The honorable peculiarities of Filipino English

Lisandro Claudio September 6, 2010 12:20pm

Around 15 years ago, my mother exposed her quirky patrician side when she got into a petty argument with her in-laws. My family was then preparing for
the golden wedding anniversary of my lolo and lola, and my uncles and aunts were drafting an invitation letter. The draft invitation read We cordially invite
you to the golden wedding anniversary of Atty. Enrique Claudio and Dr. Victoria Claudio.

Mom, always concerned with proper etiquette, objected to the use of the title Atty. Unlike Dr., she claimed, Atty. was not a proper honorific, but one
invented by title-obsessed Pinoys. Mom argued valiantly, but my uncles and aunts prevailed.

I was thinking of this incident the other day, so I did some research on commonly-used professional titles in the Philippines like Atty., Arch., and Engr.
True enough, my mother, Prof. Dr. Sylvia Estrada-Claudio, MD, PhD (titles are really funny), was right. Miss Manners (Judith Martin) guide to proper
etiquette does not include these three in her list of accepted English honorifics. Moreover, if you look through the two most reputable English dictionaries
(Oxford and Merriam Webster), you will note the absence of these words. The less reputable dictionary.com includes atty., but defines it as an
abbreviation and not a title meant to precede a name. All sources, however, list Ms., Mr., Mrs., Fr., and Dr.

So why did Pinoys invent titles for professionals?

Personally, I dont see the need for excessive and insecure claims to higher education. An Atty., for me, conjures images of either a juvenile lawyer/frat
boy who beats people up simply because he can or a cutthroat goon who defends everyone from plunderers to warlords (Dont get me wrong, Im not saying
there arent wonderful Attys. The image just bothers me). In contrast, an attorney who refers to ones self as Mr. or Ms. conjures a man/woman of
understated class and humble restraint.

I find it surprising that Filipino English would create new titles, given that our English is based on the supposedly democratic English of the Americans.

Unlike the case of British colonies like India or Malaysia, the English taught to Filipinos was the egalitarian English of the New World. American English, as
conceptualized by Noah Webster, was a language rid of the superfluities and class distinctions of British English. Webster sought to simplify the language
from spelling to pronunciation. Unpronounced Us were dropped (as in the case of colour becoming color), and Ss that sounded like Zs became Zs (as in the
change from organise to organize). Webster also despised the upper-class English habit of clipping syllables (as in the case of mi-li-ta-ry being
pronounced as mi-li-try).

For Webster, a standardized American English would allow all Americans to speak and write the same language. The British spoke different Englishes (from
the Queens English, the Scottish brogue to cockney), which created what the fictional Professor Henry Higgins in My Fair Lady called verbal class
distinctions. You could tell a rich Brit from a poor one based on how he/she spoke. American English, on the other hand, would reflect the sense of equal
opportunity at the center of the American dream. For Webster, all Americans would speak the same dialect regardless of their class origins.

Websters linguistic impulse naturally dovetailed with American Republicanism, which, in challenging British courtly governance, also challenged British courtly
titles. America is not known for having lords and ladies.

So if Filipino English is based on American English, why is it more hierarchical? Why the fetish for professional titles like Atty., Arch., and Engr.? I have
not conducted documentary research on this topic, but allow me to offer some hypotheses.

A simple answer would be that the Americans who colonized the Philippines encountered lowland societies that already used Iberian linguistic class markers
like Don and Doa. Don and Doa, however, are not professional titles like Atty. So we still need to ask why we ended up inventing titles that reflect
ones educational status.

I suspect the answer lies in the fundamental contradiction of the American colonial project. The Americans who occupied the Philippines justified their actions
through the rhetoric of benevolent assimilation. In other words, they were only subjugating Filipinos in order to teach them values like American
egalitarianism.

The contradiction here is obvious. How can you teach egalitarianism through a system (colonialism) that is inherently anti egalitarian? Consider that in order
to successfully subjugate a people, a colonizer must manufacture a desire for his culture and his society (a desire we now call colonial mentality). In the case
of the Philippines, this is exactly what the Americans did.

The power of American colonialism lay in its emphasis on education an education that supposedly exposed Filipinos to the wonders of the American way of
life. Through education, the American colonial state bred a new elite of Filipinos trained in a new, more modern, American system. People with advanced
degrees like law or engineering were at the apex of this system. Their prestige, as such, not only rested on their purported intelligence, but also their
mastery of the colonizers way of life.

This, I suspect, is the source of the magical and superstitious attachment we have to attorneys, architects and engineers. The language we use is still
haunted by our colonial experience. We linguistically privilege professionals because our colonizers made us value a certain kind of white-collar work.

