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1. Crescent v. M/V Lok Maheshwari 474 S 623

2. Laureano v. CA 324 S 414
3. EDI-Staffbuilders Int'l v. NLRC 537 S 409
4. Duetsche v. CA 585 S 150
5. Yao Kee v Sy-Gonzales 167 S 736
6. Wildvalley v. CA 342 S 213
7. Philippine Comm. & Indus. Bank v. Escolin 56 S 266
8. In re: Estate of Johnson 39 P 156
9. Zalamea v. CA 228 S 27
10. Miciano v. Brimo 50 P 587
11. Suntay v Suntay 95 P 500
12. Pakistan Int'l Airlines Corp. v. Ople 190 S 90


1. Crescent v. M/V Lok Maheshwari 474 S 623

FACTS:

Respondent M/V "Lok Maheshwari" (Vessel) is an oceangoing vessel of Indian registry that
is owned by respondent Shipping Corporation of India (SCI), a corporation organized and
existing under the laws of India and principally owned by the Government of India. It was
time-chartered by respondent SCI to Halla Merchant Marine Co. Ltd. (Halla), a South
Korean company. Halla, in turn, sub-chartered the Vessel through a time charter to
Transmar Shipping, Inc. (Transmar). Transmar further sub-chartered the Vessel to
Portserv Limited (Portserv). Both Transmar and Portserv are corporations organized and
existing under the laws of Canada.

On or about November 1, 1995, Portserv requested petitioner Crescent Petroleum, Ltd.
(Crescent), a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Canada that is
engaged in the business of selling petroleum and oil products for the use and operation of
oceangoing vessels, to deliver marine fuel oils (bunker fuels) to the Vessel. Petitioner
Crescent granted and confirmed the request through an advice via facsimile dated
November 2, 1995. As security for the payment of the bunker fuels and related services,
petitioner Crescent received two (2) checks in the amounts of US$100,000.00 and
US$200,000.00. Thus, petitioner Crescent contracted with its supplier, Marine Petrobulk
Limited (Marine Petrobulk), another Canadian corporation, for the physical delivery of the
bunker fuels to the Vessel.

On or about November 4, 1995, Marine Petrobulk delivered the bunker fuels amounting to
US$103,544 inclusive of barging and demurrage charges to the Vessel at the port of
Pioneer Grain, Vancouver, Canada. The Chief Engineer Officer of the Vessel duly
acknowledged and received the delivery receipt. Marine Petrobulk issued an invoice to
petitioner Crescent for the US$101,400.00 worth of the bunker fuels. Petitioner Crescent
issued a check for the same amount in favor of Marine Petrobulk, which check was duly
encashed.

Having paid Marine Petrobulk, petitioner Crescent issued a revised invoice dated
November 21, 1995 to "Portserv Limited, and/or the Master, and/or Owners, and/or
Operators, and/or Charterers of M/V Lok Maheshwari" in the amount of US$103,544.00
with instruction to remit the amount on or before December 1, 1995. The period lapsed
and several demands were made but no payment was received. Also, the checks issued to
petitioner Crescent as security for the payment of the bunker fuels were dishonored for
insufficiency of funds. As a consequence, petitioner Crescent incurred additional expenses
of US$8,572.61 for interest, tracking fees, and legal fees.

On May 2, 1996, while the Vessel was docked at the port of Cebu City, petitioner Crescent
instituted before the RTC of Cebu City an action "for a sum of money with prayer for
temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary attachment" against respondents
Vessel and SCI, Portserv and/or Transmar.
On May 3, 1996, the trial court issued a writ of attachment against the Vessel with bond
at P2,710,000.00. Petitioner Crescent withdrew its prayer for a temporary restraining
order and posted the required bond.

On May 18, 1996, summonses were served to respondents Vessel and SCI, and Portserv
and/or Transmar through the Master of the Vessel. On May 28, 1996, respondents Vessel
and SCI, through Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation (Pioneer), filed an urgent ex-
parte motion to approve Pioneers letter of undertaking, to consider it as counter-bond
and to discharge the attachment. On May 29, 1996, the trial court granted the motion;
thus, the letter of undertaking was approved as counter-bond to discharge the
attachment.

ISSUE:

Whether the Philippine court has or will exercise jurisdiction and entitled to maritime lien
under our laws on foreign vessel docked on Philippine port and supplies furnished to a
vessel in a foreign port?

RULING:

In a suit to establish and enforce a maritime lien for supplies furnished to a vessel in a
foreign port, whether such lien exists, or whether the court has or will exercise
jurisdiction, depends on the law of the country where the supplies were furnished, which
must be pleaded and proved.

The Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis trilogy of cases, which replaced such single-factor
methodologies as the law of the place of supply. The multiple-contact test to determine,
in the absence of a specific Congressional directive as to the statutes reach, which
jurisdictions law should be applied. The following factors were considered: (1) place of
the wrongful act; (2) law of the flag; (3) allegiance or domicile of the injured; (4)
allegiance of the defendant shipowner; (5) place of contract; (6) inaccessibility of foreign
forum; and (7) law of the forum. This is applicable not only to personal injury claims
arising under the Jones Act but to all matters arising under maritime law in general

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The Court cannot sustain petitioner Crescents insistence on the application of P.D. No.
1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 and hold that a maritime lien exists. Out of the
seven basic factors listed in the case of Lauritzen, Philippine law only falls under one the
law of the forum. All other elements are foreign Canada is the place of the wrongful act,
of the allegiance or domicile of the injured and the place of contract; India is the law of
the flag and the allegiance of the defendant shipowner. Applying P.D. No. 1521,a
maritime lien exists would not promote the public policy behind the enactment of the law
to develop the domestic shipping industry. Opening up our courts to foreign suppliers by
granting them a maritime lien under our laws even if they are not entitled to a maritime
lien under their laws will encourage forum shopping. In light of the interests of the various
foreign elements involved, it is clear that Canada has the most significant interest in this
dispute. The injured party is a Canadian corporation, the sub-charterer which placed the
orders for the supplies is also Canadian, the entity which physically delivered the bunker
fuels is in Canada, the place of contracting and negotiation is in Canada, and the supplies
were delivered in Canada.

2. Laureano v. CA 324 S 414

In 1978, Menandro Laureano was hired as a pilot by the Singapore Airlines Limited (SAL).
In 1982 however, SAL was hit by recession and so it had to lay off some employees.
Laureano was one of them. Laureano asked for reconsideration but it was not granted.
Aggrieved, Laureano filed a labor case for illegal dismissal against SAL. But in 1987, he
withdrew the labor case and instead filed a civil case for damages due to illegal
termination of contract against SAL. Laureano filed the case here in the Philippines. SAL
moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The motion was
denied. On trial, SAL alleged that the termination of Laureano is valid pursuant to
Singaporean law.

The trial court ruled in favor of Laureano. SAL appealed the case raising the issue of lack
of jurisdiction, non applicability of Philippine laws, and estoppel, among others. The Court
of Appeals reversed the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Singaporean Law is applicable to this case.

HELD:

No.

The specific Singaporean Law which holds valid the dismissal of Laureano is not proved in
court. As such, the trial court cannot make a determination if the termination is indeed
valid under Singaporean Law. Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of
Singapore. SAL has the burden of proof. SAL failed to prove such law hence Philippine law
shall apply. However, the case must be dismissed on the ground of estoppel. Under our
laws, all money claims arising from employer-employee relationships must be filed within
three years from the time the cause of action accrued. Laureanos cause of action accrued
in 1982 when he was terminated but he only filed the money claim in 1987 or more than
three years from 1982. Hence he is already barred by prescription.
5. Yao Kee v Sy-Gonzales 167 S 736

Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 leaving behind properties here in
the Philippines.

Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales et al filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration
alleging that they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego. The petition was
opposed by Yao Kee et al alleging that Yao Kee is the lawful wife of the deceased whom
he married in China. The trial court rendered decision in favor of the opposition. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, modifying the decision declaring the
marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee as not has been proven valid in accordance with the laws
of China.

Hence, both parties moved for reconsideration to which the Supreme Court granted.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat is valid in accordance with Philippine
laws.

HELD:
Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proven as any other fact. To
establish the validity of marriage, the existence of foreign law as a question of fact and
the alleged marriage must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
For failure to prove the foreign law or custom and consequently of the marriage, the
marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat in China cannot be recognized in the jurisdiction of
Philippine courts.

