Political Crisis in Greece and Italy: a comparative analysis of

SYRIZA and 5 Stars Movement

Raffaele Borreca
Ph Candidate
!niversity of Peloponnese
Department of Political Science and International Relations
1
A"stract
The spaces opened by the economic and political crisis offered many rooms for manoeuvre to those
opposition forces able to canalise in electoral terms the protest and translate its claims in specific demands
or a coherent political narrative. Strong of their electoral results, the Greek SYRI! and the Italian "ive
Stars #ovement $#%S& assumed soon a pivotal role in their political systems. 'o(ever, although the
demands and the ob)ectives of both SYRI! and the #%S are, to a certain e*tent, similar, the t(o parties
differ in terms of political background, ideology and internal organi+ation. The success of the #%S trace
its roots in the conte*t of deep distrust against the political system reigning in Italy since the 1,,-s. In the
#%S problematically coe*ist a grassroots direct democracy approach and the charismatic and substantially
unchallenged leadership of the founder .eppe Grillo. The capability of the radical left SYRI! to convey
the anti/#emorandum contestation and its constitution in an unitarian party follo(ing the 0-10 elections
reaffirmed the centrality of the traditional mass party in the Greek democratic representation. 'o(ever, its
electoral drive to(ards the centre poses ma)or ideological challenges. "inally, the scepticism to(ards the
1uropean governance of both parties cannot be mistaken for anti2europeism. SYRI! and the #%S
canali+ed the protest from the streets to the national 3arliament giving democratic representation to the
contestation and contributing in the politicisation of the 1uropean polity.
0
Introd#ction
The European debt crisis constituted a crucial event with important social and political
consequences, notably for the southern European states. In 0-11, Ireland, 3ortugal, Greece, Italy and Spain
changed their governments, before the natural end of the legislature. In Spain the government called for
snap elections, in (hich the governing party suffered a large defeat. Governments resigned in Ireland and
3ortugal and soon after ne( elections (ere held. In Greece and Italy, 4oucas 3apademos and #ario
#onti, t(o non2elected professionals, (ere appointed as caretaker 3rime #inisters after Georgios
3apandreu and Silvio .erlusconi decided to step do(n. 3rovisional coalition5unity2government (ere
formed under their supervision. 6e( elections then follo(ed both in Greece $#ay and 7une 0-10& and
Italy $"ebruary 0-18&, that resulted in governments supported by the same centre2left / centre2right grand
coalitions that provided the parliamentary ma)ority to their 9technocratic: predecessors. In these countries,
the elections sa( the electoral e*ploits of ne( ma)or opposition parties, able to convey and e*press the
large discontent to(ards the crisis management and the failures of the national political system.
The se;uence of events that led to the political crisis in all these countries began to unfold (ith the
sudden stop in private capital inflo(s caused by the international financial crisis, as (ell as by the
developments of the 1uropean sovereign debt crisis $#erler < 3isani2"erry 0-10&.

Governments found
refinancing and repaying their debt increasingly difficult. The response (as a first round of austerity
measures that (ere adopted both autonomously and as part of an international bailout agreement.
'o(ever, as the Greek crisis (ent on and the risk of contagion reached other 1uro+one countries, the
governing parties (ere pressured to take on further cuts, amidst public opinion=s distrust and the pressure
from the parliamentary oppositions. Trade unions, organised interests and ne( social movements took the
streets, the latter calling for a radical change of the political and economic system.

"inally, the
governments in charge announced their resignation or promised elections after the vote of a ne(, important
austerity budget and5or the adoption of a bailout deal (ith the 1> and the I#", as (as the case in Ireland,
3ortugal and Greece. !s a conse;uence of their involvement in the austerity campaigns, most of the
former governing parties under(ent historic electoral backlashes in the general as (ell as in local
elections. !t the same time, the protests against the austerity measures and the ma)or political parties, held
responsible for the economic setback, translated in different political representations and led to the
emergence of ne( organised political actors.
8
SYRIZA and the Mo$imento 5 Stelle: the electoral rise
The debate over the 1>5I#" bailout plan for Greece, the #emorandum of "inancial and
1conomic 3olicies, monopolised the heated political campaign that led to the snap elections in the
spring 0-10. The #emorandum 5 anti2#emorandum divide proved to be a transversal cleavage,
bringing to the breaking point established balances of po(er inside the Greek party system. This ne(
kind of split generated by the financial collapse of the country divided e;ually the public opinion and
the electorate. The #emorandum became the symbol of the country?s place in 1urope, of the
po(erlessness of the Greek state, relying on decisions coming from "rankfurt or .erlin, and of the
impossibility or inability for the national leaderships to provide a convincing response to the country?s
economic and social crisis. 6o less important, the #emorandum constituted the battleground on (hich
the sho(do(n of the Greek party system, as established since the return of the country to democracy,
(as played. Thus, the months preceding the 0-10 snap elections fi*ed the Greek political forces in t(o
opposed camps. @n the one side those calling for the respect of the agreements and of the ob)ectives set
by the #emorandum in the name of responsibility and Greece?s 1uropean membership. @n the other,
the parties, flanked by a large part of civil society, that harshly contested the #emorandum and the
1uropean governance of the crisis, in the name of the country?s dignity and independence. .oth the
camps, highlighted the necessity of a change, be it in terms of socio2economic model and practices
$Ahalari 0-10& or assuming the form of anti2establishment and anti2system contestation.
