1933 Montevideo Convention

ARTICLE 1
The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a ) a permanent population; b ) a defined territory; c ) government; and d) capacity
to enter into relations with the other states.
COLLADO VS CA
FIRST DIVISION
[G. R. No. 107764. October 4, 2002]
EDNA COLLADO, BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO C. TORRES, JOSE AMO, SERGIO L. MONTEALEGRE, VICENTE C. TORRES, JOSEPH L.
NUEZ, GLORIA SERRANO, DANILO FABREGAS, FERNANDO T. TORRES, LUZ G. TUBUNGBANUA, CARIDAD T. TUTANA, JOSE C.
TORRES, JR., IMELDA CAYLALUAD, ROSALIE TUTANA, NORMA ASTORIAS, MYRNA M. LANCION, NORBERTO CAMILOTE,
CECILIA MACARANAS, PEDRO BRIONES, REMEDIOS BANTIGUE, DANTE L. MONTEALEGRE, AIDA T. GADON, ARMANDO T.
TORRES and FIDELITO ECO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, thru the Director of
Lands, respondents,
BOCKASANJO ISF AWARDEES ASSOCIATION, INC., LITA MENDOZA, MORADO PREFIDIGNO, TERESITA CRUZ and CALOMA
MOISES,respondents/intervernors.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This Petition
[1]
seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
[2]
dated June 22, 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 25597, which declared null and void the
Decision
[3]
dated January 30, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71, in LRC No. 269-A, LRC Rec. No. N-59179, confirming the imperfect title
of petitioners over a parcel of land.
The Facts
On April 25, 1985, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed with the land registration court an application for registration of a parcel of land with an approximate area of
1,200,766 square meters or 120.0766 hectares (Lot for brevity). The Lot is situated in Barangay San Isidro (formerly known as Boso-boso), Antipolo, Rizal, and
covered by Survey Plan Psu-162620. Attached to the application was the technical description of the Lot as Lot Psu-162620 signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-
in-Charge of the Survey Division, Bureau of Lands, which stated, [t]his survey is inside I N-12 Mariquina Watershed. On March 24, 1986, petitioner Edna T.
Collado filed an Amended Application to include additional co-applicants.
[4]
Subsequently, more applicants joined (collectively referred to as petitioners for
brevity).
[5]

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, and the Municipality of Antipolo, through its Municipal Attorney and the Provincial Fiscal of
Rizal, filed oppositions to petitioners application. In due course, the land registration court issued an order of general default against the whole world with the
exception of the oppositors.
Petitioners alleged that they have occupied the Lot since time immemorial. Their possession has been open, public, notorious and in the concept of owners. The
Lot was surveyed in the name of Sesinando Leyva, one of their predecessors-in-interest, as early as March 22, 1902. Petitioners declared the Lot for taxation purposes
and paid all the corresponding real estate taxes. According to them, there are now twenty-five co-owners in pro-indiviso shares of five hectares each. During the
hearings, petitioners submitted evidence to prove that there have been nine transfers of rights among them and their predecessors-in-interest, as follows:
1. SESINANDO LEYVA was the earliest known predecessor-in-interest of the Applicants who was in actual, open, notorious and continuous
possession of the property in the concept of owner. He had the property surveyed in his name on 22 March 1902 (Exhibit W and W-1
testimonies of J. Torres on 16 December 1987 and Mariano Leyva on 29 December 1987).
2. DIOSDADO LEYVA, is the son of Sesinando Leyva, who inherited the property. He had the property resurveyed in his name on May 21-28,
1928 (Exhibit X and X-1; testimony of Mariano Leyva, a son of Diosdado Leyva).
3. GREGORIO CAMANTIQUE bought the property from Diosdado Leyva before the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines during World War II. He
owned and possessed the property until1958. He declared the property for tax purposes, the latest of which was under Tax Declaration No.
7182 issued on 3 February 1957 (Exhibit I and testimony of Mariano Leyva, supra).
4. ANGELINA REYNOSO, bought the property from Gregorio Camantique by virtue of a Deed of Sale on 3 February 1958 (Exhibit H). During the
ownership of the property by Angelina Reynoso,Mariano Leyva the grandson of Sesinando Leyva, the previous owner, attended to the
farm. (Testimony of Mariano Leyva, supra). Angelina Reynoso declared the property in her name underTax Declaration No. 7189 in 4 February
1958, under Tax Declaration No. 8775 on 3 August 1965, under Tax Declaration No. 16945 on 15 December 1975, and under Tax Declaration
No. 03-06145 on 25 June 1978.
5. MYRNA TORRES bought the property from Angelina Reynoso on 16 October 1982 through a Deed of Sale (Exhibit G).
6. EDNA COLLADO bought the property from Myrna Torres in a Deed of Sale dated 28 April 1984 (Exhibit P-1 to P-3).
7. Additional owners BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO TORRES, JOSE AMO, VICENTE TORRES and SERGIO MONTEALEGRE who
bought portions of the property from Edna Collado through a Deed of Sale on 6 November 1985 (Exhibit Q to Q-3).
8. And more additional Owners JOSEPH NUNEZ, DIOSDADO ARENOS, DANILO FABREGAS, FERNANDO TORRES, LUZ TUBUNGBANUA,
CARIDAD TUTANA, JOSE TORRES JR., RODRIGO TUTANA, ROSALIE TUTANA, NORMA ASTORIAS, MYRNA LANCION, CHONA
MARCIANO, CECILIA MACARANAS, PEDRO BRIONES, REMEDIOS BANTIQUE, DANTE MONTEALEGRE, ARMANDO TORRES, AIDA
GADON and AMELIA M. MALAPAD bought portions of the property in a Deed of Sale on 12 May 1986 (Exhibit S to S-3).
9. Co-owners DIOSDADO ARENOS, RODRIGO TUTANA, CHONA MARCIANO and AMELIA MALAPAD jointly sold their shares to new
OWNERS GLORIA R. SERRANO, IMELDA CAYLALUAD, NORBERTO CAMILOTE and FIDELITO ECO through a Deed of Sale dated 18
January 1987 (Exhibit T to T-9).
[6]

During the hearing on January 9, 1991, only the assistant provincial prosecutor appeared without the Solicitor General. For failure of the oppositors to present
their evidence, the land registration court issued an order considering the case submitted for decision based on the evidence of the petitioners. The court later set aside
the order and reset the hearing to January 14, 1991 for the presentation of the evidence of the oppositors. On this date, counsel for oppositors failed to appear again
despite due notice. Hence, the court again issued an order submitting the case for decision based on the evidence of the petitioners.
The Trial Courts Ruling
After appraisal of the evidence submitted by petitioners, the land registration court held that petitioners had adduced sufficient evidence to establish their
registrable rights over the Lot. Accordingly, the court rendered a decision confirming the imperfect title of petitioners. We quote the pertinent portions of the courts
decision, as follows:
From the evidence presented, the Court finds that from the testimony of the witnesses presented by the Applicants, the property applied for is in actual, open, public
and notorious possession by the applicants and their predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial and said possession had been testified to by witnesses Jimmy Torres,
Mariano Leyva, Sergio Montealegre, Jose Amo and one Chona who were all cross-examined by Counsel for Oppositor Republic of the Philippines.
Evidence was likewise presented that said property was declared for taxation purposes in the names of the previous owners and the corresponding taxes were paid by
the Applicants and the previous owners and said property was planted to fruit bearing trees; portions to palay and portions used for grazing purposes.
To the mind of the Court, Applicants have presented sufficient evidence to establish registrable title over said property applied for by them.
On the claim that the property applied for is within the Marikina Watershed, the Court can only add that all Presidential Proclamations like the Proclamation setting
aside the Marikina Watershed are subject to private rights.
In the case of Municipality of Santiago vs. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 734, 1983 private rights is proof of acquisition through (sic) among means of acquisition of
public lands.
In the case of Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 193-195, by private rights means that applicant should show clear and convincing evidence that the property in
question was acquired by applicants or their ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish government or by Possessory Information title, or any other means
for the acquisition of public lands xxx (underscoring supplied).
The Court believes that from the evidence presented as above stated, Applicants have acquired private rights to which the Presidential Proclamation setting aside the
Marikina Watershed should be subject to such private rights.
At any rate, the Court notes that evidence was presented by the applicants that as per Certification issued by the Bureau of Forest Development dated March 18, 1980,
the area applied for was verified to be within the area excluded from the operation of the Marikina Watershed Lands Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904 per
Proclamation No. 1283 promulgated on June 21, 1974 which established the Boso-boso Town Site Reservation, amended by Proclamation No. 1637 dated April 18,
1977 known as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation. (Exhibit K).
[7]

In a motion dated April 5, 1991, received by the Solicitor General on April 6, 1991, petitioners alleged that the decision dated January 30, 1991 confirming their
title had become final after the Solicitor General received a copy of the decision on February 18, 1991. Petitioners prayed that the land registration court order the Land
Registration Authority to issue the necessary decree in their favor over the Lot.
On April 11, 1991, the Solicitor General inquired from the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal whether the land registration court had already rendered a decision and
if so, whether the Provincial Prosecutor would recommend an appeal. However, the Provincial Prosecutor failed to answer the query.
According to the Solicitor General, he received on April 23, 1991 a copy of the land registration courts decision dated January 30, 1991, and not on February 18,
1991 as alleged by petitioners in their motion.
In the meantime, on May 7, 1991, the land registration court issued an order directing the Land Regulation Authority to issue the corresponding decree of
registration in favor of the petitioners.
On August 6, 1991, the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Judgment pursuant to Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 129 on the
ground that there had been no clear showing that the Lot had been previously classified as alienable and disposable making it subject to private appropriation.
On November 29, 1991, Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., an association of holders of certificates of stewardship issued by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR for brevity) under its Integrated Social Forestry Program (ISF for brevity), filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion
for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Petition-In-Intervention. They likewise opposed the registration and asserted that the Lot, which is situated inside the Marikina
Watershed Reservation, is inalienable. They claimed that they are the actual occupants of the Lot pursuant to the certificates of stewardship issued by the DENR under
the ISF for tree planting purposes.
The Court of Appeals granted the motion to intervene verbally during the preliminary conference held on April 6, 1992. During the preliminary conference, all
the parties as represented by their respective counsels agreed that the only issue for resolution was whether the Lot in question is part of the public domain.
[8]

The Court of Appeals Ruling
In a decision dated June 22, 1992, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and declared null and void the decision dated January 30, 1991 of the land
registration court. The Court of Appeals explained thus:
Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is enshrined in the 1935 (Art. XIII, Sec. 1), 1973 (Art. XIV, Sec. 8), and 1987 Constitution (Art. XII, Sec. 2), all lands of the
public domain belong to the State. An applicant, like the private respondents herein, for registration of a parcel of land bears the burden of overcoming the presumption
that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain (Director of Lands vs. Aquino, 192 SCRA 296).
A positive Act of government is needed to declassify a public land and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes (Republic vs.
Bacas, 176 SCRA 376).
In the case at bar, the private respondents failed to present any evidence whatsoever that the land applied for as described in Psu-162620 has been segregated from the
bulk of the public domain and declared by competent authority to be alienable and disposable. Worse, the technical description of Psu-162620 signed by Robert C.
Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge, Survey Division, Bureau of Lands, which was attached to the application of private respondents, categorically stated that "This survey
is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed."
That the land in question is within the Marikina Watershed Reservation is confirmed by the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds in a Report, dated
March 2, 1988, submitted to the respondent Court in LR Case No. 269-A. These documents readily and effectively negate the allegation in private respondent
Collados application that said parcel of land known as Psu-162620 is not covered by any form of title, nor any public land application and are not within any
government reservation (Par. 8, Application; Emphasis supplied). The respondent court could not have missed the import of these vital documents which are binding
upon the courts inasmuch as it is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department to classify public lands. They should have forewarned the respondent judge
from assuming jurisdiction over the case.
x x x inasmuch as the said properties applied for by petitioners are part of the public domain, it is the Director of Lands who has jurisdiction in the disposition of the
same (subject to the approval of the Secretary of Natural Resources and Environment), and not the courts. x x x Even assuming that petitioners did have the said
properties surveyed even before the same was declared to be part of the Busol Forest Reservation, the fact remains that it was so converted into a forest reservation, thus
it is with more reason that this action must fail. Forest lands are inalienable and possession thereof, no matter how long, cannot convert the same into private
property. And courts are without jurisdiction to adjudicate lands within the forest zone. (Heirs of Gumangan vs. Court of Appeals. 172 SCRA 563;
Emphasis supplied).
Needless to say, a final judgment may be annulled on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, fraud or that it is contrary to law (Panlilio vs. Garcia, 119 SCRA 387, 391) and
a decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time (Suarez vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 339).
[9]

Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
The issues raised by petitioners are restated as follows:
I
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
GRANTING THE APPLICATION OF THE PETITIONERS FOR CONFIRMATION OF TITLE;
II
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT FILED BY THE REPUBLIC LONG AFTER THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT HAD BECOME FINAL;
III
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE INTERVENORS PETITION
FOR INTERVENTION WHICH WAS FILED OUT OF TIME OR LONG AFTER THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT HAD BECOME FINAL.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
First I ssue: whether petitioners have registrable title over the Lot.
There is no dispute that Executive Order No. 33 (EO 33 for brevity) dated July 26, 1904
[10]
established the Marikina Watershed Reservation (MWR for
brevity) situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioners even concede that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620, is inside the technical, literal description of
the MWR. However, the main thrust of petitioners claim over the Lot is that all Presidential proclamations like the proclamation setting aside the Marikina
Watershed Reservation are subject to private rights. They point out that EO 33 contains a saving clause that the reservations are subject to existing private rights, if
any there be. Petitioners contend that their claim of ownership goes all the way back to 1902, when their known predecessor-in-interest, Sesinando Leyva, laid claim
and ownership over the Lot. They claim that the presumption of law then prevailing under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926 was that the land
possessed and claimed by individuals as their own are agricultural lands and therefore alienable and disposable. They conclude that private rights were vested on
Sesinando Leyva before the issuance of EO 33, thus excluding the Lot from the Marikina Watershed Reservation.
Petitioners arguments find no basis in law.
The Regalian Doctrine: An Overview
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
[11]
The Spaniards first
introduced the doctrine to the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de
Leyes de las Indias
[12]
which laid the foundation that all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public
domain.
[13]
Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.
[14]

The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration
of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims. The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law partly amended the Mortgage Law as well as the Law of the Indies.
The Maura Law was the last Spanish land law promulgated in the Philippines. It required the adjustment or registration of all agricultural lands, otherwise the lands
would revert to the state.
[15]

Four years later, Spain ceded to the government of the United States all rights, interests and claims over the national territory of the Philippine Islands
through the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. In 1903, the United States colonial government, through the Philippine Commission, passed Act No. 926, the first
Public Land Act, which was described as follows:
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the
public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed
the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon
public lands, for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish
concessions and grants in the Islands. In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in
the government; and that the governments title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United
States. The term public land referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private appropriation and
settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands.
[16]

Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates
the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.
Act 2874, the second Public Land Act, superseded Act No. 926 in 1919. After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA 141 for
brevity) amended Act 2874 in 1936. CA 141, as amended, remains to this day as the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the
public domain other than timber and mineral lands.
[17]

In the meantime, in order to establish a system of registration by which recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible and imprescriptible, the legislature passed
Act 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, which took effect on February 1, 1903. Act 496 placed all registered lands in the Philippines under the Torrens
system.
[18]
The Torrens system requires the government to issue a certificate of title stating that the person named in the title is the owner of the property described
therein, subject to liens and encumbrances annotated on the title or reserved by law. The certificate of title is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel
of land are quieted upon issuance of the certificate.
[19]
PD 1529, known as the Property Registration Decree enacted on June 11, 1978,
[20]
amended and updated Act 496.
The 1935, 1973, 1987 Philippine Constitutions
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine substituting, however, the state, in lieu of the King, as the owner of all lands and waters of
the public domain.
[21]
Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his separate opinion in Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,
[22]
explained thus:
One of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and conservation of the natural resources of the
country. There was an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in favor of the principle of state ownership of natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian
doctrine. State ownership of natural resources was seen as a necessary starting point to secure recognition of the states power to control their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept of State ownership of land and natural resources was
introduced by the Spaniards, however, they were not certain whether it was continued and applied by the Americans. To remove all doubts, the Convention approved
the provision in the Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine.
Thus, Section 1, Article XIII
[23]
of the 1935 Constitution, on Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources barred the alienation of all natural resources
except public agricultural lands, which were the only natural resources the State could alienate. The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian doctrine in Section 8,
Article XIV
[24]
on the National Economy and the Patrimony of the Nation. The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII
[25]
on
National Economy and Patrimony.
Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions prohibited the alienation of all natural resources except agricultural lands of the public domain. The 1987 Constitution
readopted this policy. Indeed, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources enumerated in the Philippine Constitution belong to the State.
Watershed Reservation is a Natural Resource
The term natural resource includes not only timber, gas, oil coal, minerals, lakes, and submerged lands, but also, features which supply a human need and
contribute to the health, welfare, and benefit of a community, and are essential to the well-being thereof and proper enjoyment of property devoted to park and
recreational purposes.
[26]

In Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
[27]
the Court had occasion to discourse on watershed areas. The Court resolved the issue of
whether the parcel of land which the Department of Environment and Natural Resources had assessed to be a watershed area is exempt from the coverage of RA No.
6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL for brevity).
[28]
The Court defined watershed as an area drained by a river and its tributaries and enclosed
by a boundary or divide which separates it from adjacent watersheds. However, the Court also recognized that:
The definition does not exactly depict the complexities of a watershed. The most important product of a watershed is water which is one of the most important human
necessit(ies). The protection of watershed ensures an adequate supply of water for future generations and the control of flashfloods that not only damage property but
also cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility that needs to be answered now.
Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067) provides:
Art. 67. Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water or overlying any ground water may be declared by the Department of Natural Resources as a
protected area. Rules and Regulations may be promulgated by such Department to prohibit or control such activities by the owners or occupants thereof within the
protected area which may damage or cause the deterioration of the surface water or ground water or interfere with the investigation, use, control, protection,
management or administration of such waters.
The Court in Sta. Rosa Realtyalso recognized the need to protect watershed areas and took note of the report of the Ecosystems Research and Development
Bureau (ERDB), a research arm of the DENR, regarding the environmental assessment of the Casile and Kabanga-an river watersheds involved in that case. That report
concluded as follows:
The Casile barangay covered by CLOA in question is situated in the heartland of both watersheds. Considering the barangays proximity to the Matangtubig
waterworks, the activities of the farmers which are in conflict with proper soil and water conservation practices jeopardize and endanger the vital
waterworks. Degradation of the land would have double edge detrimental effects. On the Casile side this would mean direct siltation of the Mangumit river which
drains to the water impounding reservoir below. On the Kabanga-an side, this would mean destruction of forest covers which acts as recharged areas of the
Matangtubig springs. Considering that the people have little if no direct interest in the protection of the Matangtubig structures they couldnt care less even if it would
be destroyed.
The Casile and Kabanga-an watersheds can be considered a most vital life support system to thousands of inhabitants directly and indirectly affected by it. From these
watersheds come the natural God-given precious resource water. x x x
Clearing and tilling of the lands are totally inconsistent with sound watershed management. More so, the introduction of earth disturbing activities like road building
and erection of permanent infrastructures. Unless the pernicious agricultural activities of the Casile farmers are immediately stopped, it would not be long before these
watersheds would cease to be of value. The impact of watershed degradation threatens the livelihood of thousands of people dependent upon it. Toward this, we hope
that an acceptable comprehensive watershed development policy and program be immediately formulated and implemented before the irreversible damage finally
happens.
The Court remanded the case to the Department of Agriculture and Adjudication Board or DARAB to re-evaluate and determine the nature of the parcels of land
involved in order to resolve the issue of its coverage by the CARL.
Sta. Rosa Realtygives us a glimpse of the dangers posed by the misuse of natural resources such as watershed reservations which are akin to forest
zones. Population growth and industrialization have taken a heavy toll on the environment. Environmental degradation from unchecked human activities could wreak
havoc on the lives of present and future generations. Hence, by constitutional fiat, natural resources remain to this day inalienable properties of the State.
Viewed under this legal and factual backdrop, did petitioners acquire, as they vigorously argue, private rights over the parcel of land prior to the issuance of EO
33 segregating the same as a watershed reservation?
The answer is in the negative.
First. An applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48 of CA 141, as amended. He
must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain and that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his
name arising from an imperfect title. An imperfect title may have been derived from old Spanish grants such as a titulo real or royal grant, a concession especial or
special grant, a composicion con el estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de compra or title through purchase.
[29]
Or, that he has had continuous, open and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty years preceding the filing of his application
as provided by Section 48 (b) CA 141.
Originally, Section 48(b) of CA 141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by
RA 1942 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title. The same, however,
has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977, the law prevailing at the time petitioners application for registration was
filed on April 25, 1985.
[30]
As amended, Section 48 (b) now reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application
for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Interpreting Section 48 (b) of CA 141, the Court stated that the Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove the following:
(a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be since time
immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law,
acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued.
[31]

