Mach and Ehrenfels:

The Foundations of Gestalt Theory

(1)


http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith//articles/mach/mach.html
Kevin Mulligan and Barry Smith



From Barry Smith (ed.), Foundations of Gestalt Theory, Munich and ienna: !hilosophia, 1"##,
1$%&'(.

1. ream!le

)ne important measure of the success of a philosophy of science is the e*tent to +hich the
clarifications +hich it yields ha,e positi,e and fruitful conse-uences +ithin the sciences themsel,es.
Such success is at least in part a function of the e*tent to +hich its e*amples and problems are ta.en
o,er from genuine science and are not merely tri,ial or o,er&simplified illustrations. /he thought of
Mach in particular, and of 0ustrian philosophers of science in general, pro,ides us +ith stri.ing
e*amples of such interaction. Mach1s epistemology and ontology gre+ out of his in,estigations, both
systematic and historical, in physics and psychology, and they contributed in turn to the further
de,elopment of his o+n thin.ing in these areas and to the +or. of those, such as 2instein and
2hrenfels, +hom he influenced. Similarly, it +as the interaction bet+een philosophy and psychology
+hich made possible the seminal +or. on the notion of 3estalt -uality by 2hrenfels, and this +or.,
together +ith the +ritings on the logic and ontology of parts, +holes and structures by other
members of the Brentano school, led in turn to significant further de,elopments, not only in
psychology itself, but also in neighbouring disciplines such as linguistics.
($)


4e shall find in +hat follo+s that +e can come to terms +ith the implications of the ideas of Mach
and 2hrenfels on the perception of +hat is comple* and on the comple*ity of perception only by
paying especially detailed attention to their respecti,e understandings of the notion of non-causal
dependence. /he clarification of this notion & first effected in a truly systematic +ay in the +ritings
of these t+o authors and in those of their contemporaries Brentano and Stumpf & is, +e shall argue,
one of the great achie,ements of 0ustrian philosophy of science. Mach, it +ill turn out, +as unable
successfully to incorporate his descriptions of comple* perception +ithin his general atomistic
frame+or. in no small part because his understanding of dependence +as in a -uite specific sense
too narro+. /he great significance of the +or. of 2hrenfels and of other members of the Brentano
tradition from our point of ,ie+ is that, because they +ere more faithful to the structures of +hat is
gi,en in perception, they +ere able to de,elop a richer theory of dependence, the implications of
+hich +ere to e*tend far beyond the narro+ sphere of perceptual psychology.


". The ro!lem of the erce#tion of $om#le%es

/o tal. of a 1perception of +hat is comple*1 is, from the atomistic perspecti,e +hich held s+ay
amongst the ma5ority of nineteenth century psychologists, already to employ a form of speech that is
illegitimate in the sense that it is not grounded in any underlying reality. /here is at most, according
to the atomistic psychologist, the possibility of a summation of simple percei,ings, each one of
+hich +ould ha,e something unitary or non&comple* as its ob5ect or content.
(6)


Mach, too, embraced an atomism of this .ind. For him all comple*es, including the ego itself, are
mere ideal, practical or pro,isional 1mental&economic unities1. 0s he puts it in the Analyse der
Empfindungen, only the 1elements1 (sensations, Empfindungen) are real.
(%)
But he clearly sa+ that
there is a problem of comple* perception,
(')
and 2hrenfels, as is +ell .no+n, +as able to ta.e certain
passages from this +or. as the starting& point of his in,estigation of comple*&perception in his
classic essay of 1#"7, 89ber 13estalt-ualit:ten18. /hese passages are not isolated instances of +hat
might be ta.en to be less than careful thin.ing on Mach1s part. ;ndeed the e*amination of Mach1s
+ritings re,eals that his anticipation of 2hrenfels goes bac. at least $7 years earlier. )n receipt of
2hrenfels1 paper, Mach replied in a letter that he had already put for+ard the main ideas & albeit in a
more psychological +ay, in terms of a theory of 1muscular sensations1 & in an earlier paper.

/he paper in -uestion is almost certainly his 8Bemer.ungen <ur =ehre ,om r:umlichen Sehen8 of
1#>',
(>)
a critical discussion of the psychology of ?erbart dealing specifically +ith the problem of
our recognition of perceptual comple*es. ?o+, Mach as.s, do +e recognise different spatial figures
(1Gestalten1) as the same@ ?o+ does it come about that +e apparently recognise melodies as being
ali.e@ ?o+ is it that +e recognise the form of a melody more easily than the .ey in +hich it is
played@ 4hy is it that +e recognise a rhythm more easily than an absolute duration@ 4here is the
similarity bet+een the indi,idual, unitary -ualities presented in the hearing of a melody played on a
trumpet in the .ey of A, and those presented in the hearing of 1the same1 melody played on a ,iolin
in 3@ Becognition and li.eness here, as Mach points out,



cannot depend on the -ualities of the perceptual presentations CVorstellungenD, for these are
different. )n the other hand recognition, according to the principles of psychology, is possible only
on the basis of presentations +hich are the same in -uality (Mach 1#>', p. 1$$ of repr., 2ng. p. 6"1,
-uoted in Schul<.i, p. %$).

/here is, Mach concludes,



no other alternati,e but for us to consider the -ualitati,ely dissimilar presentations in the t+o series
as being necessarily connected +ith some sort of -ualitati,ely similar presentations. (loc. cit., our
emphasis)

Mach, that is to say, claims that there is a means of sol,ing the problem of comple* perception
+ithin the atomistic frame+or. by means of an appeal to additional elementary sensations outside
the sphere of perception, sensations he calls Muskelempfindungen. 4hen +e hear the same melody
in t+o different .eys, our apprehension of this 1sameness1 rests on the fact that, for all the differences
in tone&sensations, the same feeling&sensations are in,ol,ed in both cases. )n a tri,ial interpretation,
Mach here is presenting a ,ie+ according to +hich our e*perience en5oys a certain sort of double
structure, each separate e*perience of the indi,idual tones in a melody or of the points in a spatial
figure is coloured by a certain element of feeling. ;t remains the case that, on this modified ,ie+ of
1element1, e*perience is 5ust one damned element after another.

Such a ,ie+ is indeed able to sol,e the problem of identity of comple* ob5ects of e*perience, at least
for simple cases, but it is not only this problem +hich an account of our perception of +hat is
comple* is called upon to resol,e. Such an account must e*plain also the unity of comple*es that is
gi,en in e*perience, and it must do 5ustice to the fact that comple*es are gi,en in such a +ay as to
be demarcated from other, neighbouring comple*es in such a +ay as to form unified and integral
+holes. 0nd Mach1s account, on this interpretation, is inade-uate to features such as this.

/here is, ho+e,er, another, more subtle interpretation of Mach1s position, the possibility of +hich
+e almost certainly o+e to 2hrenfels, since it consists in a certain sense in reading bac. 2hrenfels1
ideas on 3estalt -ualities into the rele,ant Machian te*ts. 0ccording to this interpretation, it is not
the successi,e elementary successions, but rather each apparent comple* perception that comes to be
associated +ith its o+n characteristic feeling&sensation or ner,ous quale. /he e*istence of
similarities bet+een such quale can then e*plain both ho+ it is that +e can en5oy the appearance of
+hat is putati,ely the same comple* e,en +here the associated elementary data of perception are in
fact distinct, and also ho+ it is that the apparent comple* in -uestion is gi,en as something unitary
and as something set apart from its en,ironment.

/hus +hen ; see a s-uare, for e*ample, then in addition to the percei,ed elements (+hether these be
concei,ed as points, lines or segments) there is also a peculiar ner,ous sensation +hich ; ha,e as a
result of the inner,ations of the muscles of my eyes, a sensation that is repeated, spontaneously and
+ithout any effort on my part, +hene,er ; see a similar figure. /he body as a hole +e might say, in
consort +ith specific sensory presentations of +hat is simple, is to do the 5ob of accounting for our
apparent presentation of +hat is comple*. 0nd +e should, as Mach himself argues, loo. to the
,ariety of the human organism,



+hich is pro,isionally rich enough to co,er the outlays of psychology in this regard & and it is high
time that +e too. seriously the tal. of 1bodily resonance1 in +hich psychology has so readily
engaged. (1#>', loc. cit., 2ng. p. 6"$)
(()

Eo+ an account of this .ind +or.s +ell enough, on its o+n terms, in relation to our (apparent)
perceptions of congruent but differently coloured spatial shapes (space and shape, +e note, are the
sub5ect&matter of Mach1s 1#>' paper). 2ach such shape can indeed be seen as being associated &
1necessarily connected1, as Mach puts it & +ith its o+n characteristic muscular inner,ation, itself
deri,ed from corresponding motor processes of the eye and head. (Modern&day psychologists, +ith
their in,estigation of the role of the .inaesthetic dimension in e*perience, ha,e at least to some
e*tent ,indicated Mach in this regard.) 4e are interested, ho+e,er, in a general theory of comple*
perception. ;ndeed Mach himself +rites:



Fust as the same, differently coloured forms, the same muscular sensations, must occur if the forms
are to be recognised as the same, so too each and e,ery form, each and e,ery abstraction, as one
might say, must in 5ust the same +ay be based upon presentations of a -uite particular -uality. /his
holds true for space and shape, as +ell as for time, rhythm, pitch, the form of melodies, intensity,
and so on. (loc. cit., 2ng. p. 6"1f.)

