Happiness and Virtue as a Mean

Edip Yuksel
Happiness is a feeling. It is probably the balance (remainder) of pains and
pleasures, fortunes and misfortunes, success and failures, loe and hatred, hope
and !orries. In other !ords, it is the aerage perception of all "good" perception
minus all "bad" perception. It seems that !e hae t!o different concept of
happiness regarding its life#span. $emporal happiness and permanent happiness
(or real happiness). $he former is our current response (feelings) to a particular
pleasing phenomenon. $he later is a state of contentment regarding our oerall
aspects of life.
My %ebster&s 'ollege (ictionary briefly states the modern concept of happiness.
You are happy, if you are)
*. delighted, pleased, or glad+
,. characteri-ed by pleasure, contentment, or .oy+
/. faored by fortune+ fortunate or lucky.
$he first and the second are sub.ectie definitions of happiness. $he third one is
an ob.ectie definition. In modern terminology, happiness is mostly considered as
an entirely sub.ectie state of mind. %e can classify this state of mind in t!o
categories) Momentary happiness, and 0ermanent happiness.
Momentary happiness is a feeling !hich appears in our conscious for a limited
time. Ho!eer, it co#e1ist !ith the permanent happiness in the background. 2or a
perpetually unhappy person a momentary happiness is a lightning in a dark night.
3n the other hand, for a perpetually happy person it is a ne! moon in a bright
day. $herefore, the ones that really counts is the permanent one.
$he permanent happiness is the product of permanent hormones that paints our
subconscious. $hose hormones are released according to our mental
interpretation of three interals) our past memories, current perception, and
e1pectations. 4 person is perpetually happy if his brain produces .oyful hormones
for this three interals. $he importance of those three interals differs from time
to time, person to person. 5eertheless, the crucial one is the future. 3ur
e1pectations or !orries about the future has an oerriding impact in our state of
happiness. 4 strong faith in a ery happy (6) future can create enough hormones
of .oy !hich can erase all the misfortunes of the past and present. It can supply a
prisoner !ith enormous po!er that transforms the pains of torture into .alapeno
pepper. (It is delicious6)
$he ancient conception of happiness, on the other hand, is based on ob.ectie
definition. 4s !e mentioned aboe, the %ebster&s (ictionary gies a component
of that concept) "faored by fortune+ fortunate or lucky." 4ristotle&s dictionary
adds another component) irtue. In fact, 4ristotle considers irtue as the most
important component of happiness.
It seems that our modern conception of happiness tries to ans!er t!o 7uestions
"4m I happy8" or "Ho! can I become happy8" $he ans!er for the first one is
"you kno! better", for the second one is "gain e1ternal goods and en.oy them6"
9ut, the ancients tried to ans!er those t!o 7uestions from a different perspectie.
$o the 7uestion "4m I happy8" they came up !ith an interrogatie ans!er "9ring
your resume, and !e !ill decide." $o the second 7uestion "Ho! can I become
happy8" they listed the conditions for ho! to become a good citi-en) "9e a
healthy and !ealthy irtuous person."
$hus, the ancient conception of happiness is "a socially .ustified state of
contentment" !hile the modern conception of happiness is "personally .ustified
state of contentment." 4ccording to %ebster, a burglar celebrating his success in
a bar !ith his friends is happy+ but according to 4ristotle that burglar cannot be
happy, since happiness is releant for rational beings, and a rational being cannot
be happy !ith burglary. 4 celebrating burglar is a gra-ing animal.
It seems that 4ristotle considered happiness as a 7uality of intellectual beings.
4ristotle is much more consistent than us by suggesting an intellectual definition
to that 7uality. 4n intellectual being likes "irtue" and dislikes "eil," or prefers
irtue to the lack of it. $hus, an intellectual being can be happy only if he acts
irtuous. $he problem !ith this theory lays in a uniersal definition of irtue and
eil.
4nother (ifference)
4nother difference bet!een the modern and ancient conception of happiness is its
permanency. 4ncients used only three integers to measure happiness. :nhappy (#
*), 5either happy nor unhappy (;), Happy (<*). Ho!eer, !e use infinite
number of fractions to measure the degree of happiness or unhappiness.
