2NC Overview

The embargo currently contains obstacles that require Cuba to meet a slew of
conditions before the US will economically engage the question is whether
the US should remove those obstacles to allow engagement or whether we
should keep those obstacles in place and assist Cuba in overcoming them
rather than remove the embargo, the counterplan helps Cuba meet its
conditions
6064 of U.S.C. Title 22 says the embargo can only be terminated if a
transition government is in power the counterplan amends the definition of a
transition government to mean that compensation for expropriated property to
US citizens is sufficient. The second part of the counterplan establishes a
Bilateral Investment Treaty with Cuba that will use a Step-Down Restitution
Policy to assist Cuba in providing that compensation. The restitution provided
by the counterplan results in Cuba meeting the definition of a transition
government so that the Cuban embargo can now be lifted but ensures that the
embargo is lifted because restitution has been provided rather than lifting the
embargo in spite of restitution not being provided
2NC Property Rights Overview

Brazils legal system allows the expropriation of property without owners
being compensated
The US is incapable of changing this if we set the model that Cubas
expropriation allows them to get off without penalty
The CP sends an important signal to the rest of LA that you cannot allow for
property takings of citizens in your country
Thats Poblete

Poorly enforced property rights in Latin America cause Amazon deforestation Araujo
property rights insecurity brings a significant increase in the rate of deforestation
2NC Turns Democracy
Turns democracy the only means of effective democratic growth is the
protection of property rights and economic freedom
Tong and Dorgler, 11 Bin, The School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology, Australia, and
Benno, The School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology, Australia CREMA Centre for Research in
Economics, Management and the Arts, Switzerland and CESifo, Germany, August, Democracy, Property Rights, Income Equality, and
Corruption | ADM
This paper presents theoretical and empirical evidence on the nexus between corruption and democracy. We establish a political
economy model where the effect of democracy on corruption is conditional on income distribution and
property rights protection . Our empirical analysis with cross-national panel data provides evidence that is
consistent with the theoretical prediction . Moreover, the effect of democratization on
corruption depends on the protection of property rights and income equality which shows that
corruption is a nonlinear function of these variables. The results indicate that democracy will work
better as a control of corruption if the property right system works and there is a low level of income inequality.
On the other hand if property rights are not secured and there is strong income inequality, democracy may even lead to an increase
of corruption. In addition, property rights protection and the mitigation of income inequality contribute in a
strong manner to the reduction of corruption.
Heres the statistical model
Tong and Dorgler, 11 Bin, The School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology, Australia, and
Benno, The School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology, Australia CREMA Centre for Research in
Economics, Management and the Arts, Switzerland and CESifo, Germany, August, Democracy, Property Rights, Income Equality, and
Corruption | ADM
2.1 The Model
We consider a non-overlapping-generations model where altruistic individuals with monotonic
preferences live only for one period. Each generation comprises a large number of individuals distributed uniformly over
generation has the following utility: where is his own consumption, budget constraint is, . Similar to Gradstein (2007), each
member in (1) is the income in next period accrued to his child. The (2) where is income of individual from his parent, is his
productive capital and is his unproductive capital in rent seeking. For convenience we further assume (3) where
is the average income of generation . , and its distribution therefore indicates the degree of income inequality in the
model economy. The production function without government is (4) which exhibits diminishing returns to scale. Following
Alesina and Angeletos (2005), we assume that the government levies a flat tax on individual capital to fund a lump-sum transfer
across all individuals. The tax rate is which is decided by previous voting. Then the sum of the transfer is . However, the
distribution of the transfer among individuals is determined by rent seeking activities. Similar to
Sonin (2003) and Gradstein (2007), we suppose that the share of the transfer which the individual can grab is which implies
that given the level of public property rights protection ), the share of transfer an individual gains increases with his own input and
decreases with the competing 4 inputs of the others. According to Alesina and Angeletos (2005), the corruption level is
plausibly assumed to increases with the amount of transfer. Then the net capital endowment
of individual after redistribution is given by productive and unproductive investments: And
the output produced by individual in period t+1 is So the utility of individual can be expressed as following,
Similar to Sonin (2003) and Gradstein (2007), we assume that and are exogenous to any individual since there are
numerous individuals in each generation.