Petitioners do not claim to have documentary title over the Lot. Their right to register the Lot is predicated mainly upon continuous possession since 1902.
Clearly, petitioners were unable to acquire a valid and enforceable right or title because of the failure to complete the required period of possession, whether
under the original Section 48 (b) of CA 141 prior to the issuance of EO 33, or under the amendment by RA 1942 and PD 1073.
There is no proof that prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, petitioners had acquired ownership or title to the Lot either by deed or by any other mode of
acquisition from the State, as for instance by acquisitive prescription. As of 1904, Sesinando Leyva had only been in possession for two years. Verily, petitioners have
not possessed the parcel of land in the manner and for the number of years required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title.
Second, assuming that the Lot was alienable and disposable land prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a watershed. Since then, the
Lot became non-disposable and inalienable public land. At the time petitioners filed their application on April 25, 1985, the Lot has been reserved as a watershed under
EO 33 for 81 years prior to the filing of petitioners application.
The period of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 in 1904 could no longer be counted because as a watershed reservation, the Lot was no longer susceptible of
occupancy, disposition, conveyance or alienation. Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended, applies exclusively to alienable and disposable public agricultural
land. Forest lands, including watershed reservations, are excluded. It is axiomatic that the possession of forest lands or other inalienable public lands cannot ripen into
private ownership. In Municipality of Santiago, I sabela vs. Court of Appeals,
[32]
the Court declared that inalienable public lands -
x x x cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription. Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, does not run against the State.
The possession of public land, however long the period may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard
to public land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required
number of years to constitute a grant from the State.
Third, Gordula vs. Court of Appeals
[33]
is in point. In Gordula, petitioners did not contest the nature of the land. They admitted that the land lies in the heart of
the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, which Proclamation No. 573 classified as inalienable. The petitioners in Gordula contended, however, that Proclamation No.
573 itself recognizes private rights of landowners prior to the reservation. They claim to have established their private rights to the subject land. The Court ruled:
We do not agree. No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied from the government; it is indispensable that there be a
showing of a title from the state. The facts show that petitioner Gordula did not acquire title to the subject land prior to its reservation under Proclamation No. 573. He
filed his application for free patent only in January, 1973, more than three (3) years after the issuance of Proclamation No. 573 in June, 1969. At that time, the land, as
part of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, was no longer open to private ownership as it has been classified as public forest reserve for the public good.
Nonetheless, petitioners insist that the term, private rights, in Proclamation No. 573, should not be interpreted as requiring a title. They opine that it suffices if the
claimant had occupied and cultivated the property for so many number of years, declared the land for taxation purposes, [paid] the corresponding real estate taxes
[which are] accepted by the government, and [his] occupancy and possession [is] continuous, open and unmolested and recognized by the government. Prescinding
from this premise, petitioners urge that the 25-year possession by petitioner Gordula from 1944 to 1969, albeit five (5) years short of the 30-year possession required
under Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, as amended, is enough to vest upon petitioner Gordula the private rights recognized and respected in Proclamation No.
573.
The case law does not support this submission. In Director of Lands vs. Reyes, we held that a settler claiming the protection of private rights to exclude his land from
a military or forest reservation must show x x x by clear and convincing evidence that the property in question was acquired by [any] x x x means for the acquisition of
public lands.
In fine, one claiming private rights must prove that he has complied with C.A. No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, which prescribes the
substantive as well as the procedural requirements for acquisition of public lands. This law requires at least thirty (30) years of open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and possession of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition, immediately preceding the filing of the
application for free patent. The rationale for the 30-year period lies in the presumption that the land applied for pertains to the State, and that the occupants and/or
possessors claim an interest therein only by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open and notorious possession.
Next, petitioners argue that assuming no private rights had attached to the Lot prior to EO 33 in 1904, the President of the Philippines had subsequently
segregated the Lot from the public domain and made the Lot alienable and disposable when he issued Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21, 1974. Petitioners contend that
Proclamation No. 1283 expressly excluded an area of 3,780 hectares from the MWR and made the area part of the Boso-boso Townsite Reservation. Petitioners assert
that Lot Psu-162620 is a small part of this excluded town site area. Petitioners further contend that town sites are considered alienable and disposable under CA 141.
Proclamation No. 1283 reads thus:
PROCLAMATION NO. 1283
EXCLUDING FROM THE OPERATION EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 33, DATED JULY 26, 1904, AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDERS NOS. 14 AND 16,
BOTH SERIES OF 1915, WHICH ESTABLISHED THE WATERSHED RESERVATION SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF ANTIPOLO, PROVINCE OF
RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON, A CERTAIN PORTION OF THE LAND EMBRACED THEREIN AND RESERVING THE SAME, TOGETHER WITH THE
ADJACENT PARCEL OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, FOR TOWNSITE PURPOSES UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER XI OF THE PUBLIC
LAND ACT.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
President of the Philippines, do hereby, exclude from the operation of Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904, as amended by Executive Orders Nos. 14 and 16,
both series of 1915, which established the Watershed Reservation situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon, certain portions of land
embraced therein and reserve the same, together with the adjacent parcel of land of the public domain, for townsite purposes under the provisions of Chapter XI of the
Public Land Act, subject to private rights, if any there be, and to future subdivision survey in accordance with the development plan to be prepared and approved by the
Department of Local Government and Community Development, which parcels are more particularly described as follows:
Lot A (Part of Watershed Reservation)
A parcel of land (Lot A of Proposed Poor Mans Baguio, being a portion of the Marikina Watershed, IN-2), situated in the municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal,
Island of Luzon, beginning at a point marked 1 on sketch plan, being N-74-30 E, 8480.00 meters more or less, from BLLM 1, Antipolo, Rizal; thence N 33 28 W
1575.00 m. to point 2; thence N 40 26 W 1538.50 m. to point 3; thence N 30 50W 503.17 m. to point 4; thence N 75 02 W 704.33 m. to point 5; thence N 14 18 W
1399.39 m. to point 6; thence N 43 25 W 477.04 m. to point 7; thence N 71 38 W 458.36 m. to point 8; thence N 31 05 W 1025.00 m. to point 9; thence Due North
490.38 m. to point 10; thence Due North 1075.00 m. to point 11; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 12; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 13; thence Due East
1000.00 m. to point 14; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 15; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 16; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 17; thence Due East
1075.00 m. to point 18; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 19; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 20; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 21; thence Due
South 1000.00 m. to point 22; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 23; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 24; thence Due South 1075.00 m. to point 25; thence
Due West 1000.00 m. to point 26; thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 27; thence Due West 636.56 m. to point of beginning. Containing an area of three thousand
seven hundred eighty (3,780) Hectares, more or less.
Lot B (Alienable and Disposable Land)
A parcel of land (Lot B of Proposed Poor Mans Baguio, being a portion of alienable and disposable portion of public domain) situated in the municipality of Antipolo,
Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon. Beginning at a point marked 1 on sketch plan being N 74 30 E., 8430.00 m., more or less, from BLLM 1. Antipolo, Rizal;
thence Due West 363.44 m. to point 2; thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 3; thence Due West 100.00 m. to point 4; thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 5; thence
Due West 1075.00 m. to point 6; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 7; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 8; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 9; thence Due
North 1000.00 m. to point 10; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 11; thence Due North 509.62 m. to point 12; thence S. 31 05 E 1025.00 m. to point 13; thence S
71 38 E 458.36 m. to point 14; thence S 43 25 E 477.04 m. to point 15; thence S 14 18 E 1399.39 m. to point 16; thence S 75 02 E 704.33 m. to point 17; thence S.
30 50 E 503.17 m. to point 18; thence S 40 26 E 1538.50 m. to point 19; thence s 33 23 e 1575.00 m to point of beginning. Containing an area of one thousand two
hundred twenty five (1,225) Hectares, more or less.
Note: All data are approximate and subject to change based on future survey.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I Have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 21
st
day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-four.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines
Proclamation No. 1283 has since been amended by Proclamation No. 1637 issued on April 18, 1977. Proclamation No. 1637 revised the area and location of the
proposed townsite. According to then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos, Proclamation No. 1637 excluded Lot A (of which the Lot claimed by petitioners is part) for
townsite purposes and reverted it to MWR coverage.
[34]
Proclamation No. 1637 reads:
PROCLAMATION NO. 1637
AMENDING PROCLAMATION NO. 1283, DATED JUNE 21, 1974, WHICH ESTABLISHED THE TOWNSITE RESERVATION IN THE MUNICIPALITIES OF
ANTIPOLO AND SAN MATEO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON BY INCREASING THE AREA AND REVISING THE TECHNICAL
DESCRIPTION OF THE LAND EMBRACED THEREIN, AND REVOKING PROCLAMATION NO. 765 DATED OCTOBER 26, 1970 THAT RESERVED
PORTIONS OF THE AREA AS RESETTLEMENT SITE.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Natural Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines, do hereby amend Proclamation No. 1283, dated June 21, 1974 which established the townsite reservation in the municipalities of Antipolo and San Mateo,
Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon, by increasing the area and revising the technical descriptions of the land embraced therein, subject to private rights, if any there be,
which parcel of land is more particularly described as follows:
(Proposed Lungsod Silangan Townsite)
A PARCEL OF LAND (Proposed Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation amending the area under SWO-41762 establishing the Bagong Silangan Townsite
Reservation) situated in the Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo, and Montalban, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the E., along lines 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-
8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15-16-17-18-19-20-21-22-23 by the Marikina Watershed Reservation (IN-12); on the S., along lines 23-24-25 by the portion of Antipolo; on the
W., along lines 25-26-27-28-29-30 by the Municipalities of Montalban, San Mateo; and on the N., along lines 30-31-32-33-34-35-36-37-38-39-40-41-42-43-44 by the
Angat Watershed Reservation. Beginning at a point marked 1 on the Topographic Maps with the Scale of 1:50,000 which is the identical corner 38 IN-12, Marikina
Watershed Reservation.
xxx xxx xxx
NOTE: All data are approximate and subject to change based on future survey.
Proclamation No. 765 dated October 26, 1970, which covered areas entirely within the herein Lungsod Silangan Townsite, is hereby revoked accordingly.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of April, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-seven.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President of the Philippines
A positive act (e.g., an official proclamation) of the Executive Department is needed to declassify land which had been earlier classified as a watershed
reservation and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
[35]
Unless and until the land classified as such is released in an official
proclamation so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
[36]

The principal document presented by petitioners to prove the private character of the Lot is the Certification of the Bureau of Forest Development dated March
18, 1986 that the Lot is excluded from the Marikina Watershed (Exh. R). The Certification reads:
Republic of the Philippines
Ministry of Natural Resources
BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT
REGION IV
EL AL Building
100 Quezon Avenue, Quezon City
MAR 18 1986
VERIFICATION ON THE STATUS OF LAND:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the tract of land situated in Barangay San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, containing an area of 1,269,766 square meters, as shown and described on the
reverse side hereof, surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Telesforo Cabading for Angelina C. Reynoso, is verified to be within the area excluded from the operation of
Marikina Watershed Reservation established under Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904 per Proclamation No. 1283, promulgated on June 21, 1974, which
established the Boso-Boso Townsite Reservation, amended by proclamation No. 1637 dated April 18, 1977 known as Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation.
Subject area also falls within the bounds of Bagong Lipunan Site under P.D. 1396 dated June 2, 1978 under the sole jurisdiction of the Ministry of Human Settlements,
to the exclusion of any other government agencies.
This verification is made upon the request of the Chief, Legal Staff, R-4 as contained in his internal memorandum dated March 18, 1986.
Verified by:
(Sgd) ROMEO C. PASCUBILLO
Cartographer II
Checked by:
(Sgd) ARMENDO R. CRUZ
Supervising Cartographer
ATTESTED:
(Sgd) LUIS G. DACANAY
Chief, Forest Engineering &
Infrastructure Section
The above certification on which petitioners rely that a reclassification had occurred, and that the Lot is covered by the reclassification, is contradicted by several
documents submitted by the Solicitor General before the land registration court.
The Solicitor General submitted to the land registration court a Report
[37]
dated March 2, 1988, signed by Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio of the then
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration, confirming that the Lot described in Psu-162620 forms part of the MWR. He thus recommended the
dismissal of the application for registration. The Report states:
COMES NOW the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Commission and to this Honorable Court respectfully reports that:
1. A parcel of land described in plan Psu-162620 situated in the Barrio of San Isidro, Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, is applied for
registration of title in the case at bar.
2. After plotting plan Psu-162620 in our Municipal Index Map it was found that a portion of the SW, described as Lot 3 in plan Psu-173790 was
previously the subject of registration in Land Reg. Case No. N-9578, LRC Record No. N-55948 and was issued Decree No. N-191242 on April 4,
1986 in the name of Apolonia Garcia, et al., pursuant to the Decision and Order for Issuance of the Decree dated February 8, 1984 and March 6, 1984,
respectively, and the remaining portion of plan Psu-162620 is inside IN-12, Marikina Watershed. x x x
WHEREFORE, this matter is respectfully submitted to the Honorable Court for its information and guidance with the recommendation that the
application in the instant proceedings be dismissed, after due hearing (Underlining supplied).
Likewise, in a letter
[38]
dated November 11, 1991, the Deputy Land Inspector, DENR, Region IV, Community Environment and Natural Resources Office,
Antipolo, Rizal, similarly confirmed that the Lot is within the MWR. The letter states:
That the land sought to be registered is situated at San Isidro (Boso-boso), Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY SIX POINT ZERO SEVEN
SIXTY SIX (126.0766) hectares, more particularly described in Psu-162620, which is within the Marikina Watershed Reservation under Executive Order No. 33 dated
July 2, 1904 which established the Marikina Watershed Reservation (IN-12) x x x.
x x x
That the land sought to be registered is not a private property of the Registration Applicant but part of the public domain, not subjected to disposition and is covered by
Proclamation No. 585 for Integrated Social Forestry Program hence, L.R.C. No. 269-A is recommended for rejection (Underlining supplied). Copy of the letter is
attached herewith as Annex 3 and made an integral part hereof.
Lastly, the Solicitor General pointed out that attached to petitioner Edna T. Collados [as original applicant] application is the technical description
[39]
of the Lot
signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division of the Bureau of Lands. This technical description categorically stated that the Lot is
inside I N-12 Mariquina Watershed.
The evidence of record thus appears unsatisfactory and insufficient to show clearly and positively that the Lot had been officially released from the Marikina
Watershed Reservation to form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. We hold that once a parcel of land is included within a watershed
reservation duly established by Executive Proclamation, as in the instant case, a presumption arises that the land continues to be part of such Reservation until clear and
convincing evidence of subsequent declassification is shown.
It is obvious, based on the facts on record that neither petitioners nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the Lot for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title. Even if they submitted
sufficient proof that the Lot had been excluded from the MWR upon the issuance of Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21, 1974, petitioners possession as of the filing of
their application on April 25, 1985 would have been only eleven years counted from the issuance of the proclamation in 1974. The result will not change even if we
tack in the two years Sesinando Leyva allegedly possessed the Lot from 1902 until the issuance of EO 33 in 1904. Petitioners case falters even more because of the
issuance of Proclamation No. 1637 on April 18, 1977. According to then DENR Secretary Victor Ramos, Proclamation No. 1637 reverted Lot A or the townsite
reservation, where petitioners' Lot is supposedly situated, back to the MWR.
Finally, it is of no moment if the areas of the MWR are now fairly populated and vibrant communities as claimed by petitioners. The following ruling may be
applied to this case by analogy:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not
have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also
be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless
and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
[40]