Mach assumes, that is to say, that it is possible to generalise the theory of muscular sensations to
encompass all sensory dimensions. More, that it is in principle possible to e*trapolate from this
theory in such a +ay as to encompass our apparent presentation of all 1Abstraktionen1 from +hat is
gi,en.
(#)


2hrenfels, too, recognised the necessity of such a general theory of comple* perception.
(")
But he
sa+ also & and this +as a significant achie,ement of 89ber 13estalt-ualit:ten18 & that a completely
general theory could not be obtained on the basis of an appeal to additional elementary phenomena
along the lines of Mach1s muscular sensations. For such sensations can at best e*plain our apparent
perception of +hat is comple* only in relation to +hat is non&temporal, of +hat is capable of being
presented instantaneously, i.e. simple spatial figures, simple smells, simple musical chords. /here is
no +ay in +hich an appeal to e*tra elementary (and thus instantaneous) sensations alone can sol,e
the ontological problem raised by our (apparent) perception of temporally e*tended, unitary
comple*es such as melody and rhythm, and in general of all 3estalten in,ol,ing change and motion.
For there is clearly no ans+er to the -uestion as to hen a single elementary feeling&sensation &
putati,ely associated +ith a plurality of elementary perceptions spread out in time & could become
associated +ith this plurality in the rele,ant +ay.
(17)


/he elementary inner,ation (or +hat ha,e you) can do ser,ice for the perception of +hat is comple*
only if it is someho+ associated +ith all rele,ant perceptions. /his association can come about,
ho+e,er, only if these perceptions are already collected together, e.g. through the operations of
memory, to form a single and instantaneous composite perception. But the appeal to such a
composite perception clearly signifies a departure from the atomistic perspecti,e. Moreo,er, once
such composites ha,e been accepted, it is difficult to see +hat e*planatory role could remain for any
associated muscular inner,ations.

For reasons to be in,estigated only later, Mach need not ac.no+ledge that this argument has isolated
any inade-uacy in his account, since he re5ects the notion of time as traditionally concei,edG the ,ery
concepts of simultaneity and non&simultaneity are held by him to correspond to no underlying
reality.

;t is not, ho+e,er, this inade-uacy of Mach1s account +hich +ill be of interest to us here. )ur
attention +ill be directed, rather, to+ard the nature of the relation bet+een muscular and perceptual
quale that is presupposed by his theory.


&. The 'nalysis of Sensations

/he theory of Muskelempfindungen of 1#>' is not simply abandoned by Mach in his later +ritings.
Many of the same ideas are at +or. also in the Analyse der Empfindungen, though no+ the theory of
muscular sensations has been e*tended & legitimately or not & to embrace a ta*onomy of different
.inds of 1space&sensations1, 1time&sensations1 and in principle also muscular inner,ations of other
sorts & illustrating Mach1s faith in the 1po+er and ,ariety of the human organism1.

/hus consider the follo+ing passage -uoted by 2hrenfels at the beginning of his paper:



;n melodic as +ell as in harmonic combinations, notes +hose rates of ,ibration bear to one another
some simple ratio are distinguished (1) by their agreeableness, and ($) by a sensation characteristic
of this ratio. (1##>, p. 167G 2ng. p. 16#)
(11)

Such distincti,eness manifests itself also in our forms of e*pression:



Aolours, sounds, temperatures, pressures, spaces, times and so forth are connected +ith one another
in manifold +aysG and +ith them are associated moods of mind, feelings and ,olitions. )ut of this
fabric, that +hich is relati,ely more fi*ed and permanent stands prominently forth, engra,es itself in
the memory, and e*presses itself in language. (1##>, p. $, 2ng. p. $)

4hat is missing from the Analyse der Empfindungen & and this is a crucial de,elopment & is any tal.
of a 1necessary connection1 or 1intimate mutual relation1 such as +e find in the 1#>' account.
(1$)
4e
no+ learn only that the characteristic sensations are 1connected to1 or 1dependent on1 the elements
+ith +hich they are associated. Further, this dependence is seen as being in e,ery case relati,e to the
perspecti,e or point of ,ie+ adopted by the in,estigator:



0 colour is a physical ob5ect as long as +e consider its dependence upon its luminous source (other
colours, heat, spaces, etc.). But if +e consider its dependence upon the retina...then it is a
psychological ob5ect, a sensation. (1##>, p. 16, 2ng., p. 1%f.)

4e shall turn belo+ to the tas. of e*amining in detail 5ust +hat Mach understood by 1dependence1
here. For the moment it is sufficient to note that it is not any sort of causal relation. Aausality is
re5ected by Mach as a metaphysical encumbrance, an anthropomorphic notion, properly to be
eliminated from any science that is +orthy of the name.


(. )n Gestalt *ualities

2hrenfels, too, employs a notion of non&causal dependence in his theory. But for him it is the 3estalt
-ualities themsel,es, certain sui generis ob5ects of presentation, +hich are dependent on the data of
sensation +hich are their foundation.

2hrenfels see.s to be faithful to the reality (,eridicality) of our perception of +hat is comple*. /here
is something there, he insists, +hich +e percei,e through specific types of comple* net+or.s of acts
of presentation (perception, memory and imagination) of +hat is simple, +hene,er +e percei,e a
melody, a rhythm, or any other 3estalt -uality. 0nd he claims further that, to produce a truly faithful
account of our perception of such formations +e ha,e to distinguish ob5ects of perception on t+o
distinct le,els.

2hrenfels recognises not only comple!es of elementary perceptual data but also special qualities of
such comple*es, and the formations +e percei,e are such as to in,ol,e both. Fust as for Mach, if t+o
figures are similar, then this is because of an identity in the appurtenant ner,e&processes or feeling&
sensations, so also for 2hrenfels, if t+o figures are similar, then this is because of an identity in their
associated 3estalten.
(16)


2hrenfels is e*plicit that this identity is to be e*plained by appeal to unitary presentational elements:
+hen +e hear a melody consisting of # notes, then there are (at least) nine presentations in,ol,ed, #
aural presentations of indi,idual notes, and one unitary presentation of the associated 3estalt -uality.
(1%)
2hrenfels ac.no+ledges that the notes constitute in and of themsel,es a certain comple* +hole,
and that the 3estalt -uality is founded upon (is, precisely, a 1-uality of1) this comple* +hole. But the
-uality itself is not a +hole embracing the indi,idual sensational elements as parts: a ,ie+ of this
sort +as de,eloped only +ith the +or. of 4ertheimer and the other members of the Berlin School.
;n this respect 2hrenfels, li.e Mach, can be said to ha,e offered an elementarist solution to the
problem of comple* perception.

For 2hrenfels, as for Mach, no special intellectual effort, attention or attitude is needed to produce
the a+areness of a 3estalt -uality: this a+areness occurs as it +ere automatically. /he problem of
the 1uni,ersal gi,enness of 3estalt -ualities +ith their foundations1 is ho+e,er a comple* one.
2hrenfels asserts that



+here,er a comple* +hich can ser,e as the foundation for a 3estalt -uality is present in
consciousness, this -uality is itself eo ipso and +ithout any contribution on our part also gi,en in
consciousness (translation, p. 111).
/his remar. relates only to the issue of the genesis of 3estalt -ualities, to the -uestion +hether, on
the basis of a gi,en foundation, any acti,ity or assistance is re-uired on our part in order to bring a
3estalt -uality to consciousness. /hus 2hrenfels points out that, at least in certain cases,


the e*ertion +e seem to re-uire in order to grasp a shape or melody on the basis of a foundation
already presented is much rather applied to the filling out of that foundation itself. (translation, p.
111)

?e considers our perception of paintings, +here sensation yields merely a starting point for further
imaginati,e filling out:



0 significant e*ercise of our capacities is re-uired in order to utilise in our presentation the slight
distinctions in light and colour and the foreshortenings in the perspecti,e plane as associati,e to.ens
for the realisation of the total luminosity and three&dimensionality of the painting. (translation, pp.
111 f.)
But effort is needed, 2hrenfels argues, only in order to fi* the indirectly seen parts of the +hole.
Someone +ho has de,eloped in his consciousness the foundation for the 3estalt -uality in the
appropriate +ay +ill not find it necessary to generate this -uality itself in a further act & and nor +ill
he ha,e any choice as to hich -uality +ill be generated: the -uality is, as it +ere, gi,en of itself.
2hrenfels1 ,ie+s on the genesis of 3estalt -ualities are in this respect identical to those of Mach on
the genesis of muscular inner,ations.