2NC Amazon Defo Impact Calc
Loss of the Amazon threatens extinction
Takacs, Professor of Environmental Humanities at CSU Monteray Bay, 96 (David, The Idea
of Biodiversity: Philosophies of Paradise pg. 200-201)
So biodiversity keeps the world running. It has value and of itself, as well as for us. Raven, Erwin, and Wilson oblige us to think about the value
of biodiversity for our own lives. The Ehrlichs rivet-popper trope makes this same point; by eliminating rivets, we play Russian roulette with global ecology and human futures:
It is likely that destruction of the rich complex of species in the Amazon basin could trigger
rapid changes in global climate patterns. Agriculture remains heavily dependent on stable
climate, and human beings remain heavily dependent on food. By the end of the century the extinction
of perhaps a million species in the Amazon basin could have entrained famines in which a billion
human beings perished. And if our species is very unlucky, the famines could lead to a thermonuclear war,
which could extinguish civilization. 13 Elsewhere Ehrlich uses different particulars with no less drama: What then will happen if the current
decimation of organic diversity continues? Crop yields will be more difficult to maintain in the face of climatic
change, soil erosion, loss of dependable water supplies, decline of pollinators, and ever more serious assaults by
pests. Conversion of productive land to wasteland will accelerate; deserts will continue their seemingly inexorable expansion. Air pollution will increase, and local climates
will become harsher. Humanity will have to forgo many of the direct economic benefits it might have withdrawn from Earth's wellstocked genetic library. It might, for example,
miss out on a cure for cancer; but that will make little difference. As ecosystem services falter, mortality from respiratory and epidemic disease, natural disasters, and especially
famine will lower life expectancies to the point where cancer (largely a disease of the elderly) will be unimportant. Humanity will bring upon itself
consequences depressingly similar to those expected from a nuclear winter. Barring a nuclear conflict, it appears that
civilization will disappear some time before the end of the next century not with a bang but a whimper.14
Outweighs the case irreversibility of extreme environmental catastrophe
means err neg
Cerutti 7 Professor of Political Philosophy Furio Cerutti, Professor of Political Philosophy at
the University of Florence, Global Challenges for Leviathan: A Political Philosophy of Nuclear
Weapons and Global Warming. Lexington Books. p. 31
The second feature of the impasse is irreversibility, which is peculiar to the worst outcomes of global challenges
and to some more ordinary issues of environmental policy as well, for example, the extinction of a
species. We cannot completely undo the hole in the ozone layer (it will take decades to recover, even if we totally and immediately stop using chlorofluorocarbons); nor
can we be confident that, after a large nuclear war, we would be able to reconstruct world society as we did after World War II. Not addressing the
global challenges is not a risk that can be taken in the expectation that, if something goes
wrong, we pay the price owed and go back to business as usual, or nearly as usual, as happened after
Hiroshima and Chemobyl. The difference is-and this is the third aspect of the impasse-even greater, at least with regard to nuclear
weapons: if something goes wrong, it could be not just "something," but everything and
everyone that is doomed. Among the casualties there would probably be the very actor
(humanity as a civilized species) who calculated and decided to take the risk (even if the calculation and
decision were actually made by few leading members of our kind, a fact whose relevance we will soon assess). This is a circumstance that is not considered in any theory or
philosophy of risk and is rather likely to outmaneuver this altogether. Whoever would counter this argument with reference to an established game like Russian roulette,
should bear in mind that in this game 1. the player has something to gain, if s/he wins and does not lose her/his life (money, self-esteem, or social esteem because of her/his
"courage"); 2. if s/he kills himself, s/he only kills her/himself and not others (a collective version of the game has not been proposed); 3. others (family, group) could even reap
benefit from the money or the fame s/he may leave behind. None of these circumstances or opportunities apply to our risky game with lethal weapons. If we want
to preserve our modem ability to rationally take risks, we should not deal with global and
ultimate menaces as if they were risks to be taken. There is nothing to be gained by taking
them. The unprecedented severity of the possible losses and the uncertainty in which these
issues are enveloped request a different approach, which will be looked into in the last three chapters.
