 million, the unemployment rate fell to 2.6 percent, and there were fears of labor shortages in the 1990s 188 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW if economic growth continues at 10 percent annually (Park, 1990:47). Korean manufacturing and construction employers complained that they needed about 5 percent more workers in 1989, and these labor shortages are expected to become more acute as Korea tries in the 1990s to build 2 million more houses and improve its infrastructure.21 The demand for construction workers in Korea is reflected in their declining number abroad: in 1983, about 42 percent of the 225,000 Korean workers abroad were construction workers; by 1989, only 10 percent of 76,000 were construction workers (Park, 1990:9). Korea is debating whether to import unskilled workers in the 1990s from China, for example, but uncertainty about possible reunification with North Korea will probably preclude importing workers for at least a few more years despite labor shortage complaints. The Philippines, Bangladesh, and Pakistan are classic labor exporters in that each sends 10 to 30 percent of their annual labor force entrants abroad. The Philippines processed 3 million workers for overseas employment between 1975 and 1987, and 85 percent went to the Middle East (Go, 1990:3). In 1987, about 425,000 workers were processed for overseas employment. Filipinos who work abroad are mosdy young (56 percent are 20 to 29) men and women whose skills are bimodal: they include fourth grade only unskilled workers and maids as well as college graduate nurses. A frequent complaint of migrant workers in the Philippines and other labor-exporting countries is the high cost of getting a contract for an overseas job. The Philippines sets a maximum recruitment fee of P5,000 (about $250), but workers report paying two or three times more to get jobs which pay about $250 monthly; that is, workers pay up to 25 percent of their first year's earnings just to get a contract to go overseas. Reports of workers who paid fees to go abroad but never got a contract are common. Filipino women reportedly prefer to be maids in Singapore or Hong Kong instead of the Middle East, but recruitment fees are almost three times higher to get Asian versus Middle Eastern jobs. Bangladesh is a relatively new labor exporter, but it has emerged as one of the lowest-cost sources of unskilled workers and in 1989 sent 106,000 workers abroad, 40 percent to Saudi Arabia (Mahbub, 1990:14). Remit? tances are about $800 million annually, or equal to 50 to 60 percent of the value of Bangladesh exports. Bangladesh runs a significant trade deficit 21 In November 1990, Korea announced plans to scrutinize new arrivals from Southeast Asia to reduce illegal alien workers; almost 1,000 illegal alien manual workers were apprehended in 1990, and one-third were Filipinos. Korea plans to raise fines on illegal alien workers from $4,200 to $7,000 and up to three years in jail. Korean employers who hire illegal aliens can be fined $4,200 and imprisoned for up to three years. Wall Street Journal, November 27, 1990, p. All. CONFERENCE REPORT 189 each year, and this deficit is only partially covered by remittances and foreign aid. Some Bangladeshis argue that countries which export to Bangladesh should accept migrant workers so their remittances can pay for the exports. Japan, for example, exports five times more to Bangladesh than it imports, and current Bangladesh remittances from Japan pay for just 5 percent of these Japanese imports. Bangladesh migrants are eager to work in Japan: the per capita wage gap is about 80 to one?one of the highest in the world?and Bangladesh would like to export more of its workers to Japan and elsewhere.22 Both Bangladesh and Pakistan have been exporting about one quarter of their annual labor force growth. Pakistan's annual exit was over 150,000 in the early 1980s, dipped to 58,000 in 1986, and was 96,000 in 1989 (Azam, 1990:14). The percentage of migrants who are laborers has fallen from one-half in the early 1980s to one-third in the late 1980s, and the percentage of migrants who are drivers, clerks, and tailors has increased. Because of their patriarchal kinship systems, neither Bangladesh nor Pakistan send female migrants abroad, explaining why female migrants in the Gulf States tend to be Filipino, Thai, or Sri Lankan. Like Korea, Pakistan requires migrants to have a contract which guaran? tees minimum wages and working conditions before going abroad; in Pakistan, migrants with approved contracts get a Protector of Immigrants stamp in their passports. However, a significant fraction of Pakistani mi? grants apparendy leave without approved contracts; a survey of returned migrants in the mid-1980s found that only half had approved contracts when they left Pakistan. As in the Philippines, Pakistani workers often exit without contracts because the cost of getting a contract to work abroad may be 10 to 30 percent of the first year's earnings. There were 90,000 Pakistanis in Kuwait when Iraq invaded in August 1990, and about 70,000 have returned to Pakistan. The initial attempt to fly migrants from Jordan proved too expensive, so most Pakistani migrants returned by taking their autos and what household goods they could over? land through Iraq, Turkey, and Iran. Pakistan permitted returning migrants to avoid normal tariffs and customs duties on goods brought back by this land route.23 Pakistan is currendy estimating the losses experienced by its returning migrants, and it reckons that its remittances will decrease by $1.6 billion in 1990. 22 Koga (1990) reported that Bangladesh workers earned about $7 per hour in 1989 in small manufacturing plants near Tokyo. 