6. Wildvalley v. CA 342 S 213

Facts:

The Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by Philippine President Lines, Inc., private
respondent herein, arrived in Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, to load iron ore. Upon the
completion of the loading and when the vessel was ready to leave port, an official pilot of
Venezuela, was designated by the harbour authorities in Puerto Ordaz to navigate the
Philippine Roxas through the Orinoco River. The Philippine Roxas experienced some
vibrations when it entered the San Roque Channel. The vessel proceeded on its way, with
the pilot assuring the watch officer that the vibration was a result of the shallowness of
the channel. The master (captain) checked the position of the vessel and verified that it
was in the centre of the channel. The Philippine Roxas ran around in the Orinoco River,
thus obstructing the ingress and egress of vessels. As a result of the blockage, the
Malandrinon, a vessel owned by herein petitioner Wild valley Shipping Company, Ltd., was
unable to sail out of Puerto Ordaz on that day. Subsequently, Wild valley Shipping
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Company, Ltd. filed a suit with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch III against
Philippine President Lines, Inc. and Pioneer Insurance Company (the underwriter/insurer
of Philippine Roxas) for damages in the form of unearned profits, and interest thereon
amounting to US $400,000.00plus attorney's fees, costs, and expenses of litigation.

Issue:
Whether or not Venezuelan law is applicable to the case at bar?

Ruling:
It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our
courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be
alleged and proved. For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the
following requisites are mandatory:

(1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy;
(2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with
the seal of his office.

The latter requirement is not a mere technicality but is intended to justify the giving of full
faith and credit to the genuineness of a document in a foreign country. With respect to
proof of written laws, parol proof is objectionable, for the written law itself is the best
evidence. According to the weight of authority, when a foreign statute is involved, the
best evidence rule requires that it be proved by a duly authenticated copy of the statute.
At this juncture, we have to point out that the Venezuelan law was not pleaded before the
lower court.

A foreign law is considered to be pleaded if there is an allegation in the pleading about
the existence of the foreign law, its import and legal consequence on the event or
transaction in issue.

A review of the Complaint revealed that it was never alleged or invoked despite the fact
that the grounding of the M/V Philippine Roxas occurred within the territorial jurisdiction
of Venezuela. We reiterate that under the rules of private international law, a foreign law
must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. In the absence of pleading and proof, the
laws of a foreign country, or state, will be presumed to be the same as our own local or
domestic law and this is known as processual presumption.

7. Philippine Comm. & Indus. Bank v. Escolin 56 S 266

Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles
Newton Hodges, vs. Hon. Venicio Escolin (CFI-Iloilo) and Avelina A. Magno; Testate Estate
of the late Linnie Jane Hodges. Testate Estate of the late Charles Newton Hodges. PCIB,
administrator-appellant, vs. Lorenzo Carles, Jose Pablico, Alfredo Catedral, Salvador
Guzman, Belcesar Causing, Florenia Barrido, Purificacion Coronado, Graciano Lucero,
Ariteo Thomas Jamir, Melquiades Batisanan, Pepito Iyulores, Esperidion Partisala,
Winifredo Espada, Rosario Alingasa, Adelfa Premaylon, Santiago Pacaonsis, and Avelina A.
Magno, appellees, Western Institute of Technology, Inc., movant-appellee
March 29, 1974; Barredo, J.
*This case has the length of a PIL case. Court admitted several times that it was clueless
as to some facts so it copied into the decision entire pleadings. (!!!) Plus, PCIB raised 78
assignment of errors! Well probably read the case again in Spec Pro.

Short version: The Hodges lived in the Philippines for almost half a century and died
leaving substantial properties in Iloilo and in the US. The missus died 5 years before the
husband, providing in her will that while her estate would go to him, upon his death, the
remainder should pass to her siblings. (They were childless.) The court held that this
testamentary provision, while probably ineffectual as a substitution under the Civil Code,
is not actually a substitution, but is a valid and simultaneous institution of heirs, though
the passing of title to the inheritance to the others (the siblings) was made to depend on
a resolutory condition (the husbands death). Case was remanded to the trial court for the
determination of the proper application of the renvoi principle (conflict of laws between
Philippines and Texas law), and the proper distribution of Linnies, Charles, and their
conjugal estates.

Facts:
Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges were originally from Texas, USA. During
their marriage, they had acquired and accumulated considerable assets and properties in
the Philippines and in Oklahoma and Texas in the US. They both lived, worked and were
domiciled in Iloilo City for around 50 years. Before her death, Linnie Jane executed a will
leaving her estate, less her debts and funeral expenses, to her husband Charles. Should
Charles die, the will provided that the remainder of her estate go to her brothers and
sisters, share and share alike. Should any of the brothers and sisters die before the
husband, Linnie willed that the heirs of the said sibling be substituted in the deceaseds
siblings place.