Their defense doesnt account for the cascade effect destruction
undermines resiliency
Tonn, Poli Sci Prof at Tennessee. 07 (Bruce E.-, April 13, Futures, Futures sustainability,
Science Direct; )
The first principle is the most important because earth-life is needed to support earth-life. Ecosystems are composed of countless species
that are mutually dependent upon each other for nutrients directly as food or as by-products of earth-life (e.g., as carbon dioxide and
oxygen). If the biodiversity of an ecosystem is substantially compromised, then the entire
system could collapse due to destructive negative nutrient cycle feedback effects. If enough
ecosystems collapse worldwide, then the cascading impact on global nutrient cycles could lead to
catastrophic species extinction. Thus, to ensure the survival of earth-life into the distant future the earth's
biodiversity must be protected.
Theres an invisible threshold we dont know what species loss will doom
the planet
Warner 94 (Paul Warner, American University, Dept of International Politics and Foreign
Policy, August, Politics and Life Sciences, p. 177)
Massive extinction of species is dangerous, then, because one cannot predict which species are expendable to the system as a whole. As Philip Hoose
remarks, "Plants and animals cannot tell us what they mean to each other." One can never be sure which species holds
up fundamental biological relationships in the planetary ecosystem. And, because removing species is an irreversible act, it
may be too late to save the system after the extinction of key plants or animals. According to the U.S. National Research Council, "The ramifications of
an ecological change of this magnitude [vast extinction of species] are so far reaching that no one on earth will escape them." Trifling with the
"lives" of species is like playing Russian roulette, with our collective future as the stakes.
2NC AT: Perm Do Both
Links to the net benefit normalizing economic relations means Cuba doesnt
have to compensate for expropriated property kills relations and foreign
investment
Bargaining chip key Cuba has no incentive to compensate for stolen property
if weve already normalized economic relations
2NC AT: Perm Do CP
Counterplan is a distinct policy option from the plan perm severs which is a
voting issue for fairness and ground
1) Meet requirements vs eliminate requirements
Normalization is different than normalize the counterplan may be part of
the process of normalization, but the plan text says they normalize relations
which mandate zero sanctions remain in the plan
Pfister, now a Professor of Communications at University of Nebraska-Lincoln, and Jarvis,
99 (Damien and Jason, last date cited, Normalization Topic Wording Paper
http://debate.uvm.edu/wppfister.html)
In the foreign policy literature concerning pariah states, "normalize" is used often. Literally, it means, "to make normal," and this
is how scholars in the field utilize the word. The trick with crafting a resolution utilizing "normalize" is, of course, the division of ground. Many scholars indicate
anything that makes relations "more normal," for example, humanitarian assistance, trade agreements, etc, is a
"normalization" of relations. This would make negative ground more difficult to predict, as
"normalization" would be similar to "change" with a direction. However, the verb form of normalization, normalize,
might solve many of these problems since it suggests a particular goal and end point within
the context of a specific policy. Affirmatives would be forced to create a policy that
"normalizes" relations, rather than merely advocate a policy that falls under the purview of
a process of normalization. As the definitions section below explains, normalize suggests an endpoint reached
in which relations are "normal." This definition might prevent affirmatives from lifting just
one economic sanction, since that action would leave other economic sanctions in place,
and thus not be "normal" economic relations . The contextual definitions lend credence to
this interpretation.
There are two ways to end the embargo, either Cuba can meet US conditions
under the counterplan or the US can enact new legislation eliminating those
conditions under the plan
Travieso-Diaz, Partner at Shaw Pittman, 9 (Matias, Lifting the Cuban Embargo: The New
Labors of Hercules? ASCE Cuba,
http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume19/pdfs/traviesodiaz.pdf)
In summary, the accumulated embargo legislation has created a situation where Cubas transition government must proceed in a
very specific manner that meets the requirements of the CDA and the LIBERTAD Act in
order for the embargo sanctions to be lifted. Assuming the conditions set forth in those
statutes are met, once the President submits to Congress the reports required by these laws, he can issue an executive
order to lift the embargo. The President will also be able at that time to order all affected
executive departments and agencies, including Treasury, State and Commerce, to implement the termination
of the sanctions now currently in effect against Cuba and against other countries providing assistance to the Cuban
government. If, however, the events in Cuba do not fit the pattern set out in the CDA and the
LIBERTAD Act, the embargo will remain in place until the conditions in Cuba conform to
the requirements in those laws, or until new legislation is enacted. Any effort by the President to expedite the
process (e.g., by failing to renew the applicability of the TWEA) can be countermanded by Congress, particularly if it is unclear as to in what direction the Cuban government is
going.