I must say though: if titles are meant to represent what societies value, we should make up new ones. Two come to mind: Trp. for Trapo and Cque. for
Cacique. We routinely elect them, so we must value them.

Oh, but wait, I forgot these people already have a title: Hon. Cong. for honorable congressman. And that, for many reasons (not least of which is the
assertion of being honorable), is the most absurd title yet.

Lisandro Claudio (Leloy) is a PhD Candidate in the School of Historical Studies, the University of Melbourne. He is also a lecturer (on leave) in the
Department of History, Ateneo de Manila University.

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRI STI AN MONSOD, HON. J OVI TO R. SALONGA, COMMI SSI ON ON APPOI NTMENT, and HON.
GUI LLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
Ponente: PARAS, J
Facts:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman
of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25,
1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required
qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of
the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as
Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination,
petitioner as citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be
declared null and void
I ssue:
Whether or not the appointment of Chairman Monsod of Comelec violates the Section 1 (1), Article IX-C of
the 1987 Constitution
Held:
No, it does not violate Section 1 (1), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-
born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -
elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct
of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to
clients. I t embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind
of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR
23)

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960
with a grade of 86-55%. He has been dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its
inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten
years
Hence, the Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation,
implicitlydetermined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rende
red by theCommission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference
except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
(Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the
Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise
of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount
to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writ sprayed, for has been clearly
shown. Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, he Court said that, Appointment
is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according
to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others
better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of
wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.



















PADI LLA, J ., dissenting:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not only to
require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the
Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent
the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent
Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence already
showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the constitutional
requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately, the core issue
to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of the
membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional
provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon
the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and
defining constitutional boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these are that he
must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to
ensure that such standard is met and complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual performance or
application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes
an active, habitual,repeated or customary action.
1
To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means, to
exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be
said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to
practice his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a
corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental
agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:
2

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of
the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA,
M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually
holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E.
522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (Emphasis supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it prepared, enumerated
several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a
lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends
a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil.
146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the
Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil.
968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of
the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner,
127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued
practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a
service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for
services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term "practice
of law" (Ernani Pao, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's
Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute,
and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and
Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and experience
is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of lawyer-client
relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no
attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged
in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30).
3

The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not respondent Monsod
meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10)
YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded that if ever
he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten
(10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly considered activities
peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice,
such were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To
become engaged in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the
Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva:
4

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in
theactive and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public
for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not qualified for the
position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to
his appointment to such position.


J anuary 9, 1973
I N THE MATTER OF THE I NTEGRATI ON OF THE BAR OF THE PHI LI PPI NES.
Ponente: Francisco, J
Facts:
The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the Philippine Bar,
after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial and other
local Bar associations.
On August 16, 1962, arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to the petition were orally expounded
before the Court. Written oppositions were admitted,
3
and all parties were thereafter granted leave to file
written memoranda.
In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong nationwide sentiment in favor
of Bar integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of ascertaining
the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.
In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the Integration of
the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." The measure was signed by President Ferdinand
E. Marcos on September 17, 1971 and took effect on the same day as Rep. Act 6397. This law provides as
follows:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules
of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in
order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and
enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the
National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act. Thereafter,
such sums as may be necessary for the same purpose shall be included in the annual
appropriations for the Supreme Court.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
I ssue:
Whether or not the integration of the bar is constitutional
Whether or not the court have the power to integrate the Bar
Whether or not the Court should ordain the integration of the Bar at this time
Ruling:
Yes, because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is far and just that the exercise
of that privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege, moreover, clothed with public
interest, because a lawyer owes duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the
profession, to the courts, and to the nation; and takes part in one of the most important functions
of the State, the administration of justice, as an officer of the court.
These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective action; but there can be no
collective action without an organized body; no organized body can operate effectively without
incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair and just that all attorneys be required to contribute to the
support of such organized body; and, given existing Bar conditions, the most efficient means of
doing so is by integrating the Bar through a rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual
dues to the Integrated Bar. (All that integration actually does is to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is
already a member.)
Yes, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power, under
Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. The power to integrate is an inherent part of the
Court's constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt rules of
court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor
restricts the Court's inherent power, but is a mere legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar will
promote public interest or, more specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively." (The
inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes the authority to integrate the Bar.)
Yes, the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the
Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and
legally unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an
imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and
enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.





