When Linnie died, Charles took the will to probate court, and was appointed Executor,
then later, Special Administrator. He moved to be allowed to continue administering the
family business, as per Linnie Janes wishes, and to engage in sales, conveyances, leases,
mortgages and other necessary transactions. He also filed the necessary and appurtenant
administration/accounting records, and income tax returns for the estate. Charles named
seven brothers and sisters of Linnie Jane as her heirs (Esta, Emma, Leonard, Aline, David,
Sadie, Era and Nimroy), but the order admitting the will to probate unfortunately omitted
one of the heirs, Roy (Nimroy?) Higdon, so Charles filed a verified motion to have Roys
name included.

As an executor, he was bound to file tax returns for the estate he was administering
under American law. He did file such as estate tax return on August 8, 1958. In Schedule
"M" of such return, he answered "Yes" to the question as to whether he was
contemplating "renouncing the will". On the question as to what property interests passed
to him as the surviving spouse, he answered:
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None, except for purposes of administering the Estate, paying debts, taxes and
other legal charges. It is the intention of the surviving husband of deceased to
distribute the remaining property and interests of the deceased in their
Community estate to the devisees and legatees named in the will when the
debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration are finally determined
and paid.

Charles died in Iloilo in December 1962 without having liquidated Linnies estate, which
includes her share in the conjugal partnership. A longtime employee of the Hodges,
Avelina Magno, was appointed Administratrix (for Linnies estate) and a Special
Administratrix (for Charles). Magno was appointed, but later Harold Davies
(representative of Charles heirs in the US) was designated Co-Special Administrator, who
was then replaced by one Joe Hodges, Charles nephew. One Atty. Mirasol was also
appointed as co-administrator, and an order of probate and letters of administration were
issued to Hodges and Mirasol.

At this point, the SC was already very much confused about the gaps in the facts,
convinced that the parties representing both estates had cooked up a modus operandi to
settle money matters (a settlement with records the Court never saw)which, however,
went awry, with more and more heirs from the US flocking to the Iloilo shores, and
lawyers (Ozaetas! Mabantas! Manglapuses!) filing their respective claims for retainer fees.
Much much later, PCIB became the administrator of Charles estate, asserting a claim to
all of his estate, including those properties/assets that passed to him upon Linnie Janes
death. Avelina naturally opposed this, as Linnie Janes other heirs (the HIGDONS) would
be prejudiced, so she continued acting in her capacity as administrator (entering into sales
and other such conveyances). For these acts, the PCIB dismissed her as an employee of
Charles estate, to which she responded by locking up the premises being used by PCIB as
offices, which were among the estates properties.

PCIBs Claims
Linnie Janes will should be governed by Philippine Law, with respect to the order of
succession, the amount of successional rights, and the intrinsic validity of its testamentary
provisions.
Linnie intended Philippine laws to govern her Will.
Article 16, CC, provides that "the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found", shall prevail.
However, the Conflict of Law of Texas, which is the "national law" of the
testatrix, Linnie Jane Hodges, provide that the domiciliary law (Philippine law)
should govern the testamentary dispositions and successional rights over
movables, and the law of the situs of the property (also Philippine law as to
properties located in the Philippines) as regards immovables.
Thus applying the "Renvoi Doctrine", as approved and applied in the
Christensen case (1963), Philippine law should apply.
Under Philippine and Texas law, the conjugal or community estate of spouses
shall, upon dissolution, be divided equally between them. Thus, upon Linnies
death, of the entirety of the assets of the Hodges spouses constituting their
conjugal estate pertained automatically to Charles, not by way of inheritance,
but in his own right as partner in the conjugal partnership.
The other one-half (1/2) portion forming part of Linnies estate, cannot, under a
clear and specific provision of her Will, be enhanced or increased by income,
earnings, rents, or emoluments accruing after her death. All rents, emoluments
and income from said estate shall belong to him (C. N. Hodges) and he is
further authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as he may need
or desire."
Articles 900, 995 and 1001 provide that the surviving spouse of a deceased
leaving no ascendants or descendants is entitled, as a matter of right and by
way of irrevocable legitime, to at least one-half (1/2) of the estate of the
deceased, and no testamentary disposition by the deceased can legally and
validly affect this right of the surviving spouse. In fact, her husband is entitled
to said one-half (1/2) portion of her estate by way of legitime. (Article 886)
Clearly, therefore, immediately upon the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, C. N.
Hodges was the owner of at least 3/4 or 75% percent of all of the conjugal
assets of the spouses, 50% by way of conjugal partnership share and 1/4 or
25% by way of inheritance and legitime) plus all "rents, emoluments and
income" accruing to said conjugal estate from the moment of Linnie Jane
Hodges' death.
In his capacity as sole heir and successor to Linnies estate, Charles
appropriated to himself the entirety of her estate. He operated all the assets,
engaged in business and performed all acts in connection with the entirety of
the conjugal estate, in his own name alone, just as he had been operating,
engaging and doing while the late Linnie Jane Hodges was still alive. Upon his
death on December 25, 1962, therefore, all said conjugal assets were in his sole
possession and control, and registered in his name alone, not as executor, but
as exclusive owner of all said assets.
As the sole and exclusive heir, Charles did not need to liquidate the estate.
Neither was there any asset left to Linnies estate at the time of Charles death,
though Linnies estate may have referred to all of the rest, residue and
remainder of my estate which would go to her siblings in the event of Charles
death. The provision is thus void and invalid at least as to Philippine assets.
There are generally only two kinds of substitution provided for and authorized
by our Civil Code (Articles 857-870), namely, (1) simple or
common substitution, sometimes referred to as vulgar substitution (Article 859),
and (2) fideicommissary substitution (Article 863). All other substitutions are
merely variations of these. The substitution provided for by paragraph four of
the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges is not fideicommissary substitution, because
there is clearly no obligation on the part of C. N. Hodges as the first heir
designated, to preserve the properties for the substitute heirs. At most, it is
a vulgar or simple substitution. However, in order that
a vulgar orsimple substitution can be valid, three alternative conditions must be
present, namely, that the first designated heir (1) should die before the
testator; or (2) should not wish to accept the inheritance; or (3) should be
incapacitated to do so. None of these conditions apply to C. N. Hodges, and,
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therefore, the substitution provided for by the above-quoted provision of the
Will is not authorized by the Code, and, therefore, it is void. Manresa even said,
when another heir is designated to inherit upon the death of a first heir, the
second designation can have effect only in case the first instituted heir dies
before the testator, whether or not that was the true intention of said testator.
The remedy of the Higdons, then, who are claiming dubious rights to of the
conjugal estate of the Hodges, is to file a claim against the estate of Charles.
It also follows that the conveyances executed by Avelina, claiming to be merely
in continuation of the Hodges businesses, and which corresponding deeds of
sale were confirmed by the probate court, are null and void and should be
subject to reconveyance.