That means the aff eliminates the current requirement of resolving property
claims its specifically tied to normalizing economic relations
Dhooge, Professor Business Law at University of the Pacific, 97 (Lucien, Fall, Fiddling With
Fidel: An Analysis Of The Cuban Liberty And Democratic Solidarity Act Of 1996 Arizona
Journal of International and Comparative Law, 14 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. Law 575, lexis)
Title II, consisting of Sections 6061 through 6067, provides a framework for American assistance to
transition and democratically-elected governments which may come to power in Cuba in the future. Title II, which states that it is U.S. policy to support Cuban self-
determination, n178 instructs the President to develop a plan for providing economic assistance to Cuba. n179 The types of assistance which may be extended to transition and
democratically-elected [*597] governments in Cuba are described in Section 6062. n180 In addition, the President is instructed to seek the assistance of other countries,
international financial institutions, and multilateral organizations in aiding transition and democratically-elected governments in Cuba. n181 The President is
authorized to suspend the economic embargo in the event a transition government comes
to power in Cuba and such suspension would contribute to a stable foundation for a democratically-elected government. n182 The President may terminate the
embargo in the event a democratically-elected government comes to power in Cuba. n183 The requirements for a government to be
deemed "transition" or "democratically-elected" for purposes of the Act are set forth in elaborate detail in Sections
6066 and 6067. n184 [*598] In any event, normalization of economic and diplomatic relations between
the United States and Cuba is made specifically contingent upon satisfactory resolution of
property claims of U.S. nationals by the Cuban government. n185
Defer to contextual definitions over dictionary ones the counterplan is a
precondition to normalizing relations but that is distinct from actual
normalizing which is what the plan mandates
Pfister, now a Professor of Communications at University of Nebraska-Lincoln, and Jarvis,
99 (Damien and Jason, last date cited, Normalization Topic Wording Paper
http://debate.uvm.edu/wppfister.html)
Definitions: The most difficult task in researching this wording was to determine what constitutes
"normalization" of relations with another country. While the term is used throughout the foreign policy literature, very few sources
actually provide coherent explanations of what is, and is not, "normalization." However, there are a few books that actually provide an
"official" definition. As we will discuss below, the lack of formal definitions has its advantages and drawbacks. The primary drawback to the term
normalization is the potential for affirmatives to interpret the term broadly to allow any
affirmative that "does something" with a topic nation. The "dictionary" definitions (Webster's, and
foreign policy dictionaries, etc.) would seem to allow expansive interpretations of the word as it would appear in the resolution.
However, there are two reasons that the resolution that we advocate below does not fall into that trap. First, the contextual usage of the terms
"normalize" and "normalization" provide immediate (though somewhat inconsistent) checks on affirmative ground. In the discussion of the first
resolution, we offer the example of a case that might unfreeze Iranian Assets in an attempt to normalize
economic relations with Iran. An interview with a senior Iranian diplomat indicates that unfreezing
assets is a good idea, but that such an action would be a pre-condition for taking actions to normalize
relations. However, releasing the assets would not constitute normalization itself.
Subsequently, the affirmative would not be topical, and can be contextually defended as
negative counterplan ground. A side benefit of the wide usage of the term in the literature will be intricate, lively and innovative topicality debates.
These topicality debates would not overshadow the substantive issues, however, since the literature provides a substantive check on possible affirmative cases. Second, use of
specific modifiers will prevent the "send beanie babies to Sudan" affirmative. Exclusion of "cultural normalization" from the topic will prevent small affirmatives that take
actions that would not constitute fundamental changes in current American foreign policy.
