Atlas Fertilizer vs Hon. Sec of DAR (GR No. 93100, 1997) and Phil Fed of Fishpond-Producers vs Hon.

Sec of DAR (GR

No. 97855, 1997)

Facts:
Petitioners are engaged in the aquaculture industry utilizing fish ponds and prawn farms. They question the
constitutionality of the following provisions of RA 6657 (CARL):
a. Sec 3 which includes raising of fish as an Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity;
b. Sec 11 which defines commercial farms as private agricultural lands devoted to fish ponds and prawn ponds.;
c. Sec 13 which requires the execution of a production-sharing plan;
d. Sec 16 (d) which vests with DAR the authority to determine just compensation in summary proceedings, and
e. Sec 32 which discusses the guidelines on Sec 13s production sharing plan (3% of sales to be distributed within 60
days for entities that have gross sales<5M on top of compensation AND 10% of net profit after tax if entity realizes
a profit to be distributed within 90 days),
stating that the provisions similarly treat of aquaculture lands and agriculture lands when they are differently situated, and
differently treat aquaculture lands and other industrial lands, when they are similarly situated in violation of the constitutional
guarantee of the equal protection of the laws.
They also contend the following points:
a. In aquaculture, fishponds and prawn farms, the use of land is only incidental to and not the principal factor in
productivity and, hence, as held in "Luz Farms," they too should be excluded from R.A. 6657 just as lands devoted
to livestock, swine, and poultry have been excluded for the same reason. Further, that in fishponds and prawn farms,
there are no farmers, nor farm workers, who till lands, and no agrarian unrest, and therefore, the constitutionally
intended beneficiaries under Section 4, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution do not exist in aquaculture.
b. Further, the Constitutional Commission debates show that the intent of the constitutional framers is to exclude
"industrial" lands, to which category lands devoted to aquaculture, fishponds, and fish farms belong.

Issue:
Whether or not the provisions above are constitutional and thus WON lands devoted to the aquaculture industry, particularly
fishponds and prawn farms are included in CARL.

Held:
No. They are not. With the passage of RA 7881, the above provisions (with regard to fish ponds and prawn farms) have been
removed and thus the constitutional questions regarding such provisions have become moot and academic.

RARAD et al vs CA et al (GR No. 165155, 2010)

Facts:
Petitioners who are in actual possession of the land are alleged agricultural lessees (but petitioners aver that they are
farmer-beneficiaries under PD 27 and were already granted CLTs and unregistered emancipation patents) of herein
respondents who are co-owners of 58.8 hec of rice lands in Bulacan.
In 2002, said respondents filed a complaint for ejectment against petitioners for none payment of rentals(since 1994)
before DARAB, Pampanga.
Regional Adminstrator: Judgement rendered for the Respondents, ordering severance of existing tenancy/agricultural
leasehold and ordering petitioners to vacate landholdings, remove improvements and to pay back rentals and to pay damages.
The court explained that the properties are exempt from CARP as evidenced by a DAR order.
On Appeal Reg Admin: ruled in favour of the petitioners.
CA: On certiorari (based on the premise that DARAB no longer has jurisdiction to reverse the portion of its Decision,
which had already been duly executed upon the authority of a writ issued on May 6, 2003. They also insisted that
both notices of appeal were infirm for failure to state the grounds for an appeal and for containing forged
signatures) Ruled in favor of respondents stating that the appeal was a product of forgery and thus had no legal
effect. It also found that the other appeals were mere scraps of paper as it failed to comply with 1997 DARAB
New Rules of Procedure.
Issues$$$:
1. WON the Notice of Appeal were mere scraps of paper for failure to state the grounds relied on for appeal.
2. WON the NOA were null and void for containing two falsified signatures.

Held:
1.NO. There is nothing sacred about the forms of pleadings or processes, their sole purpose being to facilitate the
application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. Hence, pleadings as well as procedural rules should
be construed liberally. Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon because rules of
procedure should not be applied to override substantial justice.
2. NO. Given the foregoing circumstances, we conclude that the unfortunate matter of signing the decedents
names in the Notice of Appeal is an innocent and harmless error on the part of the heirs.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED and the Notices of Appeal filed by the
private respondents before the public respondent are hereby decreed without legal effect.