Avelinas Claims
(At one point, even Linnies heirs wanted to have Avelina removed from her capacity as
administrator, but the lower court reversed its earlier grant of the motion, on account of a
previous injunction it issued.)
Linnie Jane merely gave Charles a life-estate or a usufruct over all her estate,
and gave a vested remainder-estate or the naked title over the same estate, to
her relatives.
After Linnies death, Charles, as administrator and executor of the will,
unequivocably and clearly through oral and written declarations and sworn
public statements, renounced, disclaimed and repudiated his life-estate and
usufruct.
Since there was no separation or segregation of the interests of Linnie and
Charles in the combined conjugal estate, as there has been no such separation
or segregation, and because of Charles repudiation, both interests have
continually earned exactly the same amount of rents, emoluments and income.

Issue:
1. Is Linnies disposition in favor of her siblings void? NO
2. How should the estate be partitioned/liquidated? REMAND!

Reasoning:
1. To a certain extent, PCIBs contention that Linnies testamentary substitution, when
viewed as a substitution, may not be given effect, is correct. Indeed, legally speaking,
Linnies will provides neither for a simple or vulgar substitution under Article 859 of the
Civil Code nor for a fideicommissary substitution under Article 863 thereof. There is no
vulgar substitution because there is no provision for either (1) predecease of the testator
by the designated heir or (2) refusal or (3) incapacity of the latter to accept the
inheritance, as required by Article 859; and neither is there a fideicommissary substitution
therein because no obligation is imposed thereby upon Hodges to preserve the estate or
any part thereof for anyone else. But from these premises, it is not correct to jump to the
conclusion, as PCIB does, that the testamentary dispositions in question are therefore
inoperative and invalid.

The error in PCIB's position lies simply in the fact that it views the said disposition
exclusively in the light of substitutions covered by the Civil Code section on that subject,
(Section 3, Chapter 2, Title IV, Book III) when it is obvious that substitution occurs only
when another heir is appointed in a will "so that he may enter into inheritance in default
of the heir originally instituted," (Article 857) and, in the present case, no such possible
default is contemplated. The brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not substitutes for
Hodges because, under her will, they are not to inherit what Hodges cannot, would not or
may not inherit, but what he would not dispose of from his inheritance; rather, therefore,
they are also heirs instituted simultaneously with Hodges, subject, however, to certain
conditions, partially resolutory insofar as Hodges was concerned and correspondingly
suspensive with reference to his brothers and sisters-in-law. It is partially resolutory, since
it bequeaths unto Hodges the whole of her estate to be owned and enjoyed by him as
universal and sole heir with absolute dominion over them only during his lifetime, which
means that while he could completely and absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter
vivos to anyone other than himself, he was not free to do so mortis causa, and all his
rights to what might remain upon his death would cease entirely upon the occurrence of
that contingency, inasmuch as the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law to the
inheritance, although vested already upon the death of Mrs. Hodges, would automatically
become operative upon the occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event of actual
existence of any remainder of her estate then.