Bar Matter No. 553 J une 17, 1993
MAURI CI O C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLI NI C, I NC., respondent.
Ponente: REGALADO, J
Facts:
The petitioner seeks to "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements and to
perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law
profession other than those allowed by law."
The petitioner states that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous, unethical, demeaning of
the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the
bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements,
hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
Respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its instance, but claims that it is not
engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the
use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the
services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, 2 reportedly decided by
the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984
Published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star,
entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of
respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales
I ssues:
Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes
practice of law
Whether or not the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.
Ruling:
It becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services" as claimed by it, or
whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes
unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal support services," as the respondent
would have it. The advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the reading public
that legal services are being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.
The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals, which is undoubtedly beyond the domain of the
paralegals. Practice of law is only reserved for the members of the Philippine bar, and not to
paralegals. As with the Legal Clinics advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that a lawyer in making known his legal services must use only honest, fair, dignified and objective
information or statement of facts. A lawyer cannot advertise his talents in a manner that a merchant
advertise his goods. The Legal Clinic promotes divorce, secret marriages, bigamous marriages which are
undoubtedly contrary to law.
Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or
causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar
tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any
activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar
Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance herewith.
31 SCRA 562
G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970

I N THE MATTER OF PROCEEDI NGS FOR DI SCI PLI NARY ACTI ON AGAI NST ATTY. VI CENTE RAUL
ALMACEN I n L-27654, ANTONI O H. CALERO, vs.VI RGI NI A Y. YAPTI NCHAY.
Facts:
Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay in a civil case. They lost in said civil case but Almacen
filed a Motion for Reconsideration. He notified the opposing party of said motion but he failed to indicate the time
and place of hearing of said motion. Hence, his motion was denied. He then appealed but the Court of Appeals
denied his appeal as it agreed with the trial court with regard to the motion for reconsideration. Eventually,
Almacen filed an appeal on certiorari before the Supreme Court which outrightly denied his appeal in a minute
resolution.
This earned the ire of Almacen who called such minute resolutions as unconstitutional. He then filed before the
Supreme Court a petition to surrender his lawyers certificate of title as he claimed that it is useless to continue
practicing his profession when members of the high court are men who are calloused to pleas for justice, who
ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity. He further alleged that due to the minute resolution, his client was made to pay P120k without knowing
the reasons why and that he became one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy. He also stated
that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and
dumb.
The Supreme Court did not immediately act on Almacens petition as the Court wanted to wait for Almacen to
ctually surrender his certificate. Almacen did not surrender his lawyers certificate though as he now argues that
he chose not to. Almacen then asked that he may be permitted to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary
action should be taken against him . . . in an open and public hearing. He said he preferred this considering that
the Supreme Court is the complainant, prosecutor and Judge. Almacen was however unapologetic.
I SSUE:
Whether or not Almacen should be suspended
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court first clarified that minute resolutions are needed because the Supreme Court cannot
accept every case or write full opinion for every petition they reject otherwise the High Court would be unable to
effectively carry out its constitutional duties. The proper role of the Supreme Court is to decide only those cases
which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties
involved. It should be remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of
right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the courts denial. For one thing,
the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals opinion.
On Almacens attack against the Supreme Court, the High Court regarded said criticisms as uncalled for; that
such is insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory. It is true that a lawyer, both as an officer of
the court and as a citizen, has the right to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels
the acts of courts and judges. His right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful
manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts.
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts.
In the case at bar, Almacens criticism is misplaced. As a veteran lawyer, he should have known that a motion for
reconsideration which failed to notify the opposing party of the time and place of trial is a mere scrap of paper
and will not be entertained by the court. He has only himself to blame and he is the reason why his client lost.
Almacen was suspended indefinitely.


RULE 138
Attorneys and Admission to Bar

Section 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter
admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled
to practice law.
Section 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. Every applicant for admission as a member
of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and
resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court
in the Philippines.
RULE 138-A
Law Student Practice Rule
Section 1. Conditions for student practice. A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the
regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education
program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative
case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the
law school.
Section 2. Appearance. The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct
supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any
and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising
attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
Section 3. Privileged communications. The Rules safeguarding privileged communications between attorney and
client shall apply to similar communications made to or received by the law student, acting for the legal clinic.
Section 4. Standards of conduct and supervision. The law student shall comply with the standards of professional
conduct governing members of the Bar. Failure of an attorney to provide adequate supervision of student practice
may be a ground for disciplinary action. (Circular No. 19, dated December 19, 1986).
RULE 139
Disbarment or Suspension of Attorneys
Section 1. Motion or complaint. Proceedings for the removal or suspension of attorneys may be taken by the
Supreme Court on its own motion or upon the complaint under oath of another in writing. The complaint shall set
out distinctly, clearly, and concisely the facts complained of, supported by affidavits, if any, of persons having
personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and shall be accompanied with copies of such documents as may
substantiate said facts.
RULE 139-A
I ntegrated Bar of the Philippines
Section 1. Organization. There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the "Integrated Bar
of the Philippines," composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