3!S@B and 6ea Cemokratia, the t(o columns of the Greek bipartitism established since the
return to democracy, aligned both on the side of the respect of the bail out conditions, though the
attitude of 6ea Cemokratia to(ards the bailout changed only after its participation to the coalition
government led by 3apademos. 'o(ever, both the 3!S@B and 6C (ere held as responsible for the
country?s economic failure and both parties accused each other of the financial mismanagement of the
country. The fact that the respect of the bail out programme united the t(o ma)or parties (as an
element of further radicalisation of the Greek political divide. "inally, the general elections held on Dth
#ay 0-10 crashed the Greek bipolar system. "or the first time since 1,EF the sum of the parliamentary
seats gained by the 3!S@B and 6ea Cemokratia did not cross the threshold of 1%- out of the 8-- seats
of the 'ellenic unicameral 3arliament. This despite the generous ma)ority pri+e of %- seats granted by
the Greek electoral la( to the first party. !fter its electoral fall, the 3!S@B became the third force in
the 3arliament, (ith only F1 seats. 'o(ever, 6ea Cemokratia (as not spared by the anger of the Greek
electorate. The 1-G seats obtained by 6C did not correspond to the strong electoral mandate called by
F
its leader, !ntonis Samaras, during the electoral campaign.
SYRI! (as the political actor that better translated the anti2#emorandum discontent. The
coalition of the radical left became the second political force of the country gaining %0 seats in the
3arliament (ith 1,-D1,1%G votes, not even 1--,--- less than 6C. The coalition tripled its preferences
obtained in the general elections of 0--, and largely improved the e*ploit of G%%,,FF preferences and
0G parliamentary seats performed in 1,G, by Synaspismos, the coalition of the lefts of (hich SYRI!
is the political heir. .oth 6C and SYRI! increased their electoral performances by 1-H during the
7une 1E elections, gaining votes mainly from those political forces that in #ay had remained under the
minimum threshold of 8H necessary to enter the 3arliament.
1
6ea Cemokratia rose to 0,,DDH
obtaining 10, seats, (hile SYRI! (ith 0D,G,H secured E1 seats. The 3!S@B managed to maintain
88 #3s (ho proved crucial for the ne( coalition government formed (ith Samaras as 3rime minister.
The rise of SYRI! drained an ample share of the constituency from the 3!S@B, overtaking
the socialists even in their traditional strongholds such as the prefectures of !chaia, Ahania $Arete& and,
in 7une, in all the four prefectures of Arete. 'o(ever, the Aoalition of the Radical 4eft represented not
only an ideological redefinition for those voters of the left (ho (ere disappointed by the 3!S@B?s
centrist drift but it (as also seen as a real possibility to unhinge the 3!S@B26C duopoly. The success
of SYRI! (as most evident in the main cities. @n the (hole, it came first in prefectures (ithin the
four ma)or Greek urban centres $!thens, Thessaloniki, that (as eventually recon;uered by 6C in 7une,
3atras and 3ireas& as (ell as in the (hole !ttica, the region of !thens, (here almost a third of the
Greek population lives. >nder the leadership of !le*is Tsipras the Aoalition of the Radical 4eft
campaigned for the unilateral cancellation of the public debt and for the (ithdra(al from the
#emorandum?s engagements. The other parties of the left did not manage to reach the results of SYRI!
or to overta"e the #!S$%. This was due both to the lower appeal of a more pragmatic or moderate profile
held during the electoral campaign, as in the case of &emo"rati"i !ristera
'
, or, on the contrary, as in the
case of the %%E, to an outspo"en Euroscepticism that warded off all those voters, both radical and
moderate, who considered the country(s participation in the European institutions and in the Economic and
)onetary *nion +E)*, as an essential conquest. ! deeper reason resides also in the cability of SYRI!
to reach and convey the reasons of the grassroots contestation.
Ihile SYRI! established itself as the ma)or party on the left, in Italy, the MoVimento 5 Stelle
$"ive Stars #oJement 2 #%S& demonstrated to be more than a protest movement, being able to compete
and (in elections. In fact, during the local elections of #ay and 7une 0-10, involving the administrations
%
of 1,--E to(ns, among (hich t(enty2eight capital of province and four regional capitals, the #%S
became, on the (hole, the third Italian party in terms of total preferences, after the centre2left Partito
Democratico $3C& and .erlusconi?s Il Popolo delle Libert $3d4&. !mong the mayor elected from the
ranks of the movement there is also the 9first citi+en: of the important to(n and provincial capital of
3arma. The electoral results of #ay (ere confirmed during the regional elections of @ctober 0-10 in
Sicily. The party became the first of the island, his candidate collecting 1G,0-H of the preferences.
'o(ever, these elections, characterised by a very lo( voter turnout $only FE,0H of citi+ens entitled to
vote&, sa( the victory of the coalition made up of the 3C and the christian2democratic party Unione di
Centro $>CA&.
The 0-10 local elections imposed the #%S as a serious challenger for upcoming parliamentary
elections of "ebruary 0-18. These elections marked the end of the Italian bipolarism established since
the arrival in politics of .erlusconi in 1,,F. The results sa( an e*tremely tight victory of 3ierluigi
.ersani?s centre2left coalition over .erlusconi?s centre2right coalition. In the lo(er chamber the centre2left
obtained 0,,%FH of the total preferences (hile the centre2right 0,,18H. In the senate 81,D-H of the votes
(ent to the centre2left, 8-,DDH to the centre2right. That is the centre2left prevailed (ith a difference of less
than a percentage point in both the houses. 'o(ever, more than the political survival of .erlusconi and the
minimal distance bet(een the t(o main coalitions, the most impressive result (as the e*ploit of the #%S.
The party, running outside any coalition, became the first most voted single party in the Ahamber of
Ceputes (ith 0%,%%H of votes and the second most voted in the Senate, (ith 08,E,H, behind the 3C. The
#%S even overcame the other coalitions in five regions for the chamber of deputies.
!ccording to the 0--% electoral la( the (inning coalition (as provided (ith %%H of the seats of
the Ahamber of Ceputes, in the case its result is belo( this percentage. Thus, the centre2left obtained 8F-
of the D8- lo(er house seats, that is an absolute ma)ority. In the case of the Senate the ma)ority pri+e is
distributed on a regional level. This means that the (inning coalition in each of the t(enty Italian regions
elected at least %%H of the region?s senators, more populous the region more senatorial seats it assigned.