I consider this difference less important than the ones regarding the components
of happiness, since the disagreement on the chemical structure of happiness is
more important than the disagreement on !hether its atom can be diided or
not.
4ristotle gies e1amples of feelings and actions !hich represent e1treme ends.
He claims that the irtue is the mean bet!een the t!o kinds of e1treme, that is
e1cessieness and deficiency.

E1cessie Mean (eficient
=ash 9rae 'o!ard
%astefulness >enerosity ?tinginess
Vanity Magnanimity 0usillanimity
Ingratiating (5o name) 2latterer

4ristotle tries to define the irtuous leel of "loe of honor" by comparisons)
. . . since people desire honor both more and less than is right, it
is also possible to desire it in the right !ay. . . . %hen compared
!ith loe of honor, it appears as indifference to honor+ !hen
compared !ith indifference, it appears as loe of honor+ and
!hen compared !ith both, it appears in a !ay as both. $his
!ould seem to be true !ith the other irtues too+ . . . (**,@b *A#
,@).
In mathematics you can find the mean of t!o numbers by diiding their sum by
t!o. In other !ords, you find the mean by the means of both ends. 9ut, you can&t
find the both ends from the mean. 3n the contrary, according to 4ristotle&s
formula of irtue, you can&t find the mean (irtue) by taking the means of t!o
e1treme ends. $here are t!o reasons for this non#mathematical character)
*. Ethical e1tremes and deficiencies cannot be e1pressed 7uantitatiely.
,. E1tremes and deficiencies are usually open ends e1tending to infinity. It is
difficult to set a limit for co!ardliness or for rashness.
/. $he e1tremes and deficiencies are based on the preiously e1isting concept of
mean+ not the other !ay around. If you don&t hae the concept of mean you can&t
imagine e1cessieness.
4ccording to 4ristotle there is a criterion that !e can recogni-e the e1tremes and
deficiencies) 9oth are self#destructie actions.
4ristotle&s theory of irtue as a mean is not a good account of irtue for at least
t!o reasons.
2irst, the opposite e1cessie ends aries according to situations, cultures,
indiiduals and conte1t. $here are endless possible situation for each action. 4n
e1cessie behaior, sometimes, can become irtuous or een deficient. $hus, this
theory of irtue is irtually useless.
?econd, there are some irtuous actions that can be placed on one of the e1treme
ends, instead of intermediary place. Bet&s assume that !e issued seenteen rules
to be obeyed by consensus. 3biously, obeying all these rules should be
considered as irtue. Ho!eer, "obeying all the rules" is not the mean of
e1cessie ends. In fact, "3beying some of the rules" is the mean of "obeying all
the rules" and "disobeying all the rules." Bet us gie a better e1ample)

E1treme Mean (eficiency
Happy (complete) 5either happy nor unhappy :nhappy
If irtuous actions and feelings are the means of both e1treme ends, then to be
happy ##!hich according to 4ristotle&s definition it is &complete&## is an e1treme
end, and thus, according to 4ristotle&s o!n theory, it is not irtuous to be happy6
$his is 4ristotle&s ethical parado1. ('an 4ristotle aoid this parado1 by playing
!ith !ords8 'an he claim that happiness is neither irtuous action nor feeling, it
is a state8)
Eudaimonia or eudaemonia (4ncient >reek) C DEFGHIJE KeLaimo niaM ),
sometimes 4nglici-ed as eudemonia ( N.u d O m o n i.O N), is a >reek !ord
commonly translated as happiness, ho!eer "human flourishing" is a more
accurate translation.K*M Etymologically, it consists of the !ord "eu" ("good") and
"daimn" ("spirit").
"Eudaimonia" !as a central concept in ancient >reek ethics, along !ith the term
"arete", most often translated as "irtue", and "phronesis", often translated as
"practical or moral !isdom."K,M In classical >reek, eudaimonia !as used as a
term for the highest human good, and so it became the aim of practical
philosophy, including ethics and political philosophy, to consider !hat it really is
and ho! it can be achieed.
