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WESTWIND VS UCPB

On August 23, 1993, Kinsho-Mataichi Corporation shipped from the port of Kobe,
Japan, 197 metal containers/skids of tin-free steel for delivery to the consignee, San
Miguel Corporation (SMC). The shipment, covered by Bill of Lading No. KBMA1074,4 was loaded and received clean on board M/V Golden Harvest Voyage No. 66,
a vessel owned and operated by Westwind Shipping Corporation (Westwind).
SMC insured the cargoes against all risks with UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc.
(UCPB) for US Dollars: One Hundred Eighty-Four Thousand Seven Hundred NinetyEight and Ninety-Seven Centavos (US$184,798.97), which, at the time, was
equivalent to Philippine Pesos: Six Million Two Hundred Nine Thousand Two Hundred
Forty-Five and Twenty-Eight Centavos (P6,209,245.28).
The shipment arrived in Manila, Philippines on August 31, 1993 and was discharged
in the custody of the arrastre operator, Asian Terminals, Inc. (ATI), formerly Marina
Port Services, Inc.5 During the unloading operation, however, six containers/skids
worth Philippine Pesos: One Hundred Seventeen Thousand Ninety-Three and Twelve
Centavos (P117,093.12) sustained dents and punctures from the forklift used by the
stevedores of Ocean Terminal Services, Inc. (OTSI) in centering and shuttling the
containers/skids. As a consequence, the local ship agent of the vessel, Baliwag
Shipping Agency, Inc., issued two Bad Order Cargo Receipt dated September 1,
1993.
On September 7, 1993, Orient Freight International, Inc. (OFII), the customs broker
of SMC, withdrew from ATI the 197 containers/skids, including the six in damaged
condition, and delivered the same at SMCs warehouse in Calamba, Laguna through
J.B. Limcaoco Trucking (JBL). It was discovered upon discharge that additional nine
containers/skids valued at Philippine Pesos: One Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Six
Hundred Thirty-Nine and Sixty-Eight Centavos (P175,639.68) were also damaged
due to the forklift operations; thus, making the total number of 15 containers/skids
in bad order.
Almost a year after, on August 15, 1994, SMC filed a claim against UCPB, Westwind,
ATI, and OFII to recover the amount corresponding to the damaged 15
containers/skids. When UCPB paid the total sum of Philippine Pesos: Two Hundred
Ninety-Two Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty-Two and Eighty Centavos (P292,732.80),
SMC signed the subrogation receipt. Thereafter, in the exercise of its right of
subrogation, UCPB instituted on August 30, 1994 a complaint for damages against
Westwind, ATI, and OFII.
After trial, the RTC dismissed UCPBs complaint and the counterclaims of Westwind,
ATI, and OFII. It ruled that the right, if any, against ATI already prescribed based on
the stipulation in the 16 Cargo Gate Passes issued, as well as the doctrine laid down
in International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v. Prudential Guarantee &
Assurance Co. Inc.7 that a claim for reimbursement for damaged goods must be
filed within 15 days from the date of consignees knowledge. With respect to