The centre2left coalition achieved a relative ma)ority in the higher house (ith 11, seats out of 81%, only
t(o more than those gained by the centre2right that (on the ma)ority in some key regions. It should be
mentioned that in the Italian system the t(o houses have the same importance and competences, thus a bill
has to pass in both the branches of the parliament to become la(. The same applies to the confidence vote.
"inally, three antithetical political forces separated by fe( or less than one percentage points in terms of
preferences led to a contradictory situation (here a coalition ma)ority could be formed in the lo(er house
D
but not in the higher. In the aftermath of the elections Grillo made clear that the #%S (ould have not voted
the confidence to any government proposed by the traditional parties. The #%S (ould have evaluated the
bills presented from time to time in the parliament, giving them a positive vote in case they matched the
#ovement?s program.
Soon after the elections, .ersani engaged the #%S proposing to (ork together on bills concerning
the reduction of the costs of politics, tougher norms on corruption, a la( on the conflict of interests, a la(
on the political parties internal democracy and an ethical code for their members, as (ell as on social
legislation. 'o(ever, Grillo refused his support to a centre2left government in e*change of a common
programme focusing on central points of the #%S programme. The opinion polls sho(ed that the #%S
electoral gro(th had not reached its limit. "urthermore, both a centre2left 2 centre2right grand coalition and
a ne( technocratic government (ould have promoted the image of the #%S as a movement fighting the
partitic system and its backroom deals and Grillo?s undifferentiated condemnation of all political parties.
6evertheless, the #%S base proved to be split over the tactical support of the government in e*change of
its commitment to the reali+ation of the movement?s proposals. "inally, as in the Greek case, the parties of
the centre2left and of the centre2right that once competed against each other (ere compelled to form a
coalition government, since they had not the numbers to form stable ma)orities on their o(n and out of
fear that ne( elections (ould further reduce their votes. #oreover, the embrace bet(een the 9old: parties,
accounted for the country?s dire economic situation, reinforced the status of the #%S in Italy and SYRI!
in Greece as the 9ne(: herald of radical changes.
%he 5 Stars Movement: pop#lism or politics &'( )
>nlike the case of other anti2austerity parties and movements that rose to prominence during the
sovereign debt crisis all over 1urope, the success of the #%S has to be placed in a conte*t of deep distrust
against the political system reigning in Italy since the 1,,-s. In 1,,0, the investigations that follo(ed
many important corruption scandals $the so called 9Tangentopoli:& crashed the Italian post2(ar political
system giving the (ay to a bipolar coalition system. 'o(ever, (hat is improperly referred as the Italian
9second republic: (as no less rich in scandals, involving almost all the political parties, at any level of
government and administration, let alone .erlusconi?s o(n record of legal troubles and scandals. In the last
t(o decades, legality and the morali+ation of public life constituted the central issues of the Italian public
debate. The diverse front of the 9anti2berlusconism: (as mainly federated by the defence of the
Aonstitution and rule of la(, against the attempts of the media tycoon to change the fundamental charter,
E
notably giving a dominant role to the e*ecutive, or to pass legislation to accommodate his legal issues.
#oreover, the privileges en)oyed by the Italian politicians and the (astes of the public administration
attracted increasing discontents and criticisms. La Casta $9The Aaste. 'o( Italian politicians became
untouchable:&, the book (ritten by t(o )ournalists of the ne(spaper Corriere della Sera in 0--E, became
soon a best seller in 0--E, the term 9caste: becoming of current use (hen referring to the corruption and
privileges of the Italian political elite and its alienation from the citi+ens. It is not a case that the first
statement made by .eppe Grillo, the founder of the movement, after the results (as a t(eet announcing
that 9honesty (ill be fashionable:.
The irruption of the #%S in the Italian national politics is (ithout precedent in the electoral history
of contemporary (estern democracies due to the party organisational model, its post2ideological profile
and the magnitude of its electoral e*ploit at the first national elections. !ll the 1-G deputes and %F senators
elected (ith the #%S, mostly under forty, had no previous e*perience neither in national nor in local
politics. The #%S refuses any ideological label, stressing its civic nature, and in effect the profile of its
electorate displays an almost perfect balance among voters (hich position themselves on the left 5
centre2left, on the right 5 centre2right and those refusing to place themselves on the left2right spectrum
$.ordignon < Aeccarini 0-18&. The story and the rise of the #%S are strictly linked (ith Grillo, a
comedian kno(n for his political satire. #arginalised from the Italian national TJ net(orks Grillo started
a series of theatre?s sho(s in the mid21,,-s (here he denounced the misgovernment and the political and
economic scandals of the country as (ell as the net(orks of po(er linking politics, media and finance.
These issues, along (ith environment and transport, constitutes the main themes of the blog beppegrillo.it
opened in 0--% (ith the support of Gianroberto Aasaleggio, o(ner of a society of marketing and (eb
strategy and Grillo?s closest collaborator.
1vents like the J2Cay $9fuck off day:& definitely consolidated the movement and the media figure
of Grillo. The J2Cay
8
held on Gth September 0--E in many Italian s;uares (as a public event (hose aim
(as to promote a bill of popular initiative proposingK i& the ineligibility of any Italian citi+en to the post of
#3 if he5she has been sentenced for any offence ii& the limitation of the number of the parliamentary
mandates to t(o legislatures iii& the modification of the electoral la( by the reintroduction of the direct
preference. Curing the second J2Cay of 0--G Grillo proposed three referendum demanding the abolition
of public funding for ne(spapers, of the order of )ournalists and of a la( regulating radio and television
broadcasting enacted by .erlusconi government. 7ournalists, daily ne(spapers and television companies
are e;ually targeted by Grillo, (ho rarely gives intervie(s and openly avoid $and ban to the #%S
G
representatives& the participation in TJ political talk sho(.