(iscussion of the links bet!een irtue of character (ethik aret) and happiness
(eudaimonia) is one of the central preoccupations of ancient ethics, and a sub.ect
of much disagreement. 4s a result there are many arieties of eudaimonism. $!o
of the most influential forms are those of 4ristotle K/M and the ?toics. 4ristotle
takes irtue and its e1ercise to be the most important constituent in eudaimonia
but does ackno!ledge the importance of e1ternal goods such as health, !ealth,
and beauty. 9y contrast, the ?toics make irtue necessary and sufficient for
eudaimonia and thus deny the necessity of e1ternal goods.
In terms of its etymology, eudaimonia is an abstract noun deried from the >reek
ad.ectie, eudaimon. $his ad.ectie is, in turn, a compound !ord composed of eu
meaning P!ellQ and daimon (daemon), !hich refers to a sort of guardian spirit.K/M
$herefore, to be eudaimon is to lie !ell, protected and looked after by a
beneolent spirit. (espite this etymology, ho!eer, discussions of eudaimonia in
ancient >reek ethics are often conducted independently of any super#natural
significance.
In his Nicomachean Ethics, (*;A@a*@R,,) 4ristotle says that eudaimonia means
Sdoing and liing !ellS. It is significant that synonyms for eudaimonia are liing
!ell and doing !ell. 3n the standard English translation, this !ould be to say that
Thappiness is doing !ell and liing !ellS. Ho!eer, it is important to notice that
ThappinessS does not entirely capture the meaning of the >reek !ord here. 3ne
important difference is that happiness often connotes being or tending to be in a
certain pleasant state of consciousness. 2or e1ample, !hen !e say of someone
that Phe is a ery happy man,Q !e usually mean that he seems sub.ectiely
contented !ith the !ay things are going in his life. %e mean to imply that he
feels good about the !ay things are going for him. In contrast, eudaimonia is a
more encompassing notion than happiness since eents that do not contribute to
oneSs e1perience of happiness may affect oneSs eudaimonia.
Eudaimonia depends on all the things that !ould make us happy if !e kne! of
their e1istence, but 7uite independently of !hether !e do kno! about them.
4scribing eudaimonia to a person, then, may include ascribing such things as
being irtuous, being loed and haing good friends. 9ut these are all ob.ectie
.udgments about someoneSs life) they concern a personSs really being irtuous,
really being loed, and really haing fine friends. $his implies that a person !ho
has eil sons and daughters !ill not be .udged to be eudaimon een if he or she
does not kno! that they are eil and feels pleased and contented !ith the !ay
they hae turned out (happy). 'onersely, being loed by your children !ould
not count to!ards your happiness if you did not kno! that they loed you (and
perhaps thought that they did not), but it !ould count to!ards your eudaimonia.
?o eudaimonia corresponds to the idea of haing an ob.ectiely good or desirable
life, to some e1tent independently of !hether one kno!s that certain things e1ist
or not. It includes conscious e1periences of !ell being, success, and failure, but
also a !hole lot more. (?ee 4ristotleSs discussion) Nicomachean Ethics, book
*.*;R*.**.)
9ecause of this discrepancy bet!een the meaning of eudaimonia and happiness,
some alternatie translations hae been proposed. %.(. =oss suggests T!ell#
beingS and Uohn 'ooper proposes "flourishing." $hese translations may aoid
some of the misleading associations carried by "happiness" although each tends
to raise some problems of its o!n. 0erhaps the safest alternatie is to leae the
term un#translated (transliterated), allo!ing its meaning to emerge by considering
ho! it !as actually used by the ancient ethical philosophers.
KeditM (efinition
In his Nicomachean Ethics, (V,*+ *;A@a*@R,,) 4ristotle says that eeryone
agrees that eudaimonia is the highest good for human beings, but that there is
substantial disagreement on !hat sort of life counts as doing and liing !ell+ i.e.
eudaimon)
Verbally there is a ery general agreement+ for both the general
run of men and people of superior refinement say that it is
KeudaimoniaM, and identify liing !ell and faring !ell !ith
being happy+ but !ith regard to !hat KeudaimoniaM is they
differ, and the many do not gie the same account as the !ise.
2or the former think it is some plain and obious thing like
pleasure, !ealth or honourW K*;A@a*XMKYM
?o, as 4ristotle points out, saying that eudaimon life is a life !hich is ob.ectiely
desirable, and means liing !ell, is not saying ery much. Eeryone !ants to be
eudaimon+ and eeryone agrees that being eudaimon is related to faring !ell and
to an indiidualSs !ell being. $he really difficult 7uestion is to specify .ust !hat
sort of actiities enable one to lie !ell. 4ristotle presents arious popular
conceptions of the best life for human beings. $he candidates that he mentions
are a (*) life of pleasure, (,) a life of political actiity and (/) a philosophical life.