Contrary to Avelinas view, however, it was not the usufruct alone of Linnies estate, as
contemplated in Article 869, that she bequeathed to Charles during his lifetime, but the
full ownership thereof, although the same was to last also during his lifetime only, even as
there was no restriction whatsoever against his disposing or conveying the whole or any
portion thereof to anybody other than himself. The Court saw no legal impediment to this
kind of institution, except that it cannot apply to the legitime of Charles as the surviving
spouse, consisting of one-half of the estate, considering that Linnie had no surviving
ascendants nor descendants. (Arts. 872, 900, and 904.)

Hodges acts of administration and accounting strongly negate PCIBs claims that he had
adjudicated to himself all of Linnies estate. While he may have used language like herein
executor (being) the only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the last
will and testament already probated there is no other person interested in the
Philippines of the time and place of examining herein account to be given notice, he
wouldve known that doing so would impute bad faith unto him. Also, in his very motions,
Hodges asserted the rights of Linnies named heirs. He even moved to include Roys name
included in the probate courts order, lest Roys heirs think that they had been omitted.

Thus, he recognized, in his own way, the separate identity of his wifes estate from his
own share of the conjugal partnership up to the time of his death, more than 5 years after
that of his wife. He never considered the whole estate as a single one belonging
exclusively to himself. The only conclusion one can gather from this is that he could have
been preparing the basis for the eventual transmission of his wife's estate, or, at least, so
much thereof as he would not have been able to dispose of during his lifetime, to her
brothers and sisters in accordance with her expressed desire, as intimated in his tax
return in the US. And assuming that he did pay the corresponding estate and inheritance
taxes in the Philippines on the basis of his being sole heir, such payment is not necessarily
inconsistent with his recognition of the rights of his co-heirs. The Court thus viewed that
under the peculiar provisions of his wife's will, and for purposes of the applicable
inheritance tax laws, Hodges had to be considered as her sole heir, pending the actual
transmission of the remaining portion of her estate to her other heirs, upon the
eventuality of his death, and whatever adjustment might be warranted should there be
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any such remainder then is a matter that could well be taken care of by the internal
revenue authorities in due time. The Court also considered as basis of Charles intentions
several questionnaires in solemn forms in filing estate taxes abroad, though they have not
been introduced in evidence (!!!), only referred to several times by the parties.

It is obvious, though, that Charles procrastinating in settling Linnies estate, and his sole
administration of it, commingled his and his co-heirs interests, making it difficult to
properly make an accounting of their shares. PCIB, then, cannot administer the properties
on its own. What would be just and proper is for both administrators of the two estates to
act conjointly until after said estates have been segregated from each other.
2. The parties were in disagreement as to how Article 16 of the Civil Code should be
applied. On the one hand, PCIB claimed that inasmuch as Linnie was a resident of the
Philippines at the time of her death, under said Article 16, construed in relation to the
pertinent laws of Texas and the principle of renvoi, what should be applied here should be
the rules of succession under the Civil Code, and, therefore, her estate could consist of no
more than one-fourth of the said conjugal properties, the other fourth being, as already
explained, the legitime of her husband (Art. 900) which she could not have disposed of
nor burdened with any condition (Art. 872). On the other hand, Avelina denied that Linnie
died a resident of the Philippines, since allegedly she never changed nor intended to
change her original residence of birth in Texas, United States of America, and contends
that, anyway, regardless of the question of her residence, she being indisputably a citizen
of Texas, under said Article 16 of the Civil Code, the distribution of her estate is subject to
the laws of said State which, according to her, do not provide for any legitime, hence,
Linnies brothers and sisters are entitled to the remainder of the whole of her share of the
conjugal partnership properties consisting of one-half thereof. Avelina further maintained
that, in any event, Charles had renounced his rights under the will in favor of his co-heirs,
as allegedly proven by the documents touching on the point already mentioned earlier,
the genuineness and legal significance of which PCIB questioned.