/here is, ho+e,er, in addition to the -uestion of the genesis of 3estalt -ualities also another
-uestion, that of the ontological status of such -ualities, and of their constituti,e relations to the
sensory data +ith +hich they are associated.
(1')
2hrenfels +as perhaps the first to consider this
problem in a serious +ay. ?e points out that if +e assert a mutual dependence of 3estalt -uality and
foundation not merely in the genetic but also in this ontological sense, then this gi,es rise
immediately to a problem of infinite multiplication. Mutual ontological foundation +ould signify
first of all, harmlessly enough, that e,ery 3estalt -uality is necessarily such that it could not e*ist
unless there e*ists also a corresponding comple* of fundamenta. But it +ould signify also that e,ery
comple* of fundamenta, too, is necessarily such that it could not e*ist unless an associated 3estalt
-uality e*isted also. E"ery arbitrary comple* of gi,en sensations, ho+e,er delineated, +ould gi,e
rise to a 3estalt -uality of its o+n. /his +ould imply, ho+e,er, that +e +ould once more be in no
position to e*plain that characteristic unity and integrity of perceptual comple*es +hich is in fact
e*perienced. /hus to hear a melody (e.g.) +ould be to hear also all constituent sub&melodies (and
indeed, unless constraints on temporal and spatial pro*imity are introduced, all melodies built up on
the basis of presently percei,ed tones together +ith tones pre,iously heard). But further, since
3estalt -ualities are themsel,es perfectly ,alid ob5ects of presentation +hich may themsel,es ser,e
as fundaments of further 3estalt -ualities, it +ould follo+ that, on hearing a se-uence (s1, s$,...,sn) of
tones, +e ha,e not only the 3estalt -uality, say f1 +hich these immediately generate, but also the
further 3estalt -ualities f$ & generated by the se-uence & (s1, s$,...,sn, f1) & the -uality f6 & generated by
the se-uence (s1, s$,...,sn, f1, f$) & and so on. Eo+ clearly, as 2hrenfels +ould say, there is nothing of
all of this gi,en in inner perception. 0nd he concludes that, in the ontological sense, 3estalt -ualities
are merely one-sidedly dependent on their fundamenta.
(1>)
Mach seems not to ha,e faced this
problem, e,en though it arises in the self&same +ay +ithin the frame+or. of his o+n ner,ous quale
theory. ?e seems, rather, to ha,e run together the genetic and the ontological dimensions and
thereby to ha,e been constrained to accept mutual dependence both in the genetic and in the
ontological sense. 0s Smith points out in his essay abo,e, the Meinongians accepted it in neither
sphere, insisting on a one&sided dependence both genetically and ontologically. /hus they held first
of all that 3estalt -ualities (no+ called 1founded contents1 and later 1higher order ob5ects1, or 1ob5ects
of presentations of e*tra&sensory pro,enance1) are one&sidedly ontologically dependent (1founded1)
on their fundamenta or 1inferiora1. But they held also that such -ualities are in need of being
produced for presentation by a special e*ertion of consciousness, that the 3estalt -uality must in a
certain sense be teased out of the perceptual en,ironment.
(1()


4e might display the essentials of 2hrenfels1 account in the form of a diagram, some+hat as
follo+s:





#iagram $.

?ere the arro+s
represent relations of
intentional
directedness
(bet+een an act and
its ob5ect), and the
double lines
represent relations of
mutual dependence.

Mach1s theory, on
the other hand, on
the interpretation
here ad,anced,
might loo. li.e this:




#iagram %.
;t is of course the differences bet+een these t+o figures that leap to the eye. /he most important of
these are: (1) 4here act and ob5ect are distinguished by 2hrenfels and the other Brentanists, Mach
embraces a conception of Elemente according to +hich sensory presentations and sensory data are
not separate but are rather run together into a single unitary item. ($) Mach1s atomism did not allo+
him to embrace either comple* presentations or comple* ob5ects of presentation such as are to be
found in the 2hrenfels theory.

;n this paper ho+e,er +e shall be concentrating on +hat the t+o accounts ha,e in common. For not
only is it the case that 2hrenfelsian 3estalt -ualities and Machian characteristic sensations perform
the same 5obG both are also such as to stand to their respecti,e underlying elementary data in the
peculiar relation of non&causal dependence referred to abo,e.

/he in,estigation of this relation has a more than parochial interest. Eotions of non&causal
dependence form indispensable components not only of Mach1s psychology and of the psychology
of 2hrenfels, but also of the +or. of other thin.ers in the Brentano tradition, particularly Stumpf,
Meinong and ?usserl, from +here they e*erted a +ide influence, to a degree +hich has still hardly
been appreciated.
(1#)
More important still, ho+e,er, if our arguments are correct, are the implications
of a demonstration of the inade-uacy of an account of dependence of the sort defended by Mach.
For this account and its deri,ati,es ha,e been an un-uestioned presupposition of almost all
subse-uent philosophy of science. /o call it into -uestion is to call into -uestion a still po+erful
orthodo*y.

+. Mach,s hiloso#hy of Science

Mach is +idely ac.no+ledged as ha,ing been the first thin.er to combine philosophical
clarification, history of science and substanti,e scientific research in +ays that are recognisable as
philosophy of science as this is no+adays understood. ?e stands at the beginning of that strand in
the history of 0ustrian philosophy +hich reaches its culmination (or its nadir) in the logical
positi,ism of the ienna circle.

But there is another, one might almost say phenomenological, aspect to his thin.ing. 0ll Mach1s
arguments, ho+e,er they are to be classified, are rigorously subordinated by him to a single goal:
the goal of increasing knoledge.
(1")
?e is -uite prepared to renounce any claim to the epithets
1physicist1 or 1philosopher1 if this contributes to the ad,ancement of our understanding of the +orld
((1"17), p. 11). ?e thereby stands in mar.ed contrast to those philosophers and scientists +ho are all
too ready to impose in ad,ance re-uirements that en-uiry has to satisfy if it is to be 1scientific1, for
e*ample by foisting abstract 1criteria of rationality1 on li,e traditions of research.

?e shares +ith ?usserl and others in the Brentano tradition the con,iction that theoretical en-uiry
cannot afford to lose sight of the origins of our ideas (scientific and other+ise). Scientific ideas, as
Mach concei,es them, must ha,e their origins in concepts & called by him 1inaugurating concepts1 &
deri,ed directly from e*perience (and, li.e the phenomenologists, Mach +as prepared to
ac.no+ledge the role played by introspection in the foundations of scientific en-uiry). /he science
of heat, he argues, is deri,ed from the concept of felt armth, the science of light from the concept
of intensity of illumination, the science of acoustics from the concept of frequency, and so on.
($7)


Mach shares +ith members of the phenomenological tradition a conception of the philosophy of
science as something that must be tied to the actual practice of science. 0s ?usserl puts it: 10 fruitful
theory of concept formation in the natural sciences can...only be a theory 8from belo+8, a theory that
has gro+n out of the +or. of the natural sciences themsel,es.1 /he passage occurs in the conte*t of a
discussion by ?usserl of a monograph by the Eeo&Hantian Bic.ert in +hich a conception of the
philosophy of science is manifested 1+hich deals so much in general constructions, is so much a
theory 8from abo,e8, that not a single e*ample is to be found in the entire monograph and nor does
this absence ma.e itself felt1 (1"(", p. 1%().

;t is a recurring feature of Mach1s deser,edly famous conceptual analyses of the ontological
commitments of scientists e.g. to space and time, that he proceeds by gradually stripping a+ay from
these all purely conceptual baggage, all metaphysical free play not directly related to sense
e*perience & and thereby arri,es, step by step, at certain (as Mach concei,es things) unambiguous
and precise components, such as the inaugurating concepts mentioned abo,e:

; see the e*pression of... economy clearly in the gradual reduction of the statical la+s of machines to
a single one, ,i<., the principle of ,irtual +or.: in the replacement of Hepler1s la+s by Ee+ton1s
single la+... and in the Csubse-uentD reduction, simplification and clarification of the la+s of
dynamics. ; see clearly the biologico&economical adaptation of ideas, +hich ta.es place by the
principles of continuity (permanence) and of ade-uate definition and splits the concept 1heat1 into the
t+o concepts of 1temperature1 and 1-uantity of heat1G and ; see ho+ the concept 1-uantity of heat1
leads on to 1latent heat1, and to the concepts of 1energy1 and 1entropy1. ((1"17), p. >f.)