Westwind, even if the action against it is not yet barred by prescription, conformably
with Section 3 (6) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) and Our rulings in
E.E. Elser, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.8 and Belgian Overseas Chartering
and Shipping N.V. v. Phil. First Insurance Co., Inc.,9 the court a quo still opined that
Westwind is not liable, since the discharging of the cargoes were done by ATI
personnel using forklifts and that there was no allegation that it (Westwind) had a
hand in the conduct of the stevedoring operations. Finally, the trial court likewise
absolved OFII from any liability, reasoning that it never undertook the operation of
the forklifts which caused the dents and punctures, and that it merely facilitated the
release and delivery of the shipment as the customs broker and representative of
SMC.
Article 1732 does not distinguish between one whose principal business activity is
the carrying of goods and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity.
The contention, therefore, of petitioner that it is not a common carrier but a
customs broker whose principal function is to prepare the correct customs
declaration and proper shipping documents as required by law is bereft of merit. It
suffices that petitioner undertakes to deliver the goods for pecuniary consideration.
And in Calvo v. UCPB General Insurance Co. Inc., this Court held that as the
transportation of goods is an integral part of a customs broker, the customs broker
is also a common carrier. For to declare otherwise "would be to deprive those with
whom [it] contracts the protection which the law affords them notwithstanding the
fact that the obligation to carry goods for [its] customers, is part and parcel of
petitioners business."
That OFII is a common carrier is buttressed by the testimony of its own witness, Mr.
Loveric Panganiban Cueto, that part of the services it offers to clients is cargo
forwarding, which includes the delivery of the shipment to the consignee. Thus, for
undertaking the transport of cargoes from ATI to SMCs warehouse in Calamba,
Laguna, OFII is considered a common carrier. As long as a person or corporation
holds itself to the public for the purpose of transporting goods as a business, it is
already considered a common carrier regardless of whether it owns the vehicle to
be used or has to actually hire one.
As a common carrier, OFII is mandated to observe, under Article 1733 of the Civil
Code, extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods it transports according
to the peculiar circumstances of each case. In the event that the goods are lost,
destroyed or deteriorated, it is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently unless it proves that it observed extraordinary diligence. In the case at
bar it was established that except for the six containers/skids already damaged OFII
received the cargoes from ATI in good order and condition; and that upon its
delivery to SMC additional nine containers/skids were found to be in bad order as
noted in the Delivery Receipts issued by OFII and as indicated in the Report of Cares
Marine Cargo Surveyors. Instead of merely excusing itself from liability by putting
the blame to ATI and SMC it is incumbent upon OFII to prove that it actively took

care of the goods by exercising extraordinary diligence in the carriage thereof. It


failed to do so. Hence its presumed negligence under Article 1735 of the Civil Code
remains unrebutted.
WHEREFORE, premises considered the petitions of Westwind and OFII in G.R. Nos.
200289 and 200314 respectively are DENIED. The September 13 2011 Decision and
January 19 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86752 which
reversed and set aside the January 27 2006 Decision of the Manila City Regional
Trial Court Branch 30 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

ABOITIZ VS CA
Facts: Anacleto Viana was a passenger of M/V Antonia bound for Manila which was
owned
by
defendant
Aboitiz.
After
the
said
vessel
has
landed,
the Pioneer Stevedoring Corp., as the arrastre operator, took over the exclusive
control of the cargoes loaded on it. One hourafter the passengers had
disembarked, Pioneer Stevedoring started operation by unloading the cargoes using
its crane. Viana who had already disembarked remembered that some of his
cargoes were still inside the vessel. While pointing to the crew of the vessel the
placewhere his cargoes were, the crane hit him, pinning him between the side of
the vessel and the crane which resulted to his death. Vianas wife filed a complaint
for damages against Aboitiz for breach of contract f carriage. Aboitiz, however filed
a third party complaint against Pioneer since it had control completely over the
vessel during the incident. Furthermore, petitioner contends that one hourhas
already elapsed from the time Viana disembarked, thus he has already ceased to be
a passenger.
Issue: Whether or not Aboitiz is liable for the death of Viana.
Held: The Supreme Court held that the failure of Aboitiz to exercise extraordinary
diligence for the safety of its passengers makes Aboitiz liable. It has been
recognized as a rule that the relation of the carrier and passenger does not cease
the moment the passenger alights from the carriers vehicle, but continues until
the passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the
carriers premises. A reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be
determined from all the circumstances. The primary factor to be considered is the
existence of a reasonable cause as will justify the presence of the victim on or near
the petitioners vessel. In the caseat bar, such justifiable cause exists because he
had to come back for his cargo. Aboitiz has failed to safeguard its passenger with
extraordinary diligence in requiring or seeing to it that precautionary measures were
strictly and actually enforced to subserve their purpose of preventing entry into a
forbidden area.

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