Second Issue: Whether the petition for annulment of judgment
should have been given due course.
Petitioners fault the Court of Appeals for giving due course to the Republics petition for annulment of judgment which was filed long after the decision of the
land registration court had allegedly become final and executory. The land registration court rendered its decision on January 30, 1991 and the Solicitor General
received a copy of the decision on April 23, 1991.
[41]
Petitioners point out that the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals the petition for annulment of
judgment invoking Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 129
[42]
only on August 6, 1991, after the decision had supposedly become final and executory. Moreover, petitioners further
point out that the Solicitor General filed the petition for annulment after the land registration court issued its order of May 6, 1991 directing the Land Registration
Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration.
The Solicitor General sought the annulment of the decision on the ground that the land registration court had no jurisdiction over the case, specifically, over the
Lot which was not alienable and disposable. The Solicitor General maintained that the decision was null and void.
Petitioners argue that the remedy of annulment of judgment is no longer available because it is barred by the principle of res judicata. They insist that the land
registration court had jurisdiction over the case which involves private land. They also argue that the Republic is estopped from questioning the land registration
courts jurisdiction considering that the Republic participated in the proceedings before the court.
It is now established that the Lot, being a watershed reservation, is not alienable and disposable public land. The evidence of the petitioners do not clearly and
convincingly show that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620, ceased to be a portion of the area classified as a watershed reservation of the public domain. Any title to
the Lot is void ab initio. In view of this, the alleged procedural infirmities attending the filing of the petition for annulment of judgment are immaterial since the land
registration court never acquired jurisdiction over the Lot. All proceedings of the land registration court involving the Lot are therefore null and void.
We apply our ruling in Martinez vs. Court of Appeals,
[43]
as follows:
The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registrable properties, such as public navigable rivers which are parts of the public domain, and cannot
validly adjudge the registration of title in favor of private applicant. Hence, the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga as regards the Lot No. 2 of
certificate of Title No. 15856 in the name of petitioners may be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally, by the State which is not bound by any prescriptive
period provided for by the Statute of Limitations.
We also hold that environmental consequences in this case override concerns over technicalities and rules of procedure.
In Republic vs. De los Angeles,
[44]
which involved the registration of public lands, specifically parts of the sea, the Court rejected the principle of res judicata and
estoppel to silence the Republics claim over public lands. The Court said:
It should be noted further that the doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when the Government sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental rights, nor does
estoppel or laches validate an act that contravenes law or public policy, and that res judicata is to be disregarded if its application would involve the sacrifice of justice
to technicality.
The Court further held that the right of reversion or reconveyance to the State of the public properties registered and which are not capable of private appropriation or
private acquisition does not prescribe.
Third issue: Whether the petition-in-intervention is proper.
The Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., an association of holders of certificates of stewardship issued by the DENR under its Integrated Social Forestry
Program, filed with the Court of Appeals on November 29, 1991 a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Petition-In-Intervention.
According to intervenors, they are the actual occupants of the Lot which petitioners sought to register. Aware that the parcels of land which their forefathers had
occupied, developed and tilled belong to the Government, they filed a petition with then President Corazon C. Aquino and then DENR Secretary Fulgencio S.
Factoran, to award the parcels of land to them.
Secretary Factoran directed the Director of Forest Management Bureau to take steps for the segregation of the aforementioned area from the MWR for
development under the DENRs I SF Programs. Subsequently, then President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 585 dated June 5, 1990 excluding 1,430 hectares from
the operation of EO 33 and placed the same under the DENRs Integrated Social Forestry Program. Proclamation No. 585 reads:
PROCLAMATION NO. 585
AMENDING FURTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 33, DATED JULY 26, 1904 WHICH ESTABLISHED THE MARIKINA WATERSHED RESERVATION (IN-
12) AS AMENDED, BY EXCLUDING CERTAIN PORTIONS OF LANDS EMBRACED THEREIN SITUATED AT SITIOS BOSOBOSO, KILINGAN,
VETERANS, BARANGAYS SAN JOSEPH AND PAENAAN, MUNICIPALITY OF ANTIPOLO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President
of the Philippines, do hereby exclude from the operation of Executive Order No. 33, which established the Marikina Watershed Reservation, certain parcel of land of
the public domain embraced therein situated in Sitios Bosoboso, Veterans, Kilingan and Barangay San Joseph and Paenaan, Municipality of Antipolo, Province of
Rizal and place the same under the Integrated Social Forestry Program of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in accordance with existing laws,
rules and regulations, which parcel of land is more particularly described as follows:
A PARCEL OF LAND, within the Marikina Watershed Reservation situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, beginning at point 1 on plan, being
identical to corner 1 of Marikina Watershed Reservation; thence
xxx xxx xxx
Containing an area of One Thousand Four Hundred Thirty (1,430) Hectares.
All other lands covered and embraced under Executive Order No. 33 as amended, not otherwise affected by this Proclamation, shall remain in force and effect.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 5
th
day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety.
(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO
President of the Philippines
Pursuant to Proclamation No. 585, the chief of the ISF Unit, acting through the Regional Executive Director of the DENR (Region IV), issued sometime between
the years 1989 to 1991 certificates of stewardship contracts to bona fide residents of the barangays mentioned in the proclamation as qualified recipients of the ISF
programs. Among those awarded were intervenors. The certificates of stewardship are actually contracts of lease granted by the DENR to actual occupants of parcels of
land under its ISF programs for a period of twenty-five (25) years, renewable for another twenty-five (25) years.
[45]
The DENR awarded contracts of stewardship to ISF
participants in Barangay San Isidro (or Boso-boso) and the other barangays based on the Inventory of Forest Occupants the DENR had conducted.
[46]

According to intervenors, they learned only on July 31, 1991 about the pendency of LRC Case No. 269-A before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal. On
August 8, 1991, they filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Opposition in Intervention before the land registration court to assert their rights and to protect
their interests.
However, shortly after the filing of their opposition, intervenors learned that the land registration court had already rendered a decision on January 30, 1991
confirming petitioners imperfect title. Intervenors counsel received a copy of the decision on August 9, 1991.
On August 14, 1991, intervenors filed a motion to vacate judgment and for new trial before the land registration court. According to intervenors, the land
registration court could not act on its motions due to the restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals on August 8, 1991, enjoining the land registration court from
executing its decision, as prayed for by the Solicitor General in its petition for annulment of judgment. The intervenors were thus constrained to file a petition for
intervention before the Court of Appeals which allowed the same.
Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
[47]
provides in pertinent parts:
Section 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is
so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court, or an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be
allowed to intervene in the action. The Court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original
parties, and whether or not the inertvenors rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
Sec. 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention
shall be attached to the motion and served on the original parties.
As a rule, intervention is allowed before rendition of judgment by the trial court, as Section 2, Rule 19 expressly provides. However, the Court has recognized
exceptions to this rule in the interest of substantial justice. Mago vs. Court of Appeals
[48]
reiterated the ruling in Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, where the
Court allowed the motions for intervention even when the case had already reached this Court. Thus, in Mago the Court held that:
It is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention filed by the movants at this stage of the proceedings where trial had already been concluded x x x and on
appeal x x x the same affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the instant petition for certiorari to review said judgment is already submitted for decision by the Supreme
Court, are obviously and, manifestly late, beyond the period prescribed under x x x Section 2, Rule 12 of the rules of Court.
But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, like all other Rules therein promulgated, is simply a rule of procedure, the whole purpose and object of which is to make the powers
of the Court fully and completely available for justice. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the
rival claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself
which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best adopted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end.
To be sure, the Court of Appeals did not pass upon the actual status of intervenors in relation to the Lot as this was not in issue. Neither was the validity of the
certificates of stewardship contracts which intervenors allegedly possessed inquired into considering this too was not in issue. In fact, intervenors did not specifically
seek any relief apart from a declaration that the Lot in question remains inalienable land of the public domain. We cannot fault the Court of Appeals for allowing the
intervention, if only to provide the rival groups a peaceful venue for ventilating their sides. This case has already claimed at least five lives due to the raging dispute
between the rival camps of the petitioners on one side and those of the DENR awardees on the other. It also spawned a number of criminal cases between the two rival
groups including malicious mischief, robbery and arson. A strict application of the rules would blur this bigger, far more important picture.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 22, 1992 declaring null and void the Decision dated January 30,
1991 of Branch 71, Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, in LRC No. 269-A, LRC Rec. No. N-59179 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Collado v. Court of Appeals
390 SCRA 343

DOCTRINE: All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.

FACTS: Petitioner filed with the land registration court an application for registration of a parcel of land, alleging that they had occupied the land
since time immemorial and that their possession had been open, public, notorious and in the concept of owners. The court rendered a decision
confirming the imperfect title of petitioners, holding that petitioners had adduced sufficient evidence to establish their registrable rights over the
Lot. On appeal, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and declared the decision of the trial court null and void. It cited the Regalian Doctrine,
enshrined in the 1935 (Art. XIII, Sec. 1), 1973 (Art. XIV, Sec. 8), and 1987 Constitution (Art. XII, Sec. 2), which states that all lands of the
public domain belong to the State. An applicant, like the private respondents herein, bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that the
land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.In the case at bar, private respondents failed to present any evidence whatsoever that
the land applied for has been segregated from the bulk of the public domain and declared by competent authority to be alienable and disposable.
Worse, the technical description signed by the officer in charge of the survey division in the Bureau of Lands categorically stated that the survey
was inside Marikina Watershed. The main thrust of petitioners claim over the Lot is that all Presidential proclamations like the proclamation
setting aside the Marikina Watershed Reservation are subject to private rights. They claim that the presumption of law then prevailing under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926 was that the land possessed and claimed by individuals as their own are agricultural lands
and therefore alienable and disposable.

HELD: The Court finds the petition bereft of merit. It was erroneous for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public
Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable. The
term public land referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private
appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands. The 1987 Constitution prohibits the
alienation of all natural resources except agricultural lands of the public domain. Watershed Reservation is a Natural Resource.

It can therefore be concluded that petitioners did not acquire private rights over the parcel of land prior to the issuance of EO 33 segregating the
same as a watershed reservation. An imperfect title may be derived from old Spanish grants or a continuous, open and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty years preceding the filing of his
application as provided by Section 48 (b) CA 141. The petitioners were unable to acquire a valid and enforceable right or tit le because of the
failure to complete the required period of possession, whether under the original Section 48 (b) of CA 141 prior to the issuance of EO 33, or
under the amendment by RA 1942 and PD 1073.

At the same time, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a watershed. Since then, the Lot became non-disposable and inalienable public land. The period of
occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 in 1904 could no longer be counted because as a watershed reservation, the Lot was no longer susceptible
of occupancy, disposition, conveyance or alienation. Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended, applies exclusively to alienable and disposable
public agricultural land.

A positive act of the Executive Department is needed to declassify land which had been earlier classified as a watershed reservation and to
convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. Once a parcel of land is included within a watershed reservation
duly established by Executive Proclamation, as in the instant case, a presumption arises that the land continues to be part of such Reservation
until clear and convincing evidence of subsequent declassification is shown.

Evidence on record thus appears unsatisfactory and insufficient to show clearly and positively that the Lot had been officially released from the
Marikina Watershed Reservation to form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Thus, neither petitioners nor their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the Lot for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title.

FRIVALDO VS COMELEC
FRIVALDO VS COMELEC
Posted by kaye lee on 10:58 PM
G.R. No. 87193, 23 June 1989 [Naturalization; Reacquisition]

FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and assumed office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a
petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he was naturalized as American citizen only to protect himself against President
Marcos during the Martial Law era.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.

RULING:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an
indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the local elections, he automatically
forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United States of America. The Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture was between him and the US. If he really
wanted to drop his American citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.