3ne important moe in >reek philosophy to ans!er the 7uestion of ho! to
achiee eudaimonia is to bring in another important concept in ancient
philosophy, "arete" ("irtue"). 4ristotle says that the eudaimon life is one of
Pirtuous actiity in accordance !ith reasonQ K*;AXb,,R*;AZa,;M. 4nd een
Epicurus !ho argues that the eudaimon life is the life of pleasure maintains that
the life of pleasure coincides !ith the life of irtue. ?o the ancient ethical
theorists tend to agree that irtue is closely bound up !ith happiness (ar[te is
bound up !ith eudaimonia). Ho!eer, they disagree on the !ay in !hich this is
so. %e shall consider the main theories in a moment, but first a !arning about the
proper translation of ar[te.
4s already noted, the >reek !ord ar[te is usually translated into English as
virtue. 3ne problem !ith this is that !e are inclined to understand irtue in a
moral sense, !hich is not al!ays !hat the ancients had in mind. 2or a >reek,
ar[te pertains to all sorts of 7ualities !e !ould not regard as releant to ethics, for
e1ample, physical beauty. ?o it is important to bear in mind that the sense of
TirtueS operatie in ancient ethics is not e1clusiely moral and includes more
than states such as !isdom, courage and compassion. $he sense of irtue !hich
ar[te connotes !ould include saying something like "speed is irtue in a horse",
or "height is a irtue in a basketball player". (oing anything !ell re7uires irtue,
and each characteristic actiity (such as carpentry, flute playing, etc.) has its o!n
set of irtues. $he alternatie translation excellence (or "a desirable 7uality")
might be helpful in coneying this general meaning of the term. $he moral
irtues are simply a subset of the general sense in !hich a human being is
capable of functioning !ell or e1cellently.
4ristotleSs account is articulated in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Eudemian
Ethics. In outline, for 4ristotle, eudaimonia inoles actiity, e1hibiting irtue
(arte sometimes translated as e1cellence) in accordance !ith reason. $his
conception of eudaimonia deries from 4ristotleSs essentialist understanding of
human nature, the ie! that reason (logos sometimes translated as rationality) is
uni7ue to human beings and that the ideal function or !ork (ergon) of a human
being is the fullest or most perfect e1ercise of reason. 9asically, !ell being
(eudaimonia) is gained by proper deelopment of one&s highest and most human
capabilities and human beings are "the rational animal". It follo!s that
eudaimonia for a human being is the attainment of e1cellence (arte) in reason.
4ccording to 4ristotle, eudaimonia actually re7uires actiity, action, so that it is
not sufficient for a person to possess a s7uandered ability or disposition.
Eudaimonia re7uires not only good character but rational actiity. 4ristotle
clearly maintains that to lie in accordance !ith reason means achieing
e1cellence thereby. Moreoer, he claims this e1cellence cannot be isolated and so
competencies are also re7uired appropriate to related functions. 2or e1ample, if
being a truly outstanding scientist re7uires impressie math skills, so that one
might say "doing mathematics !ell is necessary to be a first rate scientist". 2rom
this it follo!s that eudaimonia, liing !ell, consists in actiities e1ercising the
rational part of the psyche in accordance !ith the irtues or e1cellences of reason
K*;AXb,,R*;AZa,;M. %hich is to say, to be fully engaged in the intellectually
stimulating and fulling !ork at !hich one achiees !ell#earned success. $he rest
of the Nicomachean Ethics is deoted to filling out the claim that best life for a
human being is the life of e1cellence in accordance !ith reason. ?ince reason for
4ristotle is not only theoretical but practical also, he spends 7uite a bit of time
discussing e1cellences of character !hich enable a person to e1ercise his
practical reason (i.e., reason relating to action) successfully.