The Court cannot decide on the claims, though, for neither the evidence submitted by the
parties appeared to be adequate enough for it to render an intelligent comprehensive and
just resolution. No clear and reliable proof of what in fact the possibly applicable laws of
Texas are, was presented (Remember judicial notice in case of foreign laws?). Then also,
the genuineness of documents relied upon by Avelina is disputed. In Justice, therefore, to
all the parties concerned, these and all other relevant matters should first be threshed out
fully in the trial court in the proceedings thereafter to be held for the purpose of
ascertaining and adjudicating and/or distributing the estate of Mrs. Hodges to her heirs in
accordance with her duly probated will.

Linnies estate is the remainder of 1/4 of the conjugal partnership properties, considering
that even PCIB did not maintain that the application of the laws of Texas would result in
the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges not inheriting anything under her will. And since PCIB's
representations in regard to the laws of Texas virtually constitute admissions of fact which
the other parties and the Court are being made to rely and act upon, PCIB is not
permitted to contradict them or subsequently take a position contradictory to or
inconsistent with them.

The only question that remains to be settled in the remand to the court below are:
(1) whether or not the applicable laws of Texas do provide in effect for more, such as,
when there is no legitime provided therein
(2) whether or not Hodges has validly waived his whole inheritance from Mrs. Hodges.

In the course of the deliberations, it was brought out by some members of the Court that
to avoid or, at least, minimize further protracted legal controversies between the
respective heirs of the Hodges spouses, it is imperative to elucidate on the possible
consequences of dispositions made by Charles after Linnies death, from the mass of the
unpartitioned estates without any express indication in the pertinent documents as to
whether his intention is to dispose of part of his inheritance from his wife or part of his
own share of the conjugal estate as well as of those made by PCIB after the death of
Hodges. After a long discussion, the consensus arrived at was as follows:

(1) any such dispositions made gratuitously in favor of third parties, whether these be
individuals, corporations or foundations, shall be considered as intended to be of
properties constituting part of Hodges' inheritance from his wife, it appearing from the
tenor of his motions of May 27 and December 11, 1957 that in asking for general
authority to make sales or other disposals of properties under the jurisdiction of the court,
which include his own share of the conjugal estate, he was not invoking particularly his
right over his own share, but rather his right to dispose of any part of his inheritance
pursuant to the will of his wife;

(2) as regards sales, exchanges or other remunerative transfers, the proceeds of such
sales or the properties taken in by virtue of such exchanges, shall be considered as merely
the products of "physical changes" of the properties of her estate which the will expressly
authorizes Hodges to make, provided that whatever of said products should remain with
the estate at the time of the death of Hodges should go to her brothers and sisters;
(3) the dispositions made by PCIB after the death of Hodges must naturally be deemed as
covering only the properties belonging to his estate considering that being only the
administrator of the estate of Hodges, PCIB could not have disposed of properties
belonging to the estate of his wife. Neither could such dispositions be considered as
involving conjugal properties, for the simple reason that the conjugal partnership
automatically ceased when Linnie died, and by the peculiar provision of her will, under
discussion, the remainder of her share descended also automatically upon the death of
Hodges to her brothers and sisters, thus outside of the scope of PCIB's administration.
Accordingly, these constructions of Linnies will should be adhered to by the trial court in
its final order of adjudication and distribution and/or partition of the two estates in
question.

Disposition
Remand for determination of proper application of Art. 16, CC (renvoi), and of Charles
alleged renunciation of his ineritance under Linnies will. Avelina remains to be the
administrator of Linnies estate. The said estate consists of of the community properties
of the said spouses, as of the time of Linnies death on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the
husband had already gratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons from said date until
his death, provided, first, that with respect to remunerative dispositions, the proceeds
thereof shall continue to be part of the wife's estate, unless subsequently disposed of
Conflict of Law - SJBPrior | 7

gratuitously to third parties by the husband, and second, that should the purported
renunciation be declared legally effective, no deductions whatsoever are to be made from
said estate. PCIB and Avelina should act thenceforth always conjointly, never
independently from each other, as administrators.



9. Zalamea v. CA 228 S 27

FACTS:
Spouses Cesar and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana Zalamea, purchased three
(3) airline tickets from the Manila agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. (TWA) for
a flight from New York to Los Angeles on June 6, 1984. The tickets of the spouses were
purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full fare ticket. All
three tickets represented confirmed reservations.

While in New York, on June 4, 1984, the spouses Zalamea and their daughter received a
notice of reconfirmation of their reservations for said flight. On the appointed date,
however, the spouses Zalamea and their daughter checked in at 10:00 am, an hour earlier
than the scheduled flight at 11:00 am but were placed on the wait-list because the
number of passengers who checked in before tem had already taken all the seats
available on the flight.