"inally, the MoVimento 5 Stelle (as founded in @ctober 0--,. The five stars represent its original
missionsK the safeguarding of public (ater and the environment, the gro(th of public transport and
connectivity and development. .efore the constitution of the movement the five stars (ere granted to any
civic list or local administration promoting or pursuing these ob)ectives. These core ob)ectives coupled
(ith the assertion of no ideological affiliation on the left2right spectrum make the #%S a good e*ample of
a political party or movement (hose instances are traceable on the postmodern politics dimension
$Inglehart 1,,E, pp. 0F820%0&. 'o(ever, it is not so evident on (hich point of the a*is the #%S can be
placed. In fact, if ecology is a key postmodern value standing at the core of the #%S discourse, diverse
sensibilities inside the movement and the contradictions bet(een Grillo statements and the base
orientations emerged on issues like the ius soli or the abolition of the crime of illegal immigration, (ith the
leader promoting an e*clusivist discourse contested by the base.
!ccording to its charter, the Movimento 5 Stelle is not a political party its ob!ective being t"e
realisation o# an e##ective e$c"ange o# opinions and democratic debate outside t"e associational and party
bonds and %it"out t"e mediation o# directive or representative bodies recognising to t"e totality o# t"e
Internet users t"e role o# government normally entrusted to a minority $art. % of the #%S statute&. This
self2definition and identification highlights a typical aspect of the relationship bet(een parties and civil
society. In the case of a social movement becoming a political party or of a political party aiming at
establishing itself into civil society, the term 9movement: and the like is often employed to claim or
reaffirm a political formation?s popular grass2roots or to convey a message of radical change to(ards the
dominant political and economic establishment. The elected members of the #%S lists should act
according to the movement?s principles considering politics like a form of civil service and not as a careerK
they can assume political charges for a ma*imum of t(o mandatesL self2reduce their salariesL re)ect
electoral reimbursementsL submit themselves to the )udgement of the voters through votes on the (eb.
The movement?s 9head;uarters: are, by statute, the Internet blog of .eppe Grillo. The role of the
(eb is central in defining the organisational model and a ne( conception of democracy (here the
members of the parliament are supposed to be constantly monitored and re;uired to act according to the
political decisions and preferences discussed and adopted by the citi+ens on the (eb platform. The base of
the #ovement are the 9meetup: groups, pre2dating the launch of the party and organised through the
social media (ith the same name. They constitute local groups $180D as of "ebruary 0-1F for a total of
more than 1%-,--- members, distributed in 1,-%G cities&
F
that en)oy considerable independence from the
,
centre $that is Grillo and his blog?s collaborators& in undertaking initiatives at the local level. This activist
grassroots dimension and its civic nature have been fatally overlooked by the ma)or parties and media in
dealing (ith the #%S phenomenon, before it entered the 3arliament. Grillo?s aggressive rhetoric (ith its
populist undertones (as accorded more attention than the political engagement of thousands of Italians
and their demands.
6onetheless, the role of the former comedian as founder, spokesman and leader constitutes the
biggest contradiction in the grassroots direct democracy approach advocated by the movement. !ccording
to the art.8 of the statute, the name of the movement is combined (ith a symbol (hose only legal o(ner is
.eppe Grillo. Grillo o(nership of the movement and the control of the medium of deliberation and
votation constitute the greatest difference (ith other e*periences of direct democracy based on (eb
platforms like the German 3irate 3arty or the Spanish 1%# movement $the Indignados&. #oreover, the
9one man one vote: principle that gives every single militant the same (eight, irrespectively of his or her
political charges or functions inside the movement, is undermined by the absolute po(er of Grillo $and his
closest collaborator& to determine the e*pulsion alone of members e*pressing dissent to the official line.
This eventuality has verified several times so far, leading also to the e*pulsion of several #3s from the
#%S parliamentary group. .ordignon and Aeccarini highlight ho( the #%S organisational model, and
notably the relationships bet(een central leadership and meetup groups, can be li&ened to t"e idea o# t"e
party as #ranc"ise organisation and ho( it displays to an e*treme degree the characteristics of the business
firm model of party organisation that .erlusconi and his "or+a Italia introduced on the Italian political
scene.
It is interesting to compare Grillo?s charismatic leadership to that of .erlusconi and ho( both
reflect their privileged strategies of communication. The personalities of Grillo and .erlusconi dominated
and set the pace to the electoral campaign for the 0-18 elections, the former mainly on traditional media
the latter on the ne( media and the s;uares. @n one hand (e have the old media mogul accustomed to the
language of the commercial television and (hose messages are crafted for a passive television audience.
@n the other, the comedian and internet guru (ho calls for the active participation of common citi+ens, of
(hom he declares to be a simple spokesman, although his scenic presence dominates over his follo(ers.
.oth Grillo and .erlusconi resent the internal dissent and lament that media and )ournalists serve their
opponents? interests. Grillo goes so far to avoid and forbid the elected members of the #%S to speak in
political talk sho(s or to freely give intervie(s to ne(spapers. ! skilful use of the Internet, local actions
and obviously the successes in local and national elections forced the traditional media to give spotlights
1-
and headlines to Grillo and the #%S, although being deliberately snubbed by them. 1ventually, the
comedian performances and communication strategy outclassed those of the old TJ tycoon.
SYRIZA* the ret#rn of the left )
The comparison bet(een the Greek protest and the contemporary street mobili+ations and ne(
movements in Italy and Spain sho(s ho( the Greek society?s deep disillusion (ith and its anger to(ards
the national political system did not gave birth to 2 nor (as shaped by 2 ne( mass movements stemming
from the society?s grassroots and not referable to traditional social actors, political parties and ideologies.
Curing the 1uropean debt crisis, the 1%2# movement $the 9indignados:& (as able to lead the contestation
in Spain, dictating the times, the places and the themes of the protest, through a keen combination of
traditional forms of mobilisation and the use of the Internet and social net(orks. This resulted in the
symbolic $and physical& occupation 5 re2appropriation of the public space by a citi+en2led umbrella
movement ready to further its demands (ithout the mediation of parties or trade unions. Aertainly, this
kind of citi+en mobilisation (as present also in the streets of Greece, as in the case of the movement of the
9'(')'*+,-./)0,: $indignants&, that dre( direct inspiration from the Spanish Indignados. 'o(ever, its
influence in structuring and leading the protest (as limited.