?e argues at length for a ,ie+ of science as a continuous process of adaptation & the biological echo
here is deliberate & of thoughts to facts and of thoughts to thoughts. 0nd the aim of this adaptation
(though not its biological e*planation) is shared also by members of the Brentano tradition: it is
precisely the realisation of the fundamental re-uirement of uni,ocity (Eindeutigkeit) of our ideas.
($1)


0nd finally he shared a concern for the presuppositionlessness of description. Mach1s attitude here is
neatly captured in 4ittgenstein1s famous remar. about psychology as consisting in 1e*perimental
methods, and conceptual confusions1.
($$)
But the conceptual confusions +hich +ere the targets of
Mach1s polemics +ere all, he thought, the result of employing concepts & of time and space, of
causality, of the 1inner1 and the 1outer1 & +ithout any basis in e*perience and e*periment. )ne of the
most stri.ing e*amples here is Mach1s discussion of the 1preconcei,ed opinions1 in the psychology of
perception. /hese result, he claims, from a failure to e*amine percei,ing itself, before transferring to
the perceptual sphere, loc., stoc. and barrel, ideas deri,ed from the sphere of physics (1"76, ch. ;;).

?usserl got the main historical point e*actly right in his comments on the use made of the
1phenomenological method1 before the turn of the century by certain psychologists and natural
scientists:



/he sense of this method for men such as Mach and ?ering lay in a reaction against the threat of
groundlessness Cgegen die drohende &odenlosigkeitDG it +as the reaction against a theorising +ith the
help of conceptual formations and mathematical speculation remo,ed from intuition +hich brought
no clarity into the correct sense and achie,ement of theories (1">$, p. 67$).

& and in this same passage ?usserl stresses the similarity bet+een the approaches of Mach and
?ering on the one hand and that of Brentano on the other.
($6)



-. Mach and the Brentano Tradition

/he emphasis on description and sense e*perience in Mach corresponds in the +or. of the
Brentanian psychologists to the emphasis on the need to create a scientific psychology on the basis
of the unpre5udiced description of inner e*perience.
($%)
/he programme of descripti,e & as opposed to
genetic & psychology +as common to all first&generation descendants of Brentano. Iescripti,e
psychology deals +ith +hat +e ha,e called abo,e ontological dependence relations and +ith
associated structures in the sphere of conscious e*periences. 3enetic psychology deals rather +ith
the coming and going of conscious e*periences and +ith associated causal structures. /he
programme of descripti,e psychology finds one of its most succinct formulations in Brentano1s
Meine let'ten ()nsche f)r *sterreich ((1#"'), p. 6%), +here Brentano describes the pro5ect of a
1combinatoric1 of the basic psychic components +hich +ould yield psychic phenomena 1as letters
yield +ords1. /he rigorous ,alidity (necessity) of the la+s of such a combinatoric +ould be
contrasted +ith the empirical or inducti,e ,alidity of the la+s of genetic psychology, i.e. the la+s of
succession or of the coming and going of psychic phenomena.
($')

Mach1s thought, and not least his theory of Elemente, might indeed be described as a +or.ing out of
a related programme. For this theory rests on a stri.ingly similar conception of the connections and
combinations of Elemente:



/he aim of all research is to ascertain the mode of connection of the elements.... For us colours,
sounds, spaces, times... are the ultimate elements, +hose gi,en connection it is our business to
in,estigate. (1##>, p. $1G 2ng. p. 1#)
/he antithesis of ego and +orld, sensation (phenomenon) and thing... ,anishes, and +e ha,e simply
to deal +ith the connection of the elements... of +hich this antithesis +as only a partially appropriate
and imperfect e*pression.... Science has simply to accept this connection, and to set itself aright (get
its bearings) in the intellectual en,ironment +hich is hereby furnished, +ithout attempting to e*plain
its e*istence. (op. cit., p. 17, 2ng. p. 11)
/he great difference bet+een the t+o programmes, on the other hand, is that, as already noted, the
genetic and the ontological are simply run together in Mach, +ho .no+s nothing of the distinction
bet+een genetic and descripti,e psychology of the Brentanists.
4e ha,e emphasised that the notion of non-causal dependence +hich lies at the root of Mach1s
theory is a notion +hich appears also as a fundamental component in the +or. of the Brentanians.
0nd +hilst the Machian and Brentanian formulations of this notion are not identical, the +ays in
+hich they are put to +or. are in many respects parallel.
Mach1s ,ie+s on ho+ Elemente are related to each other ha,e been adopted by subse-uent
philosophers in the positi,ist tradition (at least in part because, since they in,ol,e a denial of any
necessary connection, they mesh +ell +ith the tenets of empiricism). /hey ha,e indeed been
absorbed to such an e*tent that they form an un-uestioned and unanalysed component of present&
day philosophy of science. Mach1s critics and interpreters ha,e concentrated in their +ritings much
rather on the Elemente themsel,es, and the literature abounds +ith refutations of the
1phenomenalism1 or 1neutral monism1 +hich Mach is held to ha,e propounded. /his aspect of his
thin.ing, too, e*erted a po+erful influence on the ienna circle. But the -uestion of the relations
beteen Elemente is clearly no less important, despite the fact that it has recei,ed so little detailed
consideration. ;t is important not only because Mach +as almost certainly the first to ha,e addressed
the problem of pro,iding such a theory +ithout appeal to e*traneous and ambiguous or une*plained
notions li.e that of causality. ;t is important further because some of his most telling insights, not
least those +hich are of rele,ance to the problem of comple*&perception, are directed precisely
to+ards the pro5ect of a general theory of relations of the gi,en sort.

.. Mach on /ariation
4hat, then, is Mach1s theory of the relations bet+een Elemente@ /o ans+er this -uestion +e must
consider a further crucial notion underlying his approach, +hich also has its counterpart in the
theories of the Brentano school: the notion of "ariation.
/hat science proceeds by identifying constancies and regularities in +hat is in flu* in reality +as a
commonplace long before the +ritings of Mach. )ne thin.s immediately of the +ritings on method
of Fohn Stuart Mill. But Mach ga,e this conception an important t+ist. /he simple & and on
reflection some+hat simplistic & opposition bet+een +hat is constant and +hat is ,ariable, is
replaced in Mach1s theory by the concept of an all-per"ading and continuous "ariation. /hus the
notion of scientific la+s as simple generalisations has no place +ithin his theory. /he ob5ect of his
researches is al+ays the continuous transition from one mosiac of ordered connections to another.
?is stri.ingly elegant and original idea +as that all connections bet+een elements and all constancy
can be understood entirely in terms of the idea of continuous transition or ,ariation.
Science, according to Mach, ta.es as its starting point the orderings of phenomena gi,en in
e*perience and assigns appropriate numerical ,alues to these phenomena in +ays +hich reflect their
dimensions of ,ariability:

/he method of change or ,ariation presents us +ith li.e cases of facts containing components that
are partly the same and partly different. ;t is only by comparing different cases of refracted light at
changing angles of incidence that the common factor, the constancy of the refracti,e inde*, is
disclosed. 0nd only by comparing the refractions of light of different colours does the difference, the
ine-uality of the indices of refraction, arrest the attention. Aomparison based on change leads the
mind simultaneously to the highest abstractions and to the finest distinctions. (1#">, p. $'#, 2ng. p.
$67f.)
Science, he argued, +or.s by assigning -uantitati,e ,alues to the ,ariables in,ol,ed, so that
scientific la+s can be concei,ed as 1functional1 or 1tabular1 descriptions of such continuous
transitions.
Mach1s thesis concerning continuous ,ariation can be understood on at least fi,e distinct le,els:
& ;t is first of all a thesis about the +ay the +orld (i.e. the totality of elements) is.
& ;t is secondly a thesis about ho+, +ithin this totality, science actually proceeds or de,elops, a thesis
about the 1economical1 ordering acti,ities of scientists.
& ;t is thirdly a thesis about the +ay science ought to proceed: a more ade-uate grasp of the notion of
continuous ,ariation +ould, Mach claims, ma.e science more efficient (more economical).
& ;t is fourthly a thesis about the continuity of transitions bet+een e,eryday e*perience as
traditionally and habitually understood and the constructions of scientific theories.
& 0nd finally it is a thesis about the interplay bet+een sense e*perience & +hich is, in a certain sense,
the only true reality & and those indirect, accessory ad5uncts to this e*perience +hich are scientific
theories.
Eo+ there is one aspect of Mach1s thin.ing here to +hich considerable attention has been paid in
subse-uent literature in the philosophy of science. Mach1s functional descriptions & +hich almost
al+ays ta.e the form of differential e-uations & in,ol,e no reference to e*trinsic notions such as
causality, space and time. /he scientist rather implicitly defines the ob5ects of his research in the ,ery
formulation of his e-uations, and particularly in his choice of ,ariables. ;n this respect Mach can
properly be said to ha,e anticipated certain aspects of the con,entionalist and operationalist
accounts of the nature of science. But Mach +as not simply a con,entionalist. For the ordering
acti,ities of scientists, their dri,e to produce economical orderings of functional descriptions, has as
its indispensable correlate in the Machian frame+or. the ordered transitions and relations e*hibited
by the phenomena themsel,es.