Resolution March 18, 1954
I n the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
ALBI NO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.
Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.
Ponente: DI OKNO, J .
Facts:
Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953. In
accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the bar those candidates
who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar
invoking its provisions, while other motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending
also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who have
sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid
injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of
whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.

I ssue:
Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.

Ruling:

RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered
from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been
indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from which ours
has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the
practice of the profession is concededly judicial.
On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative
departments of the government.
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively
to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other
authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.
Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.





Resolution of the Court En Banc dated May 12, 1994.

Bar Matter No. 702 (In the Matter of Petition to authorize Sharia'h District Court Judges to Appoint Shari'a
Lawyers as Notaries Public, Atty. Royo M. Gampong, and petitioner)

Facts:
Petitioner Royo M. Gampong, a Bachelor of Laws (LIB) graduate of Notre Dame University who was
admitted to the Philippine Shari'a Bar on October 7, 1991, filed the instant petition praying that this Court,
after due notice and hearing, issue an order authorizing all Shari'a District Court Judges to appoint
Shari'a Lawyers who possess the qualifications and none of the disqualifications as notaries public within
their respective jurisdictions.
Petitioner likewise claims that Shari'a lawyers cannot be appointed as notaries public in their places of
residence and in cities and other pilot centers where Shari'a courts are established because the RTC
Executive Judges in Cotabato and Maguindanao require them to secure certifications from the IBP
Secretary that there are no practicing lawyers in the place where they are applying. Thus, Shari'a lawyers
lose their chance to be appointed as notaries public because of the policy of the IBP chapters in Region 12
to appoint regular IBP members practically in all municipalities and provinces.
Issue:
Whether or not the Shariah District Court Judges can appoint Sharia Lawyers as notaries public
Whether or not the petitioner is qualified to practice law before the regular courts
Ruling:
The fact that judges thereof are required by law to possess the same qualifications as those of Regional
Trial Courts does not signify that the Shari'a Court is a regular court like the Regional Trial Court.

The latter is a court of general jurisdiction, i.e., competent to decide all cases, civil and criminal, within its
jurisdiction.

A Shari'a District Court, created pursuant to Article 137 of Presidential Decree No. 1083, is a court of
limited jurisdiction, exercising original only over cases specifically enumerated in Article 143 thereof. In
other words, a Shari'a District Court is not a regular court exercising general jurisdiction within the
meaning of Section 232 of the Notarial Law.

The fact, too, that Shari'a Courts are called "courts" does not imply that they are on equal footing or are
identical with regular courts, for the word "court" may be applied to tribunals which are not actually
judicial in character, but are quasi-judicial agencies, like the Securities and Exchange Commission, Land
Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Boards, Bureau of Patents,
Trademark and Technology, Energy Regulatory Board, etc.
Furthermore, the qualifications for appointment as a judge of a Shari'a District Court are different from
those required of a judge of a Regional Trial Court under Section 15 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which
provides:
Section 15. Qualifications No person shall be appointed Regional trial Court Judge unless he is a natural
born citizen of the Philippines, at least thirty-five years of age, and, for at least ten years, has been engaged in
the practice of law in the Philippines requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable
requirement.

Art. 152. Qualifications. No person shall be appointed judge of the Shari'a Circuit Court unless he is a
natural born citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-five years of age, and has passed an examination in the
Sharia' and Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) to be given by the Supreme Court for admission to special membership
in the Philippine Bar to practice law in the Shari'a courts.
No, a person who has passed the Shari'a Bar Examination does not automatically become a regular
member of the Philippine Bar, he lacks the necessary qualification to be appointed a notary public.