4ristotleSs ethical theory is eudaimonist because it maintains that eudaimonia
depends on irtue. Ho!eer, it is 4ristotleSs e1plicit ie! that irtue is necessary
but not sufficient for eudaimonia. %hile emphasi-ing the importance of the
rational aspect of the psyche, he does not ignore the importance of other TgoodsS
such as friends, !ealth, and po!er in a life that is eudaimonic. He doubts the
likelihood of being eudaimonic if one lacks certain e1ternal goods such as Tgood
birth, good children, and beautyS. ?o, a person !ho is hideously ugly or has Plost
children or good friends through deathQ (*;AAb@R\), or !ho is isolated, is
unlikely to be eudaimon. In this !ay, "dumb luck" (chance) can preempt one&s
attainment of eudaimonia.
?3'=4$E?
Eny is the ulcer of the soul.
=egard your good name as the richest .e!el you can possibly be possessed of #
for credit is like fire+ !hen once you hae kindled it you may easily presere it,
but if you once e1tinguish it, you !ill find it an arduous task to rekindle it again.
$he !ay to gain a good reputation is to endeaor to be !hat you desire to appear.
$here is only one good, kno!ledge, and one eil, ignorance.
$he une1amined life is not !orth liing.
%isdom begins in !onder.
$he only true !isdom is in kno!ing you kno! nothing.
$he ma1im, or aphorism, &]no! $hyself& has had a ariety of meanings attributed
to it in literature. $he ?uda , a *;th 'entury encyclopedia of >reek ]no!ledge,
says) "the proerb is applied to those !hose boasts e1ceed !hat they are," K,M and
that "kno! thyself" is a !arning to pay no attention to the opinion of the
multitude. K/M
0lato employs the ma1im &]no! $hyself& e1tensiely by haing the character of
?ocrates use it to motiate his dialogues. 0lato makes it clear that ?ocrates is
referring to a long#established !isdom. 9en.amin Uo!ett&s inde1 to his translation
of the (ialogues of 0lato lists si1 dialogues !hich discuss or e1plore the saying
of (elphi) &kno! thyself.& $hese dialogues (and the ?tephanus numbers inde1ing
the pages !here these discussions begin) are 'harmides (*\Y(), 0rotagoras
(/Y/9), 0haedrus (,,AE), 0hilebus (YZ'), Ba!s (II.A,/4), I 4lcibiades (*,Y4,
*,A4, */,').K*AM
In 0lato&s 'harmides (dialogue), 'harmides refers to the ma1im consistently !ith
the ie! e1pressed in the ?uda, !ith 'harmides saying, "for they imagined that
&]no! $hyself6& !as a piece of adice !hich the god gae and not his salutation
of the !orshippers at their first coming in."K,;M In modern !ords 'harmides
gies his opinion that &]no! $hyself6& !as an admonition to those entering the
sacred temple to remember or kno! their place and 'harmides says, " &kno!
thyself6& and &be temperate6& are the same. 5otice that !hen the !ords of
'harmides are !ritten, &thyself& and &temperate& are punctuated !ith e1clamation
marks in the English translations,as if they !ere commands.K,*M In the balance of
the 'harmides (dialogue), 0lato has ?ocrates lead a longer in7uiry as to ho! !e
may gain kno!ledge of ourseles.
In 0lato&s 0haedrus (dialogue), ?ocrates uses the ma1im &kno! thyself& as his
e1planation to 0haedrus for !hy he has no time for mythology or other far flung
topics. ?ocrates says, "9ut I hae no leisure for them at all+ and the reason, my
friend, is this) I am not yet able, as the (elphic inscription has it, to kno! myself+
so it seems to me ridiculous, !hen I do not yet kno! that, to inestigate irreleant
things."K,,M
In 0lato&s 0rotagoras (dialogue), ?ocrates lauds the authors of pithy and concise
sayings deliered precisely at the right moment and says that Bacedaemon, or
?parta, educates its people to that end. ?ocrates lists the ?een ?ages as $hales,
0ittacus, 9ias, ?olon, 'leobulus, Myson, and 'hilon, !ho he says are gifted in
that Bacedaemonian art of concise !ords "t!isted together, like a bo!string,
!here a slight effort gies great force."K,/M ?ocrates says e1amples of them are,
"the far#famed inscriptions, !hich are in all men&s mouths,##&]no! thyself,& and
&5othing too much.".K,YM Haing lauded the ma1ims, ?ocrates then spends a great
deal of time getting to the bottom of !hat one of them means, the saying of
0ittacus, &Hard is it to be good.& $he irony here is that although the sayings of
(elphi bear &great force,& it is not clear ho! to lie life in accordance !ith their
meanings.