In Greece, the critical mass reached by the street protests (as due essentially to the mobilisation of
traditional social actors like trade unions. The call of a strike by one of the national trade unions, (ith the
!C1CY $Aivil Servants? Aonfederation& and the GS11 $General Aonfederation of Greek Iorkers& usually
taking action together, constituted the main event that, especially in case of general strikes, attracted to the
streets other actors such as opposition parties, civil society associations, e*tra2parliamentary political
groups and violent rioters. "urthermore, the electoral rise of the anti2#emorandum parties cannot be
likened to the electoral e*ploits of the #%S and its post2ideological profile and citi+en activism. The
anti2#emorandum parties are, for all means and purposes, traditional partiesK their ideological profile,
their collocation on the left2right spectrum and their internal (orking, selection of the personnel and
political e*perience of the leaderships all reflect Mold= parties models.
SYRI! reasserted the centrality of the party in Greek democratic representation thanks to its
capability to provide an organised political outlet to the contestation. SYRI! success as (ell as its
primacy among the other anti2#emorandum parties is grounded in its pursuit of linkages in the Greek civil
society and political activism operated before and during the crisis. !s highlighted by Tsakatika and
1leftheriou, during the 0---s SYRI! opened up to the involvement of the younger cohorts and
11
conse;uently of the ne( social movements and activism that emerged in those years. .esides, the (eaker
position in unionism, in comparison (ith the other parties of the left and centre2left, urged SYRI! to take
an open stance to(ards the (orld of the associations and movements, trying more to support than to guide
them. This strategy paid off during the debt crisis and can be accounted for the party?s outstanding electoral
rise. SYRI! did not try / and actually had not the po(er / to vertically organise and assume control of
the street protests. 'o(ever, it fully supported the actions of the !C1CY and GS11, thus providing a ne(
political ally to the trade unionism disaffected (ith the 3!S@B, and stood as an informal advocate of
street movements like the indignants, embedding them in a political narrative that e*plained and )ustified
their emergence $Tsakatika and 1leftheriou 0-18, p.1%&.
SYRI!?s political origins, the composition of its constituent groups and ideology (ell
represent the history of the Greek left, the plurality of its ideological stances and their changes.
SYRI! (as formed as a coalition of left and radical left parties bet(een 0--1 and 0--F, (ith the
Aoalition of 4eft, of #ovements and 1cology $12)'-3,-.45 +65 78,-+98:5 +;) <,)6.:+;) *', +65
=,*0>0(?'5 / SY6& as its largest member, providing at least G- per cent of its cadres, activists and
voters. SY6 (as founded at the end of the 1,G-s as an electoral alliance bet(een the pro2Soviet and
orthodo* mar*ist BB1 and the eurocommunist Greek 4eft, born from the splitting of the BB12Interior.
"inally, after the BB1 left the coalition, SY6 (as constituted as a party in 1,,0. SY6 defined itself as a
pluralist left party of democratic socialism, neither orthodo* communist nor social democratic, supporting
a mi*ed economy and committed on 9ne( issues: like feminism, democratic rights and the environment.
Thus, SY6 displayed a post2modern political outlook and pluralist ambitions, though strictly rooted in a
leftist discourse, appealing to 9the men and (omen of (ork and culture, the young and the e*cluded:
$Tsakatika < 1leftheriou 0-18&.
SYRI! formed as a unitary party after the electoral e*ploit of 0-10. The founding congress of
SYRI! (as held in 7uly 0-18, (ith fifteen other constituent members alongside SY6, ranging from
orthodo* mar*ist positions to social2democracy and ecologism. @n the left of SY6 (e find the
trotskyst of the Internationalist Iorkers 4eft, the !nti2capitalist 3olitical Group, the libertarian
communist Ro+a and the maoist of the B@1 $Aommunist @rganisation of Greece&, supporting the
country e*it from the 1uro+one and (hose members participated in the 9I (on?t pay: $NOP QRSTUPV
%
&
movement. 1cologist constituents are the Radical 1cologists, 1cosocialist Greece and Bokkino
$9Red:&, particularly active in migrants issues. The democratic socialist constituents comprise
Cemocratic Society #ovement $CIBBI& and 6e( "ighter $@/05 7(;),-+A5&, the latter formed in 0--D
10
and hosting former members of the 3!S@B. Aloser to the SY6 positions are the eurocommunist of the
Rene(ed Aommunist 1cological 4eft $!B@! 2 WPXPOVYZ[\ ]^__^`PZaYZ[\ [XZ bZ[^R^cZ[\
WTZaYOTd&. "inally, in the congress of !thens (e also find the patriotic left of the Aiti+en !ssociation
Rigas, the #ovement for the >nity of !ction of the 4eft $B1C! 2 ]ePSaS cZX YSP fPgYSYX NTdaSh YSh
WTZaYOTdh&, the >nion of the Cemocratic Aentre, the >nitarian #ovement and the #ovement of the
!ctive Aiti+ens, led by the prominent figure of #anolis Gle+os.
Iith the formation of a single party the constituent members agreed on dissolve their
organisations. SYRI! has been structured (ith at its base the local sections, (hose representatives
elect each t(o years the prefectural committees $art. 11.1 of the founding charter&. SYRI! highest
political organ is the Aentral Aommission (hich is responsible to implement the decisions taken during
the congresses, assuming the political direction of the party. The Aentral Aommission elect the 3olitical
Secretariat and his5her secretary $art. 18.1&. ! general congress is held each three years $art. 18.1& and it
elects the Aentral Aommission and the party?s organ responsible for the economic auditing $art. 18.0&.
The regional steering committees coordinate the activities bet(een the national and local organs. They
are composed by t(o members of each prefecture of the region, the coordinators of the prefectural
committees, the members of parliament elected in the region, the members of the Aentral Aommission
affiliated to the regional local sections and the party members holding an elective charge in the regional
administration $art. 10.1&.