0. Mach on 1e#endence
0 first pro,isional formulation of Mach1s account of the relation of dependence might run as
follo+s: t+o ,ariables (continuously ,ariable -uantities) are dependent if and only if the ,ariation in
one is reflected in a simultaneous ,ariation in the other. )ne phenomenon is dependent on another
precisely +hen there is a regular co,ariation of the t+o. ;ndependence, on the other hand, is
signalled by the absence of any regular co,ariation. 4here tabular descriptions reflect constant
co,ariation, there +e ha,e dependence amongst the phenomena represented, and thus the proper
e*pression of relations of dependence is in functional e-uations.
($>)

;t hardly needs pointing out that the notion of necessity, including the spurious necessity in,ol,ed in
so&called relations of causality, is entirely e*cluded from this frame+or.. /he ,ery opposition
bet+een +hat is necessary and +hat is contingent dissol,es in the face of Mach1s commitment to an
all&per,ading and continuous ,ariation.
Mach1s notion of dependence is related in the first place to continuous qualitati"e co,ariation, but it
is quantitati"e ,ariation +hose ordering and presentation is the primary function of science. Science
must be -uantitati,e, Mach holds, if it is to be useful (adapti,e) at all. )nly through numerical
e-uations can +e ma.e predictions +hich ta.e us beyond the merely -ualitati,e (i.e. beyond that
+hich, according to Mach, +e .no+ already).

Juantitati,e dependence is a particular, more simple case of -ualitati,e dependence... ;n the case of
-uantitati,e dependence +hat +e find is a sur,eyable, intuiti,e continuum of cases, +hile in the case
of -ualitati,e dependence it is al+ays only necessary to consider a number of indi,idual cases by
themsel,es. ((1"1(), p. $7%, -uoted by Schul<.i, p. 1'".)
2,en +hen +e ha,e to do +ith -ualities (colours, tones) -uantitati,e features of these are a,ailable.
Alassification here is so simple a tas. that it barely ma.es itself noticeable and e,en in the case of
infinitely fine gradations, of a continuum of facts, the number system already lies ready to follo+ as
far as is necessary. ((1#">), p. %6#f., Schul<.i, p. 1>1)

Mach stresses further that dependence & or 1constancy C&est+ndigkeitD of co,ariation1 & is al+ays
relati,e to the perspecti,e adopted by the in,estigator or theorist.
($()
Eot all of +hat is continuously
in flu* can of course be grasped in any one functional description or e-uation. /he scientist rather
selects +hat is to be represented from this or that point of ,ie+. Scientific theories, the constantly
adapti,e products of the ordering acti,ities of scientists, set out the connections bet+een those
functional descriptions +hich are re,ealed by such a process of selection. /he latter pic.s out, for
reasons of his o+n and appealing to con,enience, analogy, habit, and so on, certain specific relata,
and sets other relata out of account by restricting the range of ,ariation +hich he +ill allo+ for
consideration. /hus the gas e-uation p",T K constant holds 1only for a gaseous body of in,ariable
mass for +hich pressure, ,olume and temperature ha,e the same ,alues in all its parts and pro,ided
the conditions are distant enough from li-uefaction.1 ((1"1(), p. %%', 2ng. p. 6'6f.) /he la+ of
refraction sin/sin 1is narro+ed by being related to a definite pair of homogeneous substances at a
definite temperature and pressure, as +ell as to the absence of internal differences of electrical or
magnetic potential.1 (loc. cit)
($#)

;t is the principal thesis of this paper that the theory of dependence in terms of constant co,ariation
is inade-uate, a thesis +e shall attempt to demonstrate in relation to the specific problems associated
+ith our perception of +hat is comple*. First, ho+e,er, +e must return to the treatment of
dependence by Brentano1s successors.

2. /ariation and 1e#endence in the Brentano Tradition
/he +ritings of Brentano1s pupils on ,ariation and dependence are concerned primarily not, as in
Mach1s case, +ith -uantitati,e and continuous ,arationG their employment of the notion is to a much
lesser e*tent concentrated around phenomena +hich fall +ithin the pro,ince of numerical science.
($")
/hat there are, nonetheless, parallels +ith Mach1s treatment, both of ,ariation and of dependence,
becomes clear +hen +e loo. at the first important published treatment of dependence in the
Brentano tradition & Stumpf1s -ber den psychologischen .rsprung der /aum"orstellung & +hich
deals centrally, li.e Mach1s paper of 1#>', +ith problems associated +ith the structures of ,isual
perception.
(67)

0ll presentations of colour in our e*perience, all 1colour& contents1, to use Stumpf1s term, are bound
up +ith presentations of ,isual e*tent (+ith +hat +e might call 1e*tension&contents1).
(61)
4hat is the
nature of the relation bet+een colour&contents and e*tension&contents@ /his relation cannot, Stumpf
argues, be merely one of regular but contingent association & li.e, say, the regular association of
13oethe1 and 1Schiller1 in the minds of 3erman schoolboys. For ho+e,er +e attempt to ,ary colour&
and e*tension& contents in imagination, in memory or in present e*perience, along all concei,able
dimensions, +e disco,er that it is impossible to separate the t+o. Systematic ,ariation, Stumpf
argues, re,eals that the connection of contents of the t+o gi,en types is a necessary connection & of
precisely the .ind to +hich appeal +as made by Mach, en passant, in his paper of 1#>'. Aolour&
contents and e*tension&contents are such that, as a matter of necessity, they cannot occur in isolation
from each other. 4ithin the -uantitati,e, functional frame+or. adopted by Mach in his later +ritings
all such necessary connection is in effect eradicated (or perhaps +e should say that its necessity is
simply ignored). ;t +ould seem that its recognition is made possible only on the basis precisely of
qualitati"e in,estigations of the type underta.en by the Brentanists, in,estigations in +hich further
the ontological and the genetic dimensions are .ept clearly separate.
(6$)

/he implications of this theory of necessary connection are manifold. 0s Stumpf points out, from
the necessity of the connection bet+een colour& and e*tension&contents it follo+s that it is
misleading to concei,e these as separate contents at all: each is, rather, something that is in itself
intrinsically partial or incomplete, is +hat Stumpf calls a Teilinhalt. 2ach such partial content can
e*ist only to the e*tent that it is supplemented, in the conte*t of a larger +hole, by one or more
further partial contents of a complementary sort.
Teilinhalte & +hich play a role similar to that of distincti,e features in phonology & are, +e might say,
sub&atomic units of e*perience. /heir recognition thereby signifies a brea. +ith atomistic
psychology that is no less radical than is the recognition of sui generis psychological comple*es &
for it implies that the simplistic notion of atomicity, deri,ed as it +as from the corpuscular theories
of the Ee+tonian era, cannot ser,e +ithin psychology as an ade-uate basis e,en for the treatment of
simple sensations.
/he t+o&sided relation of necessary connection bet+een colour&content and e*tension&content is
called by Stumpf a relation of mutual dependence, and +e note that dependence relations bet+een
Teilinhalte of the gi,en sorts ha,e been isolated by Stumpf precisely by a method +hich in,ol,es
appeal to a notion of ,ariation related to -ualitati,e orderings manifested in e*perience. /he same
1method of ,ariation1 is used by Stumpf also in relation to other .inds of psychic contents to re,eal
+hole families of species of Teilinhalte and t+o& or n&sided relations of mutual dependence bet+een
them.
;t is at this point that +e see the connection bet+een the t+o .ey notions of dependence and
,ariation as these are concei,ed +ithin the Brentano tradition. /he +or. of ?usserl directly
continues that of Stumpf, elaborating Stumpf1s method of systematic ,ariation in such a +ay that it
could be applied, in principle, beyond the purely psychological sphere. ?usserl and his immediate
follo+ers e*tended the method still further, to re,eal hierarchies of dependence relations not merely
in relation to perceptual phenomena but also in other, highly disparate dimensions of e*perienced
reality.
(66)