In an En Banc resolution of the Court dated August 5, 1993, in Bar Matter No. 681 "Re: Petition to Allow
Shari'a Lawyers to exercise their profession at the regular courts," this Court categorically stated that a
person who has passed the Shari'a Bar Examination is only a special member of the Philippine Bar and not
a full-fledged member thereof even if he is a Bachelor of Laws degree holder. As such, he is authorized to
practice only in the Shari'a courts

This Court further emphasized in its resolution in Bar Matter 681, that:

In order to be admitted as member of the Philippine Bar, the candidate must pass an examination for
admission covering the following subjects: Political and International Law; Labor and Social Legislation;
Civil Law and Taxation; Mercantile Law; Criminal Law; Remedial Law; and Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises (Sec. 11, Rule 138) Further, in order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed the bar
examination, he must have obtained a general average of 75% in all the aforementioned subjects without
failing below 50% in any subject (Sec. 14, Rule 138). On the other hand, the subjects covered by the special
bar examination for Shari'a courts are: (1) Jurisprudence (Fiqh) and Customary laws (Adat); (2) Persons,
Family Relations and Property; (3) Successions, Wills/Adjudication and Settlement of Property; (4)
Procedure in Shari'a Courts (See Resolution dated September 20, 1983).

It is quite obvious that the subject matter of the two examinations are different. The Philippine Bar
Examination covers the entire range of the Philippine Laws and jurisprudence, while the Shari'a Bar
Examination covers Muslim personal laws and jurisprudence only. Hence, a person who has passed the
Shari'a Bar Examination, who is not a lawyer, is not qualified to practice law before the regular courts
because he has not passed the requisite examinations for admission as a member of the Philippine Bar.
However, the Shari'a bar lawyer may appear before the Municipal Trial Courts as agent or friend of a
litigant, if appointed by the latter for the purpose but not before the Regional Trial Courts as only duly
authorized members of the Bar may conduct litigations in the latter court (Sec. 34, Rule 138).
















A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997
SOPHI A ALAWI , complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI , Shari'a District Court,
Marawi City, respondent.

Ponente:NARVASA, C.J

Facts:

Sophia Alawi is a sales representative of EB Villarosa & Partners, Co. Ltd. Of Davao City, while Ashari
Alauya is an incumbent executive clerk of court of 4th Judicial Sharia District in Marawi City.
Alawi and Alauya were classmates and friends. Through Alawis agency, a contract was executed for the
purchase on instalments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the abovementioned firm.
Thereafter, a housing loan was granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC). On December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa and Co.
advising the termination of contract with the company, on the ground that Alauyas consent was vitiated by
gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by sales agent which makes the
contract void ab initio.
Alauya also wrote to Vice President of Credit and Collection Group of National Home Mortgage Finance
Corp. (NHMFC) repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co. and asking for a
cancellation of his housing loan.
Alauya also wrote to Ms. Corazon Ordonez, Head of Fiscal Management and Budget Office, and to the
Chief, Finance Division of Supreme Court to stop deductions from his salary.
Alawi filed on SC a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996, to which she appended a copy of the letter
and accused Alauya of:
Imputation of libellous charges with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad
faith.
Causing undue injury.
Unauthorized enjoyment of free postage.
Usurpation of the title attorney which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may use.
Alauya thereafter claims that Alawi was only envious of him for being an Executive Clerk of Court but also
a scion of a Royal Family. He also claimed that Alawi falsified his signature.
As with the use of the title attorney, he justified it by assertion that it is synonymous with Counsellors-at-
Law. He preferred to use attorney because counsellor is often mistaken for councillor.
I ssues:
Whether or not Alauya is guilty of libellous charges without solid grounds through bad faith.
Whether or not Alauya is entitled to use the appellation attorney.
Ruling:
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (R.A. 6713) enunciates the
State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. Public
officials and employees must at all times respect the rights of others and refrain from doing acts contrary
to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest.
The conduct of behaviour of every official and employee of an agency involved in administration of justice
from presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with heavy burden of responsibility.
He must act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
As to Alauyas usurpation of the title attorney, the Court has declared that persons who passed the
Sharia Bar are not full-fledge members of the Philippine bar. His disinclination to use the title
counsellor does not warrant his use of the title attorney.