!ccording to the preamble of SYRI! founding charter 9Socialism is a form of organi+ation of
the society based on social o(nership and management of the means of production:. !s a conse;uence,
the main goal set by SYRI! is 9the overthro( of the domination of the forces of the neoliberalism
and of the memoranda, the forces of social destruction, and the emergence of a government of the
united 4eft, embedded in a broad social alliance:. 'o(ever, the ideological pluralism inside SYRI!
poses ma)or dilemmas concerning the future orientations of the party. !fter the electoral breakthrough
SYRI! (as no more a radical left coalition gravitating around %H of preferences. It suddenly became
a political force attracting a massive inflo(s of votes not only from the left but also from large
constituencies of the centre, (ell beyond its previous militant base and the social strata it aspires to
defend against the interests of the capital. The responsibility to take office as a ma)ority party re;uires a
clear and unambiguous government programme, synthesising the internal dialectics and overcoming
the different position of its constituent members. This task e*poses the tensions bet(een a realist
approach, promoted by the party leadership dominated by the former members of SY6, and the
18
defence of a radical stance true to the socialist idea and its realisation (ithout compromise. !s other
(estern 1uropean left and centre2left parties, SYRI! critics of the capitalist system (ill be challenged
by its ma)oritarian ambitions and, eventually, by the budgetary constraints imposed by the e*ercise of
government. In his case study on S(eden and the >nited States, .lyth $0--%& points out the crucial role
of domestic institutions in the production of social democratic policies and notably the state control of
monetary authority and credit creation. In this sense, the credentials of SYRI! leftist alternative
depends on the party?s position on the 1#>, and, ine*orably, on a change in the economic policy
orientations on the 1uropean institutional level.
A eurosceptic and populist threat to Europe ?
The national elections held in the Euro-one member states during the debt crisis highlighted the
politicisation of the European public sphere, along with the increasing Europeanisation of the national
political space. Europe constantly stood as the main topic in national public debates, following a process
of increasing politicisation. It did not constitute simply a relevant event, but the top issue on the political
agenda of the Euro-one member states. .urthermore, Europeans leaders and government officials from
other Euro-one countries became familiar presences in the national debates and media. Europe stood as a
cleavage shaping the national political arena and cross/cutting the left/right divide. 0onetheless, the
discourse over Europe is not simply articulated in terms of support or opposition, along a unidimensional
1Europeism / Euroscepticism2 line. In effect, the contestation against the European governance can target
the Euro or the +current, policies / notably the management of the debt crisis / but not the institutions or
the European construction as such +%opec"y 3 )udde '44',.
%rouwel and !bts +'445, propose a framewor" where political support for 6 discontent with
Europe is articulated according to the targets of political support and the degree of refle7ivity. The targets
of political support include European authorities, the European regime +including institutions, performance
and regime principles, and the European community. Refle7ivity refers to the extent to which individuals
are able to differentiate evaluations between different actors and institutions in a political system,
generating five types of attitudes8 confidence, distrust, scepticism, cynicism and alienation. .ollowing this
typology, the attitudes towards the E* of the )9S and SYRI! can be both qualified of sceptic, in the
sense of a responsible and open/minded criticism, as they allow for the possibility that the political system
will act on their behalf and take their values and interests into account, although they never assume this
happens as a rule +%rouwel 3 !bts '445, p.:',.
1F
;oming to the narratives shaping the European debate during the sovereign debt crisis, we can
resume them as follow8 a, the 1battle2 in defence of the E* and +the permanence in, the Euro b, the
struggle between a social Europe versus a dominating neo/liberal Europe c, the anti/austerity struggle d,
anti/Euro positions and e, another Europe outside the E* institutions or nationalist stances
+Eurocynicism 6 Euro/alienation,. It should be highlighted how the call for a ma<or role for Europe in
actively sustaining growth and policies of ma<or solidarity does not always couple with the anti/austerity
protest. In fact, the anti/austerity struggle is also endorsed by those movements and parties denouncing the
limits imposed by the E)*, and thus claiming the return to the national currency, as well as by parties
displaying anti/E* positions. .urthermore, while the neo/liberal vs social Europe cleavage is mainly
reproduced in the discourse of the lefts, the equation between neo/liberal discourse and centre/right can be
misleading. The Italian centre/right hostility to the European economic and fiscal constraints, that
ultimately led to the fall of =erlusconi government, and 0ea &emo"ratia uncompromising opposition to
the )emorandum before assuming office are good case in point. The revision of the Stability and >rowth
#act and the necessity of policies of growth and of a demand/led recovery were claimed equally by the left
as by the right. Rather, the 1neo/liberal vs social Europe2 discourse seems more to follow the European
divide between northern and southern European member states. .inally, in the political debate the lines
among the crisis different narratives can be easily blurred, the tones and the arguments more or less sharp,
according to a party being in power or at the opposition. In the first case, the party has to shore up the
social legitimacy of yet wea" institutions called to manage the crisis. In the other case, the opposition
parties search to articulate a convincing discourse over the 1change2 and ma7imise their popular support.
The discourse associated with the defence of the E* and the Euro, whatever the price and the
sacrifices, is mainly presented in the narratives of the national and European actors usually in charge of
institutional posts. Since they are called to manage, bargain or implement the policies in a difficult political
and economic environment these actors highlight the 1necessity2 of the economic sacrifices in order to
defend the European process, warning that any step bac" could unleash the ghosts of the European past. In
these narratives, the Euro is more than a currency, the tangible symbol of the European promise of peace
and prosperity. !s a consequence, Europe is one with the E* and the Euro-one, their critics and opponents
being negatively identified as eurosceptic, anti/european or nationalist, their arguments denounced as
populist. ?hen SYRI! secretary !le7is Tsipras was designed as the European @eft candidate for the post
of #resident of the European ;ommission, the spo"eswoman of 0ea &emo"ratia !nna !sima"opoulou
characterised the parties supporting the candidacy 1as e7tremist parties fanatically committed against the
1%
Euro and the Euro-one2.