A2: Cuba Says No/Conditioning Fails
Their evidence assumes adding a condition which isnt the plan we remove all
but one of the demands the US is making on Cuba
Prefer specificity Espino evidence says the flexibility of Step-Down
Restitution incentivizes Cuba to say yes
The counterplan is not conditionality, its sequenced engagement gradual
removal of some requirements signals US goodwill that brings Cuba back to
the table
Meacham, Senior Adviser Latin America and the Caribbean for the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, 9 (Carl, February 23, Changing Cuba Policy - in the United States National
Interest Staff Trip Report, https://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2009_rpt/cuba.pdf
The regime appears to be open to some bilateral dialogue and cooperation Staff's meetings with GOC
officials revealed stark differences between Cuban and U.S. priorities in bilateral relations. Most of the U.S. policy reforms that are proposed in Washington center on
liberalizing travel to the island, yet the GOC considers travel to be a domestic issue for the United States and therefore of less relevance to bilateral discussions. Most
importantly, the GOC views the USG's emphasis on conditionality (i.e., lifting U.S. economic sanctions in
return for concrete movement toward democracy) as an unlikely starting point for future
negotiations. When staff asked GOC officials about the human rights situation and the plight of Cuban dissidents, GOC officials countered with Guantanamo,\8\
Abu Ghraib, and the case of the ``Cuban Five.'' \9\ When staff asked about what gestures the Cuban government would find positive, officials expressed concerns with
programs by USAID intended to facilitate a transition to democracy in Cuba as well as Radio and TV Marti broadcasts from Miami, which are intended to provide an alternative
source of information for the Cuban people. They view these programs as interventionist tools of the United States intended to bring about regime change. On issues of
national security and commerce, however, the GOC indicated a willingness to cooperate
with the United States where mutual interests exist, echoing previous statements by Raul Castro on his desire for
dialogue with the USG. Since assuming power in 2006, he has made several overtures to engage in dialogue with the
United States with the condition that the dialogue is based on the principles of equality,
reciprocity, non-interference, and mutual respect.\10\ According to State Department sources, the USG has also made overtures
over the last 18 months to discuss narco-trafficking and current restrictions on travel for diplomats in Havana and Washington, but these efforts have proven unsuccessful thus
far. Recommendatons According to a recently published book on U.S. policy towards Cuba, only three avenues of regular official communication exist with the GOC: monthly
meetings between U.S. and Cuban military officers at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, occasional cooperation between the U.S. and Cuban coast guards on drug enforcement
and migration matters (through a U.S. Coast Guard attache at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana), and frequent contact between U.S. and Cuban meteorologists who track
hurricanes in the Caribbean.\11\ Given these precedents and the current state of U.S.-Cuban relations, staff concluded that progress could be attained
by replacing conditionality with sequenced engagement, beginning with narrow areas of
consensus that develop trust. A steady series of gradual measures has significant
confidence-building potential and could ultimately create the conditions for effective
dialogue over more contentious issues. By sequencing this process of engagement with
Cuba, the USG would have the opportunity to continually reassess progress towards the
advancement of national interests. In other words, a pragmatic, phased approach would allow the USG to halt the engagement process at any
point if U.S. interests were no longer being served. Staff recommends assessing the viability of reinstating discussions on drug interdiction and migration, and incremental
steps in other areas, in order to address issues of concern for both countries. These measures should build upon each other to establish new foundations for dialogue. Initially,
increased communication and cooperation between the GOC and USG can take place
within the framework of the existing embargo, though staff suggests consideration of several exceptions to U.S. sanctions as talks
progress, as detailed below.