KILOSBAYAN VS ERMITA
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 177721 July 3, 2007
KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION AND BANTAY KATARUNGAN FOUNDATION, petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA; SANDIGANBAYAN JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG,respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AZCUNA, J .:
Filed on May 23, 2007 was this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners are peoples and/or non-governmental organizations engaged in public and civic causes aimed at protecting the peoples rights to self-governance and
justice.
Respondent Executive Secretary is the head of the Office of the President and is in charge of releasing presidential appointments including those of Supreme Court
Justices.
Respondent Gregory S. Ong is allegedly the party whose appointment would fill up the vacancy in this Court.
Petitioners allege that:
On May 16, 2007, respondent Executive Secretary, in representation of the Office of the President, announced an appointment in favor of respondent Gregory S. Ong as
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court to fill up the vacancy created by the retirement on April 28, 2007 of Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. The appointment
was reported the following day, May 17, 2007, by the major daily publications.
On May 18, 2007, the major daily publications reported that the appointment was "recalled" or "held in abeyance" by Malacaang in view of the question relating to the
citizenship of respondent Gregory S. Ong. There is no indication whatever that the appointment has been cancelled by the Office of the President.
On May 19, 2007, the major daily publications reported that respondent Executive Secretary stated that the appointment is "still there except that the validation of the
issue is being done by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)."
Petitioners contend that the appointment extended to respondent Ong through respondent Executive Secretary is patently unconstitutional, arbitrary, whimsical and
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, that this fact is plain and incontestable, and that his own birth certificate indicates his Chinese citizenship.
Petitioners attached a copy of said birth certificate as Annex "H" to the petition. The birth certificate, petitioners add, reveals that at the time of respondent Ongs birth
on May 25, 1953, his father was Chinese and his mother was also Chinese.
Petitioners invoke the Constitution:
Section 7 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate
court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines." Sec. 2 of Art. IV defines "natural-born citizens as those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine Citizenship."
1

Petitioners maintain that even if it were granted that eleven years after respondent Ongs birth his father was finally granted Filipino citizenship by naturalization, that,
by itself, would not make respondent Ong a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Petitioners further argue that respondent Ongs birth certificate speaks for itself and it states his nationality as "Chinese" at birth. They invoke the Civil Code:
Article 410 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]he books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto x x x shall be prima facie evidence of the facts
therein contained."

Therefore, the entry in Ongs birth certificate indicating his nationality as Chinese is prima facie evidence of the fact that Ongs citizenship at birth is
Chinese.
Article 412 of the Civil Code also provides that "[N]o entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order." Thus, as long as Ongs
birth certificate is not changed by a judicial order, the Judicial & Bar Council, as well as the whole world, is bound by what is stated in his birth certificate.
2

This birth certificate, petitioners assert, prevails over respondent Ongs new Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated October 16,
1996, stating that he is a natural-born Filipino and over the opinion of then Secretary of Justice Teofisto Guingona that he is a natural-born Filipino. They
maintain that the Department of Justice (DOJ) does not have the power or authority to alter entries in a birth certificate; that respondent Ongs old
Identification Certificate did not declare that he is a natural-born Filipino; and that respondent Ongs remedy is an action to correct his citizenship as it
appears in his birth certificate.
Petitioners thereupon pray that a writ of certiorari be issued annulling the appointment issued to respondent Ong as Associate Justice of this Court.
Subsequently, on May 24, 2007, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), praying that a TRO be issued, in
accordance with the Rules of Court, to prevent and restrain respondent Executive Secretary from releasing the appointment of respondent Ong, and to prevent and
restrain respondent Ong from assuming the office and discharging the functions of Associate Justice of this Court.
The Court required respondents to Comment on the petition.
Respondent Executive Secretary accordingly filed his Comment, essentially stating that the appointment of respondent Ong as Associate Justice of this Court on May
16, 2007 was made by the President pursuant to the powers vested in her by Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution, thus:
SEC. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and Judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by
the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
Respondent Executive Secretary added that the President appointed respondent Ong from among the list of nominees who were duly screened by and bore the
imprimatur of the JBC created under Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution. Said respondent further stated: "The appointment, however, was not released, but
instead, referred to the JBC for validation of respondent Ongs citizenship."
3
To date, however, the JBC has not received the referral.
Supporting the Presidents action and respondent Ongs qualifications, respondent Executive Secretary submits that:
1. The President did not gravely abuse her discretion as she appointed a person, duly nominated by the JBC, which passed upon the appointees
qualifications.
2. Justice Gregory S. Ong is a natural-born citizen as determined by the Bureau of Immigration and affirmed by the Department of Justice, which have the
authority and jurisdiction to make determination on matters of citizenship.
3. Undisputed evidence disclosed that respondent Ong is a natural-born citizen.
4. Petitioners are not entitled to a temporary restraining order.
4

Respondent Ong submitted his Comment with Opposition, maintaining that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen; that petitioners have no standing to file the present suit;
and that the issue raised ought to be addressed to the JBC as the Constitutional body mandated to review the qualifications of those it recommends to judicial posts.
Furthermore, the petitioners in his view failed to include the President who is an indispensable party as the one who extended the appointment.
As to his citizenship, respondent Ong traces his ancestral lines to one Maria Santos of Malolos, Bulacan, born on November 25, 1881, who was allegedly a Filipino
citizen
5
who married Chan Kin, a Chinese citizen; that these two had a son, Juan Santos; that in 1906 Chan Kin died in China, as a result of which Maria Santos
reverted to her Filipino citizenship; that at that time Juan Santos was a minor; that Juan Santos thereby also became a Filipino citizen;
6
that respondent Ongs mother,
Dy Guiok Santos, is the daughter of the spouses Juan Santos and Sy Siok Hian, a Chinese citizen, who were married in 1927; that, therefore, respondents mother was a
Filipino citizen at birth; that Dy Guiok Santos later married a Chinese citizen, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, thereby becoming a Chinese citizen; that when respondent Ong
was eleven years old his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was naturalized, and as a result he, his brothers and sisters, and his mother were included in the naturalization.
Respondent Ong subsequently obtained from the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ a certification and an identification that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen under
Article IV, Sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution, since his mother was a Filipino citizen when he was born.
Summarizing, his arguments are as follows:
I. PETITIONERS LACK OF STANDING AND INABILITY TO IMPLEAD AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY WHOSE OFFICIAL ACTION IS THE
VERY ACT SOUGHT TO BE ANNULLED CONSTITUTE INSUPERABLE LEGAL OBSTACLES TO THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER AND
SHOULD PREVENT THIS CASE FROM PROCEEDING FURTHER FOR DETERMINATION ON THE MERITS BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.
II. RESPONDENT ONG IS, IN TRUTH AND IN FACT, A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES, CONSIDERING THAT:
A. DY GUIOK SANTOS WAS A FILIPINO CITIZEN AT THE TIME OF HER MARRIAGE TO EUGENIO; and
B. HAVING BEEN BORN BEFORE JANUARY 17, 1973 OF A FILIPINO MOTHER AND WHO ELECTED FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP
UPON REACHING THE AGE OF MAJORITY, RESPONDENT ONG MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS UNDER ARTICLE IV, SECTIONS 1
AND 2 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
III. THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF RESPONDENT ONG AS PRESENTED BY PETITIONERS CAN, IN NO WAY, WITHOUT MORE, ESTABLISH
WITH FINALITY THAT HE IS A CHINESE NATIONAL, OR DISPROVE CONCLUSIVELY THAT HE IS, IN FACT, A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO,
DESCENDED FROM "INDIOS."
IV. IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR RESPONDENT ONG TO RESORT TO JUDICIAL ACTION UNDER RULE 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT FOR
HIM TO BE ABLE TO CLAIM AND ENJOY HIS RIGHTFUL STATUS AS A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO.
V. THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION HAS PREEMPTIVE LEGAL AUTHORITY OR PRIMARY ADMINISTRATIVE JURIDICTION TO MAKE A
DETERMINATION AS REGARDS THE CITIZENSHIP OF RESPONDENT ONG, AND UPON SUBSEQUENT CONFIRMATION BY THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AS REQUIRED BY THE RULES, ISSUE A DECLARATION (I.E., IDENTIFICATION CERTIFICATE NO. 113878)
RECOGNIZING THAT RESPONDENT ONG IS A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO, THEREBY RENDERING NONEXISTENT ANY CONTITUTIONAL
IMPEDIMENT FOR HIM TO ASSUME THE POSITION OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT.
7

Petitioners, in turn, filed a Consolidated Reply, in which they asserted their standing to file this suit on the strength of previous decisions of this Court, e.g., Kilosbayan,
Incorporated v. Guingona
8
and Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato,
9
on the ground that the case is one of transcendental importance. They claim that the Presidents
appointment of respondent Ong as Supreme Court Justice violates the Constitution and is, therefore, attended with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. Finally, they reiterate that respondent Ongs birth certificate, unless corrected by judicial order in non-summary proceedings for the purpose, is binding
on all and is prima facie evidence of what it states, namely, that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen. The alleged naturalization of his father when he was a minor
would not make him a natural-born Filipino citizen.
The petition has merit.
First, as to standing. Petitioners have standing to file the suit simply as peoples organizations and taxpayers since the matter involves an issue of utmost and far-
reaching Constitutional importance, namely, the qualification nay, the citizenship of a person to be appointed a member of this Court. Standing has been accorded
and recognized in similar instances.
10

Second, as to having to implead the President as an alleged necessary party. This is not necessary since the suit impleads the Executive Secretary who is the alter ego of
the President and he has in fact spoken for her in his Comment. Furthermore, the suit does not seek to stop the President from extending the appointment but only the
Executive Secretary from releasing it and respondent Ong from accepting the same.
Third, as to the proper forum for litigating the issue of respondent Ongs qualification for memberhip of this Court. This case is a matter of primordial importance
involving compliance with a Constitutional mandate. As the body tasked with the determination of the merits of conflicting claims under the Constitution,
11
the Court is
the proper forum for resolving the issue, even as the JBC has the initial competence to do so.
Fourth, as to the principal issue of the case is respondent Ong a natural-born Filipino citizen?
On this point, the Court takes judicial notice of the records of respondent Ongs petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar.
In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar, docketed as B.E. No. 1398-N filed on September 14, 1979, under O.R. No. 8131205 of that date, respondent Ong
alleged that he is qualified to be admitted to the Philippine bar because, among others, he is a Filipino citizen; and that he is a Filipino citizen because his father,
Eugenio Ong Han Seng, a Chinese citizen, was naturalized in 1964 when he, respondent Ong, was a minor of eleven years and thus he, too, thereby became a Filipino
citizen. As part of his evidence, in support of his petition, be submitted his birth certificate and the naturalization papers of his father. His birth certificate
12
states that he
was a Chinese citizen at birth and that his mother, Dy Guiok Santos, was a Chinese citizen and his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was also a Chinese citizen.
Specifically, the following appears in the records:
P E T I T I O N
COMES now the undersigned petitioner and to this Honorable Court respectfully states:
1. That he is single/married/widower/widow, Filipino citizen and 26 years of age, having been born on May 25, 1953, at SAN JUAN RIZAL, to spouses
Eugenio Ong Han Seng and Dy Guiok Santos who are citizens of the Philippines, as evidenced by the attached copy of his birth certificate marked as Annex
A (if born outside of wedlock, state so; or if Filipino citizen other than natural born, state how and when citizenship was acquired and attach the necessary
proofs: By Nat. Case #584 of Eugenio Ong Han Seng (Father) See Attached documents Annex B, B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4.
x x x
V E R I F I C A T I O N
Republic of the Philippines )
City of Manila ) S.S.
I, GREGORY SANTOS ONG, after being sworn, depose and state: that I am the petitioner in the foregoing petition; that the same was prepared by me
and/or at my instance and that the allegations contained therein are true to my knowledge.
(Sgd.) GREGORY SANTOS ONG
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 28
th
day of August, 1979, City of Manila, Philippines, affiant exhibiting his/her Residence Certificate No.
A-___________, issued at ________________, on __________________, 19__.
(Sgd.)
Notary Public
Until December 31, 1979
PTR No. 3114917
January 19, 1979, Pasig, MM
Doc. No. 98;
Page No. 10;
Book No. VIII;
Series of 1979.
13

In fact, Emilio R. Rebueno, Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant, wrote respondent Ong a letter dated October 3, 1979 stating that in connection with his Petition
for Admission to the 1979 Bar Examinations, he has to submit:
1) A certified clear copy of his Birth Certificate; and
2) A certification of non-appeal re his citizenship from the Office of the Solicitor General.
Respondent Ong complied with these requirements.
It was on the basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted evidence of naturalization that this Court allowed respondent Ong to take the oath as a lawyer.
It is clear, therefore, that from the records of this Court, respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status
by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his
father.
Furthermore, as petitioners correctly submit, no substantial change or correction in an entry in a civil register can be made without a judicial order, and, under the law, a
change in citizenship status is a substantial change. In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic,
14
this Court held that:
Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the
nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted to
prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted.
15

Republic Act No. 9048 provides in Section 2 (3) that a summary administrative proceeding to correct clerical or typographical errors in a birth certificate cannot apply
to a change in nationality. Substantial corrections to the nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the civil registry should, therefore, be effected through a
petition filed in court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
16

The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities of respondent Ongs ancestors, by various births, marriages and deaths, all entail factual
assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial proceedings so as to correct the existing records on his birth and citizenship. The chain of evidence would have
to show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ongs mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still appears in the records of this Court. Respondent Ong has the
burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral tree as well as his citizenship under the time-line of three Constitutions.
17
Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot
accept an appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution. For this reason, he can be prevented by injunction from doing so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED as one of injunction directed against respondent Gregory S. Ong, who is hereby ENJOINED from accepting an
appointment to the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court or assuming the position and discharging the functions of that office, until he shall have
successfully completed all necessary steps, through the appropriate adversarial proceedings in court, to show that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen and correct the
records of his birth and citizenship.
This Decision is FINAL and IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 177721, July 3, 2007
KILOSBAYAN VS ERMITA

Only natural-born Filipino citizens may be appointed as justice of the Supreme Court
Decision of administrative body (Bureau of Immigration) declaring one a natural-born citizen is not binding upon the courts when there are circumstances
that entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial proceedings
FACTS:

This case arose when respondent Gregory S. Ong was appointed by Executive Secretary, in representation of the Office of the President, as Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court. Petitioners contended that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, born on May 25, 1953 to Chinese parents. They further added that even if it
were granted that eleven years after respondent Ongs birth, his father was finally granted Filipino citizenship by naturalization, that, by itself, would not make
respondent Ong a natural-born citizen. For his part, respondent Ong contended that he is a natural-born citizen and presented a certification from the Bureau of
Immigration and the DOJ declaring him to be such.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Ong is a natural-born Filipino citizen
RULING:

xxx respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ
cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father.