Luz Farms vs Hon Sec of DAR (GR No. 86889, 1990)

Facts:
This case raises a constitutional question on RA 6657s inclusion of raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its
coverage. Likewise a prayer for restraining order and/or preliminary and permanent injunction was also filed against the Sec
of DAR to prohibit RA 6657 and the related guidelines from being enforced and implemented.
Petitioner Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business and stands to be directly
affected by such inclusion. It contended that Congress in enacting the said law has transcended the mandate of the
Constitution, in including land devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage and stated that the used
of land is incidental to but not the principal factor or consideration in productivity in the poultry/livestock industry.
Respondent on the other hand argued that livestock and poultry raising is embraced in the term "agriculture" and the
inclusion of such enterprise in RA 6657 is proper.

Issue:
WON the inclusion of raising of livestock, poultry and swine in the coverage of RA 6657 is constitutional.

Held:
No. It is not. The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the
word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and
poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.
Likewise the court ruled that the production sharing plan required by the government is unreasonable for being
confiscatory, and therefore violative of due process.
Thus, the court held that Sec 3 (b), 11, 13 and 32 of RA 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock,
poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, are
hereby DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary injunction issued is hereby MADE
permanent.

Romanita Concha et al vs Paulino Rubio et al (GR No. 162446, 2010)
(Identification of Beneficiaries: )

Facts:

Issues:

Held:
The Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Romanita Concha, et al. vs. Paulino Rubio, et al.,
G.R. No. 162446 (March 29, 2010), citing Department of Agrarian Reform v. Department of
Education, Culture and Sports, held that the identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries
are matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP, it behooves the
courts to exercise great caution in substituting its own determination of the issue, unless
there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the administrative agency.



Province of CAMSUR vs CA (GR No. 103125 1993)

Facts:
The Provincial Government of CAMSUR passed Resolution No. 129, s. 1988authorizing the Provincial Governor to
purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and
non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees. The Provincial Governor
moved to execute such resolution and filed a motion for issuance of a writ of possession. However in 2 separate expropriation
cases, the owners brothers San Joaquin moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of inadequacy of price offered for their
property which was dismissed. The San Joaquins then petitioned the CA asking that the court declare Reso No. 129 as null
and void.
In its answer to the petition, the Province of Camarines Sur claimed that it has the authority to initiate the
expropriation proceedings under Sections 4 and 7 of Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and that the expropriations
are for a public purpose. Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General stated that
under Section 9 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no need for the approval by the Office of the
President of the exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General
expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform
of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project. The CA set aside the order and also ordered the
trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted the
requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the property of the private
respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land.

Issue:
Whether or not the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units is subject, to the prior approval of the
Secretary of the Agrarian Reform, as the implementator of the agrarian reform program.

Held:
NO. Local government units can expropriate agricultural lands without prior authority from the Department of
Agrarian Reform as the determination of the public use of the property subject for expropriation is considered an
expression of legislative policy.
Although local governments possess merely delegated, not inherent, power of eminent domain, limitations in the
exercise thereof must be clearly expressed, either in the law conferring the power or in other legislations.
The exclusive authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to reclassify agricultural lands is limited to the
applications for reclassification submitted by the landowners or tenant beneficiaries and does not include the
determination of the "public purpose" requirement of the expropriating authority.
The expropriation of property intended for the establishment of a pilot development center and housing project of
the Province of Camarines Sur held valid in consonance with the public purpose requirement of the Constitution.