Cuba has already offered to try to negotiation the restitution question 1NC
evidence proves the problem is US unwillingness to make it relevant
Ashby, Deputy Assistant Secretary Western Hemisphere for the Department of Commerce,
11 (Timothy- Director of the Office of Mexico and the Caribbean for the U.S. Commerce
Departments International Trade Administration and Senior Research Fellow at the Council on
Hemispheric Affairs, November 22, Helping Cuban Reforms Through Agricultural Trade
http://www.coha.org/helping-cuban-reforms-through-agricultural-trade/)
The President retains ultimate decision-making authority as to which countries and
products are eligible for GSP status. There are certain mandatory criteria that countries must measure up to in order to be considered eligible
for GSP treatment. Of particular interest with respect to Cuba, communist countries are not eligible for GSP treatment
unless the country receives Normal Trade Relations (NTR) status , is a World Trade Organization (WTO) member and a
member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and is not dominated by international communism.[1] In addition, a GSP beneficiary may not have nationalized,
expropriated or otherwise seized property of U.S. citizens or corporations without providing, or taking steps to provide, prompt, adequate and effective compensation, or
submitting such issues to a mutually agreed forum for arbitration.[2] While certain products from Cuba would certainly be eligible for GSP status, the mandatory country
requirements present additional hurdles for preferential trade treatment for Havana to qualify outside of the current
political climate. However, these are not insurmountable. For example, Cuba repeatedly has offered to negotiate
the settlement of claims for expropriated U.S. property, and since the demise of the Soviet Union, could not be considered
to be dominated by international communism.
That momentum is likely to increase
Santiago, Attorney at American Tower Corporation, 2K (Rolando, Spring, Y2K, The
Millennium for a Revised U.S.-Cuba Trade Policy: Grounds For Removing the Embargo
NAFTA: Law and Business Review of the Americas, 6 NAFTA L. & Bus. Rev. Am. 169, lexis)
The following is the text of an impassioned statement delivered on May 7, 1999, by Congressman Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R-Fl.) before the Trade Subcommittee of the House of
Representative's Ways and Means Committee discussing the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba and why the China model is an inadequate example for justifying a lifting of the
embargo. Congressman Balart highlights some very insightful and astute facts regarding why the Cuba dynamic cannot be treated with the same policies as those used with
China: [*191] Despite the intensification of the campaign to save the tyranny, I feel more certain everyday that Cuba will be free. A national
consensus in favor of multiparty democracy becomes apparent more clearly and more
strongly every day in Cuba, and that consensus in favor of liberty contains within it a firm rejection of tyranny and oppression. It is only a matter of time
until the necessary dynamic is achieved that will permit the Cuban people to put an end to the tyranny and recover their sovereignty through free elections. The tyranny is
obviously preparing for the time when Castro will die. We can see clear signs of its intention to name someone like
Alarcon or Lage as chief of state, probably with Raul Castro as head of the armed forces.
These maneuvers will be accompanied by offers to return previously-confiscated property
to Americans, all for the purpose of Creating increasing pressure for Congress to lift the
embargo in order to be able to establish and consolidate a fascist system in Cuba like the
one that exists today in Mainland China (the "Chinese Model"). The Chinese Model in Cuba would mean a long-term consolidation of
slavery for Cubans. We should always remember that capitalism is not synonymous with democracy or liberty; examples in this century abound (Mussolini, Hitler, Trujillo, etc.).
Capitalism, although without a doubt the most effective means of creating wealth, is perfectly compatible with oppression. It is also perfectly compatible with democracy and
liberty, but the mere fact that capitalism exists does not guarantee the development of liberty or its consolidation. Although it is clear that the establishment of a true Chinese
Model will not be possible in Cuba during Fidel Castro's rule (since that system requires a certain decentralization of power and other characteristics that the tyrant will never
permit), its establishment is theoretically possible when the tyrant dies. And the tyranny is preparing for its establishment. With that purpose it will make tempting offers to
international capitalism to try to again its support for the Chinese Model, a system which would permit the continuation of the conditions of misery, humiliation and oppression
which Cubans face today. The decisive struggle of the Cuban people, therefore, will be to avoid the establishment of the Chinese political and economic model in Cuba after
Fidel Castro's death and to achieve the return of sovereignty to the people through free elections. It is essential to realize that establishment of the Chinese Model in Cuba is
not possible as long as the American embargo exists. Without access to the American market, a Chinese Model permitting the consolidation of the slave system after the
tyrant's death could never be created in Cuba. [*192] Those who find themselves in power after the tyrant's death
will need to achieve the lifting of the embargo, and the most important leverage available
for the Cuban people at that time for the holding of free elections is, precisely, the U.S.