13. )n the $once#t of Su!stance
!erhaps the most interesting parallels bet+een the respecti,e treatments of dependence and ,ariation
of Mach and of the Brentanists are re,ealed in their analyses of the traditional concept of substance.
For Mach, as +e ha,e seen, there is 1but one sort of constancy, +hich embraces all forms, namely
constancy of connection1.
(6%)
/his applies particularly to the concept of substance. Substances
(bodies) are not that +hich is identical through change, they are not that +hich endures. /hey are,
rather,

no more than bundles of reactions connected in a la+&go,erned fashion. /he same is true of
processes of e,ery sort...+a,es and +ater +hich +e follo+ +ith the eye and +ith the sense of
touch..., shoc.&+a,es in the air +hich +e hear and can only ma.e ,isible by artificial means...,
electric currents +hich can be follo+ed in artificially produced reactions. 4hat is constant is al+ays
and only the la+&go,erned connection bet+een reactions. This is the critically purified concept of
substance hich science puts in the place of the "ulgar concept. (Mach, Eoti<buch, p. 1##, as
-uoted by Schul<.i (1"#7), p. ##, our emphasisG cf. Iingler (1"$%), p. 17>.)
/hus it is constancy of connection +hich is at the heart of the Machian concept of substance: 1+e
term substance +hat is conditionally constant1 (1"76, p. $'>, 2ng. p. 6$#), and the 1constant
connection bet+een reactions e*pounded in the propositions of physics represents the highest degree
of substantiality that en-uiry has thus far been able to re,eal.1 ((1"1(), p. 16%, 2ng., p. "")
(6')

Mach1s ,ie+s thereby signify also a re5ection of the traditional conception of substance as a substrate
of properties or bearer of accidents. Eo+ this conception is still ,ery much defended by Brentano,
(6>)
but Meinong, ?usserl and Stumpf each puts for+ard ,ie+s in opposition to that of Brentano +hich
constitute a re5ection of the traditional notion e*actly parallel to that of Mach. 0 substance is, on this
,ie+, 5ust a +hole consisting of parts standing in relations of dependence, and manifesting constant
and ,ariable dimensions. /hus as Meinong puts it:

/he nature of substance is to be sought in the fact that it is a comple* of, so to spea., mutually
dependent Caufeinander angeiesenenD properties. (Meinong 1"7>, p. $()
0nd as Stumpf & +ho had earlier been a colleague of Mach1s in !rague & +rites in the
Erkenntnislehre (sec. 6.(): substance is a unity of interdependent parts each of +hich has its o+n
dimension of ,ariation.
(6()
)r, as he formulates the matter in his autobiography:
;n the relation bet+een colour and e*tent ; thought ; could see (and still thin. so) a stri.ing e*ample
of or analogy +ith the relation +hich is ta.en to obtain bet+een the properties of substance in
metaphysics. (Stumpf 1"$%, p. #)
Hreibig, a follo+er of Meinong, e,en goes so far as to identify the thing as a specific sort of 3estalt
-uality: 10 thing is gi,en in perception as the 3estalt -uality of a sum of percei,ed characters1 (1"7",
p. 11'). /he perception of such a -uality becomes associated +ith an e*istential 5udgment +hich
ascribes e*ternal reality to that +hich is percei,ed. 10ll other definitions of the thing are purely
metaphysical in nature and alien to an empirical treatment of the problem.1
(6#)
Stumpf1s student Hurt
=e+in ta.es this idea one step further and sees the mind or ego as a mere comple* of interdependent
parts, of 1strong1 and 1+ea.1 3estalten, +hich are in part in communication +ith each other, in part
such as to disclose no genuine unity at all.
(6")


11. )n the 4ature of 1e#endence
4hat, then, is dependence@ For the Brentanists the relation of dependence is a relation of real
necessity, a reflection of structural la+s concerning the necessary co&e*istence of ob5ects. /he
necessity in,ol,ed is sui generisG it is neither physical (causal) nor logical (conceptual). ;t is a
necessity of a type +hich is illustrated not merely by the relation bet+een colour and e*tension or
bet+een the distincti,e features of a phoneme, but also, for e*ample, by the relation bet+een a
promise, on the one hand, and a mutually correlated claim and obligation on the other (the former
cannot, as a mattter of necessity, e*ist +ithout the latter). ;n fact the concept of necessary
dependence is a formal concept, a concept +hich is li.e the concepts of logic in that it can be
applied in principle to all matters, +hate,er their -ualitati,e determinations. ;t differs from the
concepts of formal logic, ho+e,er, in being ontologicalG it is a concept of formal ontology or, as
Meinong +ould put it, of the formal 1theory of ob5ects1.
;n regard to the Machian theory of necessity +e can note first of all that Mach typically opposes
logical to physical necessity and see.s to reduce the latter to the former. Aloser inspection re,eals,
ho+e,er, that by 1logical necessity1 he means only psychological necessity, a notion he e*plicates in
terms of al+ays defeasible e*pectations:

/here is only logical necessity: if certain properties hold of a fact C0ukommenD... then ; cannot
simultaneously ignore this. /hat they hold is simply an e*periential fact. /here is no such thing as
physical necessity. ((1#">), p. %6(G cf. Musil, p. #1f., 2ng. p. '#f.)
/he agreement of concepts +ith one another is a logically necessary re-uirement, and this logical
necessity is also the only necessity of +hich +e ha,e .no+ledge. /he belief in a necessity in nature
arises only +here our concepts are closely enough adapted to nature to ensure a correspondence
bet+een logical inference and fact. But the assumption of an ade-uate adaptation of our ideas can be
refuted at any moment by e*perience. ((1"7%), p. $#7G 2ng., p. 61#)

;n late editions of the Mechanics, Mach replies to ?usserl1s criticism that the principle of the
economy of thought is unable ade-uately to comprehend the nature of logical necessity. /he account
of the economy of thought has to be supplemented, ?usserl had argued, by an account of the role of
formal concepts. Mach replies as follo+s:
0s a natural scientist ; am accustomed to in,estigating indi,idual -uestions... and to mo,e from
these to+ards more general -uestions. ; adhered to this custom in in,estigating the genesis of
physical .no+ledge. ; +as obliged to proceed in this +ay because a general theory of theories +as a
tas. +hich +as beyond me L ; therefore concentrated on indi,idual phenomena: the adaptation of
thoughts to facts and to one another, thought economy, comparison, thought e*periments, constancy
and continuity of thought, and so on. ; found it both profitable and sobering to consider ordinary
thought and all science as a biological and organic phenomenon +ith logical thought as an ideal
limit case.
But he goes on:
; +ould not +ant to doubt for a minute that in,estigation can begin at either end. 0nd, as this ma.es
clear, ; am perfectly capable of distinguishing bet+een logical and psychological -uestions, a
distinction ; thin. e,eryone is capable of ma.ing +ho is interested in the light psychology amongst
other things can thro+ on logical processes. Someone +ho has once loo.ed carefully at the logical
analysis of +hat Ee+ton says in my Mechanics +ill find it difficult to reproach me +ith the attempt
to run together blind, natural thought and logical thought. 2,en if +e ha,e the complete logical
analysis of all sciences before us, the biological and psychological in,estigation of their genesis...
+ould still be neededG although this +ould not e*clude submitting the latter in its turn to logical
analysis. ((1"7%), p. '6(G 2ng., p. '"$ff.)
/hus Mach is apparently prepared to concede that the t+o approaches & the logical and the
biological/psychological & are complementary and do not at all contradict one another. ;f, ho+e,er,
+e loo. at Mach1s deser,edly famous 1logical1 analyses of Ee+ton, then +hat +e find is in fact
conceptual criticism & albeit of the highest order
(%7)
& not any recognition of the role of formal
concepts, +hether logical or ontological.
0 letter from ?usserl to Mach on receipt of his reply puts the main point clearly: the different formal
concepts & proposition, implication, some, all, cardinal number, etc. & cannot be ta.en to be
1e*pressions of empirical generalities1, they cannot be e*plained by the genetic psychology of
5udging, cognising, etc., nor by reference to the economy of thought, for any such attempted
e*planation +ould be circular.
(%1)