A
=esides the negative characterisation of the opponent(s allies, we see how their
European credentials are dismissed in reason of their negative stance toward the Euro and the Euro-one.
The E* is here defined by what is considered its most far reaching achievement in terms of integration.
.or its part, SYRI!(s leadership managed with caution the issue of the country permanence in the E)*,
despite the re<ection of the Euro by a significant internal minority of the party(s left. In any case, an open
anti/Euro stance has been so far carefully avoided. =e it economic or electoral pragmatism, this further
highlights the symbolic value of the Euro8 the Euro ma"es Europe real and reifies it as a political order
+Risse '44B,. ! similar attitude towards the Euro is "ept by the )9S. 0evertheless, the )9S confides to a
referendum the question of remaining or e7iting the E)*.
)issing of an ideological world/view the )9S official program does not embrace a specific vision
of Europe accordingly. The approach of the )9S to Europe is tactical and often based on the impromptu
declarations of its leader and on the prevailing mood of its basis. !s in the case of national policies, the
)9S fi7es its positions in immediate issues and proposals rather than providing a comprehensive policy.
.urthermore, despite the blasts against the economic 1strong powers2 and their intertwined interests
+poteri forti,, the Europe of the lobbies and the ban"ing system, the discourse of the )9S cannot be placed
in the neo/liberal vs social Europe divide. In fact, the construction of this narrative is grafted on the
traditional ideational resources of the left/right dialectic that the )9S carefully avoid, in order to be not
associated with the 1old2 politics and their ideologies. The orientations of the )9S concerning the
European policies have been translated in seven points for the '4C: European elections8 i, a referendum
over the permanence of the country in the EuroD ii, the abolition of the .iscal ;ompactD iii, the adoption of
the 1eurobond2 iv, an alliance among the )editerranean countries for a common policyD v, the e7clusion
of investments in innovation and new productive activities from the BE annual deficit thresholdD vi, the
funding for the agricultural and farming activities intended for domestic consumptionD v, the abolition of
the budget balance. These proposals ma"e clear the collocation of the )9S in the anti/austerity camp.
$n the contrary, SYRI!(s anti/austerity discourse and its anti/)emorandum fight are framed in
the social Europe paradigm. &uring the first general stri"e against the austerity measures, on 9 )ay '4C4,
the #arty of the European @eft +E@,, of which SYRI! is member, stated its support to the Greek people
in their struggle for the Disengagement from the EU-I! mechanism and from its neoliberal
"know-how# and the commitment of its member parties together with trade-unions and social movements
for a social Europe. The challenge of SYRI! to the European governance cannot be qualified of
euroscepticism as the participation of >reece in the European institutions is not questioned. Instead,
1D
SYRI! calls for 1another2 Europe, built on solidarity and a ma<or democratic accountability. These
political lines were established by the E@ in its first congress held in !thens in '449 and were inspired by
those social movements that campaigned against the international economic and financial institutions
during the '444s. The ideological affiliation of SYRI! defined also his role on the European level while
the )9S entered the European political arena as a mysterious ob<ect. SYRI!(s electoral e7ploit in '4C'
made the >ree" radical left party the most important e7ponent of the European @eft in the E*. Thus, not
only fellow parties, social movements and personalities from all around Europe supported SYRI! and its
battle against austerity, but SYRI! became a protagonist in the European public sphere.
! final comparative assessment of the #%S and SYRI!, can be made through another
characterisation that their opponents, at home as (ell as at the 1uropean level, often address to them or to
their discourseK populism. Tarchi $0--8& defines populism both as a specific set of political and cultural
trends ingrained in a society, finding representation in specific mass movements, and as a style and
conception of politics that can be adopted from ideologically different political parties. Its central tenet is
t"e belie# in t"e innate virtues o# t"e people %"ose primacy is t"e sole source o# legitimisation. The main
features of populism can be detected in the style of the political leadership, in its rhetoric and in the type of
political representation defended. 3opulist parties sho( a strict dependence on their $charismatic& leader,
(hose influence is not accountable to instruments of internal democracy or to other party organs. >sually,
the leader present him5herself as not a professional politician, coming from civil society and (ith no
connection (ith other parties. The populist rhetoric needs a conte$t o# e$traordinary dramatiBation, its aim
being the refounding of democracy from its roots and to give back po(er and political representation to
the people. Thus, the traditional enemies of populism are parties and politicians, bureaucracy and
technocrats, the finance and intellectuals and media. These make up a corrupted and colluded system
detaining the political, economic and cultural po(er $Tarchi 0--8&.
The sovereign debt crisis offered a conte7t of e7traordinary dramati-ation. The radical critics of the
political and economic system and its conflict of interests +1conflitti di interesse#$ or interconnected
interests +1%&'()*+,-*.' /0-1234.5'2, frequently where charged with a populist rhetoric and
argumentations. Fowever, in the case of SYRI! we can spea" mainly of a style of politics G to which,
inter alia, almost all the political forces involved in the )emorandum G anti/)emorandum manichaean
struggle have more or less resorted. =ut the party(s structured organisational model, its lively internal
debate and, as a consequence, the limitations to which its leadership is subdued do not match the
characteristics of an authentic populist movement. The structured system of representation between central
1E
organs and regional and local representations prevented the appearance of a leadership without formal
chec"s and balance as in the case of the )9S. In effect, >rillo(s style of leadership and rhetoric are not the
only features that allow to qualify the )9S as a populist party. >rillo(s leadership +and ownership, of the
movement, not limited by formal mechanisms of control and accountability, contradicts the real
emancipation and self/organisation of the movement(s base and thus that same model of direct democracy
advocated by his founder.