The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities of respondent Ong's ancestors, by various births, marriages and deaths, all entail factual
assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial proceedings so as to correct the existing records on his birth and citizenship. The chain of evidence would
have to show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ong's mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still appears in the records of this Court. Respondent Ong
has the burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral tree as well as his citizenship under the time-line of three Constitutions. Until this is done, respondent Ong
cannot accept an appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution. For this reason, he can be prevented by injunction from doing so.
ELIZABETH LEE VS DIRECTOR OF LANDS
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 128195. October 3, 2001]
ELIZABETH LEE and PACITA YU LEE, HON. JUDGE JOSE D. ALOVERA,
*
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Roxas City, THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ROXAS CITY, petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS
AND THE ADMINISTRATOR, LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
*
respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PARDO, J .:
The case under consideration is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision
[1]
of the Court of Appeals nullifying that of the Regional Trial Court, Roxas
City, in Reconstitution Case No. R-1928,
[2]
pertaining to Lot 398, Capiz Cadastre, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 3389.
Sometime in March 1936, Rafael, Carmen, Francisco, Jr., Ramon, Lourdes, Mercedes, Concepcion, Mariano, Jose, Loreto, Manuel, Rizal and Jimmy, all
surnamed Dinglasan sold to Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, a parcel of land with an approximate area of 1,631 square meters, designated as Lot 398 and covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 3389, situated at the corner of Roxas Avenue and Pavia Street, Roxas City.
[3]

However, in 1948, the former owners filed with the Court of First Instance, Capiz an action against the heirs of Lee Liong for annulment of sale and recovery of
land.
[4]
The plaintiffs assailed the validity of the sale because of the constitutional prohibition against aliens acquiring ownership of private agricultural land, including
residential, commercial or industrial land. Rebuffed in the trial court and the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court. On June 27, 1956, the
Supreme Court ruled thus:
granting the sale to be null and void and can not give title to the vendee, it does not necessarily follow therefrom that the title remained in the vendor, who had also
violated the constitutional prohibition, or that he (vendor) has the right to recover the title of which he has divested himself by his act in ignoring the prohibition. In
such contingency another principle of law sets in to bar the equally guilty vendor from recovering the title which he had voluntarily conveyed for a consideration, that
of pari delicto.
[5]

On July 1, 1968, the same former owners Rafael A. Dinglasan, together with Francisco, Carmen, Ramon, Lourdes, Mercedes, Concepcion, Mariano, Jose,
Loreto, Rizal, Jimmy, and Jesse Dinglasan filed with the Court of First Instance, Capiz an action for recovery of the same parcel of land.
[6]
Citing the case of Philippine
Banking Corporation v. Lui She,
[7]
they submitted that the sale to Lee Liong was null and void for being violative of the Constitution. On September 23, 1968, the heirs
of Lee Liong filed with the trial court a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of res judicata.
[8]
On October 10, 1968, and November 9, 1968, the trial court denied
the motion.
[9]
The heirs of Lee Liong elevated the case to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari. On April 22, 1977, the Supreme Court annulled the orders of the
trial court and directed it to dismiss the case, holding that the suit was barred by res judicata.
[10]

On September 7, 1993, Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and Pacita Yu Lee filed with the Regional Trial Court, Roxas City a petition for reconstitution of title of Lot No.
398 of the Capiz Cadastre, formerly covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 3389 of the Register of Deeds of Roxas City.
[11]
Petitioners alleged that they were the
widows of the deceased Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Ting, who were the heirs of Lee Liong, the owner of the lot. Lee Liong died intestate in February 1944. On June 30,
1947, Lee Liongs widow, Ang Chia, and his two sons, Lee Bun Ting and Lee Bing Ho, executed an extra-judicial settlement of the estate of Lee Liong, adjudicating to
themselves the subject parcel of land.
[12]
Petitioner Elizabeth Lee acquired her share in Lot No. 398 through an extra-judicial settlement and donation executed in her
favor by her deceased husband Lee Bing Hoo. Petitioner Pacita Yu Lee acquired her share in the same lot by succession from her deceased husband Lee Bun Ting, as
evidenced by a deed of extra-judicial settlement.
[13]

Previously, on December 9, 1948, the Register of Deeds, Capiz, Salvador Villaluz, issued a certification that a transfer certificate of title over the property was
issued in the name of Lee Liong.
[14]
However, the records of the Register of Deeds, Roxas City were burned during the war. Thus, as heretofore stated, on September 7,
1968, petitioners filed a petition for reconstitution of title.
On June 10, 1994, the Regional Trial Court, Roxas City, Branch 17, ordered the reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title in the name of Lee Liong
on the basis of an approved plan and technical description.
[15]
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads thus:
WHEREFORE, in reiteration, the Register of Deeds for the City of Roxas is ordered to reconstitute the lost or destroyed certificate of title in the name of Lee Liong,
deceased, of Roxas City, with all the conditions stated in paragraph 2 of this decision. This decision shall become final after the lapse of thirty (30) days from receipt by
the Register of Deeds and by the Commissioner of LRA of a notice of such judgment without any appeal having been filed by any of such officials.
SO ORDERED.
Given at Roxas City, Philippines,
June 10, 1994.
JOSE O. ALOVERA
Judge
[16]

On August 18, 1994, the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Roxas City, Branch 17 issued an Entry of Judgment.
[17]

On January 25, 1995, the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of judgment in Reconstitution Case No. 1928, alleging that
the Regional Trial Court, Roxas City had no jurisdiction over the case.
[18]
The Solicitor General contended that the petitioners were not the proper parties in the
reconstitution of title, since their predecessor-in-interest Lee Liong did not acquire title to the lot because he was a Chinese citizen and was constitutionally not qualified
to own the subject land.
On April 30, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision declaring the judgment of reconstitution void.
[19]

On May 24, 1996, Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and Pacita Yu Lee filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the decision.
[20]
On February 18,
1997, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
[21]

Hence, this petition.
[22]

Petitioners submitted that the Solicitor General was estopped from seeking annulment of the judgment of reconstitution after failing to object during the
reconstitution proceedings before the trial court, despite due notice. Petitioners alleged that the Solicitor General merely acted on the request of private and politically
powerful individuals who wished to capitalize on the prime location of the subject land.
Petitioners emphasized that the ownership of the land had been settled in two previous cases of the Supreme Court, where the Court ruled in favor of their
predecessor-in-interest, Lee Liong. Petitioners also pointed out that they acquired ownership of the land through actual possession of the lot and their consistent
payment of taxes over the land for more than sixty years.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General submitted that the decision in the reconstitution case was void; otherwise, it would amount to circumventing the
constitutional proscription against aliens acquiring ownership of private or public agricultural lands.
We grant the petition.
The reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the original form and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a
piece of land.
[23]
The purpose of the reconstitution of title is to have, after observing the procedures prescribed by law, the title reproduced in exactly the same way it has
been when the loss or destruction occurred.
[24]

In this case, petitioners sought a reconstitution of title in the name of Lee Liong, alleging that the transfer certificate of title issued to him was lost or destroyed
during World War II. All the documents recorded and issued by the Register of Deeds, Capiz, which include the transfer certificate of title issued in the name of Lee
Liong, were all destroyed during the war. The fact that the original of the transfer certificate of title was not in the files of the Office of the Register of Deeds did not
imply that a transfer certificate of title had not been issued.
[25]
In the trial court proceedings, petitioners presented evidence proving the sale of the land from the
Dinglasans to Lee Liong and the latters subsequent possession of the property in the concept of owner. Thus, the trial court, after examining all the evidence before it,
ordered the reconstitution of title in the name of Lee Liong.
However, there is a question as to whether Lee Liong has the qualification to own land in the Philippines.
The sale of the land in question was consummated sometime in March 1936, during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. Under the 1935
Constitution,
[26]
aliens could not acquire private agricultural lands, save in cases of hereditary succession.
[27]
Thus, Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, was disqualified to
acquire the land in question.
[28]

The fact that the Court did not annul the sale of the land to an alien did not validate the transaction, for it was still contrary to the constitutional proscription
against aliens acquiring lands of the public or private domain. However, the proper party to assail the illegality of the transaction was not the parties to the
transaction.
[29]
In sales of real estate to aliens incapable of holding title thereto by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution both the vendor and the vendee are
deemed to have committed the constitutional violation and being thus in pari delicto the courts will not afford protection to either party.
[30]
The proper party to assail
the sale is the Solicitor General. This was what was done in this case when the Solicitor General initiated an action for annulment of judgment of reconstitution of
title. While it took the Republic more than sixty years to assert itself, it is not barred from initiating such action. Prescription never lies against the State.
[31]

Although ownership of the land cannot revert to the original sellers, because of the doctrine of pari delicto, the Solicitor General may initiate an action for
reversion or escheat of the land to the State, subject to other defenses, as hereafter set forth.
[32]

In this case, subsequent circumstances militate against escheat proceedings because the land is now in the hands of Filipinos. The original vendee, Lee Liong,
has since died and the land has been inherited by his heirs and subsequently their heirs, petitioners herein. Petitioners are Filipino citizens, a fact the Solicitor General
does not dispute.
The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the public or private domain was intended to protect lands from falling in the hands of non-
Filipinos. In this case, however, there would be no more public policy violated since the land is in the hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such land. If
land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the
title of the transferee is rendered valid.
[33]
Thus, the subsequent transfer of the property to qualified Filipinos may no longer be impugned on the basis of the invalidity
of the initial transfer.
[34]
The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.
Incidentally, it must be mentioned that reconstitution of the original certificate of title must be based on an owners duplicate, secondary evidence thereof, or
other valid sources of the title to be reconstituted.
[35]
In this case, reconstitution was based on the plan and technical description approved by the Land Registration
Authority.
[36]
This renders the order of reconstitution void for lack of factual support.
[37]
A judgment with absolutely nothing to support it is void.
[38]

As earlier mentioned, a reconstitution of title is the re-issuance of a new certificate of title lost or destroyed in its original form and condition.
[39]
It does not pass
upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title.
[40]
Any change in the ownership of the property must be the subject of a separate suit.
[41]
Thus,
although petitioners are in possession of the land, a separate proceeding is necessary to thresh out the issue of ownership of the land.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 36274. In lieu thereof, the Court sets aside
the order of reconstitution of title in Reconstitution Case No. R-1928, Regional Trial Court, Roxas City, and dismisses the petition, without prejudice.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
LIMKAICHONG VS COMELEC
Political Law Jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals
Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1
st
District of Negros Oriental. Paras, her rival, and some other concerned citizens filed disqualification cases against
Limkaichong. Limkaichong is allegedly not a natural born citizen of the Philippines because when she was born her father was still a Chinese and that her mom, though
Filipino lost her citizenship by virtue of her marriage to Limkaichongs dad. During the pendency of the case against Limkaichong before the COMELEC, Election day
came and votes were cast. Results came in and Limkaichong won over her rival Paras. COMELEC after due hearing declared Limkaichong as disqualified. About 2
days after the counting of votes, COMELEC declared Limkaichong as a disqualified candidate. On the following days however, notwithstanding their proclamation
disqualifying Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued a proclamation announcing Limkaichong as the winner of the recently conducted elections. This is in compliance
with Resolution No. 8062 adopting the policy-guidelines of not suspending the proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification cases which
shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Paras countered the proclamation and she filed a petition before the
COMELEC. Limkaichong asailed Paras petitioned arguing that since she is now the proclaimed winner, the COMELEC can no longer exercise jurisdiction over the
matter. It should be the HRET which should exercise jurisdiction from then on. COMELEC agreed with Limkaichong.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proclamation done by the COMELEC is valid. Whether or not COMELEC should still exercise jurisdiction over the matter.
HELD: The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. The COMELEC Second Division rendered its Joint Resolution dated May 17, 2007. On May 20, 2007,
Limkaichong timely filed with the COMELEC En Banc her motion for reconsideration as well as for the lifting of the incorporated directive suspending her
proclamation. The filing of the motion for reconsideration effectively suspended the execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution. Since the execution of the
May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution was suspended, there was no impediment to the valid proclamation of Limkaichong as the winner. Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure provides:
Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days
from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the execution for implementation of the decision, resolution, order and ruling.
The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichongs proclamation. The SC has invariably held that once a winning candidat e has been proclaimed, taken his
oath, and assumed office as a Member of the HOR, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends,
and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending
before it at the time of the proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the
constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latters election, returns and
qualifications. The use of the word sole in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral
Tribunals jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.