Out of the 42 names on the wait-list, the first 22 names were eventually allowed to board
the flight to Los Angeles, including Cesar Zalamea. The two others, on the other hand,
being ranked lower than 22, were not able to fly. As it were, those holding full-fare ticket
were given first priority among the wait-listed passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who was holding
the full-fare ticket of his daughter, was allowed to board the plane; while his wife and
daughter, who presented the discounted tickets were denied boarding. Even in the next
TWA flight to Los Angeles, Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter, could not be accommodated
because it was full booked. Thus, they were constrained to book in another flight and
purchased two tickets from American Airlines.

Upon their arrival in the Philippines, the spouses Zalamea filed an action for damages
based on breach of contract of air carriage before the RTC of Makati which rendered a
decision in their favor ordering the TWA to pay the price of the tickets bought from
American Airlines together with moral damages and attorneys fees. On appeal, the CA
held that moral damages are recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of
contract of carriage only where there is fraud or bad faith. It further stated that since it is
a matter of record that overbooking of flights is a common and accepted practice of
airlines in the United States and is specifically allowed under the Code of Federal
Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board, neither fraud nor bad faith could be imputed
on TWA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in accepting the finding that overbooking is specifically
allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations and in holding that there was no fraud or
bad faith on the part of TWA ?

HELD:
The CA was in error. There was fraud or bad faith on the part of TWA when it did not
allow Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of
confirmed tickets. The US law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never
been proved.

1.) Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the court take judicial notice of them.
Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Written law may be evidenced by
an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officers having legal custody of
the record, or by his deputy and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has
custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul-
general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of
the Phil. stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and authenticated by
the seal of his office. Here, TWA relied solely on the testimony of its customer service
agent in her deposition that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautic Board
allows overbooking. Aside from said statement, no official publication of said code was
presented as evidence. Thus, the CAs finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by
the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in fact.


"That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline when it did not allow
petitioners to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets cannot be
disputed. The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been
proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of
them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Written law may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such
officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its customer
service agent, in her deposition dated January 27, 1986 that the Code of Federal
Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. Aside from said statement,
no official publication of said code was presented as evidence. Thus, respondent court's
finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has
no basis in fact."

"Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not
applicable to the case at bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus which
require that the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued should be applied by
the court where the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is
Conflict of Law - SJBPrior | 8

issued in such State by the defendant airline. Since the tickets were sold and issued in the
Philippines, the applicable law in this case would be Philippine law."

Other Issues:

2.) Even if the claimed US Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not
applicable to the case at bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus which
requires that the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued should be applied by
the court where the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is
issued in such State by the airline.

3.) Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling
the passengers concerned to an award of moral damages. Where an airline had
deliberately overbooked, it took the risk of having to deprive some passengers of their
seats in case all of them would show up for check in. for the indignity and inconvenience
of being refused a confirmed seat on the last minute, said passenger is entitled to an
award of moral damages. This is so, for a contract of carriage generates a relation
attended with public duty --- a duty to provide public service and convenience to its
passengers which must be paramount to self-interest or enrichment. Even on the
assumption that overbooking is allowed, TWA is still guilty of bad faith in not informing its
passengers beforehand that it could breach the contract of carriage even if they have
confirmed tickets if there was overbooking. Moreover, TWA was also guilty of not
informing its passengers of its alleged policy of giving less priority to discounted tickets.
Evidently, TWA placed self-interest over the rights of the spouses Zalamea and their
daughter under their contract of carriage. Such conscious disregard make respondent
TWA liable for moral damages, and to deter breach of contracts by TWA in similar fashion
in the future, the SC adjudged TWA liable for exemplary damages, as well.

10. Miciano v. Brimo 50 P 587

FACTS:
A will of an American testator provided that his estate should be disposed of in
accordance with the Philippine law. The testator further provided that whoever would
oppose his wishes that his estate should be distributed in accordance with Philippine laws
would forfeit their inheritance

ISSUE:
Will there be forfeiture?

HELD:
Even if the testators wishes must be given paramount importance, if the wishes of the
testator contravene a specific provision of law, then that provision in a will should not be
given effect. A persons will is merely an instrument which is PERMITTED, so his right is
not absolute. It should be subject to the provisions of the Philippine laws.

The estate of a decedent shall be distributed in accordance with his national law. He
cannot provide otherwise.

The SC held that those who opposed would not forfeit their inheritance because that
provision is not legal.