/here is in fact a fundamental unclarity in the concept of necessity that is employed by Mach, and
thus +e can anticipate a corresponding unclarity about +hat precisely dependence is, an unclarity
+hich emerges most pointedly in Mach1s t+o papers & replies to !lanc. and Stumpf & of (1"17).
Iependences are, he says, 1real1, 1gi,en1G physical dependences differ from psychological
dependences in being more 1intrinsic1 CinnigD, thereby yielding us our concepts of matter. 0ll +ell
and good, as intuitions go. But Mach +as unable to produce a theory of the different types of
dependence +hich could do 5ustice to intuitions of this sort. ),erimpressed by the relati,ity of a
restricted range of e*amples of dependence concei,ed as more or less constant co,ariation, Mach
came to see the latter as an e*hausti,e category +hose inner structure is not capable of being further
penetrated by science.
4e ha,e mentioned already that ?usserl generalised Stumpf1s theory of co,ariation beyond the
sphere of psychic contents. ?usserl +ent beyond Stumpf first of all in recognising relations of one&
sided in addition to those of mutual dependence. ;n this he +as embracing an idea already de,eloped
by Brentano in his theory of the types of psychic phenomena in the #eskripti"e 1sychologie and
before him by 0ristotle in the theory of indi,idual accidents. Brentano1s o+n e*amples of one&sided
dependence are couched in the terminology of one&sided separability: a 5udgment cannot e*ist in
separation from an associated presentationG a phenomenon of preference or a,ersion cannot e*ist in
separation from an associated 5udgment, and so on. )ther sorts of e*amples of one& sided
dependence might be: the dependence of current or charge upon a conductorG of magnetic attraction
on magnetised bodyG of action upon agentG of a depression o,er the 0tlantic upon molecules of airG
and so on. But all of these e*amples & and certainly all the e*amples treated by Brentano (and by
Stumpf) & concern ob5ects e*isting simultaneously. Brentano1s theory is in this sense too narro+.
?usserl +ent further than both Brentano and Stumpf, secondly, in admitting trans&temporal
dependence relations.
(%$)
Eo+, as +e ha,e seen, it +as 2hrenfels in 89ber 13estalt-ualit:ten18 +ho
first too. the notion of dependence as this +as to be found in Brentano and Stumpf and applied it to
e*amples of ob5ects of sense that are spread out in time and to ob5ects of sense that do not e*ist
simultaneously or at an instant. ;n this +ay he +as able to produce the first truly general theory of
the perception of comple*es, embracing both ,isual and (for e*ample) aural comple*es, both static
and dynamic comple*es, and also hybrid comple*es of ,arious .inds.
(%6)

;t +as in the end ho+e,er ?usserl, in the 6rd 2ogical 3n"estigation,
(%%)
+ho succeeded in bringing
together all of these strands & one&sided and mutual dependence and independence & +ithin the
frame+or. of a single theory. Moreo,er, it +as ?usserl +ho managed to free the theory of
dependence relations from the limitation to psychological e*amples (and to psychologically
moti,ated criteria of dependence) and to de,elop the theory as a formal ontology applicable to all
material ,arieties of ob5ects, e*isting both simultaneously and across time. ?usserl did not, ho+e,er,
ignore the -uestion of the relation bet+een this formal ontology and the field of psychological
e*amples in +hich it has its roots. ;ndeed his 2ogical 3n"estigations can be said to sho+ the true
indispensability of both mutual and one&sided dependence to the ade-uate understanding of the
structures of mental phenomena, as also of the phenomena of language.
But ho+ does this lea,e Mach@ 3i,en his notion of dependence as 1logically necessary1 constant
co,ariation, Mach, it is clear, cannot accept e,en the possibility of one&sided dependence. /+o or
more ,ariables can either ,ary simultaneously together, in +hich case, according to Mach, +e ha,e
mutual dependence. )r they can fail to ,ary together, in +hich case there is no dependence at all. 0
third alternati,e simply fails to present itself +ithin the tabular or functional conception of scientific
la+s defended by Mach & and, +e might add, by almost all subse-uent philosophers of science. 0ll
purported e*amples of one&sided dependence must therefore be re5ected by these philosophers as
spurious, to be e*plained a+ay by a sufficiently deep analysis or reduction of the phenomena in
-uestion.
0nd +hile the recognition of a relation of necessary connection bet+een characteristic sensation and
foundation +as, as +e ha,e seen, clearly e*pressed in Mach1s 1#>' paper, e,en at that stage, that is
to say before the fully +or.ed&out theory of Elemente, it is clear that Mach +as una+are of the
peculiarity of relations of one&sided dependence. 4ithin the terms of Mach1s official theory of
dependence relations the insight into this peculiarity simply cannot find e*pression. Misled by the
fact that his ,ie+ of dependence as constant co,ariation is plausible for the bul. of the e*amples he
treats (e.g. the gas la+s
(%')
), Mach adopts a theoretical frame+or. +hich cannot permit the proper
formulation of other sorts of e*amples, and he thereby misses distinctions +hich e,en he +ould
other+ise ha,e to admit as being crucial.
!erhaps the most important of these & to +hich +e dra+ attention only in passing & +as dealt +ith
most succinctly by Hurt =e+in. ;t is the distinction bet+een +hat might be called successi"e and
longitudinal causality. /hus consider a sentence such as 1if the temperature of a gas is raised, then it
+ill e*pand or its pressure +ill increase)1:
/he essential meaning of such an assertion is this: e,ents a and b are necessarily dependent
moments of a single unified occurrence. /he mathematical formula states the -uantitati,e relations
in,ol,ed in the occurrence. 0lready in such cases the dependent moments of the occurrence are
moments that obtain temporally side by side.
/he part&processes in -uestion, then, are to be understood as being related not by temporal
succession as 1cause1 and 1effect1, but rather in such a +ay that they are 1brought into reciprocal
functional dependence throughout the longitudinal section of the occurrence in -uestion1. (=e+in
1"$(, p. 67') /+o -uite different sorts of dimension in nature are in,ol,ed in these t+o different
forms of causality: Mach is able to gi,e a clear account of neither.

1". E#ilogue
/he implications of Mach1s commitment to a uni,ersal mutual dependence are far&reaching. ;n
relation to the concept of time, for e*ample, it leads to a position that is difficult to distinguish from
a Spino<istic pantheism, a ,ie+ of the +orld +hich +ould ma.e e,erything dependent on e,erything
else (the night, in +hich all co+s are blac.). 0s Musil +rites, e*pounding Mach1s theory:


space and time are themsel,es concepts for certain connections bet+een phenomena: the oscillations
of a pendulum, for e*ample, ta.e place in time only if its e*cursion depends on the position of the
earth and so here the measurement of time amounts to measurement of angles or lengths of arcs. ;f
+e imagine the natural course of different e,ents represented by e-uations in,ol,ing time, then time
may be eliminated from these e-uations (for e*ample, an e*cess of temperature may be determined
by space tra,ersed by the falling body)G the phenomena then appear simply as dependent on one
another. ;t is therefore superfluous to emphasise time and space, since temporal and spatial relations
merely reduce to dependences bet+een the phenomena. /hus the e-uations of physics refer to a ,ery
general connection. For to be a function of time no+ means to be dependent on certain spatial
positionsG and that all spatial positions are functions of time means that from the point of ,ie+ of the
cosmos all spatial positions depend on one anotherG but since spatial positions can only be
recognised by reference to states +e can also say that all states depend on one another. ;n our ideas
of time, then, the profoundest and most uni,ersal connection of things finds e*pression. /he same is
true of our ideas of space, for e,ery motion of a body H is a motion to+ards other bodies 0, B, A...,
and e,en if one says that a body preser,es unchanged its direction and ,elocity in space this contains
a reference to the need to ta.e into account the +hole +orld. (Musil 1"7#, p. ($, 2ng., p. '$)
4e ha,e -uoted Musil at such length, first of all in order to dra+ attention to the fact that our
criticisms of Mach, here, are ,ery much Musilian in spirit. But also because of the candour +ith
+hich Musil e*presses the implications of Mach1s ,ie+s. /he theory of time presented in this
passage carries the implication that Mach could not introduce a notion of one&sided dependence into
his system by the bac. door, by appealing to trans-temporal ,ariation, such that a later ,ariation
+ould be non&reciprocally dependent upon an earlier. ;n fact, Mach identifies all attempts to state a
dependence relation across time +ith attempts to sa,e the banished notion of causality. But this
signifies that the three dimensions of the temporal and the atemporal, of the possible and the
necessary, and of the causal and the non&causal are, in effect, confounded +ithin Mach1s functional
frame+or., +here the more careful approach of 2hrenfels and of the other Brentanians had made it
possible to .eep them apart.
)nly at one point does Mach recognise, in passing, that the commitment to uni,ersal mutual
dependence does not e*haust all purely analytic possibilities. 1But +e do not1, he says, 1need to see
any metaphysical problem in this1 ((1"7%), p. '%#G 2ng. p. 6'1). ?ere as else+here his faith lies in
the possibility that +hen all inter,ening ,ariables are spelled out & e.g. bet+een friction and heat &
+e shall be left +ith a system e*pressible entirely in terms of functional e-uations. But he is here
directly contradicting his o+n principle that +hat is gi,en in e*perience should be ta.en at face
,alue. 0s Musil points out (op. cit., p. ((, 2ng. p. ''), the direct generation of heat through friction
does not correspond to any direct generation in the opposite direction. /he directionality or
irre,ersibility of certain relations of dependence is gi,en in e*perience. ;t is only in ,irtue of an
impo,erished theory of dependence that Mach can o,erloo. this.