COQUILLA VS COMELEC
COQUILLA VS COMELEC
Posted by kaye lee on 11:07 PM
G.R. No. 151914, 31 July 2002 [Citizenship; Reacquisition]

FACTS:
Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there until 1965, when he was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen
after joining the US Navy. In 1998, he came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he continued making several trips to the United States.

Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 which was approved. On November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.

On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern Samar which was approved in 2001. On February 27, 2001, he filed his
certificate of candidacy stating that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years.

Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for re-election sought to cancel Coquillas certificate of candidacy on the ground that his statement as to the two year
residency in Oras was a material misrepresentation as he only resided therein for 6 months after his oath as a citizen.

Before the COMELEC could render a decision, elections commenced and Coquilla was proclaimed the winner. On July 19, 2001, COMELEC granted Alvarez petition
and ordered the cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Coquilla had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least on year before the elections held on May 14, 2001 as what he represented in his COC.

RULING:
No. The statement in petitioners certificate of candidacy that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for two years at the time he filed such certificate is not
true. The question is whether the COMELEC was justified in ordering the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for this reason. Petitioner made a false
representation of a material fact in his certificate of candidacy, thus rendering such certificate liable to cancellation. In the case at bar, what is involved is a false
statement concerning a candidates qualification for an office for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. This is a misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the
cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy. The cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy in this case is thus fully justified.

IN RE CHING
Legal Profession Admission to the Bar Citizenship Requirement

In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law degree at the Saint Louis University in Baguio City. He eventually passed the bar but he was advised that he needs to show
proof that he is a Filipino citizen before he be allowed to take his oath. Apparently, Chings father was a Chinese citizen but his mother was a Filipino citizen. His
parents were married before he was born in 1963. Under the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate child, whose one parent is a foreigner, acquires the foreign citizenship of
the foreign parent. Ching maintained that he has always considered himself as a Filipino; that he is a certified public accountant a profession reserved for Filipinos;
that he even served as a councilor in a municipality in La Union.
The Solicitor-General commented on the case by saying that as a legitimate child of a Chinese and a Filipino, Ching should have elected Filipino citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; that under prevailing jurisprudence, upon reaching the age of majority is construed as within 7 years after reaching the age of majority
(in his case 21 years old because he was born in 1964 while the 1935 Constitution was in place).
Ching did elect Filipino citizenship but he only did so when he was preparing for the bar in 1998 or 14 years after reaching the age of majority. Nevertheless, the
Solicitor-General recommended that the rule be relaxed due to the special circumstance of Ching.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ching should be allowed to take the lawyers oath.

HELD: No. Unfortunately, he belatedly elected Filipino citizenship. The Supreme Court cannot agree with the recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Fourteen
years had lapsed and its way beyond the allowable 7 year period. The Supreme Court even noted that the period is originally 3 years but it was extended to 7 years. (It
seems it cant be extended any further). Chings special circumstances cant be considered. It is not enough that he considered all his life that he is a Filipino; that he is
a professional and a public officer (was) serving this country. The rules for citizenship are in place. Further, Ching didnt give any explanation why he belatedly chose
to elect Filipino citizenship (but I guess its simply because he never thought hes Chinese not until he applied to take the bar). The prescribed procedure in electing
Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship
and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Chings unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.

CO VS HRET
CO VS. HRET
G.R. No. 92191-92, July 30, 1991

FACTS:
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in
the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was
proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar.

The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondentalleging that Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of thePhilippines and not a resident of the
second district of Northern Samar.

The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) declared respondent Ong is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for
voting purposes.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondent is a natural born Filipino and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.
2. Whether or not the HRET committed grave abuse of authority in the exercise of its powers.
HELD:
1. The Court affirmed the decision of HRET that respondent is a natural born Filipino and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar. Therespondent traces his natural born
citizenship through his mother, not through the citizenship of his father. The citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine whether or not the respondent
chose" to be a Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up to the present, both mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have elected any
other citizenship unless he first formally renounced Philippine citizenship in favor of a foreign nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a problem of election, there
was no foreign nationality of his father which he could possibly have chosen.

2. The Court declared that HRET did not commit any grave abuse of discretion. The same issue of natural-born citizenship has already been decided by
the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and by the Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of the Constitution drafted by that Convention. Emil Ong, full blood
brother of the respondent, was declared and accepted as a natural born citizen by both bodies.
BENGSON VS HRET
Political Law Natural Born Requirement Requirements to be a Congressman
Bengson and Cruz were rivals in the 1998 elections in the 2
nd
District of Pangasinan. They were running for Congress. Cruz won by a significant margin over the
incumbent Bengson. Bengson then filed a Quo Warranto proceeding in the HRET alleging that Cruz is not a natural born citizen, as defined by law; hence he should be
disqualified from holding office. The HRET subsequently declared and affirmed Cruz as the winner. Bengson filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that Cruz was
indeed born a Filipino and he is defined under the 1935 Constitution as a natural born citizen. Cruz however lost his citizenship when he enlisted in the US Army in
1985. He also swore allegiance to the US without consent from the Philippines. Cruz, on the other hand, argued that he regained his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of RA
2630 which provides that Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United
States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Bengson insists that Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution expressly states that natural-born citizens are those who
are citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cruz is a natural-born citizen.

HELD: Petitioners contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As
correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the term natural-born citizen was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his
Philippine citizenship. In respondent Cruzs case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he
subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630. Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born
citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

MERCADO VS MANZANO
FACTS
Petitioner Mercado and respondent Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. Respondent received the highest votes
from the election but his proclamation was suspended in view of a pending petition fordisqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that respondent was not
a Filipino citizen but a US citizen.
Manzano was born in San Francisco, California, USA and acquired US citizenship by operation of the US Constitution & laws under the principle of jus soli. However,
he was also a natural born Filipino citizen as both his parents were Filipinos at the time of his birth. Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent is
both a Filipino and a US citien a dual citizen.
Under Sec.40(d) of the LGC, those holding dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective local position.
ISSUE
Whether under our laws, respondent is disqualified from the position for which he filed his CoC and is thus disqualified from holding the office for which he has been
elected.
HELD
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of 2 or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states.
Considering the citizenship clause (Art.IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens to possess dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino
fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of
their fathers country such children are citizens of the latters country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country, the former are considered
citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a
person simultaneously owes loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.
The phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160, Sec.40(d) and in RA 7854, Sec.20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, mere dual citizenship
does not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their CoC, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual
citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

GALLEGO VS VERA
GALLEGO vs. VERA
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the CFI of Leyte, which declared illegal the petitioners election to
the office of the municipal mayor of Abuyog, Leyte in the election of Dec. 1940, on the ground that he did not meet the residence qualification. Gallego is a native of
Abuyog, Leyte. After his studies, he was employed as a schoolteacher in Catarman, Samar, as well as in some municipalities in Leyte. In 1937, as a municipal mayor in
Abuyog Leyte, but lost. In June 1938, he worked in Malaybalay Bukidnon in a plantation of the Bureau of Forestry to make up for the financial drawback caused by his
loss in the previous election, and stayed there until he resigned in Sept. 1940. Gallego registered himself as an elector in Bukidnon and voted there in the election for
assemblymen held in Dec. 1938, and in Jan. 1940,
He obtained and paid for his residence cert. from the municipal treasurer of Malaybalay, in which certificate it was stated that he had resided in the said
municipality for one and a half year. The CA declared that Gallego lost his domicile in Abuyog Leyte at the time he was elected mayor there on the grounds that:
1. He regi st ered as a vot er i n Malaybalay, Buki dnon
2. He vot ed i n Malaybalay i n t he 1938 elect i on for assembl ymen
3. He obt ai ned a resi dence cert from t he muni ci pali t y of Malaybalay

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Gallego lost his domicile of origin in Abuyog, Leyte and acquired a new domicile in Malaybalay, Bukidnon.

HELD:
Yes. Gallego did not lose his domicile in Abuyog by working in Malaybalay as an employee, registering as voter there and securing his residence certificate
there for1940. The decision of the CA is reversed.
In the definition of residence in the election law under the 1935 Constitution, it states that in order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur:
1. Resi dence or a bodi l y presence i n t he new locali t y2 . An i n t e n t i o n t o r e ma i n t h e r e 3. An i nt ent i on t o abandon t he old domi ci le The
purpose to remain in the domicile should be for an INDEFINITE period of time. The court believed that Gallego had no intention to stay in Malaybalay
indefinitelybecause: 1.When he was employed as a teacher in Samar, he always returned in Abuyog and even resigned when he ran for office in 1937 2.His departure
was only for the purpose of making up for the financial drawback caused by his loss in the election3. He di d not t ake hi s wi fe and chi ldren t o Malaybalay
wi t h hi m 4. He bought a pi ece of land i n Abuyog and di d not avai l of t he land i n the plantation offered to him by the government 5.He visited his
family no less than three times despite the great distance between Abuyog, Leyte and Malaybalay Bukidnon The court said that the manifest intent of the law in fixing a
residence qualification is to:exclude a stranger or a newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an
elective office to serve that community.

ROMUALDEZ VS RTC
Facts: Philip Romualdez, the petitioner, is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, the son of the former Governor of Leyte, Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, and
nephew of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos. Sometime in the early part of 1980, the petitioner, in consonance with his decision to establish his legal residence at
Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte, caused the construction of his residential house therein. He soon thereafter also served as Barangay Captain of the place where he
voted. After the people power, petitioner left the country and fled to America for asylum. When Romualdez arrived in the Philippines in December 1991, he did not
delay his return to his residence at Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. During the registration of voters conducted by the COMELEC on February 1, 1992 for the Synchronized
National and Local Election scheduled for May 11, 1992, petitioner registered himself anew as a voter at Precinct No. 9 of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. On February 21,
1992, Donato Advincula, respondent, filed a petition with the MTC of Tolosa, Leyte, praying that Romualdez be excluded from the list of voters in Precinct No. 9 of
Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte, under BP 881 and RA 7166 alleging that Romualdez was a resident of Massachusetts, U.S.A.; that his profession and occupation was in the
U.S.A.; that he had just recently arrived in the Philippines; and that he did not have the required one-year residence in the Philippines and the six-month residence in
Tolosa to qualify him to register as a voter in Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. Romualdez contends that he has been a resident of Tolosa, Leyte, since the early 1980's,
and that he has not abandoned his said residence by his physical absence therefrom during the period from 1986 up to the third week of December 1991. After due
hearing, the Municipal Court of Tolosa, Leyte held in favor of the petitioner Advincula then appealed the case to the respondent court then it rendered the assailed
decision that the petitioner is disqualified to register as a voter for the 1992 elections and hereby reverses the decision of the lower court in toto. Hence, this recourse.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent court erred in finding the petitioner to have voluntarily left the country and abandoned his residence in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.