Concl#sion and final considerations
SYRI! and the #%S are the parties that better e*pressed the protest during the sovereign debt
crisis. .oth could aspire to a ma)oritarian role in their respective political systems, by e*panding their
constituencies beyond their militant bases and groups of society more sensitive to their message. The
message of the #%S, refraining from any ideological stance, appeals to all citi+ens to take back politics
from the hands of the corrupted politicians and reali+e a real democracy through the help of the
Internet. @n the contrary, SYRI! affirmed its hegemony on the left after the 0-10 elections and it is
from the left that it pointed to(ards the s(inging electorate of the centre. The ob)ective of Grillo to
con;uer 91--H: of the 3arliament seats, 9the citi+ens becoming the state:, and to clean politics from
the partitocracy state by themselves the populist mission of the #%S. 'o(ever, this ambition cannot
federate alone the diverse electorate of the movement in a stable catch all party. This is, in any case, a
development vehemently re)ected by GrilloK the #%S is first of all a citi+en movement (hose e*istence
is finalised to the dissolution of partitocracy.
The path of SYRI! to become a government party seems to have more solid foundation, due
to its clear ideological stance and policy preferences that can fi* the anti2#emorandum protest in a
long term political pro)ect, supported by different sectors of society. 'o(ever, this ma)oritarian drive
could e*act the moderation of its original radical discourse. !s for other socialist parties in (estern
1urope in the past, the eventuality of taking office poses a dilemma in pursuing the struggle against the
forces of neo2liberism. @n one hand SYRI! (ould finally accept the diagnosis of the problems and,
above all, the constraint set by the dominant discourse and claim that it has better solutions. @n the
other hand, it can continue the effort to persuade voters and 1uropean partners that the solution lies in a
radical change of policy paradigm, redefining both diagnosis and constraints $3r+e(orsky 0--1&. The
sovereign debt crisis and the anti2#emorandum struggle in Greece offered a uni;ue occasion for a
change of paradigm backed by a large popular support. 6evertheless, con;uering the trust of voters,
1G
1uropean and international partners and economic players could re;uire an unambiguous departure
from the most radical and uncompromising stances.
! final remark should be made on the politicisation of 1urope and the role played by the #%S
and SYRI! in the conte*t of the 1uro+one crisis. The success of the #%S and SYRI! posed a ma)or
political challenge to actors and institutions that managed the 1uropean political and economic crisis so
far. 'o(ever, both parties cannot be labelled of anti2europeism, even taking in account the discontent
against the 1> and the 1uro in a not marginal part of their electoral base. SYRI! and the #%S stand
out in the anti2austerity camp demanding ma)or solidarity at the 1uropean level, in the form of specific
demands or, as in the case of SYRI!, by upholding a change of policy paradigm. .oth the #%S and
SYRI! canali+ed the protest from the streets to the national 3arliament and more than any other
contestation movements or party during the sovereign debt crisis contributed to give a voice and
representation to a malaise other(ise lost in the abstentionism or, (orse, compounding *enophobic or
authoritarian movements. Curing the 0-10 Greek elections the abstention rates reached a record
8F,,-H in #ay and 8E,%8H in 7une, (hile around EH of the votes (ent to the *enophobic e*treme
right of Golden Ca(n. "inally, the politicisation, even through policy contestation, o# Curope is the
only alternative to the alienation #rom Curope. ! ma)or involvement of the citi+ens in the 1uropean
political debates and a ma)or democratic accountability of the decisional process are the only (ay to
counteract the crisis of social legitimacy suffered by the 1> and overcome its economic and political
impasse.
1,
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00
1
The total percentage of preferences given to the parties (hich did not succeed in securing at least a seat in the
3arliament amounted to 1,,-8H of the preferences in #ay and %,,GH in 7une. !mong these parties (ere the
conservative right of the 3opular @rthodo* Rally $from 0,,-H in #ay to 1,%GH in 7une&, that collapsed electorally after
its contradictory participation into the 3apademos government, the Green 1cologists $"rom 0,,8H to -,GGH& and the
liberals of Cimiourgia, oanan 5 Recreate Greece $from 0,1%H to 1,%,H&.
0
.orn after the split of a reformist (ing of SYRI! $the Rene(al Iing platform& in 0-1-, Demo&rati&i Dristera
$CI#!R& (as at its first electoral e*perience. 4ed by the mild mannered "otis Bouvelis, (hose figure contrasted (ith
that of Tsipras both in reason of its age and of its political style, CI#!R campaigned against the #emorandum policies,
but proposing a gradual phasing out from the #emorandum programmes or a revision concerted (ith the international
partners and institutions, in order to save the country?s permanence in the 1#>. Given these preconditions, CI#!R
(as open to cooperate in a government of national unity unlike SYRI! (hich e*cluded any government of national
unity (hose ob)ectives (ere not the prompt cancellation of the #emorandum. Thus, the #3s elected by CI#!R $1, in
#ay, 1E in 7une, (ith the electoral preferences slightly above 8%-,--- in both electoral rounds& became crucial in the
formation of a coalition government. This (ould not happen in the elections of #ay. 'o(ever, after the electoral round
of 7une CI#!R supported the 6C23!S@B parliamentary ma)ority already numbering a total of 1D0 #3s.
8
The 9J: stands for va##anculo, the Italian inter)ection $9get offn:& many time addressed by Grillo to the Italian political
and economic establishment during the event. The letter, capital and in red in the movement logo, take also the shape of
the sign affi*ed to the specific ob)ectives and proposals realised thanks to the action of the movement. "inally, in the
case of the J2Cay, the 9J: (inked also to the popular dystopian movie V #or Vendetta. The mask of Guy "a(kes (orn
by the protagonist, struggling against a future totalitarian regime, has become an icon of the late 0---s social
movements and protests and the symbol of the hacktivist group !nonymous.
F
httpK55beppegrillo.meetup.com5
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NOP QRSTUPV claims free of charge education, health, public transport, (ater, electricity and all natural goods. The
movement supports (orker?s strikes and forms of civil disobedience, including the non payments of public utilities bills. It
also competed in the national elections in the spring 0-10, collecting %%,DFD votes $-,GGH& in #ay and 08,E8F $-,8,H& in
7une. httpK55denplirono.(ordpress.com5
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