embargo. n92
Bargaining chip of embargo removal solves
Haas, JD U of Miami, 9 (Megan, Spring, Tierra Sin Duenos: The Effect of Cuba's Foreign
Investment Scheme on United States' Certified Property Claims Texas Hispanic Journal of Law
& Policy, 15 Tex. Hisp. J.L. & Pol'y 93, lexis)
A. How to Approach U.S. Confiscation Claims for Cuban Property A future Cuban government n189 will need to provide some
type of remedy for the confiscated property claims. n190 The extent and substance of that remedy is largely unknown, although
not without speculation from experts and property owners themselves. The current Cuban government is not entirely closed
to negotiating a settlement for the confiscated properties; however, they have made it clear that they will not be pushed
or bullied by the United States government. Cuba claims that, if anything, the United States should be compensating them for the billions of dollars they have suffered in
embargo-related damages over the years. n191 Whichever way the issue is resolved, the expropriation claims are recognized as a
large obstacle to the normalization of U.S.-Cuba relations n192 and a precondition to
increasing foreign investment in the island. n193 As it becomes [*117] apparent that the transition to democracy and a free-market
economy will not instantly occur in Cuba, the viability of any proposed program to settle property claims will depend on the economic and political conditions in which Cuba
finds itself at that time. n194 Also, several questions should be considered, such as who should negotiate the settlements and what form of compensation would be the most
adequate? In Cuba's past negotiations with the countries that received compensation for
confiscated property were held between Cuba and the state representing the claimant. The
settlements were negotiated over a long period of time, and payments were made in lump sum. n195 If history repeats, any future government in
Cuba will likely seek similar terms for the U.S. claims. Traditionally, the U.S. President has wide power to settle claims against
foreign governments. n196 Here, due to the magnitude and the amount of the claims, certain groups have suggested that a bilateral U.S.-Cuba tribunal be established to
resolve the claims. n197 A third alternative would be to allow the claimants to negotiate directly with the Cuban government for whatever form of compensation that will
mutually benefit the two parties. Unfortunately, it has been held that individual claimants have forfeited their right to settle directly with the Cuban government when they
certified their claims with the Department of State. Claimants are thus bound by any settlement reached by the Department of State on their behalf. n198
Framework
Research and debate about existential risks is needed to inform the public
debate is a forum to build awareness of these threats to examine possible
political responses
Bostrom, Professor of Philosophy at Oxford University and Director of the
Future of Humanity Institute, 2 (Nick, March, Existential Risks: Analyzing
Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards Journal of Evolution and
Technology, Vol 9, http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html
9 Implications for policy and ethics Existential risks have a cluster of features that make it
useful to identify them as a special category: the extreme magnitude of the harm that would
come from an existential disaster; the futility of the trial-and-error approach; the lack of
evolved biological and cultural coping methods; the fact that existential risk dilution is a global
public good; the shared stakeholdership of all future generations; the international nature of
many of the required countermeasures; the necessarily highly speculative and multidisciplinary
nature of the topic; the subtle and diverse methodological problems involved in assessing the
probability of existential risks; and the comparative neglect of the whole area. From our survey
of the most important existential risks and their key attributes, we can extract tentative
recommendations for ethics and policy: 9.1 Raise the profile of existential risks We need more
research into existential risks detailed studies of particular aspects of specific risks as well as
more general investigations of associated ethical, methodological, security and policy issues.
Public awareness should also be built up so that constructive political debate about possible
countermeasures becomes possible. Now, its a commonplace that researchers always
conclude that more research needs to be done in their field. But in this instance it is really
true. There is more scholarly work on the life-habits of the dung fly than on existential risks.
9.2 Create a framework for international action Since existential risk reduction is a global public
good, there should ideally be an institutional framework such that the cost and responsibility
for providing such goods could be shared fairly by all people. Even if the costs cant be shared
fairly, some system that leads to the provision of existential risk reduction in something
approaching optimal amounts should be attempted.