G.R. No. L-18727 August 31, 1964

J ESUS MA. CUI , plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONI O MA. CUI , defendant-appellant,
ROMULO CUI , I ntervenor-appellant.
Ponente: MAKALI NTAL, J .:
Facts:
Quo warranto originally filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The office in contention is that of
Administrator of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili. Judgment was rendered on 27 April 1961 in favor of
the plaintiff, Jesus Ma. Cui, and appealed to us by the defendant, Antonio Ma. Cui, and by the intervenor,
Romulo Cui.
Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of their
incapacity or death, to "such persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them."
Section 2 of the deed of donation
Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer the Hospicio until her death in 1929.
Thereupon the administration passed to Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem. The first died on 8 May
1931 and the second on 1 July 1931. On 2 July 1931 Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of Mauricio Cui, became
the administrator.
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui
Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio" entered into between them
and embodied in a notarial document. The next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office.
Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of either the "convenio" (agreement) or of his brother's
assumption of the position.
5 September 1960 the plaintiff wrote a letter to the defendant demanding that the office be turned over to
him; and on 13 September 1960, the demand not having been complied with the plaintiff filed the complaint
in this case. Romulo Cui later on intervened, claiming a right to the same office, being a grandson of
Vicente Cui, another one of the nephews mentioned by the founders of the Hospicio in their deed of
donation.
I SSUE
Who is best qualified as administrator for the Hospicio?
HELD
Antonio should be the Hospicios administrator.
Jesus is the older of the two and under equal circumstances would be preferred pursuant to sec.2 of the
deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be, applied the deed gives preference to the one,
among the legitimate descendants of the nephews named, who if not a lawyer (titulo de abogado), should
be a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or if failing all theses, should be the one who
pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified.
Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of laws but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed the
examinations. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and although disbarred in 1957,
was reinstated by resolution, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the
Hospicio.
The term titulo de abogado means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but
membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. A Bachelors
degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic requirements, does not
entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. By itself, the degree merely serves as evidence of
compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has successfully completed all the
prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education.
The founders of the Hospicio provided for a lwayer, first of all, because in all of the works of an
administrator, it is presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license to practice the profession
would be a distinct asset.
Under this criterion, the plaintiff Jesus is not entitled as against defendant, to the office of administrator.
Reference is made to the fact that the defendant Antonio was disbarred (for immorality and unprofessional
conduct). However, it is also a fact, that he was reinstated before he assumed the office of administrator.
His reinstatement is recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that required for his
admission to the Bar in the first place. Also, when defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the
restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out.

































Perito en el derecho positivo que se dedica a defender en juicio, por escrito o de palabra, los derechos o
intereses de los litigantes, y tambien a dar dictmen sobre las cuestiones o puntos legales que se le
consultan

Abogado: Proficient in the positive law that is dedicated to defend in court, in writing or verbally, the
rights or interests of the litigants, and also to give dictmen on legal issues or points that you consult


Que en caso de nuestro fallecimiento o incapacidad para administrar, nos sustituyan nuestro legitime
sobrino Mariano Cui, si al tiempo de nuestra muerte o incapacidad se hallare residiendo en la ciudad de
Cebu, y nuestro sobrino politico Dionisio Jakosalem. Si nuestro dicho sobrino Mariano Cui no estuviese
residiendo entonces en la ciudad de Cebu, designamos en su lugar a nuestro otro sobrino legitime
Mauricio Cui. Ambos sobrinos administraran conjuntamente el HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI. A
la muerte o incapacidad de estos dos administradores, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE
DE BARILI pasara a una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que descienda legitimainente de
cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui y Victor Cui, y que
posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos, el que pague
al Estado mayor impuesto o contribution. En igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferida el varon de mas
edad descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la administracion. Cuando absolutamente faltare persona de
estas cualificaciones, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara al senor Obispo
de Cebu o quien sea el mayor dignatario de la Iglesia Catolica, apostolica, Romana, que tuviere asiento en
la cabecera de esta Provincia de Cebu, y en su defecto, al Gobierno Provincial de Cebu.

That in case of our death or incapacity to manage, we replaced our nephew legitimize Mariano Cui, if at
the time of our death or disability shall be found to reside in the city of Cebu, and our political nephew
Dionisio Jakosalem. If our nephew Mariano Cui said were not then residing in the city of Cebu, designate
in place to legitimize our other nephew Mauricio Cui. Both nephews jointly administer the HOSPICE OF
SAN JOSE DE BARILI. A death or disability of these two charges, the administration of HOSPICE OF
SAN JOSE DE BARILI happen to one person who will be the male, of age, which falls legitimainente any of
our legitimate nephews Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vincent Cui and Victor Cui, and he holds a law
degree, or doctor, or civil engineer or chemist, or lack of these securities, which pay the highest state tax or
contribution. Circumstances being equal, be preferred to the more male offspring who lately had the old
administration. When person absolutely should fail these qualifications, the administration of HOSPICE
OF SAN JOSE DE BARILI happened to Mr. Bishop of Cebu or whoever the highest dignitary of the
Catholic Church, Apostolic, Roman that hath seat at the head of the Cebu Province, and in his absence, the
Provincial Government of Cebu.