In 0lato&s 0hilebus dialogue, ?ocrates refers back to the same usage of &kno!
thyself& from 0haedrus (dialogue) to build an e1ample of the ridiculous for
0rotarchus. ?ocrates says, as he did in 0haedrus, that people make themseles
appear ridiculous !hen they are trying to kno! obscure things before they kno!
themseles. K,@M. ?ocrates then gies three e1amples of !ays people may not
kno! themseles.
By contemporaries of Socrates
Bike 0lato, ^enophon reports ?ocrates&s use of the saying &]no! $hyself& as an
organi-ing theme for a long dialogue !ith Euthydymus in ^enophon&s Memoirs
of ?ocrates.K,\M
4ristophanes is the third contemporary of ?ocrates !hose descriptions of
?ocrates and his teaching remain e1tant. In $he 'louds, 4ristophanes makes a
mockery of philosophers in general and ?ocrates in particular. $he !ords _I`aCF
DCb aEcdHb I (and kno! yourself) are used in $he 'louds by a father deriding his
son for his lack of learning, "4nd you !ill kno! yourself, ho! ignorant and
stupid you are."K,XM
Later usage
2rom *@/A on!ards the phrase "nosce te ipsum" and its Batin ariants !ere often
used in the anonymous te1ts !ritten for anatomical fugitie sheets printed in
Venice as !ell as for later anatomical atlases printed throughout Europe. $he
*@/;s fugitie sheets are the first instances in !hich the phrase !as applied to
kno!ledge of the human body attained through dissection.K,ZM
In *\@*, $homas Hobbes used the term &nosce teipsum& !hich he translated as
&read thyself& in his famous !ork, The Leviathan. He !as responding to a popular
philosophy at the time that you can learn more by studying others than you can
from reading books. He asserts that one learns more by studying oneself)
particularly the feelings that influence our thoughts and motiate our actions. 4s
Hobbes states, "but to teach us that for the similitude of the thoughts and passions
of one man, to the thoughts and passions of another, !hosoeer looketh into
himself and considereth !hat he doth !hen he does think, opine, reason, hope,
fear, etc., and upon !hat grounds+ he shall thereby read and kno! !hat are the
thoughts and passions of all other men upon the like occasions."K,AM
In *X**, 4le1ander 0ope !rote a poem entitled &4n Essay on Man, Epistle II,&
!hich begins "]no! then thyself, presume not >od to scan, $he proper study of
mankind is Man."K/;M
In *X@;, 9en.amin 2ranklin in his 0oor =ichard&s 4lmanack obsered the great
difficulty of kno!ing one&s self, !ith) "$here are three $hings e1tremely hard,
?teel, a (iamond, and to kno! one&s self." K/*M
In *Z/*, =alph %aldo Emerson !rote a poem entitled eI`fF gCEcdhI, or >nothi
?eauton (&]no! $hyself&), on the theme of &>od in thee.& $he poem !as an
anthem to Emerson&s belief that to &kno! thyself& meant kno!ing the >od !hich
Emerson felt e1isted !ithin each person.K/,M
In *Z/,, ?amuel $. 'oleridge !rote a poem entitled &?elf ]no!ledge& in !hich
the te1t centers on the (elphic ma1im &]no! $hyself& beginning, &>nithi
seauton6##and is this the prime 4nd heaen#sprung adage of the olden time6##& and
ending !ith &Ignore thyself, and strie to kno! thy >od6& 'oleridge&s te1t
references U:VE54B, 1i. ,X.K//M
0B4$3
"4s the builders say, the larger stones do not lie !ell !ithout the lesser." #0lato
I feel it means the bigger something is the more it depends on the smaller things.
%hen I read it I think of a science point of ie!. %e as the !orld (9ig thing)
depend on atoms and molecules (?mall thing) to keep us functioning. %ithout the
small thing !e !ould not be !here !e are today. %e !ould not een e1ist.
4t the touch of loe eeryone becomes a poet. R 0lato
5ecessity is the mother of inention