Held: WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, the court finds the respondent to be a resident of Brgy. Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte and qualified to register as a voter
thereat. Hence, the instant petition for exclusion of Philip G. Romualdez from the list of voter of Precinct No. 9, Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte is hereby ordered DENIED and
petition DISMISSED.
AKBAYAN VS COMELEC
Political Law Election Laws Right of Suffrage Extension of Voters Registration
On January 25, 2001, AKBAYAN-Youth, together with other youth movements sought the extension of the registration of voters for the May 2001 elections. The
voters registration has already ended on December 27, 2000. AKBAYAN-Youth asks that persons aged 18-21 be allowed a special 2-day registration. The Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) denied the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth the sued COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion for denying the petition. AKBAYAN-
Youth alleged that there are about 4 million youth who were not able to register and are now disenfranchised. COMELEC invoked Section 8 of Republic Act 8189
which provides that no registration shall be conducted 120 days before the regular election. AKBAYAN-Youth however counters that under Section 28 of Republic Act
8436, the COMELEC in the exercise of its residual and stand-by powers, can reset the periods of pre-election acts including voters registration if the original period is
not observed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC exercised grave abuse of discretion when it denied the extension of the voters registration.
HELD: No. The COMELEC was well within its right to do so pursuant to the clear provisions of Section 8, RA 8189 which provides that no voters registration shall be
conducted within 120 days before the regular election. The right of suffrage is not absolute. It is regulated by measures like voters registration which is not a mere
statutory requirement. The State, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voters registration for the
ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election activities could be performed
by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner one which is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the
prevalent circumstances of the times. RA 8189 prevails over RA 8436 in that RA 8189s provision is explicit as to the prohibition. Suffice it to say that it is a pre-
election act that cannot be reset.
Further, even if what is asked is a mere two-day special registration, COMELEC has shown in its pleadings that if it is allowed, it will substantially create a setback in
the other pre-election matters because the additional voters from the special two day registration will have to be screened, entered into the book of voters, have to be
inspected again, verified, sealed, then entered into the computerized voters list; and then they will have to reprint the voters information sheet for the update and
distribute it by that time, the May 14, 2001 elections would have been overshot because of the lengthy processes after the special registration. In short, it will cost
more inconvenience than good. Further still, the allegation that youth voters are disenfranchised is not sufficient. Nowhere in AKBAYAN-Youths pleading was
attached any actual complaint from an individual youth voter about any inconvenience arising from the fact that the voters registration has ended on December 27,
2001. Also, AKBAYAN-Youth et al admitted in their pleading that they are asking an extension because they failed to register on time for some reasons, which is not
appealing to the court. The law aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights.

CENIZA VS COMELEC
Equal Protection Gerrymandering
**Gerrymandering is a term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power. **
Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC adopted Resolution No. 1421 which effectively bars voters in chartered cities (unless otherwise provided
by their charter), highly urbanized (those earning above P40 M) cities, and component cities (whose charters prohibit them) from voting in provincial elections. The
City of Mandaue, on the other hand, is a component city NOT a chartered one or a highly urbanized one. So when COMELEC added Mandaue to the list of 20 cities
that cannot vote in provincial elections, Ceniza, in behalf of the other members of DOERS (Democracy or Extinction: Resolved to Succeed) questioned the
constitutionality of BB 51 and the COMELEC resolution. They said that the regulation/restriction of voting being imposed is a curtailment of the right to suffrage.
Further, petitioners claim that political and gerrymandering motives were behind the passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the Charter of Mandaue City. They
contend that the Province of Cebu is politically and historically known as an opposition bailiwick and of the total 952,716 registered voters in the province, close to
one-third (1/3) of the entire province of Cebu would be barred from voting for the provincial officials of the province of Cebu. Ceniza also said that the constituents of
Mandaue never ratified their charter. Ceniza likewise aver that Sec 3 of BB 885 insofar as it classifies cities including Cebu City as highly urbanized as the only basis
for not allowing its electorate to vote for the provincial officials is inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such classification is not based on substantial
distinctions germane to the purpose of the law which in effect provides for and regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage, and therefore such unreasonable
classification amounts to a denial of equal protection.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection.
HELD: The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of local government units. In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is stated
that The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities. The petitioners
allegation of gerrymandering is of no merit, it has no factual or legal basis. The Constitutional requirement that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of
the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to the approval by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or
units affected is a new requirement that came into being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective in character and therefore cannot affect the creation of the
City of Mandaue which came into existence on 21 June 1969.
The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis of their regular annual income is based upon substantial distinction. The
revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a relatively independent social, economic, and political unit. It would also
show whether the city has sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the province where it is geographically situated. Cities with
smaller income need the continued support of the provincial government thus justifying the continued participation of the voters in the election of provincial officials in
some instances.
The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal protection of the law since the voters in other component cities are allowed to vote for
provincial officials. The contention is without merit. The practice of allowing voters in one component city to vote for provincial officials and denying the same
privilege to voters in another component city is a matter of legislative discretion which violates neither the Constitution nor the voters right of suffrage.

MACALINTAL VS COMELEC
Political Law Election Laws Absentee Voters Act Proclamation of Winners in a National Elections
Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the said
act on the following grounds, among others:
1. That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be allowed to participate in absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit stating his
intent to return to the Philippines is void because it dispenses of the requirement that a voter must be a resident of the Philippines for at least one year and in the place
where he intends to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election;
2. That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of
winning candidates for president and vice-president, is unconstitutional because it violates the Constitution for it is Congress which is empowered to do so.

ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintals arguments are correct.

HELD: No.
1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically reside in the Philippines within the period required for non-absentee voters. Further, as
understood in election laws, domicile and resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws is concerned). The
domicile is the place where one has the intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is considered a
resident of the Philippines for purposes of being qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the immigrant does not execute the affidavit then he is not qualified
as an absentee voter.
2. The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of Congress to allow COMELEC to include the proclamation of the winners in the vice-
presidential and presidential race. To interpret it that way would mean that Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power. The canvassing and proclamation of the
presidential and vice presidential elections is still lodged in Congress and was in no way transferred to the COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.

CAASI VS CA
Merito Miguel was elected as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan in the local elections of January 18, 1988. His disqualification, however, was sought by Mateo Caasi on the
ground that under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code Miguel was not qualified because he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the USA and not
of Bolinao. Sec. 48 provides: permanent resident of the USA and not of

Sec. 68. Disqualifications - Any person who is a permanentresident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under
this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residencerequirement provided for in
the election laws.

Miguel admitted that he holds a green card, but he denied that he is a permanentresident of the United States. He argued that he obtained the green card for convenience
in order that he may freely enter the United States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is apermanent resident of
Bolinao, Pangasinan and that he voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on February 2, 1987 for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and the
congressional elections on May 18, 1987.

After hearing, the Comelec dismissed the petition. It held that the possession of a green card by the respondent Miguel does not sufficiently establish that he has
abandoned his residence in the Philippines.

Issue: Whether a green card is proof that the holder thereof is a permanentresident of the United States such that it would disqualify him to run for any
elective local position.

Held: Yes. Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status areconclusive
proof that he is a permanent resident of the United States. In the"Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting
and submitted to the US Embassy in Manila before his departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein regarding his "Length of
intended stay (if permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer was, "Permanently." On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the US Department of Justice
and Immigration and Registration Service to Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. On the back of the card, the upper portion, the
following information is printed: Alien Registration Receipt Card. Person identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and work in the United States.

Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. He did
not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there. He entered the US with the intention to live there permanently as evidenced by his application
for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa.


Issue: Whether Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987 and presenting himself as a candidate for mayor of Bolinao in the January 18, 1988
local elections, waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States

Held: No. To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as
a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself
constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts
independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective office."

Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is
a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it.
Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor
of Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988, the conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office.


Issue: Whether or not Miguel is disqualified from office.

Held: Yes. Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves that he is apermanent resident or immigrant it of the United States, but the records of this case are
starkly bare of proof that he had waived his status as such before he ran for election as municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18, 1988. We, therefore, hold that he was
disqualified to become a candidate for that office. Hence, his election was null and void.
Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy is one of the
qualifications that a candidate for elective public office must possess. Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a permanent resident of the United States
and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran formayor of that
municipality on January 18, 1988.

In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanentresidents or immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a
clear policy of excluding from the right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who possess dual loyalties and allegiance. The law has reserved that
privilege for its citizens who have cast their lot with our country "without mental reservations or purpose of evasion." The assumption is that those who are resident
aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such entire devotion to the interest and welfare of their homeland for with one eye on their public duties here, they must
keep another eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign country of their choice in order to preserve their status as permanent residents thereof.

Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an
immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law" is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of the United
States before he was elected to public office, not "during his tenure" asmayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan. (G.R. No. 88831 November 8, 1990)

NICOLAS-LEWIS VS COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003. Long before
the May 2004 national and local elections, petitioners sought registration and certification as "overseas absentee voter" only to be advised by the Philippine Embassy in
the United States that, per a COMELEC letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs dated September 23, 2003, they have yet no right to vote in such elections owing to
their lack of the one-year residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution.
Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004 electionsowing to the COMELEC's refusal to include them in the National Registry of Absentee
Voters, petitioner Nicolas-Lewis et al., filed on April 1, 2004 a petition for certiorari and mandamus, praying that they and others who retained or reacquired
Philippine citizenship under No. 9225, be allowed to avail themselves of the mechanism provided under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189) and
that the COMELEC accordingly be ordered to allow them to vote andregister as absentee voters under the aegis of R.A. 9189.
On April 30, 2004 (a little over a week before Election Day), COMELEC filed a Comment praying for the denial of the petition. Consequently, petitioners were not
able to register let alone vote in said elections.
On May 20, 2004, the OSG filed a Manifestation (in Lieu of Comment) stating that all qualified overseas Filipinos, including dual citizens who care to exercise the
right of suffrage, may do so, observing, however, that the conclusion of the 2004 elections had rendered the petition moot and academic.
Issues:
1. Must the Supreme Court still resolve said petition considering that under the circumstances the same has already been rendered moot and academic?
2. WON dual citizens may exercise their right to suffrage as absentee voters even short of the 1-yr residency requirement.
Held:

1. Yes. The holding of the 2004 elections had indeed rendered the petition moot and academic, but only insofar as petitioners participation in such political exercise is
concerned. The broader and transcendental issue tendered in the petition is the propriety of allowing dual citizens to participate and vote as absentee voter in
future elections, which however, remains unresolved.
2. Yes. We start off with Sections 1 and 2 of Article V of the Constitution, respectively reading as follows:

SEC 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided
in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. xxx.

SEC 2. The Congress shall provide a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.

In a nutshell, the aforequoted Section 1 prescribes residency requirement as a general eligibility factor for the right to vote. On the other hand, Section 2 authorizes
Congress to devise a system wherein an absentee may vote, implying that a non-resident may, as an exception to the residency prescription in the preceding section, be
allowed to vote.
In response to its above mandate, Congress enacted R.A. 9189 - the OAVL - identifying in its Section 4 who can vote under it and in the following section who cannot.

Soon after Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 passed the test of constitutionality, Congress enacted R.A. 9225 the relevant portion of which reads:

SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and
be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet therequirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise
known as The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and other existing laws; xxx

There is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they
can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that duals are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the
same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as
possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residencyrequirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.

Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is
that "duals" may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters. R.A. 9189 defines the terms adverted to in the
following wise:
Absentee Voting refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad exercise their right to vote;
Overseas Absentee Voter refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to register and vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on
the day of elections;
While perhaps not determinative of the issue tendered herein, we note that the expanded thrust of R.A. 9189 extends also to what might be tag as the next
generation of "duals". This may be deduced from the inclusion of theprovision on derivative citizenship in R.A. 9225 which reads:

SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire
Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines.

It is very likely that a considerable number of those unmarried children below eighteen (18) years of age had never set foot in the Philippines. Now then,
if the next generation of "duals" may nonetheless avail themselves the right to enjoy full civil and political rights under Section 5 of the Act, then there is neither no
rhyme nor reason why the petitioners and other present day "duals," provided they meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of theConstitution in relation to
R.A. 9189, be denied the right of suffrage as an overseas absentee voter. Congress could not have plausibly intended such absurd situation.