CONFED, NFSP et al vs DAR (GR 169514, 2007)
COVERAGE; COVERAGE AND ACQUISITION OF SUGARLANDS; VALIDITY OF SECTION 16, R.A. NO.
6657
Facts:
A Prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the
Confederation of Sugar Producers Association, Inc., et al. It seeks, inter alia, to enjoin the Department of Agrarian
Reform, the Land Bank of the Philippines, and the Land Registration Authority from "subjecting the sugarcane
farms of Petitioner Planters to eminent domain or compulsory acquisition without filing the necessary
expropriation proceedings pursuant to the provisions of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court and/or without the
application or conformity of a majority of the regular farmworkers on said farms."
Petitioners CONFED, NFSP, UNIFED and PANAYFED claim that their members own or administer private
agricultural lands devoted to sugarcane. They and their predecessors-in-interest have been planting sugarcane on
their lands allegedly since time immemorial. While their petition is denominated as one for prohibition and
mandamus, the petitioners likewise seek to nullify paragraphs (d), (e) and (f) of Section 16 of Republic Act No.
(RA) 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. In other words, their arguments, which
will be discussed shortly, are anchored on the proposition that these provisions are unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether or not DAR acted in excess of jurisdiction by exercising the Power of Eminent Domain to Deprive
Thousands of Landowners, including the Member-Planters of Petitioner-Federations of their Private Agricultural
Lands, without Filing the Necessary Expropriation Proceedings pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court in
Gross Violation of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution?
Held:
In Association of Small Landowners, the Court categorically passed upon and upheld the validity of Section 16 of
RA 6657, including paragraphs (d), (e) and (f), which sets forth the manner of acquisition of private agricultural
lands and ascertainment of just compensation.
The foregoing disquisition is binding and applicable to the present case following the salutary doctrine of stare
decisis et non quieta moverewhich means "to adhere to precedents, and not to unsettle things which are
established." Under the doctrine, when the Supreme Court has once laid down a principle of law as
applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where
facts are substantially the same; regardless of whether the parties and property are the same. The doctrine
of stare decisis is based upon the legal principle or rule involved and not upon the judgment which results
therefrom.
Contrary to the petitioners' submission that the compulsory acquisition procedure adopted by the DAR is without
legal basis, it is actually based on Section 16 of RA 6657. Under the said law, there are two modes of acquisition
of private agricultural lands: compulsory and voluntary. The procedure for compulsory acquisition is that
prescribed under Section 16 of RA 6657.
The procedure prescribed in Section 16 of RA 6657 is a summary administrative proceeding. As outlined in Roxas,
the said procedure, taken together with the pertinent administrative issuances of the DAR, ensures compliance with
the due process requirements of the law. More importantly, this summary administrative proceeding does not
preclude judicial determination of just compensation. In fact, paragraph (e) of Section 16 of RA 6657 is categorical
on this point as it provides that "[a]ny party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of
proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation."
The petitioners' main objection to paragraphs (d), (e) and (f) of Section 16 of RA 6657 is that they are allegedly in
complete disregard of the expropriation proceedings prescribed under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. The petitioners'
argument does not persuade. As declared by the Court in Association of Small Landowners, we are not dealing here
with the traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain, but a revolutionary kind of expropriation:
Indeed, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of the inclusion by Congress of
the sugar lands in the coverage of RA 6657. It is basic in our form of government that the judiciary cannot inquire
into the wisdom or expediency of the acts of the executive or the legislative department, for each department is
supreme and independent of the others, and each is devoid of authority not only to encroach upon the powers or field
of action assigned to any of the other departments, but also to inquire into or pass upon the advisability or wisdom of
the acts performed, measures taken or decisions made by the other departments.
Petition is dismissed.
LBP vs Honeycomb Farms Corp (GR No. 169903, 2012)

Facts:
Honeycomb Farms Corp. (HFC) voluntarily offered their two parcels of land to the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) for P 10,480,000.00 or P 21,165.00. The Landbank of the Philippines (LBP) used the
guidelines set forth in DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 17 series of 1989 as amended by DAR AO No. 3
series of 1991 to fix the value of these lands. HFC rejected the valuation. The voluntary offer to sell was referred
to the DAR adjudication Board. The Regional adjudicator fixed the value of landholdings at P 5,324,529.00.
HFC filed a case with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)of Masbate acting as Special Agrarian Court against the
DAR Secretary and LBP, praying to compensate HFC for its landholdings amounting to P 12,440,000.00. In its
amended complaint, HFC increased the valuation P 20,000,000.00. LBP, on the other hand, revalued the land
under TCT No. T-2872 at P 1,373,244.78, which was formerly fixed at P 2,527,749.60; and TCT No. T-2549 at P
1,513,097.57, which was previously fixed at P 2,796,800.00. The RTC made its own valuation when the Board of
Commissioners could not agree on the common valuation. The RTC took judicial notice of the fact that a
portion of 10 hectares of that land is a commercial land because it is near the commercial district of Cataingan,
Masbate.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). HFC argued that the government illegally failed to
pay just compensation pursuant when LBP opened trust account in its behalf which is contrary to existing
jurisprudence. LBP on the other hand argued that the RTC erred when it disregarded the formula set forth in
DAR AO No. 6 series of 1992 as amended by DAR AO No. 11 series of 1994 and in declaring the 10 hectares
of that land as a commercial land. The CA decided in favor of HFC. CA held that the lower courts are not
bound by the factors enumerated in Section 17 of RA 6657 which are mere guide in determining just
compensation. Also, the valuation by LBP based on the formula was too low and, therefore, confiscatory. LBP
argued that the CA erred in not applying the formula based on law and that the land taken pursuant to the States
agrarian reform program involves both the exercise of the States power of eminent domain and the police
power of the State. Consequently, the just compensation for land taken for agrarian reform should be less than
the just compensation given in the ordinary exercise of eminent domain. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the RTC erred when it made its own valuation and disregarded the DAR formula/ Whether
application of DARs formula is mandatory in determining Just Compensation, hence the RTC and CA
erred when both disregarded the same;
2. Whether the compensation to be paid should be less than the market value of the property because the
taking was not done in LBPs traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain;
3. Whether a hearing is necessary before the RTC can take judicial notice of the nature of the land; and
4. Whether payment through trust account is valid.
Held:

Heirs of Lorenzo Buensuceso, vs Lovy Perez (GR No. 173926, 2013)

DAR vs Roberto J Cuenca et al. (GR No. 154112, 2004)

JURISDICTION; DAR HAS JURISDICTION OVER ALL CONTROVERSIES INVOLVING THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM
Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Roberto J. Cuenca
G.R. No. 154112 (September 23, 2004)

Facts:
Private respondent Roberto J. Cuenca is the registered owner of a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 816-A and
covered by TCT No. 1084, containing an area of 81.6117 hectares, situated in Brgy. Haguimit, La Carlota City and
devoted principally to the planting of sugar cane.
On 21 September 1999, Noe Fortunado, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of La Carlota City issued and
sent a NOTICE OF COVERAGE to private respondent Cuenca placing the above-described landholding under the
compulsory coverage of R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
On 29 September 1999, private respondent Cuenca filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, La Carlota City,
a complaint against Noe Fortunado and Land Bank of the Philippines for 'Annulment of Notice of Coverage and
Declaration of Unconstitutionality of E.O. No. 405, Series of 1990, With Preliminary Injunction and Restraining
Order.'
Private respondent Cuenca prayed that the Notice of Coverage be declared null and void ab initio and Executive
Order No. 405 dated 14 June 1990 be declared unconstitutional.
MARO Noe Fortunado filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court a quo has no jurisdiction
over the nature and subject matter of the action, pursuant to R.A. 6657.
The respondent Judge issued a Temporary Restraining Order directing MARO and LBP to cease and desist from
implementing the Notice of Coverage. In the same order, the respondent Judge set the hearing on the application for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on January 17 and 18, 2000.
In an order dated 16 February 2000, the respondent Judge denied MARO Noe Fortunado's motion to dismiss and
issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction directing Fortunado and all persons acting in his behalf to cease and desist
from implementing the Notice of Coverage, and the LBP from proceeding with the determination of the value of the
subject land.
The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) thereafter filed before the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the writ of preliminary injunction issued by respondent Judge on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Issue:
The Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious error by not taking into cognizance that the issues raised in the
complaint filed by the private respondent, which seeks to exclude his land from the coverage of the CARP, is an
agrarian reform matter and within the jurisdiction of the DAR, not with the trial court.
The Honorable Court of Appeals, with due respect, gravely abused its discretion by sustaining the writ of injunction
issued by the trial court, which is a violation of Sections 55 and 68 of Republic Act No. 6657.
Held:
The Petition has merit. The issue involves the implementation of agrarian reform, a matter over which the DAR has
original and exclusive jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 50 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No.
6657)
All controversies on the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) fall under the
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), even though they raise questions that are also legal or
constitutional in nature. All doubts should be resolved in favor of the DAR, since the law has granted it special and
original authority to hear and adjudicate agrarian matters
Having declared the RTCs to be without jurisdiction over the instant case, it follows that the RTC of La Carlota City
(Branch 63) was devoid of authority to issue the assailed Writ of Preliminary Injunction. That Writ must perforce be
stricken down as a nullity. Such nullity is particularly true in the light of the express prohibitory provisions of the
CARP and this Court's Administrative Circular Nos. 29-2002 and 38-2002. These Circulars enjoin all trial judges to
strictly observe Section 68 of RA 6657, which reads:
"Section 68. Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue Interference. No injunction, restraining order,
prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by the lower courts against the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the
Department of Agriculture (DA), the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Department
of Justice (DOJ) in their implementation of the program."