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Endnotes
1. Be,ised and e*panded 2nglish ,ersion of 8Mach und 2hrenfels: 9ber 3estalt-ualit:ten und das
!roblem der 0bh:ngig.eit8, in B. Fabian, ed., =hristian "on Ehrenfels. 2eben und (erk?
0msterdam: Bodopi, 1"#', #'&111.
$. Eote that, precisely spea.ing, Brentano and his students ma.e up not a school but a loose
association, a fact mar.ed in +hat follo+s by our tal.ing of 1the Brentano tradition1, 1Brentano and
his heirs1, etc. )n the influence of this tradition: see Smith, ed. 1"#$. )n its unifying philosophical
features, see Mulligan (1"#7).
6. Eote, ho+e,er, Stumpf1s remar. (1"6"/%7, ;, p. $%6f.) to the effect that the disco,eries of the
3estalt psychologists ha,e led to false and e*aggerated accusations that nineteenth century
psychology +as purely summati,e or atomistic. /he assumption holds good, he points out, only in
certain cases: e.g. /aine and the 2nglish associationist psychologists. ;t is not true of e.g. =ot<e and
Fames.
%. 1##>, p. 1#, 2ng. trans., p. $7.
'. 0s 3usta, Bergmann points out, Mach belongs +ith Meinong & he could ha,e mentioned all
Brentano1s heirs & to the first group of philosophers +ho too. seriously 1the introspecti,e
irreducibility1 of certain 1relational characters1 ((1"'7), p. ()
>. Af. Meinong (1">'), p. (%. Mach does not mention the 1#>' paper by name.
(. 0s Spino<a (Ethics, ;;;, !roposition $, Scholium) puts it: 1Eo one has yet determined +hat the
body is capable of... For no one has yet come to .no+ so e*actly the structure CfabricaD of the body
that he could e*plain all its functions.1
#. /he passage in -uestion is discussed in Becher 1"11, pp. $6# ff., +ho points to the importance of
Mach1s 1hypothesis of identical accompanying phenomena1 for the treatment of the problem of mind
and body. Becher points out also ho+e,er that this hypothesis goes beyond +hat is gi,en in
e*perience. See also Heiler 1"#$, p. $'', +ho sees in the hypothesis an anticipation of HRhler1s
isomorphism theory.
". /his is in contrast to ?usserl in the 1hilosophie der Arithmetik of 1#"1, +hose ,ie+s in this
respect are too often o,erhastily identified +ith those of 2hrenfels. See the discussion in T 6 of the
essay by Smith, abo,e.
17. )n the importance of the peculiarities of temporal 3estalten for the early +or. of the Berlin
school see 0sh 1"#$, pp. $">f.
11. Aonsider also the follo+ing passage, +hich illustrates clearly the connection bet+een ner,ous
quale and bodily mo,ement:
/o the three optical space&coordinates, ,i<., to the sensations of height, breadth, and depth, corresponds...simply a three&fold inner,ation, +hich turns the eyes to the right or
to the left, raises or lo+ers them, and causes them to con,erge , according to the respecti,e needs of the case...4hether +e regard the inner,ation itself as the space&sensation,
or +hether +e concei,e the space&sensation as ulterior to the inner,ation CisD a -uestion neither easy nor necessary to decide. (1##>, p. ((f., 2ng. p. #1)

1$. ;n his t+o papers of (1"17), particularly +here he is replying to criticisms of e.g. Stumpf, +e do encounter references to an 1innigste 0usammenhang1, a notion +hich may
be descended from the earlier notion of a 1necessary connection1, but these references play no effecti,e role +ithin Mach1s later theory. ;n particular, Mach ma.es it clear in
these papers that such connections are merely per,asi,e and ,ery fre-uent, and that they are 1necessary1 e*clusi,ely in this sense (i.e. not necessary at all).

16. /he Munich psychologist Aornelius, in his o+n paper 89ber 13estalt-ualit:ten18 of 1"77, criticises both 2hrenfels and Mach for ha,ing dra+n the +rong inferences from
the e*istence of percei,ed similarity. 2hrenfels +as +rong, he held, for ha,ing concei,ed the 3estalt -uality as a 1positi,e content of presentation1 superadded to our
perception of +hat is gi,en on the le,el of sensation. 0nd Mach +as +rong for ha,ing missed the fact that feelings, too, +hether muscular or non&muscular, are themsel,es
,arieties of 3estalt -ualities. For Aornelius, tal. of 3estalt -ualities is a mere roundabout +ay of referring to similarity of comple*es of sensations, +hich should simply be
accepted as a primiti,e phenomenon.

1%. )f course more presentations +ill be in,ol,ed also in ,irtue of the +or.ings of memory, +hich are re-uired if the 3estalt& presentation is to be constituted at allG but +e
shall lea,e this matter aside in +hat follo+s since it bears no relation to our principal concerns.

1'. /hat there are t+o distinct dimensions here is seen if +e consider, for e*ample, the relation bet+een a child and his mother (or bet+een 3od and ?is Areation). /he child
is genetically dependent upon its mother, could not ha,e begun to e!ist unless the mother e*isted. But the the child is clearly not dependent for its continuing to e*ist upon the
continued e*istence of its mother. See ;ngarden (1">%/>') for the definiti,e philosophical treatment of this distinction.

1>. Boughly: a is one&sidedly dependent on b if and only if a is such that, as a matter of necessity, it cannot e*ist unless b e*ists but not con,ersely. a is t+o&sidedly
(mutually) dependent on b if and only if a and b are necessarily such that neither can e*ist +ithout the other. Alearly mutual dependence can hold also in relation to any
plurality of ob5ects, ho+e,er large. See Smith, ed. 1"#$ for further details. ;n the 3erman ,ersion of this paper, +here +e concentrated rather on the genetic -uestion, it +as
suggested erroneously that 2hrenfels did not use the notion of one&sided dependence.

1(. See T ' of the paper by Smith, abo,e. ;nterestingly 2hrenfels, in his paper on 3estalt -ualities of 1"6$, published in 1"6(, allies his o+n earlier +or. +ith that of the
production theorists, though this retrospecti,e interpretation seems not to be supported by the te*t of the paper of 1#"7.

1#. Af., again, Smith, ed. 1"#$, esp. the diagram on p. %#$.

1". See e.g. Feyerabend (1"#7), pp. $>$&>#.

$7. Eote that many, if not all, of Mach1s inaugurating concepts are ordinal in nature: that is, they ha,e to do +ith intensi"e magnitudes. See Bradley (1"(1), ch. ;;, on
8Metrical Aoncepts8.

$1. See e.g. Mach (1#">), p. %'$f., (1"1(), pp. %%>, %%"f., 2ng. pp. . Aompare Brentano (1">#), p. '#, and also the follo+ing passage from ?usserl:

Iepth CTiefsinnD is a mar. of chaos +hich genuine science aims to transform into a cosmos, into a simple, completely clear, analysed order. 3enuine science .no+s no depth
as far as its actual theory e*tends. 2,ery piece of accomplished science is a +hole made up of steps of thought each of +hich is immediately e,ident & and hence not at all
1deep1. Iepth is a matter of +isdom, conceptual uni,ocity and clarity a matter of rigorous theory. ((1"11), p. 1%% of the translation)

$$. 4ittgenstein (1"'6), ;;, *i,.

$6. Aompare also the follo+ing discussion by HRhler of the 1pu<<le1 of e*ternal perception:

although allegedly founded on processes in my interior, such percepts as tree, house, cloud, moon and thousands of others are clearly locali<ed outside of me... )nly a fe+
authors, mostly men of great phenomenological po+er, ha,e been able to recogni<e the apparent pu<<le as +hat it really is: a most unfortunate pseudoproblem produced by
inconsistent thin.ing. Such men +ere 2. ?ering, the physiologist, and 2. Mach, the physicist and philosophy. (HRhler 1"6#, pp. 1$>f.)

?ering1s important role in the early de,elopment of 3estalt psychology, abo,e all in the matter of e*perimental approach, has been stressed by 0sh (1"#$, pp. #(&17#). See
especially ?ering1s <utlines of a Theory of the 2ight 7ense of (1"7'). ?ering1s +or. contains considerations of the relationship of psychology and physiology and of the
physiological correlates of perception related in important +ays to those of HRhler 1"$7.

$%. See ?. =Qbbe1s 8!ositi,ismus und !h:nomenologie8 of 1">7, an e*cellent account of the phenomenology of the Analysis of 7ensations. See also Sommer (1"#')

$'. Af. Hraus1s remar.s in Brentano (1"$'), ,ol.;, p. *,ii, and, for a fuller treatment, Brentano1s #eskripti"e 1sychologie (1"#$). )n the parallels bet+een the Brentanian
opposition bet+een descripti,e and genetic psychology and the synchronic/diachronic opposition of de Saussure, see S. Baynaud (1"#$).

$>. Aompare the papers of 3relling and )ppenheim and the discussion by Simons in Smith (ed.), Foundations of Gestalt Theory.