23 In addition to losing their contracts, Pakistani and other migrants in Kuwait saw the value of their savings in Kuwaiti dinars devalued by 90 percent when Iraq replaced the Kuwaiti dinar with its own currency at a 1 to 1 rate versus the preinvasion 1 to 10 rate. 190 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW There were between 3 and 3.5 million Asian migrants in the Middle East when Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. Amjad (1990:5) reports that India had 800,000 to 1 million migrants in the Gulf States, Pakistan 850,000 to 1.1 million, the Philippines 700,000 to 800,000, Bangladesh 250,000 to 300,000, Sri Lanka 200,000 to 300,000 and Indonesia, Korea, and China less than 100,000 each. Remittances to the Asian countries of origin of these migrants were as much as $10 billion annually during the 1980s. Unlike Arab labor migration to the Gulf States, Asian labor migration was much more organized, with Korea being the most organized exporter of labor and Thailand having the least governmental involvement in labor emigration. Few Asian countries have programs and policies which can translate remittances and returned migrants into sparkplugs for job-creating devel? opment. Government programs which assist returned migrants are some? times resented by other nationals because the returned migrants are in most cases better off than nonmigrants. However, without effective development strategies for both migrants and nonmigrants, remittances wind up being spent without launching stay-at-home development. There appears to be little research and few policy suggestions for using the window of opportu? nity provided by remittances and returned migrants to accelerate Asian development. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Conference participants agreed that Asia is joining the Middle East as a major destination for Asian migrants in the 1990s. There are now about 1 million migrant workers in the four major Asian labor-importing countries, but half are illegal aliens in Malaysia. The major new destination may be Japan: it will continue to have labor shortages in the 1990s, and if it decides to cope with these labor shortages by importing migrant workers, Japan could import in the 1990s more than the 2 million migrants in Saudi Arabia. Japan seems to be divided on whether to become a labor-importing country in the 1990s. Like Singapore and Hong Kong, Japan now provides relatively easy entry for professional migrants. However, most of the 80,000 legal foreign workers in Japan, as well as most of the 65,000 foreign students and trainees and most of the 200,000 illegal aliens, are unskilled workers. Japan has indicated that it is willing to import unskilled workers by granting automatic work and settlement rights to South American residents of Japanese descent, for example, but Japan has not yet decided whether to import unskilled workers from other countries who may settle in Japan. Japan seems to be less confident than Singapore that it can rotate migrants and prevent settlement, and less interested than Hong Kong in migrant maids, but very worried about the settlement of migrant workers?the most CONFERENCE REPORT 191 often repeated example of what Japan does not want is the Turkish workers who settled in Germany. While Japan debates whether to import unskilled migrant workers in the 1990s, the Asian labor exporters that became accustomed to exporting 10 to 30 percent of their annual labor force growth to Middle Eastern countries in the 1980s are looking for new destinations as the demand shrinks in the Middle East. These countries would like to go on exporting workers to earn remittances and to reduce their unemployment despite the widely acknowl? edged human and social costs of emigration due to family separation at home and mistreatment abroad. Emigration and remittances seem to have become institutionalized in some of the Asian labor-exporting countries, but there have been few studies of the local and regional effects of emigration and litde thought given to what development efforts should be undertaken if opportunities for emigration diminish. Conference participants thought that the current uncertainty about whether the destination of Asian migrants will shift from the Middle East offers a unique opportunity to reassess international migration for employ? ment. Potential labor importers such as Japan can determine the pros and cons of importing workers under the higher standards expected by labor exporters. In Japan's case, Asian labor exporters promise to be especially sensitive about the treatment of their nationals in Japan because of Japan's often harsh occupation of their countries in World War II. If Japan and other Asian countries emerge as 1990s destinations for migrant workers, labor exporters hope that bilateral and multilateral agreements can deal with both the specific problems that have arisen with migration to the Middle East, such as recruitment costs and mistreatment abroad, and the more general issue of how to organize emigration so that exporting workers becomes a road to economic development rather than a path to continued dependence on foreign labor markets. REFERENCES Abella, M. 1990 Structural Change and Labor Migration within the Asian Region, mimeo. Prepared for UNCRD Conference on Cross-National Labour Migration in Asia. Nagoya, Japan, November 5-8. Abella, M. 1986- Newspaper Clippings and Reprints of Periodicals on 1990 International Migration for 1990 Employment in Asia. Bangkok: International Labour Organization. Amjad, R. 1990 Asian Labor in the Middle East: Lessons and Implications, mimeo. 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